Reply:

Reply to this parliamentary question has been logged with the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence.

 

Reply:

The SSA through its National Communications provides the following as measures and steps to ensure that Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Security or cyber security in organs of state is maintained.

Provision of ICT Security Solutions and services to organs of state for protecting and securing electronic systems:

Rendering periodic and on-demand Information Assurance services and continuous monitoring services to clients and identified Critical Information Infrastructure:

• • Conducting technical Vulnerability and Risk assessments to identify and report on common critical vulnerabilities affecting Organs of state.
  • Continuous monitoring of ICT Security network infrastructures and systems of Organs of state in order to provide proactive alerts and warnings that help to protect the systems before harm.
  • Provision of Incident response to compromised systems of organs of state to mitigate risks and deploy measures to avoid recurrence of ICT security and Cyber-attacks and incidents.
  • Provision of cyber security awareness.

SSA National Communications is also busy with the review of the Cyber Security Strategy to improve the security and resilience of national infrastructures and services. The strategy establishes a range of national objectives and priorities that should be achieved in a specific timeframe.

The review/finalisation of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill:

• to define offences and impose penalties that have a bearing on cybercrime
• to criminalise the distribution of data messages that are harmful
• to provide for interim protection order
• to further regulate jurisdiction in respect of cybercrimes
• to further regulate the powers to investigate cybercrimes
• to further regulate aspects relating to mutual assistance in respect of the investigation of cybercrime
• to provide for the establishment of a 24/7 Point of Contact
• to further provide for the proof of certain facts by affidavit
• to impose obligations on electronic communications service providers and financial institutions to assist in the investigation of cybercrimes
• to report cybercrimes
• to provide for the establishment of structures to promote cybersecurity and capacity building
• to regulate the identification and declaration of critical information infrastructures and measures to protect critical information infrastructures
• to provide that the Executive may enter into agreements with foreign States to promote cybersecurity
• to delete and amend provisions of certain laws
• to provide for matters connected therewith.

Reply:

Reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logged with the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) in Parliament

Reply:

Reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logged with the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence

Reply:

A reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logdged.

Reply:

A reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logdged.

Reply:

A reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logdged.

Reply:

Reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logged with the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI).

Reply:

Reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logged with the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI), which has also received briefing on the Progress with regard to the implementation of the recommendations in the High Level Review Panel Report.

Reply:

There is no disproportionate secrecy applied by the State Security Agency with regard to the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) which oversees the State Security Agency. Section 4(1) of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act 40 of 1994) (“the Act”) makes it mandatory that the JSCI shall, in the performance of its functions, have access to intelligence, information and documents in the possession or under the control of a Service, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or the common law, but subject only to the stated conditions in the Act.

Progress reports on implementation of the High Level Review Panel Report were presented to the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Inteligence (JSCI). The Honourable D Kohler, Member of Parliament can access these progress report from the JSCI.

Reply:

This Parliamentary question deal with sensitive State Security Agency operational issues, of which Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) in Parliament has been created to deal with. Accordinly, reply to this parliamentary question has been submitted to the Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI).

Reply:

1. (a)(b)(c) and (2) investigations are still on going.

Reply:

Reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logged with the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI), which has also received briefing on the Progress with regard to the implementation of the recommendations in the High Level Review Panel Report.

Reply:

(1) Yes. Investigations have been instituted. These investigations are on going.

(2) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa prohibts involvement of the Members of the Executive into the intelligence operations of the State Security Agency (SSA). Furthermore, the existing National Strategic Intelligence Act (Act 39 of 1994) and Operational Directives of the SSA also prohits involvement of the Members of the Executive into the intelligence operations.

Both the National Strategic Intelligence Act (Act 39 of 1994) and the Intelligence Services Act (Act 65 of 2002) are under review for amendment as part of the intelligence reforms recommended by the High-level Review Panel.

(3) Review of Operational Directives and Standard Operational Procedure is a work in progress. The review seeks to amongst others enable SSA Members to report manifestly illegal order. Furthermore, a process on Amendments to Regulations is currently underway, the Regulations will strengthen accountability and good governance of the Members.

(4) The Intelligence Academy is in a process of reviewing its training programmes with a view to adequately capacitate Members of the intelligence community. Furthermore, the intelligence amendments currently underway seeks to improve coordination of intellligence and counter intelligence.

(5) The Reports are instrumental in the reform and the legislative amendments, aimed at strengthen the oversight structures. The legislative amendments will be submitted to Parliament for consideration, inputs and processing.

Reply:

All the matters raised above by the Honourable Member of Parliament have extensively been dealt with in the Findings and Recommendations of the High-Level Review Panel, particularly as outlined in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 13 of the High-Level Review Panel’s Report. These matters therefore do not require additional investigation as doing so would duplicate the work done by the Panel. The Honourable Member is also reminded that the President of the Republic, HE President MC Ramaphosa, accepted the High-Level Review Panel report with all its findings and recommendations.

Processes such as drafting of a new legislative framework and the review of internal departmental regulatory processes have been initiated to address the implementation of the recommendations and these are at various degrees of development and implementation. Some of the recommendations in relation to capacity, etc., are however dependent on the finalisation of a new legislative framework.

Reply:

1. Yes, the State Security Agency was approached by the aforesaid provincial governments to conduct lifestyle audits of the members of the respective Executive Councils.

2. Reports of the lifestyle audits will be submitted to the respective provincial government, which will decide whether or not to make them available to the public.

Reply:

The State Security Agency possess partial forensic capabilities to conduct lifestyle audits and where there is a lack, collaborate with other organs of state such as the South African Police Services (SAPS), Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), e.t.c. to compensate the discrepancy.

The lifestyle audit framework currently at the drafting stages will, once completed, lay a foundation of the requisite capabilities to conduct a lifestyle audit.

Reply:

The Deputy Minister has submitted a Reply in this regard to the Parliament Office of the African Transformation Movement (ATM)

Reply:

(i) The conducting of lifestyle audits are implied in the legal prescripts such as those, among others, that govern the enforcement of the provisions in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 (Act 121 of 1998)(POCA) and the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act 12 of 2004)(PRECCA) by law enforcement agencies, as well as the conducting of vetting by the State Security Agency (SSA).

The SSA is mandated in terms of section 2(1)(b) of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act 39 of 1994)(NSIA) to fulfil the national counter-intelligence responsibilities and for this purpose to conduct and co-ordinate counter-intelligence and to gather, correlate, evaluate, analyse and interpret information regarding counter-intelligence in order to-

(i) identify any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic or its people;

(ii) inform the President of any such threat;

(iii) supply (where necessary) intelligence relating to any such threat to the South African Police Service for the purposes of investigating any offence or alleged offence; and

(iv) supply intelligence relating to any such threat to the Department of Home Affairs for the purposes of fulfilment of any immigration function;

(v) supply intelligence relating to any such threat to any other department of State for the purposes of fulfilment of its departmental functions; and

(vi) supply intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC).

The performance of vetting investigations falls squarely within the definition of counter-intelligence in section 1 of the NSIA. Section 2A of the NSIA empowers the SSA to conduct vetting investigations to determine the security competence of a person, if such a person-

(a) is employed by or is an applicant to an organ of state; or

(b) is rendering a service or has given notice of intention to render a service to an organ of state, which service may-

(i) give him or her access to classified information and intelligence in the possession of the organ of state; or

(ii) give him or her access to areas designated national key points in terms of the National Key Points Act, 1980 (Act 102 of 1980).

“Security competence” is defined in section 1 of the NSIA to mean a person's ability to act in such a manner that he or she does not cause classified information or material to fall into unauthorised hands, thereby harming or endangering the security or interests of the State, and is measured against a person's-

(a) susceptibility to extortion or blackmail;

(b) amenability to bribes and susceptibility to being compromised due to his or her behaviour; and

(c) loyalty to the State and the relevant institution”.

Furthermore, the legislative and regulatory framework governing members of the Executive, and the Public Service provides for reporting, mandatory disclosure of financial interests and conflicts of interest, and the referral of cases of non-disclosure, which enable the institutionalisation of lifestyle audits. Where obligations are stipulated in legislation, regulations and Codes of Conduct governing the aforementioned persons, placing a duty on them to disclose personal financial interests and conflicts of interests, misconduct proceedings should be instituted against them for:

(i) failing to disclose personal financial interests or conflicts of interest; or

(ii) making incomplete, incorrect or misleading disclosures of personal financial interests and conflicts of interests.

There are concomitant legal implications for breaches of the relevant legislative and regulatory provisions and Codes of Conduct.

In addition, the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999)(PFMA) sets the framework for accountable financial administration in the public service. Legislative imperatives on Risk Management that deal specifically with the financial and fraud risk categories are contained in sections 38 to 42 of the PFMA and regulation 3 of the Treasury Regulations, 2005. Section 38(1)(a)(i) of the PFMA requires the all departments, trading entities and constitutional institutions have and maintain effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial and risk management and internal control. Risk management processes, responsibilities and punitive measures for non-compliance are incorporated into the responsibilities of Accounting Officers and Audit Committees, and by extension to all Managers in terms of the provisions of section 45 of the PFMA. Regulation 3.2.1 of the Treasury Regulations requires that:

“The Accounting Officer must facilitate a risk assessment to determine the material risks to which the institution may be exposed and to evaluate the strategy for managing these risks. Such strategy must include a fraud prevention plan. The strategy must be used to direct internal audit effort and priority, and to determine the skills required to manage these risks.”

The internal audit unit must in accordance with regulation 3.2.7 of the Treasury Regulations prepare, in consultation with and for the approval of the audit committee, a rolling three-year strategic internal audit plan based on its assessment of key areas of risk for the institution, having regard to its current operations, those proposed in its strategic plan and its risk management strategy.

Hence, implementing lifestyle audits forms part of a risk management system and strategy, aimed at identifying risks related to unethical conduct, corruption and fraud.

(ii)

(aa) Lifestyle audits are a critical a critical assessment by means of an amalgamation of a variety of information sources in order to compare the subject’s lifestyle with his/her declared income streams. In essence, it is a test to determine whether wealth is commensurate to income.

During vetting investigations, the SSA in terms of the NSIA (section 2A (5), (5A) and (6)), may in the prescribed manner gather information relating to-

(a) criminal records;

(b) financial records;

(c) personal information; or

(d) any other information which is relevant to determine the security clearance of a person:

Provided that where the gathering of information contemplated in paragraphs (c) and (d) requires the interception and monitoring of the communication of such a person, the relevant members shall perform this function in accordance with RICA. Vetting Field Work Units within departments of State may, on request by the SSA, assist the SSA in gathering the information. The head of the SSA or any officials delegated by him or her in writing may, after evaluating the information gathered during the vetting investigation, issue, degrade, withdraw or refuse to grant a security clearance.

In addition, it should be noted that legislative provisions that affect the employee–employer relationship must be considered when conducting lifestyle audits, particularly the Constitution; the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 1997 (Act 75 of 1997); the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act 66 of 1995)(LRA) and its accompanying Codes of Good Practice issued by the Department of Labour.

(bb) Lifestyle audits are utilised as a legitimate fraud prevention and detection mechanism and serve as a tool to understand the financial profile of an individual, in terms of legitimate declared income versus known and observed assets.

Reply:

The Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence has scheduled a briefing by the State Security Agency on the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill (Gilab). This briefing will amongst others, provide progress on Gilab. Drafting of the General Intelligence Amendment Bill is taking place within context of ITT and implementation of the HLRP Recommendations. Strategic thrust of the ITT drafted Bill was re-creation of 1994/5 intelligence structures. This posed a significant challenge and threat to civilian intelligence. This Bill had to be revised to consider futurist configuration, which takes into consideration current, and emerging threats; Process of drafting Gilab including its buinsess case is affected by myriad factors including;

(b) Lockdowns aimed at containing spreed of Coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic;

(c) Consultation with the President on options for optimal configuration;

(d) Consultation with the National Treasury, Department of Public Service and Admnistration and JSC Cluster.

The Bill will be submitted to Parliament after approval by the Cabinet.

Reply:

(1) The Minister has never been asked by the President to intervene on the matter in question.

Any legal matter between South Africa and any other country would be dealt with through the appropriate channels and instruments, such as mutual legal assistance. The Ministry responsible for the Civilian Intelligence structures is not one of such instruments.

(2) There has never been a discussion between the President of Botswana and the Minister on this matter.

(3) None.

(4) The visit was cancelled because of other commitments.

(5) Purpose for which the visit was intended remains valid, therefore, a visit in the near future cannot be rulled out.

Reply:

1. The criteria for Top Secret security clearance are multiple and include the successful completion of the vetting process that includes

1.1 Verification of the subject’s/applicant’s records as reflected in databases:

• criminal records;
• financial records;
• personal information; or
• any other information that is relevant to determine the security clearance of a person.

•  

1.2 The positive outcome following a vetting fieldwork investigation. For a Top-Secret Security Clearance, the process entails the following:

• Full record checks on databases (as mentioned above);
• A subject/applicant interview;
• Two (2) interviews with references;
• One (1) work enquiry; and
• A polygraph examination and evaluation.

(1.2.2) Regarding the later point, all resultant reports (subject/applicant and combined References’ Interview Report; Investigation Memorandum, and Investigation Diary and Polygraph report.) are then sent to the Evaluation division.

(1.2.2) In assessing the reports, the Evaluator will consider the following in his/her risk summary as per the Legislation:

• Integrity;
• Loyalty to the State and the relevant institution; and
• Non-susceptibility to extortion and blackmail;
• Non-amenability to bribes and non-susceptibility to being compromised due to his or her behaviour or vulnerabilities.

These qualities are critical criteria for employment in a position requiring Top Secret security clearance.

(1. 3) Based on the Evaluator’s recommendations – emergent from records, interviews and investigations – on whether to issue, degrade, withdraw or refuse to grant a security clearance, the State Security Agency’s (SSA’s) Director-General signs off on the vetting result.

2. Regarding Mr Mc Bride’s security clearance:

2.1 On 5 October 2018, the request for the vetting of Mr Mc Bride to the level of a Top Secret level was received from the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID).

2.2  His employment at the IPID was later terminated.

2.2 On 23 April 2020, the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) requested the SSA to transfer his Top Secret clearance to them.

2.3 On 29 June 2020, the SSA Acting Director-General enquired about the progress on the vetting of the said subject.

2.4 On 30 June 2020, the SSA Human Resource Consultant enquired about the vetting of the said subject.

2.5 On 1 July 2020, the subject was contacted to avail himself for a personal interview and it followed all the steps outlined above.

2.6 As per the approved Standard Operating Procedure (VA01/2010) on Vetting Fieldwork Investigation, a Polygraph test for a Top-Secret Clearance is required. However, due to the current COVID-19 pandemic, a Polygraph examination could not be conducted, the specific reason being that the procedure would require the Polygraph Examiner to be in close proximity of the subject in a closed area for an extended period; thus exposing them (polygraph examiner/subject) to a possible transmission of the virus.

2.7 Nonetheless, given that all the other tests resulted in a positive outcome, the security clearance was issued on condition that as soon as the COVID-19 infection rate flattens, the Polygraph examination will be conducted.

2.8 Accordingly, a Top-Secret security clearance procedure was conducted on Mr Mc Bride and a Top-Secret security clearance was issued on the basis of the information currently available to the SSA.

2.9 A Top-Secret Clearance was issued on 14 July 2020.

3. Not at this stage.

Reply:

1 (a)

1. (aa) (i) Operational Capacity is: 1501 and

(ii) Administrative Capacity is: 147

1. (bb) (i) Operational Capacity is: 291 and

(ii) Administrative Capacity is: 22

1. (b) None

1. (c) (i) & (ii) Not applicable given 1(b).

2. Not applicable given 1(b).

Reply:

 

​

1. 

1. In theresponse to Parliamentary Question 934 on 8 June 2020, items, suppliers and amounts were tabulated and repeated below:

Hence to answer Parliamentary Question 1159 that asks about specifically companies and total amounts, transactions with Inhlanhla Ga Tshwarelo amounted to R61 700.00, those with Bidvest Steiner to R431 560.00, those with Lechoba Medical Technology to R477 369.80, and those with Ubuntu Technologies to R66 122.70.

(2) Regarding the purchasing of goods and/or services below the amount of R500 000 connected to the Covid-19 pandemic;

(a) goods and/or services were purchased from Ga Tshwarelo, Bidvest Steiner, Lechoba Medical Technology, and Ubuntu Technologies as indicated above.

(b) the transaction amounts are those mentioned in answer (1).

(c) Ga Tshwarelo supplied masks, gloves and disposable masks; Bidvest Steiner provided sanitisers and surface wipes; Lechoba Medical Technology supplied filtering masks, sanitisers and infrared thermometers, and Ubuntu Technologies supplied anti-virus software and licences to ensure secure, remote communication.

(3) SSA followed a deviation process

(a) to provide a Secure Video Conferencing Solution for Government on an urgent basis to allow work to continue while minimising the health risks posed by infectious Covid-19.

(b) The financial details are reflected in the table above.

(4) Goods and/or services were purchased/acquired adhering to National Treasury instructions 2020/2021 in relation to the Emergency Procedures in response to the National State of Disaster. Companies were selected that met National Treasury’s requirements and/or were among those identified and proposed by it.

The reason for choosing the said Information Technology supplier is that the Agency already had contracts with the two companies Nanoteq and TrueConf that provided infrastructure to the SSA on secure communications and video conferencing solutions respectively. Consequently, the SSA approached the two companies to increase the number of licences they were already providing to the SSA so that the need that came from Government could be satisfied.

(5) Whether the Minister makes a statement on the matter remains her prerogative.

Reply:

1. The matter on permanent appointment of the Director-General is a work in progress, details on the process including the date will be provided to the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence.

2. Yes. The contract has been extended until 31 August 2020.

3. The permanent appointment for position of Director: Foreign Branch was made with commencement date of 1 July 2020

4 The number of Deputy Director-Generalpositions occupied in an acting capacity is four (4), permanent appointment to these positions is a workin progress.

5. The Number of General Manager positions occupied in an acting capacity is ten (10), permanent appointment to these positions is a work in progress.

 

Reply:

The Honourable Member is kindly referred to the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) where a reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logged.

Reply:

1. No, the Department will not offer any form of Covid-19 financial or other relief to small businesses. It is not within the mandate of the Department to offer any form of Covid-19 financial or other relief to small business.

2. No, there will be no financial or other relief to be allocated. It is not within the mandate of the Department to offer any form of Covid-19 financial or other relief to small business.

Reply:

The Honourable Member is kindly referred to the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) where a reply to this Parliamentary Question has been logdged.

Reply:

(1) The department has not awarded any open tender related to Covid-19 pandemic, however, awarded 3 Purchase Orders to date for Covid-19 related personal protective equipment (PPE) and 1 Purchase Order for antivirus software for the Secure Video Conferencing Solution through quotation processes to the following companies (i) Bidvest Steiner, (ii) Inhlanhla Ga Tshwarelo, (iii) Lechoba Medical Supplies and Ubuntu Technologies.

(2) Deviation process was followed to provide Secure Video Conferencing Solution for Government on an urgent basis to allow work to continue while minimising the health risks posed by infectious Covid-19 pandemic.

(3) The reason for choosing the said Information Technology supplier is that the department already had contracts with the two companies (i) Nanoteq and (ii) TrueConf that provided infrastructure to the department on secure communications and video conferencing solutions respectively. Consequently, the department approached the two companies to increase the number of licences they were already providing to the department with a view to minimize the risk of the Covid -19 pandemic.

(4) Not at this stage

Reply:

Information relating to services rendered to the State Security Agency (SSA) forms part of the broader operational strategy and therefore remains classified and privileged.

It should, however, be observed that the SSA is held accountable on such matters by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI), the Inspector- General of Intelligence and the Auditor-General.

Reply:

The requested information is of such a nature that it would form part of the broader operational strategy of the State Security Agency and therefore as a matter of policy, the SSA does not disclose such information. It should however be observed that the SSA is held accountable on such matters by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence

Reply:

(a) The total amount budgeted for the Ministry for the 2019-2020 financial year is R 47 081 363.09.

(b) It should be observed that the SSA may be held accountable on such matters by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI), the Inspector-General and the Auditor-General.

Approved/Not Approved

Reply to the Parliamentary Question 289 to the Minister of State Security

Reply:

The current and future plans to roll out 5G mobile network in South Africa by strategic investment partners will not have any potential state security threats due to information being shared by partners as the existing adequate Regulations, Governance and Compliance are in place and adhered too.

 

The SG mobile nstwork is going to provide enhanced services/advantages (speed-faster, more coverage and more capacity). The current security applied on the existing mobile technologies (3G, 4G, Edge, etc) will not be impacted and will remain the same and be covered by the current security precautions and methods applied by SSA security advisory services and related stake holders.

 

SSA will (be required to) further verify and continuously monitor all hardware and software providing 5G services to detect potential threats and vulnerabilities as manda

Reply:

Buildings, properties and facilities of the SSA are acquired for purposes of operational requirements. Out of necessity, the operations of SSA are mostly and mainly covert in nature. It is therefore illegal to disclose the asset base of the SSA to non-members.

The SSA also operates on the basis of need to know that essentially dictates that any disclosure of classified information should only be for purposes of achieving operational objectives.
 

Reply:

a) (i) SSA held eight (8) briefing sessions in 2018.

(ii) Not applicable

b) Eight (8) compulsory briefing sessions were held in 2018.

Reply:

The requested information is of such a nature that it would form part of the broader operational strategy of the State Security Agency (SSA) and therefore as a matter of policy the SSA does not disclose such information. It should however, be observed that the SSA is held accountable on such matters by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and the Auditor-General.

 

 

 

 

 

P 0 B o x 3 7 , M e n\ y n , 0 0 6 3, to) . ( 0 j y ) 3 6 7 0 7 00 , F e x (0 1 2 j 36 7 0 7 19

P O 8 o x £t 2 7 4, Ws te r fr o nI , £ 00 2, Te I ( 02 1 ) '4 0 1 18 00, F a x ( 0 21 } 4 6 1 4 6 4 4

 

 

 

Ref: MIN/M1/1/7

 

15 February 2019

 

Mr NA Masondo, MP The Chairperson JSCI

CAPE TOWN

 

Dear Chairperson

 

PARLIAMENTARY QUES7ION NO 146 FOR WRITTEN REPLY FROM NR W HORN

 

Please find enclosed a copy of my response to the above- mentioned parliamentary question by Mr W Horn, MP of the Democratic Alliance, which I have tabled with the National Assembly.

 

Thank you

 

 

 

 

MS D LETSATSI-DUBA, MP MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY

 

 

MI HI S 7 2. ft

S ’7 A 7 L  SE C UR I T Y

nc uuu t. ir: c› r s ‹›« i ›i or ui‹: a

P O g o x 3 7, Me nI y n , 0 0 6 3, Ta I j 0 J 2 ) 3 6 7 07 0 o, F e x , I g 1 y ) 3 6 7 0 7 s 9

P0 B o x S 12 7 6 , Wa I e r fr o n I , 8 0 0 2, To ' ( 0 2 1 ) 4 0 1 16 0 0. F a x ! ( 0 Z ) J 6 I J 64 4

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ref: MIN/M1/1/7

 

15 February 2019                                                                                                         Honourable Mr Horn, MP

Democratic Alliance Marks Building CAPE TOWN

 

Dear Honourable Horn

 

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION NO146 FOR WRITTEN REPLY

 

I write to inform you that I have tabled the response to your question with the National Assembly.

 

Thank you

 

 

 

MS D LETSATSI-DUBA, MP MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY

 

Reply:

1. For the exclusive knowledge of the State Security Minister and Deputy, the State Security Agency (SSA) has never contracted the services of Bosasa or African Global Operations, as it is know now.

2. Not applicable (N/A)

Reply:

Information relating to members of the State Security Agency (SSA) forms part of the broader operational framework of the SSA and therefore remains classified and privileged.

It should however be observed that the SSA is held accountable on such matters by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) and the Inspector-General.

Reply:

1. The department does not apply GRAP 103 in recognising any of its assets, and therefore is not required to apply the standard to any of its artwork.  Furthermore, SSA does not have heritage assets as defined and recognised by GRAP 103.  GRAP 17 is however used to recognise assets.

 

2. Artwork is included in the SSA assets register.  Verification of artwork occurs with the normal verification of other assets’ classes and have been audited as part of the statutory audit by the Office of the Auditor General.

 

Reply:

The EFF is advised to request the South African Revenue Service to indicate whether it produced the so-called spy-tapes.

Furthermore, the requested information is of such a nature that it would form part of the broader operational strategy of the State Security Agency and therefore as a matter of policy the SSA does not disclose such information.  It should however be observed that the SSA is held accountable on such matters by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI).

Reply:

 

The State Security Agency has never borrowed any amount of money from any entity in the People’s Republic of China in the past three years and since 1 April 2018.

Reply:

Information relating to the regulation of the intelligence services is governed by the Intelligence Services Act, 65 of 2002 (as amended). The questions raised by Dr Groenewald would be better ventilated through the oversight bodies such as the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI), Inspector-General of Intelligence, among other regulatory bodies.

Reply:

For the period commencing 2015/2016 to 2017/2018 financial year SSA has recorded forty-one (41) motor vehicle accidents of which nine (9) vehicles were found to be uneconomical to repair.

Repair costs were as follows:

Description	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018
Total Accidents	8	20	13
Total Written Off	1	8
Total Repair Costs	R758 934.31	R462 140.04	R11 100.00

Vehicles were written off when the value to repair exceeded the vehicle value. Hence, it did not make economic sense to repair them.

Currently, there is not tracking system installed in the official vehicles for SSA. Research with regard to systems is currently being conducted to find the most suitable system for the SSA.

Reply:

No, I have not travelled with any family member during the above period.

Reply:

The State Security Agency (SSA) has forwarded the following internal cases:

• Medical Aid Fraud: The SSA reported a case against a service provider. The amount of R29 000.00 was recovered.
• A case concerning fraud involving a company who submitted a tender to the SSA was handed over to the SAPS for investigation.
• Money stolen from SSA Head Office: The matter was handed over to the Hawks and went to court. The case against all members was withdrawn due to a lack of evidence. Subsequently, the National Prosecuting Authority has undertaken to relook into the matter, to review the decision to withdraw the charges and to provide an update on developments. The SSA has referred 38 cases to SAPS and 4 to the DPCI relating to government officials of other departments for investigation.

Reply:

All employees of the SSA, including all levels of management, are subjected to extensive vetting every five years. The SSA also reserves the right to re-vet any of its employees during the course and scope of the five years should a need arise. Vetting is one of the core competencies of the SSA and is not outsourced to any service provider.

Information pertaining to vetting, as with other operational information of the SSA, forms part of the broader operational strategy of the agency and, therefore, as a matter of policy, the SSA does not disclose such information. It should, however, be observed that the SSA is overseen by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) and the Inspector General of Intelligence amongst other regulatory bodies.

Reply:

Information relating to service providers of the SSA is information that forms part of the broader operational strategy of the agency and therefore as a matter of policy the SSA does not disclose such information. It should however be observed that the SSA is overseen by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) and the Inspector General of Intelligence amongst other regulatory bodies.

Reply:

1. Yes, the State Security Agency has a sexual harassment policy called the “Human Resource Directive: Sexual Harassment and Promotion of Racial Tolerance: HRD: 19.” Assault is dealt with in terms of Chapter XVIII (Disciplinary Procedure) of the Intelligence Service’s Regulations, 2014.

(i) Reports of sexual harassment and assault are investigated by conducting interviews and obtaining statements from the relevant parties, witnesses and gathering supporting evidence (video footage, SMSes, etc). HRD: 19 also provides mediation between the complainant and the transgressor on sexual harassment cases. The policy provides for due regard to sensitivity of the matter.

(ii) The Disciplinary Procedure makes provision for various sanctions (counselling, warning, fine, suspended discharge, discharge) where a disciplinary hearing takes place in respect of a sexual harassment or assault case.

2. (a) (i) Number of cases 2014/2015: 2

Number of cases 2015/2016: 2

Number of cases 2016/2017: 2

(ii) There is no case since 1 April 2017 which is still in

progress.

(b) (i) 6 cases were opened and concluded.

(ii) One case was withdrawn

(iii) One case is still open.

(b) Sanctions for the sexual harassment and assault cases:

• Final written warning and fine
• Verbal warning
• Warning and suspended fine
• Final written warning
• Warning

Reply:

In line with its directives, standard operating procedures and as a matter of policy, the State Security Agency (SSA) does not comment on operational matters as it is held accountable on such matters by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI).

However, regarding the matter in question, the SSA is not privy to such an investigation.

Reply:

Information relating to the financial and employment details of employees of the State Security Agency (SSA) forms part of the broader operational strategy and therefore remains classified and privileged.

It should however be observed that the SSA is held accountable on such matters by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI).