Question NW579 to the Minister of Public Enterprises
28 March 2024 - NW579
Gondwe, Dr M to ask the Minister of Public Enterprises
With reference to the recent Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) collision on the export line to Richards Bay which occurred in January 2024, (a) on what date is the investigation into the accident likely to be concluded and the details of the full investigation be made public and (b) what (i) total number of accidents did TFR experience in each of the financial years since 1 April 2021 to date, (ii) total number of the accidents were found to have been as a result of sabotage, (iii) was the outcome of the investigations into each of the accidents and (iv) steps has Transnet taken to minimize TFR accidents?
Reply:
According to the information received from Transnet:
- The Board of Inquiry (BOI) investigating the accident had a first sitting on 5th of February 2024 and held the last the sitting on the 19th of February 2024. The draft report has been circulated to all the BOI members for comments and will be signed off latest 22nd of March 2024.
The BOI report forms part of the TFR investigation process and it is an internal document which is confidential. The BOI findings and outcomes can be shared on request.
(b)(i) 2021-2022 6 collisions
2022-2023 3 collisions
2023-12 March 2024 1 collision
(b) (ii) One sabotage case, but seven (7) of the ten (10) collisions occurred under abnormal operating conditions as a result of theft and vandalism.
(b (iii)
|
Province |
Operations Area |
Financial Year |
Operating conditions |
Outcome (Causes) |
|
Mpumalanga |
Nelspruit |
2021/22 |
Abnormal: Visual Display Unit not operational leading to inability to locate train position in the section |
Non-adherence to Train Working Rules in that the Train Driver declared his train complete and clear whilst it was not. |
|
Gauteng |
Welgedag |
2021/22 |
Abnormal: Visual Display Unit not operational leading to inability to locate train position in the section |
Non-adherence to Train Working Rules in that the Train Driver mislead the Train Control Officer by confirming the wrong position of his train |
|
Eastern Cape |
Port Elizabeth |
2021/22 |
Normal |
Non-adherence to the Train Working Rules in that the Train Driver passed a signal at Danger/Red which he was not authorized to pass after being warned by a previous signal which was at caution/yellow |
|
Gauteng |
Vereeniging |
2021/22 |
Abnormal: track circuits were down leading to inability to locate train position in the section |
Non-adherence to Train Working Rules in that the Train Control Officer did not make sure that the line was clear of trains before authorizing another train to proceed on the same line |
|
Northern Cape |
Kimberley |
2021/22 |
Normal |
Non-adherence to Train Working Rules in that the Train Driver exceeded the point where he was authorized up to whilst on his way to assist a failed train on the same line |
|
Gauteng |
Vereeniging |
2021/22 |
Abnormal: Visual Display Unit not operational leading to inability to locate train position in the section |
Non-adherence to Train Working Rules in that the Train Control Officer authorized a train without ensuring that the previous train was complete and clear of the section |
|
KwaZulu Natal |
Bayhead |
2022/23 |
Normal |
Non-adherence to Train Working Rules by the Track inspector in that he did not couple machines together when they were moving as a train. |
|
Limpopo |
Nelspruit |
2022/23 |
Abnormal: Visual Display Unit not operational leading to inability to locate train position in the section |
Non-adherence to Train Working Rules in that the Train Driver mislead the Train Control Officer by confirming the wrong position of his train. |
|
Mpumalanga |
Nelspruit |
2022/23 |
Sabotage: once the angle cock is closed the following wagons’ brakes are disabled. |
The train parted and the subsequent train following collided with the wagons left on the line. The angle cock was found in closed position on the last wagon that parted. |
|
KwaZulu Natal |
Richards Bay |
2023/24 |
Abnormal: Visual Display Unit not operational leading to inability to locate train position in the section |
Non-adherence to Train Working Rules in that the Train Control Officer did not make sure that the line is clear of trains before authorizing the movement into an occupied line. |
Table: Total Number of Collision incidents (2021/22 – 2023/24)
(b) (iv) Interventions
- Filling of Train Control vacancies to ensure effective supervision and alleviate fatigue;
- Network rationalization to reduce manual verbal authorizations;
- Approach market to explore technology on ‘Electronic Train Order’ capability; and
- Establish back-up capacity to deal with communications failure.
- Improve security effectiveness through Outcome Based Security contracts.
The transparency of Transnet and the continued efforts to improve operational efficiency and reduce mishaps is to be applauded.