Questions & Replies: Transport
2011-03-10
THIS FILE CONTAINS 25 REPLIES.
SEARCH ON THE TOPIC/KEYWORD YOU ARE LOOKING FOR BY SELECTING CTRL + F ON YOUR KEYBOARD
QUESTION NO 2179
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: Friday, 23 September 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 19 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 25 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
Whether any surveys have been undertaken since his reply to question 14 on 3 March 2011 to research the preference of commuters in terms of their use of (a) trains, (b) rail corridors and (c) stations; if not, why not; if so, (i) what are the relevant details of the surveys and (ii) when will the next survey be conducted? NW2551E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(a), (b) and (c) (i) and (ii)
The Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) conducts surveys on customer satisfaction twice per year. The last survey was conducted at the end of the 2010/11 financial year. The survey results were as follows:
| 2009/10 | 2010/11 | |
| Metrorail | 71% | 67.9% |
| Mainline Passenger Services (Shosholoza Meyl) | 81% | 77.9% |
| Autopax | 82% | 84.1% |
Areas of low satisfaction with Metrorail are operations of trains (punctuality, reliability and overcrowding) at 55.3%, followed by infrastructure and rolling stock at 67.5%. Passenger information and communication was the highest satisfaction with an average of 75,2% for the year, followed by ticket sales and timetables at 70.9%.
On the Mainline Passenger Services, the lowest rated area is onboard services at 68.2%, and the highest rated area is passenger information and communication at 82,5%.
All ratings for Autopax are above 80%, with the journey experience rated the highest at 84,9%.
Corridor prioritization is informed by demand in terms of current and future travel patterns, spatial development and densities, as well as customer surveys. PRASA is embarking on a process to revitalize the rail system with the new rolling stock programme and the modernization of key priority corridors, which includes renewal of the signalling systems and station upgrades, et cetera. This will contribute significantly to improving the overall customer experience of the rail system.
Furthermore, a study to establish short, medium and long term demand patterns is currently in progress, incorporating all passenger entities of PRASA. The status quo portion of the study is nearing completion. The study will provide PRASA with various options for future prioritization of investment.
QUESTION NO 2176
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: Friday, 23 September 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 19 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 25 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether he intends to introduce amendments to legislation pertaining to the legal limit of alcohol in a person's blood system whilst driving; if not, why not; if so, (a) what amendments does he intend to introduce, (b) what is the motivation for the intended amendments and (c) when does he intend to introduce such amendments;
(2) whether any study/research has been conducted in this regard; if not, why not; if so, what are the findings of this study/research? NW2548E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) Yes, I am considering amending legislation pertaining to the legal limits of alcohol for drivers contained in the National Road Traffic Act, 1996 (Act No 93 of 1996).
(a)
In the first place, I am considering amendments that will enable authorities to cancel the licences of drivers who have recently acquired licences and suspending their right to reapply for a licence for a given period.
In the second place I am considering reviewing the current legal limits on the blood alcohol level. The review will be done in consultation with medical specialists.
(b)
Evidence shows that alcohol plays a significant role in many road collisions, and it is important to continuously assess and review existing legal requirements in this regard.
(c)
As mentioned above, we need to determine the appropriate limit once we have undertaken scientific and medical research with the medical fraternity.
(2) Yes, both internationally and locally there is substantial research. However, the Department of Transport needs constantly to evaluate such research and to determine its appropriateness for South African conditions.
QUESTION NO 2175
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 19 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 25 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether his department's plan to use environmentally friendly road equipment such as solar powered street lights has been put into operation yet; if not, why not; if so, (a) what kind of equipment is being used, (b)(i) how and (ii) where is this equipment being used, (c) since when has this equipment been used, (d) what are the costs of the (i) proposed and (ii) current use of environmentally friendly equipment;
(2) whether an analysis has been undertaken to demonstrate the cost effectiveness of using this equipment; if not, why not; if so, what are the results of this analysis? NW2547E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) The Department of Transport's (DoT) plan to use environmentally friendly road equipment such as solar powered street lighting has not been put in operation yet, pending the finalisation of the development of the National Climate Change Response Policy and the review of the National Energy Efficiency Strategy for South Africa.
However, the DoT, in preparation for the implementation of the above Policy and Strategy, is planning to develop the Climate Change Response Strategy and the Energy Efficiency Framework for the Transport Sector in the country, which will include the utilisation of solar energy in the powering of street lights.
(a), (b) (i) and (ii), (c), (d) (i) and (ii) Fall away.
(2) The Energy Research Centre at the University of Cape Town is busy with the Transport Mitigation Study, which is hampered by lack of transport data. After the completion of the study, a cost/benefit analysis will then be finalised.
QUESTION NO 2174
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: FRIDAY, 14 OCTOBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 19 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 25 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What (a)(i) are the objectives and (ii) is the (aa) vision and (bb) mandate of the unit that was established to coordinate transport investment projects, (b) budget has been allocated to this unit, (c) are the main line items of this budget and (d) processes, procedures and mechanisms are in place to (i) monitor and (ii) measure the (aa) efficiency and (bb) efficacy of this unit;
(2) (a) when is this unit expected to officially commence operation, (b) what are its plans for the (i) 2012-13, (ii) 2013-14 and (iii) 2014-15 financial years and (c) where will this unit be located in his department's organogram;
(3) what (a) staffing positions will this unit be made up of and (b) are the specified staffing positions' respective (i) functions and (ii) terms of reference? NW2546E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) (i) and (ii) (aa) and (bb), (b), (c) and (d) (i) and (ii) (aa) and (bb)
Following the successful hosting of the International Investors Conference on 13 and 14 June 2011, hosted by the Department of Transport, the Department realised the need to create capacity to sustain the momentum of the Conference and coordinate departmental investment ambitions, with both internal and external government stakeholders.
The Unit is purely a co-ordinating mechanism, assisting the Director-General, Department of Transport, to coordinate all work related to investments, as a follow-up to the Conference. The Director-General has pulled various members of the Department, as well as from the Office of the Director-General, to come together and coordinate these important functions. Up to this point, no budget has yet been allocated to the Unit, with officials still largely operating from their respective sections within the Department.
The Unit is currently tasked with the responsibility of ensuring a seamless processing of all projects that were flagged during the Conference to a point where they are implemented.
(2) (a), (b) (i), (ii) and (iii) and (c)
Over the next three years, the team of this Unit is expected to, amongst others, coordinate investment promotions of the transport fraternity, ensure constant liaison with all critical stakeholders, investigate the establishment of a transport-wide Permanent Project Financing Mechanism, develop acomprehensive investment strategy for transport, facilitate the financing of identified projects and coordinate investment work across all modes, and with all our provinces.
(3) (a) and (b) (i) and (ii)
Staff members are mainly drawn from the office of the Director-General, Department of Transport, and other divisions within the Department of Transport, mainly at Chief Director and Director levels, and they are focusing on the areas outlined above.
QUESTION NO 2173
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 19 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 25 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether Metrorail commuters are permitted to purchase one way tickets for trips; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details;
(2) whether a commuter can purchase tickets from any other source outside ticket sales; if not, why not; if so, how are these ticket sales (a) controlled and (b) tracked? NW2545E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) Yes, Metrorail commuters may purchase a one way/single trip ticket on the day of travel or preceding day, which is valid for an unbroken trip and the distance stipulated on the ticket. This ticket is valid for only one day. The one way tickets are the most sold as compared to the return, weekly and monthly tickets.
(2) At present, the commuter rail environment (Metrorail) ticketing system does not make provision for external sales of tickets. These can only be purchased from Metrorail offices. It is only for the mainline long-distance passenger services (Shosholoza Meyl) that passengers can order tickets through the Metrorail Call Centre, and then pay either at the station, do an electronic transfer/bank deposit or credit card payment.
(a) The sales are recorded on the Metrorail financial systems.
(b) It is reconciled daily, weekly and monthly, i.e. money banked versus ticketing system balances.
____________________________________________________________________________
QUESTION NO 2170
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: FRIDAY, 23 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 19 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 25 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) How many disciplinary cases have been opened against employees of the Civil Aviation Authority since its establishment;
(2) what are the relevant details of each case including the (a) date in which the case was opened, (b) nature of the case and (c) current status of the case;
(3) (a) what is the standard method of dealing with such cases and (b) how are persons that are under investigation acted upon? NW2542E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) and
(2) (a), (b) and (c)
| NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES | NATURE OF CASES | DATE OFFENCE COMMITTED | HEARING DATE | SANCTION | STATUS |
| 1 | Insubordination | 30 June 2008 | 04 April 2009 | Found guilty and given six months' written warning | Case closed |
| 1 | Dereliction of duties | 04 April 2008 | 28 May 2008 | Found guilty and given six months' written warning | Case closed |
| 1 | Reported for duty under the influence of alcohol | 25 August 2008 | 03 September 2008 | Found guilty and given six months' written warning | Case closed |
| 1 | Served the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) with a falsified CV | 05 September 2008 | 11 February 2009 | Found guilty and summarily dismissed | Case closed |
| 1 | Omitted to divulge his previous employment record | 03 October 2008 | 03 March 2009 | Pardoned | Case closed |
| 1 | Insubordination | 28 January 2009 | 25 February 2009 | Pardoned | Case closed |
| 2 | Absenteeism and submission of inappropriate sick note | April 2009 | 25 June 2009 | Given six months' written warning | Cases closed |
| 1 | Served examination candidates with papers containing ostensible answers | June 2009 | 24 July 2009 | Alleged offender resigned in the course of the hearing | Case closed |
| 1 | Alleged offender overrode the examination system | June 2009 | Several dates due to availability and number of witnesses. Finalised on 22 February 2010 | Summary dismissal | Offender is reviewing the case through the Labour Court |
| 1 | Insubordination and dereliction of duties | November 2008 | 05 May 2010 | Pardoned | Case closed |
| 1 | Approved training manuals without authority | February 2008 | 23 November 2009 | Pardoned | Case closed |
| 1 | Assaulting a client | 02 December 2010 | 14 March 2011 | Employee applied for an interdict through the Labour Court | Awaiting the finalisation of the Labour Court process |
| 2 | Putting the image of the SACAA in disrepute | 02 December 2010 | 19 April 2011 | Charges withdrawn | Cases closed |
| 2 | Breach of petty cash procedures | 21 April 2011 | 20 July 2011 | Cases postponed to 02 and 09 September 2011 | Case postponed |
| 1 | Divulging SACAA information on the public chat web | 12 June 2011 | 15 July 2011 | Case postponed to 25 August 2011 | Case postponed due to non- availability of witnesses |
Prior to 2007, disciplinary cases were handled internally, but documentation got lost during relocation from Brooklyn Pretoria to the SACAA's Midrand offices.
There are approximately two cases that are currently underway and are being investigated with a view of charging the employees concerned.
(3) (a)
The SACAA has a disciplinary code that guides the management and handling of disciplinary issues should they arise.
(b)
The SACAA has a suspension procedure which guides management when the need arises, should it be perceived that the alleged offender may interfere with the investigation or he/she poses danger to other employees, then suspension is invoked.
____________________________________________________________________________
QUESTION NO 2143
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: Friday, 23 September 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 19 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 25 – 2011)
Mr J J Mc Gluwa (ID) asked the Minister of Transport:
How many cargo trucks have (a) entered the country through ports of entry during the period 1 February 2011 up to 15 August 2011 and (b) been found to be overloaded? NW2491E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(a)
Whilst the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA) keeps records of outgoing trucks passing through the ports of entry, the C-BRTA, unfortunately, does not collect and maintain statistics on cargo trucks that enter the country through the SADC ports of entry. Although some of this information has been collated by other entities within government, the C-BRTA also requires such information and confirms that this disparity will be addressed as part of the Agency's Changing Gears Strategy in the period leading up to 2013.
Information from the C-BRTA's collaborating partners on in-bound cargo trucks at our disposal is for the 2010/2011 financial year and only covers two months of the requested statistics (February and March 2011). The information is submitted as an annexure to this response.
(b)
The information for Beitbridge as provided has been obtained through our collaborative partner and it covers the period January to July 2011 for vehicles entering and exiting South Africa and has not been filtered.
Summary of weighing results for all cargo vehicles entering and exiting South Africa at the Beitbridge border post:
| Weighing Results 2011 | ||||||||
| Month | Vehicles Weighed 2011 | Vehicles Legal 2010 | Vehicles in Tolerance 2011 | Vehicles in Tolerance (%) | Vehicles over Grace 2011 | Vehicles over Grace (%) | Vehicles Charged 2011 | Vehicles Charged (%) |
| Jan | 4,322 | 3,578 | 642 | 14.85% | 102 | 2.36% | 102 | 2.36% |
| Feb | 10,641 | 8,853 | 1,582 | 14.87% | 206 | 1.94% | 206 | 1.90% |
| Mar | 13,336 | 11,222 | 1,884 | 14.13% | 230 | 1.73% | 230 | 1.73% |
| Apr | 13,986 | 11,665 | 2,037 | 14.56% | 284 | 2.03% | 284 | 2.03% |
| May | 15,146 | 12,737 | 2,085 | 13.77% | 324 | 2.10% | 324 | 2.14% |
| Jun | 15,862 | 13,343 | 2,189 | 13.80% | 330 | 2.09% | 330 | 2.09% |
| Jul | 17,467 | 14,611 | 2,425 | 13.88% | 431 | 2.47% | 431 | 2.47% |
| Total year to date | 90,760 | 76,009 | 12,844 | 14.15% | 1907 | 2.10% | 1907 | 2.10% |
| Notes: Vehicles weighed include light vehicles which require a Cross Border Permit to operate. | ||||||||
| There are legislated values. Vehicles within these limits are legal. | ||||||||
| The prosecuting authority allows grace. If a vehicle is overloaded within grace it is referred to as vehicles within tolerance. | ||||||||
| Vehicles over grace are the only prosecutable vehicles. | ||||||||
QUESTION NO 2170
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: FRIDAY, 23 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 19 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 25 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) How many disciplinary cases have been opened against employees of the Civil Aviation Authority since its establishment;
(2) what are the relevant details of each case including the (a) date in which the case was opened, (b) nature of the case and (c) current status of the case;
(3) (a) what is the standard method of dealing with such cases and (b) how are persons that are under investigation acted upon? NW2542E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) and
(2) (a), (b) and (c)
| NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES | NATURE OF CASES | DATE OFFENCE COMMITTED | HEARING DATE | SANCTION | STATUS |
| 1 | Insubordination | 30 June 2008 | 04 April 2009 | Found guilty and given six months' written warning | Case closed |
| 1 | Dereliction of duties | 04 April 2008 | 28 May 2008 | Found guilty and given six months' written warning | Case closed |
| 1 | Reported for duty under the influence of alcohol | 25 August 2008 | 03 September 2008 | Found guilty and given six months' written warning | Case closed |
| 1 | Served the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) with a falsified CV | 05 September 2008 | 11 February 2009 | Found guilty and summarily dismissed | Case closed |
| 1 | Omitted to divulge his previous employment record | 03 October 2008 | 03 March 2009 | Pardoned | Case closed |
| 1 | Insubordination | 28 January 2009 | 25 February 2009 | Pardoned | Case closed |
| 2 | Absenteeism and submission of inappropriate sick note | April 2009 | 25 June 2009 | Given six months' written warning | Cases closed |
| 1 | Served examination candidates with papers containing ostensible answers | June 2009 | 24 July 2009 | Alleged offender resigned in the course of the hearing | Case closed |
| 1 | Alleged offender overrode the examination system | June 2009 | Several dates due to availability and number of witnesses. Finalised on 22 February 2010 | Summary dismissal | Offender is reviewing the case through the Labour Court |
| 1 | Insubordination and dereliction of duties | November 2008 | 05 May 2010 | Pardoned | Case closed |
| 1 | Approved training manuals without authority | February 2008 | 23 November 2009 | Pardoned | Case closed |
| 1 | Assaulting a client | 02 December 2010 | 14 March 2011 | Employee applied for an interdict through the Labour Court | Awaiting the finalisation of the Labour Court process |
| 2 | Putting the image of the SACAA in disrepute | 02 December 2010 | 19 April 2011 | Charges withdrawn | Cases closed |
| 2 | Breach of petty cash procedures | 21 April 2011 | 20 July 2011 | Cases postponed to 02 and 09 September 2011 | Case postponed |
| 1 | Divulging SACAA information on the public chat web | 12 June 2011 | 15 July 2011 | Case postponed to 25 August 2011 | Case postponed due to non- availability of witnesses |
Prior to 2007, disciplinary cases were handled internally, but documentation got lost during relocation from Brooklyn Pretoria to the SACAA's Midrand offices.
There are approximately two cases that are currently underway and are being investigated with a view of charging the employees concerned.
(3) (a)
The SACAA has a disciplinary code that guides the management and handling of disciplinary issues should they arise.
(b)
The SACAA has a suspension procedure which guides management when the need arises, should it be perceived that the alleged offender may interfere with the investigation or he/she poses danger to other employees, then suspension is invoked.
QUESTION NO 2081
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 12 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 23 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) How many authorised aircraft inspections conducted by the Civil Aviation Authority (i) in (aa) 2008, (bb) 2009 and (cc) 2010 and (ii) during the period 1 January 2011 up to the latest specified date for which information is available uncovered cases of noncompliance and (b) what were the reasons for noncompliance in each case;
(2) whether he intends introducing any legislation pertaining to (a) the authorisation of inspectors and (b) their required qualifications; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details;
(3) whether any policy permits an inspector to inspect an aircraft when he or she has a (a) biological and/or (b) marital relationship with an aircraft owner; if not, what is the position in this regard; if so, what are the relevant details? NW2354E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) (i) (aa), (bb) and (cc) (ii) and (b)
The number of inspections conducted by the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) depends on different factors, and the inspections themselves vary in nature. There are importation Certificate of Airworthiness Inspections, export Certificate of Airworthiness Inspections and Surveillance Inspections (which vary between Ramp Inspections and Operations Inspections). All these inspections are authorised in various ways, and to mention Ramp Inspections, as an example, the SACAA conducts Ramp Inspections on foreign aircraft that operate into the Republic of South Africa through a Foreign Operating Permit (FOP). As part of the approval of the FOP, the operator is required to provide details of the intended flight, and with that the SACAA schedules and conducts an inspection.
To provide more clarity, there are 11 383 (as at the end of July 2011) aircraft currently registered in South Africa, and there is constant movement, be it additions or deletions. In the beginning of 2008, the register was at 10 307. Also, in 2008 the SACAA had received and processed 653 new registrations and 128 deletions (10 832 at the end of that year). In 2009 there was a total of 498 movements (392 additions and 106 deletions), which increased the number to 11 118. In 2010, there was a total of 476 movements (356 additions and 120 deletions), which increased the number to 11 354. In 2011, there was a total of 45 movements (37 additions and 8 deletions), which increased the number to 11 383 at the end of July 2011. When there is a movement such as these, the SACAA will conduct an inspection (on request from clients, which vary from Import Certificate of Airworthiness Inspections and Export Certificate of Airworthiness Inspections). Should a client decide not to request for an Import Inspection, the Aircraft will not be issued with a Certificate of Airworthiness Inspections and can therefore not operate.
(2) (a) and (b)
It should be noted that not even the Director of the SACAA's qualification criteria is stated in the Civil Aviation Act, 2009 (Act No 13 of 2009), which would render the legislation bulky and cumbersome. However' the legislation does cover the appointment of SACAA staff, and that is outlined in section 96 of the Act, (which is extracted and referred to below). The SACAA (as directed by the Minister of Transport) has qualifications and authorizations for inspectors and this is referred to as the Inspector Qualification Framework (IQF). This is also referred to in section 96 of the Act, which deals with appointment and remuneration of staff of the SACAA and it states, "(1) Subject to section 76 (2), the Director may appoint such employees as are necessary to enable the Civil Aviation Authority to properly carry out its functions".
In addition to the legislation as mentioned above, the SACAA has developed an Inspector Qualifications Framework. An extract from the IQF reads as follows:
"The Inspector Qualifications Framework has been developed for the use and guidance of relevant SACAA Technical Managers and the HR department staff members for the recruitment of Inspectors. The first part of the document sets SACAA's general approach towards determining the Entry Level Qualifications and Experience of Inspectors, including their initial and recurrent training requirements and their specific technical tasks. The Appendixes contains information that is specific to the technical areas within the SACAA. It defines the specific category or level of Inspector for the relevant technical area and each category or level's entry-level qualification and experience requirements. This information will be utilized for the recruitment of Inspectors and all personnel, directly or indirectly concerned with this, must apply the requirements defined within this Framework".
The following matrix, deals with qualifications and skills level required for Inspectors.
| Inspector Level | Inspector | Senior Inspector | Principal Inspector |
| Qualification | Matric or N3 & AME in the correct discipline or equivalent Degree/ Diploma | Matric or N3 & AME in the correct discipline or equivalent Degree/ Diploma | Matric or N3 & AME in the correct discipline or equivalent Degree/ Diploma |
| Aircraft | Aircraft above 5 700kgs (Part 121) or below 5 700kg (Part 135) | Aircraft above 5 700kgs (Part 121) or below 5 700kg (Part 135) | Aircraft above 5 700kgs (Part 121) or below 5 700kg (Part 135) |
| Industry Experience | At least 5 years aircraft maintenance environment. | At least 2 years as an Inspectorwith satisfactory performance assessment | At least 4 years as a CAI Inspector with satisfactory performance assessment |
| Other skills required: | Computer literacy and report writing skills. | Computer literacy, report writing skills & project management. | Computer literacy, report writing skills & project management. Ability to assess, research, change and make recommendations to review airworthiness data and standards |
(3) (a) and (b)
Referring to the response to question (2), the SACAA is guided by legislation, and section 98 of the Civil Aviation Act of 2009 deals with the matter.
Section 98 of the Act that deals with the conflict of interest, states that any person appointed to perform any function in terms of this Act or the regulations must upon such appointment and thereafter, in writing, annually or as and when such conflict may occur, disclose to the Director details of all employment, positions, offices, allegiances, interests or any activities, which may compromise his or her independence in carrying out his or her duties and functions in terms of this Act.
In addition, for section 84, 93 and 98, in dealing with conflict of interest, the SACAA has a procedure where employees declare interests. Based on that, the Line Manager assures that an employee is not assigned inspections that may bring his/her work in disrepute. All declared interests are logged centrally and kept for this purpose.
QUESTION NO 2080
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 12 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 23 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether any survey has been conducted to ascertain the number of resignations of lawyers from the Road Accident Fund (RAF); if not, why not; if so, what are the main findings of such a survey;
(2) what (a) is being done to investigate this problem and (b) average costs are associated with the (i) resignation and (ii) subsequent appointment of new lawyers;
(3) whether any measures are in place to retain the service of competent lawyers; if not, why not; if so, what measures? NW2353E
______________________________________________________________________
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
It is assumed that the reference to "lawyers" in the Question means admitted attorneys and admitted advocates.
(1) A specific survey to ascertain the number of resignations of lawyers from the Road Accident Fund (RAF) has not been conducted as such a survey is not required due to the fact that the RAF continuously retains data and information pertaining to all resignations from the RAF.
During the 2011 financial year there were 145 resignations from an average staff complement during that period of approximately 1 900. Of the 145 resignations, only six were lawyers. During the first four months of the 2012 financial year, 56 employees resigned, of which only two were lawyers.
The RAF requests all employees who resign to participate in exit interviews and participation in such processes is voluntary. The exit interviews that were conducted with the lawyers who resigned indicated that the main reason for the resignations was a desire to return to practice in the legal profession as attorneys or advocates.
(2) (a) and (b) (i) and (ii)
The RAF considers that the resignation of eight lawyers during the past 18 months is within the bounds of normal attrition parameters. The RAF consequently does not consider that the number of resignation of lawyers is a problem to the organisation.
The costs relating to the resignation and appointment of new lawyers are minimal - the reason being that replacements are usually sourced internally. It is only in exceptional circumstances that external candidates are recruited. This occurs when specialist skills are required and the costs then relate to the placement of adverts.
(3) The RAF has a number of strategies aimed at containing the number of resignations and positioning the RAF as a preferred employer. Numerous measures are utilised to achieve the aforegoing and these include offering ongoing skills and people development programmes, providing bursaries for further education, and giving staff access to a broad based Employee Wellness Programme. The retention measures of the RAF are contained in a number of its policies, including a Retention Policy.
QUESTION NO 2079
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 12 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 23 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether any processes, procedures and mechanisms exist to (a) identify and (b) measure substandard workmanship conducted on the Gauteng toll road project; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details of these areas of concern;
(2) whether any such areas of concern have been identified; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details;
(3) (a) how are these areas of concern being dealt with and (b) what has been the cost to date to deal with these areas of concern? NW2352E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)Allconstruction work executed by the South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) has to comply with COLTO (Committee of Land Transport Officials) standard specifications for road and bridge works, as well other project specifications, which form part of the contract between the contractor and SANRAL. SANRAL appoints consulting engineers and independent accredited laboratories to monitor the execution of the works, to execute process control, and to ensure compliance with the specifications.
The contractor must implement a quality assurance system in accordance with ISO 9002 standards. Various national guidelines have been developed in South Africa to guide practitioners on quality control during construction and to identify substandard workmanship. These guidelines are followed on all road projects.
In terms of the International Federation of Consulting Engineers' (FIDIC) conditions of contract that SANRAL uses, retention money is deducted from every contractor's payment certificate, to ensure that defects ascribed to the contractor are repaired. Once the contract is completed, a defects liability period of 12 months commences, during which the contractor must complete all outstanding work and remedy any further defects that may manifest in this period.
(b) The abovementioned quality assurance measures were also applied on the Gauteng Freeway Improvement (GFIP) Toll Road Project to ensure that the contractor complies with all the specifications.
(2) Two areas of concern were identified. One related to the stability of the bitumen rubber asphalt mix provided for the asphalt overlays on the N1 and N12 concrete road sections, and the other related to the G1 base utilised on portions of the R21.
(3) (a) Independent forensic engineering investigations are currently in progress to identify the cause of these problems. As soon as the causes of these problems are identified and appropriate remedial measures determined, the failed road sections will be corrected.
(b) Costs have not been finalized yet, since the appropriate remedial actions will only be determined by the current investigations. Ultimately the party responsible for the cause of the problem/s will be held liable for all repair/replacement costs.
I would also like to draw the Honourable Member's attention to other challenges that SANRAL experienced during the construction of the Gauteng Toll Road Project. The following extract from the "Civil Engineering Contractor" demonstrates the impact of Acidic Water on our construction work:
"While much has been said about acid mine drainage in South Africa, the impact has been felt by contractors working on the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project Package E.
According to Dudley Garner of Civil Engineering Contractor, in terms of structures, acidic water in the Swartspruit area presented a challenge. The problem with acidic water is so bad that parts of the old concrete-pipe culverts in the area have been completely eroded and had to be replaced with pipes manufactured from dolomitic aggregate which was also used to manufacture W40 Class durability concrete for the extension of the box culvert-type bridge in the Swartspruit. Foundation problems were also experienced at one abutment on the extension of this bridge, so piling had to be employed in this instance."
Therefore, it is the quality control and assurance systems that are in place that identify such problems, which are then timeously repaired.
QUESTION NO 2078
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: Friday, 23 September 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 12 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 23 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) What is the (i) mandate and (ii) function of the National Traffic Intervention Unit, (b) how does it differ from similar units that already exist, (c) which entity or departmental programme finances this unit and (d) what standing does this unit have;
(2) whether there is a relationship/connection between this unit and the toll roads project; if not, to whom does the unit report; if so, what is the nature of this relationship;
(3) (a) who appoints officers in this unit and (b) in terms of which legislation or regulation are such appointments made;
(4) whether any formal agreements have been drawn up with any other (a) agency, (b) department or (c) authority on (i) provincial or (ii) local level; if not, why not; if so, (aa) with whom were agreements entered into and (bb) what are the relevant details of such agreements? NW2349E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) (i)
Given the high crash and fatality rate in the country, it became necessary to establish the National Traffic Police in 2010, to bolster the efforts and interventions of existing traffic authorities in dealing with particularly difficult areas where traffic violations are leading to fatal crashes and where additional capacity is required.
The Road Traffic Management Act, 1999 (Act No 20 of 1999), the National Road Traffic Act, 1996 (NRTA) (Act No 93 1996), and the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offenses (AARTO) Act, (Act No 46 of 1998), are all section 44 (2) legislation as provided for in the Constitution and have been passed under section 76 of the Constitution. The Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) was established in terms of section 2 (a) (i) of the RTMC Act, effecting the pooling of road traffic powers of the Minister and every MEC of Transport in South Africa. It therefore follows that by resolution by the RTMC Shareholders Committee, the pooling of powers is effected, in this case, to form the National Traffic Police Unit. The acting Chief Executive Officer was mandated by the Shareholders Committee to appoint officers to this Unit.
In terms of the AARTO Act, issuing authority means the RTMC, established under section 4 of the RTMC Act. It is also common cause that an issuing authority must have authorised personnel to be able to issue, as envisaged by the AARTO Act.
(ii)
The National Traffic Police has been established in order to perform duties related to traffic law enforcement throughout South Africa, as prescribed by the NRTA Act of 1996.
The main objectives of the Unit include, amongst others:
§ To undertake special traffic enforcement operations based on smart policing principles in hazardous locations;
§ to augment and co-operate with and provide support to authorities that need assistance; and
§ to pro-actively work towards reducing offence rates in specific areas.
(b)
The National Traffic Police Unit has jurisdiction throughout South Africa and can be deployed to assist in any area, whereas all other traffic departments are either provincial or local and therefore their jurisdiction is limited to their specified sphere of government.
(c)
The Unit is funded by the RTMC, with contributions from the South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL). Self-funding is also envisaged from the revenue generated through traffic fines.
(d)
The Unit has a standing as prescribed by the following legislation:
· The Road Traffic Management Act, 1999 (Act No 20 of 1999)
· The National Road Traffic Act, 1996 (Act No 93 1996)
· Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No 51 of 1977)
· Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offenses Act, 1998 (Act No 46 of 1998
(2) The Unit reports to the RTMC, as an issuing authority as prescribed by the AARTO Act and the resolution of the RTMC Shareholders Committee on 01 April 2011.
(3) (a) and (b)
The acting Chief Executive Officer of the RTMC appoints the officers in terms of section 3 A (1) (a) (iv) of the NRTA, section 20 of the RTMC Act, as well as the AARTO Act, which describes the RTMC as an issuing authority.
(4) (a), (b), (c) (i), (ii) (aa) and (bb)
There is a relationship with SANRAL and Transnet Freight Rail on the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP) and the Railway Crossings, respectively. The details of the involvement and collaboration are still being finalized.
QUESTION NO 2073
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 12 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 23 – 2011)
Mr P D Mbhele (Cope) asked the Minister of Transport:
Whether his department will disclose details relating to the new cost structure for the Gautrain that came into effect on 1 June 2011; if not, why not; if so, what are the reasons for the new cost structure? NW2340E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
There is no new cost structure for the Gautrain Project. The Project was undertaken as a Public Private Partnership (PPP) in full compliance with Treasury Regulation 16, and the Concession Agreement was signed in September 2006, with a construction contract where only the variation of the inflation rate and foreign exchange rates can affect the otherwise fixed costs.
In September 2006, the costs of the development of the system was R25,7 billion. In July 2011, the costs to date amounted to a total of R26,4 billion. In understanding this figure, the inflation rate being higher than 4,5% over five years has cost R950 million. The Project has made savings of R365 million on the foreign exchange costs and this will be available to National Government to allocate to other projects. The scope of the project itself has not changed materially. This is because any additional costs related to the construction have been dealt with as per the stipulations of the Concession Agreement, where changes in construction costs are a risk that Bombela, the Concession Company, carries.
QUESTION NO 2072
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: FRIDAY, 14 OCTOBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 12 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 23 – 2011)
Mr P D Mbhele (Cope) asked the Minister of Transport:
What was the cost of road accidents in (a) 2009, (b) 2010 and (c) during the period 1 January 2011 up to the latest specified date for which information is available? NW2339E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
The Department of Transport (DoT), via its agency, the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC), used to calculate the cost of road accidents in previous years. However, this was stopped since we became aware that we were only making use of statistics of fatal crashes, and not taking into consideration other factors – this has proven, at times, to be quite confusing to members of the public.
For this reason, the DoT, via its other agency, the Road Accident Fund (RAF), only kept records of the cost of claims, which is not equal to the total cost of accidents. The mission of the RAF is to provide appropriate cover to road users within the borders of South Africa, to rehabilitate persons injured, compensate for injuries or death and indemnify wrongdoers as a result of motor vehicle accidents in a timely, caring and sustainable manner. The RAF also supports safe use of South Africa's roads.
The RAF operates on a fault-based system and can provide for human injury cost of claims for accidents reported in that financial year. Below, please find the latest audited claims expenditure costs to date:
(a) The cost of claims of human injury costs for the period 01 April 2008 - 31 March
2009 was R23 292 031 billion.
(b) The cost of claims of human injury costs for the period 01 April 2009 - 31 March
2010 was R14 264 200 billion.
(c) The cost of claims of human injury costs for the period 01 April 2010 - 31 March
2011 was R15 222 198 billion.
QUESTION NO 2051
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 05 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 21 – 2011)
Mr N J J van R Koornhof (Cope) asked the Minister of Transport:
Whether he has taken cognisance of the proposed hiking of airport taxes; if not, what is the position in this regard; if so, how will the recently-announced higher tariffs at South African international airports compare with tariffs levied at other international airports? NW2300E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
As Minister of Transport, I have taken due cognisance of the proposed increase in airport charges, and a Task Team was established to review the proposed airport charges as promulgated by the independent regulator. Benchmarking studies have indicated that South African airport charges ranked 42nd out of 50 international airports (as least expensive in terms of the latest available data as at 2009). Even after the recent increases in airport charges, South African airports will still compare favourably to charges levied at other international airports.
QUESTION NO 2001
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 22 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 05 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 21 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What budget has been allocated for the completion of the Gauteng toll roads project;
(2) whether this project is currently within the budget; if not, (a) why not and (b) what is being done to remedy this situation; if so, what mechanisms, processes or procedures are in place to ensure that this project remains within the budget? NW2247E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) The first phase of the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP) was divided into 18 civil construction work packages and 15 work packages related to the toll infrastructure and systems, including intelligent transport systems. The estimated budget for the project is R22,7 billion (rounded), excluding VAT. The estimated budget, inclusive of VAT, is R25,9 billion (rounded).
(2) (a) and (b)
The 'final' estimate shows that the project is within budget. However, as the Honourable Member is aware, there have been delays due to the irregular supply of bitumen. There may be a cost that our agency responsible for this project, the South African National Agency (SANRAL), may have to bear for those delays, if the delays are found to be a force majeure event.
QUESTION NO 2000
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 05 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 21 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What is currently the (a) optimal and (b) actual number of safety inspectors working for the Railway Safety Regulator (RSR);
(2) whether any plans are in place to increase the actual number of safety inspectors; if not, why not; if so, what (a) are these plans and (b) budget has been incurred for this purpose? NW2246E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) and (b)
The Railway Safety Regulator's (RSR) approved organisational structure calls for 32 inspectors, and at present there are 10 inspectors employed.
(2) (a)
Yes, there are plans to increase the number of inspectors up to the required capacity of 32 over the medium term starting in 2012/13. An additional four inspectors have recently been appointed and will commence duties on 01 September 2011.
(b)
Further increases to the complement of inspectors are subject to the availability of funding. A request for additional funding has been submitted to National Treasury for the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) period 2012/13 to 2014/15. In terms of this request, an additional eight, then six, and then four inspectors are to be appointed in each successive year of the MTEF period.
QUESTION NO 1999
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: Friday, 18 November 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 05 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 21 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) How many incidents have been investigated by the Railway Safety Regulator (RSR) in the (i) 2008-09, (ii) 2009-10 and (iii) 2010-11 financial years and (b) what was the nature of each incident;
(2) whether reports have been compiled with regard to each specified incident; if not, why not, in each case; if so, what were the main findings and recommendations in each case;
(3) whether there are any mechanisms, processes or procedures in place that ensure that the specified recommendations are implemented; if not, (a) why not and (b) what measures has he taken to ensure that such recommendations are implemented; if so, what are the relevant details;
(4) whether the Railway Safety Regulator has conducted any analysis of rail safety trends since 1 April 2008; if not, why not; if so, what were the main findings with regard to each specified trend? NW2245E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
Number of incidents investigated by the Railway Safety Regulator (RSR):
(i) In 2008-09 the RSR investigated four incidents.
(ii) In 2009-10 the RSR investigated seven incidents.
(iii) In 2010-11 the RSR investigated 18 incidents.
(b) Nature of each incident
v Nature of each incident 2008-09
Runaway Metrorail train near Koeberg Road Station
On 25 May 2008, at approximately 06:54, Metrorail train en-route from Cape Town to Kapteinsklip on the number one line failed as it was departing from Koeberg Road Station.
Rear end collision of two Metrorail trains between Midway and Lenz
On 02 February 2009, at approximately 07:14, a Metrorail train collided with the rear of another Metrorail train in the section between Midway and Lenz.
Springs - Brakpan rear end collision
On 02 February 2009, at approximately 17:15, a Metrorail train collided with the rear end of another Metrorail train in Springs.
Derailment of a Shosholoza Meyl train in Dikgale
On 22 February 2009, at approximately 20:15, a Shosholoza Meyl train en-route from Louis Trichardt to Polokwane derailed on the facing points at Dikgale
v Nature of each incident 2009-10
Metrorail train collided with the rear end of another metro train in Wonderboom Station
On 08 May 2009, at approximately17:07, a Metrorail train collided with the rear of another Metrorail train in the platform at Wonderboom Station.
Collision at a level crossing at Distell
On 09 September 2009, at approximately 09:19, a Metrorail train en-route from Stellenbosch to Vlottenburg collided with an Isuzu bakkie at the level crossing at Distell.
Derailment of 11 tank wagons carrying dangerous goods on the Amanzimnyama line
On 12 October 2009, 11 tank wagons carrying dangerous goods derailed on the Amanzimnyama service line outside Durban.
Metrorail train struck and killed a mother and child under the Lansdowne Road Bridge
On 15 October 2009, at approximately 7:07, a Metrorail train en-route from Philippi to Nyanga struck and killed a mother and child under the Lansdowne Road Bridge.
Collision of two Shosholoza Meyl trains at Frederikstad
On 07 December 2009, at approximately 13:42, a Shosholoza Meyl train en-route from Cape Town to Johannesburg collided with another Shosholoza Meyl train en-route from Johannesburg to Cape Town at Frederikstad.
Collision at a level crossing in Suurbekom
On 08 December 2009, at approximately 12:57, a Metrorail train en-route from Suurbekom towards Midway collided with a Volkswagen double cab vehicle at the level crossing just outside the departing points.
Collision at a level crossing at Mogwase
On 02March 2010, at approximately 06:50, a Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) train en-route from Thabazimbi to Pyramid South collided with a Toyota Venture vehicle at the level crossing at Mogwase.
v Nature of each incident 2010-11
Rovos Rail derailment
On 21 April 2010, at approximately 11:25, a Rovos Rail train en-route from Cape Town to Capital Park in Pretoria - hauled by Transnet Frieght Rail (TFR) electric locomotives from Cape Town to Centurion - ran away downhill towards Pretoria and derailed at the southern entrance to Pretoria Station.
The investigation is still in progress
Metrorail train derailed at the entrance of Kempton Park Station
On 07 June 2010, at approximately 06:50, a Metrorail train en-route to Pretoria derailed at the entrance of Kempton Park Station.
Collision at a level crossing in Hartswater
On 17 July 2010, a TFR train collided with a Ford Ranger bakkie at a level crossing in Hartswater.
Metrorail train collided with the rear of a TFR goods train between Kaalfontein and Birchleigh Stations
On 05 June 2010, at approximately 20:23, a Metrorail train collided with the rear of a TFR goods train between Kaalfontein and Birchleigh Stations.
Derailment of a TFR goods train between Balfour North and Sprucewell
On 24 June 2010, at approximately 00:41, a TFR train en-route from Limeacres to Newcastle derailed with 15 wagons loaded with dolomite between Balfour North and Sprucewell.
Derailment of a Shosholoza Meyl train in Radikoffie
On 28 June 2010, at approximately 05:40, a Shosholoza Meyl train derailed near Radikoffie Station.
An improvement directive was issued to TFR in which the concerns emanating from the investigation were tabled. Therefore, no investigation report was compiled.
Collision at a level crossing in Bela Bela
On 10 July 2010, at approximately 05:25, a TFR train en-route from Pyramid South to Polokwane collided with a blue Citi Golf vehicle at a level crossing in Bela Bela.
Collision at a level crossing at Buttskop
On 25 August 2010, at approximately 06:51, a Metrorail train en-route from Blackheath to Melton Rose collided with a minibus taxi on a level crossing at Buttskop Road, fatally injuring nine children in the taxi.
Collision of a Metrorail train with a TFR goods train in Natalspruit
On 10 September 2010, a Metrorail train en-route from Vereeniging via Meyerton to Germiston collided with a stationery TFR goods train before Mpilisweni Station in Natalspruit.
The investigation resulted in a prohibition directive issued to the operator with the immediate threats to safety tabled. Therefore, an investigation report was not compiled.
Goods train derailment at Brakspruit Bridge in Phalaborwa
On 19 September 2010, at about 21:45, an air brake goods train, No 8841, from Phalaborwa to Hoedspruit, with six 18E locomotives and a combination of 80 CR and CRM wagons, loaded with rock phosphate and magnetite, derailed at Brakspruit Bridge bridge in Phalaborwa.
Collision of a TFR train with a tractor hauled trailer on a level crossing on the Katnael - Atlanta section
On 30 September 2010, at approximately 15:50, a TFR goods train collided with a tractor hauled trailer on a level crossing on the Katnael - Atlanta section.
Collision of a ballast train and a rail-road vehicle
On 26 October 2010, at approximately 12:10, a collision occurred on a section of the Gautrain alignment located in the Snake Valley area between Centurion and Pretoria. The ballast train collided with a rail-road vehicle.
Collision of a TFR goods train with a road vehicle at a level crossing in Simonsvlei
On 25 October 2010, at approximately 07:40, a TFR train en-route from Wellington to Muldersvlei struck a car at the Simonsvlei road crossing between Paarl and Klapmuts.
Derailment of a TFR goods train at Citriodora Station
On 29 December 2010, at approximately 15:43, a TFR goods train en-route from Witbank to Nelspruit derailed with 14 wagons just outside Citriodora Station.
Rear end collision near New Era Station
On 02 January 2011, at approximately 20:30, an empty Metrorail train, No 0907, en-route from Dunswart to Springs, collided with the rear of a TFR train No 4663 near New Era Station in Springs.
The investigation is still in process.
Rear end collision near Alliance Station
On 14 January 2011, at approximately 17:30, Metrorail train No 8882, en-route from Daveyton to Dunswart, collided with the rear of another Metrorail train No 8884 near Alliance Station in Springs.
The investigation is still in process.
Derailment of a Metrorail train at Ravensklip in Germiston
On 22 March 2011, at approximately 07:40, Metrorail train No 0637 derailed one bogie at crossing points at Ravensklip in Germiston.
The investigation is still in process.
A Metrorail train collided with a car at Austell level crossing
On 04 January 2011, at approximately 10:13, a Metrorail train en-route from Cape Town to Fish Hoek struck a car at the Austell Road crossing between Heathfield and Retreat.
(2) The ideal situation is for the RSR to investigate all the occurrences. However, this is not possible due to capacity constraints. In other cases the Regulator will not investigate if the cause of the occurrence is clear on preliminary investigation. In all cases where the Regulator investigates, a report is compiled.
The operator is also required to investigate each occurrence in accordance with the requirements of the National Railway Safety Regulator Act, 2002 (Act No 16 of 2002), as amended. Should the operator's process be found wanting, the RSR will recommend a review of the investigation or initiate its own investigation. In all instances a follow-up process is carried out to ensure implementation of corrective actions.
· Incidents between 2008 - 2009
Runaway Metrorail train near Koeberg Road Station
Findings:
· After the train failed on a steep gradient outside Koeberg Road Station, the train driver, while doing a power test in the middle motor coach, was not able to brake the train as the dead man's feature had been disabled by means of a piece of wire tied around the vertical shaft of the master controller and consequently the train ran backwards.
· The disabling of the safety critical features in the driver's cab of the middle motor coach, which was done to stop unauthorised persons from interfering with the driver controls while the train is en-route, was not implemented in accordance with a formal change process.
Recommendations:
· Appropriate measures should be developed and implemented to eliminate unauthorised access to the driver's cab of the middle motor coach.
· A comprehensive risk assessment should be carried out to decide which features in the driver's cab of the middle motor coach should be disabled, if any, especially considering the utilisation of the features in the cab under normal and abnormal operating conditions.
· If any features in the driver's cab of the middle motor coach are to be disabled, a detailed change management process must be undertaken to ensure that all rules, procedures, training material, et cetera are amended to cater for such changes.
· All train sets in Metrorail Western Cape should be inspected and any disabled dead man's feature should be re-instated to operational standards, pending a decision in principle on disabling/enabling of middle motor coach cabs.
· If a train set is to be released for service with any deficiencies, the roadworthy certificate must be endorsed with exact details of the defective features that are allowed to remain in service.
· Training and refreshers for train drivers and train guards should be re-assessed to include simulation exercises on abnormal situations.
Rear end collision of two Metrorail trains between Midway and Lenz
Findings:
· Failure of a signalling module of the Train Control Officer (TCO) that transmitted a false condition that the track was not occupied, when train No 9019 was in fact occupying the track. This condition allowed train No 9013 to enter the section when it was not safe to do so.
· On entering the section, the driver of train No 9013 also failed to react appropriately to a signal that fell back to danger in front of him.
· Failure of the process for coordinating the activities and the technician doing repairs and maintenance on the line. The process for testing and handover of signalling equipment was not followed, and thus trains were allowed to run on signals before signalling system was verified safe for service.
Recommendations:
· The refurbishment process on the signalling system is expedited and all measures are explored to obtain the necessary resources.
· A comprehensive audit of the signal maintenance practices, technology and equipment of the Gauteng Region.
· Existing procedures for maintenance of the signal module equipment be reviewed. Quality assurance and test procedures should also be developed and strictly enforced.
· Review of the voice communication process and associated infrastructure between the signal cabin, the driver and the technician to provide for redundancy and to ensure that safety critical information pertaining to the network is made available for the decision making.
· Stricter controls are introduced into the process of occupation of infrastructure, repair, testing and commissioning before the assets are restored to service.
· Risk assessment of the practice of abnormal working in the Gauteng Region.
Springs-Brakpan rear end collision
Findings:
· The driver did not keep his train under control and was not ready to stop at the next signal, which could be at danger.
· The driver did not follow the operating rules describing the steps to be followed when observing a T-signal at danger.
Recommendations:
· Steps must be taken in the short term to give an audible warning to drivers when they are passing a signal at danger.
· Plans must be formulated and implemented in the medium term to automatically stop the train when a signal is passed at danger.
· A procedure must be developed to ensure that train drivers have available and use clinical accessories and medication prescribed.
Derailment of a Shosholoza Meyl train in Dikgale
Findings:
· The blades of the points were not fully closed.
· The train crew did not observe that the tumbler on the points was set for the loop line and/or did not have their train sufficiently under control to be able to stop if/when it was observed that the points were not set correctly.
· Train crews do not act according to the spirit and intent of the Train Working Rules and the General Appendix number 6 instructions.
· No procedures are in place to ensure that safety inspections of the points and related equipment are undertaken at regular intervals.
Recommendations:
· Training programs and general supervision of train crews and staff with safety responsibilities should be improved to ensure that the integrity of the railway system is not compromised.
· Patrick locks or other similar positive locking mechanisms on facing points should be installed.
· Incidents between 2009 - 2010
Metrorail train collided with the rear end of another Metrorail train in Wonderboom Station
Findings:
· The driver did not keep his train under control and was not ready to stop at the next signal which could be at danger.
· The driver of the train disregarded the permanent speed restriction on the line.
· Drivers do not have co-drivers or assistant drivers with them, neither are they assisted with technical equipment to prevent, or warn, of the passing of a signal at danger.
Recommendations:
· Steps must be taken in the short term to give an audible warning to drivers when they are passing a signal at danger.
· Plans must be formulated and implemented in the medium term to automatically stop the train when a signal is passed at danger.
· A procedure must be developed to ensure that train drivers act according to the prescribed operational rules to stay within prescribed speed restrictions and to keep their trains under control.
· The procedure to test for substance abuse must again be brought to the attention of the responsible personnel.
· The practice to not afford protection by train personnel at an incident must be stopped and protection according to the train working rules must be afforded.
· Vacancies in the personnel structure of the signal department must be filled as a matter of urgency.
Collision at a level crossing at Distell
Findings:
· Sub-standard road user behaviour in that the driver of the road vehicle did not abide by the level crossing signage and proceeded to cross the level crossing in front of the advancing train.
· A pair of signal apparatus cabinets at the crossing may have partially obscured the bakkie driver's view of the oncoming train.
· The sun's rays may have affected the bakkie driver's ability to see the oncoming train.
· Road users approaching the crossing have poor sight distance to see oncoming trains.
· The road markings at the level crossing are faded.
· The ongoing deployment of train drivers who have been subjected to repetitive human trauma could be potentially dangerous practice if not carefully managed.
Recommendations:
· The signal apparatus cabinets, which create a visual obstruction, should be repositioned.
· The relevant road authority should be requested to repaint the road markings and reinstate the rumble strips.
· The road reserve fence should be reinstated.
· All Metrorail level crossings in the Western Cape should be inspected for visual obstructions, signage, et cetera and repairs should be carried out where necessary with priority being given to the locations identified.
· The road layout at this level crossing should be re-engineered to reduce the risk of visual obstruction of oncoming trains being created by vehicles using the side road to Distell adjacent to the crossing.
· Long-term development of the Distell complex should be discussed with the view to mitigating the future road-rail interface risks, possibly including the closing of one of the level crossings.
·
Derailment of 11 tank wagons carrying dangerous goods on the Amanzimnyama line
On 12 October 2009, 11 tank wagons carrying dangerous goods derailed on the Amanzimnyama service line outside Durban.
Findings:
· The cause of the derailment was rotten wooden sleepers.
· The annual inspection done on this service line was inadequate as it did not detect the severe levels of decay in a number of adjacent timber sleepers.
· The practice of replacing every fourth defective sleeper with a sound sleeper is a temporary repair strategy and is not an acceptable permanent standard.
Recommendations:
· The inspection technique for service lines constructed of timber sleepers should be improved. Over and above the current visual inspection, a hammer should be used to test for hollowness and a representative sample of sleepers should be opened up to afford the inspector the opportunity to check the sleeper properly.
· The section of track that has been repaired using new concrete sleepers interlaced with older timber sleepers should be re-inspected and all rotten sleepers replaced.
Metro train struck and killed a mother and child under the Lansdowne Road Bridge
Findings:
· On the balance of probability, this was a suicide.
· The railway reserve is continuously frequented by pedestrians.
· The railway reserve is for the most part unfenced.
· The pedestrians who trespass in the railway reserve are not sensitized to the offence that they are committing.
Recommendations:
· Metrorail should consider constructing a footbridge or underpass at this point to provide a safe route across the track.
· Metrorail should reinstate the fencing of the rail reserve between Philippi and Nyanga.
· Metrorail should engage the community to warn them of the dangers of crossing railway lines. Once the fencing has been reinstated, law enforcement should commence.
Collision of two Shosholoza Meyl trains at Frederikstad
Findings:
· The procedures laid down in the Train Working Rules, the General Appendix part 1 and the Track Warrant System Rules do not strictly specify the responsibilities of the train crew and the Train Control Officer (TCO) during admittance and departure from crossing places when trains cross.
· The rule to leave the decision of which train is admitted to which line at a crossing place to the discretion of the TCO leads to unsafe operations when the first train is admitted into the main line. This is inherently less safe than admitting the first train into the loop line.
· The driver of train No 17007 did not keep his train under control and was not ready to stop at the two-way point indicator.
· The driver of train No 17007 did not follow the operating rules describing the steps to be followed when passing a warning board.
· The driver of train No 71010 could not find his points key and did not report this to the TCO.
Recommendations:
· Take immediate action to ensure that the instructions and rules controlling the admittance and departure of trains at crossing places are changed to ensure that the second train may not approach the facing points until such time as the Train Control officer authorizes him to do so.
· Take action to ensure that train crews are fully conversant with the Train Working Rules and requirements of the General Appendix regarding actions to be taken when approaching and passing a station warning board and approaching the facing points of a station/crossing place equipped with two-way points.
· Develop procedures to ensure that train drivers have all the equipment they need for a particular trip with them and that it is easily available when so required.
· Take action to ensure that procedures are developed to test all the radio equipment, inclusive of handsets, in locomotive cabs before the departure of each train as well as the quality of voice communication between the locomotive and the relevant operations control office.
Collision at a level crossing in Suurbekom
Findings:
· The driver of the road vehicle did not stop at the level crossing stop sign and warning flashing lights for the train.
· It is highly probable that the driver of the road vehicle was using his cell phone while traversing the level crossing.
· The intensity of the flashing lights is not sufficient to be seen at distances greater that about 100 metres.
· The flashing lights are not visible to road traffic in the subsidiary roads that join 5th Avenue at the level crossing.
· The road markings are worn and not very visible.
· The speed humps on 5th Avenue in the railway reserve impedes the crossing of the railway line by road vehicles.
Recommendations:
· Law enforcement by Metro Police should be improved at this siding.
· The light intensity of the flashlights should be increased so as to be visible in bright sunlight from at least 100 metres.
· Additional flashing lights facing in the direction of the subsidiary roads must be erected.
· The road markings must be repainted by Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) inside the rail reserve and by the municipality outside the rail reserve.
· The humps must be moved at least 30 metres away from the railway line as laid down in the South African Road Traffic Signs Manual (SARTSM).
· The correct signage as laid down in the Safety Instructions: High Voltage Electrical Equipment of TFR must be provided at the level crossing.
· The necessary control measures must be taken to ensure that the railway line in never obstructed by stationary road vehicles.
Collision at a level crossing at Mogwase
Findings:
· Sub-standard maintenance to the Toyota Venture in that the vehicle's brakes were inadequate.
· The driver of the road vehicle did not stop at a safe distance from the railway line to allow the train to cross the road without hitting the vehicle.
· Sub-standard maintenance to the road, in that the area next to the railway line was not level.
· There are no road markings at the level crossing.
· The road signage conforms to minimum standards, but should be maintained to a proper standard.
Recommendations:
· The road next to the railway line at the level crossing should be repaired.
· Road markings to be added on the road at the level crossing.
· Road signage and road markings should be maintained to proper standards as laid down in the SARTSM for the particular type of level crossing
· Incidents between 2010 - 2011
Rovos rail derailment
The investigation is still in progress.
Metrorail train derailed at the entrance of Kempton Park Station
On 07 June 2010, at approximately 06:50, a Metrorail train en-route to Pretoria derailed at the entrance of Kempton Park Station.
Findings:
· The condition of the brakes and wheels on the train indicates that the inspection and repair process for theses sub-systems is inadequate.
· Inadequacy of the inspections and shortage of the wheels due to procurement difficulties.
Recommendations:
· The RSR should conduct a maintenance planning audit at Metrorail Wolmerton and Braamfontein Depots. This will assist the Regulator in assessing the adequacy of the maintenance being done by the operator and also it would highlight the depth of the procurement problems with regard to spares in general.
· Metrorail is conducting its own internal investigation. The RSR should request their completed investigation report. The report should be reviewed and the implementation of its recommendations should be followed up.
Collision at a level crossing in Hartswater
An improvement directive was issued to the operator and no investigation was compiled as the improvement directive addressed the concerns identified in the investigation.
Metrorail train collided with the rear of a TFR goods train between Kaalfontein and Birchleigh Stations
Findings:
· Inadequate enforcement by the operator and lack of compliance by train drivers to faulty T-signals rules. There is a culture of passing a T-signal at danger without authority.
· Delay in repairing faulty T-signals by the operator.
· The crew have become habituated to working under abnormal conditions. The drive on sight rule can result in train drivers driving trains at speeds where they fail to bring a train to a stop when there is an obstruction on the line during abnormal conditions.
· The Metrorail train crew was rushing to reach the end of their journey, driving at a speed that could not allow the driver to bring the train under control. It was late at night and dark.
· Three Boards of Inquiries were conducted by the RSR since 2005, recommendations were made regarding T-signals and the "drive on sight" rule. The action plans that the operator developed and implemented in response to these recommendations are not working. There is a culture of passing a T-signal at danger without authority.
Recommendations:
Ø Faulty T-signals should be treated the same as any other faulty railway signal. The instruction that a train driver can pass a faulty T-signal at danger after three minutes has a risk of train drivers passing T-signals without stopping, especially if the signal is faulty for a long time, as in this case.
Ø The operator should reduce the time it takes to repair faulty T-signals. This can reduce the risk of train drivers passing a T-signal at danger without following procedures.
Ø The instruction on "drive on sight" should be reviewed and an acceptable speed limit should be decided upon. As it stands, the instruction has a risk of train drivers running trains at speeds where they fail to stop when there is an obstruction on the railway line. The operator should develop and implement a process to monitor train driver compliance, especially late and last trains of a day. In this case the driver passed Kaalfontein Station without stopping and passed a T-signal at danger. Currently it is possible for train drivers to break rules on faulty T-signals and for an all stations train to pass some railway stations without stopping and get away with it.
Ø The operator should review their action plans on the RSR's recommendations from three previous Boards of Inquiry regarding T-signals and the "drive on sight" rule. It is clear from these recurring incidents that the action plans are failing.
Derailment of a TFR goods train between Balfour North and Sprucewell
Findings:
· A broken rail, which turned out to be a skid mark was reported hours before the derailment on the number one line.
· The train driver reported vacuum problems to the TCO, which afterwards turned out to be a derailment.
· The Centralised Traffic Control day-shift personnel did not report any problems experienced during the day to the night-shift personnel.
· TFR ignores unsafe conditions reported by train drivers.
· The train was running above 60 km/h, which is the speed limit for vacuum trains.
· The digital indicators on the 18E locomotive react slowly.
· There is poor communication between the driver and the TCO.
Recommendations:
· TFR should find a method to be used to make fault reporting more accurate.
· Train drivers should reduce speed to stop when they observe a drop in vacuum readings.
· TFR should find a method to introduce the correct handing over process between shifts.
· Train operators should explore and formalize the fault reporting channel between train drivers and TFR.
· Train driver supervisors should read and study recordings on data loggers as a control measure on a regular basis.
· The train operator should find a method to increase the accuracy of the 18E locomotive dashboard indicators.
· TFR should review the communication protocol between drivers and TCO's.
Derailment of a Shosholoza Meyl train in Radikoffie
An improvement directive was issued to TFR in which the concerns emanating from the investigation were tabled. Therefore, no investigation report was compiled.
Collision at a level crossing in Bela Bela
An improvement directive was issued to the TFR in which the concerns emanating from the investigation were tabled. Therefore, no investigation report was compiled.
Collision at a level crossing at Buttskop
On 25 August 2010, at approximately 06:51, a Metrorail train en-route from Blackheath to Meltonrose collided with a minibus taxi on a level crossing at Buttskop Road, fatally injuring nine children in the taxi.
Findings:
· Sub-standard behaviour of the motor vehicle driver in that he disobeyed a battery of protection measures, including flashing lights and a lowered boom and drove onto the tracks in the path of an oncoming train.
· Culture of lawlessness on the roads of the Western Cape, which is exacerbated by inadequate law enforcement.
· Buttskop Road carries high traffic volumes and, particularly during train service peaks, there is a backup of cars when the booms are closed. This may cause frustration amongst queuing motorists, resulting in sub-standard behaviour.
· The signage painted on the road surface was faded/worn and was hardly visible in places.
· The flashing red lights at level crossings require motorists to stop and wait for the lights to stop flashing. In contrast, flashing red lights at traffic intersections require motorists to stop and proceed when safe. This is confusing.
Recommendations:
Ø Investigate the possibility of closing this crossing and replacing it with a grade separating structure at a suitable location.
Ø The road signage should be repainted.
Ø The contradiction in traffic signal interpretation needs to be addressed by the appropriate authorities.
Collision of a metro train with a TFR goods train in Natalspruit
The investigation resulted in a prohibition directive issued to the operator with the immediate threats to safety tabled. Therefore, an investigation report was not compiled.
Goods Train derailment at Brakspruit Bridge in Phalaborwa
The RSR reviewed the operator's report and is satisfied with the findings and recommendations from the report. The RSR will follow up on the implementation of the recommendations.
Collision of a TFR train with a tractor hauled trailer on a level crossing on the Katnael - Atlanta Section
Findings:
· The Pendoring - Atlanta section is ±45 km long with 47 level crossings. Some of these level crossings are less than 100 metre from each other.
· There are long vehicles that stand foul of the level crossing when waiting for road traffic to clear on the R511.
· The train exceeded the speed limit in most parts of the section.
· The tractor driver did not stop, despite the fact that the train driver blew the train's whistle.
Recommendations:
· The train operator, together with the farm owners along the railway line, must agree to reduce the number of level crossings on this line and reduce the train speed limit.
· The train operator and all relevant parties must find a solution for long vehicles that foul the line when waiting to turn onto the R511 after crossing over level crossings.
· Supervisors should read recordings on train navigators for control measures.
Collision of a ballast train and a rail-road vehicle
The investigation resulted in an improvement directive being issued to the operator with the threats to safety identified and therefore an investigation report was not compiled.
Collision of a TFR goods train with a road vehicle at a level crossing in Simonsvlei
Findings:
· Sub-standard behaviour of the motor vehicle driver in that she ignored a series of warning boards and drove onto the tracks in the path of an oncoming train.
· The gravel road surface at the crossing is very uneven. However, it is unlikely that this contributed to the cause of this accident.
Recommendations:
Ø TFR, in conjunction with the road owner, should repair the road surface in the immediate vicinity of the crossing and arrange for ongoing maintenance.
Ø Education of motorists and enforcement of traffic legislation should be improved.
Derailment of a TFR goods train in Citriodora
Findings:
· Sub-standard condition of the railway line whereby the high rail moved to the left under the train as a result of broken Teflon brackets.
· Rails that have reached their maximum wear have not been replaced.
· Ballast profile does not conform to the required TFR standards.
· The section is poorly maintained.
Recommendations:
Ø The operator should use the IM2000 readings to optimize the maintenance plan.
Ø The operator should record and rectify defects identified by track inspectors during visual inspections.
Ø The operator should ensure the ballast sleepers and sleeper components are safe for the passage of trains.
Ø The operator should replace rails that have reached maximum wear.
A Metrorail train collided with a car at Austell level crossing
Findings:
· Sub-standard behaviour on the part of the vehicle driver in that he entered the crossing and brought his vehicle to a stop on the railway tracks after the booms and flashing lights had been activated.
· The flashing red lights at the level crossing require motorist to stop and wait for the lights to stop flashing. In contrast, flashing red lights at a traffic intersection require motorists to stop and proceed when safe. This is confusing.
· Depending on the wind direction, the train siren is not sufficiently audible to motorists in vehicles with windows closed, car radio playing, et cetera.
· There are numerous advertising boards affixed to the road and rail reserve fences adjacent to the flashing light installations, which may distract a driver's attention.
Recommendations:
· Investigate the possibility of closing this crossing and diverting the traffic to existing road over rail bridges.
· This contradiction in traffic signal interpretation needs to be addressed by the appropriate authorities.
· Metrorail should consider erecting a bell/siren at the crossing to complement the flashing lights.
· In conjunction with the local authority, Metrorail should implement a programme to regularly remove these boards.
(3) (a) Not applicable.
(b)
Yes, there are procedures that ensure that recommendations are implemented.
These include processes for continuous monitoring and assessment of implementation. Follow-up inspections and audits are conducted to verify implementation and the effectiveness thereof. In cases of continued non-compliance and where conditions pose safety threats, directives are issued to remove the threat or to suspend the operation altogether.
(4) The RSR prepares a National State of Safety Report annually, which, amongst others, presents an analysis of rail safety trends. The RSR's Inspectorate also conducts detailed analysis of occurrence trends in order to target its activities. From the State of Safety Report and the RSR's internal analysis the following trends are evident:
ü Derailments, while generally decreasing, continue to be a high-cost occurrence for TFR in particular. The last financial year experienced a reversal in this improving trend, particularly in TFR. The main causes of these derailments are the condition of infrastructure and human factors related.
ü Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) train on train collisions in Gauteng are emerging as a major occurrence category. The main cause is infrastructure, particularly signalling, and the sub-standard driver behaviour/ actions.
ü People being struck at train intersections - these occurrences are concentrated in Gauteng, the Western Cape and in KwaZulu-Natal. They are mainly due to people illegally crossing the railway lines; this is further exacerbated by poor settlements patterns in the vicinity of railway lines.
ü Deterioration in the condition of rolling stock and infrastructure due to investment backlogs both in PRASA and TFR. One notable consequence of rolling stock shortages and inadequate infrastructure is the incidence of overcrowding in the PRASA environment.
ü The shortage of skills in safety related grades from drivers, to artisans and to engineers in PRASA and TFR.
ü The Western Cape and North West continue to have a number of level crossing occurrences.
ü While the introduction of the Railway Police has led to sustained improvements in personal safety on trains, there remains a high incidence of theft and vandalism (including copper and other metal theft), which is placing further pressure on the safety and operational efficiency of the system.
QUESTION NO 1996
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 22 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 05 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 21 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What has been the figures relating to the (a) projected and (b) actual (i) income, (ii) profit margins and (iii) ridership for each month since the inception of the first leg of the Gautrain;
(2) what are the projected total figures for (a) income, (b) profit margins and (c) ridership once the link between Johannesburg and Pretoria has been completed? NW2241E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a), (b) (i) (ii) and (iii)
The income and ridership projections for the Gautrain were made on an annual basis over the concession period and were not prepared for each month as requested by the Honourable Member. The actual income for the first year of operations of the first leg of the Gautrain was R174,3 million, which is 25% higher than the expected income of R 139,5 million. The higher than expected income was as a result of the 1,33 million airport passengers using the system during this period, which was 32% higher than expected. The total ridership (commuters and airport passengers) of 2.88 million was, however, 28% less than the expected total ridership for the first 12 months of operations of the first leg. The actual monthly ridership since commencement of operations was:
Bombela, the concession company responsible for operating the Gautrain, is a private company and their profit margins on the project are not available.
(2) (a), (b) and (c)
Income and ridership on the system is expected to build up over a three to five year period after commencement of the full system whilst travelers make the shift from private to public transport. Thereafter, ridership and income is expected to increase annually by the percentage of economic growth in the Gauteng economy. The ridership in the first year of operations of the full system is expected to be 20,3 million passengers with an estimated income of R710 million.
QUESTION NO 1995
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 05 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 21 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether there are any programmes in place to (a) develop, (b) retain and (c) employ qualified professionals at the Passenger and Rail Agency of SA (Prasa); if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details of such programmes;
(2) whether any costs have been incurred for these programmes in the (a) 2008-09, (b) 2009-10 and (c) 2010-11 financial years; if not, why not; if so, what is the detailed breakdown of these costs (i) for each programme and (ii) in each specified financial year? NW2240E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a), (b) and (c)
The Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) has, for some time now, established a strong relationship with Higher Learning Institutions such as the Universities of Cape Town, Stellenbosch and Pretoria, among others, in which to develop skills pipelines and expose graduates to PRASA career opportunities, in which bursary schemes are awarded to attract and employ qualified professionals at PRASA.
This pipeline programme has also been extended to high schools. Grade 11 and 12 learners, especially those studying mathematics and science (in previously disadvantaged rural schools) through partnership with non-profit organisations such as Kutlwanong Mathematics and Science Centre, are selected and put on a programme to support and improve their mathematics and science results.
Apart from the External Bursary Scheme, PRASA employees may apply for an internal part-time bursary scheme, in which they can be developed through PRASA career models whilst within the Agency. This, however, depends on available advertised vacancies on successful completion of their studies, and these employees may also apply for positions in the next level of their career paths.
Secondly, for the past three years PRASA has partnered with Gordon Institute Business Science (GIBS) and developed a Management Development Programme (MDP). This programme focuses particularly on middle management, who are exposed and introduced to strategic execution issues, global economy, finance, innovative thinking, marketing and customer centricity, among others. Most middle managers have successfully gone through this programme and it has proven to be a success.
(2) (a), (b) and (c) (i) and (ii)
The costs for the various programmes are as follows:-
Bursaries:
§ 2008/09 = R5 183 017.00
§ 2009/10 = R3 514 739.62
§ 2010/11 = R8 541 273.65
Management Development Programme (MDP):
§ 2008/09 = R1 152 000.00
§ 2009/10 = R2 488 000.00
§ 2010/11 = R2 535 000.00
QUESTION NO 1994
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: Thursday, 20 October 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 05 AUGUST 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 21 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether there are any processes, procedures and mechanisms in place to (a) communicate and (b) distribute information on the National Transport Master Plan (NATMAP) to all the provinces; if not, why not, in each case; if so, what are the (i) deadlines for communicating and distributing the information, (ii) objectives of communicating and distributing the information and (iii) further relevant details;
(2) whether any deadlines have been set by which provinces are required to action objectives within the NATMAP framework; if not, why not; if so, what is the deadline for each province;
(3) whether each province has made budget allocations for the implementation of the NATMAP; if not, why not; if so, how much has each province budgeted for the implementation of the NATMAP? NW2239E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) and (b) (i), (ii) and (iii)
The National Transport Master Plan (NATMAP) 2050 development process was a bottom-up approach, i.e. it started with the development of the Provincial Transport Master Plans, which culminated into the National Transport Master Plan known as NATMAP 2050. At the provincial level, Provincial Departments of Transport coordinated and chaired the NATMAP developmental processes. The final provincial reports were sent to provinces after completion of each phase.
The Provincial Departments also participated in the round table conferences that were held after completion of each phase, where findings were discussed with all stakeholders for comments and inputs.
(2) No deadlines have been set at this stage. These will happen after the NATMAP 2050 Plan has been approved by Cabinet. The Department of Transport (DoT) is currently embarking on the last stage of consultation with stakeholders that were not part of the NATMAP 2050 development process.
(3) It is anticipated that provinces will allocate budgets to implement NATMAP 2050 projects once Cabinet has approved the Plan.
QUESTION NO 1973
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 29 JULY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 20 – 2011)
Mr N J J v R Koornhof (Cope) asked the Minister of Transport:
Whether there are any plans to open the Skukuza airport for commercial flights in future; if not, why not; if so, when? NW2216E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
The South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) acts on behalf of the Minister of Transport on all aviation safety and security matters, including the safety oversight of all licensed aerodromes. It is, however, the prerogative of the aerodrome licence holder to decide on the type of operations it wants to provide, based on its technical capabilities and financial standing, consistent with the conditions of the relevant aerodrome licence.
Skukuza Airport currently holds a Category II aerodrome licence for daylight operations and according to the SACAA, no request for the upgrading of the aerodrome license has been made to date.
All air services (commercial and non-commercial) to and from Skukuza Airport will require approval from the Management Authority in terms of the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act, 2003 (Act No 57 of 2003), administered by the Department of Environmental Affairs. The Minister of Environmental Affairs should, therefore, be approached should information regarding compliance with the said Act be required.
QUESTION NO 1923
DATE REPLY RE-SUBMITTED: Wednesday, 07 December 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 29 JULY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 20 – 2011)
Mr G G Boinamo (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
Whether he has employed a ministerial special advisor; if so, (a) what are the duties of the advisor, (b) at which post level was the appointment made, (c) what is the salary level of the advisor, (d) what is the duration of the employment contract entered into with the advisor and (e) why was it necessary to appoint this advisor? NW2161E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e)
According to the Ministerial Handbook for Ministers and Deputy Ministers, and in terms of section 12A of the Public Service Act, 1994, Act No 93 of 1994, as amended, each Minister is entitled to two special advisors.
Two special advisors were appointed to the Minister of Transport, but both have since been transferred to other Ministries/ Government Offices. The one advisor was transferred to the Minister of Labour, and the other one to the Office of the President. I therefore do not have any special advisors at present.
QUESTION NO 1923
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: Thursday, 17 November 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 29 JULY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 20 – 2011)
Mr G G Boinamo (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
Whether he has employed a ministerial special advisor; if so, (a) what are the duties of the advisor, (b) at which post level was the appointment made, (c) what is the salary level of the advisor, (d) what is the duration of the employment contract entered into with the advisor and (e) why was it necessary to appoint this advisor? NW2161E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
Yes, a Ministerial Special Advisor was appointed on 12 February 2010 in terms of section 12A of the Public Service Act, 1994 (Act No 103 of 1994). The Special Advisor, however, transferred to another department on the 1st October 2011. I therefore do not have a Special Advisor at present.
(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) Fall away.
QUESTION NO 1859
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 31 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 29 JULY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 20 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
With reference to the amendments and revised regulations (details furnished) made to the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Act (AARTO Act), Act 46 of 1998, (a) what (i) are the reasons for these changes, (ii) are the details regarding the preparation, public participation and comment processes that were followed to determine these changes and (iii) submissions were received in response to calls for public participation and (b) when will the amending Bill to the AARTO Act be tabled? NW2096E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(a) (i) The reasons for these changes are to:
§ address the shortcomings and deficiencies identified during the conduct of the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences (AARTO) pilots in Johannesburg and Tshwane;
§ make law enforcement more efficient; and
§ prepare for a smooth national rollout.
(ii) The comments received from the public participation process were recorded. A team comprising the Road Traffic Infringement Agency (RTIA), the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) and the Department of Transport (DoT) has held numerous meetings and workshops to consider all the comments received from stakeholders, to assess them and effect the necessary changes where necessary. In addition, comments and advice from the State Law Advisors have also been considered.
(iii) Only 13 sets of comments were received timeously from the public, activist groups, government departments and other organisations. All the comments received are in support of the implementation of the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences (AARTO) Act.
(b) It is envisaged that the Regulations Amendments will be finalised before the end of September 2011. Thereafter, the Amendment Bill to the AARTO Act will be prepared and is envisaged to be tabled before the end of the 2011/12 financial year.
QUESTION NO 1858
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 29 JULY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 20 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether, upon his leaving his position as Premier of KwaZulu-Natal to take up office as Minister of Transport, any officials of the office of the Premier were appointed within his department; if so, (a) which officials, (b) why were they appointed and (c) on what conditions were they moved from the office of the Premier to his department;
(2) whether the positions of these officials are subject to the designation of a certain person (name furnished); if so, what are the reasons for this? NW2095E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) Officials transferred from the Office of the Premier: KwaZulu Natal to this Department's Transport Ministry upon the Minister's appointment:
§ Mr N Bhikshu, Chief of Staff: Transport Ministry, (Salary level 14);
§ Ms P A Ntshangase, Receptionist/Secretary (Pretoria), (Salary level 6)
§ Ms N P S Mdletshe, Private Secretary to the Minister, (Salary level 13);
§ Mr M N Mbokazi, Driver/Body Guard, (Salary level 8);
§ Ms S V Ngubane, Assistant Private Secretary to the Minister, (Salary level 12);
§ Mr S Maistry, Director: Media Liaison, (Salary level 14);
§ Ms Z F Maseko, Private Secretary to the Special Advisor and Project Leader, (Salary level 13);
(b) Bhikshu: Appointed as Chief of Staff: Transport Ministry - to provide a support service to the Minister, ensuring an efficient and dynamic interface between the Ministries, Department and promoting a sound understanding of the policies and performance of the Minister and the Department;
Ntshangase: Appointed as Receptionist/Secretary (Pretoria) - to render a reception and general administrative support service to the Ministry in Pretoria;
Mdletshe: Appointed as Private Secretary to the Minister –to manage all matters pertaining to the Minister's executive obligations;
Mbokazi: Appointed as Driver/Body Guard - to provide a driver and security service to the Minister of Transport;
Ngubane: Appointed as Assistant Private Secretary to the Minister - to manage all matters pertaining to the executive obligations of the Minister;
Maistry: Appointed as Director: Media Liaison - to promote and enhance communication between all structures in Parliament and the DoT and deal with media liaisons in the Office of the Deputy Minister;
Maseko: Appointed as Private Secretary to the Special Advisor and Project Leader - to manage all matters pertaining to the Minister's executive obligations;
(c) All the above officials are appointed in terms of Chapter 8 of the Ministerial Handbook which serves as a guide on the establishment of private offices for Members of the Executive. It stipulates that the core staff be determined by the relevant Executive Authorities, who may decide on the creation and grading of posts as identified in their structure based on proven needs and sufficient funds. The Executive Authority has the option of appointing staff –
Ø on a contract linked to the political term of Office of the Executive Authority concerned;
Ø as full-time public servants, provided that the job evaluation system is applied and there are sufficient funds on the approved budget of the department; or
Ø may second personnel from components within the department to the Office of the Political Bearer.
All the above-mentioned officials were transferred in their permanent capacities.
(2) The positions of the officials in Ministry are subject to the designation of the Minister in terms of the provisions of the Ministerial Handbook, to provide support services to ensure an efficient and dynamic interface between the various Ministries and Departments, and promoting a sound understanding of the policies and performance of the Minister and the Department of Transport.
QUESTION NO 1842
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 22 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 29 JULY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 20 – 2011)
Adv A de W Alberts (FF Plus) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) For how long already have the streetlights over the N3 highway and at the Gilooly traffic interchange been switched on permanently and (b) why;
(2) whether these lights are going to remain switched on permanently; if not, what steps does he intend taking to prevent streetlights from remaining switched on during the day; if so, why? NW2078E
____________________________________________________________________________
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
The freeway lights on the N3 from the Geldenhuis Interchange through the Gillooly's Interchange to the Buccleuch Interchange have been on in parts of the road from February 2011, as the work progressed. Some parts of the lighting have been on for a longer period of time and other parts for a shorter period, since February 2011.
(b)
During this time the electrical installation and testing of the lighting system were in process. During the installation period, the system is extremely vulnerable to theft and vandalism of copper and other material, which has a high scrap value. Until the system is commissioned (and all the manholes closed and secured, the cables covered in concrete, the mast doors welded, the mini substations security fenced and the alarms activated) the power cannot be turned off due to the risk of theft, as it is more difficult to steal cable if the power is on. Although R600 000 per month was spent on security on this section, theft still occurred, especially where the power was off. During the period, 10 767 metre of cable to the value of R984 860.43, excluding VAT, had been stolen. Two mini substations were vandalized, which cost R222 028.80, excluding VAT, to repair. This does not include any costs for disruption and the nuisance factor of keeping on repairing the lights.
(2) The lighting installation on this section of road is almost complete. A final inspection of the installation was held on 27 July 2011. The electrical maintenance contractor is busy securing all the lighting mast doors by welding it all around the door to the mast. Within the next few weeks the lights will operate on day/night switches (photo cells). The lights will then be off during the day, and on at night, on all the completed sections.
The South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) is experiencing a substantial amount of vandalism of its infrastructure, especially related to the systems that involved technology and material that has a scrap value. The completion of the work and the security that will be in place will, however, not guarantee that vandalism will not occur. The systems are designed to be electricity efficient and therefore the cost of replacing a cable overshadows the additional cost of electricity. Power that is on provides an additional system security, and therefore SANRAL will always consider this option of additional security, especially when the operations of the system are threatened by theft and vandalism.
This might not be an optimum solution to protect SANRAL's assets, but it is a practical approach to the scourge of the theft and vandalism, and on balance it is the correct approach.
QUESTION NO 1831
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 29 JULY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 20 – 2011)
Mr J J Mc Gluwa (ID) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether the taxi industry has a role to play with regard to public transport; if not, what is the position in this regard; if so,
(2) whether he intends scrapping toll fees for commuter taxis; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details? NW2064E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) Yes, the taxi industry has a role to play with regard to public transport in the country. According to the Household Travel Survey of 2003, taxis transport close to 65% of the commuting public daily. The Department of Transport took a decision in our Transport Lekgotla earlier this year that all new subsidised public transport, tendered or negotiated, should integrate the minibus taxi operations. The Rea Vaya BRT in Johannesburg has agreed to a two-third majority ownership by taxi operators in the operating company of the system.
(2) Cabinet decided in the meeting of 10 August 2011 to exempt commuter taxis (class A), as well as commuter busses (class B), from paying toll tariffs within the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Scheme.
QUESTION NO 1765
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 01 JULY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 19 – 2011)
Mr J J van der Linde (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether his department has conducted any inspections to ensure that all ambulance operators have a (a) valid Code 10 drivers licence and (b) professional driving permit as required by the Road Traffic Act; if not, (i) why not and (ii) when will it be conducted; if so, (aa) when was it conducted and (bb) how many ambulance operators were found not to have (aaa) valid Code 10 drivers licence and (bbb) professional driving permit;
(2) whether his department has inspected all ambulances for road worthiness/ fitness in the (a) 2009-10, (b) 2010-11 financial years and (c) in the period 1 April 2011 up to the latest specified date for which information is available; if not, (i) why not and (ii) how often is his department compelled to check ambulances; if so, (aa) how many ambulance in each province did not comply with the requirements set out in the National Road Traffic Act, Act 3 of 1996, with regard to the road worthiness/ fitness and (bb) which aspects did each ambulance fail to meet. NW1992E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
Firstly, I would like to correct the Honourable Member when referring to the old code 10 driving licences, which the Department of Transport (DoT) has dealt with a long time ago. We have long ago streamlined our driving licenses in terms of the international and the SADC driving licenses' requirements. The Honourable Member is also incorrect to assume that a code C1 (equivalent to code 10) driving licence is a requirement for all ambulances. The code is only required for ambulances with a gross vehicle mass (GVM) above 3 500kg. 49.68% of all ambulances in the live vehicle population have a gross vehicle mass (GVM) of less than 3 500kg. Therefore a code B or EB licence would be sufficient for the operation of all other ambulances up to 3 500kg.
(b)
All drivers of ambulances above 3.500kg are holders of a professional driving permit (PDP) as prescribed in the National Road Traffic Act, 1996 (Act No 93 of 1996). The eNaTIS system is able to identify all those drivers that are required to be in possession of a PDP.
(i) and (ii) (aa) and (bb) (aaa) and (bbb)
The DoT has not at this stage conducted any site visits to all the emergency services to ensure compliance. However, the Department of Health and the medical fraternity have a duty to ensure that all drivers of emergency vehicles comply with the prescripts of the National Road Traffic Act, 1996. In this regard, the DoT will engage with the relevant authorities to submit details of drivers to check if they are in possession of a valid PDP. The checking of PDPs for ambulance drivers is not an isolated activity of law enforcement, but it is included in the general law enforcement activities of ensuring that drivers are correctly licensed to operate their vehicles on a public road.
(2) (a) In the 2009-10 financial year, 3 708 ambulances were tested.
(b) In the 2010-11 financial year, 4 015 ambulances were tested.
(c) From 01 April 2011 to 30 June 2011, 1 253 ambulances were tested.
(i) and (ii)
Those emergency vehicles that are required to undergo annual roadworthy testing are subjected to testing on an annual basis.
All vehicles with a GVM above 3 500kg (including ambulances) must be certified as roadworthy on an annual basis. All ambulances with a GVM below 3 500 kg and that are licensed as transporting passengers for reward must be certified as roadworthy on an annual basis. All other ambulances only require certification of roadworthiness upon change of ownership or after a competent authority has suspended or cancelled the roadworthy status.
(aa) and (bb)
| PROVINCES | Categories | ||||||||||||
| Braking system | Dimensions | Electrical system | Engine | Exhaust system | Fittings and equipment | Identification and documentation | Instruments | Steering | Suspension and undercarriage | Transmission and drive | Wheels | Grand Total | |
| Eastern Cape | 9 | 14 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 53 | |
| Free State Province | 2 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 23 | ||||
| Gauteng | 21 | 37 | 18 | 4 | 22 | 10 | 2 | 9 | 22 | 4 | 9 | 158 | |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 140 | 13 | 181 | 107 | 28 | 169 | 17 | 5 | 105 | 152 | 85 | 118 | 1 120 |
| Limpopo | 7 | 7 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 45 | |||||
| Mpumalanga | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||
| North West | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | |||||||
| Northern Cape | 9 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 42 | |||
| Western Cape | 8 | 10 | 3 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 49 | ||
| Grand Total | 197 | 13 | 263 | 135 | 33 | 238 | 36 | 9 | 121 | 204 | 97 | 152 | 1 498 |
QUESTION NO 1731
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 25 JULY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 24 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 18 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) Which companies were contracted to undertake feasibility and costing studies with regard to the construction aspects of the Gauteng toll road project, (b) what were their terms of reference and (c)(i) how were they appointed and (ii) on what criteria was the selection of each specified company based;
(2) what was the (a) budgeted and (b) actual cost for each aspect that was (i) researched and (ii) determined by the specified companies;
(3) what deadlines were set for each aspect that was (a) researched and (b) determined by the specified companies;
(4) whether the specified deadlines were met; if not, in each case, (a) why not and (b) what action was taken to remedy the situation? NW1955E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
Consulting Engineering Services for the Proposed Gauteng Freeway Upgrading and Expansion Project: Traffic Modelling, Toll Strategy and Toll Feasibility Studies:
v Goba (Pty) Ltd/Tolplan (Pty) Ltd JV
The above feasibility study also included two specialist studies, namely:
Ø Macro Economic Impact Study: School of Business from the University of Cape Town, together with Arup
Ø Social Impact Study: University of Johannesburg
The services to be provided by the Traffic Modelling, Toll Strategy and Toll Feasibility Advisor in respect of the Gauteng Toll Project were described as follows in the tender document for service providers:
Section A1 (Traffic Modelling):
§ Prepare and workshop with the South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) an implementation schedule covering all facets of traffic modelling for the assignment.
§ Review existing traffic information and the available SATURN traffic model that was developed in 2001/02 for Gauteng. More information is available from SANRAL. SANRAL intends to use this model, updated to a 2005 base date.
§ Update the SATURN model to a 2005 calibrated and validated base date model. The proposal must make provision for the required traffic surveys and costs to update and recalibrate the model.
§ Review proposed toll strategies developed under Section A2, proposed toll plaza/point locations, impact of the toll strategy on alternative routes, and other aspects of alternative toll strategies, that may be generated through the toll strategy and financial modelling process.
§ Model the effect of different toll tariff scenarios and discount scenarios in order to determine the impact on gross toll revenue streams and toll diversion.
§ Assist SANRAL on an ad hoc basis to model the impact of alternative options/requests received from provincial and metropolitan government as well as the public.
§ Service providers may make an alternative proposal with respect to the use of the SANRAL SATURN model. The alternative must be well motivated and explain the specific model to be used as well as the advantages of using this model. This alternative will be priced separately in Part C, Section A1.1 of the pricing Schedule. In the event of an alternative offer, points 2 and 3 need not to be completed by the tenderer.
Section A2 (Toll Strategy and Feasibility)
§ Familiarise with and review the proposals envisaged by SANRAL, as well as the institutional environment/situation that may impact on the project.
§ Prepare and workshop with SANRAL an implementation schedule covering all facets of the assignment.
§ Develop and workshop a comprehensive list of possible toll strategy scenarios.
§ Review, research and advise on the estimated initial capital, future capital (expansions), future routine and periodic maintenance costs as well as the toll capital and operational costs for the purposes of setting up a financial model. A critical aspect of the submission will be the experience in the project team with respect to the technical and cost related aspects of open road free flow tolling in an urban environment.
§ Investigate directional toll principle vs other strategies such as semi-open, closed systems, etc. Then determine the toll plaza/point locations, all possible alternative routes (and the impact of toll diversion on the capacity of these routes) as well as perceived road user cost savings.
§ Determine the financial feasibility of the project, taking into account three traffic growth scenarios (Low, Medium, High).
§ Determine the range of possible toll tariffs, discounts and gross toll revenue streams.
§ Comparison of advantages and disadvantages of alternative toll strategies.
§ Determine options available to benefit high occupancy vehicle usage and public transport usage.
§ Determine scope for and the financial implications for the provision of public transport infrastructure (Strategic Public Transport Networks) as part of the Gauteng freeway improvement and expansion scheme.
§ Assist SANRAL on an ad hoc basis to determine the impact of alternative options/requests received from provincial and metropolitan government as well as the public."
(b) The project terms of reference for the Economic Studies (Macro and Social) included:
§ Determining the contributions to GDP as a result of:
Ø the impact of road construction;
Ø the ongoing maintenance and operation of the proposed roads;
Ø the road user benefits that would be generated; and
Ø the network savings that would be generated.
§ Contribution to the Gross Geographic Product
§ The economic relevance of transport infrastructure and infrastructure spending.
§ Job creation (direct, indirect, job relocations, long/short term).
§ The macro-economic impact as a result of the generation of direct and indirect income tax, company tax, other capital expenditure and indirect household income.
§ Changes in property values.
§ The cost of traffic diversion.
§ Network capacity and road user benefits.
§ Determine the journey times and cost of travel for different categories of road users, per area, income, age, travel mode, etc.
§ Determine vehicle operating costs as well as the value of time for different user and vehicle classes.
§ Determine the net economic impact on road users of the proposed Gauteng Freeway Improvement Scheme (GFIS).
§ Determine the direct benefits and costs to the society in the GFIS area.
§ Determine the impact of construction, operations and maintenance activities on sustainable job creation (direct, indirect, long and short term).
§ Determine the impact of construction, operations and maintenance activities on training and education.
§ Advise on the likelihood and extent of possible long term effects of land use changes as a result of the implementation of the project.
§ The study must take into account Provincial and Metropolitan transport policies and the positioning of the proposed GFIS and tolling within these policies.
(c) (i)
The traffic and toll feasibility project was appointed on an open tender basis and tenders
were received from the following consortiums/companies:
§ Gauteng Toll Study Consortium consisting of Arup/Africon/PD Naidoo/Plan Associates/ Deloitte
§ Stewart Scott/BKS
§ Tolplan/Goba
§ Urban Toll Specialists consisting of ITS/LTE/Steer Davies Gleave
§ Vela VKE
The University Of Cape Town/Arup, as well as the University of Johannesburg, was appointed on a time and cost basis for the macro and socio impact studies.
(ii)
The criteria for the selection of the successful consortium for the traffic and toll feasibility study were as follows:
§ Quality
The quality criteria and maximum score in respect of each of the criteria were as follows:
| Description of quality criteria and sub criteria | Maximum number of tender evaluation points |
| Technical experience in comparable projects | 50 |
| Managerial ability appropriate to the size and nature of the work | 30 |
| Continuing Professional Development of the key staff | 5 |
| Organisation, logistics and support resources | 5 |
| Quality assurance systems which ensure conformance to Employer's stated requirements | 10 |
| Total evaluation points for quality | 100 |
§ Financial offer
§ Preference
The weightings of the three factors in the final score were:
§ Quality 72%
§ Financial 18%
§ Preference 10%
The appointments for the macro and social economic studies were based on SANRAL's need to appoint independent specialist experts in these fields.
(2) (a) and (b) (i) and (ii)
The budgeted and actual costs for the major aspects involved in the study (all excluding
VAT) were as follows:
| PHASE 1: GFIP Toll Feasibility Study | Budget | Actual |
| Traffic Modelling, Toll Strategy and Feasibility | R5 894 737 | R6 362 542,00 |
| Disbursements – Traffic surveys, Economic studies, etc. | R2 000 000 | R2 487 426,09 |
| *Total (excluding VAT) | R7 894 737 | R8 849 968.09 |
*Apart from the feasibility study, an amount of R2 288 881,53 was spent at the tendered hourly rates to perform various additional investigations required by or as a result of interaction with the Gauteng Province and/or the metropolitan areas.
The additional expenditure for this phase of the study was approved and budgeted for.
Subsequent to the feasibility study, SANRAL initiated in the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 financial years an update and review of the original study in order to take cognisance of actual tendered cost information that became available, as well as other updated information. SANRAL also required several hundreds of detailed traffic, tariff and discount scenarios and associated revenue and financial evaluations to be performed in order to arrive at tariff and discount recommendations to the Minister of Transport.
| PHASE 2: GFIP Tariffs and Discount Study | ||
| Budget | Actual Expenditure | |
| Traffic Modelling | R1 880 000 | R2 912 436,89 |
| Discount, Revenue and Financial Modelling | R2 480 000 | R3 284 938,30 |
| Economic Impact Study | R 490 000 | R 795 481,80 |
| Contingencies | R2 000 000 | |
| e-Toll Calculator Development | R 178 310,00 | |
| TOTAL | R6 850 000 | R7 171 166,99 |
These amounts were budgeted for in the 2009/10 and 2010/11 budgets of SANRAL.
The additional expenditure for the above phase of the project relates to extensive modelling to determine the discount regime for the toll implementation, prior to the original announcement of the toll tariffs. After the toll tariffs were suspended, further scenarios were tested as part of the proceedings of the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP) Steering Committee.
(3) (a) and (b)
The tender document required a 12-month "target duration" for the feasibility study. The tender also required assistance on an ad hoc basis to determine the impact of alternative options/requests received from provincial and metropolitan government, as well as the public.
In 2010, SANRAL also required the traffic, toll and economic studies to be updated with the latest available information in order to finalise the recommendation to the Minister of Transport, with respect to the toll tariffs for the GFIP.
(4) (a) and (b)
The specific deadline was met in that the feasibility report supporting decision-making was completed.
QUESTION NO 1730
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 25 JULY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 24 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 18 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) On what basis were roads identified throughout the country for future tolling and (b) what criteria does his department use for tolling specific roads;
(2) whether his department has undertaken a consultation process in each province in this regard; if not, why not; if so, in each case, (a) what (i) processes, (ii) mechanisms and (iii) procedures were followed, (b)(i) who was consulted and (ii) how were they identified, (c) what has been the cost of the specified consultations to date, (d) what amount has been budgeted for future consultations and (e)(i) what objections have been received and (ii) from whom? NW1954E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
The South African Strategic Roads Network Study (1998) identified the primary road network of South Africa, in consultation with the Provinces and Local Government authorities. This was followed by the Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa (RIFSA 2006) as approved by Cabinet. These documents identified the Primary Road Network (38 000 km) and also those roads that will form the National Road Network (20 000 km). The split between Primary and National Road Network is currently under review where more of the 38 000 km will reside under the National Road Network.
The introduction of toll roads on national roads is directly related to the backlogs that exist with regard to the South African Road Network and the associated funding constraints experienced by the Fiscus, which currently makes it impossible for the required remedial measures to be implemented as and when required, resulting in the continued deterioration of the South African Road Network. Based on available condition data (some of which is as old as 2004) the estimated strengthening and re-gravel backlog based only on roads already in a poor to very poor condition is R149 billion, as summarised in the table below.
The above backlog excludes backlogs related to periodic resurfacing of the network, upgrade of gravel roads to surfaced standard, addition of additional lanes to alleviate congestion and construction of new roads.
The current budgets available from the Fiscus are totally inadequate to address the above backlogs and sustain the network. The long term impact of this is illustrated in Figure 1 for the National Road Network under the jurisdiction of the South Adrican National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL). As a result, SANRAL utilises the user-pay principle through toll funding to supplement the budgets available from the Fiscus. When a national road is declared a toll road, it is no longer dependent on the Fiscus, thus reducing the burden on the Fiscus, and enabling the available Fiscus funding to be spent on a shorter network, resulting in the improved overall long term national road network condition as illustrated in Figure 2:
Figure
Figure § derive the Road User Benefits, including Vehicle Operating Costs, for each toll class of vehicle;
§ calculate the overall economic benefit of the project in relation to the costs of implementing the project; and
§ derive toll tariffs for each of the vehicle classes based on the benefit that each user class will gain from the tolled facility.
SANRAL toll roads typically show considerable economic feasibility with minimum real economic Internal Rates of Return (IRR) of well above 15% and Benefit/Cost ratios in excess of 2. Examples of such economic assessment reports are available on www.nra.co.za under the projects and impact assessment pages.
(2) (a) (i), (ii) and (iii), (b) (i) and (ii), (c), (d) and (e) (i) (ii)
Toll road projects typically involve considerable upgrading and widening of existing facilities, and often some greenfields construction. This will necessitate a full Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). As part of the Public Participation Process (PPP), required by EIA legislation, all stakeholders (Provinces, Local Authorities, et cetera) must be notified and comments must be requested from such stakeholders and Interested and Affected Parties (I&APs). The consideration and response to issues raised by stakeholders and I&APs, including toll issues, are then dealt with as required by the EIA legislation and regulations.
Once EIA authorization has been achieved and the Minister responsible for environmental matters has given final approval, SANRAL proceeds to the declaration of this project as a toll road (the Intent to Toll process). This process is, so to speak, a second bite at the cherry, for all Interested and Affected Parties to participate in the process of declaring a road as a toll road. The procedure for the consultation process is specified in Section 27 (4) of the South African National Road Agency Limited and National Roads Act, 1998 (Act No 7 of 1998), namely:
§ SANRAL must give notice in the prescribed manner.
§ Give indication where the toll plazas are located.
§ Invite I&AP's to comment and make representation.
§ Publish the notice: Intent to Toll in the media.
§ Give notice in writing to the Premier of the province(s) in which province(s) the project is located.
§ Similarly give notice to all Municipalities and Councils in which jurisdiction the road is located.
§ Hold public meetings at various locations along the route.
§ SANRAL must consider all comments and representation, compile a report detailing such issues and showing, where possible, how such issues are to be accommodated, present the report to the SANRAL Board for consideration, and if approved by the Board and on its recommendation, recommend to the Minister of Transport to declare the road as a toll road in terms of Section 26 of Act No 7 of 1998.
§ If the Minister is satisfied that SANRAL has considered all comments and representations to the extent that it is possible, he may declare the toll road.
As is evident from the above, consultation with stakeholders takes place at various levels. In addition, both stakeholders and I&APs were consulted before and during the implementation of SANRAL toll road projects.
The cost of EIAs and the consultation process form part of SANRAL's ongoing development costs for each project and form part of the total capital investment for each toll road. Typical values for EIAs are in the order 0.5% to 3% of the project capex.
Although, the 'user-pay' principle is regarded as a grudge payment, the value of the toll road is generally accepted. Our experience is that it is not the principle of a toll road that is commented on, but the quantum to be paid. Nevertheless, the success and usage of South African toll roads over the last 30 years have demonstrated the effectiveness of tolling and the advantages of such infrastructure. At present, SANRAL operates some 3 120 km of toll roads and receive numerous commendations from users on its toll roads.
QUESTION NO 1729
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 10 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 24 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 18 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)(i) What consultations have been undertaken in addition to the call for submissions with regard to the Gauteng toll roads project and (ii) with whom have these consultations been undertaken, (b) what were the (i) mechanisms, (ii) processes and (iii) procedures that were followed in this regard, (c) what were the (i) deadlines and (ii) time frames of the consultation process and (d) what has been done to broaden the consultation process as much as possible;
(2) whether a report on the consultation process and the results thereof will be (a) compiled and (b) made available; if not, why not; if so, when;
(3) whether an opportunity will be provided to comment on the report; if not, why not; if so, to whom? NW1953E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) (i)
The Minister of Transport suspended the implementation of e-tolling on the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP) to allow for a Steering Committee process to review the proposed toll tariffs, to implement a broad consultative process and also explore the possibilities of increasing the Public Transport offering, to provide more options and ease the burden on commuters.
The Steering Committee was comprised of the following officials:
§ Director-General: National Department of Transport (Chairperson)
§ Director-General: Gauteng Provincial Government (Deputy Chairperson)
§ Head of Department: Gauteng Department of Roads and Transport
§ Respective Deputy Directors-General
§ South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) representatives
§ Representatives from the Gauteng Communications section
§ Representatives from the National Department of Transport Communications' section
§ National Treasury representatives
The Steering Committee was tasked with producing a report to be presented to the political principals and to the stakeholders that made presentations to the Steering Committee, detailing the following:
Ø Tariff Determination: A number of options, indicating the financial implications of each, and a recommendation on the most appropriate revenue generating model.
Ø Public Transport Transformation: Exploring various ways of improving the current public transport offering, so as to provide commuters with viable travelling choices and thus reduce their dependence on the private car.
Ø Communication and Stakeholder Management: Design and implement a structured consultation process with the identified key stakeholders and also ensure constant, informative communication through key messaging throughout the Steering Committee engagement period.
The Department of Transport (DoT) re-opened the public participation process for the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP). Members of the public were invited to make inputs through the following options:
· Post (The DoT address in Pretoria: Private Bag X0001 or hand delivery to 159 Forum Building, Struben Street, Pretoria)
· Email ([email protected])
· Fax to email (0855192300)
In addition to this, a structured engagement process with stakeholders was also implemented. The engagements took place on 24 March and 04, 05 and 06 April 2011. All the meetings were conducted as open sessions.
(ii)
Four sessions (4 days) were held. The sessions were held with business organisations, political parties, organised labour, public transport operators and municipalities.
The following groups made representations:
· Business Unity South Africa (BUSA)
· Road Freight Association (RFA)
· South African Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association
· Retail Motor Industry (Verbal Presentation)
· Southern Africa Tourism Association (SATSA)
· Johannesburg Chamber of Business
· South African Local Government Association (SALGA)
· The Automobile Association (AA)
· South African Road Federation (SARF)
· The Democratic Alliance (DA)
· Afriforum/Solidarity
· South African Communist Party (SACP)
· The Freedom Front Plus
· ANC Youth League
· COSATU
· South African Bus Owners Association (SABOA
· National Taxi Alliance (NTA)
· Mamelodi Commuter Forum
· South African Commuters Organisation
· Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (EMM)
(b) (i), (ii) and (iii)
The main issues that were raised by the public and through the stakeholder engagement were compiled. Three technical sub-streams were formed to evaluate proposals and comments, and also to evaluate possible revised strategies and toll tariffs. The sub- streams were:
Communications and Stakeholder Engagement (Managed public engagement process)
This sub-stream approached the work in a two-pronged process. Firstly, the re-affirmation of the user-pay principle and the process of engagement were focused on the various options available to implement this established principle.
Secondly, a public stakeholder engagement process was put in place. Whilst it was recognized that a physical engagement with every member of the public was not possible, everyone was given an opportunity to make an input.
Financial and Traffic Modeling
This team included representatives from SANRAL, Gauteng Provincial Government, National Department of Transport and National Treasury. Furthermore, independent external reviewers (an economist, a transport economist for financial modeling and legal advisors) were also included.
The independent external reviewers reviewed the current tariff and financial models as submitted by SANRAL, re-visited all the inputs and assumptions of the financial model and developed options that are presented in this report.
Public Transport Transformation
This work stream was established to address the need to improve the public transport offering in Gauteng. Given the fairly long lead times in the transformation of public transport, any proposed interventions will be in the medium to long term, therefore this work stream will need to operate for a period that goes beyond the term proposed for the GFIP Steering Committee.
(c) (i) and (ii)
The consultation process was concluded at the last stakeholder meeting that was held on 06 April 2011. Thereafter, the sub-streams developed a report that compiled the issues raised, responses to these issues, as well as recommendations for the consideration of the Minister of Transport.
The report has already being completed and submitted to stakeholders.
(d)
Open invitations to stakeholders as well as the general public to participate in the consultation process were made as discussed under (1) (a) (i) above.
This is in addition to the requirements of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Intent to Toll (ITT) processes followed – see my reply to Question No 1730, which was submitted to Parliament on Monday, 25 July 2011 (this National Assembly's Internal Question Paper No 18 – 2011 was published on Friday, 24 June 2011). The Honourable Member should therefore appreciate that the engagement with stakeholders and the public at large was thorough and extensive.
(2) (a) and (b)
A report was compiled and the report, including the recommendations, was made available to the stakeholders.
(3)The report was presented to stakeholders on 30 June 2011 at a stakeholder feedback session. Stakeholders made comments at the session.
QUESTION NO 1720
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 10 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 24 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 18 – 2011)
Mr G G Boinamo (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What is the detailed expenditure breakdown for the Ministry sub-programme under Programme 1: Administration in the (a) 2007-08, (b) 2008-09, (c) 2009-10 and (d) 2010-11 financial years;
(2) (a) what was the actual budget increase each year, expressed as a percentage, for funds allocated to this sub-programme and (b) how is the increase for each specified financial year justified? NW1944E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1)
| Expenditure breakdown for the Ministry | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| 2007/08 | 2008/09 | 2009/10 | 2010/11 | |
| Rands | Rands | Rands | Rands | |
| Compensation of Employees | 5,292,082 | 6,268,331 | 12,332,871 | 13,307,151 |
| Goods and Services: | 5,848,928 | 8,106,220 | 19,198,622 | 24,389,431 |
| Administrative costs | 21,771 | 1,545 | 1,606 | 1,000 |
| Advertisements | 0 | 1,400 | 24,000 | 1,022,221 |
| Equipment below R5,000 | 19,236 | 7,955 | 132,307 | 339,690 |
| Consultants and special services | 71,064 | 76,130 | 1,376,868 | 229,229 |
| Catering | 15,550 | 20,504 | 85,016 | 177,086 |
| Communication: Cellular, telephone, postage | 477,500 | 575,161 | 1,035,761 | 1,663,554 |
| Contractors: Artists and performers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5,376 |
| Contractors: Audio visual | 0 | 6,693 | 71,444 | 33,588 |
| Maintenance and repairs | 10,353 | 11,736 | 34,816 | 85,181 |
| Transport: Vehicles | 1,436,951 | 2,307,142 | 3,824,897 | 5,099,675 |
| Entertainment | 93,456 | 0 | 0 | 67,838 |
| Computer services and licenses | 3,737 | 1,791 | 13,092 | 1,836 |
| Operating leases | 206,097 | 233,701 | 153,613 | 235,024 |
| Delivery services | 98,606 | 59,012 | 143,099 | 95,642 |
| Inventories | 20,666 | 301 | 9,852 | 38,210 |
| Printing and stationery | 341,194 | 526,160 | 460,355 | 714,566 |
| Subscriptions | 6,436 | 3,969 | 0 | 69,014 |
| Resettlement cost | 0 | 0 | 778,349 | 187,434 |
| Personnel Agency fees | 41,713 | 70,263 | 79,846 | 79,192 |
| Travel and subsistence local | 1,858,495 | 2,396,327 | 7,651,022 | 5,083,009 |
| Travel and subsistence foreign | 1,007,229 | 1,465,310 | 3,169,861 | 9,098,761 |
| Training | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Venues and facilities | 118,875 | 341,120 | 152,818 | 62,304 |
| Leave gratuity and gifts | 0 | 100,000 | 20,000 | 316,855 |
| Capital: Office and computer equipment and furniture | 45,493 | 121,118 | 873,087 | 384,769 |
| Losses written off | 30,327 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total expenditure | 11,216,830 | 14,595,669 | 32,424,580 | 38,398,207 |
(2) (a)
| 2007-08 | 2008/09 | 2009/10 | 2010/11 | |
| Actual budget increase each year as a percentage | -13.01% | 14.59% | 37.55% | 40.15% |
(b)
§ In 2007/08, budget for goods and services were cut by 17,4 per cent for Programme 1 (Refer ENE 2007).
§ In 2008/09, the budget for Programme 1 increased by 18,1 per cent (Refer ENE 2008).
§ In the Adjusted Budget for 2009/10, an additional R3 million was allocated for the new Deputy Minister's office, which comprised of compensation of employees only. Of this amount, R1,7 million was allocated to the Ministry, representing an increase of 14% on the Ministry's budget of the previous financial year. No further funds were allocated for the office of the Deputy Minister. During a re-prioritisation process, an additional R2,974 million was allocated to the budget of the Ministry, which represented an increase of 24,48 per cent on the budget of the previous year.
Traveling expenditure in 2009/10, caused by obligations of the Minister on invitation of the President and international stakeholders, which was not previously budgeted for, indicated that the budget was inadequate. In 2010/11, the budget for the Ministry was increased to cater for the higher demand on particularly travelling expenditure
QUESTION NO 1663
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 10 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 24 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 18 – 2011)
Mr N J J van R Koornhof (Cope) asked the Minister of Transport:
Whether Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) intends reinstating the Shosholoza Meyl Premier Classe train service from Pretoria to Nelspruit and Hoedspruit; if not, why not; if so, when? NW1872E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
Yes, the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) intends to resume the Premier Classe service to both Nelspruit and Hoedspruit through a re-engineered business process.
The initial service design was terminated due to low passenger numbers, coupled with locomotive shortages. PRASA consequently carried out marketing and financial feasibility studies on the aforementioned routes and has come to the resolution that a joint effort, implemented by PRASA and the respective tourism authorities, will unlock new opportunities, inclusive of economies of scale and joint marketing campaigns. This impending relationship is bound to ensure the sustainability of these routes in socio- economic terms.
PRASA is currently at an advanced stage with regard to the strategic rail partnerships with the provinces of Mpumalanga and Limpopo and anticipates a resumption of service in the last quarter of the 2011 calendar year. Private charters are currently being offered on these routes on an ongoing basis.
QUESTION NO 1596
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 07 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 17 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 17 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) On what dates were the service fees of the (i) Air Traffic and Navigation Services Company Limited (ATNS) and (ii) the Airports Company of SA (ACSA) last increased and (b) in each case, (i) by what percentage were they increased, (ii) what was the fee (aa) before and (bb) after the increase and (iii) how was each specified increase calculated;
(2) whether any research has been conducted on the impact that the fee increase at each institution would have on the industry; if not, why not; if so, in each case, what (a) were the (i) findings and (ii) recommendations of the research and (b) are the further relevant details? NW1798E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) (i) and (ii) and (b) (i), (ii) (aa) and (bb) and (iii)
Air Traffic and Navigation Services Company Limited (ATNS)
The ATNS received a tariff increase in March 2010 through the permission by the Regulating Committee: Airports Company of South Africa and ATNS.
The permission provides tariff increases for a five-year period and increases were as follows:
· Financial year 2010/11: 35.8%
· Financial year 2011/12: 6.6%
· Financial year 2012/13: 5.7%
· Financial year 2013/14: 5.5%
· Financial year 2014/15: 5.6%
Fees have different cost components (variable, business sustainability and fixed costs) and mass categories. For instance, a plane with a mass category >15 000 kg would have paid R4,972.34 before the increase and R6,693.98 after the increase in the 2010/11 financial year.
Airports Company South Africa Limited (ACSA)
The last increase for passenger service charges was on 01 April 2010. The increase at the time was as per the schedule below:
Passenger service charges Before Increase After
Domestic R42.98 32.7% R57.02
Regional R89.47 31.4% R117.54
International R118.42 31.1% R155.26
Increases are calculated on a price cap formula as published within permission by the Regulating Committee. The price cap formula determines a maximum charges level in any particular year to provide a commercial return on capital employed.
(2) (a) (i) and (ii) and (b)
ATNS
A research and a consultation process are done before the increases are granted by the Regulating Committee. Inflation, affordability and the impact are all considered in that process. Reputable research institutions like the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) are used for economic outlook indicators.
ACSA
Following ACSA's permission application in 2009, the Regulating Committee commissioned an independent study to provide insight into the potential impact of ACSA's proposed tariff increases on traffic volume. No written feedback has been received. However, verbally the consultants have indicated that even a 133% tariff increase for 2011 would have had a potential negative impact of 5% on traffic volume growth for domestic traffic volume only. It would have had no impact on regional or international traffic volumes.
QUESTION NO 1595
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: Friday, 18 November 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 17 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 17 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What was the (a) date, (b) time, (c) location and (d) total financial loss, (i) in (aa) 2008, (bb) 2009 and (cc) 2010 and (ii) during the period 1 January 2011 up to the latest specified date for which information is available, of aviation hull losses by aircraft registered in South Africa (aaa) inside and (bbb) outside South African airspace;
(2) whether investigations were launched into these specified incidents; if not, why not; if so, what were the main (a) findings and (b) outcomes of the investigation in each case? NW1797E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) (i) (aa), (bb) and (cc) and (ii) (aaa) and (bbb)
Please refer to the attached Annexure A for detailed information and also note that it is unfortunately not possible to estimate the total financial losses.
(2) Yes, investigations were and are being carried out.
(a) The South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) found the main findings to be a combination of the following:
Ø Human related errors (discussion making).
Ø Mechanical failure (component or system).
Ø Training or lack thereof (technical knowledge of the aircraft).
Ø Weather related (Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) without rating, et cetera).
(b) See the list of recommendations attached as Annexure B.
QUESTION NO 1593
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 07 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 17 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 17 – 2011)
Dr S M van Dyk (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether all (a) traffic officers and (b) other relevant (i) officers or (ii) administrative officials of local authorities who are involved in putting into place and enforcing the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences (AARTO) system have written competence tests on their knowledge of the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Act, Act 46 of 1998; if not, (aa) why not and (bb) when will the specified persons be tested; if so, with regard to each specified local authority, (aaa) how many exams were written, (bbb) when were they written and (ccc) where were they written;
(2) what are the (a) fail and pass rates, (b) pass mark and (c) averages with regard to each test or examination that was conducted in each specified local authority;
(3) how are officials who failed exams handled with regard to their involvement in AARTO;
(4) whether AARTO fine books have been issued to each person who wrote the specified tests or exams; if not, why not; if so, how long before or after their test was a fine book issued to each person? NW1795E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a), (b) (i) and (ii)
In 2009 a total of 2 009 officials were trained in the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences (AARTO) Unit Standard as part of the initial tender, which included the development and alignment of the learning material against the registered AARTO Unit Standard.
The training focussed mainly on Traffic Officers, although a small number of South African Police Services' members and officials from the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development were also trained. The following National Traffic Information System (eNaTIS) administrative personnel were also trained in regard to the AARTO National Contravention Register (NCR) in the provinces:
| AARTO NCR Training | : 2008 to 2011 |
| PROVINCE | TOTAL |
| Gauteng | 331 |
| Limpopo | 43 |
| Mpumalanga | 9 |
| North West | 14 |
| Northern Cape | 33 |
| Eastern Cape | 8 |
| Western Cape | 46 |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 182 |
| Free State | 12 |
| TOTAL | 678 |
The initial theoretical training of 2009 officials was aimed at trainers who were supposed to train their fellow officers. The training by these trainers did not happen successfully in some Provinces as many of the trainers were not confident enough to present AARTO.
The Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) therefore invited all provinces and metros to nominate facilitators and field-training officers who will be responsible for both AARTO theoretical training and training on the National Contraventions Register (NCR). The RTMC funded the travelling and accommodation of these officials for both training sessions and informed provinces that they must roll out AARTO training for all local authorities in their respective provinces.
AARTO Theoretical Train-the-Trainer
A total of 56 facilitators and field training officers reported for the train-the-trainer session on the amended AARTO Regulations and amended AARTO forms at Boekenhoutkloof Traffic College on 18 – 20 July 2011. Provinces were also informed that they should contact the RTMC if they need further assistance with AARTO theory and NCR training. One request for further assistance was received from the North West Province and 11 field training officers were then trained in Rustenburg from 16 – 18 August 2011.
An RTMC official also monitored and assisted the field training officers in the Eastern Cape with AARTO training on 16 and 17 August 2011.
The following provinces and local authorities attended the AARTO theoretical train-the-trainer session on 18 – 20 July 2011:
Gauteng – 2
Limpopo – 5
Mpumalanga – 9
North West – 9
Free State – 9
Eastern Cape – 11
Northern Cape – 2
Western Cape – 4
KwaZulu-Natal – 4
AARTO NCR Train-the-Trainer
The following provinces attended the AARTO NCR train-the-trainer session from 02 – 04 August 2011.
Gauteng – 6
Limpopo – 2
Mpumalanga – 4
North West – 4
Free State – 4
Eastern Cape – 1
Northern Cape – 4
KwaZulu-Natal – 5
Western Cape indicated that they have sufficient officials trained on the National Contraventions Register and therefore did not send any nominees for training.
Training plans
Provinces were requested to forward their AARTO training roll-out plans to the RTMC, as the RTMC will monitor and assist during this training. The RTMC has received AARTO training roll-out plans from the following provinces:
Gauteng – NCR training plan received. No AARTO theory top up plan has been received.
Mpumalanga – NCR and theory training plans received.
North West – Awaiting training plans.
Northern Cape - NCR and theory training plan received.
Limpopo - NCR and theory training plan received.
Free State - NCR and theory training plan received.
Eastern Cape - NCR and theory training plan received.
Durban Metro Police Department- NCR and heory training plans received.
Western Cape – no plan received as they indicated that they are only left with a few officers to be trained on AARTO theory. The NCR plan is still to be submitted.
KwaZulu-Natal – no plan received, as they indicated that all Officers are trained in this province with regard to AARTO theory. NCR training plan is still be submitted.
(bb) (aaa)
Assessment took place on a continuous basis during the initial training in 2009 in the form of formative assessments and summative assessments. The SETA programme approval also allowed for the re-assessment of learners.
(bbb) This was conducted on a continuous basis during 2009.
(ccc) The assessment of all learners was undertaken as part of the training at the relevant venues in the various provinces.
(2) (a)
Of the 2009 officials trained, 77.1% were found competent in the AARTO Unit Standard and the completion of the AARTO 01 form. These results were endorsed by the Local Government Sector Education and Training Authority (LGSETA). 19.4% of the officials were declared not yet competent.
(b)
Since the training was undertaken in the outcomes based format, learners were required to complete all the formative assessments and obtain 70% in the summative assessment. The requirement for competence in the completion of the AARTO 01 form was 100%.
(c)
The combined assessment results per official per province are set out in the table below:
| Combined theory assessment results (excluding AARTO 01): competence mark = 70% | ||||||
| Province | Number of learners | % Competency | Competent | Not yet competent (NYC) | Absent | Withdrew |
| Western Cape | 148 | 93% | 138 | 1 | 8 | 1 |
| Northern Cape | 142 | 92% | 130 | 11 | 1 | 0 |
| Eastern Cape | 193 | 79% | 153 | 36 | 3 | 1 |
| Free State | 274 | 77% | 210 | 52 | 12 | 0 |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 219 | 90% | 198 | 15 | 4 | 2 |
| Mpumalanga | 256 | 73% | 186 | 58 | 12 | 0 |
| Limpopo | 251 | 70% | 176 | 70 | 1 | 4 |
| North West | 192 | 73% | 140 | 48 | 4 | 0 |
| Gauteng | 86 | 63% | 54 | 13 | 9 | 10 |
| Pilot Project | 248 | 66% | 164 | 79 | 5 | 0 |
| Total number of learners | 2 009 | 77% | 1 549 | 383 | 59 | 18 |
| Percentage | 100% | 77.1% | 19.1% | 2.9% | 0.9% | |
(3) All officials who were declared not yet competent underwent remedial training and re- assessment. Those who have still not been found competent, will once again undergo the full training course during the further training programmes in their provinces' preparation for the national roll-out of AARTO.
(4) AARTO has only been implemented in Pretoria and Johannnesburg at present and all officials are in possession of the AARTO infringement notice books in those areas. Officials in the other provinces/areas where AARTO has not yet been implemented are still issuing Section 56 notices.
QUESTION NO 1592
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: FRIDAY, 01 JULY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 17 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 17 – 2011)
1592. Dr S M van Dyk (DA) to ask the Minister of Transport:
(1) What (a) targets have been set for the Shova Kalula Bicycle Project since its launch on 13 October 2001 and (b) has been achieved against these set targets;
(2) whether an analysis has been done in this regard; if not, why not; if so, (a) when and (b) what were the main (i) findings and (ii) recommendations;
(3) whether he intends constructing a bicycle manufacturing plant; if not, why not; if so,
(4) whether a feasibility study has been undertaken in this regard; if not, why not; if so, what are the main (a) findings and (b) recommendations? NW1794E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) Since the Shova Kalula Bicycle Project was launched on 13 October 2001, a target of delivering one million bicycles over ten years was set.
(b) 72 000 bicycles have been delivered since 2001. These bicycles were delivered as follows:-
§ 2001 – 2008: 29 500 bicycles distributed
§ 2008 – 2009: 26 100 bicycles distributed
§ 2009 – 2010: 15 000 bicycles distributed
§ 2010 - 2011: 1 400 bicycles distributed
(2) (a) The Shova Kalula impact assessment study was conducted between January and April 2011.
(b) The main aim of the study was to determine the social and economic impact of the bicycles distributed, identify gaps in the project and obtain the recommendations that will guide the further rollout of the project.
(i) The findings of the study include the following:
· Lack of provision for non-motorised transport (NMT) infrastructure (walkways and bicycle lanes).
· Improvement in attendance and academic performance for learners who benefited from the project.
· No bicycle shops in the areas where bicycles were distributed.
· The current bicycle shops are not sustainable, because of low volume of bicycles in the rural areas.
(ii) The recommendations include:
· Increase the volume of bicycles to between 500 – 1 000 per community in order to make the necessary impact. This in turn will make the bicycle shops established sustainable.
· The Department of Transport should establish bicycle micro businesses in areas where more bicycles were distributed.
· The shops established should have additional activities that will increase the sustainability of the project.
· Comprehensive marketing and communication campaigns need to be implemented in order to change user perception towards non-motorised transportation.
· In order to make bicycles affordable, a subsidisation scheme needs to be introduced.
· Build new and retrofit the current infrastructure with sidewalks and cycle paths using the Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) initiative.
(3) Yes, the Department of Transport intends to facilitate the establishment of a local bicycle manufacturing plant.
(4) Yes, a study to determine the economic and social viability of establishing a local bicycle manufacturing plant was undertaken in this regard.
(a) Findings
· There are no companies that manufacture a complete bicycle in South Africa, due to relatively small local demand for commuter bicycles.
· There is only one company that manufactures a highly-priced bicycle frame for sports use, but still imports a great number of components from other countries.
· The cost of manufacturing bicycles locally cost more as compared to bicycles imported from the East, but importation of bicycles does not contribute towards local economic development.
· There is a low demand for bicycles in South Africa, due to issues of affordability, perception (cultural, norms and values), safety concerns and lack of infrastructure.
(b) Recommendations
· In order to meet the real demand for bicycles, there is a need to establish a local bicycle plant as part of a long term intervention by starting with assembly, frame manufacturing and lastly with other components.
· It is recommended that three bicycle manufacturing plants be established in Gauteng, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, in order to contribute to job creation and economic development in line with the comprehensive anti-poverty strategy.
· It is recommended for Government to engage the private sector in funding the establishment of a plant through private public partnerships (PPP), and also subsidise bicycles in order to make them affordable.
· There is a dire need to promote cycling through aggressive campaigning, marketing and communication in partnership with civil society and the private sector.
QUESTION NO 1589
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: FRIDAY, 01 JULY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 17 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 17 – 2011)
1589. Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) to ask the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether any conditions had been agreed upon when he decided to assist with the funding of the Gautrain Project; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details;
(2) whether any timelines have been put in place within which these conditions are required to be met; if not, why not; if so, (a) what are these timelines and (b) to which conditions have they been attributed;
(3) whether any punitive measures have been taken; if not, why not; if so, (a) against whom and (b) what are the relevant measures that have been taken in this regard? NW1791E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) At the time that Cabinet approved that the Department of Transport would assist with the funding of the Gautrain, a condition for the funding set by Cabinet was that the Gautrain should be integrated with the public transport system in Gauteng. In order to achieve this, a Gautrain Public Transport Integration Committee (PTIC) was established, consisting of representatives of the National Department of Transport, the Gauteng Department of Roads and Transport, the Gautrain Management Agency (GMC), the City of Tshwane, the City of Johannesburg, the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), to drive the integration. After the opening of the first phase of the system between OR Tambo International Airport and Sandton on 08 June 2010, the PTIC drafted a report, entitled "Integration of the Gautrain into the broader Gauteng transport system" as a review of the progress made to that date with the integration of the Gautrain. This report, dated 03 September 2010, was submitted to, and noted by Cabinet, on 30 March 2011.
(2) (a) and (b)
Beyond the milestone orientated reporting, timelines are prescribed in the Conditional Grant Framework for the Gautrain Rapid Rail Link. No other timelines were set, as integration is an ongoing process.
(3) No punitive measures have been taken, as the conditions have been complied with.
(a) and (b) Fall away.
QUESTION NO 1584
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: FRIDAY, 23 September 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 17 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 17 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether any progress updates have been provided by the SA Police Service with regard to the Deloitte Forensic Report into alleged fraudulent activities in Metrorail; if so, (a) what are the relevant details of the progress updates and (b) on what dates were the updates given; if not,
(2) whether his department has made any enquiries in this regard; if not, why not; if so, what were the outcomes;
(3) whether any action was taken against any person(s) implicated in this report; if not, (a) why not, (b) what was the designation of each such person, (c) where were they stationed and (d) what were the main functions that they performed; if so, what are the relevant details? NW1786E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
Criminal and disciplinary investigations against the persons implicated are still in process, and any further action will be dependent on the outcome of these investigations. However, these persons have been removed from their previous sensitive roles/positions they were employed in.
(b)
No update received.
(2) As a result of lack of progress on the case, a follow up was made by the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA). Hence, the case was escalated to the Priority Crimes Unit of the South African Police Services' (SAPS) commercial branch.
(3) (a)
There are two processes being followed – internal disciplinary hearings and criminal investigations by the SAPS. The one internal disciplinary case has been concluded in Durban. The person was found guilty and a six months suspended sentence was imposed. This case is being reviewed by PRASA's Corporate Office, as the sentence is deemed extremely lenient for the nature of the offence. The other internal disciplinary case is still proceeding.
(b)
The designations of the employees are:
· Durban: Metrorail Information Communication Technology (ICT) Desktop Support Technician
· Durban: Metrorail Finance Officer
· Gauteng North: Finance Officer
· Gauteng North: Finance Officer
· Gauteng North: Assistant Manager: Finance
· Gauteng North: ICT Administrator
(c)
Employees implicated are based in Durban and Gauteng North Metrorail.
(d)
The main functions performed were:
· ICT desktop support
· Processing of payments
· Cash management within finance
QUESTION NO 1563
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 10 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 10 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 15 – 2011)
Mr N J J van R Koornhof (Cope) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether his department has done a survey of all regional roads that need urgent repairs; if not, what is the position in this regard; if so,
(2) whether he will publicise the specified roads that were found to be in need of urgent repairs; if not, why not; if so, when;
(3) when will the roads be fixed? NW1731E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) Yes, the Department of Transport undertook an exercise to determine the "State of the Road Network for South Africa", which was presented at the Road Construction and Maintenance Summit of May 2010. In summary, we have established the following about the road network through the processing of all available road condition assessments from the various road authorities (Departments) across South Africa:
| Authority | Total Network | Visual Condition Data (km)2 | ||||||
| Very Poor (km) | Poor (km) | Fair (km) | Good (km) | Very Good (km) | Total km with Data | % Network With Data | ||
| SANRAL – Paved roads | 16 170 | 233 | 1 199 | 6 391 | 7 750 | 597 | 16 170 | 100 |
| Provinces – Paved roads | 48 176 | 3 532 | 7 200 | 15 179 | 16 470 | 4 706 | 47 088 | 97.74 |
| Metros – Paved roads | 51 682 | 421 | 1 256 | 6 707 | 20 104 | 12 250 | 40 737 | 78.82 |
| Municipalities – Paved roads | 37 691 | 121 | 272 | 1 579 | 5 271 | 3 623 | 10 866 | 28.83 |
| Provinces – Gravel roads | 136 640 | 19 327 | 33 219 | 35 344 | 13 863 | 1 981 | 103 733 | 75.92 |
| Metros – Gravel roads | 14 461 | 2 | 7 | 55 | 1 722 | 3 | 1 789 | 12.37 |
| Municipalities – Gravel roads | 302 158 | 123 | 485 | 849 | 557 | 117 | 2 131 | 0.71 |
| Totals km | 606 978 | 23 759 | 43 639 | 66 103 | 65 737 | 23 276 | 222 514 | |
| Totals % | 10.68 | 19.61 | 29.71 | 29.54 | 10.46 | 100 | ||
* Table: Summary of Road Condition in South Africa (Source: Road Construction & Maintenance Summit, May 2010, Department of Transport)
From the above table, roads in poor to very poor condition would require urgent attention. However where there is inadequate funding, the strategy is to prevent any further deterioration of roads in fair condition so that they do not slide into poor to the very poor category, whilst additional funds, when available, are then used to address the more costly rehabilitation of those roads in poor to very poor condition. The specifics about regional roads are not provided here due to the short response time and can be obtained from the various roads authorities.
(2) The Department of Transport will publish in a Government Gazette the provincial roads infrastructure projects list, to be funded from the Provincial Roads Maintenance Grant, which will be implemented during the 2011/12 to 2013/14 financial years as submitted by provinces.
(3) Falls away - addressed in part (2) above.
QUESTION NO 1516
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 10 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 10 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 15 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What is the stage of implementation of the (a) Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences (AARTO) and (b) Road Traffic Infringement Agency (RTIA);
(2) whether the implementation of the (a) Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences (AARTO) and (b) Road Traffic Infringement Agency (RTIA) is on schedule as initially planned; if not, why not; if so, what steps is his department taking in each case; if so, what are the relevant details in each case;
(3) on what date does he envisage that final implementation of the (a) Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences (AARTO) and (b) Road Traffic Infringement Agency (RTIA) will take place? NW1680E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
After the initial pilot, the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences (AARTO) is operational in the jurisdictional areas of the City of Tshwane and the City of Johannesburg since 01 April 2010. Preparations for the national roll-out are at an advanced stage. The Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) and the Road Traffic Infringement Agency (RTIA) have been engaging intensively with the key stakeholders and role-players to prepare them for the national roll-out. All provinces are represented in the National AARTO Task Team. In addition, provinces have established their own Provincial AARTO Task Teams to ensure that all the traffic departments of the local municipalities are aware of the AARTO requirements and are preparing for the implementation in accordance with the appropriate equipment and procedural standards.
(b)
The Road Traffic Infringement Agency (RTIA) is in the first stage of implementation with the core, critical staff already operating. There is an appointed and functioning RTIA Board that assumed its duties with effect from August 2010. In addition to the acting Registrar and acting Chief Financial Officer, there is a Deputy Registrar, Representations Manager and administrative staff. The Agency is in the process of finalizing the appointment of additional representations officers, as well as other essential staff by August 2011.
(2) (a)
The national roll-out of AARTO requires preparations to be done by a total of 214 provincial and municipal traffic authorities. Many of the municipalities did not budget for these preparations during the 2010/2011 financial year, which, amongst others, require the purchasing of computer equipment. Funds will be allocated by these authorities during the 2011/2012 financial year, which commenced on 01 July 2011. This omission by some authorities resulted in the delay of implementation during the previous financial year as originally planned. The main areas of concern that impacted negatively on the delayed implementation are inadequate budget availability beyond the control of the RTMC and RTIA for the provision of required equipment and infrastructure, the training of traffic officers and support personnel. However, arrangements have now been made to acquire the required funding by engaging the Department of Transport and National Treasury. Another area is the publication of the AARTO Replacement Regulations, the intensive engagement of critical stakeholders and role-players, the consideration of public comments and finalization of the Regulations to introduce the necessary efficiencies and to ensure an effective implementation and national rollout.
(b)
The Agency continues with the enhancement of its service delivery and mandate and, in particular, supporting the national rollout of the AARTO. The Agency regularly consults with the Department of Transport for assistance in the execution of its mandate and the increment of required capacity, with the secondment of the necessary expertise to assist the Agency in achieving service delivery. The main area of concern for the Agency is the provision of adequate staff capacity, which is impacted negatively by the inadequate budget allocation from the national fiscus.
(3) (a)
It is envisaged that an AARTO Summit will be held on a date to be announced in due course and will involve all role-players and stakeholders. The date for the national roll-out of AARTO will be announced soon after the Summit.
(b)
The Agency continuously engages with the Department of Transport to ensure that it can adequately provide the necessary support for the national roll-out, which is expected to be announced soon.
QUESTION NO 1515
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 10 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 10 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 15 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether any functions of the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC), as specified in its mandate, are being performed by another entity; if so, (a) which functions, (b) which entities are performing these functions, (c) since when has the entity in question been performing the specified tasks, (d) why are these functions being performed elsewhere and (e) what oversight and monitoring processes, procedures and mechanisms exist over the specified functions in this regard;
(2) whether there are any costs involved in letting other entities perform these functions; if not, why not; if so,
(3) whether there are any plans to revert the responsibility of performing these functions back to the RTMC; if not, why not; if so, what are the (a) timeframes and (b) further relevant details? NW1679E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
The Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) was established by an Act of Parliament, namely the Road Traffic Management Corporation Act, 1999 (Act No 20 of 1999), and is mandated with the following functions as per section 18 of the RTMC Act:-
I. Road Traffic Law Enforcement
II. Training of traffic personnel
III. Road Traffic information
IV. Accident investigations and recording
V. Communication and education
VI. Infrastructure safety audits
VII. Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences
VIII. Vehicle registration and licensing
IX. Vehicle and roadworthiness testing
X. Testing and licensing of drivers
(b)
The RTMC performs function (I) to (VII), while functions (VIII) to (X) currently rest with the Department of Transport (DoT). The latter must still be transferred from the DoT to the RTMC.
(c)
Function (VII) was transferred to the RTMC in 2009, when the Minister of Transport approved that the RTMC must operationalise the implementation of the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences (AARTO).
(d)
At that time (2009), the Road Traffic Infringement Agency (RTIA) was not yet established, thus it became important that the RTMC performs those administrative functions that should result in the full implementation of AARTO.
(e)
Monitoring processes, procedures and mechanisms form part of the report that the RTMC submits to the DoT, with specific reference to the resource utilization and requirement relating to the implementation of AARTO.
(2) Yes, there are costs involved, but parts of the costs are recoverable from the process issued under AARTO, and some in terms of the business plans submitted by the RTMC.
(3) (a) and (b)
At this stage the DoT is still monitoring the performance of the RTMC, subsequent to the unauthorized and irregular utilization of funds collected by the RTMC by the previous management, and the proposed interventions highlighted in the report of the Task Team that I appointed to carry out investigation into those allegations. The remainder of the functions will only be transferred once I am satisfied that the RTMC has implemented sound management processes.
QUESTION NO 1497
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 10 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 03 JUNE 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 14 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether he has found that the requirement for taxi operators to register with the SA Revenue Service (SARS) are adhered to before (a) operating licenses are issued and (b) recapitalisation takes place; if not, why not; if so, how many taxi operators have provided his department with proof that they are registered taxpayers since the relevant legislation came into effect;
(2) whether his department communicated the information provided by taxi operators to SARS; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details? NW1664E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) and (b)
In terms of the National Land Transport Act, 2009 (Act No 5 of 2009), a valid tax clearance certificate is a pre-requisite for the issuance of an Operating License. The Operating Licensing Board (OLB) cannot issue an operator with an operating license if all the requirements have not been met.The scrapping administrator has to ensure that the operator has a valid operating license, and since the tax clearance certificate is addressed by the OLB, it is not necessary for this function to be validated by the scrapping administrator.
Information related to the number of taxi operators that are registered taxpayers, is in the process of being collected from all OLB's in all provinces, and this will be forwarded the Honourable Member once it becomes available.
(2) The scrapping administrator annually provides the details of operators that have scrapped to the South African Revenue Services (SARS).
QUESTION NO 1399
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 10 AUGUST 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 27 MAY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 13 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether statistics are kept with regard to (a) crashes, (b) injuries and (c) deaths involving minibus taxis; if not, why not; if so, what are these statistics in each case for each of the past three calendar years;
(2) whether any research has been conducted to determine the reasons for these accidents; if not, why not; if so, what were the main (a) findings and (b) outcomes of the research;
(3) whether any action has been taken as a result of these findings; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details? NW1567E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1)Yes, the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) keeps statistics for road crashes and deaths.
(a)
The number and percentages of fatal crashes are provided in the table and the graph below:
| Province | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2008/09 | 2008/09 | 2009/10 | 2009/10 |
| No. of minibus | No. of minibus | No. of minibus | Change | % Change | Change | % Change | |
| Gauteng | 199 | 185 | 118 | -14 | -7.04 | -67 | -36.22 |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 179 | 145 | 238 | -34 | -18.99 | 93 | 64.14 |
| Western Cape | 87 | 101 | 103 | 14 | 16.09 | 2 | 1.98 |
| Eastern Cape | 125 | 94 | 131 | -31 | -24.80 | 37 | 39.36 |
| Free State | 48 | 61 | 68 | 13 | 27.08 | 7 | 11.48 |
| Mpumalanga | 101 | 87 | 91 | -14 | -13.86 | 4 | 4.60 |
| North West | 70 | 47 | 57 | -23 | -32.86 | 10 | 21.28 |
| Limpopo | 106 | 101 | 118 | -5 | -4.72 | 17 | 16.83 |
| Northern Cape | 9 | 11 | 8 | 2 | 22.22 | -3 | -27.27 |
| RSA | 924 | 832 | 932 | -92 | -9.96 | 100 | 12.02 |
The table above shows that the number of fatal crashes involving minibus taxis decreased by 9.96% from 2008 to 2009. However, an increase was recorded in this regard for 2009-2010, with 12.02%. The increase for 2009-2010 may be as a result of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup that was hosted in South Africa and on the road constructions.
(b) Injuries
The number of injuries is not available as the South African Police Services (SAPS), who attend accident scenes, does not record injuries. The Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) is in the process of developing an Accident Recording System (ARS) that will improve the reliability of data.
(c) The number of fatalities is provided in the table below:
Table A
| Province | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2008/09 | 2008/09 | 2009/10 | 2009/10 |
| Fatalities | Fatalities | Fatalities | Change | % Change | Change | % Change | |
| Gauteng | 210 | 168 | 114 | -42 | -20.00 | -54 | -32.14 |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 245 | 175 | 321 | -70 | -28.57 | 146 | 83.43 |
| Western Cape | 106 | 110 | 142 | 4 | 3.77 | 32 | 29.09 |
| Eastern Cape | 204 | 145 | 146 | -59 | -28.92 | 1 | 0.69 |
| Free State | 70 | 81 | 97 | 11 | 15.71 | 16 | 19.75 |
| Mpumalanga | 139 | 95 | 137 | -44 | -31.65 | 42 | 44.21 |
| North West | 75 | 56 | 78 | -19 | -25.33 | 22 | 39.29 |
| Limpopo | 115 | 130 | 140 | 15 | 13.04 | 10 | 7.69 |
| Northern Cape | 11 | 10 | 18 | -1 | -9.09 | 8 | 80.00 |
| RSA | 1175 | 970 | 1193 | -205 | -17.45 | 223 | 22.99 |
The table above shows that the number of fatalities follows the same trend as the fatal crashes. Whereby a decrease of 17,45% has been recorded for 2008/09 and an increase of 22,99% for 2009/10.
(2) (a) and (b)
Yes, the RTMC annually conducts an independent traffic offence survey to determine the level of lawlessness on the roads with regard to selected critical road traffic offences that mostly contribute to the occurrence of road crashes in the country.
The survey focuses on the following traffic offences (violations):
· Speed, urban and rural roads (light vehicles, heavy vehicles and taxis)
· Traffic signal offences
· Overtaking across barrier line
· Alcohol levels
· Driving licenses present and valid
· Wearing of seatbelts
· Vehicle fitness
· Correlation between vehicle registration plate and license disk
· Pedestrian compliance
· Presence of traffic officers, pedestrians, cyclists and animals on the roads
The RTMC conducts an independent annual traffic offence survey and the information obtained from the survey is mainly used for the following purposes:
· To determine the level of legal compliance/non compliance amongst road users on a year-on-year basis
· To measure the effect and impact of road safety intervention strategies such as communication, law enforcement programmes, amongst others
· To inform and recommend intelligent transport systems
· To inform and recommend automated law enforcement technologies
· To complement existing traffic safety information, as well as to identify factors that contribute to road traffic crashes
By comparing these rates on an annual basis, the long-term progress with regard to traffic discipline, law compliance, quality and safety in road traffic can be measured, monitored and evaluated.
The following are the causes of road traffic accidents:
· Speed
· Alcohol
· Roadworthiness
· Fatigue
· Overtaking on barrier line
The findings of the survey conducted in 2008, 2009 and 2010 confirmed the following traffic violations committed by minibus taxis:
· Speed
· Alcohol
· Smooth tyres
The tables below give the summary of the findings and the outcomes of the surveys conducted in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
Speed offences for Minibus Taxis – Urban Roads Summary of Speed Offences: Minibus Taxis – Urban Roads – Day Time| ANNUAL COMPARISONS: SPEED - % DRIVERS EXCEEDING LIMIT - MINIBUS TAXIS - DAY TIME - URBAN ROADS - ALL DAYS OF THE WEEK | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2008 | 35.8% | 48.7% | 36.2% | 39.1% | 40.7% | 40.0% | 32.2% | 49.4% | 19.5% | 38.9% |
| 2009 | 45.5% | 52.6% | 30.5% | 40.4% | 35.9% | 29.9% | 43.2% | 39.6% | 28.6% | 41.2% |
| 2010 | 21.0% | 34.3% | 39.2% | 35.6% | 33.1% | 16.5% | 9.3% | 36.7% | 9.9% | 27.2% |
| Annual change in offence rate % | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2007 - 2008 | 10.8% | 28.3% | 31.7% | 24.9% | 19.8% | 12.2% | -1.4% | 27.4% | 15.2% | 18.8% |
| 2008 - 2009 | 9.6% | 3.9% | -5.6% | 1.3% | -4.7% | -10.1% | 11.0% | -9.8% | 9.1% | 2.3% |
| 2009 - 2010 | -24.5% | -18.3% | 8.6% | -4.9% | -2.9% | -13.4% | -33.9% | -2.9% | -18.7% | -14.1% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of speed offences for minibus taxis during the day time in urban areas increased from 38.9% in 2008 to 41.2% in 2009, and decreased from 41.2% in 2009 to 27.2% in 2010. The Western Cape has the highest offence rate in this regard for 2010 with 39.2%, and the North West has the lowest offence rate with 9.3%. The Western Cape shows the largest increase in offence rate percentage, from 30.5% to 39.2%. The North West shows the largest decrease in offence rate percentage from 43.2% to 9.3%.
Summary of Speed Offences: Minibus Taxis – Urban Roads – Night Time| ANNUAL COMPARISONS: SPEED - % DRIVERS EXCEEDING LIMIT - MINIBUS TAXIS - NIGHT TIME - URBAN ROADS - ALL DAYS OF THE WEEK | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2008 | 47.8% | 42.6% | 24.7% | 30.9% | 47.6% | 44.0% | 27.2% | 45.0% | 12.0% | 39.7% |
| 2009 | 37.1% | 44.8% | 29.0% | 33.5% | 31.5% | 31.9% | 49.7% | 51.1% | 26.0% | 37.1% |
| 2010 | 27.3% | 43.3% | 69.8% | 36.3% | 18.8% | 31.1% | 4.8% | 11.0% | 5.5% | 34.3% |
| Annual change in offence rate % | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2007 - 2008 | 24.0% | 28.4% | 1.2% | 26.0% | 16.2% | 12.8% | -16.5% | 13.5% | -3.9% | 16.6% |
| 2008 - 2009 | -10.7% | 2.2% | 4.4% | 2.6% | -16.0% | -12.1% | 22.5% | 6.2% | 14.0% | -2.6% |
| 2009 - 2010 | -9.8% | -1.5% | 40.7% | 2.8% | -12.7% | -0.8% | -44.9% | -40.2% | -20.5% | -2.9% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of speed offences for Minibus Taxis during the night time in urban areas decreased from 39.7% in 2008 to 37.1% in 2009, and further decreased from 37.1% in 2009 to 34.3% in 2010. The Western Cape has the highest offence rate in this regard for 2010 with 69.8%, and the North West has the lowest offence rate with 4.8%. The Western Cape shows the largest increase in offence rate percentage, from 29.0% to 69.8%. The North West shows the largest decrease in offence rate percentage from 49.7% to 4.8%.
Speed offences for Minibus Taxis – Rural Roads
Summary of Speed Offences: Minibus Taxis – Rural Roads – Day Time| ANNUAL COMPARISONS : SPEED - % DRIVERS EXCEEDING LIMIT - MINIBUS TAXIS - DAY TIME - RURAL ROADS - ALL DAYS OF THE WEEK | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2008 | 39.0% | 33.9% | 55.4% | 19.5% | 49.3% | 59.0% | 40.0% | 66.8% | 53.3% | 43.5% |
| 2009 | 56.0% | 69.3% | 80.6% | 68.1% | 42.1% | 68.7% | 72.0% | 64.9% | 73.0% | 64.6% |
| 2010 | 36.3% | 57.3% | 60.5% | 47.2% | 70.9% | 35.3% | 36.1% | 43.6% | 49.6% | 47.0% |
| Annual change in offence rate % | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2007 - 2008 | 7.3% | 7.1% | 5.0% | -9.9% | 12.7% | 35.8% | 10.8% | 29.6% | 5.2% | 9.7% |
| 2008 - 2009 | 17.0% | 35.4% | 25.2% | 48.6% | -7.1% | 9.7% | 32.0% | -2.0% | 19.6% | 21.2% |
| 2009 - 2010 | -19.7% | -12.0% | -20.1% | -20.9% | 28.8% | -33.4% | -36.0% | -21.2% | -23.4% | -17.6% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of speed offences for minibus taxis during the day time in rural areas increased from 43.5% in 2008 to 64.6% in 2009, and decreased from 64.6% in 2009 to 47.0% in 2010. The Free State has the highest offence rate in this regard for 2010 with 70.9%, and Mpumalanga has the lowest offence rate with 35.3%. The Free State shows the largest increase in offence rate percentage, from 42.1% to 70.9%. The North West shows the largest decrease in offence rate percentage from 72.0% to 36.1%.
Summary of Speed Offences: Minibus Taxis – Rural Roads – Night Time| ANNUAL COMPARISONS: SPEED - % DRIVERS EXCEEDING LIMIT - MINIBUS TAXIS - NIGHT TIME - RURAL ROADS - ALL DAYS OF THE WEEK | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2008 | 32.9% | 34.0% | 59.6% | 21.9% | 45.4% | 59.5% | 55.5% | 66.7% | 43.8% | 42.7% |
| 2009 | 54.4% | 51.8% | 64.9% | 51.4% | 58.3% | 63.8% | 61.4% | 57.9% | 63.2% | 57.2% |
| 2010 | 26.0% | 60.5% | 61.9% | 58.1% | 68.8% | 36.8% | 3.7% | 40.0% | 67.0% | 43.5% |
| Annual change in offence rate % | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2007 - 2008 | 2.6% | 6.7% | 5.1% | -4.3% | 4.2% | 47.0% | 27.5% | 36.6% | -13.4% | 9.8% |
| 2008 - 2009 | 21.4% | 17.8% | 5.3% | 29.5% | 12.9% | 4.4% | 5.9% | -8.8% | 19.5% | 14.5% |
| 2009 - 2010 | -28.3% | 8.7% | -3.0% | 6.7% | 10.4% | -27.0% | -57.7% | -17.9% | 3.8% | -13.6% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of speed offences for minibus taxis during the night time in rural areas increased from 42.7% in 2008 to 57.2% in 2009 and decreased from 57.2% in 2009 to 43.5% in 2010. The Free State has the highest offence rate in this regard for 2010 with 68.8%, and the North West has the lowest offence rate with 3.7%. The Free State shows the largest increase in offence rate percentage, from 58.3% to 68.8%. The North West shows the largest decrease in offence rate percentage from 61.4% to 3.7%.
Summary of Speed Offences: Minibus Taxis – Rural Roads – Day Time vs. Night Time| DAY TIME VS NIGHT TIME COMPARISON: SPEED - % DRIVERS EXCEEDING LIMIT - MINIBUS TAXIS - RURAL ROADS - ALL DAYS OF THE WEEK | ||
| Province | Day | Night |
| GP | 36.3% | 26.0% |
| KZN | 57.3% | 60.5% |
| WC | 60.5% | 61.9% |
| EC | 47.2% | 58.1% |
| FS | 70.9% | 68.8% |
| MP | 35.3% | 36.8% |
| NW | 36.1% | 3.7% |
| LI | 43.6% | 40.0% |
| NC | 49.6% | 67.0% |
| RSA NWT | 47.0% | 43.5% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of speed offences for this category are higher during the day (47.0%) than during the night (43.5%). The province with the largest difference in day and night time offence rates is the North West, with 36.1% during the day, and 3.7% during the night. The province with the smallest difference in day and night time offence rates is the Western Cape, with 60.5% during the day, and 61.9% during the night.
Speed offences For Minibus Taxis – Weekday vs Weekend Comparisons Summary of Speed Offences: Minibus Taxis – Weekday vs. Weekend| WEEKDAY VS WEEKEND COMPARISON: SPEED - % DRIVERS EXCEEDING LIMIT - MINIBUS TAXIS - DAY AND NIGHT - URBAN AND RURAL | ||
| Province | Weekday | Weekend |
| GP | 23.0% | 35.6% |
| KZN | 52.3% | 39.2% |
| WC | 43.1% | 58.8% |
| EC | 41.7% | 52.3% |
| FS | 41.7% | 52.5% |
| MP | 25.6% | 26.1% |
| NW | 13.9% | 11.4% |
| LI | 34.1% | 40.5% |
| NC | 19.1% | 50.8% |
| RSA NWT | 33.6% | 40.3% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of speed offences for this category are lower during the week (33.6%) than over the weekend (40.3%). The province with the largest difference in week and weekend offence rates is the Northern Cape, with 19.1% during the week, and 50.8% over the weekend. The province with the smallest difference in week and weekend offence rates is Mpumalanga, with 25.6% during the week, and 26.1% over the weekend.
ALCOHOL OFFENCES
Alcohol offences for Minibus Taxis – Rural and Urban Roads Summary of Alcohol Offences: Minibus Taxis – Rural and Urban Roads – Day Time| ANNUAL COMPARISONS: ALCOHOL - % DRIVERS EXCEEDING LEGAL LIMIT - MINIBUS TAXIS - DAY TIME - URBAN AND RURAL - ALL DAYS OF THE WEEK | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2008 | 1.15% | 0.00% | 0.97% | 1.67% | 0.00% | 1.41% | 1.52% | 1.14% | 0.00% | 0.92% |
| 2009 | 1.08% | 0.00% | 1.37% | 0.00% | 4.30% | 1.05% | 1.64% | 3.13% | 0.00% | 1.19% |
| 2010 | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 1.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 1.41% | 0.00% | 0.13% |
| Annual change in offence rate % | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2007 - 2008 | 1.15% | 0.00% | 0.97% | 0.49% | 0.00% | 1.41% | 1.52% | 1.14% | 0.00% | 0.84% |
| 2008 - 2009 | -0.07% | 0.00% | 0.40% | -1.67% | 4.30% | -0.36% | 0.12% | 1.99% | 0.00% | 0.27% |
| 2009 - 2010 | -1.08% | 0.00% | -1.37% | 1.00% | -4.30% | -1.05% | -1.64% | -1.72% | 0.00% | -1.06% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of alcohol offences for minibus taxis in this category have increased from 0.92% in 2008 to 1.19% in 2009, and decreased from 1.19% in 2009 to 0.13% in 2010. Limpopo has the highest offence rate in this regard for 2010 with 1.41%, and Gauteng, along with all other provinces except Eastern Cape and Limpopo, has the lowest offence rate with 0.00%. The Eastern Cape shows the largest increase in offence rate percentage, from 0.0% to 1.0%. The Free Stateshows the largest decrease in offence rate percentage from 4.3% to 0.0%.
Summary of Alcohol Offences: Minibus Taxis – Rural and Urban Roads –Night Time| ANNUAL COMPARISONS: ALCOHOL - % DRIVERS EXCEEDING LEGAL LIMIT - MINIBUS TAXIS - NIGHT TIME - URBAN AND RURAL - ALL DAYS OF THE WEEK | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2008 | 0.00% | 0.00% | 3.08% | 3.57% | 1.27% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 2.99% | 0.87% |
| 2009 | 0.88% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 2.74% | 0.93% | 0.00% | 1.82% | 1.59% | 0.68% |
| 2010 | 1.14% | 1.67% | 1.00% | 1.64% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.85% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.96% |
| Annual change in offence rate % | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2007 - 2008 | 0.00% | 0.00% | 3.08% | 3.57% | -2.96% | 0.00% | -3.37% | -5.13% | 2.99% | 0.21% |
| 2008 - 2009 | 0.88% | 0.00% | -3.08% | -3.57% | 1.47% | 0.93% | 0.00% | 1.82% | -1.40% | -0.20% |
| 2009 - 2010 | 0.27% | 1.67% | 1.00% | 1.64% | -2.74% | -0.93% | 0.85% | -1.82% | -1.59% | 0.28% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of alcohol offences for minibus taxis in this category have decreased from 0.87% in 2008 to 0.68% in 2009 and increased from 0.68% in 2009 to 0.96% in 2010. KwaZulu-Natal has the highest offence rate in this regard for 2010 with 1.67%, and the Free State, along with Mpumalanga, Limpopo and the Northern Cape, has the lowest offence rate with 0.0%. KwaZulu-Natal shows the largest increase in offence rate percentage, from 0.0% to 1.67%. The Free State shows the largest decrease in offence rate percentage from 2.74% to 0.0%.
Summary of Alcohol Offences: Minibus Taxis – Rural and Urban Roads – Day Time vs. Night Time| DAY TIME VS NIGHT TIME COMPARISON: ALCOHOL - % DRIVERS EXCEEDING LEGAL LIMIT - MINIBUS TAXIS - URBAN AND RURAL - ALL DAYS OF THE WEEK | ||
| Province | Day | Night |
| GP | 0.0% | 1.1% |
| KZN | 0.0% | 1.7% |
| WC | 0.0% | 1.0% |
| EC | 1.0% | 1.6% |
| FS | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| MP | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| NW | 0.0% | 0.9% |
| LI | 1.4% | 0.0% |
| NC | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| RSA NWT | 0.1% | 1.0% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of alcohol offences for this category are lower during the day (0.1%) than during the night (1.0%). The province with the largest difference in day and night time offence rates is KwaZulu-Natal, with 0.0% during the day, and 1.7% during the night. The province with the smallest difference in day and night time offence rates is Free State, along with Mpumalanga and Northern Cape, with 0.0% during the day, and 0.0% during the night.
Summary of Vehicle Fitness – Worn Tires: Minibus Taxis – Urban and Rural Roads– Day Time and Night Time| ANNUAL COMPARISONS: WORN TYRES - % OF VEHICLES WITH WORN TYRES - MINIBUS TAXIS - DAY AND NIGHT - URBAN AND RURAL - ALL DAYS OF THE WEEK | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2008 | 5.0% | 8.9% | 6.4% | 9.2% | 7.4% | 6.8% | 8.0% | 9.4% | 8.0% | 6.9% |
| 2009 | 3.4% | 8.8% | 4.3% | 2.7% | 15.2% | 2.0% | 1.8% | 3.3% | 0.7% | 4.9% |
| 2010 | 6.3% | 3.6% | 8.0% | 4.0% | 1.7% | 3.6% | 7.3% | 4.0% | 4.3% | 5.3% |
| Annual change in offence rate % | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2007 - 2008 | -8.8% | 6.1% | 3.9% | 5.6% | -15.6% | 2.7% | -4.0% | -0.9% | 1.9% | -1.9% |
| 2008 - 2009 | -1.6% | -0.1% | -2.1% | -6.5% | 7.8% | -4.8% | -6.2% | -6.0% | -7.3% | -2.0% |
| 2009 - 2010 | 2.9% | -5.2% | 3.7% | 1.3% | -13.5% | 1.6% | 5.5% | 0.6% | 3.6% | 0.4% |
The information above shows that on a national basis the percentage of worn tyre offences for minibus taxis in this category have decreased from 6.9% in 2008 to 4.9% in 2009, and have increased from 4.9% in 2009 to 5.3% in 2010. The Western Cape has the highest offence rate in this regard for 2010 with 8.0%, and the Free State has the lowest offence rate with 1.7%. The North West shows the largest increase in offence rate percentage, from 1.8% to 7.3%. The Free State shows the largest decrease in offence rate percentage from 15.2% to 1.7%.
(3) The findings of the research are shared with the provincial, local and metropolitan traffic authorities. The National Rolling National Enforcement Plan, including recent initiatives to stop 1 million vehicles per month, put together by all authorities, is informed by the survey findings to address the traffic violations committed by minibus taxis and other vehicle types.
QUESTION NO 1398
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 07 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 27 MAY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 13 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What are the official road use statistics for the 2011 Easter period with regard to (a) the number of (i) crashes in the various vehicle classes, (ii) deaths in the various vehicle classes, (iii) injuries in the various vehicle classes and (iv) deaths involving minibus taxis and (b) geographical location of each specified accident;
(2) what dates are used to compile these statistics;
(3) what are the comparative statistics for the (a) 2010, (b) 2009 and (c) 2008 Easter period;
(4) whether any research has been conducted into the findings of these comparisons; if not, why not; if so, (a) in what form did this research take place and (b) what were the findings;
(5) whether any action has been taken in response to these findings; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details? NW1566E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
(i) Crashes in various vehicle classes
| Easter 2011 | Number of Vehicles per Type Involved in Fatal Crashes | |||||||||
| Vehicle Type | GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA |
| Motorcars | 9 | 22 | 3 | 7 | 17 | 13 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 89 |
| Minibuses | 4 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 29 |
| Minibus Taxis | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| Buses | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Motorcycles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| LDV's - Bakkies | 1 | 15 | 3 | 11 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 8 | 2 | 57 |
| Trucks | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 |
| Trucks - articulated | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Other and unknown | 1 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 14 |
| Total Motorised | 15 | 55 | 7 | 26 | 30 | 23 | 21 | 25 | 9 | 211 |
| Bicycle | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Animal drawn | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 15 | 56 | 7 | 26 | 30 | 23 | 21 | 25 | 9 | 212 |
(ii) Fatalities per vehicle type
| Easter 2011 | TOTAL Number of ALL Fatalities per Type of Vehicle | |||||||||
| Vehicle Type | GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA |
| Motorcars | 9 | 21 | 3 | 6 | 21 | 14 | 10 | 4 | 7 | 95 |
| Minibuses | 4 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 14 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 41 |
| Minibus Taxis | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Buses | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Motorcycles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| LDV's - Bakkies | 0 | 12 | 2 | 10 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 9 | 2 | 50 |
| Trucks | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| Trucks - articulated | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Other and unknown | 1 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 14 |
| Total Motorised | 14 | 50 | 6 | 24 | 34 | 33 | 18 | 28 | 10 | 217 |
| Bicycle | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Animal drawn | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 14 | 51 | 6 | 24 | 34 | 33 | 18 | 28 | 10 | 218 |
(iii)
The number of injuries is not available as the South African Police Services (SAPS), who attend to accident scenes, do not record injuries. The Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) is in the process of developing an Accident Recording System (ARS) that will improve the reliability of data.
(iv) Deaths involving minibus taxis
| Easter 2011 | TOTAL Number of ALL Fatalities per Type of Vehicle | |||||||||
| Vehicle Type | GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA |
| Minibus Taxis | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 |
(b) Fatal crashes per Route from 21 April to 25 April 2011 see attached
(2) Statistics are compiled as from the Easter Thursday to Easter Monday. However, the data is extracted after 30 days to make room for late reporting, as well as to comply with the 30 days period reporting, based on international standards.
(3) (a), (b) and (c)
The table below shows the number and percentage (%) of crashes and fatalities per user group:
| Number of Fatal Crashes and Fatalities per User Group | % of Annual Total | |||||||
| Year | Fatal | Drivers | Passen- | Pedes- | Total | Drivers | Passen- | Pedes- |
| Crashes | gers | trians | gers | trians | ||||
| 2008 | 219 | 77 | 137 | 83 | 297 | 25.93 | 46.13 | 27.95 |
| 2009 | 173 | 73 | 105 | 96 | 197 | 37.06 | 53.3 | 48.73 |
| 2010 | 184 | 62 | 105 | 77 | 244 | 25.41 | 43.03 | 31.56 |
| 2011 | 215 | 75 | 138 | 83 | 296 | 25.34 | 46.62 | 28.04 |
(4) (a) and (b)
Yes, the RTMC annually conducts an independent traffic offence survey to determine the level of lawlessness on our roads with regard to selected critical road traffic offences that mostly contribute to the occurrence of road crashes in the country. The survey focused on the following traffic offences (violations):
· Speed - urban and rural (light, heavy vehicles and taxis);
· traffic signal offences;
· overtaking across barrier line;
· alcohol levels;
· driving licenses present and valid;
· wearing of seatbelts;
· vehicle fitness;
· correlation between vehicle registration plate and license disk;
· pedestrian compliance; and
· presence of traffic officers, pedestrians, cyclists and animals on the roads.
The RTMC conducts an independent annual traffic offence survey and the information obtained from the survey is mainly used for the following purposes:
· To determine the level of legal compliance/non-compliance amongst road users on a year-on-year basis;
· to measure the effect and impact of road safety intervention strategies such as communication, law enforcement programmes, amongst others;
· to inform and recommend intelligent transport systems;
· to inform and recommend automated law enforcement technologies; and
· to complement existing traffic safety information as well as to identify factors that contribute to road traffic crashes.
By comparing these rates on an annual basis, the long-term progress with regard to traffic discipline, law compliance, quality and safety in road traffic can be measured, monitored and evaluated.
Standards that were appliedThe following standards have been applied to determine the acceptable traffic offence level:
· Exceeding the speed limit: Maximum 5% defective rate (i.e. not more than 5% offenders).
· Exceeding the legal breath alcohol limit: Maximum of 0.4% defective rate at any time of the day of night (i.e. not more than 1 offender in 250 drivers tested found over the legal limit).
· Crossing on a barrier line: Maximum of 1% barrier line offences (1 offence for every 100 convoys observed).
· Vehicles disobeying traffic signals: Maximum of 1% of red phases with an offence.
· Wearing of seat belt: Maximum 15% offence rate.
· The use of child restraints: Maximum 15% offence rate.
· Driver licence present and valid: Maximum 1% offence rate.
· The validity of the vehicle registration discs and correlation between the registration disc and number plate: Maximum 1% offence rate.
· Public Driver Permit present and valid: Maximum 1% offence rate.
· Worn vehicle tyres: Maximum 1% defective rate.
· Vehicle lights defective: Maximum 1% defective rate.
· The use of cellular phones while driving a vehicle: Maximum 1% offence rate.
· Pedestrians disobeying traffic signals: Maximum of 1% of red phases with an offence.
Comparison of combined road traffic offence indices for 2008, 2009 and 2010| Combined Offence Indexes | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2008 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 8.5 | 10.3 | 6.9 | 4.3 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 6.8 |
| 2009 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 5.9 | 5.0 | 6.2 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 5.6 |
| 2010 | 3.3 | 5.9 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 4.2 |
The information above shows that the overall index has decreased from 6.8% in 2008 to 5.6% in 2009, and also decreased from 5.6% in 2009 to 4.2% in 2010.
All other provinces show a decrease between 2008 and 2009 and between 2009 and 2010 offence indices, except for the Northern Cape, which remained constant on 4.3%.
Mpumalanga shows the highest offence index for 2009. The Northern Cape shows the lowest offence index for 2009.
The following changes were observed in South Africa with averages for the different offences used to calculate the overall offence index:
· The urban speed offence index decreased from 6.3 to 5.6.
· The rural speed offence index decreased from 7.9 to 5.6.
· The nighttime alcohol offence index decreased from 2.4 to 2.3.
· The unobserved seatbelt offence index for drivers decreased from 1.5 to 0.8.
· The unobserved seatbelt offence index for front passengers increased from 4.5 to 5.0.
· The daytime traffic signal offence index decreased from 24.7 to 12.3.
· The daytime barrier line offence index decreased from 16.1 to 10.3.
· The driver's license offence index decreased from 1.5 0.8.
· The PDRP offence index decreased from 2.0 to 0.8.
· The worn tires offence index decreased from 6.8 to 5.6.
· The front bright light offence index decreased from 1.1 to 1.0.
· The tail light offence index decreased from 0.6 to 0.5.
· The brake light offence index increased from 2.3 to 4.2.
Correlation between Fatal Crash Statistics and Traffic Offence RatesInformation on the comparison between fatal crashes and road traffic offences for the years 2008 and 2009 is given in the table below.
| Comparison between Fatal Crashes and Traffic Offence Indices | ||||||||
| Number of Fatal Crashes | Combined Offence Index | |||||||
| Prov. | 2008 | 2009 | Change | % Change | Prov. | 2008 | 2009 | Change |
| GA | 2 311 | 2 121 | -190 | -8.2 | GA | 6.1 | 5.8 | -0.3 |
| KZ | 2 117 | 2 249 | 132 | 6.3 | KZ | 7 | 6 | -1.0 |
| WC | 1 290 | 1 055 | -235 | -18.2 | WC | 8.5 | 5 | -3.5 |
| EC | 1 067 | 993 | -74 | -6.9 | EC | 10.3 | 5.9 | -4.4 |
| FS | 650 | 699 | 49 | 7.5 | FS | 6.9 | 5 | -1.9 |
| MP | 1 187 | 1 236 | 49 | 4.1 | MP | 4.3 | 6.2 | 1.9 |
| NW | 869 | 840 | -29 | -3.3 | NW | 5.4 | 5.1 | -0.3 |
| LI | 1 081 | 1 144 | 63 | 5.8 | LI | 5.6 | 5.7 | 0.1 |
| NC | 233 | 227 | -6 | -2.7 | NC | 6.4 | 4.3 | -2.1 |
| RSA | 10 805 | 10 564 | -241 | -2.2 | RSA | 6.8 | 5.6 | -1.2 |
The information above shows that, in general, there is some correlation in the change in the number of fatal crashes and the change in the overall combined offence index. For example:
· National level : offence index decreased by 1.2 and fatal crashes decreased by 2.2%
· Gauteng : offence index decreased by 0.3 and fatal crashes decreased by 8.2%
· Western Cape : offence index decreased by 3.5 and fatal crashes decreased by 18.2%
· Eastern Cape : offence index decreased by 4.4 and fatal crashes decreased by 6.9%
· Mpumalanga : offence index increased by 1.9 and fatal crashes increased by 4.1%
· North West : offence index decreased by 0.3 and fatal crashes decreased by 3.3%
· Limpopo : offence index increased by 0.1 and fatal crashes increased by 5.8%
· Northern Cape : offence index decreased by 2.1 and fatal crashes decreased by 2.7%
Exceptions in this regard are the following provinces which show a simultaneous increase or decrease in traffic offences and fatal crashes from 2008 to 2009:
· KwaZulu-Natal : offence index decreased by 1.0 and fatal crashes increased by 6.3%
· Free State : offence index decreased by 1.9 and fatal crashes increased by 7.5%
Correlation between fatal crash statistics and traffic offence ratesInformation on the comparison between fatal crashes and road traffic offences for the years 2009 and 2010 is given in the table below:
| Comparison between Fatal Crashes and Traffic Offence Indices | ||||||||||
| Number of Fatal Crashes | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2009 | 2 440 | 2 994 | 1 448 | 1 471 | 849 | 2 155 | 1 173 | 1 500 | 342 | 14 372 |
| 2010 | 1 872 | 2 243 | 1 029 | 1 207 | 775 | 1 177 | 855 | 1 121 | 256 | 10 535 |
| Change | -568 | -751 | -419 | -264 | -74 | -978 | -318 | -379 | -86 | -3 837 |
| % Change | -30.3% | -33.5% | -40.7% | -21.9% | -9.6% | -83.0% | -37.2% | -33.8% | -33.6% | -36.4% |
| Combined Offence Index | ||||||||||
| GA | KZ | WC | EC | FS | MP | NW | LI | NC | RSA | |
| 2009 | 5.8 | 6 | 5 | 5.9 | 5 | 6.2 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 5.6 |
| 2010 | 3.3 | 5.9 | 4.6 | 5 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 4.2 |
| Change | -2.5 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.9 | -0.9 | -2.6 | -1.5 | -0.9 | 0 | -1.4 |
| % Change | -43.1% | -1.7% | -8.0% | -15.3% | -18.0% | -41.9% | -29.4% | -15.8% | 0.0% | -25.0% |
The information above shows that there is strong correlation in the change in the number of fatal crashes and the change in the overall combined offence index. For example:
· National level : offence index decreased by 25.0% and fatal crashes decreased by 36.4%
· Gauteng : offence index decreased by 43.1% and fatal crashes decreased by 30.3%
· KwaZulu-Natal : offence index decreased by 1.7% and fatal crashes decreased by 33.5%
· Western Cape : offence index decreased by 8.0% and fatal crashes decreased by 40.7%
· Eastern Cape : offence index decreased by 15.3% and fatal crashes decreased by 21.9%
· Free State : offence index decreased by 18.0% and fatal crashes decreased by 9.6%
· Mpumalanga : offence index decreased by 41.9% and fatal crashes decreased by 83.0%
· North West : offence index decreased by 29.4% and fatal crashes decreased by 37.2%
· Limpopo : offence index decreased by 15.8% and fatal crashes decreased by 33.8%;
Exceptions in this regard are the following provinces, which show contradictions in traffic offences and fatal crashes from 2008 to 2009:
· Northern Cape: offence index remained the same and fatal crashes decreased by 33.6%
The surveys found the following traffic offences to be the most frequent:
· Driving under the influence of alcohol;
· Barrier line offences contributing to most head-on collisions;
Smooth and damaged tires; and
· Excessive and inappropriate speed.
(5) The findings and recommendations of the surveys are used as the basis for developing the annual rolling enforcement plans by all traffic authorities in the country.
QUESTION NO 1397
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 27 JUNE 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 27 MAY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 13 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether any tests, surveys, research or any other activities have been undertaken with regard to the use of cellular phones whilst an aircraft is in flight; if not, why not; if so, (a) what type of test or activity was conducted, (b) when did it take place and (c) what were the most important findings and outcomes;
(2) whether he intends permitting the use of cellular phones on board whilst an aircraft is in flight; if not, why not; if so, (a) what are the timeframes in this regard and (b)(i) which persons/entities will be involved and (ii) what are the relevant details with regard to the processes, procedures and mechanisms that will be involved? NW1565E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
When the issue (use of cellular phones on aircraft) was originally raised in the 1980s, there was mutual agreement between the mobile phone operators and the aviation industry to ban the use of mobile phones on board all aircraft. This is reflected in the minutes of the meeting to discuss or clarify the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) European Air Navigation Planning Group Conclusion 48/23 on the use of mobile phones on board of aircraft.
The South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) was one of the aviation bodies that banned the use of mobile phones on board aircrafts, through Part 91.01.9 of the South African Civil Aviation Regulations (SACARs), 1997, as amended, detailed in Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC) 64.12 - which prohibits operating Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs), which may adversely affect the performance of the systems and equipment on board the aircraft during flight.
(1) (a), (b) and (c)
No tests, surveys, research or any other activities have been undertaken in this regard.
This is a result of the following:
§ The SACARs do not address cellular phones, but rather speak of PEDs. A PED in this context is an all encompassing term that includes, but is not limited to, laptop computers, heart pacemakers, hand-held calculators, hearing aids and electronic games, audio tape players and recorders, CD/DVD/MP3 players, etc.
§ Some PED use is permissible on board aircraft, after a determination is made by the Pilot in Command, while some are restricted for use in critical flight phases.
§ To arrive at an amicable resolution to the issue, which is the permissibility of use of cellular phones, wireless networks on board aircraft, three cases need to be addressed. The first of these cases is the safety case, the second is the legal issue, and the third case is the SACAR evolution.
o A determination has to be made of hazards this exercise may present. A hazard is defined as any condition that compromises the overall safety of the airplane or a condition that significantly reduces the ability of the flight crew to cope with adverse operating conditions. One way of allaying fears of the worst happening would be to conduct a systematic and comprehensive examination of pertinent functions (loss and malfunctions) involved to identify and classify failure conditions according to their effects on the aircraft crew and occupants by requesting a safety case, e.g. a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA).
o ICAO Annex 8 deals with the Contracting State's responsibility of ensuring the airworthiness of aeronautical products. The guidance document, ICAO Doc. 9760, further details the role and responsibility of the State of Registry, i.e. the SACAA. SACAR Part 47.00.5 states that any Class I product which is to be placed on the South African Civil Aircraft Register for the first time shall be accompanied by the Type Acceptance Certificate. SACAR Part 21.08.3 requires aircraft to be issued with a Certificate of Airworthiness, to have been issued with a Type Acceptance Certificate (or Type Certificate) by the SACAA, and that the aircraft is in conformance with this Type Design.
o The SACAA conducts Type Acceptances in order to obtain sufficient data on the product to enable effective safety oversight of the product whilst on the South African Civil Aircraft Register, e.g. approval of modifications, continued airworthiness, etc. The type of acceptance exercise conducted by the Certification Engineering department of SACAA is the best platform to determine whether PEDs present no interference to the aircraft's navigation, communication or other electronic system.
§ Regulatory evolution is required to reflect advances in technology. Changing regulations is a herculean task that warrants time and resources, with emphasis on the latter.
(2) The responses under question (1) above adequately address this concern. The SACAA is mandated to ensure that the regulations are upheld and that it does not constrain the industry. This implies that PED use (i.e. cellular phones) on board aircraft, through certification engineering tasks only, shall be possible.
(a) Timeframes are subject to adequate financial backing and resource allocation.
(b) (i) The SACAA and operators are currently involved, to such an extent that SACAA has granted exemptions from SACAR Part 91.01.9 to some operators to conduct trials on the use of PEDs, i.e. the use of cellular phones in flight-mode.
(ii) The process shall be within the ambits of the South African Civil Aviation Regulations, 1997, as amended. The procedure (subject to SACAA internal vetting) might be, as stated in (b) (i), that operators have been granted exemptions for trials, and in doing so, collect data with specific information for comparison (which may include observations, incidents and or hazards). Although the monitoring of various types of cellular phones, that are being used in flight-mode has already been done by IEEE/ANS C63.4 and IEC CISPR 22, creating a new "local" body of knowledge is commended:
"If all operators collect this type of data with specific information, a large enough database could be generated to identify specific devices causing interference. The operator may want to obtain the services of a person or facility capable of determining non-interference to the aircraft's navigation, communication, or other electronic system. Personnel, specifically designated by the air carrier or commercial operator for this purpose, may make this determination using the process described in RTCA/DO-294. For other aircraft, the language of the rule expressly permits the determination to be made by the Pilot in Command or operators of the aircraft. Thus, in the case of rental aircraft, the renter-pilot, lessee, or owner-operator could make the determination." ~ AC91.21-1B.
The desired way would be that the Certification Engineering Department of the SACAA gets involved as early as possible, preferably during the type acceptance exercises. Alternatively, the manufacturer and SACAA can undertake to ensure that all communication and navigation wiring and line replacement units in the operator's fleet, meet Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 25.1309(a) and RTCA-DO160E (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) requirements, respectively, and therefore ensuring that aircrafts meet RTCA-DO294B requirements.
However, the funding and human resources at SACAA's disposal shall dictate the pace of change.
QUESTION NO 1383
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED:
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 27 MAY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 13 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether any funding has been provided to the SA Coast Guard Training Facility by (a) his department or (b) any of the agencies reporting to his department in the past four financial years; if so, for each specified year, (i) how much funding was provided, (ii) how were these funds distributed, (iii) to whom were these funds distributed and (iv) what was the purpose of providing these funds,
(2) whether any accreditation/ certification for maritime training was given to the trainees; if not, why not, if so, (a) to how many (b) in which categories? NW1550E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a), (b) (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)
South Africa does not have a Coast Guard Training facility. Coast guarding functions rest with the South African Navy until such time that the Department of Transport (DoT) is ready to take over this responsibility. No funding was ever provided in any financial year for this function, neither by the DoT or the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA), the DoT's maritime agency.
(2) (a) and (b)
The Department of Transport trained 120 seafarers for skippers' licences at entry level. When more funds become available, these seafarers will be trained for the second phase. They were accredited by SAMSA in 2010 and training was conducted in KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Limpopo.
QUESTION NO 1382
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 27 JUNE 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 27 MAY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 13 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether any of the boards of any agency under the jurisdiction of his department has any vacancies; if so, in each case, for the affected boards, (a) when did each of these vacancies occur and (b) what was the reason for the vacancies not being filled when the term of the previous incumbent expired,
(2) whether he has found that any of these boards in terms of their respective Acts are operating illegally; if so, which boards? NW1549E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) Yes, there are vacancies on the Boards of the Road Accident Fund (RAF), Airports Company South Africa Limited (ACSA) and the Air Traffic and Navigation Services Company Limited (ATNS).
(a) RAF: The vacancy occurred on appointment of the new Non-Executive Members of the RAF Board in October 2010, when one of the persons declined the appointment due to ill-health.
ACSA: The vacancies occurred when five of the Non-Executive Directors of the Board were retired at the Annual General Meeting held in September 2010.
ATNS: The vacancy occurred when one of the Non-Executive Members of the Board tendered his retirement from the Board in September 2010.
(b) The reason for not filling the vacancies at the time of expiry is that the appropriate candidates with the required expertise had to be identified.
(2) No, none of the Boards mentioned in (1) above are operating illegally – they operate legally within their respective legislative frameworks.
QUESTION NO 1370
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 27 JUNE 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 27 MAY 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 13 – 2011)
Mr J J Mc Gluwa (ID) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What is the detailed breakdown of the 70 000 proposed job opportunities to be created in the 2010-11 financial year in terms of his department's multi-billion rand road maintenance programme,
(2) whether these jobs will only provide temporary employment; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details? NW1550E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) The S'hamba Sonke Programme (Moving Together: Accelerating Rural Development Through Access and Mobility) addresses various issues, including unemployment by creating work opportunities and Full Time Equivalent (FTE's) jobs through the implementation of road infrastructure capital and maintenance projects.
A work opportunity refers to paid work created for an individual on an Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) project for any period of time. The same person can be employed on different projects and each period of employment will be counted as a job opportunity.
A Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Job refers to one person-year of employment. One person year is equivalent to 230 person days of work where person-years of employment equal total number of person days of employment created for targeted labour during the year, divided by 230 days. For task-rated workers, tasks completed are used as a proxy for 8 hours of work per day.
Based on the business plan, and information supplied by Provinces to the Department of Transport, the following is a breakdown of job opportunities and jobs per Province for the 2011/12 financial year:
| Province | Number of Job Opportunities | Number of Full Time Equivalent Jobs |
| Eastern Cape | 32 965 | 14 333 |
| Free State | 10 370 | 4 509 |
| Gauteng | 5 636 | 2 450 |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 57 000 | 24 783 |
| Limpopo | 23 976 | 10 424 |
| Mpumalanga | 15 740 | 6 843 |
| Northern Cape | 1 568 | 682 |
| North West | 6 427 | 2 794 |
| Western Cape | 1 375 | 598 |
| TOTALS | 155 057 | 67 416 |
(2) Construction jobs are temporary by nature. Sustainable jobs are created from periodic routine maintenance work such as cleaning of drains and grass cutting. Out of the estimated 155 057 jobs to be created, a total of 67 416 jobs shall be Full Time Equivalent jobs.
QUESTION NO 1352
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: TUESDAY, 24 MAY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: THURSDAY, 21 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 12 – 2011)
Mr G R Morgan (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether, with reference to a notice published in The Mercury on 11 April 2011, regarding his intention to enter into a lease agreement in terms of section 4 of the Seashore Act, Act 21 of 1935, with eThekwini Municipality for the purpose of leasing the seashore and seabed between Vetch's Pier and the North Pier of Durban Harbour, he has consulted the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs on excluding the specified land from coastal public property in terms of section 27(4) of the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act (NEMICMA), Act 24 of 2008; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details;
(2) whether, in declaring his intention to lease the abovementioned land, he has taken sections (a) 12, (b) 13 and (c) 27 of the NEMICMA into consideration; if not, what is the position in each case; if so, what are the relevant details in each case? NW1498E
____________________________________________________________________________
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) Section 3 and 4 of the Sea-shore Act, 1935, (Act No 21 of 1935), empowers the Minister to let or lease, sell or donate any portion of the sea-shore and the sea-bed within the jurisdiction of the harbour or port for, amongst other activities, recreation and amusement, construction of piers, wharves, jetties, landing strips, breakwaters, promenades, embankments, esplanades, buildings, whaling stations and any work that the Minister may deem necessary for the economic development of the country.
The Sea-shore Act further makes provisions for the Minister to let the sea-shore and the sea-bed, provided that lease of the land in question will, amongst other things, have no serious negative effects for the general public to enjoy the sea-shore and the sea, and that the Minister must first consult the Local Authority in any decision he is going to make regarding the lease.
A total of 14 appeals were lodged with the former MEC for Agriculture, Environmental affairs and Rural Development, KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government, Mr Mtholephi Mthimkhulu, against his Department's authorization. These appeals were dealt with and approval of the Environmental Impact Assessment was upheld by Mrs Lydia Johnson, the MEC for Agriculture, Environmental Affairs and Rural Development on the 06th August 2009.
The Department of Transport (DoT) extensively consulted in November and December 2009 with relevant stakeholders, including the Port Consultative Committee for the Port of Durban, Transnet National Ports Authority, the Ports Regulator of South Africa, South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) and the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs.
The Branch: Maritime Transport Regulation in the Department of Transport consulted with the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs with regards to coming into force of the Integrated Coastal Management Act, 2008 (Act No 24 of 2008), against the Sea-shore Act of 1935. The Department of Water and Environmental Affairs confirmed that although the Integrated Coastal Management Act came into force from the 1st of December 2009, section 65 and 66 relating to leases of the sea-shore and the sea are not in force, meaning that the Sea-shore Act remains in force in this regard. This implies that the Minister of Transport has jurisdiction over the matter.
Further consultation has been held between the Department of Transport and the Durban Point Development Company that is working with the eThekwini Municipality on this project, on whether the Integrated Coastal Management Act is in force with regards to the leasing of the coastal area or the Sea-shore Act.
(2) (a), (b) and (c)
The DoT's Maritime Transport Regulation Branch consulted with the National Ports Authority to verify whether the land in question is coastal public property, that it is within the alienated zone of the harbour as outlined in section 10 of the National Ports Act, 2005, (Act No 12 of 2005), the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act (NEMICMA), 2008 (Act No 24 of 2008), and section 2 of the Sea-shore Act of 1935. The Harbour Master for the Port of Durban, Captain Rufus Lekala, confirmed that the land in question is within the port limits as defined by the Minister in the Port Regulations. Hence, the application was tabled to the Department of Transport by the eThekwini Municipality.
The eThekwini Municipality is aware that prior to any signing of the lease agreement with the Minister of Transport, the following documents, not limited to, have to be submitted for the approval of the Minister:
§ A reversionary right to be retained by the Minister;
§ an environmental management and protection plan that will have to be approved by the Safety, Health and Environmental Quality Control (SHEQ) Manager at Transnet National Ports Authority; and
§ a development plan that will be retained by the Department of Transport.
The Maritime Industry has been widely consulted and has approved the project. Furthermore, the Minister of Transport will continue to consult with stakeholders that have lodged objections.
QUESTION NO 1293
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: TUESDAY, 14 JUNE 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: THURSDAY, 21 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 12 – 2011)
Adv A de W Alberts (FF Plus) asked the Minister of Transport:
How many (a) African, (b) Coloured, (c) Indian and (d) White employees are there in each of the public institutions that report to him in terms of Schedules 1 to 3D of the Public Management Act, Act 1 of 1999? NW1434E
____________________________________________________________________________
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
Air Services Licensing Council (ASLC)
The ASLC is a statutory Council consisting of five members each. The Council does not employ any staff as all administrative work is done by employees of the Department of Transport.
Airports Company South Africa Limited (ACSA)
(a) African : 1 455
(b) Coloured : 392
(c) Indian : 195
(d) White : 312
Air Traffic and Navigation Services Company Limited (ATNS)
(a) African : 327
(b) Coloured : 83
(c) Indian : 74
(d) White : 382
Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA)
(a) African : 144
(b) Coloured : 6
(c) Indian : 5
(d) White : 28
South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA)
African : 274
(a) Coloured : 18
(b) Indian : 22
(c) White : 109
South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA)
(a) African : 104
(b) Coloured : 25
(c) Indian : 7
(d) White : 44
South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL)
(a) African : 83
(b) Coloured : 33
(c) Indian : 23
(d) White : 80
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA)
(a) African : 11 733
(b) Coloured : 1 619
(c) Indian : 279
(d) White : 1 718
Road Accident Fund (RAF)
(a) African : 1 345
(b) Coloured : 169
(c) Indian : 122
(d) White : 231
Railway Safety Regulator (RSR)
(a) African : 48
(b) Coloured : 4
(c) Indian : 2
(d) White : 11
Road Traffic Infringement Agency (RTIA)
(a) African : 9
(b) Coloured : 1
(c) Indian : 0
(d) White : 0
Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC)
(a) African : 333
(b) Coloured : 13
(c) Indian : 7
(d) White : 10
Ports Regulator of South Africa
(a) African : 9
(b) Coloured : 2
(c) Indian : 2
(d) White : 2
QUESTION NO 1225
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: TUESDAY, 24 MAY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 11 – 2011)
Mr S C Motau (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) How does the SA Maritime Safety Authority (Samsa) intend to create employment opportunities in the 2012-13 financial year, (b) what jobs will be created and (c) what are the expected costs involved;
(2) whether Samsa has set any targets in this regard; if not, why not; if so, (a) what are the details of these targets, (b) how were they derived, (c) what are the time frames attributed to these targets and (d) what (i) processes, (ii) procedures and (iii) mechanisms exist to ensure that these targets are met? NW1363E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
The core job creation programme of the South African Maritime Safety Association (SAMSA) entails attracting commercial vessels to the South African Ship Registry. Aspects driving the ship registry are ownership, mortgage ranking, health of seafarers, tonnage tax and other incentives. This initiative will not only ensure creation of employment opportunities, but will secure the supply of key national items like fuel or oil for the proper functioning of the economy.
SAMSA also realises that poor education and skills are critical impediments to job creation in the sector and to the country at large. SAMSA, in recognition of this imperative, has initiated a cadetship programme in partnership with the South African Maritime Training Academy and six shipping lines. Through this programme, SAMSA aims to increase the number of secured berths for cadets. This initiative will equip the maritime sector with the means of meeting the current officer and ratings shortage in the country and globally. The facilitating mechanism in the programme is the subsidising of the cost of berths with public funds through SAMSA.
Other targeted maritime training and development areas are the establishment of a network of high schools offering maritime subjects in all 8 port cities, expansion of the Further Education and Training colleges (FET) and Universities maritime courses. This should create indirect jobs for additional lecturers, instructors, private trainers, et cetera.
However, with the long-term policy objective of growing the sector and elevating South Africa's ranking as a maritime nation, more may have to be done to increase not only the capacity of training institutions to supply cadets, but more critically the capacity of the system to berth cadets in order for them to qualify as certified officers, hence, the need to attract commercial vessels to the national flag.
(b)
It is anticipated that the National Ship Registry and the cadetship programme will create direct employment opportunities for officers and ratings such as deck engineers. Both programmes and other skills development initiatives also imply opportunities for ancillary support services. In this regard, many indirect employment occupations will be created.
The following table summarises the type of occupations to be created in the maritime sector:
| Industry | Type of occupation |
| Shipping (National Ship Register) | Navigation Officers Engineers Ratings |
| Maritime Port and Auxiliary Services | Artisans Naval Architects Ship and Boat Repairers Ship and Boat builders Hydrographers Marine Attorneys Maritime Economics Marine Financiers Maritime Technologists Hospitality officers (Chefs, Stewards, et cetera) |
| Training Institutions | Lecturers/Trainers/Assessors Administration staff |
| Public (SAMSA) | Management Ship and Boat Surveyors Inspectors Maritime Security Environmentalists |
(c)
§ National ship register - R300 000 in 2011/12.
§ Cadetship programme R6 million in 2011/12.
§ High Schools and expanded maritime courses – R670 000 in 2011/12.
§ Public (SAMSA) R18 million per annum of which about R12 million is for Inland Waterways Inspectorate.
(2) (a), (b) and (c)
SAMSA aims to establish a National Ship Registry of 300 trading vessels by 2025, initially targeting the 1990 levels of around 75 vessels to the South African Registry by 2018. It is projected this will create direct employment opportunities for 3 000 officers (Marine Navigators and Engineers) and about 15 000 ratings (non-officers) seafarers. This amounts to about 480 new officers per annum over the next 7 years. On average, a vessel requires approximately 40 local people (20 people for each shift that takes place). To reach this target implies an equal amount of seafarers needing to be trained and available in South Africa.
It is also documented that each job at sea provides an economic multiplier factor of 8 to 10 shore-based support jobs which implies this development will provide many employment opportunities ashore.
(d) (i), (ii) and (iii)
South African Ship Registry Programme
SAMSA was instrumental in the establishment of the coordinating forum – the Maritime Economic Development Policy Cluster led by the Department of Transport (DoT) and is working in conjunction with other government departments, such as Trade and Industry, National Treasury, Justice, Labour, Public Enterprises and Home Affairs and development finance institutions, such as the Industrial Development Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa to ensure that the National Ship Registry objectives are realized.
South African Sea Cadetship Programme
The Sea Cadetship Programme is already in the implementation phase, with an initial intake of 18 cadets placed in April 2011. SAMSA aims to make annual placements, commencing with 140 officer cadets (and 560 ratings trainees) by the end of 2011, rising to 250 officers (and 1 000 ratings trainees) by 2014, and reaching 480 officers (and 1 920 ratings trainees) placed for every fiscal year. Thus, the successful implementation of the MoU between SAMSA, the Seafarer Recruitment/Placement Agencies and shipping lines is vital. Additional government funding is also critical in order to sustain the initiative. SAMSA has also entered into MoUs with two placement agencies already, pledging about R6 million to each for cadets placed in terms of the Service Level Agreements and Contracts of Agreement.
Maritime High Schools Network Programme
SAMSA is in the process of concluding Cooperation Agreements with relevant provincial government departments (e.g. Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal Departments of Education) to ensure the establishment (in some instances revival) of Maritime High Schools. For the 2011/12 financial year, SAMSA and the Eastern Cape Provincial Government jointly funded and placed the initial intake of Grade 10 learners in Simon's Town, who will return to the Eastern Cape as senior learners when the Province launches its own Maritime High School in 2012/2013. The target is a network of High Schools offering maritime studies in Nautical, Maritime Economics, Maritime Hospitality (Cruise Industry focused) and Fishing, by 2014 as follows: 1 in the Northern Cape, 1 more in the Western Cape, 2 more in KwaZulu-Natal and 2 in the Eastern Cape. Therefore, successful implementation of such MoUs is very important.
National Schools Cadetship Induction Programme
SAMSA has undertaken to resuscitate the floundering and mothballed Sea Cadetship Programme aimed at learners at basic education levels operating throughout the coastal and inland provinces, in partnership with the SA Navy. The programmes serve as a maritime awareness for children as young as 13 years until finishing school level (Grade 12).
Inland Waterways Boating Safety Programme
SAMSA is involved in promoting and enforcing inland waterways boating safety. This includes campaigns on boating safety awareness. The waterways lie in every province and district municipality. The programme will create about 50 direct new SAMSA jobs and 900 municipal safe boating jobs (at about 60% of municipalities, employing 3 employees and the rest 1 person each to promote safe boating), with manifold indirect job opportunities created.
QUESTION NO 1200
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: TUESDAY, 24 MAY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 11 – 2011)
Mr D C Ross (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether, with regard to the purchasing of rail coaches by (a) the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) and (b) any of its affiliated entities in the (i) 2011-12, (ii) 2012-13 and (iii) 2013-14 financial years, the said entities have considered public-private partnerships; if not, why not; if so, what is the nature of each consideration;
(2) whether a decision has been made in each case; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details? NW1336E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) and (b) (i), (ii) and (iii)
The Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) is currently engaged in a detailed feasibility study, which will enable it to determine the level of private sector participation in the acquisition of new rolling stock. There may be areas of private sector participation relevant to the financing and maintenance of new rolling stock. To further assist PRASA in this endeavor, the Public Private Partnership Unit (PPPU) of National Treasury is providing technical assistance with the feasibility study. Only once the feasibility study has been completed, will PRASA be able to decide the exact and appropriate level of private sector participation in the process.
(2) As indicated, no decision will be made on the level of private sector participation until the feasibility study has been completed. PRASA's requirements in this regard will be made clear in the tender documentation to be released to the market at the appropriate time.
QUESTION NO 1199
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: TUESDAY, 24 MAY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 11 – 2011)
Mr D C Ross (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) In respect of the (a) 2011-12, (b) 2012-13 and (c) 2013-14 financial years, how many rail coaches will be purchased by (i) the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) and (ii) any of its affiliated entities;
(2) in respect of all coaches that will be purchased (a) which entity will purchase coaches, (b) when will they be purchased, (c) at what cost and (d) from which supplier will they be bought;
(3) what (a) procedures, (b) processes and (c) mechanisms were used to choose the suppliers from which coaches will be purchased;
(4) whether these coaches will be financed; if not, why not in each case; if so, what are the relevant details to (a) the finance provider and (b) the terms and conditions relevant to the finance provider in each case;
(5) in respect of each entity, how many (a) permanent and (b) temporary employment opportunities will be created over the three year period? NW1335E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a), (b), (c) (i) and (ii)
In respect of the financial years 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14, the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) and its affiliates will not receive any rolling stock. PRASA is currently undertaking an in-depth feasibility study, which will confirm its detailed requirements for rolling stock and related infrastructure upgrades, all of which will be linked to financing requirements and a high level procurement plan. It is anticipated that the first batch of coaches will be ordered late 2012, with a lead time of three years.
(2) (a), (b), (c) and (d)
PRASA will be the entity that purchases rolling stock and hopes to see the first of the new coaches arrive in the 2015/16 financial year. Since no procurement process has taken place yet, PRASA has not identified any rolling stock manufacturers as suppliers and, therefore, has no associated costs or financiers or coaches. However, PRASA did hold a very successful market engagement between the 5th and 7th of April 2011 to gather information from both potential rolling stock manufactures and potential financiers from international and local markets, which will inform the outcome of the feasibility study.
(3) (a), (b) and (c)
As stated above, no suppliers have been chosen yet. However, PRASA is committed to following a fair, open and transparent procurement process, which is required under the provisions of the Constitution and the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No 1 of 1999) (PFMA), as amended.
(4) (a) and (b)
The results of the feasibility study will determine what capital portions of the rolling stock recapitalization will be financed from the National Treasury and which portions will be financed from private sector sources. The study results are expected to be released in June 2011.
(5) (a) and (b)
We can confirm that a significant amount of job opportunities will be created through this programme. We are also committed to the IPAP2 process, where we will ensure the procurement of rolling stock over the envisioned 18 year period will give effect to the Department of Trade and Industry's localization policy and the establishment of manufacturing and supplier plants in South Africa. This will revitalize the local rolling stock manufacturing capacity in the country, transfer skills and create significant long term decent employment opportunities.
| el Bay | RSA | Pleasure craft | Drowning occurred resulting in the death of two people. | No further action. |
QUESTION 1198
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: WEDNESDAY, 07 SEPTEMBER 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 11 – 2011)
Mr D C Ross (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) In respect of the past three financial years for which information is available, (a) how many reports regarding safety issues have been compiled by the SA Maritime Safety Authority (Samsa) and (b) what is the (i) theme and (ii) title of each report;
(2) whether any of these reports deal with or have been compiled as a result of an investigation; if so, (a) which reports, (b) what is the nature of each investigation and (c) what are the main (i) findings and (ii) recommendations of each investigation;
(3) whether his department acted upon any of the recommendations made in each report that resulted from an investigation; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details;
(4) whether any (a) arrests and (b) prosecutions have been made as a result of these investigations; if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details in each case? NW133E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) Of the major incident reports that the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) attended to, the major ones are three reports.
(b) (i)
The theme of all the reports is based on establishing facts relating to accidents that happened in so far as finding answers to the following questions are concerned:
Ø What happened?
Ø How did it happen?
Ø Why did it happen?
Ø What can be done to prevent similar incidents from happening in the future?
(ii) Title of each report:
§ "Enquiry into the Sinking of Motor Fishing Vessel (MFV) Kingfisher."
§ "Report of the Incident Which Led to the Death of Three Passengers on Board of the Shark Cage Diving Vessel, SHARK TEAM."
§ "Capsize of a Barge at Barham Bay, Emalahleni, (Witbank)"19th November 2010: Report (in terms of section 265 of the Merchant Shipping, 1951, Act 57 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on Preliminary Enquiry Held in Terms of section 264 of the Act."
(2) (a) All the reports deal with and were compiled as a result of investigations.
(b) The nature of all the investigations listed above was to establish facts by answering questions listed in (1) (b) above.
(i) and (ii)
Findings of the "Enquiry into the Sinking of Motor Fishing Vessel Kingfisher":
Ø The vessel was not using appropriate navigation charts for that coast line therefore contravened Regulation 5 of the Merchant Shipping (Carriage of Charts and Nautical Publications) Regulations, 2002. This is believed to be the primary cause of the accident as the skipper navigated in an area noted on the chart as dangerous in the prevailing weather conditions;
Ø The skipper failed to exercise prudent seamanship and left the area prior to the onset of a known deterioration in the weather conditions;
Ø The ship owner failed to conduct quarterly safety audits, therefore contravened regulation 39A of the Maritime Occupational Safety Regulations, 1994; and
Ø The ship owner failed to provide SAMSA with crew medical examination certificates, therefore in contravened of section 101 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1951.
A recommendation relating to the above findings was made to the Minister of Transport based on Section 266 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1951 which empowers the Minister to convene a Court of Marine Enquiry whenever an allegation of incompetency or misconduct has been made against the owner, master or crew member of the vessel; when a vessel has been lost, abandoned or stranded; when an accident has occurred on board or such vessel has been damaged or caused damage to another vessel; or when loss of life or serious injury to any person has occurred on board.
Findings relating to the Report of Death on the Shark Cage Diving Vessel were:
Ø The vessel's cabin and viewing deck were missing after it was recovered, but the hull appeared undamaged.
Ø Witnesses confirmed that the vessel had been struck by a large wave while it was anchored.
Ø There appears to have been confusion as to the number of passengers on board and how many had been recovered or how many were missing (only a booking list was available).
Ø The vessel had been operating in the designated area for such operation, as defined by the Marine and Coastal Management (MCM), and had the appropriate permit issued by MCM.
Ø Information exists in the Admiralty Publication (Mariner's Handbook), which quotes from Africa Pilot Volume III publication that ships have reported encountering abnormal waves in the area.
Ø The crew on board the vessel did not have the appropriate training to work on board, except the skipper who had an expired interim skipper's certificate of competency.
Ø Owners and skippers engaged in such operations stated that passengers sometimes put them under pressure to go to sea because of not wanting to miss such a "lifetime" opportunity of shark cage diving.
Ø The vessel was ultimately repaired and issued with the appropriate local general safety certificate to resume operations.
Recommendations were made to the Minister for the convening of a Court of Marine Inquiry. Further findings relating to the above findings were:
§ Shark cage diving by its very nature can be considered as a risky venture. Passengers need to be fully briefed of what the trip will involve and all associated dangers and risks before boarding the vessel. This briefing should include sea sickness, poor weather and sea conditions, procedures in the event of an emergency (medical and other) and a practical lifejacket demonstration. Once passengers have been informed they should have the option of not continuing with the trip should they wish.
§ Following on with the risks involved with shark cage diving owners need to examine their own operations and put in place control measures to reduce the likelihood of incidents and have procedures in place covering various scenarios. Examples of incidents could be: medical emergency involving a passenger, capsize during exiting a launch site, shark bite, emergency transfer of passengers at sea, inoperable engines, vessel drifting onto a lee shore, fire during refueling etc.
Emergency services should be informed of these procedures.
o A passenger and crew list must be left with the harbor controller at the launch site prior to departure of each vessel. This list will then be close at hand should it be required in an emergency. This list must contain the name of the vessel and names of all passengers and crew, the intended area of operation and the expected times of departure and arrival. The primary purpose of this list is for use in an emergency, as such the layout and writing must be clear and legible. This requirement is as per Merchant Shipping (national Small Vessels Safety) Regulations of 2007, as amended, and Marine Notice 7 of 2008.
o Shark cage diving vessels must be manned by suitably trained personnel. Some operators have volunteer programmes whereby young people learn about sharks and assist with the shark cage diving operation. Volunteers must not be used in place of crew unless they have been properly trained and fulfill all the requirements for crew as stated in the Merchant Shipping (National Small Vessels Safety) Regulations of 2007, as amended. Volunteers, if carried and not complying with these regulatory requirement,s should be considered as passengers.
o Sea conditions on the Cape South Coast are seldom flat and calm, and television and internet weather forecasts may not always be correct. Owners and skippers of shark cage diving vessels should be aware that there are services available which can be area and operation specific. These services may be able to trigger warnings of large swell and wave focusing.
Findings of the report relating to "Capsize of a Barge at Barham Bay":
Ø The accreditation issued by SAMSA to the Authorised Agency had expired and accordingly it was not accredited as an Authorised Agency, either at the time when the barge was issued with a Certificate of Fitness (COF), or at the time of the casualty.
Ø Leaving aside the accreditation issue, the Authorised Agency unlawfully issued the COF in contravention of the Merchant Shipping (Small Vessels Safety) Regulations 2007 (Regulations) and Marine Notice 13 of 2007, insofar as the vessel was operating as a commercial vessel, the number of passengers certified exceeded twelve, and the length of the barge exceeded nine metres.
Ø The Agency's inspector wrongfully issued the provisional COF.
Ø The Agency's inspector had limited or no knowledge of the Regulations or Marine Notice 13 of 2007.
Ø Information and updates conveyed by the Agency to its inspectors are open to scrutiny.
Ø The Agency's procedures for certification and registration of vessels are open to criticism.
Ø The Agency's procedures for appointing inspectors are open to scrutiny.
Ø The barge did not have a valid COF
Ø The owner of the barge, in breach of Regulation 14 of the Merchant Shipping (Small Vessels Safety) Regulations, failed to ensure that the barge was operated by a skipper holding a valid Certificate of Competency (CoC) or that it was crewed by a competent crew.
Ø The skipper of the barge did not have any or any valid CoC in terms of the Regulations.
Ø The barge was certificated for "Sports and Recreation" use, but was used as a passenger vessel in violation of the Regulations.
Ø The barge was overloaded and unstable on any basis, even if the COF had been valid in allowing 21 passengers.
Ø The owner of the barge apparently carried out modifications to the barge since the barge was last surveyed and failed to have his COF re-issued.
Ø An expired fire extinguisher was found on board the barge during the investigation.
Ø The barge crew failed to ascertain the seriousness of water ingress, no efforts were apparently made to pump out water nor were the effects of passengers on the top deck and free surface appreciated by the crew.
Ø The crew was in any event apparently not competent to determine the aspects of the vessel's stability.
Ø SAMSA does not have a consistent system for carrying out ad hoc audits on authorized agencies.
Ø SAMSA does not have a national database of small craft or full national control of the system for accreditation of inspectors and small craft.
The recommendation was as follows:
The panel respectively recommends that a Court of Marine Enquiry should be convened as soon as possible in relation to the casualty, but with terms of reference which include the following:
§ A full and complete investigation of the casualty with a view to determining the cause of the casualty - determining whether any person, persons or organization are to blame directly or indirectly for the casualty, and determining whether the casualty could have been avoided.
§ Investigate the licensing or certification of the barge and the process in connection therewith, in particular that followed by the Agency and its inspector.
§ Investigate, generally, the accreditation process and auditing of authorized agencies for the certification of small craft.
§ Make recommendations for the sanctioning of any persons or organizations, if appropriate, by SAMSA or otherwise.
§ Make recommendations with regard to improving the regulatory system for small craft in South Africa with a view to improving safety.
(3) Two recommendations were made into the convening of the Court of Marine Inquiry. These are findings relating to the enquiry into the Sinking of Motor Fishing Vessel Kingfisher and findings relating to the Report of Death on the Shark Cage Diving Vessel. Findings of the report relating to Capsize of a Barge at Barham Bay is yet to be sent to the Minister with a recommendation to convene a Court of Marine Inquiry.
(4) No arrests or prosecutions have been made because the recommended Court of Marine Enquiry has not taken place yet.
OTHER INCIDENTS COMPILED BY SAMSA
See attached
QUESTION NO 1197
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: Wednesday, 01 June 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 11 – 2011)
Mr P Van Dalen (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) Whether he intends proposing or introducing any alternative sources of funding the Road Accident Fund (RAF); if not, why not; if so, what are the relevant details of such alternative sources;
(2) whether his department is researching and investigating these alternative sources of funding; if not, why not; if so, in each case, (a) at what stage is the research and investigation process, (b) what are the costs involved and (c) what are the further relevant details?
NW1332E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) Yes, I intend proposing alternative sources of funding for the Road Accident Fund (RAF). The Department of Transport, in conjunction with the RAF, is engaging in discussions with National Treasury on exploring alternative funding options, which include, but is not limited to, a cash injection to clear the backlog of claims and also an additional fuel levy based on a revenue requirement model.
(2) The revenue requirement model has already been developed and discussed with National Treasury.
(a) The revenue requirement model has already been developed.
(b) The cost for development of the revenue requirement model is R94 050.
(c) The revenue requirement model is currently not fully utilized.
QUESTION NO 1196
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: THURSDAY, 19 MAY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 11 – 2011)
Mr P Van Dalen (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) What processes and mechanisms are in place to monitor adherence to the legislation governing restricted airspace;
(2) whether there has been any contravention of airspace restrictions in the (a) 2008-09, (b) 2009-10 and (c) 2010-11 financial years; if so, (i) what are the relevant details of each such incident and (ii) what action has been taken against the perpetrators in each case? NW1331E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) The South African Air Force (SAAF) and the South African Police Services (SAPS) conduct air patrols to monitor adherence to the legislation governing restricted airspace. The SAAF also deploys mobile radar systems and the current Air Traffic Navigation Services (ATNS) radar systems are used for such monitoring.
(2) (a), (b) and (c) (i) and (ii)
There have been transgressions and such have been dealt with within the SAAF and SAPS structures.
QUESTION NO 1195
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: THURSDAY, 19 MAY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 11 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) What airspace restrictions have been declared for the past three financial years for which information is available, (b) what is the reasoning behind each respective restriction and (c) which (i) parties and/or (ii) individuals requested these restrictions;
(2) whether any of these requests were denied; if so, (a) who made the request and (b) why was the request denied;
(3) whether any objections were received with regard to any applications; if so, in each case, (a) who made the objection, (b) against which application was it made and (c) what was the nature of the objection? NW1330E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a)
The South African Air Force (SAAF) and the South Africa Police Services (SAPS) declared restricted airspace around all stadia that were nominated to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup matches. These included all the match venues for the 2009 Confederations Cup, which preceded the World Cup final matches.
(b) The reasoning behind each respective restriction was in the interest of national security.
(c) (i) and (ii)
These restrictions were requested by the SAPS in collaboration with the SAAF.
(2) (a) and (b)
None were denied as the motivation explaining the interest of national security was adequate.
(3) (a)
The aviation industry was consulted through the official National Airspace Committee (NASCOM) and no objections were raised against the proposed restrictions in these meetings. The only objections received after the NASCOM meetings were from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Associations (AOPA) for restrictions imposed during the 2010 FIFA World Cup draw and the South African National Defence Force Border Safeguarding Operation in February 2011.
(b) and (c)
The aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), a NASCOM member, wrote to the Director of Civil Aviation (DCA) to complain about the notice period. They also alleged that the restrictions imposed will have an insurmountable negative effect on their members. The DCA may declare by notice (in terms of part 91.06.20) in the Aeronautical Information Publication, the Aeronautical Information Circular or Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), any area to be a restricted area, which is what the DCA did in this case. The DCA disagrees with AOPA's implications that the restrictions imposed will have an insurmountable negative effect on its members on the basis that normal operations were still allowed, albeit with the necessary vetting and authorization procedures that needed to be executed as per the published procedures.
QUESTION NO 1194
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: MONDAY, 27 JUNE 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER NO 11 – 2011)
Mr S B Farrow (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
(1) (a) What process is being followed with regard to the recapitalisation of all Metrorail's train entities, (b) what are the (i) timeframes and (ii) milestones and (c) what are the (i) costs to date and (ii) future anticipated costs;
(2) whether this project is being overseen by (a) a committee, (b) a team or (c) any other governing body; if not, why not; if so, what are the details of (i) the entity and the individuals who form part of this entity;
(3) on what date is it envisaged that this project will be presented to the Cabinet? NW1329E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(1) (a), (b) (i) and (ii) and (c) (i) and (ii)
The recapitalisation process currently followed by the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) involves the development of a detailed feasibility study to confirm the requirements and value for money. Once the results are ready, which are scheduled for mid-June 2011, PRASA will then present the information to the National Department of Transport and National Treasury, respectively. The cost implication for this exercise amounts to R16 million. However, we anticipate spending a further R30 million for the procurement process, which is expected to commence by March 2012.
(2) (a), (b) and (c) (i)
Yes, the project is being overseen by an Inter-departmental Steering Committee consisting of senior officials from PRASA, the National Department of Transport, National Treasury and the Departments of Trade and Industry and of Public Enterprises. Furthermore, PRASA has assembled an internal executive team to oversee the delivery of the project.
(3) It is anticipated that the project will be presented to Cabinet in July 2011 for consideration. This is in line with the timing for the feasibility study results.
QUESTION NO 1192
DATE REPLY SUBMITTED: TUESDAY, 24 MAY 2011
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 2011 (INTERNAL QUESTION PAPER: NO 11 – 2011)
Mr M S F de Freitas (DA) asked the Minister of Transport:
Whether the service of the Premier Classe train has been terminated or interrupted since 1 January 2010; if so, (a) why, (b) what steps has he taken to reintroduce the service, (c) what steps has he taken to assist the tourism sector in providing an alternative service and (d) what contigency plans were in place when this service was terminated/interrupted? NW1327E
REPLY:
The Minister of Transport:
(a), (b), (c) and (d)
The Premier Classe service rendered by Shosholoza Meyl is currently scheduled and operating as follows:
· Johannesburg – Cape Town – Johannesburg (two return trips per week).
· Johannesburg – Durban – Johannesburg (one return trip per week).
· Johannesburg – Hoedspruit – Johannesburg has been cancelled due to the low demand for the service.
· Cape Town – Port Elizabeth – Cape Town service has been suspended as a result of insufficient resources, i.e. locomotives and train crew. The Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) has requested assistance with required resources from Transnet Freight Rail. However, they could not accede to PRASA's request, due to resource constraints on their side as well.
From time to time there are challenges in the train operations environment, in either undertaking or completing a trip. In cases where a scheduled trip has not been undertaken, a full refund is given to the passenger or an alternative date of travel is agreed to. In cases where a trip is not completed by train, Shosholoza Meyl uses its luxury bus fleet to enable passengers to complete the journey.