Before the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the
Public Sector, Including Organs of State (Zondo Commission), was established, Parliament was tasked with
investigating state capture.
In 2017, the House Chairperson of Committees, Mr Cedric Frolick, directed four committees—the Portfolio Committees on Home Affairs, Mineral Resources,
Public Enterprises, and Transport—to probe allegations of state capture linked to alleged emails involving
several Ministers and report back to the National Assembly.
Two of the four committees made progress with their investigations and published reports, while the other two did not get underway.
- Public Enterprises: Report
- Portfolio Committees on Home Affairs: Report
- Mineral Resources: “The Committee focused on its oversight responsibilities regarding state capture and
proposed a programme to deal with allegations of state capture in the Department of Mineral Resources, but
no funding was provided by Parliament for the investigation, so it could not be pursued effectively” (Fifth
Parliament Committee Legacy Report)
- Transport: “The allegations regarding state capture is being considered under the judicial commission of
inquiry, as well as via investigations by the HAWKS - the Committee may want to take up this inquiry once
those processes have been finalised” (Fifth Parliament Committee Legacy Report)
In 2018, the Zondo Commission was established, and its terms of reference included the matters considered by
those four committees. It was recommended that the work done by the committees could serve as a basis for
further investigation by the Commission and that Parliament would hand over the Committee Reports together with
the entire record of evidence collected during their inquiries.
Parliament, represented by the National Assembly Speaker (Ms Thandi Modise) at the time, appeared before the Zondo Commission in April 2021. In her testimony, she said it was
"regrettable" that Parliament only woke up when things got really bad and highlighted that the legislature would
strengthen its performance and improve efficiency in law-making and oversight.
The final tranche of the Commission’s Reports was released in June 2022. One of these volumes dealt with Parliament. Broadly, the Zondo Commission put forward that weaknesses in parliamentary
oversight and Executive accountability had, over time, contributed to corruption and maladministration and
recommended that Parliament consider reforms to improve its oversight and accountability function.
Access all Zondo
Commission Reports.
In October 2022, the President submitted the Executive's Implementation Plan to Parliament. You can read it here.
In November 2022, the National Assembly began formally processing the Zondo Report. Its Rules Committee convened
and adopted a 31-page Implementation Plan to deal with the Commission’s recommendations. You can read it here.
19 recommendations relate to Parliament’s processes (including the processing of legislation specific to
Parliament). 27 recommendations relate to the Executive Implementation Plan, on which Committees exercise
oversight and are required to submit quarterly reports.
For a status update on the latter, view the work undertaken by the relevant parliamentary committees here. The main
matters here cover investigations, prosecutions, consequence management, asset recovery, and new legislation and
policy development. These are medium to long-term items that the Seventh Parliament, civil society, and the
broader public must follow up on.
At a meeting in April 2023, Members
expressed conflicting views on the Commission’s recommendations about the legislature. Some expressed concern
that the recommendations amounted to overreach and did not respect the doctrine of separation of powers. Others
felt that although the recommendations were not binding, it had to be acknowledged that something was wrong with
oversight.
Others pointed out that the institution already had mechanisms for conducting oversight and was in the process of
strengthening them.
At the end of June 2023, former Speaker Mapisa-Nqakula presented a progress report highlighting that 11 of the 19
Parliament-related recommendations were addressed while the remaining 8 were ongoing. You can find the update here.
Parliament has addressed 13 out of the 19 recommendations by the end
of March 2024. For some recommendations, we cannot find evidence of where, how and by whom the decisions were
taken. Where we would find a record of discussion around a particular recommendation, we have added hyperlinks
for further information. Some recommendations are partly addressed and have been categorised as ongoing.
A large part of the Sixth Parliament's legacy will be how it dealt with the Zondo Commission’s recommendations.
These recommendations were made with the intention of bringing about necessary institutional reform of
Parliament so that, hopefully, it is not found wanting again in the face of another state capture.
PMG’s view, articulated in the papers listed below, is that:
While tinkering with the rules of Parliament and the system of accountability from a technical sense is necessary
and important, there are bigger structural issues such as leadership, political climate, and the willingness of
individual members of Parliament that need to be addressed in order to have any real impact. Political will is
primary for effective oversight – this will allow for effective use of budgets, mechanisms, rules, resources and
support. It simply cannot work the other way around. Too often there is a tick box, token or ritualistic
oversight where as long as a meeting is held or a report written, this is sufficient but there is no real
accountability in that nothing changes.
Parliamentary committees, very broadly speaking, do good work producing detailed reports with considered
recommendations based on engagements with the Executive such as meetings and oversight visits - this is in
effect, oversight in action. This work is rendered useless if the recommendations are not followed up.
Parliament and committees cannot depend on the goodwill of the Executive to respond - this simply must be
enforced on the part of the institution. This ought to be a basic part of Parliament’s oversight architecture.
As we pointed out in our 2022 report, oversight is a continuum, a cycle requiring constant follow-through, so
oversight is ineffective without a clearly set out system for follow-through. While each committee would be
responsible for tracking its own recommendations, the overarching standard system must be stipulated. It might
prove prudent for committees to have quarterly meetings to review reports tabled during the quarter – while some
do this, it is not a standardised process. Standardising these processes removes discretion and vagueness.
2022: "WHERE WAS PARLIAMENT?" PMG review
of parliamentary oversight in light of State Capture and Zondo Report
2023: A PMG Review of Parliament’s Processing of the State Capture Commission Report
Considering all of this, it is necessary to reflect on former Chief Justice Mogoeng’s comments in the Nkandla
judgement about Parliament and its role in our democracy. “Similarly, the National Assembly, and by
extension Parliament, is the embodiment of the centuries-old dreams and legitimate aspirations of all our
people. It is the voice of all South Africans, especially the poor, the voiceless and the least˗remembered.
It is the watchdog of state resources, the enforcer of fiscal discipline and cost-effectiveness for the
common good of all our people. It also bears the responsibility to play an oversight role over the Executive
and state organs and ensure that constitutional and statutory obligations are properly executed. For this
reason, it fulfils a pre-eminently unique role of holding the Executive accountable for the fulfilment of
the promises made to the populace through the State of the Nation Address, budget speeches, policies,
legislation and the Constitution, duly undergirded by the affirmation or oath of office constitutionally
administered to the Executive before assumption of office. Parliament also passes legislation with due
regard to the needs and concerns of the broader South African public. The willingness and obligation to do
so is reinforced by each member’s equally irreversible public declaration of allegiance to the Republic,
obedience, respect and vindication of the Constitution and all law of the Republic, to the best of her
abilities. In sum, Parliament is the mouthpiece, the eyes and the service-delivery-ensuring machinery of the
people. No doubt, it is an irreplaceable feature of good governance in South Africa.”
Progress Report
19 recommendations relate to Parliament’s processes (including the processing of legislation
specific to Parliament); several recommendations containing various elements, but grouped into 27, for referral
purposes relate to other entities including government departments.
Below are Parliament's recommended processes for specific legislative matters that have been
addressed by the relevant committees. This
visual representation highlights the procedural recommendations and corresponding actions taken by the
committees in response to legislative considerations.
1
Parliament should consider amending section 6(1) of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act 40 of 1994, to
ensure that, before an election, the outgoing Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence is required to report
to Parliament on as much as possible of the period preceding the election.
Joint rule 1(2)(l) read with joint rule 8(5) in Schedule B of the Rules of the JSCI provide for special
reporting of the JSCI. It defines the “special report” as a report that is prepared by the Committee at the
request of Parliament, the President or the Minister responsible for each Service, or when the Committee
deems it necessary, and tabled or submitted as provided for in section 6(2) of the Act. In terms of this
defined special report, the Committee may report to Parliament, through the special report mechanism, at any
given time as and when the Committee deems it necessary.
2
Parliament should consider whether it would be desirable to enact legislation which protects Members of
Parliament from losing their party membership (and therefore their seats in Parliament) merely for
exercising their oversight duties reasonably and in good faith.
The constitutional oath of office for all Members of Parliament should serve as a guideline for executing
Members’ constitutionally mandated functions. Sections 58 and 71 of the Constitution, 1996 which deal with
privilege. and which provide that Cabinet members, Deputy Ministers, Members of the National Assembly,
delegates to the National Council of Provinces and local government representatives participating in the
Council, have freedom of speech in the Assembly and the Council and in its committees, subject to its rules
and orders and are not liable to civil or criminal proceedings, arrest, imprisonment or damages for anything
that they have said in, produced before or submitted to the Assembly, the Council or any of its committees,
or anything revealed as a result of anything that they have said in, produced before or submitted to the
Assembly, the Council or any of its committees. Section 6 of the Powers, Privileges and Immunities of
Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act, 2004 already provides for the protection of members for the
exercise of their constitutional responsibilities. The Section provides for the privileges, immunities,
independence and protection of members and Parliament.
3
Subject to budgetary restraints, the scale and skills of the research and technical assistance made
available to the portfolio committees be enhanced.
In the last 12 months, additional content advisors, legal advisors and researchers have been appointed. All
critical appointments aimed at addressing capacity constraints are being made.
4
Parliament needs to make it clear that the practice of late submissions to portfolio committees will not be
tolerated.
Committees already have powers in the Rules and legislation (Powers, Privileges and Immunities of
Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act) to obtain information they need.
5
Parliament should consider whether there is a need to legislate on the issue of reports by representatives
of the Executive to Parliament.
The Rules Committee
determined
that there is no need for legislation in this regard. Instead, it agreed on parameters for guidelines on
managing this exercise.
6
Parliament needs to make clear that non-attendance by ministers and others scheduled to attend portfolio
committee meetings will not be tolerated and to ensure that consequences are visited on those who offend
without adequate cause. (Parliament should consider whether there is a need to legislate on this issue.)
The Rules Committee
concluded
that there was no need for additional legislation or rules. The Committee also noted that the Powers,
Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act already made it an offence for
persons to refuse to appear before Parliament. As an example, in the past 12 months a Minister was summoned
for not appearing before the Committee on Tourism.
7
Parliament should consider whether it supports the principle of "amendatory accountability" and, if it
does, whether it would be desirable to give detailed substance to this principle in an Act of Parliament,
along the lines suggested in the Corder Report.
Parliament undertook research on international practices and specifically whether other countries had comparable laws. The research found that, from the 12 countries surveyed, none had statutes. The Rules Committee
agreed that, as a general point, legislation would not necessarily serve to address all the challenges identified by the State Capture Commission
8
Consideration should be given by Parliament to amendments to its own rules, with a view to addressing the
problem of ministers who fail to report back to Parliament on what if anything has been done in respect of
remedial measures proposed by Parliament or on alternative methods preferred by them to address defective
performance highlighted by Parliament.
The Rules Committee
acknowledged
that the Sixth Parliament had taken steps to facilitate co-operation between Parliament and the Executive.
The Committee concluded that there was no need for additional legislation or rules.
9
The Commission supports the recommendation that, with the support of a majority of members of a portfolio
committee, a portfolio committee could put a minister to terms in respect of remedial action, and could
thereafter, through the Speaker intercede with the President, as head of the national executive, in the
event of non- compliance. The Leader of Government Business could also play a role in such a process.
The Rules Committee
acknowledged
that the Sixth Parliament had taken steps to facilitate co-operation between Parliament and the Executive.
The Committee concluded that there was no need for additional legislation or rules.
10
Parliament should consider whether more representatives of opposition parties should be appointed as chairs
of portfolio committees.
The Rules Committee
did not agree
with the view expressed by the State Capture Commission that parliamentary oversight may be better served if
more chairpersons were elected from minority parties but reiterated that Section 57 of the Constitution
(1996), empowered the Assembly to determine its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures.
11
Parliament to consider whether it is desirable to amend its rules to give effect to the proposals by
Corruption Watch on appointments by Parliament.
The Rules Committee
noted that
the option of legislative review may not resolve the challenges alluded to by the State Capture Commission.
Moreover, there were already laws and best practices concerning the selection of certain office-bearers and
that all appointments must be based on merit. Best practices already developed by Parliament should be
maintained.
12
Parliament should consider whether it would be desirable for it to establish a committee whose function is
or includes oversight over acts or omissions by the President and Presidency, which are not overseen by
existing portfolio committees.
There was a study tour undertaken to explore international best practice. Based on the engagements, the
Rules Committee
noted that, while
the Assembly already has comprehensive procedures to facilitate oversight, it must remain proactive and
receptive to reform. The report also suggested that, in the case of the Presidency, the Seventh Parliament
consider which committee would be best placed to scrutinise the budget of the Presidency.
13
Political Party Funding Act 6 of 2018 be amended to criminalise the making of donations to political
parties in the expectation of or with a view to the granting of procurement tenders or contracts as a reward
for or in recognition of such grants having been made.
This matter was addressed by the Electoral Matters Amendment
Bill, which Parliament passed in March 2024 and was enacted in May 2024
14
Parliament should consider whether introducing a constituency-based (but still proportionally
representative) electoral system would enhance the capacity of Members of Parliament to hold the Executive
accountable. If Parliament considers that introducing a constituency-based system has this advantage, it is
recommended that it should consider whether, when weighed against any possible disadvantages, this advantage
justifies amending the existing electoral system.
The Electoral Amendment
Act, 2023, passed by
Parliament makes provision in section 23 for an Electoral Reform Consultation Panel, which the Minister must
establish. The functions of the Panel inter alia are to independently investigate, consult on, report on and
make recommendations in respect of potential reforms of the electoral system for the election of the
National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures.
15
Parliament to ensure that adequate funds are allocated, particularly to portfolio committees, to enable
effective parliamentary oversight.
Parliament is in ongoing consultations with National Treasury for more resources in fulfilment of its
constitutional mandate. The Joint Financial Management of Parliament Committee
advised that the next
Parliament should take up a funding model to ensure a budget governance system, process and allocations
commensurate with Parliament as an Arm of State.
16
Parliament to implement a system to "track and monitor" implementation (or non-implementation) by the
Executive of corrective action proposed in reports adopted by Parliament.
At present, most committees have a “recommendation tracking tool” in place to follow up on actions to be
taken by the Executive. The Houses, too, have manual systems in place, and an e-system is being piloted.
This matter is also part of the Annual Performance Plan of the institution.
The Rules Committee recommends a model for
the Assembly to follow up with government assurances made by Ministers from the floor of the House.
Members will be aware that Ministers do undertake to respond to issues raised by members during debates,
in reply to statements and questions. In this regard, the Rules Committee has agreed that a record be
maintained of these undertakings and that they be referred to the relevant oversight committee by the
Speaker. This will therefore serve as another avenue for Parliament to hold the Executive to account. As
another initiative, the Rules Committee endorsed a system to monitor the implementation of House
resolutions. The Assembly can now expect regular reports on the status of compliance with these
resolutions.
17
Parliament to establish an Oversight and Advisory Section to provide advice, technical support, co-
ordination, and tracking and monitoring mechanisms on issues arising from oversight and accountability
activities of Members of Parliament and the committees to which they belong.
The matter of oversight monitoring, tracking and advisory is currently receiving attention, with the focus
being on capacity more than on establishing new structures.
18
Interactions between the National Executive and Parliament
There are ongoing interactions between Parliament and the Leader of Government Business on parliamentary
processes. Parliament and National Treasury are also engaging with a view to giving appropriate ways to give
effect to the State Capture Commission’s recommendations on the resourcing of Parliament, specifically with
respect to its capacity to hold the Executive to account.
Discussions are ongoing between Parliament and
Treasury with a view to reinforcing Parliament’s financial resources.
19
Matters concerning implicated members
12 cases were referred to the Joint Committee on Ethics and Members Interests, and 8 have been concluded
*The Ethics Committee did not respond to questions for an update
