1. Introduction: Background
Parliaments serve as critical pillars of democratic governance, representing the voice of the people, enacting laws, and providing oversight over the executive branch. Administrative and financial autonomy are essential for parliaments to fulfil their functions effectively, ensuring independence from external influences and enabling them to act in the public interest. However, the degree of autonomy varies across different countries, influenced by historical, political, and institutional factors.
This paper focuses on three countries—South Africa, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka—to explore the administrative and financial autonomy of their respective parliaments. South Africa's post-apartheid transition, Malaysia's multicultural society, and Sri Lanka's complex ethnic and political dynamics provide rich and relevant context for comparative analysis. By examining the institutional structures, legal frameworks, and practical challenges faced by these parliaments, this study aims to deepen our understanding of parliamentary autonomy and its implications for democratic governance.
2. Conceptual Framework:
Parliamentary autonomy refers to the degree of independence enjoyed by the legislative branch in performing its functions, free from undue influence or interference from external actors, particularly the executive branch. It encompasses administrative autonomy, which pertains to the management and operation of parliamentary affairs, and financial autonomy, which relates to the control and allocation of financial resources.
As noted in a 2020 publication from the Inter-Parliamentary Union:
“To more effectively perform their functions and better reinforce the separation of powers between branches of State governance, observers have generally agreed that more autonomous parliamentary administrations are desirable.”1
Autonomy is critical for a parliament to function effectively as it is recognised – legally and politically – as a separate branch of government and, as such, requires the freedom from constraint evident when the executive branch controls the administration and/or financial aspects of a parliament.
In a Westminster-style parliament, such as the three being compared for this paper, this kind of autonomy becomes more challenging. As a result of the executive needing to maintain the confidence of the parliament in order to remain in government, there is a need to have a working majority within the institution. This leads, in many cases, to executive capture of the parliament, which, in turn, means de facto control of the administration and financing of the institution.2
Parliamentary autonomy is crucial for the functioning of democracy as it ensures the separation of powers, fosters checks and balances, and promotes accountability and transparency in government. An autonomous parliament can effectively represent the interests of the people, scrutinize government actions, and enact laws that reflect the will and priorities of the electorate. By safeguarding parliamentary autonomy, democratic systems can uphold the principles of democratic governance and protect the rights and freedoms of citizens.
Therefore, it is important to understand the various components of parliamentary autonomy to better understand how a parliament can pursue a more autonomous approach to its work.
Administrative autonomy involves the ability of parliament to manage its internal affairs, including hiring staff, managing facilities, and drafting and adopting procedural rules. It encompasses aspects such as the appointment of parliamentary officials, the organization of parliamentary committees, and the conduct of parliamentary proceedings.
Financial autonomy refers to parliament's authority to control its budget, allocate resources, and manage expenditures independently. It involves aspects such as the formulation of the parliamentary budget, the allocation of funds for parliamentary activities, and the oversight of financial management processes. This is important because a budget is a direct reflection of policy and development priorities.
By comparing three national parliaments with similar parliamentary systems, levels of development and social and political challenges, it is possible to extract some lessons that provide guidance as to how a parliament can achieve autonomy and thus be better equipped to meet its constitutional mandates of oversight, law-making and citizen representation.
3. Administrative Autonomy
Looking at the three countries’ respective parliaments we can get a sense of the level of autonomy for each.
In South Africa, the Parliament consists of two houses: the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The National Assembly is the primary legislative body, responsible for passing laws and overseeing the executive branch. The NCOP represents the interests of the provinces and ensures their effective participation in the legislative process.
The Constitution of South Africa provides a legal framework for parliamentary autonomy, delineating the powers and functions of the legislative branch. It establishes the independence of Parliament and outlines its authority to manage its internal affairs, including the appointment of parliamentary officials and the formulation of procedural rules.3
For its administration, the South African national parliament still relies on the Parliamentary Service Act (1974)4 for institutional structures and procedural mechanisms to support its functioning. However, challenges such as resource constraints pose obstacles to achieving an effective parliamentary administration.
In Malaysia, the Parliament consists of two houses: the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives or Lower House) and the Dewan Negara (Senate or Upper House). The Dewan Rakyat is the primary legislative body, comprising elected representatives from across the country. The Dewan Negara represents the interests of the states and serves as a check on legislative power.
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia provides a legal framework for parliamentary autonomy, outlining the powers and privileges of Parliament and its members. However, with regard to parliamentary autonomy, the Constitution was amended in 1992 to limit the original autonomy conferred upon the Parliament and putting key decisions, such as staffing, under the control of the executive.5
Upon independence in 1963, Malaysia had a Parliamentary Service Act that was brief, but did provide for the framework for administrative autonomy for the federal Parliament. However, in 1993 that law was repealed and since that time the executive has exerted some administrative control over the Parliament, including the transferring of staff in and out of the institution at the call of the Public Service Commission. This has had a significant impact on the ability of the Parliament to manage its own affairs. However, it has only been in recent years, as new political parties have assumed power, that any discussion has emerged to create a more autonomous parliament.6
Like South Africa*, the Malaysia Parliament has separate house committees for the House, chaired by the Speaker, and the Senate, chaired by the Senate President. These committees provide advice on the facilities, services, and privileges of each chamber. The appointment of parliamentary service members follows the general policy of the public service and is overseen by the executive branch, specifically the Prime Minister's Department.
In Sri Lanka, the Parliament consists of a unicameral legislature, comprised of elected representatives from across the country. The Constitution of Sri Lanka provides a legal framework for parliamentary autonomy, delineating the powers and functions of the legislative branch. It grants the Secretary General of the Parliament the status of a constitutional officer and grants the post the autonomy to hire and manage staff.7
The brief constitutional provisions have been further entrenched through the Parliamentary Staffs Act.8 That Act is also brief, but has been the foundation for the autonomy of the Parliament and its administration, including the autonomy of the Secretary-General to manage staff. Through this legal framework, the Parliament has been able to maintain de jure and de facto administrative autonomy. This has allowed the institution to maintain a cadre of specialised administrative support for MPs, committees and the Parliament, which is important for preserving and maintaining institutional memory and professional expertise.
4. Financial Autonomy
Financial autonomy refers to the legal and policy frameworks that ensure a parliament has the independence to define its own budget and how it is allocated. It also refers to the public finance management systems that are put in place by a parliament to ensure it can manage its own finances effectively.9
In South Africa, the Parliament plays a significant role in the budgetary process, scrutinizing government expenditures and approving the annual budget. However, with regard to its own annual budget, the Parliament‘s capacity and authority to define its own budget is quite limited.
The Parliament does have the authority to allocate the funds it receives annually from the state budget and has in place internal systems to monitor and manage the funding. However, there is a limited opportunity for the Parliament to influence the amount of funding it receives annually. This is as a result of two key factors – the electoral system has shifted MP accountability away from the citizens who vote for them in favour of political party leadership, resulting in significant executive dominance over MPs and, in turn, the operations of the Parliament. In addition, as the Ministry of Finance has a strong role in defining the budgets for all executive branch entities (e.g. ministries and agencies), it also exerts a similar level of control over the Parliament and other independent institutions.
There have been recent efforts to create greater autonomy for the Parliament (and provincial legislatures). The South African Legislative Sector (SALS)10 has worked in recent years to develop a national law that would establish a formal sectoral approach to the work of the nine provincial legislatures and the national parliament. In addition, this legislation would establish greater financial autonomy for the sector. Despite not having such a legal framework in place, SALS has also promoted inter-parliamentary engagement to allow for the sharing of best practices that have enabled some space for the legislatures and Parliament to expand their capacity to manage staff and build their institutional capacity. But these initiatives have been limited by a lack of resources that could be addressed, at least in theory, by greater parliamentary financial autonomy.
In Malaysia, the Parliament is overseen by a Chief Administrator, responsible for the administrative and financial matters of Parliament, who is selected from the Public Service. Additionally, there are two Secretaries of the Parliament: the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, both appointed by His Majesty the King of Malaysia as per the Constitution.
With the Chief Administrator being appointed and reporting to the executive, this means, for financial matters, the Parliament has almost no autonomy over how it spends the funds allocated to the institution through the annual state budget.
In Sri Lanka, Parliament must request funding each year through the annual state budget. Despite the budget having to be approved and endorsed by the Parliament each year, the institution provides its request for funding to the Ministry of Finance and will then wait for the determination from the Ministry as to the final allocation of annual funds. The same legislation that established the autonomy of the parliamentary administration was intended to also have financial regulations incorporated that would have enabled the Parliament to establish the internal systems that are required to allow for the institution to be autonomy financially. However, to date, no such regulations or any other legal instrument have been adopted to allow for the Parliament to function autonomously. Without such autonomy, the Parliament is unable to address many of the key reforms it wants to implement, as it lacks the resources to accomplish what it wants to achieve.
In addition, in the past ten years, there have been several amendments to the Constitution that have attempted to adjust the relationship between the executive and the Parliament. Some amendments have attempted to turn the political system into a presidential system, while other countervailing amendments have attempted to rebalance the relationship between the two branches. But the back-and-forth on the status of the Parliament has signalled that greater autonomy is not a priority for the political elite.
5. Lessons Learnt
The following are common threads or issues that can be identified from the scan of the legal frameworks and systems in place in South Africa, Malaysia and Sri Lanka on the functioning of each nation’s parliament:
Executive Dominance: The dominance of the executive branch poses a significant challenge to parliamentary autonomy in South Africa, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka, limiting the effectiveness of legislative oversight and accountability mechanisms as a result of each respective parliament not having sufficient autonomy, particularly financial independence.
Resource Constraints: Resource constraints, including limited funding, staffing shortages, and inadequate infrastructure, pose challenges to effective parliamentary administration in South Africa, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. Yet, as theoretically and constitutionally independent branches of government, parliaments should not need to rely on the executive to ensure that they have adequate funding to meet their constitutional mandates.
Lack of Legal Framework: In each of the three countries reviewed, the legal framework for ensuring parliamentary autonomy is incomplete. This is most obvious in Malaysia, which lacks any current legislation to establish administrative or financial autonomy for the institution. But for South Africa and Sri Lanka, despite the constitutional provisions and some legislation, some gaps have enabled the executive to maintain financial control over each respective parliament.
One Party Dominance: In each of the three countries there has been in the past decades the dominance of one political party or coalition that has been a factor in limiting parliamentary autonomy. In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) has won majority governments in each election held since 1994. In Malaysia, until very recently, one political coalition – UMNO – held office at the federal level for decades. Sri Lankan politics have been dominated by one family and their political party since the turn of the century. Such dominance can often lead to the capture of state institutions by the dominant political party and the lack of political will or an effective opposition to create more autonomy in the parliament.
Lack of Political Will for Reform: Linked to the above lessons, the various factors noted culminate in a broad lack of political will to reform the current political system to establish a parliament that has the autonomy to act within its mandate to pass laws, monitor government programmes and spending, and ensure public input. The lack of political will can be attributed to a number of reasons, but can include political inertia – changing the current system requires significant effort. There is also, in some cases, an electoral system or political party regulation that creates a situation where the MPs elected are more accountable to their party leadership then to their constituents. Also, once an executive branch has achieved dominance over the legislative branch, there are few incentives for encouraging more autonomy for the parliament, as this will just create, in the eyes of the executive, a greater opportunity to interfere in its work.
6. Implications for the South African Parliament:
Based on the brief analysis provided and the lessons garnered, the Parliament of South Africa requires some enhancement if it is to overcome the barriers, such as the electoral system and one-party dominance, that are preventing the Parliament from fulfilling its constitutional mandate. As was noted in the Zondo Commission Report11 in 2022:
“Parliament of South Africa requires some enhancement if it is to overcome the barriers, such as the electoral system and one-party dominance, that are preventing the Parliament from fulfilling its constitutional mandate”
“[b]y failing to properly carry out its oversight role [...], Parliament has, at least to some extent, contributed towards State capture. Because its failure to do its job meant that acts of state capture and corruption were allowed to spread and deepen, it should have stepped in to ensure the continuation of investigations against the Guptas”.12
But the lack of capacity or political will to conduct effective oversight of the executive cannot be divorced from the lack of autonomy for the Parliament. In turn, the lack of autonomy of the Parliament can be directly linked, in part, to the lack of an effective legal framework. As was recently noted by the Parliament, without sufficient funding and resources, the institution cannot implement the relevant recommendations from the Zondo Commission as they relate to Parliament and its role in preventing state capture.13
In addition to acute lack of funding, the legal framework for Parliament is also lacking. The Parliamentary Service Act dates back to the time of apartheid and has not been substantively amended in 50 years. In addition, Parliament lacks the legal framework to exert financial autonomy by more effectively advocating for and obtaining the resources it requires through the annual budget process. Until the South African Parliament has an adequate legal framework in place and enforced, there will be no chance that it will achieve the autonomy anticipated in the Constitution.
In addition, South Africa has established a relatively unique sectoral approach to parliamentary development, having established the South African Legislative Sector (SALS). This entity has been working to facilitate knowledge sharing and capacity development through peer-to-peer exchanges between the national Parliament and the nine provincial legislatures. Yet this collaborative approach has been limited due to a lack of formal recognition and institutionalisation of such cooperation. A draft law to establish SALS as a legal entity has languished in Parliament for a number of years. The approval of the draft law would go a long way to creating the space required for the parliaments in South Africa to develop the systems required for de facto autonomy from their respective executive branches of national and provincial governments.
The fact that the SALS Bill has not progressed indicates the lack of political will in South Africa for a more robust and effective legislative branch at the national and provincial levels. The current electoral system is a major drag on any momentum for more parliamentary autonomy. Despite the reforms adopted in 202314 and 202415, the fundamental flaws in both political party structures and the means by which MPs and MPLs are elected have not been addressed and, thus, such reforms will likely have a limited impact on the relationship between the executive and legislative branches.16
Finally, if and when Parliament obtains de jure or de facto autonomy, there will be a need for a clear plan to ensure it has the capacity to deliver such authority in an open and accountable manner. This will require the reform of current laws and procedures, and introduction of new systems, especially with regard to effective public finance management, to ensure the Parliament is capable of meeting its responsibilities related to autonomy.
In conclusion, parliamentary autonomy is fundamental to democratic governance, enabling effective representation, oversight, and legislative functions. In South Africa, addressing challenges such as executive dominance and resource constraints is imperative to safeguarding parliamentary autonomy and fostering effective governance. By learning from comparative experiences and addressing common challenges, South Africa can strengthen its parliamentary system, ensuring independence, accountability, and responsiveness to citizen needs.