Department’s public hearings

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE
8 May 2007
DEPARTMENT BUDGET & STRATEGY: INPUT BY COSATU, CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES, INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE

Chairperson: Mr D J Sithole (ANC)

Documents handed out:
Centre for Policy Studies submission
COSATU submission
Institute for Global Dialogue submission

Audio Recording of the Meeting Part1 & Part2

SUMMARY
Submissions were made that assessed South Africa’s foreign policy, in terms of its achievements and the budgetary resources available to accomplish the goals of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Dr Zondi Siphamandla (Director, Institute for Global Dialogue), Dr Chris Landsberg (Director, Centre for Policy Studies) and Mr Bongani Masuku (COSATU, International Relations Secretary) delivered presentations on the commitments of the DFA.

Dr Landsberg aimed to provide a framework for assessing the budget speech and looking at the commitments of the DFA within that framework. He asserted that South Africa’s foreign policy was predictable and rested upon seven pillars: the proposed pursuit of domestic goals through foreign policy; secondly, the variance between South Africa’s African Agenda (AA) and the AA of the rest of Africa; thirdly, the South-South cooperation strategy of SA; fourthly, South Africa (SA) is the only South African country to take the North-South partnership seriously; fifthly, a global governance agenda, specifically regarding the reform of the world funding institutions; sixth, SA is faced with the question of how to put in place the necessary measures domestically to execute its foreign policy agenda; and lastly, the capacity of SA to follow through with its policies.

Dr Siphamandla outlined four things he hoped would be achieved in terms of the global governance agenda. Firstly, a reformation of the political power and architecture of the global governance structure; secondly, the global financial institutions needed to be reformed. Thirdly, a global South agenda needed to be rebuilt - SA needed to identify its strategic partners and choose these partners so as to push its certain agenda. Finally, development needed to be placed at the forefront of SA’s foreign agenda.

Mr Masuku’s presentation focused on four issues: SA’s South-South agenda; transformation of global governance; the nature of the relationship between SA’s civil society, the DFA and other relevant parties; COSATU had attempted to build the capacity of all its members engaged in international work. This needed to occur nationally to create both momentum and leverage internationally.

Several issues were discussed including the relationship between NEPAD and SA. Dr Landsberg commented that he believed it best that SA had “released” NEPAD to the AU, whilst Dr Siphamandla felt it may have been too soon. The nature of democracy and the media’s role in shaping the perception it, was raised, particularly with regards to Zimbabwe. The disparity between the DFA’s goals and its means to achieve them was questioned, as was the department’s role in rectifying the problem.

MINUTES
Centre for Policy Studies submission
Dr Chris Landsberg (Director: Centre for Policy Studies) provided a framework for assessing the budget speech and to look at the commitments made by the DFA within that framework. He raised the question of what the DFA’s agenda was in terms of political and financial dimensions. The concept of the “African Agenda” (AA) was raised. Particularly, the next two months would be dominated by the debate around which the integration model should be pursued by Africa and the African Union (AU) government debate – what he believed would dominate the AU summit in Accra Ghana.

He stated that since 1998, SA’s foreign policy had become predictable. As he saw it, SA’s foreign policy rested on seven pillars which may need adjustment. Firstly, it is often stated that South Africa (SA) uses foreign policy to pursue domestic goals. However, this was not always the case in practice. South Africa needs to become more disciplined about establishing a connection between domestic goals and foreign affairs. Secondly, SA’s African Agenda is not always the same as the rest of Africa. Thirdly, the South-South cooperation strategy of SA as a leader of the developing world and Africa, is of importance. Fourthly, SA is the only South African Country to take the North-South partnership seriously. This partnership is based on a trade-off between the G8 and the North on the one side and SA on the other.

SA and Africa through SA’s foreign policy strategy has five expectations of its partnership with the West: higher levels of aid, increased market access, a fairer trade regime, dept relief and support for African peace initiatives. At the same time, the G8 expects SA to promote good governance, the rooting out of corruption, addressing conflicts on the continent and putting in place conditions for economic take-off on the continent. Fifthly, SA has a global governance agenda, specifically regarding the reform of the world funding institutions. Sixth, SA is faced with the question of how to put in place the necessary measures domestically to execute its foreign policy agenda, for example the encouragement of language learning. Lastly, he questioned the capacity of the DFA.

Dr Landsberg then elaborated on the concept of the African Agenda. The debate surrounding the AA is with regards to the African Integration Strategy and was to be played out in the AU summit in Accra in July. Three models of integration were identified. The first of these was a Pan-Africanist movement which saw a United States of Africa whereby the role of the state within the Union could be compared to that of a state in a federation. Supporters of this movement were Gadaffi, Museveni, Obasanjo and the out-going chair of AU Commission.

The second of these models is what Landsberg termed “continental Africanism”. This model proposes that existing AU institutions should be strengthened instead of the “rushing in” proposed by the first strategy. By strengthening the institutions, African states would be made to maintain the norms proposed by the AU. This movement is spear-headed by Thabo Mbeki and SADC was the only African region going into the Accra meetings with a unanimous stand on the AA model issue. The downside of SA being at the forefront of this movement was that SA was developing a reputation for having progressive rhetoric yet conservative practices.

In terms of this African Agenda, SA perceives it as resting upon five pillars. Firstly, a harmony needs to be established between domestic and foreign affairs. Secondly, SA has a clear policy on the AU – existing institutions should be strengthened. However, concerns were raised about the means by which SA meant to spearhead this process. It was Landsberg’s belief that in Accra, Mbeki intended to declare that SA would provide the resources for the strengthening of the AU institutions. Yet, no budget increase had occurred. There was a clear disjuncture between the commitments made and the resources available.

Thirdly, SA saw the AU as being made up of sub-regional building blocks in the form of regional organisations such as SADC, EGAT (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). These regional economic groups need to be strengthened and transformed into regional integration groups in order to strengthen the AU. Dr Landsberg expressed concern over the implications of this for SA with regards to SADC (South African Development Community) – SA would be expected to back up the reform of SADC with resources it did not have.

Fourthly, SA believes NEPAD is the genuine social-economic plan of SA. NEPAD introduces the notion that peace and democracy go hand-in-hand with economic development. A drawback of NEPAD is that it is seen by the rest of the continent as being an extension of SA’s domestic economic plan. With regards to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as a model for development, it is believed that SA has tried to manipulate the governance of the process.

SA’s peace and security initiatives form the basis of the final pillar. The current government is willing to back peacemaking up with huge resources for peacekeeping – with a heavy price tag. Currently, SA’s diplomacy depends too much on the roles of the head of state, deputy ministers and other prominent figures and no effort is being made to institutionalise a peacemaking strategy.

Dr Landsberg concluded by emphasising the notion of partnerships. He expressed concern over SA’s capacity to hold itself and the G8 accountable. He was also worried about the gap between the ambitious policies & goals of the DFA and its capacity to achieve these goals.

He concluded that SA’s foreign policy was already so predictable and he believed that after 2009 there would be very few changes made.

Institute for Global Dialogue
Dr Zondi Siphamandla (Director) commented that much of his material had been covered by Dr Landsberg. He raised several questions about foreign policy on the continent and in SA and the nature of that policy. He posed the question of what the DFA’s fundamental goal was. The issue of competition and cooperation within the continent and between sub-regional groups was raised. Dr Siphamandla felt that SA had been denied acknowledgement for its mediation on achievements in Cote d’Ivoire by Nigeria and pointed out what he believed to be several back-biting manoeuvres on behalf of both of these actors.

He emphasised two points: a balance needed to be established between realism and idealism and SA needed to identify its strategic partners.

He outlined four things he hoped would be achieved in terms of the global governance agenda. Firstly, a reformation of the political power and architecture of the global governance structure was needed – the UN needed to be reformed and multilateralism needed to be enhanced. Secondly, the global financial institutions needed to be reformed. This would be problematic as reform demanded democracy from institutions which were run on the basis of stake-holder interest. The IMF had also anticipated this move from SA and allowed the proliferation of smaller, private financial organisations.

Thirdly, a global South agenda needed to be rebuilt. SA needed to identify its strategic partners and choose these partners so as to push its certain agenda. Currently, SA had bi-national commissions (BNCs) with almost all countries. In particular, SA needed to work on and define its relationships with USA, China and France. The latter was particularly important with regards to relations within Africa. He asked what SA’s reaction would be to the vacuum produced by France’s dominance over certain areas waning. He strongly emphasised that strategic partners needed to be chosen to push SA’s agenda.

The final issue was one of development – what Dr Siphamandla believed needed to be placed at the forefront of the agenda. He felt that the UN was key in putting development at the centre of political and economic agendas worldwide. However, the structure of the UN’s development agencies was questioned – some may need to be streamlined and amalgamated. The DFA’s role in finance for development and in the reformation of the UN was questioned.

The DFA’s role in fighting terrorism was raised. SA is calling for a more principled but strategic intervention in certain hotspots. However, whether SA has the capacity on the ground is questionable.

In terms of the African Agenda, SA did not have members at the AU who would be able to leverage SA’s issues in the AU. In terms of the AU, it was necessary to develop a capacity for the AU to carry out its goals. It was also important to note that NEPAD was losing momentum to APRM. The decision made by SA to hand over control of NEPAD to the African continent may have been too soon. NEPAD was in need of champions and this was lacking.

The situation regarding SADC and SACU also needed to be resolved – SA needed to establish where they were investing their capital. SADC was also being criticised for its weak implementation capacity – there were many vacant positions. A further problem is that states are unwilling to cede sovereignty to the regional organisation. South Africa had not embraced the SADC agenda – it had not established its own national committee.

He echoed Dr Landsberg’s concerns over the lack of institutionalisation of diplomacy skills within the department and capacity within the department.

He concluded by emphasising that other countries were willing to put members in the UN and such organisations. SA needed to reassess its bi-national commissions. The department needed to improve its articulation of policies not only to the public but within the department itself. There were too many vacancies within the department. However, Dr Siphamandla saw no problem with using experts in certain areas. There needed to be greater collaboration between the Department of Trade and Industry and the DFA.

COSATU submission
Mr Bongani Masuku, COSATU: International Relations Secretary, raised the issues on the non-state actors in SA’s foreign affairs. He questioned whether the goals could be achieved. It was taken for granted that there was agreement on what comprised and defined national interests. Fundamental to foreign policy should be the emphasis on development and the eradication of poverty. He questioned what makes the African Agenda, African. He also asked how the consolidation of regional democracy could be implemented. He was specifically interested in what the role workers were to play in these challenges and issues.

He concentrated on four major issues in his presentation: firstly, SA’s South-South agenda was questioned. SA’s relationship with the EU changed the dynamic of South-South cooperation. SA needed to be consistent in applying the South-South agenda not only to other African states but to itself.

Secondly, in terms of the transformation of global governance, Mr Masuku argued that SA needed to push institutions such as the IMF for stronger development agendas and agencies. It was also not wrong of SA to participate in the fight against terrorism. However, the way in which this was approached was vital.

Thirdly, the nature of the relationship between SA’s civil society, the DFA and other relevant parties was questioned. Civil society institutions of the North played a substantial role in the shaping of policies. Two major premises were emphasised: firstly, civil society’s role in SA cannot be ignored; and secondly, how the state supports the role of civil society needs to be addressed.

Representatives of COSATU and the HSRC had been asked to give presentations. Adequate responses to these presentations would hopefully be made at a follow-up meeting in a week. During this subsequent meeting, the budget allocations of the DFA would be addressed.

Lastly, like Mr Landsberg, Mr Masuku saw the FSI as playing a vital role. COSATU had attempted to build the capacity of all its members engaged in international work. This needed to occur nationally to create both momentum and leverage internationally.

The chair emphasised the importance of SA pooling its resources.

Discussion
Dr Landsberg commented on Dr Siphamandla’s statement that NEPAD may have been released too soon. He believed that NEPAD was damaging SA’s position on the continent due to the tendency of SA to push NEPAD above all other institutions and principles – the AU included. Where SA had gone wrong, he believed, was in the lack of representation within the AU to assist in the integration of NEPAD into the AU.

Mr M Skosana (IFP) stated that terrorism had been linked to the state by the Bush administration. He raised the issue of SA Corporations in Africa. A code of conduct should be established and harmonised with the labour laws of the countries in which these businesses operate. He commented that in a meeting with the president, the issue of diplomacy in the East was raised. It was thought that perhaps a multi-party presidential peace envoy would be appropriate. There was not a single objective between all parties when it came to the East.

Dr Landsberg commented that he found the concept of a multi-party presidential envoy to be fascinating. The government should become less sensitive about who it worked with in order to better address issues.

Mr Skosana asked what the Blair Commission meant for NEPAD. He questioned how effective reform of the global financial institutions would be as there were no African economists or advisors.

Mr Siphamandla agreed with this.

Mr Skosana raised the issue of Zimbabwe and stated that SA could not just leave it to disintegrate. It was important to realise that the DFA was governed by national interest.

Mr M Sibande (ANC) asked whether the majority of Africa was following the Pan-African movement or that headed by Mbeki.

Dr Landsberg replied that approximately 70 per cent of Africa followed the model supported by Mbeki. However, he feared that they did so with ulterior motives in mind – to maintain the status quo and to prevent change.

Mr Sibande asked whether SA was on the right track in terms of global trading. He said that the DFA should face a challenge with its interventions – SA was not trusted by everyone.

Ms M Gxowa (ANC) raised the issue of departmental vacancies and how they were to be approached – politicians often left the duties to the officials. She also proposed that a number of workshops such as this should be undertaken.

Mr Siphamandla replied that a balance needs to be struck between domestic and international issues.

Dr A Luthuli (ANC) asked how the department was to address the issue of disparity between human and financial resources on the one hand, and the goals of the department on the other.

Dr Landsberg replied that the department needed to hold the executive accountable to the goals they have set for themselves. FSI had a vital role to play in achieving the goals of the DFA. A need exists for the FSI to be better utilised. Relationships need to be improved between the government and NGO’s, the government and universities and the FSI. Dr Landsberg suggested that the DFA needed to approach universities about implemented courses aimed at practical diplomacy. A culture of national service needs to be established.

The Chair agreed that the department was not achieving its goals. Research gained from diplomacy students could be used by the government.

Dr Siphamandla remarked that the DFA had to find a strategy to use China’s global strength to leverage its own interests. China was very clear about what it wanted from Africa.

The Chair asked to what extent China would be willing to carry the developing world.

Mr Skosana asked how influence the international civil society could be informed on South African people’s beliefs.

Mr Masuku replied that there were a variety of beliefs. Yet, there was a national development agenda which most parties agreed upon. These were the goals which were conveyed. He suggested an annual forum between civil society, the FDA and other governmental departments in order to synergise goals.

Mr Skosana asked whether the state was responsible for supporting civil society or whether the actions of the state should be guided by civil society.

Mr Masuku replied that it was supposed to be a mutually beneficial relationship. The citizens should primarily be able to shape what the government should do but the government should be aware of what the citizens were doing. Some agendas would require resources and for this, government support would be needed.

Mr Skosana pointed out that different forms of democracy existed.

Mr Masuku replied that there was a great deal of hypocrisy surrounding the definition of democracy. The reaction to human rights violations was largely determined by the media. He cited the examples of Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Swaziland, he argued, banned political parties and arrested the opposition. This, however, was ignored by the media and the region in general as the banning was due to Swaziland’s position as a monarchy. Political and civil rights were being pushed aside by considerations for the culture of Swaziland. The human rights violations in Zimbabwe, on the other hand, were well documented in the media.

Mr Skosana stated that COSATU was pursuing a mentality of “workerism”, it was not concerned with its members gaining control of the markets or economic power but rather just with working.

Mr Masuku replied that any national development agenda needed to take into account the position of the worker if it was to be successful. Economic growth was not uniform amongst the population. The rights of the worker needs to be protected.

Mr Sibande (ANC) noted that the notion of integration emerged in the late 1980’s. He asked what the views of other workers in other countries are about integration they may not see it in the same way.

Workers have different views, an example of this is the variation of views on Zimbabwe. There are huge issues surrounding the concept of democracy. These views may be determined by national interests or by fear of SA due to its size and economic control. They do, however, agree that they should enhance the developmental agenda

The Chair stated that the issue of democracy was complicated. He also stated that the role of trade unions is limited. In a state in transition, the role of trade unions is to aid the transformation of society. It could be debated that the Zimbabwe trade unions were incorrect in their actions. Zimbabwe is supposed to be a democracy, but the quality of that democracy was dubious. Issues of democracy always reverted to human rights and the chair questioned the validity of this. This relates to what is and is not contested in the realm of international relations.

The Chair concluded that the department should have a further meeting with all the actors involved. He also commented that the presenters should point out the weaknesses of committee members.

The meeting was adjourned.