French and Belgian Foreign Policy: Ambassadors’ briefings

Meeting report

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE
17 August 2005
FRENCH AND BELGIAN FOREIGN POLICY: AMBASSADORS’ BRIEFINGS

Chairperson: Mr D Sithole (ANC)

Documents handed out:
The Royal Museum for Central Africa: A Selection of Exhibition Texts: Memory of the Congo – The Colonial Era (Mainly photographs – available from PMG on request at [email protected].)
[Neither the French nor the Belgian Ambassador presented from obtainable documents.]

SUMMARY
In the morning session, the French Ambassador briefed the Committee on France’s strong relationship with South Africa and the rest of the African continent. France regarded South Africa as one of the key mediators in the Cote d’Ivoire peace process. The elections scheduled for 13 October 2005 would be the key to resolving conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. France was also confident that South Africa would become one of the permanent African members of the Security Council after it had been restructured.

The Committee was strongly in favour of France’s relationship with and support of South Africa. However, it was concerned over French military presence in Cote d’Ivoire and its effect on the peace process. It also questioned France’s view on the crisis in Haiti. The Committee further sought clarification regarding the French initiative of international taxation. France’s view regarding agricultural subsidies and debt relief was also questioned. Lastly, the Committee queried France’s future plans in terms of trade with South Africa and providing aid to the country.

In the afternoon, the Belgian Ambassador highlighted that his country had been critically reflecting on its colonial past. He outlined the history of the Congo, which included the recent peace process. He discussed various partnerships being explored by South Africa and Belgium around the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This included training a brigade from the Congolese Defence Force and offering support for the peace process. The Ambassador then discussed the history of Rwanda and Burundi. He highlighted the excellent work that South Africa had done in attempting to secure peace in Burundi.

In the ensuing discussion, Members enquired about:
- Belgium’s view of the proposed United Nations Security Council reform;
- why the Ambassador had not mentioned the role of Tshombe and the Belgians in the death of Patrice Lamumba;
- whether the Belgians were responsible for the situation in the Congo,
- whether there were obstacles to the Congolese election; and
- whether the corruption problem in the Congo was out of control.

MINUTES

French Ambassador’s briefing
Ambassador Jean Felix-Paganon described France and South Africa’s bilateral relationship as being dense and confident. The two countries agreed on most issues and if there were any disagreements both countries were quick to iron out any problems. This strong relationship was quite remarkable as many observers would rather argue that the two countries were on a collision course in terms of interests and perceptions. This analysis had been proven wrong as after eleven years of the new South Africa, the two countries were seen to be key partners in their policies towards Africa.

Africa was an extremely important issue for French diplomatic action. France had left a strong history and legacy in Africa with a number of human and personal exchanges. Africa was also strategically important to France. It counted Africa as being an important element of its own security and diplomatic action due to two reasons. Firstly due to the continent’s geographical closeness to France. Secondly because of the huge challenge the underdevelopment of Africa posed for the security of France. This was why France’s general interest was to secure stability in Africa.

These issues were the main reason for the close partnership between South Africa and France. Both had the same idea of contributing to the stability and development of the continent as it was in their own best interests for the continent to be stable and to become prosperous.

France and South Africa enjoyed close cooperation on a number of issues in Africa. A good example was on the issue of the Comores that was important for the stability of the Indian Ocean. The Comores were disregarded by many, but South Africa as chair of the African Union (AU) took the lead for mediation and if President Mbeki had not kept this interest, the issue would have been forsaken. France supported the mediation process by giving advice and interacting with key players and it was remarkable that the process had been so successful.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was a second example of the bilateral relationship between France and South Africa. South Africa was a key operator in bringing about an agreement between the Congolese parties at Sun City. France tried to supplement the process in New York by bringing the issue to the attention of the Security Council. France would not have managed to obtain the United Nations (UN) and the Security Council’s involvement if the mediation had not produced such concrete results. However the results of the mediation would not have been implemented without the aid of the Security Council and France played a large part in bringing the DRC to the Security Council’s attention. The DRC had been a bad memory for the Security Council and it was at first reluctant to become involved. However the strong bilateral partnership between France and South Africa regarding the DRC had grown to include a number of other stakeholders. This expansion had meant that the DRC was no longer a key issue on the agenda of France and South Africa’s partnership, but was rather a greater concern for the UN.

On the general issues regarding Africa, France was a strong supporter of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in words and deeds. It was funding a number of feasibility studies for NEPAD projects and France felt practical results were essential. It was also waiting with interest for the release of the first results of the Peer Review Mechanism and hoped that these results would bring credibility to the process. France was also working together with the United Kingdom (UK) on financing development in the continent. The two countries had come up with two sets of ideas. Firstly, the United Kingdom introduced the idea of the International Finance Facility (IFF). Secondly, from France’s side were innovative ideas on funding development, including the idea of international taxation. The countries managed to make these ideas complementary rather than competitive.

France felt that the IFF was important to kick off the funding process but at some point fresh money would be needed and additional sources of funding would be required to keep the IFF process running. France believed that international taxation could be an additional source of funding. The ambitious commitments made in Gleneagles were also extremely important. Fifty billion dollars of fresh money had been committed and in terms of the current structure fourteen billion dollars of this money would go to the European Union (EU) for funding development. Bilateral conversations had occurred been South Africa and France on the idea of international taxation. South Africa understood the technical difficulties surrounding the issues but did feel that it was an issue worth exploring further.

France and South Africa had discussed and tried to co-ordinate other issues in the past. The first issue was potentially very serious and involved the nuclear ambitions of Iran. South Africa was very involved in this as it had been a ‘bridge builder’ between the G3 countries (UK, Germany and France) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

The other issue regarded United Nations (UN) reform. France hoped to talk with South Africa as much as possible regarding this issue as it felt that South Africa would play a large role in the multilateral system. This was because South Africa was probably the most important country in Africa and Africa in turn was an important part of the international order. South Africa was therefore at the centre of the game. France felt that the reform and expansion of the Security Council was a positive occurrence as it would be an improvement to the international system. The lack of agreement in Addis Ababa had been a great setback to the process but France hoped it would still continue. To put Africa and its development at the centre of UN activities was a positive move. France was working in New York along with members of the Security Council to achieve various objectives, so that hopefully the next summit would bring a number of practical results.

The final general issue where France and South Africa were working together was the environment. France welcomed the kind of support seen from South Africa on France’s initiative to create a UN organisation for the environment.

Mr Felix-Paganon then focused on the issue of Cote d’Ivoire. France felt that this was a burning issue in Africa as it felt that the situation in Cote d’Ivoire was even more unstable than the situation in Sudan before the death of Mr Garang. It was important to put the recent events from 1999 up to the present within a greater context and to have a historical perspective of the situation so that one could see the broader fundamentals of the crisis. Three elements needed to be kept in mind and were essential for a solution.

Firstly, a demographic revolution had occurred in Cote d’Ivoire. In 1960, the country had a population of three million people; at the present moment, the country had a population of seventeen million people. This was a growth of 5.5% that was probably the largest growth of its kind in the world. The population growth was a huge burden on Cote d’Ivoire’s society as a whole and had a large impact on the cities as well as the countryside.. The second element was the economic crisis that existed in Cote d’Ivoire. The country’s previous wealth had been due to coffee and cocoa exports and the prices of both products had huge drops in the 1970s. At that time, Cote d’Ivoire’s economy had been booming and the state wanted to continue this boom. The fluctuation of commodity prices led to the country becoming largely indebted and due to the prices not bouncing back, a very serious economic situation developed. This situation included poverty that was a new feature in this country.

The third element was the political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. France felt that the balance sheet of former President Felix Houphouet-Boigny was very positive but one could refer to it as an authoritarian regime rather than a democracy. It was not a dictatorship but was rather an intermediate system where there was a large degree of freedom of expression but also tight control over the government. Now suddenly there had been an upsurge and willingness to bring in a democracy into a framework that had not been completely ready for it. Politicians have also not been ready to pursue democracy in terms of power sharing and sharing responsibilities but rather with regards to monitoring the economy. These three issues were the general background of the Cote d’Ivoire crisis.

When analysing France’s actions in the crisis, two important elements needed to be discussed. The first element was the election of President Gbagbo in October 2000. France was aware of the fact that South African authorities had a number of misgivings regarding these elections. France was aware of these problems but was more proactive in accepting the election results announced by the Constitutional authorities. The driving force for France’s position was that the elections brought with it aspirations for change and it fell within the constitutional framework so there were no reasons for not supporting these elections. This acceptance by France was also in alignment with the country’s new policy towards Africa, which was one of non-interference. The elections, although not perfect, were also supported by neighbouring countries and fell within their legal frameworks.

In 2002, France still had forces in Cote d’Ivoire. This was a huge dilemma for the country and it had no simple solutions. France was faced with three options. Firstly to do nothing which it felt in a way was to do something. France had citizens and troops in the country as well as a number of obligations to the Cote d’Ivoire government including the implementation of its military agreements. The second option was to roll over and send troops back to the borders. Many parties including President Gbagbo argued that this was the option France should have taken yet France felt that the opposition was not just coming from the borders. The country also felt that this option would have meant taking sides that would have gone against its policy of non-interference. The final option was to try to stabilise the situation by looking for a political agreement. This was the option taken by France. After analysing the problems posed by the other two options it felt it was the best option France could have chosen. Bringing about this political solution was the main aim of the Lina-Marcoussis agreement and even though these discussions were held in France, this posed a symbolic problem. France felt that a reasonable agreement had been reached largely due to the support from the UN and the African Union (AU).

The relationship between South Africa and France regarding Cote d’Ivoire was not a new feature of the crisis. South Africa and France had extensive discussions during the Accra talks in November 2003, an initiative of the AU. President Mbeki was an arbitrator at these talks and he was aware that the involvement of neighbouring countries in the crisis would have a positive effect but the direct interest of these neighbouring countries could also be a problem. Countries that were not close to Cote d’Ivoire could therefore bring a positive contribution to the crisis. France had been very supportive of the Accra talks and welcomed the influence of President Mbeki during these talks after he had been asked by the Chairperson of the AU to be the arbitrator.

France’s contribution in the Cote d'Ivoire crisis was two-fold. Firstly to contribute on the ground, as if there were no French forces, there would be no peacekeeping by the UN that would lead to chaos. This would be done as discreetly as possible as the presence of these forces was an emotionally and politically sensitive issue. The second role was to closely cooperate and prolong the mediation efforts in New York. As a permanent member of the Security Council, it was France’s duty to bring the issue to the Security Council so that it could deal with it.

Finally, France was in full agreement with South Africa that the keyword for the solution to the Cote d’Ivoire crisis was an election. This election, which was planned for 13 October 2005, would not live up to the perfect standards of the South African election, but could still be conducted in a reasonably good manner and be accepted by everyone. In strategic terms, it would be the best possible solution to the three challenges discussed above. The election would be the starting point and the only way to bring the parties of Cote d’Ivoire to a reasonable system of powersharing. It was the clearest tactical and strategic answer to move to away from the current unstable situation. The election was a clear objective which would open a new phase in Cote d’Ivoire and make the people understand that they had to live together in order to restore peace and stability.

Discussion
The Chairperson began by mentioning a few administrative issues. The Committee had received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs to meet a delegation from Sudan that would be leaving on 20 August 2005. The Chairperson had temporarily accepted a meeting for 19 August that would begin at nine o’clock. He hoped that despite this meeting being very short notice most Members would be able to attend and if they had problems with the time they had to alert the Committee Clerk.

The second administrative issue was the restructuring of the UN that would begin in September. The Committee was trying to organise this into three processes. Firstly, the Committee hoped to have a UN Ambassador give a briefing on the restructuring of the UN and this was planned for 26 September 2005. The Committee also hoped to have all other institutions that were involved in the UN conference discuss the restructuring with them. Secondly the Committee wished to have the Department brief it on its own position regarding the UN restructuring process. Lastly after the final UN General Assembly meeting had taken place the Committee hoped to have the Department give a briefing on the outcomes of that meeting. The Committee Clerk would circulate the dates of these briefings once they had been confirmed.

Mr L Joubert (IFP) felt that Mr Felix-Paganon had left an important issue out of his briefing; the current situation in Haiti. What was France’s position regarding this situation?

Mr Felix-Paganon replied that the situation in Haiti was probably not the best example of cooperation between South Africa and France. France had serious doubts on the role President Aristide could play in bringing stability to Haiti while South Africa had serious doubts over his departure from Haiti. The French Foreign Minister had made a statement in the past that was interpreted as a call to topple President Aristide; however at this point in time France felt that he was more part of the problem than the actual solution. There were doubts surrounding President Aristide’s resignation, but France did not view this resignation as negative but had rather brought positive changes to Haiti. What was important to note was that the Security Council had also unanimously endorsed what had occurred in Haiti and was supportive of the political process that had begun in the country. France was obviously a part of the Security Council; however it was aware that this process would be very complicated and would pose many challenges.

Mr D Gibson (DA) had three questions. The first regarded the restructuring of the UN Security Council. The DA was a strong supporter of this reform and it felt that South Africa had a strong claim to one of the new seats. It was extremely important that the developing world was included in the Security Council. He asked if France agreed with the proposition that the rejection of the G4 compromise at Addis Ababa, against the advice of President Mbeki, would make reform impossible. Would the insistence of the AU for veto powers for new members and to have particular numbers in the UN not lead to this historical opportunity being missed? The second question surrounded the Cote d’Ivoire issue. Did France think that the current revelation that South Africa had been selling military equipment to Cote d’Ivoire would impact on South Africa’s ability to mediate? Thirdly, he enquired whether one should pay attention to the demands of opposition forces in Cote d’Ivoire that President Mbeki should be replaced as a mediator. The reason for this demand was that the opposition forces alleged that Defence Minister Lekota at the conclusion of a recent visit, gave an incorrect interpretation of the agreement relating on who could stand and who could not stand for the presidency in Cote d’Ivoire. Did France think that this demand for a new mediator could gain in strength and did it know of anyone who would want to take over this difficult task of being a mediator?

Mr Felix-Paganon replied that the events in Addis Ababa were a great setback. France believed that the G4 formula as amended in London was the best deal for Africa in years to come. This deal provided two permanent members, four non-permanent members and one rotating member from the African continent. This meant that at a single point in time, one could have had seven African members in the Security Council. It was unrealistic to call for veto powers. However it was in some African countries’ best interests not for the deal to be successful, as their status would be diminished due to them not being eligible to become permanent members. This was unfortunate as these countries were able to block the whole system. France hoped that the discussions between the AU and the G4 would resume because if it did not, it would take a long time to get back on track with the process.

The discussions surrounding the restructuring of the UN began in the early 1990s; yet France estimated that it would still take around ten years for a formula for the Security Council to be agreed upon. It therefore hoped that there was a way to resume dialogue between the African Union and the G4. France fully supported the idea that South Africa should qualify as a permanent member in the Security Council. Whether the permanent members were chosen by the African Union or the UN General Assembly, France had no doubt that South Africa would be one of the two permanent members from Africa. The sale of arms to Cote d’Ivoire by South Africa would in no way affect the position of South Africa in the mediation process. The sale of military equipment was not official government policy, but was rather an example of unfortunate interference by outside parties. France also felt that it was not up to the parties involved in the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire to decide on who should be the mediator in the peace process. It was rather up to the international community to decide who should be a mediator as if it was left to the conflicting parties to decide it would become an issue on its own.

Professor B Turok (ANC) commented that everyone understood that there had been a substantial change to French policy in recent years in a number of areas, especially towards Africa. This included the initiative by President Mitterand on the Tobin Tax that seemed to have taken a different form. His questions would deal with earlier issues that were raised. He felt that Cote d’Ivoire highlighted a number of issues regarding foreign intervention in Africa. For instance, the French Ambassador had not dealt with the destruction of the Cote d’Ivoire air force by the French military. This seemed to be the turning point in the entire situation. Why did France take such aggressive action especially in light of their policy of non-intervention and not taking sides? France’s military action and presence in Cote d’Ivoire was very worrying to the ANC. Being part of a UN peace keeping force was favourable but it resembled more of a past colonial military presence. Secondly, France claimed that they were not in favour of debt cancellation. However debt cancellation was an extremely fundamental issue for Africa. France’s lack of support had a negative effect on its desire to have a new image in Africa especially due to Britain being a strong supporter of debt cancellation. Lastly, he enquired about the reduction of French economic benefits to its former colonies. Could France afford to reduce these economic benefits at a time of poverty and starvation in their former colonies? Should it not be the other way around especially in the light of the Millennium Development Goals?

Mr Felix-Paganon responded that the position towards the Tobin Tax had not changed. A commission had been set up that had set out a number of criteria for international taxation and it was still regarded as a promising route to take in the future. France together with its European partners had been working on a general concept for international taxation and the immediate application of the taxation to airplane tickets which would be very moderate. These discussions were not only on what to tax but also how to manage the funds received from this taxation. France wanted to channel this money into the funds for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. This would hopefully show that the principle of international taxation could work and that it was both implementable in terms of acquiring the money and then using it effectively.

Regarding the attack by the French on Cote d’Ivoire’s air force, France had received warning signs that President Gbagbo had been considering military operations. France believed this was simply an attempt to gain military terrain in the north and therefore cross a line that had been decided internationally to be protected by international forces that was deployed by the Security Council. This was a clear threat to French forces and the attack was therefore a form of legitimate self-defence and was not about taking sides.

Mr Felix-Paganon emphasised that France was definitely not against debt cancellation. However it did have some misgivings about blanket debt cancellation which cancelled a hundred percent of all debts of certain categories of states. This posed a number of problems. Most importantly it was a direct punishment to those countries who had not indebted themselves or who had paid back all their debts in the past. It was important to note that this debt cancellation could not work in a vacuum and it would encourage financial mismanagement in the continent. France thought that a case-by-case approach should be used where individual countries were studied and an ad hoc solution for every case would then be created. If a blanket approach were needed in some countries, France would support full debt cancellation provided it occurred on a case-by-case basis. France was strongly committed to its official development assistance (ODA) efforts to its colonies and was aiming at 0.7% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2012.

Mr M Ramgobin (ANC) concentrated on the topic of Cote d’Ivoire. He agreed that it was important to view the problems of the country in the historical context. He felt that Mr Felix-Paganon had neglected to mention that under France’s tutelage the country had produced almost 40% the region’s exports and was the third largest coffee producer after Brazil and Columbia. The situation in Cote d’Ivoire was so favourable that while many European settlers were leaving the continent, the French community increased from 10 000 in 1960 to 50 000 in 1980. He therefore asked about the economic effect of the French departure and the establishment of cartels in Cote d’Ivoire.

The absence of the Pretoria agreement was also obvious in the briefing. He enquired France’s view on this agreement as the ANC felt the mechanisms presented by the signed Pretoria agreement were fundamental. However, one could see that as late as November 2004, peace-keeping troops had been confronted by French troops outside the presidential palace in Abidjan. South Africa could not interpret the relevance of this French military presence when government troops had been sent out by the authority of the state to establish peace, security and law and order in the country. Against this background, he enquired about France’s position on the AU’s view that it was difficult to comprehend how the people who had in fact started all the problems in the first place should be allowed to be the mediators to bring peace and stability back to the continent.

Mr Felix-Paganon highlighted that France was committed to finding a mechanism that prevented the fluctuation of commodity prices in Cote d’Ivoire. However, this had been difficult to achieve in a global political economy where there was no room for a mechanism to achieve commodity price stability. This was regrettable. The structure of the economy of Cote d’Ivoire dependent on the limited number of agricultural commodities was not a legacy left by France. It was rather the result of a detrimental policy followed by the independence government of Cote d'Ivoire. Though it introduced a number of positive mechanisms such as the regulation of revenues for the peasants it also went wrong due to a number of reasons. Most importantly the Cote d’Ivoire government did not try to strengthen the industrial processes of its economy and therefore only relied on its unstable agricultural exports. France felt that it could not be blamed for this situation as it happened after 1960.

The French President and Government support the Pretoria agreements wholeheartedly. France was doing all it could to ensure that the 13 October elections were successful. The situation regarding the French troops at the Presidential palace in Abidjan was a clear example of difficult and serious times. It would always be a tragic situation when military troops were placed in front of a mob as these troops were not trained for such a situation. France worked closely with the South African government and urged the Cote d’Ivoire government not to interfere with the French troops. France had informed the government that these troops would move out of the area after two hours, yet the government took the opportunity to harass the troops further in these two hours. France regretted the situation that occurred but did not feel that it should take the blame. It cost France a lot of money to keep its troops in the country but talks with UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, highlighted the fact that there was no other solution to the problem. If France withdrew it troops, the UN would also withdraw their troops.

However if there were a candidate prepared to take on the responsibility of the corps and had the same military capacity, they would be welcome to take over from France. There was no possible solution without a military force in Cote d’Ivoire. The corps was also supported by the South African government, the UN Security Council and the troop contributing countries that were mostly from African countries that realised that the corps was important for their security. France therefore felt it was unfair to accuse the peace-keeping corps as being a new colonial and one sided force as it was acting under the authority of the Security Council.

Since 2003, France had been having informal discussions with South Africa regarding the situation in the Cote d’Ivoire. It was very supportive of South Africa’s role as a mediator in the crisis and felt that it was an important solution if the efforts of the AU should fail. So France had been supportive of the role of President Mbeki as a mediator in the process all along. President Mbeki had achieved a number of solutions at the conclusion of the Pretoria agreement. France therefore felt that it would not challenge the authority of the mediator. The conditions decided on by President Mbeki for the upcoming elections were final. The Pretoria Agreement had also been endorsed by the international community. The Pretoria agreement stated that in the case of a dispute the parties agreed that the mediator would act as arbitrator and any decisions made by the mediator was accepted in advance. When the G7 signed this agreement they agreed that the mediator’s decisions were final. However now that they were required to stick to their commitments and begin disarmament they would try to find any pretext not to begin this process. The disarmament process would pose many problems but France was committed to ensuring that it would not occur in a one-sided manner. Finally, France believed that South Africa and France had achieved a remarkable degree of congruency and it felt that there was no alternative to South African mediation. No B plan existed and for this reason alone France was behind South African mediation one hundred percent.

Mr L Greyling (ID) suggested that the issue of climate change should also be included in the considerations surrounding international taxation. The airplane ticket taxation was a good idea but the issue of climate change should also be considered when funds were distributed due to the difficulty of limiting the emissions from bunker fuels. He also argued that a positive aspect brought by the Tobin Tax was that it reduced the incentives for currency speculation while at the same time raising money for development aid. Another burning issue was that of agricultural subsidies. Most people around the world understood that a common agricultural policy was supported by a number of European countries. Any attempts to remove these subsidies were resisted by countries such as France. What efforts would France make for the removal of these subsidies?

Mr Felix-Paganon agreed that climate change would be a good candidate when the distribution of funds was considered. However climate change posed huge governance problems. The governance of distributing funds in areas such as HIV/AIDS was much simpler. Many political and technical issues had to be considered, including the proper balance of dollars during the distribution of funds as most of the money collected would be flowing form the North. It was therefore a very complicated and sensitive process, but if successful, they could then look for new sources of revenue and new projects to fund. While the Tobin Tax had a number of positive aspects the beauty of airplane taxation was that only those countries that were willing, would be taxed and the market would not be distorted. Tobin Tax had a potentially disruptive effect and therefore the requirement for consensus was much higher with regards to this form of taxation. This cooperation would also be difficult to achieve. On the other hand, the airplane tax would not destroy the markets and it could involve emerging countries that meant that the responsibility of international taxation could be shared by a wide range of countries.

The common agricultural policy was not a French policy but rather a policy of the EU. It was also no longer a huge political and economic issue for France. Agriculture provided just below five percent of France’s working force. Although it was an important element of the country’s exports it was no longer linked to the subsidies. The record of the EU in terms of market access was impressive. The EU absorbed two thirds of Africa’s exports and many steps had been taken to make the EU much more open than other areas of the world. However studies had shown that market access did not favour the development of developing countries but rather favoured agri-business in emerging older developed countries such as Australia and Brazil. Therefore it was dangerous to try to state a relationship between market access and development.

Mr S Huang (ANC) asked three questions. Firstly, France was a key role player in Europe and had a strong influence in the EU. However it had a no vote on the EU constitution. In the light of this absence of votes how had France integrated itself with the EU for the past fifteen years? The second question was on the issue of trade between South Africa and France. Trade had occurred between the countries since 1993, yet in 2003 and 2004 trade was -10.3% and -13.2% respectively. How was France planning to alter the balance of this trade so that it was in its favour? Lastly, since 2001, France had donated R69 million to South Africa through its solidarity fund. How could France increase this amount in order to help a number of initiatives especially that of HIV/AIDS in the country?

Mr Felix-Paganon emphasised that France were not the only country that did not agree to the EU constitution. This did not mean the end of the European process. There were a number of provisions for a future ratification process and the French Government would in the next two years see where the country stood with regards to this process and then make a decision it deemed to be appropriate. It was too early to determine what the solution would be but it definitely was not the end of the European process. The no vote in France was not a no to Europe and there was still overwhelming support for the European process.

Bilateral trade between South Africa and France was growing steadily even though there was an important deficit to the detriment of South Africa. However, France was satisfied with bilateral trade and would welcome any trade initiatives that would increase France’s market share, reduce the deficit and produce a sound commercial relationship between the countries. A key player in South Africa’s relationship with France was the French Development Agency (AFD). This group made non-sovereign privileged loans to South Africa and the level of its commitment was around €150 million which increases by about €30 to €40 million a year. South Africa was second on its list in terms of commitment after Morocco. This initiative was a sound way of working together with South Africa.

The Chairperson thanked Mr Felix-Paganon for clearly outlining the relationship and support South Africa received from France as well as a number of other issues he had raised. He did not believe that President Aristide had resigned but would accept that he left on his own accord and had volunteered to leave the country. He would also accept that the support South Africa received from France demonstrated that it recognised that South Africa understood West Africans better than the former colonial masters did. While a number of other solutions existed, markets were dominated by the idea of globalisation.

Belgian Ambassador’s briefing
After the lunchbreak, Ambassador P Labourverie noted that Belgium was acknowledging the wrongs of its colonial past in central Africa. Indeed, the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Brussels had exhibits that critically analysed Belgium’s colonial past. In terms of this, the museum was unique within the context of Europe.

Mr Labourverie proceeded to outline the history of the Congo. The Congo had originally been colonised in 1885, as the personal possession of the Belgian King Leopold II, but in 1908 the Belgian government formally took over its administration. On 30 June 1960, the Congo gained its independence and Mr Patrice Lamumba was elected as its President. Shortly after this, rioting erupted, the country collapsed, Lamumba was assassinated, United Nations peacekeeping forces were deployed, and the Katanga province unsuccessfully attempted to secede. In 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko gained power and during the 1970s, the economy collapsed.

At the beginning of the 1990s, due to strong internal opposition, Mobutu agreed to hold multi-party elections. However, he stalled the process and in 1996, Mr Laurent Kabila’s army, along with Rwandan and Ugandan troops, invaded the Congo and took power. Mr Kabila asked the Rwandan troops to leave the Congo in 1998, but they refused and attempted to take over Kinshasa. Zimbabwean, Angolan and Namibian troops intervened in order to stop the Rwandan forces. Various rebellions also erupted during this period and war broke out between various Congolese movements. In January 2001, Mr Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Mr Joseph Kabila, succeeded him. In 2002 and 2003, due to South African mediation, foreign troops began leaving the Congo.

In February 2002, politicians from the various Congolese movements held peace negotiations at Sun City, but the process was inconclusive. A new round of negotiations was held in Pretoria in December 2002, which resulted in the formation of a transitional government. The three main movements formed the basis of this transitional government, while Mr Joseph Kabila was its president. Constitutional elections have been scheduled for November 2005 while Presidential elections were due to take place in March 2006.

Mr Labourverie discussed the partnership that existed between Belgium and South Africa around the Congo. He observed that co-operation with South Africa brought legitimacy to Belgium’s peace efforts in the Congo. Indeed, the Belgian government admired the role that South Africa had played in the mediation process. South Africa possessed the political legitimacy to ensure that the Congolese reached an agreement. Belgium’s role in the Congo, on the other hand, was to offer financial support, which included offering funding for the Congolese election process. The Belgian government was also attempting to convince other European countries to offer financial support for the processes in the Congo.

Mr Labourverie added that the South African and Belgian Defence Ministries were co-operating on the training of a Congolese army brigade. The Congolese army was divided into three factions, and it was vital for the peace process that these three factions were united into a single functioning army. A major concern, however, was that even the legitimate brigades within the Congolese army were not being regularly paid. This was a dangerous situation because, in the past, the trigger for most of the riots in the Congo had been the non-payment of the army. As a result, a European Commission Unit had offered to aid in supervising the payment of soldiers. Mr Labourverie added that there was also constant communication between the South African and the Belgian governments regarding the situation in the Congo. South Africa had also initiated a census project in the Congolese civil service and army. Its aim was to eradicate the problem of ‘ghost’ civil servants and soldiers. Belgium recognised that such an undertaking was vital in rooting out corruption and, therefore, pledged monetary support for South Africa’s initiative.

Mr Labourverie discussed aspects of the colonial history of Rwanda and Burundi. Between 1895 and 1899 Germany colonised both Rwanda and Burundi, but in 1923, following World War One, Belgium received a mandate from the League of Nations to administer these two countries. Belgium imposed a form of indirect rule, which involved bolstering the Tutsi elite. As independence approached, the Belgians began providing support to other political parties, whose members were mainly Hutus, in the hope that this would create multi-party democracies. In June 1962, the United Nations granted independence to Rwanda and Burundi.

Mr Labourverie noted that Rwanda’s first post-independent President was overthrown by a military coup in 1973. At that point, Mr Habyarimana became President and all opposition political parties were banned. In 1990, Rwandan Tutsi exiles invaded the country from Uganda. A tentative ceasefire was reached between the warring parties in 1992. On 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana, along with the Burundian President, died when the aircraft they were travelling in crashed. This was used as a pretext by Hutu militants for initiating the genocide during which more than 800 000 people were killed. A new government under Mr Kagame attempted to rebuild the country after the genocide and it removed all references to ethnicity in Rwanda’s new Constitution.

Mr Labourverie commented that Burundi’s post-colonial history had been marked by several military coups. Indeed, it was estimated that 300 000 people in Burundi had died in conflict since its independence. Indeed, during the 1990s Burundi was in a state of civil war. In 1999, Mr Mandela mediated between the Burundian parties. However, the Force for National Liberation (FNL) and Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) were not signatories to the agreement and, as a result, the civil war continued. However, in 2001 a three-year transitional government was installed and through South Africa’s intervention, the FDD agreed to become involved in the peace process. In 2003, an African peacekeeping force was also deployed to Burundi, which included South African troops. Added to this, Belgium and South Africa contributed towards the cost of the peacekeeping force, but in 2004, the United Nations took over the responsibility for this force. In April 2005, Burundian citizens approved a new Constitution, which included guarantees for the Tutsi minority. Communal elections were held in June 2005 and Parliamentary elections were held in July 2005. The FDD gained fifty eight percent of the votes in the Parliamentary elections. The Parliament still needed to elect the president, who would be inaugurated on 26 August 2005.

Mr Labourverie stated that the Belgian government admired the role that South Africa played in Africa. Belgium strongly backed the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Renaissance initiative. Indeed, there needed to be African solutions to African problems. He concluded by stating that Belgium wanted the Congo to succeed in its peace and reconstruction endeavours.

Discussion
Mr D Gibson (DA) enquired whether Belgium supported the proposed reform of the United Nations Security Council, whereby the developing world would gain a number of permanent Security Council seats. South Africa had a strong case for receiving one of the seats

Mr Labourverie agreed that important developing countries should be allocated seats on the Security Council. It would be wonderful if South Africa could be given a permanent seat as it would allow it to influence the Security Council from within.

Mr Gibson asked for Belgium’s opinion on the African Union’s (AU) decision to reject the G4’s comprise on Security Council seats. Specifically, the G4 had offered a number of permanent non-veto seats to the developing world. Mr Gibson commented that the DA believed that the AU had made a blunder in not accepting this offer, and pushing for seats with veto powers. He asked whether Belgium believed that the AU had made a historical mistake.

Mr Labourverie replied that the decision of the AU was unfortunate: It seemed that the insistence of voting and veto rights had jeopardised the prospects of Security Council reform

Mr Gibson asked Mr Labourverie to contrast the colonial eras of Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo with their post-colonial eras. This would allow one to understand what the colonial powers did to Africa, and what Africans did to themselves.

Mr Labourverie responded that the Belgian government had become responsible for the administration of the Congo in 1908. At this time, mining and agricultural industries were established in the Congo. The Belgians also established an education system and by 1959 the Congo had the highest literacy rate in Africa. Added to this, Belgium invested heavy in a tertiary education system in the Congo during 1956. The Congo, unfortunately, was not ready for independence in 1960, but sections of the international community and the Congolese people pushed for it. The result was that, when independence came, the country collapsed.

Mr M Ramgobin (ANC) said that the Royal Museum for Central Africa was an extraordinary museum. Mr Labourverie agreed that it was a remarkable museum, as it presented a critical self-examination of Belgium’s colonial role in Central Africa.

Mr M Ramgobin (ANC) stated that Mr Labourverie failed to mention how Moise Tshombe had celebrated the gruesome murder of Patrice Lamumba, in which Belgian soldiers were implicated.

Mr Labourverie replied that Patrice Lamumba had been a hero. There was a 2001 Commission of Inquiry undertaken by the Belgian Parliament into his death. It had access to many resources, including to formerly classified documents. The Commission found that Belgian troops had transported Lamumba to Katanga, but they had not been involved directly in his killing. The Commission, nonetheless, ruled that Belgium did have a moral responsibility for his death, as it had failed to intervene to stop his murder. As a result, the Belgian government had apologised to the Congolese people and the Lamumba family. A trust fund was also established for the Lamumba family.

Mr Ramgobin noted that the ANC did not hold the current Belgian generation responsible for colonial atrocities; however, it was the responsibility of Belgian’s present generation to aid the DRC in its reconstruction. Through this, Belgium had the opportunity to make amends for its colonial past. Ms M Njobe (ANC) observed that the Congo had been struggling for the last 45 years. As the former administrator, did Belgium feel responsible for this?

Mr Labourverie responded that colonialism was wrong, but it was in the past. There had been recent articles in the American and British press that accused Belgium of committing genocide, between 1885 and 1890, in the Congo. The term genocide implied that there had been a clear intention to destroy an entire population. This was not case in the Congo: there had only been two genocides in history, which were those that were committed against the Jewish and Tutsi peoples. Added to this, the articles had simply speculated about the population of the Congo in the 1880s and 1890s: no census records exited during that period. The Belgians had committed some atrocities in the Congo, such as labour exploitation, but certainly not genocide. Belgian soldiers had even tortured and mutilated individual Congolese, but that was in the 1890s and could not be compared to the horrors of World War Two. In 1904, the Belgium government had even convened a Commission of Inquiry, which investigated the excesses of the Belgian army in the Congo. Nonetheless, he felt that Belgium could not be held directly responsible for the situation in the Congo forty-five years after its independence. When the Belgian government left the Congo, the situation was not as bad as the present one.

Mr Ramgobin commented that it seemed as though the European Union was more willing to aid Eastern Europe rather than Africa. Indeed, why was Europe not extending the same support to Africa as it offered to Eastern Europe? Was the differential treatment a racial issue?

Mr Labourverie responded that perhaps some European countries were experiencing donor fatigue towards Africa. It was correct that the European Union had embraced Eastern Europe, but it had also continued to offer support to Africa. Indeed, Belgium felt a moral responsibility towards the Congo and was involved in furthering the cause of central Africa.

Mr Ramgobin commented that there was an allegation that multinational companies and foreign governments were fuelling the conflict in the DRC in order to gain ownership of its natural wealth. He asked whether these allegations were well founded. It seemed as though Africa would remain a theatre of war because of foreign entities hankering after its mineral wealth.

Mr Ramgobin commented that there been a recent report in the New York Times, which had stated that the United States felt that it needed to undertake a "benevolent imperialist" role in the DRC. He asked whether this was the situation.

Ms S Camerer (DA) stated that she had attended a meeting on the DRC that was addressed by Mr Ajello, the European Union Representative for the Great Lakes Region. During the meeting, Mr Ajello stated that corruption was rife in the Congolese civil service and army. For example, the army was supposed to consist of 350 000 troops; however, at least half of these were ‘ghost’ soldiers. The Congolese army was also harassing and preying upon the civilian population. She noted that Mr Ajello had also remarked that there were still at least 50 warlords that were operative, and were being funded by neighbouring states through the proceeds of ‘blood’ diamonds. She asked whether Mr Ajello was over emphasising the problems that existed in the Congo.

Mr Labourverie replied that Mr Ajello had accurately described the situation in the Congo. The country had tremendous problems and many government officials had plundered the state’s resources. It also lacked proper administration, social security and infrastructure. Nonetheless, one had to be optimistic and have hope. Indeed, South Africa was playing a key role in ensuring that the Congolese addressed the problem of corruption.

Ms Camerer enquired whether Belgium, or the whole of the European Union, would be involved, along with Africa, in attempting to get the DRC to implement democracy and good governance. She felt that the challenges in the DRC were so huge that no single country could influence the outcome.

Ms Njobe asked whether there were any obstacles that could affect the Congolese elections. What still needed to be done to ensure that the elections took place?

Mr Labourverie replied that the sheer size of the DRC would pose a logistics challenge during the election. Another problem was that the DRC had never conducted a census and most people had no form of identification. Despite this, the international community had established a voter registration system in most parts of the DRC. However, some of the areas were still in a state of conflict and it was possible that the elections would not take place in these areas. Nonetheless, Belgium and South Africa needed to try their best to ensure that free and fair elections were held in the Congo.

The Chairperson felt that Belgium’s re-examination of its own past was praiseworthy. The Committee would be working with the Belgian Parliament in order to consider how parliamentarians, from both countries, could contribute to the processes in the Congo. Indeed, the two parliaments needed to continue and strengthen their relationship around the issue of Africa. South Africa’s success in Africa depended on its partners, such as Belgium.

The meeting was adjourned.