Peacekeeping: the Brahimi Report

Meeting report

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE AND DEFENCE PORTFOLIO AND JOINT STANDING COMMITTEES: JOINT MEETING
20 March 2001
BRAHIMI REPORT ON PEACEKEEPING: BRIEFING

Chairperson: Mr Ebrahim, Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee Chairperson

Relevant Documents:
- Brahimi Report
- The African Regional Assessment Workshop on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations, Preliminary Report (See Appendix)

An International Relations lecturer at Wits University spoke on the Brahimi Report, a review of UN peace and security activities with recommendations as to how peacekeeping can be better conducted. The Report came out of a realisation that UN peacekeeping missions such as Somalia and Rwanda had been failures. It explores how peacekeeping can be effective and credible.

The Brahimi Report calls for peacekeeping to be the core activity of the UN, with more preventative diplomacy and the effective use of fact-finding missions. New information gathering and analysis methods will be used to create better "early warning" systems. The UN needs more representatives from Africa and the southern hemisphere in general.

MINUTES
Mr Chris Landsberg, a lecturer in the Wits University Department of International Relations, spoke on the Brahimi Report, the result of an independent panel discussion arranged by the United Nations with Mr Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, and others with peacekeeping experience. The Brahimi Report is a review of UN peace and security activities with recommendations as to how peacekeeping can be better conducted. The Report was discussed in Johannesburg in February at the African Regional Assessment Workshop, in which Mr Landsberg participated.

The impetus for the report was the UN's peacekeeping failures in Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, and more recently, in Sierra Leone and Kosovo. The UN learned from these failures that its peacekeeping is not effective. The indifference with which the world faced the genocide in Rwanda has been called "the worst racism in international affairs the world has ever seen". The UN's Rwanda mission was given no money to purchase any major item of equipment. Everything was to come from either Somalia or Cambodia. The Brahimi Panel, then, was put into place with a view to restoring the effectiveness and credibility of the UN peacekeeping process.

The Brahimi report calls for more preventative diplomacy and the more effective use of fact-finding missions. New information gathering and analysis methods will be used to create better "early warning" systems. The UN needs more representatives from Africa. Deployment capacity should be increased to within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. Mr Landsberg called this rapid deployment very ambitious and a radical paradigm shift for the UN peacekeeping forces. Peacekeeping should now be the core activity of the UN. It is currently under-budgeted, but the Brahimi Report recommends it be part of the overall UN budget. UN peacekeeping operations should be boosted, particularly in terms of personnel. There should be more personnel from countries in the southern hemisphere.

Mr Landsberg said the workshop in Johannesburg produced two broad views on how to deal with peacekeeping operations in future. The first is that, despite Africa's frustrations with UN peacekeeping, Africa needs the Brahimi process and the UN peacekeeping system. Africa is the part of the world most affected by and most in need of peacekeeping. It will benefit most from the radical shift in peacekeeping Brahimi proposes.

The second view is that Africa needs to fall back on its own will and capabilities in establishing an independent peacekeeping capacity based on sub-regional organisations, such as SADC, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This view is rooted in scepticism that anything worthwhile will come out of the Brahimi Report without the political will and participation of the countries of the industrialised north. Proponents of this view suggest that the ideal of "African solutions to African problems" has become a pretext for Western disengagement from peacekeeping in Africa. Africa has to accept there is little chance the United States or Europe will send their troops to Africa, although these countries will send money. Foreign aid is important and African states have to ask themselves how best to use foreign aid.

There is now a new kind of conflict. Whereas during the Cold War, conflicts were inter-state, they are now intra-state, particularly in Africa. This changes the nature and needs of peacekeeping operations. Mr Landsberg complained that Brahimi does not address this.

The Brahimi Report ignores African regional groups such as SADC and the OAU, but Mr Landsberg said they proved in Eritrea how effective they can be. He did note that he thinks SADC has "a long way to go". The current conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the first big peacekeeping challenge for South Africa.

Discussion
(Q) Chairperson Ebrahim asked if it would be possible to implement the Report, ie to make a shift from traditional to preventive peacekeeping.

(A) Mr Landsberg said Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, is in favour of humanitarian intervention and is not deterred by the concept of sovereignty. But ultimately, it is the United States that will determine whether reform will take place. Mr Landsberg was not optimistic that the Brahimi Report will be implemented. Intervention is not seen as strategic, so he does not think major revisions and restructurings will take place. The engagement of the Brahimi process will require the commitment of key states in the region.

(Q) A member asked if there was a "higher level" than what the Brahimi Report proposes, in terms of changing decision-making structures. He said the current structures are skewed and need to be made more representative.
[Ed: This question was not responded to directly]

(Q) Ms Hajaij (ANC) asked how SADC could be strengthened.

(A) Mr Landsberg said South Africa is the hegemon without the ability to realise its goals. In this way, it could easily be isolated if it attempted to take matters into its own hands. The question is how South Africa will intervene, in the context of SADC.

(Q) A member of the Defence Portfolio Committee said he thinks South Africa is on the brink of sending troops to the DRC. He said he did not think the West would support this and asked what other African countries would offer support and whether the UN will offer money to support the mission.

(A) Mr Landsberg said the UN would make a limited contribution of mostly humanitarian supplies. He also noted the African countries that normally send peacekeepers are currently involved in wars, ie Sudan, so he does not know who will support South Africa in the DRC.

Mr Landsberg emphasised if troops are sent, they need appropriate resources. He cited Somalia as an example of where this did not happen.

(Q) A member asked how states would abide by the new norms and values the Brahimi Report proposes.

(A) Mr Landsberg said "Don't go it alone", as South Africa learned from Nigeria in 1995. Strong countries have to work together and get others to follow. You have to lead without being a bully.

Appendix
THE AFRICAN REGIONAL ASSESSMENT WORKSHOP ON THE BRAHIMI REPORT ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS

21-22 FEBRUARY 2001: A SUMMARY
by Francis Kornegay and Chris Landsberg

Introduction
The African regional workshop of the Brahimi Report on United Nations "Peace Operations" took place on 21-22 February 2001 in Johannesburg, South Africa. The workshop brought together 60 participants representing a cross-section of African officials, experts and scholars concerned with peace and security issues. The workshop was funded by Britain's Department for International Development (DFlD) through New York University's Center on international Cooperation (CIC). its purpose was to review the Brahimi Report's findings and recommendations on UN peace operations and their implications for Africa.

The Africa workshop was hosted by the International Relations Department of the
University of the Witwatersrand with co-sponsoring from Makerere University in
Uganda. The University of the Witwatersrand Deputy Vice Chancellor, Dr. Leila Patel
welcomed participants followed by a keynote opening of the proceedings by Mr. Sipho
Pityana, Director-General of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs.

Two broad views were expressed at the workshop. The first suggested that, in spite of Africa's frustrations with UN peacekeeping, Africa could ill afford to disengage from the Brahimi process and the UN peacekeeping system. The UN must continue to have primary responsibility for global - including African - peace and security. The continent had no choice but to persevere in efforts to reform how the UN and its powerful member states engaged with Africa on peace and security issues. This view might be characterized as a position articulating the need for pan-African inspired and initiated joint solutions with the international community in addressing Africa's problems.

Related to this broad view is the suggestion that, if implemented in its entirety, the Brahimi Report would bring about a radical paradigm shift in UN peace operations, and one that would benefit Africa. However, there was widespread scepticism whether the Brahimi Report would in fact be implemented, and one speaker proclaimed that the workshop might serve to 'bury Brahimi'.

The second broad view argued that Africa needed to fall back on its own will and capabilities in establishing an independent peacekeeping capacity based on sub-regional organisations and the OAU. Proponents of this view voiced strong scepticism about the report and questioned whether anything worthwhile could come out of Brahimi for Africa in the absence of political will on tile part of international actors like the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France, the western powers more broadly and the countries from the industrialised north in general.

Supporters of this view cited the reluctance of developed countries 1) to enter into meaningful partnerships with African regional and sub-regional actors; 2) forge joint efforts to help bolster the capacities of African states: and 3) provide resources like finances and logistical equipment to African peacekeepers.

Proponents of this view noted that 'African solutions to African problems' has become a pretext for Western disengagement from peacekeeping in Africa. 'African solutions to African problems' may further be interpreted as a smokescreen for marginalizing Africa as a result of Western donor fatigue. Then, there is the question of Africa' s willingness to engage. The example of the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was cited. Although there are apparent plans for ACRI to devolve and/or build up a regional brigade capacity, South Africa has snubbed the ACRI and won't even engage on its own terms. Hence, if Africa is not to be excluded in terms of forging peacekeeping partnerships, it must exercise pro-active engagement as well.

Issues
The two views mentioned above surfaced throughout a spirited and frank debate following an agenda that started off with an overview of implications for Africa of the Brahimi Report. This was followed by a series of thematic assessments on prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building. These issues were then debated with a view to establishing a division of labour between the UN and sub-regional organizations. This discussion covered the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD.

Conflict Prevention
The Brahimi Report was considered weak in several definitional and conceptual areas. The boundaries between inter and intra-state conflicts were not clear in terms of UN peace operations. Another challenge that was placed on the agenda is what one observer called intra-inter state conflicts a la the conflict in the DRC. The assumption that you can prevent conflict was challenged in terms of the suggestion that non-violent tensions reflective of conflict short of violence may serve as healthy signals of 'early warning' that can be addressed to avoid violent outbreak of conflicts. This raised the widespread concern about the lack of political will. Observers noted that 'political will' was less significant than 'a recognition of political necessity' in resolving and preventing conflicts. The question of political will presents a serious paradox; those with resources typically lack the will, and those with the will esssentially lack the resources. In short, the willing are unable, and the able are unwilling.

Conflict prevention in the African context has to occur against the backdrop of the socioeconomic dimensions of security in developing countries with comparatively weak states. Conflict prevention in Africa needs to be approached from a transformation perspective at three levels: situational, institutional and systemic. The situational level refers to early warning 'signals' which requires 'early response'. Institutional transformation presuppose security cooperation between states in setting up 'peace regimes'. This should reflect shared values, rules, processes and procedures (e.g. peacekeeping training). Systemic transformation calls for action to address structural aspects of conflict situations. These - like the land crisis in Zimbabwe - may require transformative remedies in order to prevent conflicts. This systemic aspect also applies to resolving the problems of peacekeeping in Africa, not just between Africa and the UN, but between African countries involving debates over the role of major African powers playing a hegemonic role versus notions of 'collective' security initiatives. There was a perception of a hegemonically-inclined 'Annan Doctrine' encouraging 'lead nations' to lead a collective of states in imposing peace and security.

Peacekeeping
The Brahimi Report's implications for peacekeeping in Africa inspired a sense of 'déjà vu'. This sense was based on a history of past studies, conferences, findings and recommendations concerning peace operations in Africa that have made little headway in terms of follow-up and implementation. Hence, the biggest challenge for the international community and for Africa was thought to be a lack of political will in deploying UN peacekeepers to Africa. The Brahimi Report inspired considerable scepticism among participants. Major issues highlighted were:

- Shortcomings in planning and executing peacekeeping in Africa have often been identified, but the political will needed to correct them has often been lacking.
- The developed counties are often not willing to enter into genuine partnership with African countries to strengthen their capability for peacekeeping operation.
- Not enough provision is made for Africans to serve at the UN Headquarters Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), especially at the information gathering level.
- African governments need to take up the challenge of seeing to it that peace prevails on the continent and work to end the situation where neighbouring countries participate either directly or indirectly in fuelling conflicts.
- African countries, through sub-regional organisations and the OAU, must start building up some capacity for peacekeeping operations.
- The permanent members of the UN Security Council must develop a positive attitude to resolving African conflicts.

This latter point was amplified in terms of the ease of the UN's Rwanda mission in 1994:
That mission was given no money to purchase any major item of equipment. Everything was to come from either Cambodia or Somalia. But, who was to send them from
Cambodia to Rwanda for rapid deployment to avert imminent catastrophe?

Peace-Building
Some of the peacekeeping observations had important implications for peace-building. For example, it was noted that while the Brahimi Report's emphasis on recruiting legal experts to evaluate criminal codes may be important, it is more urgent to place emphasis on building up the state administrative machinery in order to facilitate the meeting of basic needs in a post-conflict situation. Furthermore, peace-building suggests the urgency for UN peacekeeping to contemplate broader developmental objectives which emphasize African leadership and 'ownership' of peace-building processes. Here, there was wide consensus on peace-building being shaped by the UN as a process that would place priority on roles for Women, civil society organisations and local communities in a participatory process emphasising grassroots development. Within this matrix, democratic governance was also emphasised alongside popular participation in development, coupled with good governance were thought to be essential in ensuring that peace-building is attainable. This formula should guide what the Brahimi Report referred to as the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) dimension to missions. And this could apply to prevention as well as post-conflict situations. One analyst stressed the importance that 'quick impact projects should not become temporary impact projects'.

Divisions of Labour
In approaching a relationship between the UN and the OAU there was felt to be a need to understand the OAU at three levels: member states (which raises the issue of 'sovereignty'); the General Secretariat; and sub-regional organisations (SADC, ECOWAS, and lGAD). Sub-regional organisations started as economic community blocs but have ended up as security communities as well. There is much conflicting and overlapping membership and geographic spread, but these organizations are the pillars of the OAU. The Abuja treaty of 1991 recognizes their primacy in economic and security cooperation There is no written, formalised division of labour between the OAU and African subregional organizations, but informal arrangements which involve first and foremost 'the countries of the region' which automatically brings in sub-regional organisations.

Even as these issues have yet to be adequately digested, the OAU is faced with a looming transformation that will add yet another dimension to this 'division of labour' theme. Namely, the OAU's transformation into the African Union (AU). What is particularly challenging in this regard, especially with regard to conflict prevention, is the fact that the AU, unlike the OAU, breaches the sanctity of the sovereignty principle and its corollary, 'non-interference.' Article 4 of the constitutive act of the AU qualifies the sovereignty principle. Therefore, the current arrangement between the OAU and the UN on UN peace operations will have to give way to ore between the AU and UN which, indeed, may be more facilitative of a collaborative division of labour in which the entry point for conflict prevention may be less of a legal encumbrance than is currently the case.

There was a lively debate on the roles of aspiring hegemons like South Africa and Nigeria, and many participants argued that sub-regional security Systems should be collective rather than hegemonic.

The UN and OAU need one another and there already is an understanding of that need.
Some participants argued that, in a crisis, either the regional organisation or a sub regional actor must respond first. Then, at a more advanced stage, the UN can come in. The Ethiopia-Eritrea peace settlement is indicative of that relationship. However, the UN, with its greater resources, tends to come in and push the OAU aside. If the OAU and sub-regional organizations become 'junior partners' the relationship with the UN becomes problematic. If it is equal with consultation, then a real partnership is possible. Balance has to be struck. The UN has a mandate for global peace, and must be held to that responsibility in Africa.

The UN and Sub-regional Organisations
When ECOWAS deployed troops to Liberia, many rationales were put forth. But no one could challenge the fact of a humanitarian crisis in Liberia. The expectation was that the US would come to the rescue but it failed to do so. This spurred the launching of ECOMOG. There is a problem, however, when you cannot distinguish warring factions or you have multiple factions, constituting 'complex peacekeeping situations.' in terms of doctrine, it should be recognised that you cannot apply it by applying traditional concepts. Sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS can engage in 'non-traditional' peacekeeping. The QAU sanctioned ECOMOG and supported it as a good idea. The UN eventually deployed military observers to assist ECOMOG in Liberia

Some participants argued that ECOWAS should create the environment for the UN to come in since it cannot respond to refugee crises as the UN can. Sub-regional organisations do not have the infrastructure nor the capacity to take up these challenges. A new ECOWAS Security Protocol of 1999 involving re-structuring at the ECOWAS secretariat may enable ECOWAS to be more effective in peace-making and peacekeeping. The ECOWAS standby arrangement, however, reflect only a slight improvement. Sierra Leone actually saw competition between ECOMOG and the UN. UN and sub-regional organizations need to deal with each other in peacekeeping situations based on what they do best, on their comparative advantages. The question for Africa is: how can we manage the resources that we have? Joint sub-regional operations might be a way to go. Unlike, SADC and the OAU, ECOWAS has not entered into a formal arrangement or understanding with the UN which some suggested raised other issues in the sub-regional connection in UN peace operations: that of autonomy and freedom of action on the part of such organizations.

As far as sub-regional organizations are concerned, Brahimi's narrow objective was to focus on the UN. The lack of African involvement in the finalisation of Brahimi reflects the fact that the report does not include in much detail relations between die UN and Africa's sub-regional organizations. Nothing in the Charter precludes sub-regional and regional actions as long as they are in accord with UN principles. Chapter 53 of the UN

Charter legitimises sub-regional peacekeeping with the express consent of the UN Security Council This provides an opening for sub-regional peacekeeping engagement. The general requirements for any sub-regional organizations to manage conflict are the political cohesiveness of the sub-region, well-trained and equipped national armed forces and interoperability as well as an ability to promote longer-term political and economic stability.

According to one participant, SADC realities suggests that, like Comesa, 80% of SADC's budget comes from outside the region; the bloc is divided between South Africa and countries close to it, and Zimbabwe and those close to it. The region, said the commentator, is racked by internal state conflicts and instabilities. There is a perceived resistance to democratisation and bad governance.

There is insufficient peacekeeping training in SADC countries and interoperability. Political will is needed to develop a SADC peacekeeping capacity. At the level of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) there is agreement on a standby arrangement but there has been little movement. With the exception of Zimbabwe, Southern Africa's peacekeeping commitment in the Brahimi sense was depicted as weak. On that score, it was suggested that there is a reed to reflect on intervention under the guise of peacekeeping. Distinctions need to be made in this regard. Further, in terms of divisions of labour, there are the questions of who funds, who coordinates and who commands and controls.

IGAD comprises the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) where the longest running conflict in the world is the Sudanese civil war, the world's invisible war. It is focused on negotiations between Khartoum and the SPLM/SPLA with an IGAD sub-committee on Sudan. It produced a Declaration of Principles in 1994 signed by Khartoum in 1997. IGAD has been preoccupied with establishing an 'early warning' system and with the proliferation of small arms. At the moment relations between lGAD and the UN is at the level of humanitarian assistance and relief which reflects the UN's capacity in this regard. Unicef has been the UN facilitator in negotiations between Khartoum and SPLM on humanitarian relief. African states need to be better organized in order to take advantage of Brahimi and to have an enhanced relationship with the IJN on peacekeeping.

Observations & Conclusions
Cutting across the thematic and division of labour issues, there were expressed concerns that the technicalities of reforming UN peace operations be matched by an equal, if not greater, attentiveness to the political obstacles confronting UN peace operations in Africa, especially the question of political will; political will being an issue not just for the international community, but for many African actors as well who have developed a vested interest in conflicts in neighbouring countries. To the extent that the Brahimi Report acknowledged the need to differentiate between victims and aggressors, this was cited as a step forward in addressing the political (and moral) dimensions of UN peace operations.

An overriding conclusion was that the Brahimi Report did not adequately address the role of regional and sub-regional organizations and how they relate or should relate to the UN, especially in terms of Chapter 8 (article 53) of the UN's Charter. Formal arrangements should be established between the UN and the OAU, between SADC and the UN, and between the UN and ECOWAS.

A very fundamental observation and issue was raised in the legal realm. This had to do with how conflict prevention should be approached through early warning and other means (like 'quiet diplomacy') when confronting the principles of 'sovereignty' and 'non-interference' as enshrined in the OAU Charter. These principles raised the need for consent. In this regard, the Brahimi Report provides no clue as to the 'point of entry' in conflict prevention in an environment of 'non-consent' where African heads-of-state are resistant to being approached about problems in their countries that may escalate and explode into violent confrontation.

Main Points and tentative Recommendations
In summing up, the following points, including recommendations (which were often combined with observations), stand out from the workshop:

· The Brahimi Report came in for heavy criticism in terms of the 'top-down' approach taken which did not take African views into account, leaving this to the tail end of the exercise in terms of the regional review assessments.
· The Brahimi process has to acknowledge African initiatives and the fact that Africans on the continent through regional and sub-regional groupings have undertaken a number of initiatives in peace operations. What the UN should do is to strengthen these already on-going African peace initiatives. In other words, while the UN should be acknowledged as the world's primary peacekeeper, Africa needs to be assisted in building its capacity to supplement UN efforts. Lessons learned from UN and ECOMOG peacekeeping in West Africa might help this process of integrating UN and African peacekeeping.
· An underlying problem in the UN-Africa peace operations debate is the tension between centralising capacities (within the UN at the global level) versus decentralization to regional and sub-regional organizations. Brahimi is seen as reflecting a preoccupation with centralizing peace operations in a manner that cannot adequately address African problems. In terms of the funding dimension, the dilemma is; should funding be centralized around the UN Security Council or can funding be channeled through Africa's regional and sub-regional organisations?
· There is a need to for Africa to create its own peace regimes and link them at the international level of a restructured UN peace and security system. But Brahimi gives no guidance on how this should be done or approached.

The bulk of the following recommendations focused on Post-Conflict Peace-Building. These were articulated as follows:

The Brahimi Report is to be commended for highlighting the importance of Post-Conflict Peace-Building (PCPB). But one must go beyond Brahimi's focus on military, legalistic. criminal and legislative aspects. Successful peace-building should include re-establishing communities and livelihoods and fostering reconciliation This could involve establishing a conflict resolution unit as part of the peace-building process. Local NGOs and women would be emphasized and this should be taken into account in staffing PCPB missions.

- Quick Impact Projects: These need to engage communities and/or grassroots development initiatives. Women and NGOs should be targeted. Quick Impact Projects should be durable and sustainable.
- The UN DPKO is not an Africa-friendly UN component, it must be transformed in this sense.
- Political development: There is a great need to factor in the political process into PCPB to reinforce post-conflict recoveries. Build in democratic processes, dialogues, etc. Care should however be taken that political dimensions of PCPB are not co-opted into executive structures of government. Peace-building should emphasize strengthening the rule of law and 'good governance' to avoid a return to war. This political dimension should involve the identifying and inclusion of all stakeholders to avoid PCPB being undermined.
- Refugees and internally-displaced people have to be factored into PCPB. They need to be rehabilitated in a targeted manner. This raises the issue of involvement by other agencies of the UN. UNHCR and UNICEF must be integrated into the UN's PCPB mission strategies. (What about a UN inter-agency coordinating process for PCPB; a UN Inter-Agency Program on Post-Conflict Peace-Building).
- At the sub-regional level, a civil police capacity-building resource for PCPB operations should be considered.
- Demobilisation and re-integration are an integral part of PCPB and their finding by the UN should be mandatory.
- Finally, there should be a recognized link between 'conflict prevention' and PCPB. QIPs should target the preventive phase as well as the post-conflict phase.