Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan developments: Department of International Relations & Cooperation briefing

Meeting report

Current developments in Côte D’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Sudan: Department of International Relations and Cooperation briefings
Mr Nandipha Dlakavu, Deputy Director General, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, noted that the Referendum in South Sudan and in the Diaspora (North Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Australia, Britain, United States of America, Canada and Egypt) was held from 9 to 15 January 2011. This was part of the key provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and the Machakos Protocol stated that at the end of the six-and-a-half year period, Southern Sudan would hold a referendum to decide whether to remain part of the united Sudan, or to secede and form a new state. This event would bring about a new kind of dynamic within that region. He outlined the numerous watchdog bodies who had observed the referendum, including South Africa and the African Union. These observers confirmed that the Referendum met international standards, and the polls were orderly and peaceful. However, the Arab League indicated that some voters were underage.

For the referendum to be valid, 60% of registered votes had to vote. That threshold was confirmed by the Southern Sudan Referendum Bureau (SSRB) to have been met. The Referendum Law required that in order for South Sudan to secede, 50% plus one vote was required. Although the official announcement of the results was expected on 14 February 2011, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) had confirmed that the results obtained so far were in favor of secession. There had been much tribal tension, with North-residing Southern Sudanese fearing ill-treatment should the secession of Southern Sudan come about, and many had been so fearful that they had already relocated to Southern Sudan. According to the CPA, the interim period of Sudan would end in July 2011, and until then Southern Sudan would continue to work with the North to iron outstanding issues. He went on to point out that the CPA also made provision for the finalisation of the Abyei referendum and popular consultations between the two regions of the South Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains. According to the CPA, Southern Sudan and Abyei referenda were supposed to run simultaneously, but the Abyei referendum had been delayed. Mr Dlakavu explained that during the Abyei referendum, the citizens of Abyei were expected to decide whether they wanted to join the North or South Sudan.

The National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) were still battling to reach common ground on issues including who would be eligible to vote in the referendum and the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) had given the NCP and SPLM various options to resolve the Abyei issue. These include holding the Referendum as planned, giving the territory to the South, ceding it to the North as well as partitioning. Negotiations on this were still under way. Other issues included the future of Southern Sudanese living in the North and vice versa, international agreements and debt should the South Sudan become independent.

Shortly before the start of the Southern Sudan Referendum, clashes between Abyei local police belonging to Ngok Dinka tribe and nomadic tribe of Misseriya erupted in the Abyei region. Over 49 people were thought to have been killed. On 12 January 2011 the Abyei people, the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka held a peace conference to discuss their challenges and possible ways forward. This conference acknowledged that the two peoples had a very deep relationship and had lived in peace and co-existed for a long time, and encouraged them to continue to do so, and to share water resources and grazing lands.

Mr Dlakavu then said that the US Presidential Envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, had indicated on 14 January 2011 that the Doha Peace Process should continue, as all the efforts were needed to end the war in the Darfur region. Sudan government had withdrawn the negotiating team from Doha at the end of 2010, as a mediator was finalising a peace deal with the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and brokering a truce between the Sudanese Army and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

Mr Dlakavu said that the AUHIP had also released a framework document that outlined four possible ways of approaching post-referendum issues. These included total separation and independence of the two states, or the creation of two countries, which would negotiate a framework of co-operation in a co federal arrangement, creation of two separate countries with soft borders that permitted freedom of movement for both people and goods, or total separation with citizens needing visas to cross the border. He added that post-referendum negotiations would still continue. The government remained on high alert to respond to any spontaneous processes, but opposition leaders confirmed publicly that if a broad inclusive national government was not formed, the opposition would destroy the Government. One of the opposition leaders, Dr Hassan Al Turabi, had since been arrested and was still in custody. The NCP and academics had warned

that the opposition plans should not be underestimated.

Discussion
Mr M Manana (ANC) queried the implications of the disputed Abyei Region and also wanted to know when discussions on the sharing of assets and liabilities would take place between the two countries.

Mr Dlakavu responded that issues of what would be shared, and how this would be done, had yet to be discussed and were outstanding issues.

Ms C Dudley (ACDP) asked whether any peace keeping forces would be deployed, particularly for the next six-month period in Sudan, and whether security would be seen as a matter of rising concern.

Mr M Nkosi, Deputy Director General, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, responded that it was common knowledge that the North had been protected by a sophisticated professional military force, whilst the military wing of a liberation movement had guarded the South. When the CPA was signed, and with the likely autonomy of the South, the military wing in the South would be changing to operate as a fully-fledged national army.

Mr K Mubu (ANC) questioned the example that had been set to other African countries in similar situations to Sudan, where ethic differences caused problems, and enquired whether the splitting of the state was likely to promote peace and unity amongst people.

Mr Dlakavu said that there was a referendum and democratic principles prevailed. The Sudan issue was unique because there was not an aggressive and unilateral push for independence, which was instead seen as but one option, rather than the first choice. The African Union would not support the alteration of the borders of Africa by other countries.

Mr Mubu was not clear on the terminology used, saying that the South had never had economic power or means to “reconstruct”. He wondered how the South would bring in capacity to run a State.

Côte d’Ivoire briefing
Mr Dlakavu outlined the background to the issues in Côte d’Ivoire, also referred to as the Ivory Coast. The political deadlock continued, with Mr Laurent Gbagbo and Mr Allasane Quattara maintain their claim to legitimacy as elected presidents of the country. He said that Mr Gbagbo continued to function as the President while Mr Quattara had been isolated in the Golf Hotel. Mr Gbagbo controlled the civil service and the security forces. Mr Quattara had support of the rebel Forces Nouvelles and the bulk of the international community.

Mr Quattara was declared the winner of the election by the Independent Electoral Commission, but the Constitutional Council annulled results from some constituencies and then invalidated that electoral body decision, pronouncing Mr  Gbagbo as President. Both were sworn in as President and had appointed their own Prime Ministers and Cabinet. The international community rejected Mr Gbagbo’s claim to the Presidency, and the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States  (ECOWAS) recognised Mr Quattara as President. On 23 December 2010 the Central Bank of West African States had also recognised Mr Quattara as president and said that only people authorised by him would be allowed to access the State account. This decision was intended to cut off the funding of Mr Gbagbo that was going to pay civil servants and the military. On 22 January 2011, West African leaders asked Mr Quattara to nominate a new head for the West African Central Bank, following the resignation of the former Governor, Mr Philippe Henri Dacoury–Tabley.

In practice, Mr Gbagbo continued to control the civil service and the security forces, the national broadcaster, energy sector, and the import/export infrastructure. He had demanded the immediate withdrawal of United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and French forces.

Mr Dlakavu noted that the elections were held in terms of the Constitution and within the framework of international agreements that provided for the role of the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations. However, the Constitutional Council had annulled votes from the seven disputed districts to pronounce Mr  Gbagbo the winner. The African Union had called for the election results announced by the Independent Electoral Commission to be respected.

ECOWAS had certified the results as announced by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations (SRSG), and regarded Mr Quattara as the duly elected President. The AU endorsed this position on 4 December. A summit on 7 December called on Mr Gbagbo to abide by the results of the second round of Presidential elections. However, it was notable that Angola supported Mr Gbagbo’s claims. On 3 January 2011, a delegation from AU and ECOWAS, which included the Prime Minister of Kenya, Mr Raila Odinga, as the AU representative, undertook a mission to seek a peaceful resolution, following this up with further visits on 17 and 18 January 2011. Angola publicly stated that it viewed ECOWAS’s decision as being premature. Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) had held a meeting on 18 January and a statement issued after that meeting said that ECOMOG had finalised a military plan, in case that option was required by ECOWAS. Mr Odinga had issued a statement that efforts to reach settlement had failed. He had subsequently, on 20 January 2011, visited South Africa and held discussions with President Zuma.

Mr Dlakavu said the security situation had deteriorated significantly, with serious confrontation, and about 20 people had been killed. A United Nations Security Council resolution approved an increase of 2 000 peacekeepers on 19 January 2011.

The ECOWAS Mission had reiterated the positions of the Extra-ordinary Summits of the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government and the AU Peace and Security Council. Mr Gbagbo agreed to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis without any pre-conditions, whilst Mr Quattara indicated his willingness to ensure a dignified exit for Mr Gbagbo, provided the latter accepted the outcome of the presidential election. 

Mr Dlakavu said that South Africa believed it was crucial to determine the legality of the successive events, and to ensure that the principles of the rule of law, good governance, and respect for the will of the people were respected. The South African government had, on 8 December 2010, urged Mr Laurent Gbagbo to respect and abide by the declarations issued by ECOWAS, the AU and the UNSC with regard to the second round of elections in Cote d’Ivoire. It further called for restraint and urged the Ivorian leaders to promote national reconciliation and unity. It supported the ECOWAS and AU position that diplomacy should continue to attempt to resolve the matters, and that ECOWAS leadership should continue to try to open space for a peaceful resolution. South Africa did not support military intervention in Cote d’ Ivoire.

Discussion
The Chairperson asked whether the role of the Constitutional Council was made clear prior to the elections, as it could be problematic if the constitutional aspects had not been outlined from the start.

Mr Dlakavu said the Ivorian Constitution was very clear, and this was also clarified prior to the elections. If the IEC declared the elections to be legitimate, then the Constitutional Council was obliged to endorse those results, unless the Constitutional Council declare a problem with any aspect of the election, in which case it had a Constitutional right to annul the whole election (as opposed to parts or fragments of it, which is what it had in fact done) and to order that fresh elections be held.

Mr K Mashabe (ANC) queried the truth behind allegations by the media that Zimbabwe had received arms flown in by two Antanov aircraft, destined for Côte d’Ivoire.

Mr Dlakavu could not deny or confirm the allegations of arms being sent to Mr Gbagbo’s regime via Zimbabwe.

Mr Mashabe questioned what had been negotiated between former President Thabo Mbeki and the two Ivorian leaders, saying that the media had suggested that Mr Mbeki had urged them to form a government of national unity, similar to the one he had advocated in Zimbabwe. Given that the current state of the Zimbabwean government of national unity left much to be desired, he questioned if this was seen as the best option.

The Chairperson asked if South Africa had called for Mr Gbagbo to step down and Mr Quattara to be sworn in as President, as the media seemed to indicate that South Africa did not support this route, or whether it had not taken sides but instead urged both sides to negotiate. 

Mr Dlakavu said that South Africa’s statement of 8 December 2010 clearly indicated that it supported the AU view that Mr Gbagbo should step down and Mr Quattara must be sworn in as President. South Africa had adopted the principle that it would not, itself, express its own opinion or views on events outside the Southern African region, but would take the lead of the relevant leaders in the jurisdiction where the events had taken place. This stance had not changed. South Africa had not advocated for a unity government in Côte d’Ivoire, as it preferred that the Ivorian leaders must themselves negotiate the best resolution to the matter, but it would be willing to assist in the negotiating process.

Ms Dudley pointed out that the two factions had been negotiating for a considerable time, and there seemed no conclusions had been reached.

Mr Dlakavu said that if longstanding negotiations were really futile, then the events that were unfolding in Sudan would most probably never happen. There had been instances of peaceful conflict resolution on the African continent. This issue was not dependent on meeting time frames, but on political will.

Ms Dudley said that the international community had rejected Mr Gbagbo’s claim to the presidency, and enquired on what grounds this had been done. Her party believed that the AU, EU and UN themselves had undermined the rule of law, and the Constitution of Côte d’Ivoire. She queried whether South Africa might have overlooked any aspects of the law and constitution of Côte d’Ivoire.

Mr Dlakavu said that the international community held the view that duly constituted elections were held and there was no constitutional infringement. South Africa was not ignoring the rule of law.

The Chairperson said that negotiation was not to be seen as an option, but as the proper route.

The meeting was adjourned.