Eskom corruption & related matters: engagement with Brig J. Burger

Meeting report

Opening remarks by the Chairperson
The former Eskom GCE, Mr Andre de Ruyter, appeared before the Committee on 26 April 2023 following public allegations he made pertaining to corruption, criminal activity, financial maladministration and procurement irregularities at Eskom. During his appearance before the Committee, he cited law enforcement and intelligence agencies he personally engaged with to report the allegations, including a private funded information gathering requested exercise. The Committee subsequently resolved to extend invitations to all parties mentioned by the former Eskom GCE to ascertain the extent of their knowledge regarding the serious allegations and to disclose the actions they have taken to address these allegations.

On 9 May 2023, the Committee met with the cited law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies. During this meeting, the National Commissioner of Police (NCoP), General Fannie Masemola, disclosed that Brigadier Jap Burger was the SAPS representative who engaged in discussions with the former Eskom GCE concerning corruption, criminal activity, financial maladministration and procurement irregularities at the national power utility. The head of security further confirmed this at Eskom on 10 May 2023. The meeting in question with Brig Burger was said to have been in August 2022, where the Brigadier allegedly sought specific information on the designated areas of criminality, maladministration, fraud and corruption within Eskom.

On 7 June 2023, the Committee held a follow-up meeting with the NCoP and Special Investigating Unit (SIU) with a keen interest in hearing from Brig Burger in light of the continuous and crucial references to him and his knowledge of the information-gathering exercise at the national power utility. Unfortunately, Brig Burger did not attend the meeting on 7 June 2023. During this meeting, the NCoP mentioned that he had directed the Brigadier to attend despite the Brigadier expressing safety concerns about making a public appearance. At the meeting, the Committee directed that the necessary security protocols must be put in place for the Brigadier in light of the security concerns.

The NCoP further stated that he had called the Brigadier on the morning of the meeting to enquire about his whereabouts, emphasising that he should be present as required by the Committee. The NCoP revealed that Brig Burger had expressed discomfort about appearing before the Committee, but the NCoP insisted that he attend and provide reasons if he chose not to. In the same meeting the NCoP highlighted SAPS’ ongoing processes relating to the allegations of corruption, criminal activity and maladministration at Eskom. The NCoP reported that he had engaged with Brig Burger who provided feedback on his meeting with the former GCE. The Brigadier claimed that Mr de Ruyter provided him with information pertaining to the allegations but did not hand over the information-gathering report.

Brig Burger allegedly informed the NCoP that he followed the information up with one of the investigating bodies he was part of. The Committee further resolved to invite the Brigadier to a meeting on 12 September 2023. In response to the Committee’s invite, the NCoP disclosed that Brig Burger had since retired at the end of June 2023 and would therefore not be appearing before SCOPA as he is fully engaged in the month of September 2023.

Before exercising its powers to summon him in accordance with section 56A of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (Constitution of SA, 1996) read with the Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliaments and Provincial Legislatures Act 4 of 2004 (PPIMPLA,2004), the Committee extended a final invite to the Brigadier to appear on 25 October 2023. Consequently, Brig Burger advised the Committee that he was not in a position to accept the invitation. Following interactions between the parliamentary legal services and the Brigadier’s legal representatives, Brig Burger agreed to appear before the Committee in compliance with the subpoena served on him by SCOPA.

The purpose of the meeting is to engage Brig Burger with the aim of understanding the extent of his knowledge regarding the allegations made by the former Eskom GCE and to disclose to the Committee the actions he has taken in this response. With that background, the Chairperson handed the floor over to Adv Frank Jenkins, from the parliamentary legal services, to go through the subpoena processes and administer the oath or solemn affirmation to Brig Burger before the Brigadier gives evidence before the Committee.

Adv Jenkins relayed to Brig Burger that by law, he was expected to answer all questions fully and satisfactorily and produce any requested documentation relating to the subject matter. Brig Burger would be protected in that the evidence given under oath before the Committee would not be used against him in any court of law or outside Parliament except in criminal proceedings concerning a charge of perjury or a charge related to the evidence required in the proceedings. Any false or misleading evidence is a criminal offence that would make Brig Burger liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding two years.

The Chairperson indicated to the Committee that Brig Burger would have the latitude to consult with his legal representative when necessary. He stated that the focus of the meeting would be solely on the allegations related to the financial maladministration, and corruption at Eskom. He clarified that notwithstanding the summons, Brig Burger was not appearing before the Committee as a suspect.

Opening remarks by Brigadier Burger
Brig Burger began by introducing his legal representative, Mr Milton de la Harpe. He extended an apology for what may have appeared to the Committee as an act of avoidance. He stated he is a retired Brigadier from SAPS and has worked on corruption since 1999. The SAPS anti-corruption unit was shut down in 1999. When the opportunity to establish an anti-corruption unit in the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), came about in 2009/2010, he established that anti-corruption task team. This section was shut down by the new incumbent, Lt Gen Berning Ntlemeza. There are difficulties within the structures in terms of doing operational work due to the continuous undermining of such work.

He explained that he was removed from the anti-corruption task team in 2015. In 2018, he was requested to contribute towards anti-corruption investigations with the Independent Police Investigating Directorate (IPID) to support their investigations. In 2019, he was asked to assist with establishing the investigative directorate of corruption within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). Subsequently, he was seconded for three years over to the NPA. He withdrew from this opportunity as the feasibility of doing work in such a space dwindled. He was moved back to SAPS with the understanding that he would still support the anti-corruption work of the office of the NCoP.

Since 2021, he has been adrift. He contemplated putting in his early retirement because there was no traction and no interest from the police management team in dealing with matters of serious corruption, specifically when matters related to state corruption. Initially, he was not tasked by the NCoP because the NCoP approached retired Major General (Maj Gen) Johan Booysen to set up and lead a team to deal with the Eskom investigations. The team would be dealing with matters related to Eskom corruption comprehensively, in other words, using a top-down approach.

The difference between top-down and bottom-up is that many complaints can be delayed. Catching a guy with a sack of stolen coal, thus low-level work, became the priority and general detective work. The team dealing with such investigations did not move up to deal with the orchestrators and the kingpins. The way that the organisation is forced to function is to push all cases down to the docket or operational level and not necessarily to the organised crime space. This is not conducive to addressing the main problem. South Africa will not win the fight against corruption if it is dealt with this way. SAPS is not approaching corruption as a matter of national security interest. There is a State Security Council (SSC), but what have they done around the Eskom issue?

He explained that he was not approaching the Committee from a position of arrogance but rather was wary that he was working within a contaminated space. He highlighted that the address by the NCoP to the Committee was a misrepresentation of his character, prompting him to write a letter to the Speaker to clarify his position.

On the issue of witnesses, he remarked that he had an obligation as a police officer to proactively protect the identity of witnesses and whistle-blowers. The scope of the investigations did not refer to a docket; it is a more comprehensive and strategic assessment of what is going on at Eskom. In his letter to the Speaker, he stated Eskom was a national security concern. He worked for over 24 years in the anti-corruption space and is obligated to deal sensitively with the Eskom matter. Certain information should not be made privy to the public as investigations are ongoing with security concerns. The Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) should be engaged in terms of oversight. Government processes, including oversight mechanisms, are not working. Investigations on criminality, such as organised crime corruption as it relates to national security are classified in terms of the law.

Eskom is part of the critical national infrastructure of the country. Who is supposed to be serving the energy sector with protective intelligence and ensuring that the sector is security-compliant and competent? This would be the State Security Agency (SSA). In his initial engagements with Mr de Ruyter, he asked Mr de Ruyter if he had received a security briefing as it relates to the investigation. Mr de Ruyter answered by saying no. The second question he posed to the former GCE was whether all his people had been vetted. If you deal with organised crime, you must make sure you have a comprehensive approach.

Mr de Ruyter engaged the SSA on the vetting processes and those processes commenced subsequently. During the vetting process, certain vulnerabilities are identified. These are on an organisational level and on an individual level. There was no product or support that he could determine from the SSA to a CEO or any head of an agency that is of vital importance, such as Eskom. Reference to the matter of security is not merely for a secretive purpose, but rather whether all the functions of government have done their work to protect their respective entities. What he found was that none of the functionaries of government did this work.

A collaborative and integrative approach is needed when looking at state security issues. Brigadier Burger remarked that it seems intentional to forgo a response to protect government institutions. He appreciated the fact that the scope of the questions posed in the meeting would be focused on SCOPA’s mandate. He insisted that other oversight mechanisms needed to be activated as well. It is imperative to note that investigations into organised crime and corruption are classified, so confidentiality surrounding such matters is essential for the effectiveness and success of investigations.

The Committee should not underestimate the support and contamination within government sector from organised crime syndicates. In light of this, being cognisant of all the risks is very important. He expressed willingness to meet the JSCI and other oversight mechanisms at their earliest convenience. Such a meeting conducted on an urgent and expedited basis provides an appropriate opportunity to respond to inquiries that align with the statutory and regulatory framework governing a meeting.

Such engagements ensure a judicious and lawful approach to addressing concerns related to national security. Brigadier Burger emphasised that he has dedicated more than half of his career to corruption work. He will not pull back and hide, as issues must be dealt with appropriately.

The Chairperson thanked Brig Burger for the comprehensive background as it placed many things in context.

Discussion
Ms B van Minnen (DA): the Committee spoke to and about the Eskom board, including role players such as the security sector involved in the allegations. The whole Eskom story has become quite complex. On the one hand, allegations are made and on the other hand, allegations are denied. It is apparent that there were meetings and people implicated, including political figures. The extent of the corruption is enormous at a very high level. What is of great concern is the board that did not seem particularly interested in pursuing some of the allegations made. The chairperson of the board said distinctly that the allegations were not his problem but rather they were a SAPS problem. That is certainly irresponsible and of an appalling nature; if you are the chairperson of a board, you should have an interest in the entity.

We hear and see the arrests of a few people here and there, such as people operating the freight, trucks, or drivers. These are indeed quite lower-level issues. Can you elaborate on the reasons as to why SAPS’s investigations are pushed down to a transactional level or docket level? It seems that the big issues of corruption and the complex networks are not really being addressed for various reasons. It seems that the smaller operators are being dealt with, possibly in an attempt to obscure what is really going on. Would you be prepared to talk about whether that is deliberate or whether it is a flaw in the system? The Committee has dealt with several law enforcement agencies and some of them do seem committed to dealing with issues, such as the SIU, but in the same breath, the Committee has had interviews with SAPS and law enforcement that have been very unsatisfactory.

Brig Burger: everyone had heard and spoken about state capture. In 2011, he met with Mr Willie Hofmeyr, a former Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions and former head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit. At the meeting, using the word state capture was almost frowned upon. Today it has become a daily reference because the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State (Zondo Commission) emphasised the phenomena of state capture and that South Africa had been captured. Typically, everyone assumes that state capture is a legacy, but it is not. Many state organs are still under state capture. The integrity of these organs has not yet been restored. Circling back to security clearance and vetting, that is but one instrument to start cleaning out and making sure that the state has people of integrity through the vetting process which would lead to institutions of integrity; this does not exist.

For instance, at the NPA, prosecutors were involved in various acts of criminality, yet they have not been removed. In 2018, Brig Burger worked on a project called the integrity support project, which also presented to the Portfolio Committee on Police. The project used data to fast-track the integrity testing of individuals. Thereafter it was shut down. It was not given any further resources or support to develop. The question is whether this was a deliberate attempt to kill the project or just a failure in the system. The answer is that both scenarios are being dealt with. On the one hand, police are working against deliberate resistance and on the other hand, there is a designed failure of government in its approach.

What is the standard operating procedure (SOP) for organised crime detection? What must be done? Should there not be a national security response involving all stakeholders or all role players? Not just finger-pointing between different law enforcement agencies, but an existing reality. Where is the collective response? How did the fact that national institutions and national interests such as Transnet and Eskom got captured happen if there was civilian and criminal intelligence? These processes are not active and functioning. The National Security Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 (NSIA, 1994) speaks about an intelligence estimate. What does it say about the energy sector, as that is where atrocities are committed?

Most investigations emphasise what has been going on in the past, whereas there is a current and ongoing concern. The energy sector should be protected to prevent possible criminal cases ten years down the line. What is the difference between having a holistic position in terms of dealing with risks and threats, rather than just low-level investigations? These are also important and should not be downplayed. Detectives are dealing with these, so who is working on the organised crime?

Eskom is functioning within a swamp of organised crime, especially in the Mpumalanga area. Brigadier Burger explained this is information and intelligence received not from Mr de Ruyter, but information generally known. Eskom was already under investigation as a security concern. A crime-combatting strategy should exist. Brig Burger asked Minister Cele what the stance was on the crime-combatting strategy. A strategy was conceived in 1999 and it was based on two primary approaches: a geographical approach, relating to where the incident happened and an organised crime approach. This approach is more thematic, a top-down approach and affects national security. Very little work was done on the organised crime approach. Specialised units were closed in the early 2000s with no real attempt to re-establish these units.

Although there are still some good officers, the non-action in terms of a national-level organised crime approach is a systemic design flaw. It certainly has not been properly developed but is supplemented by deliberate non-action where individuals who would take action are either not supported or subtly undermined.

Ms van Minnen: in meetings with the Minister of Police, Mr Cele’s exact words were that he had enormous political motivation to try and deal with the organised crime around Eskom. In the same breath, although he assured the Committee that there was enormous political will there seems to have been very little action. Constant contradictions from various parties, including various different law enforcement agencies as to what was known and what was not known were voiced. In particular, there was ambiguity around whether they had met with Mr de Ruyter. A number of parties tried to deny that the meeting had happened, whilst others admitted that the meeting had taken place, that they were aware of the reports, and that they were aware of at least one high-profile name involved with issues in Mpumalanga. She asked the Brigadier whether, now that he has retired, the work is still being done from an investigative point of view and why there would be deliberate ambiguity regarding who knew what and when. The ambiguity makes a number of law enforcement agencies complicit or incompetent.

Brig Burger remarked that the latter part of her statement may be truer than she could believe. There has been controversy in the newspapers about the provincial commissioner in Mpumalanga, indicating direct police involvement surrounding the Eskom issue. Has the Committee asked the Minister of Police, Mr Cele, what his policy is related to dealing with matters on organised crime, as this is where policy direction should emanate? Is there failure on the operational level to deal with organised crime? Guidelines could be developed and directives issued without the Minister’s direct involvement with the contents of the investigations.

The cash and transit robberies, for instance, are creating havoc in the country and these are not dealt with from a national security or a national interest perspective. Despite the meetings, the problem cannot seem to be addressed. Brigadier Burger insisted that this issue can indeed be addressed but the law enforcement agencies should no longer function as individuals in silos. Collaborative work should be the norm to resolve this issue as it is a collective responsibility. Some syndicates receive support not only from SAPS but also from the intelligence services.

There should be a renewed outlook on how government responds to criminality. Brig Burger said he consulted with Dr Sydney Mufamadi, the presidential security advisor, on the issue that the departments were not functioning as a collective. It was suggested that a national security council should be revoked to start guiding initiatives, facilitating actions for each department, and setting timeframes for action. Dr Mufamadi was not in agreement with the concept. This reaction closed all avenues and Brig Burger had no alternatives and did not know where else to turn to.

The design of an anti-corruption body or mechanism contained in a draft bill was not supported by the NPA. It is important to view the corruption prevention architecture and roles of the various players holistically. An investigating directorate’s mandate is to investigate after the fact, after an incident has already occurred. It is important to manage the risks and the threats. A comprehensive approach is not only reactionary but also preventative. It is about how current issues are addressed while also ensuring that mechanisms are in place to prevent future criminality on a wider scale.

Ms van Minnen: oversight is one of SCOPA’s roles, but in this case, the kind of oversight that the Brigadier is mentioning relates not just to parliamentary committees but also anti-corruption units. The oversight issue touches on the national intelligence committee. There is a concern that as soon as a matter goes to the JSCI, it is classified and oversight is no longer possible as the case becomes covert.

A deep concern relates to part of this inefficient oversight, the flaws seen in the system, and the inability to track down and deal with the powers behind organised crime. Raising cases with the JSCI, the classification of these cases will create a process that would aid the concealing of what is happening and assist in bringing a veil of secrecy over big investigations. The result is that it is easier to shelve them with little or no progress. Should a system where it is not so easy to simply classify matters be looked at, so that dismantling the swamps of the various organised crime networks is not prevented?

Brig Burger: there is a place for classification of information and related processes, but it is possible to create sanitised versions for the purposes of SCOPA. In most circumstances, there will be overreach and failures. The rampant corruption in the country is to obtain financial benefit that cannot be classified as it relates to the public purse. He suggested that SCOPA would benefit from creating a communication channel with the JSCI. The JSCI should provide this Committee with a risk assessment according to this Committee’s mandate to enable SCOPA to complement the work of the JSCI.

He remarked that in his 40 years in SAPS, he worked on a national level, he has a grasp of what has been happening on national level and there is a lack of communication in national departments. No one is engaging substantively with the other. He suggested that the silos need to be broken down. Classified reports need to be reviewed and certain elements need to be declassified so that the committees can work with each other more productively to fulfil their respective mandates. SCOPA should task intelligence services and not simply ask them what they know and hold them accountable to provide feedback,

Ms van Minnen asked whether, in its current format, SAPS and the current law enforcement would be able to deal with the size of the problem in the energy sector, including Eskom.

Brig Burger: no, the reason being the policing model does not encompass a more risk-based and comprehensive approach to its assessment. Addressing 80 or 90% of the threat and closing all the gaps related to vulnerabilities within Eskom lies with the accounting officer.

Mr B Hadebe (ANC) remarked that it was time to address the real reason that everyone had gathered in the meeting and focus on the actual task at hand. When the Committee engaged with the former Eskom GCE, Mr Andre de Ruyter, he indicated to the Committee that he had furnished SAPS with all the relevant information pertaining to intelligence operations and that an officer was assigned to deal and liaise with him directly. Later, when the Committee engaged with the NCoP it was discovered that the senior official assigned to liaise with the former Eskom GCE was Brig Burger. The Committee is interested in understanding the allegations pertaining to financial mismanagement and corruption at Eskom. Has the Brigadier received information pertaining to these allegations, and what action was taken to deal with such? Is Brigadier Burger in possession of the so-called intelligence report?

Brig Burger explained that he was requested by the retired Maj Gen Booysen to interact on his behalf with Mr de Ruyter. He received information, not from Mr de Ruyter but from the Fivaz Group (FG) on very broad allegations pertaining to corruption and financial maladministration. Operational reports that could not be validated at that stage were given to him. His concern was that the FG intended to use psychological warfare tactics to support Mr de Ruyter. With his background as a police officer and in intelligence, this kind of tactic is very dangerous. He did not understand why they would use these kinds of tactics and why these tactics were necessary. The use of psychological warfare immediately contaminated the operation from his perspective.

After receiving the operational reports, he requested validation pertaining to the role players involved. He did not receive such validation. Nevertheless, he passed the reports to the DPCI team working on the Eskom matter. They agreed that they needed to adopt a more comprehensive approach and be very careful not to take on an entity without the proper protocol. He submitted information to the Minister and the head of DCIP when it became clear that the NCoP was not going to establish a proper investigation team. The purpose was for them to establish an investigative task team. He confirmed that the information he received was made operationally available to DCIP and the team that the NCoP established at Eskom under the authority of Lt Gen Peter Jacobs. Regarding the financial irregularities, Brig Burger stated that he could not recall anything specifically. Most of the information was largely based on the criminality at Eskom.

Mr Hadebe confirmed that Brig Burger could not validate the information at his disposal but what exactly did this mean and did this make his work difficult? Also, whose responsibility was to validate the information at his disposal to pursue the work?

Brig Burger explained that it is the role of SSA to validate the information. He shared the information with the SSA to corroborate the validity of the information. At this stage, the pursuit to validate the information was shut down. The SSA did not want to deal with the issue and was unprepared to cooperate. If a criminal investigation is started, certain types of investigations such as interceptions low-level case inclusions, are very difficult to conduct. This leads to the next step, establishing a properly constituted team from various stakeholders to deal with the matter and ensure that the team is not being led blindly by the nose.

Within intelligence services, various mechanisms are utilised to ensure that information is authentic and sources are validated. None of this was in place when the intelligence report was availed to the Brigadier from Mr de Ruyter. Brig Burger did not expect this from Mr de Ruyter as he has no background in intelligence.

Mr Hadebe asked Brig Burger, having received the intelligence report, was there any outstanding information required from the person making the allegations or were you satisfied that the information given was sufficient to start with the work?

Brigadier Burger said all the information given to him was incomplete. He asked Mr Hadebe what report he was referring to.

Mr Hadebe said that he was referring to the report that was conducted by a private company, the FG. That report was shared with Brig Burger and he had full access to the report.

Brig Burger did not know of such a report. He mentioned that he had received information in the form of operational reports. After Mr de Ruyter’s media interview, he received a WhatsApp message from a retired NCoP, George Fivaz. Mr Fivaz did not know what Mr de Ruyter was referring to because he never gave Mr de Ruyter a report. The whole notion of a report is alien to him as he does not know about such a report. There was operational exchange with him. There may have been other reports which he was not privy to, but as far as he is concerned there was no singular report.

Mr Hadebe asked whether Brig Burger was confirming to the Committee that the private company that conducted an intelligence operation at Eskom and concluded its work in the form of an intelligence report, that the report was submitted to the Eskom GCE was not made available to Brig Burger. Was he only made aware of the so-called intelligence report, compiled by the private company, like everyone else on the news? This would imply that Mr de Ruyter did not present an intelligence report from the FG to Brig Burger at any point.

Brig Burger explained that he was never given an intelligence report. This is different to the operational engagements where information was shared. He did not see nor receive a concluded intelligence report from Mr de Ruyter. He received operational intelligence reports from informers.

Mr Hadebe asked what exactly Brig Burger received from Mr de Ruyter on behalf of Eskom to investigate and how far did the investigation progress. Based on the information the Committee received, Brig Burger had access to the intelligence report. The SIU is in possession of such a report with allegations of senior politicians’ involvement and the Committee is not privy to such. All the Committee knows is that the report is with you and the SIU. If you did not get the report, then what exactly did you get from Mr de Ruyter in relation to financial misconduct and alleged people who happen to hold positions of authority and have taken an oath to protect the public purse? The Committee is interested in following the money as it relates to the misappropriation of taxpayer’s funds, the mandate of SCOPA.

Brig Burger emphasised that he had not received a report from Mr de Ruyter. He stated that he attended meetings with Mr de Ruyter and the FG, during which information was shared. The information came directly from the FG. After the meetings, they would give him documents on a memory stick. There was no singular report coming from Mr de Ruyter. A report may have been written after he withdrew from the investigation, but he did not receive the report. What they did have was an elaborate diagram with all the unsubstantiated allegations and cartels.

Mr Hadebe asked whether Brig Burger’s involvement was based on his meeting with Mr de Ruyter and the FG. A presentation was given during the meeting, but nothing in terms of a report and a promise of information on a stick and that did not happen?

Brig Burger clarified that the FG had assured him that they would provide the information to him after the meetings, but it was low-level intelligence, information and source reports. It was not a report from Mr de Ruyter himself.

Mr Hadebe asked if Brig Burger received information from the private company.

Brig Burger said that, indeed, he did receive information from the private company in the presence of Mr de Ruyter in subsequent meetings. Mr de Ruyter himself did not furnish a report. There was a report that Mr de Ruyter shared with him that was done by the head of security in terms of widespread corruption, but that was done way back in the beginning. It was not based on the FG intelligence.

The Chairperson interjected, stating that where the Committee would need assistance is the timeline of the events as the Committee’s understanding, to build on what Mr Hadebe was saying, is that a meeting took place where Mr de Ruyter raised matters with the NCoP and when the NCoP designated Brig Burger. The gap is where Brigadier Burger is now introducing the element of Maj Gen Booysen preceding Brig Burger’s involvement. Therefore, clarity is needed to assist Mr Hadebe’s question which looks at what point Brig Burger came to the Eskom investigation and who appointed Brig Burger to be part of the investigation. The NCoP never mentioned anything about Maj Gen Booysen’s involvement.

Mr Hadebe’s interpretation of events is correct as the Committee’s understanding is that the NCoP was approached during a meeting at an academy and at that meeting, he delegated and gave Brig Burger the information on the investigation. The Committee has become aware that Brig Burger was getting regular updates as the FG investigation was happening. The timeline needed to be sorted out as it is a bit muddy.

Brig Burger replied that a number of meetings were held prior to his involvement. There were engagements between the NCoP and Maj Gen Booysen in which there was a request followed by a contract for Maj Gen Booysen to lead the Eskom investigations. Maj Gen Booysen can verify the truth of this engagement as he was directly involved. Maj Gen Booysen contacted him and asked him to assist after the NCoP approved his involvement to continue with the investigation. This was formalised during August.

Mr Hadebe wanted to know, after having served for so many years in the anti-corruption unit as a brigadier, interacting with this private company, did he, in executing his work not question the legality of having a private company accessing Eskom’s data considering some of Eskom’s plants are a national key point?

Brig Burger remarked that he did not need to source clarity. He knew it was not legal, so he went to engage with the SSA, specifically the counterintelligence, to investigate the FG’s involvement and see the intention behind it. This was the nature of the support requested from the SSA that was not provided.

Mr Hadebe inquired if the engagement continued, knowing that it was illegal.

Brig Burger stated that he listened to them with the understanding that there were no contractual obligations and he would not be tasked to do anything. He was going to listen to what they had to say and process the information for SAPS’s purposes, but they had to be extremely vigilant to not take any information as fact as the processes and sources were doubtful since these could not be validated.

Mr Hadebe remarked that as a police officer dealing with issues of national security understanding that someone in a meeting has in his possession information obtained illegally, this raised and how often after the first meeting did Brig Burger continue to engage with the private company?

Brig Burger clarified that he did not say the information was illegally gained. The private company may have sources that gained intelligence legally but the essence of employing a company to work on intelligence for Eskom was highly irregular.

Mr Hadebe asked how many times Brig Burger had interacted with the company.

Brig Burger said that he could not remember the exact number of times he interacted with them but it was approximately around ten times. He had various engagements with them, intending to hear what they had to say. He had not made a determination that the information they shared with him was gained illegally.

Mr Hadebe said he was raising this because earlier on, Brig Burger had indicated that he had asked whether the staff had been vetted when he was engaging with Mr de Ruyter. This means that automatically, you were dealing with someone who knows the prescripts of the law. When you asked Mr de Ruyter about the staff, did you also ask whether he had been vetted?

Brig Burger replied that Mr de Ruyter had told him he was not vetted and would not submit himself to the process.

Mr Hadebe asked what was expected of him in terms of his role and responsibility as a law enforcement officer, someone who had taken an oath to serve and protect the country, once he found out that Mr de Ruyter was not vetted and was in possession of intelligence information.

Brig Burger asked who appointed Mr de Ruyter as the appointer and was obligated to ensure that Mr de Ruyter was security competent in line with a precondition of the post.

Mr Hadebe stated that Brigadier Burger also had a responsibility because once the fact that whoever had appointed Mr de Ruyter, had no vetting on him should have determined how the investigation should proceed.

Brig Burger explained that he did raise the vetting issue with Minister Pravin Gordhan in a meeting and Minister Gordhan conceded to the fact that Mr de Ruyter had not been vetted. Minister Gordhan responded by saying that Brigadier Burger and Mr de Ruyter must sort it out between the two of them. Brig Burger said this was not his mandate and therefore he could not do anything about it. Basic legal requirements were not met. He stated that he did not share any classified information with the FG or Mr de Ruyter.

Mr Hadebe stated that, in summary, by virtue of having information that is not validated, the investigation could not proceed. For the Committee to be able to ascertain whether or not certain action was taken, this has to be verified by the SSA, as it is their responsibility to validate the information. At the time that Brig Burger received the information and at the time of his retirement, the information at his disposal was not validated and he could not proceed with it. Is it a correct summary?

Brig Burger said that Mr Hadebe’s summary was not correct. Firstly, he stated that he raised the involvement of the FG with the SSA after taking responsibility for overseeing the investigation. Secondly, the information that was coming in was available to the investigators so that they could validate whether it was fact and indicate their key areas of interest. This did not happen. So, it is not as though the information lay idle. The information still had to be validated. He also did not know that there was a final report from the FG. There may have been further work after he withdrew from the investigation, which he was not privy to.

In summary, what was put on the table could not be directly translated into evidence, and a holistic threat was purported to have been present. There was no substantial proof of this. The mere diagram or visual with names and construction of a narrative was not sufficient as evidence for a criminal investigation. There are criminal investigations such as court docket cases, familiar to all, but there are also investigations conducted by the intelligence services that are not always court-directed. These are more risk-based, which he was after when approaching the intelligence agencies as they serve Eskom. So, they needed to validate the information to ensure that they were not being misled and results from the investigation became a crime intelligence task which could be translated into evidence.

Regarding whether the investigation could proceed due to the invalidated information, he stated that he availed all the information he had at his disposal to the DPCI, but he was not certain whether they found any value in the information. If the FG information is looked at in isolation, it is not something he could work on standing on its own.

Mr Hadebe drew the Committee’s attention to the fact that they were dealing with invalidated information that could not be substantiated.

The Chairperson said the DPCI would appear the following week with what was sent to DPCI. He is sceptical to call it a report. However, the clarity still lacking is the establishment of Maj Gen Booysen’s team and the point at which Brig Burger was brought into the investigation. Also, on what grounds would Brig Burger have been invited to a meeting with the FG and Mr de Ruyter? The Committee is now aware that Mr de Ruyter commissioned a private investigation, as mentioned in one or two of the meetings. The Chairperson asked Brig Burger whether he met during the privately funded investigation conducted by the FG. Were they sharing an investigation with Brig Burger or were they sharing bits and pieces of the investigation’s outcomes?

Brig Burger clarified that he was not initially brought into the investigation by the NCoP. The NCoP consulted with the retired Maj Gen Booysen, intending to employ him. It had gone as far as the NCoP drafting a contract for Maj Gen Booysen to employ him as investigation lead on Eskom. This happened at the end of May or the beginning of June 2022. Maj Gen Booysen called him as he knew he was about to submit his papers for early retirement. Maj Gen Booysen said to him that if he took up the investigation, he would like Brig Burger to assist him, due to his previous experience with the anti-corruption task team. There were no further developments following that conversation.

During the last week in June 2022, loadshedding suddenly increased to stage six, and the presidency required answers as to why this occurred. The NCoP requested Maj Gen Booysen to contact Mr de Ruyter immediately. Due to the non-availability of flights, Maj Gen Booysen was not able to meet Mr de Ruyter. Maj Gen Booysen asked the NCoP if Brigadier Burger could meet Mr de Ruyter in the interim, given that he would be on leave for three weeks. Brig Burger explained that this is how he got involved in the investigation. His involvement was formally ratified by the NCoP about a month later.

Mr Hadebe was interested in knowing when and who Brig Burger contacted at the SSA to request validation of the information at his disposal, to enable the Committee to approach the relevant person in this regard and to understand why information was not validated.

Brig Burger mentioned that the SSA agent he liaised with was Mr Donovan Nel from Counterintelligence SSA. Brigadier Burger mentioned that he has cooperated well with Mr Nel for years. In just two days after reaching out to him regarding the investigation, Mr Nel shut down all cooperation with him.

Mr Hadebe asked if Brig Burger was aware that section 34 of the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (PRICCA) places a responsibility on Mr de Ruyter to inform and submit information relating to crime.

Brig Burger said he was aware, although he was not sure which version was available on the internet, but he drafted the initial guidelines for reporting the PRICCA that should be on the DPCI’s website.

Mr Hadebe asked Brig Burger if he had ascertained in his interaction with Mr de Ruyter whether he had followed section 34 and reported the matter as prescribed.

Brig Burger said that during his engagements with Mr de Ruyter, he had not yet reported the matter as prescribed, but he had reported the matter during his interaction with the NCoP. He explained that PRICCA was not designed to catch out people. Whether Mr de Ruyter reported his concerns to law enforcement? He did. Did the relevant parties follow the administrative procedures of taking down the information in the prescribed form? They did that later through his lawyers.

He realised there was an almost vindictive response and disregard for what Mr de Ruyter did report to the Minister, the authoritative body above him. He did report it to the NCoP and various other entities. These entities did not do their administrative duties of taking down the allegations in the prescribed form and getting a reference. Brig Burger did discuss this with Mr de Ruyter and asked him to draft a formal report. At that point, Mr de Ruyter was not on the best terms with the board and the Minister.

Mr Hadebe stated that certain processes ought to be followed to address the matter. It does not exempt an individual by virtue of having reported the matter to the executive authority to say that they have done their work. When dealing with corruption, the laws that govern operations must be implemented.

Brig Burger stated that formal processes had to be followed but at that stage, those processes had not been completed. He stated that he did not tell Mr de Ruyter not to complete the processes. He urged him to complete the processes. He went to the DPCI as, in terms of the PRICCA, a designated DPCI officer should take down the allegations. This did happen and he did it through his lawyers at a later stage.

The Chairperson said that Mr de Ruyter reported the matter on 22 April 2022, the day he submitted the same statement to the Committee. The head of the DCPI confirmed that the day before he appeared before the Committee, he had handed over the same statement he had presented to the Committee and to the DPCI.

Mr Hadebe said he was satisfied and was in a better position to recommend a way forward in this matter. It should not have taken this long and had Brig Burger appeared earlier before the Committee would have made speedier progress on these matters.

Mr S Somyo (ANC) thanked Brig Burger for ultimately appearing before the Committee. He stated that he had a wrong perception of Brig Burger. He thought he was somewhat evasive through the correspondence the Committee encountered when trying to get Brig Burger to appear before the Committee. He admitted that he was wrong and has learnt that it is not the case. He stated that so far, Brig Burger has confirmed that he never come across a report.

Brig Burger clarified that many references have been made to a report, but he has not received a report from Mr de Ruyter. He did however receive a report that was drafted way back, even before he engaged with Mr de Ruyter from the head of security but as for a report related to the FG, he has not seen a single report and neither did Mr Fivaz confirm that such a report was submitted.

Mr Somyo asked the Brigadier whether he had any interaction with Mr Fivaz.

Brig Burger said that he had various interactions with the retired NCoP, Mr George Fivaz.

Mr Somyo asked Brig Burger whether the basis of his interaction with Mr Fivaz was informed by an investigation taking place at Eskom.

Brig Burger said he had known the former NCoP, Mr Fivaz, before their interaction on the Eskom investigation, but he was reintroduced to Mr Fivaz when he was working on the investigation at Eskom. What the FG was doing exactly during the Eskom investigation remains unclear as he was not part of the task team. Mr de Ruyter commissioned the FG. Even though private funds were used, it was all for the benefit of Eskom.

Eskom is a national concern and people are willing to assist where they can; it would be prudent to give clarity on what their approach was. Whether the FG approached Mr de Ruyter with information or whether he commissioned the FG is unclear.

Mr Somyo noted that Brig Burger mentioned he came across a conclusive report.

Brig Burger clarified that nothing he found coming from the FG was conclusive. It was in process, to build a bigger picture from their perspective.

Mr Somyo said that the Brigadier mentioned psychological tactics, which were suggested as a mechanism to support Mr de Ruyter at Eskom.

Brig Burger confirmed this was correct and stated that Mr Tony Botha put forward the psychological warfare suggestion to support Mr de Ruyter. Psychological warfare is not something that is usually part of an investigation. It used to be referred to in the old days as ʽStratCom’ which stands for strategic communication, a strategy used to spin information to create an incorrect perception. It is not necessarily bad, but it did not have a role in the investigation. It becomes troublesome when dealing with evidence.

Mr Somyo asked Brigadier Burger how long he had been a police officer.

Brig Burger said he had been an officer for 40 years, six months and eight days. He explained that the type of work he did was at a strategic level and he usually needed about 18 months to two years to establish new components. He established the anti-corruption task team. It took about 18 months’ traction to implement. There was no appetite in police management to take on any of the matters he put on the table. At the end of the 90s, the government developed a few scenarios such as global village, African hub, frozen revolution. The scenario he ended up in was one with a number of policies, documents with barely any implementation. Even if there was approval from Cabinet and Parliament. The force does not align itself operationally with other departments and agencies.

Mr Somyo asked Brigadier Burger if he was aware of the Total Onslaught.

Brigadier Burger said he was aware, but he did not draft it.

Mr Somyo asked Brig Burger if he was involved at the time of the Total Onslaught in the instances of national security.

Brigadier Burger confirmed that he was involved as he had joined the police on 23 December 1982.

Mr Somyo remarked that he was asking these questions to gauge how much Brig Burger understood about the phrase of psychological tactical involvement in matters of both fighting crime and supporting individuals perceived to be under threat. He mentioned that the Brigadier seemed to upscale such a scenario to a level of assessing the success leading to finalising a case docket. Mr Somyo asked what the main cause was for wanting to use this kind of approach with Eskom.

Brig Burger said Mr Tony Oosthuizen used the term psychological warfare as a tactic to be deployed. He answered that he was familiar with the approach from the then Total Onslaught and in terms of international practices as well. He stated that he also knows the downside of the tactic. He had no idea why they would adopt such a tactic and stated that he did not want to speculate. The SSA did not serve Eskom. The question is why it was thought to be appropriate to use alternative tactics to obtain the intelligence needed, while the intelligence services were obliged by law and the Constitution to provide intelligence. They failed and created this void.

Mr Somyo said that with Brig Burger’s experience, one appreciates his analogy that you did not want to drop the ball while in action. Therefore, you continued to provide that kind of support, such that you used this kind of approach as a yardstick going forward in terms of that report in asking the SSA for its own verification. You mentioned that when that was requested, an individual approach closed up and there was never any further interaction.

Brig Burger said he approached them wanting to know who and what the FG is because the SSA is involved when classified information is at stake. It seems the FG had free access to such information. He stated that he did not ask them about this information because he would have been soliciting an illegitimate party with access to classified information. It was strange and a security risk and that responsibility lies within the mandate of the SSA. He approached the SSA to look into the FG as the Group had stated they wanted to use psychological warfare which was a red light at that point in time. Strangely enough, the SSA chose to withdraw.

Mr Somyo stated that in the Brigadier’s continuation as party to the investigation, he had this practical experience. He asked whether the closure of the investigation was driven by the SSA and if it drove Brig Burger to accept that the investigation was shut down. He further asked whether Brig Burger saw the necessity to take this further to the NCoP or whoever could assist in determining whether it was appropriate to close the investigation.

Brig Burger stated that he did engage the NCoP prior to this and asked him to open communication avenues with the Director-General of the SSA (DG: SSA) for cooperation but the NCoP did not do this. He said he raised the issue of involving other parties, specifically the DPCI and the importance of a multidisciplinary approach. He did not place this specific issue on the table with the DPCI.

He said that he has been isolated in the police for the past two years. The Minister asked him in January 2022 who he reported to and he stated that he had been waiting more than a year to report to someone. He stated there was no organisational support for him as he was supposed to report to the Deputy National Commissioner of SAPS: Crime Detection (DNCoP: CD), but no one was appointed after Lt Gen Ntshinga left. The typical organisational structure did not accommodate him. Brig Burger said that it is apparent from his isolation that there was no support for the work he was doing. Therefore, his early retirement was approved.

Mr Somyo said validation is a necessary process for ensuring the authenticity of information. He remarked that the Brigadier had confirmed that what was discussed in the meeting was valid enough to take further.

Brig Burger said that any information has value with intelligence, but its source must be determined. The process to follow if the source is unknown is determining if other sources can provide the same information. Thereafter, the information is validated and evaluated. If no source can be determined, known knowledge of the environment is scrutinised and the probability and value of the information are established.

Brig Burger said he was operating outside the intelligence structures. He wanted to push through the formal structures to get SSA on board as structurally, SSA might be able to assist with the verification. He stated that due to the volume of information coming forth, not only from them but other sources as well, the intelligence services needed to be reignited to deal with the information, but this did not happen.

Mr Somyo said Brig Burger was a committed policeman who loved his work but had to retire early after being involved in the onerous task of unearthing corruption at Eskom. He asked whether Brig Burger was retiring as a broken man. He also asked whether Brig Burger felt that the isolation caused him to feel his analytical capabilities were not being utilised and that he was not contributing to the entity that ought to provide energy and sustenance to the economy of the country.

Brig Burger said he is not a broken man. He is doing what he wanted to do and he now has a personal life. He has never been married and this is partly due to the pressures of his work. He is now exploring his life. He stated that he did not have to retire but from a personal perspective, he did as there was no opportunity to add value. He stated that he has fought his organisation for most of his life. He was a police officer for 40 years and a colonel for 20 of those 40 years. Jokingly, he mentioned that most people thought his first name was Colonel. He said there are no career opportunities for those who work on corruption as people and the organisation itself do not favour those investigating corruption.

He said that he was in a good position as a colonel after 20 years. He knows warrant officers who have been warrant officers for 30 years. He said that this is an untenable situation in the SAPS. He said that as he attended his farewell from service upon retiring, the NCoP called all who went on early retirement at the end of June and wanted to know why people were leaving. He said he thinks 288 people have left. There are more now but to his understanding, early retirement is no longer approved. Brig Burger stated that the staff had enough. He said that one of the officers bemoaned that he was not going to work in this mess anymore. Brig Burger said it is fine to hear it and think about the police, but he would not be able to motivate new recruits to join the police at this stage.

Mr Somyo stated that even if the Brigadier has not vocalised it, his intention is quite clear in that he does not want to be party to psychological warfare. Persuasion could not defeat his conscientiousness and he moved further to ensure that what he had as a report, his own credibility and the credibility of the system that he has worked in for years, meant that it was necessary for the report to be fully validated. The necessity of fighting crime, in his judgment, is the basis of credible and validated information and through this justice, can prevail.

Brig Burger agreed with Mr Somyo’s remarks and added that he asked the organisation for training on psychological warfare as he wanted to understand what was meant by the phrase and what the intention was because there may be criminal implications to their intentions. This was not realised.

Brig Burger continued that if you are working in an environment, you need to understand what you are dealing with. In essence, corruption is a two-way game, even a witness can be part of corruption. It is important to understand who you are dealing with to ensure integrity and credibility in your processes so that you can provide actionable information that can be used as evidence in a court of law.

Ms A Beukes (ANC) said the Brigadier referred to people who funded the intelligence report as people of concern. Who are they?

Brig Burger said that he did not refer to the funders as people of concern but the fact that private security or entities were involved in issues of national security was a concern to him. He revealed that he did not know who the funders were. He could speculate but he simply does not know. It surprised him that it was allowed, whereas there is protective security and intelligence.

Ms Beukes asked Brig Burger whether he had ever questioned Mr de Ruyter or Mr Fivaz on who was sponsoring their investigation.

Brig Burger said he did ask Mr de Ruyter and the FG who was sponsoring them. He could not disclose any names as he had not engaged with them nor validated the information. Also, the citizens of the country are concerned and they may have been lobbied into a space they believe they are providing assistance.

Ms Beukes asked the Brigadier if he knew the names of the sponsors.

Brigadier Burger said he did not know all the names, only one or two names.

Ms Beukes asked if he ever, in one of his engagements with Mr de Ruyter, asked him why he was opting to conduct a private investigation rather than going through the normal security processes.

Brig Burger said he did ask Mr de Ruyter why and he responded that the private investigators are willing to work and they are willing to provide answers. Mr de Ruyter was honest about the fact that intelligence services did not serve and support him. On the other hand, he did not properly engage them. The intelligence services and security cluster are in dire threat as they are not fulfilling their mandate. It is important to acknowledge that Mr de Ruyter did not create the dysfunction, as the issues existed before his appointment. Urgent attention is needed as the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and management at Eskom will deal with the same issues. One of the important tasks is to find out whether Mr de Ruyter commissioned the services of Mr Fivaz or whether they approached him with the intelligence.

Ms Beukes asked if, according to Brig Burger, Mr de Ruyter had started by approaching the relevant security agencies to assist him, and he was not satisfied.

Brig Burger clarified that he did not say this. From his understanding, Mr de Ruyter did not start reporting with the relevant security agencies but nor was he served by them. He did not trust the state security space. A lot of context around this issue needs to be understood to comprehend the position that Mr de Ruyter found himself in. After listening to the Zondo Commission, we are now aware of the atrocities committed by security personnel in state capture. As a CEO, anyone would have thought twice before engaging national security and law enforcement. However, those are the legal processes or legal prescripts that must be followed nevertheless but we are not cleaning up what should be cleaned up so that our CEOs feel adequately supported by national security and law enforcement agencies.

Mr de Ruyter had made the issues known and engaged the NCoP on those issues last year. Being served on an advisory basis by the SSA should be an ongoing process. It is not only when a crime is committed. It is to assist with the governance of a state-owned entity. This is important as a preventative measure and should not only occur as a reaction to criminal activity. Brig Burger stated that he drafted letters asking Mr de Ruyter to engage SSA, but he never proceeded to do so.

Ms Beukes asked the Brigadier if he agreed that assumptions would be made in the absence of communication.

Brigadier Burger agreed, stating that this is how humans function.

Ms Beukes said the reason why she was asking was because he opted not to honour the first Committee invitation to him for the meeting on 7 June 2023. Reasons were provided to the Speaker. What was the main reason for not honouring that invitation?

Brig Burger said that, firstly, it was an invite, meaning he was not compelled to accept the invitation and attend the meeting. Also, he mentioned that he was misrepresented by the NCoP, implying he was functioning in a relatively hostile environment and therefore he was not going to be properly supported. He has his own legal representative present with him today but if he had responded on 7 June 2023, he would have been obligated to use a legal representative provided to him by SAPS. He did not believe that his rights and interests would have been protected by the SAPS legal representative.

State capture encompassed huge political involvement and abuse of political power; with that said, it is not a jab at SCOPA per se, but he had to ensure that he protected his investigative processes and criminal investigations against possible undue influence. Invitations can easily be honoured as soon as a precedent is created where investigators are protected and not compromised or undermined. That was his primary concern relating to his attendance. The second issue was that he dealt with many witnesses and informers and being on public camera identifies you, creating a risk not only for you but also for witnesses. Exposing investigators might pose a risk for witnesses and whistle-blowers.

Ms Beukes said it is appreciated that the Brigadier stated his respect for oversight. In his personal view, she asked how SCOPA is exercising its mandate.

Brig Burger once again emphasised the importance of context. He posed the question of whether Eskom was a failure on Mr de Ruyter’s part or whether it was a security failure of government.

Ms Beukes asked Brig Burger whether he feels bitter upon his retirement after attempting to fight corruption for 40 years. Does he feel low?

Brig Burger said he was not retiring feeling bitter or low. The fact that he was isolated came with the territory, so he did not expect any less. He does not necessarily believe he achieved everything he set out to achieve. He worked in a high-risk environment which means he could not be successful in everything, but he feels content that he did what he could. More can be done, but the environment is still under state capture. There is a serious deficit in terms of competence. Working with corruption is not enjoyable but necessary work needs to be done.

The Chairperson noted Mr de Ruyter remarked Eskom was bleeding R1 billion per year in the allegations he made. Did he communicate that to you?

Brig Burger said that his focus was not on the financials of Eskom so Mr de Ruyter may have communicated this information but not substantively.

The Chairperson asked whether there would be a correlation between the financial losses and the criminality he spoke of. To what extent was intelligence gathered?

Brig Burger cautioned the Committee against assuming that all financial losses are criminal in nature. Sometimes, the losses point to a high level of mismanagement. Eskom has a high level of mismanagement, which is not necessarily criminal.

The trigger for the Committee to engage with Mr de Ruyter was a letter that the Committee had received from Mr Hadebe in response to the interview and a large part of the interview was about corruption. The Committee assumes that he was speaking about Eskom losing R1 billion. The Chairperson said he was trying to understand the nature of the report that Mr de Ruyter had presented to the Brigadier. Is what he said in the interview somewhat different from what he reported to the investigating team as the Committee is trying to gauge where this R1 billion is? Where are the gaps? It has to be identified and sorted out if it is mismanagement or corruption. Mr de Ruyter placed a figure in the public discourse by saying that the culmination of issues at Eskom resulted in a R1 billion loss.

Brig Burger clarified that Mr de Ruyter did not provide him with a report. Brig Burger does not recall that the aspect of billions being lost was a core issue mentioned. It was more low-level issues that were discussed. From a business model perspective, Eskom is very diverse. One of the questions he asked Mr de Ruyter was whether he contributes and maintains organised crime. Mr de Ruyter replied, shocked and asked what was meant by that question.

Brig Burger used the following example to illustrate this. Eskom discarded non-usable metal through a service provider. How much of the precious metals reaches the service provider? Mr de Ruyter indicated that 20 tons of metal was supposed to reach the service provider every year but only about three tons reached them. The question is then, what happens to the remaining 17 tons? Those are instances of losses. There is criminality involved in that, as well as possible corruption. It is not about one individual factor but rather how the whole system has been set up to support criminality. There is a greater complexity when looking at all the losses at Eskom.

The Chairperson indicated that Mr de Ruyter made allegations that two senior politicians are involved in the Eskom corruption. Did he report this allegation?

Brig Burger clarified that the information he received did not come from Mr de Ruyter himself; it came from the FG in his presence. The names were not mentioned.

The Chairperson confirmed whether those allegations were made.

Brigadier Burger confirmed that the allegations were made.

The Chairperson remarked that it was confusing because Mr de Ruyter came to a parliamentary hearing and spoke in broad strokes, saying that he had engaged Brig Burger. If the information comes from the FG, that means that the information he provided is totally different. Brig Burger mentioned vetting, which is a serious issue and is reflected in the Committee records. According to Brig Burger, Mr de Ruyter said that he would not be subjecting himself to a process of vetting and he confirmed this to the Committee. On the one hand, he does not want to be vetted, but on the other, he wants to gain services from the SSA. How was that going to work? How would he have been serviced if he had not cooperated with the SSA?

Brig Burger asked how you can receive a security briefing about a national critical infrastructure, which is classified by law, if you are not security compliant. In other words, not vetted. It is a disaster, in his opinion.

The Chairperson stated that he was not trying to vindicate the SSA, but if the SSA must service Eskom, part and parcel of the SSA being able to provide information to Mr de Ruyter is through him being vetted and categorised. Mr de Ruyter was not prepared to subject himself to vetting. Does he then not create a stumbling block to the services he requires because he is closing himself off from the processes that allow him access to the information?

Brig Burger said this means in the two and half years’ no one cared about that. Those are the practical implications of the vetting issue. Mr de Ruyter discussed this with him towards the end of last year. Why was this not raised by SSA and the Minister regarding the fact that he has not yet complied with his security clearance? What Mr de Ruyter did after Brig Burger supported him was to write a letter asking for a whole vetting process to start with his personnel. He did start enacting it.

The Chairperson indicated that the matter sat with the Committee quite early having raised it with SSA because, in 2014, Cabinet decided that all persons, including CEOs, must be vetted. The matter was raised way before the engagements with Mr de Ruyter had started. The Committee had the then deputy state security officer appear before the Committee and categorically tell the Committee that Mr de Ruyter did not want to be vetted. The relationship between Mr de Ruyter and SSA was not interactive, so much so that all did what they wanted to do. The major issue is that it is possible to see how SSA would not have briefed someone who was not vetted and refused to be vetted. The services due to Mr de Ruyter, were collapsed by him and his attitude towards vetting.

Mr Hadebe said when the vetting question was put to Mr de Ruyter, a state security agent was stationed at Megawatt Park to assist with vetting. When Mr de Ruyter was asked about his vetting, he said that much information was required from him and it was a tedious process. He could not forward all the necessary information. Mr Hadebe asked Brig Burger if, from the time you are employed to the time you wrote a resignation letter; does it require that much time to furnish the necessary information required from you? Mr de Ruyter replied that he did not see a need as he had already handed in his resignation letter. So, he refused to submit the requisite information under the disguise that a lot of information was required from him even though state security was stationed at Megawatt Park for that exercise.

Brig Burger confirmed that this was correct and this was towards the end of last year. He wanted to make the point that nothing in terms of vetting was done in the previous two and a half years. It is important to consider who Mr de Ruyter reported to because that person was supposed to ensure compliance with his contract. Was it the chairman of the board or was it the Minister? So, there were basically gaps in terms of oversight at the higher levels.

The Chairperson remarked that the Committee was in agreement with this fact but the point they were also trying to make was that there were efforts from the Committee on the vetting issue at Eskom including the vetting of Mr de Ruyter and he was categorised. Despite those efforts, he placed the relationship in an invidious position with such an attitude, resulting in the Committee now being burdened with private groups or entities who are given access to Eskom information. The information landed in private hands as a response to a vetting refusal and SSA response lapsing. The issue now is the Committee is saddled with an ex-GCEO who put the entity at risk, whereas he was supposed to uphold fiduciary responsibilities for the protection of an institution.

For clarity, the Chairperson confirmed with the Brigadier that he presented the information he was given by the FG to the DCPI and SSA amongst others for the purposes of taking this forward.

Brig Burger said he had operational engagements with SSA and he did hand over some information, but before he could hand over everything, the investigation was shut down. He handed over all his information to the DPCI to investigate the Eskom atrocities.

In a briefing to the Committee just over a year ago, the Chairperson commented that the SIU spoke about confirmed syndicates but specifically related to trucking diesel, coal, and fuel mainly in Mpumalanga. Were those issues reported to the Brigadier as well?

Brig Burger stated that part of the information as it pertains to the trucking syndicate was forthcoming. In addition, information on the construction mafia emerged at almost all the sites where pilfering of development funds occurred, which was part of community investments. An extensive list of syndicates that are functioning exist. The current investigating team functioning from Megawatt Park are addressing some of these syndicates through low-level investigations. One has to consider the important question of who is behind these syndicates. He mentioned that there is a tendency to separate corruption and organised crime, whereas corruption is just one of the elements of organised crime. Looking at this from an organised crime perspective, corruption is entailed within.

The Chairperson noted that the Brigadier raised the issue with the national security advisor when he appeared before the Committee, and he seemed to appear not to know much. So, what was the extent of the briefing he was given?

Brig Burger said that he engaged the national security advisor on two matters. Firstly, around Eskom but he did not give the advisor an operational briefing as that was not his role. Secondly, he raised the issue that they were not functioning from the perspective of national security. He also told the advisor that the role players, such as the DGs, need to be brought together to find a resolution. Having a constable with a docket under his arm is not going to solve this problem. All entities need to take a comprehensive national security approach in order to address the issues.

He also advised the security advisor that they should not dwell on Eskom; they should rather focus on the energy sector as the energy sector and other entities like Eskom will be the focus of organised crime in future. He suggested establishing a national mechanism to look at national security for the country and the role of the intelligence services, the police, and law enforcement in terms thereof. Two weeks after the engagement, he heard that there was a national energy crisis committee. He shared these ideas with the advisor to lobby for a high-level governance of national security issues.

The Chairperson said the matter of the two politicians was raised in a meeting between the Committee and the national security state advisor. The Committee enquired whether the President was briefed on this potential threat. To what extent was the allegation of politicians’ involvement taken seriously and required attention?

Brig Burger said that he does not know whether the President has been briefed as he is not privy to those engagements, but he asked for a special investigating team to be set up to deal with this matter comprehensively and nothing was done.

The Chairperson asked whether the Lt Gen Jacobs’ team is not the one that is supposed to be dealing with these matters.

Brig Burger clarified that Lt Gen Jacobs and his team deal with the reported cases. There should be a properly selected and skilled team to do these corruption investigations.

The Chairperson inquired whether this was the reason that the Brigadier would have done fragmented reporting. Brig Burger said he was using a fragmented approach constructively in that he went to DPCI and SSA in the absence of a security task team.

Brig Burger explained that it was not about fragmented reporting but rather a fragmented approach. When a team is assembled, representatives from various institutions are needed. The use of personal networks is not the way to conduct an investigation. It should be a formal government approach.

The Chairperson noted Brig Burger mentioned the vetting matter with Minister Gordhan and the Minister said you should sort it out. Would there have been no follow-up by enquiring whether the Minister could try and clarify what he meant you should sort out in light of the fact that a high premium is placed on vetting in that it gives one access to certain information? That response is worrisome.

Brig Burger remarked that the response also took him aback. He attempted to explain to the Minister that if Mr de Ruyter did not trust the SSA, he, as a Minister, could approach the defence intelligence services to conduct the vetting or the police vetting unit could conduct the vetting to circumvent a deadlock within SSA. The response from the Minister was that the two of them should sort it out. Brig Burger stated that it was not his responsibility as a police officer to address that. He could merely advise how to circumvent the vetting process with the SSA but there was no appetite for such processes. In general, government intelligence officials are not vetted.

The Chairperson stated that he raised the vetting issue due to the Brigadier mentioning state capture across the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). He asked the Brigadier whether the vetting issue is not receiving the requisite attention from government as should be.

Brig Burger confirmed that this was true. Vetting is not a concern. He said he even went as far as developing an integrity support process in 2018 which provides a wider scope to vetting that not only tests your ability to keep secrets but is not designed as an anti-corrupt mechanism. One must look at the integrity measures for government and part of it as vetting for individuals in terms of classified information.

The Chairperson indicated that the Brigadier had mentioned that it should not be assumed that state capture is a legacy project. This speaks to what Minister Gordhan has articulated as state capture 2.0. He asked the Brigadier if it is his contention that state capture remains part and parcel of the daily social, political, and economic life of this country.

Brig Burger confirmed that state capture was indeed part and parcel of the country’s social, political, and economic fabric.

The Chairperson noted the Brigadier had mentioned that in 1995, he was in the NCoP’s office. Would that NCoP be NCoP George Fivaz? And if so, what is the nature of his relationship with former NCoP George Fivaz?

Brig Burger explained that he was appointed to the NCoP’s office to work on the reconstruction development programme. It lasted for about four to five months until corruption was identified within logistics. He was then unceremoniously removed from his office by himself. He stated that they did indeed know each other, and they had a cordial relationship.

The Chairperson remarked that he brought this to light because Brig Burger and Mr Fivaz met each other in a forensic space dealing with Eskom years later. He asked the Brigadier whether their interaction remained purely professional in terms of information exchange and that there was nothing more and nothing less.

Brig Burger confirmed their interaction was purely professional. He clarified that there was no forensic angle to the investigation. It was purely intelligence.

Final Comments and Questions
Mr Hadebe noted that he kept hearing that Mr de Ruyter was not served by the SSA yet there has been no indication that he approached them. Would it be fair to conclude that he did not approach the SSA, he was not vetted and most importantly, the SSA operations remain unclear as such information can only be shared by vetted individuals?

Brig Burger said the SSA has an obligation to Eskom and all other areas of national interest to conduct their processes in terms of those institutions. The question is, was the information on the table?

Mr Hadebe remarked that the information could not be shared with the public since it is classified thus no conclusion can be made. It would be seriously misguided.

Brig Burger stated that his security classification is top secret. It was most of his life and he has engaged SSA. The service value chain should inform operations. There is supposed to be a flow; SSA serving national security and national intelligence entities. The energy sector is one of the national security priorities, the national security priority is Eskom, and the list goes on. There is a system to manage the priorities but the systems are not functioning.

Mr Hadebe remarked that the national estimates are not for public consumption unless Brigadier Burger knows something the Committee does not know to make such a bold statement.

The Chairperson stated that it is an intelligence matter and what has been established is that SSA and Mr de Ruyter had no relationship therefore the Committee cannot conclusively make any assumptions. There are observations or lack thereof but no weeding into the merits or demerits of such can be done. What is known categorically from Mr de Ruyter, confirmed by Brig Burger, is that Mr de Ruyter was not prepared to subject himself to vetting. In the Committee’s recommendations on the way forward, there may be merit to Brigadier’s assertion to interact with the DPCI. Safe to say that vetting remains government’s Achilles heel.

Mr Somyo mentioned that since SSA confirmed that they are stationed at Eskom, where they are receiving applications, Mr de Ruyter chose not to be vetted so the relationship as it stands was Mr de Ruyter’s choice.

Ms van Minnen stated that the vetting was delayed and it did not happen. By the time it started to happen, Mr de Ruyter had said that he was leaving in any event, so he did not see the point and did not proceed with it.

Mr Hadebe stated that the latest information under the name of Mr de Ruyter said there were outstanding documents.

The Chairperson suppressed the debate, stating that the Committee will make the necessary recommendations on the issue of vetting. It is sufficient to say that Mr de Ruyter was never vetted as discussed. This presented a security challenge in terms of a security risk and the matter of vetting ends there.

Mr Hadebe said Brig Burger had mentioned that he was aware of one or two names who funded the investigation. He is uncomfortable giving us the names of one or two of the funders but how did he become aware of these funders?

Brig Burger stated that he does not exactly remember how he came across the names of the funders as that was not part of the scope of his work and he cannot validate what he heard or who was behind it. It was probably a discussion between Mr de Ruyter and Mr Fivaz where he heard the names, but he cannot furnish those names as that information is unsubstantiated.

Mr Hadebe said that the implicated officials or politicians were disclosed to the Brigadier and that information did not come from Mr de Ruyter, but it came from Mr Fivaz. Is that correct?

Brig Burger stated that the names were gathered as part of the initial investigations made by the FG and they included names of politicians, officials, business people, and private citizens.

Mr Hadebe said the FG needed to produce further information to substantiate the information. Is that correct?

Brig Burger said that the information provided by the FG had to be further substantiated and validated by intelligence agencies, but further information was not provided even though he asked for further information from the FG.

Final Remarks
The Chairperson thanked all the attendees for their presence and engagement in the meeting. On behalf of the Committee, he thanked retired Brig Burger for appearing before the Committee and engaging with the Committee’s questions and providing clarity. He remarked that if they had spoken to Brig Burger first there would have been far more clarity on the Eskom matters, but rather late than never.

The Committee’s outlook has been enriched as Brig Burger was an active player in events, not in the corruption and maladministration events, but in the operations as a response to the criminal activities. The Brigadier has provided clarity that the Committee will take forward with the necessary persons. The Chairperson wished the Brigadier well on his retirement, adding that he wished that his life may be meaningful and fulfilling and that his service may not be lost to the public and that he will avail himself when needed.

He stated that the Committee needed to meet with the NCoP. and Maj-Gen Booysen to round off on the matter. He asked the secretariat to produce a draft report on the Eskom matter by the end of the month. He requested the Committee Members to draft their inputs, notes and contributions in the next two weeks. The matter must come to a logical parliamentary conclusion.

Brig Burger thanked the Committee for the opportunity and apologised for the perceived avoidance. He explained that he had to ensure that he was legally protected as his previous employer would not necessarily have done that. Whenever needed, he will provide his support to restore the country's integrity.

The meeting was adjourned.