Revised SANDF HR Strategy; SANDF deployment; with Minister and Deputy Minister

Defence

26 October 2023
Chairperson: Mr V Xaba (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

In a virtual meeting, the Joint Standing Committee was joined by the Department of Defence and Military Veterans and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to consider the Committee’s proposal for a new human resources (HR) strategy to ensure a permanent exit mechanism for soldiers, and a rejuvenation of the force.

The Department’s presentation dealt with the implemented HR interventions, with a special focus on the Mobility Exit Mechanism (MEM) performance targets and achievements, consideration of a permanent exit strategy, and the rejuvenation of the defence force. The Department reported under-funding below the current strength of the SANDF. There was stagnation in the ranks, and this was a major contributor to its HR costs, and also limited the available forces to be employed in military operations.

The Department reported successfully implementing the exit strategy and the funded MEM. It was committed to reducing the number of members who occupied senior positions in the SANDF, and rejuvenating the force with more members at the bottom of its employment structure so that a greater number of people were employable and efficient.

Some Members felt that the Department’s presentation was not sufficiently detailed and relevant, as it did not provide any targets, numbers and measurable information that showed that a step was being taken to go in a different direction. The Department was also criticised for its lack of urgency regarding implementation, and the presentation did not emphasise that a younger force was needed. Members shared the concerns of the Department over the low level of funding, which cast doubt on its ability to meet its targeted 2025/26 break-even point.

The Minister pointed out that the defence force's finances were affected by tasks for which it could not budget. Examples of this were its deployment to guard Eskom facilities, and the ongoing challenge of dealing with the illegal mining operations of the zama zamas. While one might expect compensation for its involvement, this was often not forthcoming. The Department of Defence would be engaging with the Department of Finance for increased financial support.

The Committee concurred with the deployment letter that sought to extend the deployment of soldiers tasked to attend to Eskom matters, at a cost of over R100 million.

Meeting report

Briefing by South African National Defence Force: Exploring A Permanent Exit Strategy For Soldiers

Brig Gen Kevin Richards, Director: Human Resources Strategic Planning, South African Defence Force (SANDF), reported that continued under-funding below the current strength persisted in the SANDF. There was stagnation in the ranks, which was a major contributor to human resources (HR) costs and limited the forces available to be employed in military operations. This had negative implications on the ability of the defence force to fulfil its mandate.

There was significant pressure on the Department of Defence and Military Veterans (DMV) to compensate employees. The allocated funding had been below the current strength and was likely to persist. Approximately R12 billion in irregular expenditure had been reported. What had happened in the space of the compensation of employees (CoE), the composition of soldiers, and the ability of the SANDF to project itself in military terms, showed an interplay between the underfunding of the defence force and, more specifically, the CoE, stagnation throughout the system, and the defence force’s inability to replenish personnel losses.

A funded exit strategy was one of the HR interventions contemplated and successfully implemented by the Department. The Minister had issued internal instructions to comply with the intent to curb costs, subsequent to the agreement in 2021 on what to do to curb costs. In so doing, propelled by the funding strategy of exiting soldiers, the Department had been allocated R1 billion for the 2022/23 financial year, and R800 million for the 2023/24 financial year.

The Department had successfully implemented the funded the exit strategy -- the mobility exit mechanism (MEM).

The outcomes of the exit strategy demonstrated the resolve of the Department to pursue and implement HR cost savings measures as contemplated and agreed to, but more specifically on the trajectory of future management of the expenditure on the CoE.

Delays had materialised during the process of executing the exit strategy as a result of the number of separations, and the structure of the administrative function to manage the separation of soldiers.

Performance targets included:

  • A decrease by one year in the average age of military personnel;
  • A progression through the system of rank levels;
  • A decrease in the number of personnel stagnated;
  • An increased attrition rate, composed of normal attrition and induced attrition, to a level of 4 924 over a 12-month period;
  • An additional 2 549 vacancies created through the Military Skills Development System (MSDS) intake; and
  • A reduction in the defence force’s capacity to 59 249.

The deliverables of a funded exit strategy included:

  • Force strength management: making more soldiers available to employ and deploy in military operations. The SANDF needed to maintain its track record of conducting successful military operations.
  • Force strength planning: an accurate average force strength must be planned. This would allow for a more accurate plan to compensate employees.
  • Force strength distribution: a managed force strength would enable critical HR capacity to satisfy forecast HR requirements.
  • Force strength composition: strengthened application of force generation rules.
  • Lower HR cost contributor: the force needed to recruit more younger soldiers who were more efficient and cost less.

Long-term system personnel costs the Department more than a contract-based employment system. Factors such as the country’s fiscal environment and the Department of Defence (DoD) being funded below its strength contributed to significant constraints on managing contracts within the core of the new service system implemented by the DoD and the SANDF.

The current core service system -- the contract-based employment system -- was steadily being eroded.

He reported that 1 260 military personnel had been separated. A permanent exit strategy approach must apply a reduced tempo and reduced pace principle. It also needed to be more administratively manageable within the Department, because all types of administration went through one entity within the Department, and it would lessen the burden on that entity to be able to manage that administrative process.

The Department had adopted two specific broad approaches toward rejuvenation, with specific adverse implications for the SANDFs capabilities. This included the replacement of personnel losses according to attrition. In previous years, the SANDF recruitment strategy had been able to feed the reserves and satisfy personnel losses in the regular force. The country’s current fiscal environment did not allow for this form of recruitment. This resulted in a halt to the rejuvenation of the reserves.

The second approach involved recruiting through the military skills development system every alternate year. This had significantly contributed to a reduced force strength.

He concluded by stating that it had become evident that without a secure funding trajectory for defence, the DoD and the SANDF would be hard-pressed to implement measures to effectively manage its human resource needs and costs. A course of action to institute a permanent exit strategy for soldiers at an approximate cost of R600 million would assist the DoD and the SANDF to effectively manage the strength of the force, its distribution and composition within the defence allocation, as determined by government.

Vice Admiral Asiel Kubu, Chief of Human Resources, SANDF, said that the Department and the SANDF were comfortable that the current MEM they had implemented had made a significant difference in terms of reducing human capital in the Department. The DoD and the SANDF had not seen anything that talked about the savings, as there was a lack of funding for the severance and National Treasury paid only for the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) liability, so the severance was coming from the Department. It would be evident that the money spent on severance would also go down once the Department had passed these two years. It was now moving to the normal exit interventions, and the Department would start seeing a significant difference in the reduction of the COE. The Department needed to continue with the exit of its people, as this would allow for rejuvenation of the defence force. The Department’s approach was to exit at the top and rejuvenate at the bottom so that there would be a number of people who were employable -- soldiers, sailors and airmen.

Discussion

The Chairperson said he was happy that progress had been made and progress was clear, as opposed to the previous time when colleagues were thinking that maybe this situation would improve in the near future. They had now realised that the fiscal situation in the country was not likely to improve, and therefore the Department and the Committee must tighten their belts and do everything humanly possible to bring the expenditure within control so that the defence force could do more with less.

It was projected that the MEM would start to show some savings by 2025/26, but he was now uncertain, considering the underfunding, that the SANDF would break even and start to pose some savings in 2025/26. Maybe the SANDF also needed to reflect on that because when the MEM was first conceptualised, it had a different set of conditions. Those conditions had changed. Usually, the decision would be taken and the projection would be made, and everything would be said to be equal. Could the SANDF still say everything was equal and that they would be able to meet the targets within the planned timeframe? This was so that the Committee could measure its expectations accordingly.

Mr S Marais (DA) said he had studied this presentation and had asked himself what the real purpose of the SANDF’s strategy was. Was the purpose to decrease the cost of employees but retain the numbers, or was it to reduce the numbers as well? This presentation did not show how the SANDF would cut the cost of employees. There was already a 70% over-expenditure by the SANDF, therefore there needed to be a significant reduction in the monetary value of the cost of employees. Even the number that had been referred to here was 59 000, and for quite some time, the numbers had been around 60 000, with about 10 000 for civilian employees. So, in other words, there was no reduction in the number of soldiers here. In fact, there was a case being made out that there would be more MSDS hires, but there must basically be a halt to the MEM of permanent people. That meant that the numbers would increase, and therefore the costs would increase. He could not see how the costs would be reduced.

He pointed out that the presentation mentioned that there had been pressure on the cost of employees since 2017. He had been a member of the previous Parliament, and there had already been huge pressure on the cost of employees. During that time, the Skills Development Act (SDA) funding was used to fund this cost. There had been an offer from National Treasury at the time to cut the cost of employees -- a once-off offer to all state departments -- and the Department and the SANDF had opted not to make use of that. That refusal was biting the SANDF in the leg at the moment.

He also could not understand, as was stated in slide three of the presentation, that stagnation in the ranks was a major contributor to HR costs. How could stagnation contribute to the cost? Stagnation meant that one did not move from a lower rank to a higher rank, which was more expensive. So, how could stagnation in the ranks add to higher employee costs? It did not make sense to him.

In terms of the numbers of where the SANDF needs to be, it had been referred to the Committee that there were a lot of deliverables. There was no monetisation, no values, no numbers being given to any of those four strengths, of management making more soldiers available. How many soldiers did they have currently available for military operations, and how many of the current 59 000 did they need? There was a maximum of between 30 000 and 40 000 members of the SANDF that could be considered for deployment and for operations. The reserve force would also need to be used, because regular force members could not be used, even with those numbers. They were not at the fitness or competency level, yet they needed to deploy them. The Committee did not see more soldiers who were younger and cost less. Where were the SANDF’s scientific calculations to support what they were saying? Only using words, with the greatest of respect, was not going to help.

He challenged the Department and the Chief of Human Resources to give the Committee scenarios. If there must be a reduction of uniformed members from 59 000 to 50 000 members, where would the SANDF be able to cut out personnel, and what would the financial and practical implications be? How much would it be on 5 000, and how much would it be on 2 500? More significant and drastic decisions needed to be made somewhere, because the proposals were not forthcoming from the Department, the SANDF or the Minister, and they could not go on like this.

The average age of the force was 41, but a couple of years ago, it had been about 42 or 43, so somewhere along the line, they had lost age and he did not know how they had got there. Slide five of the presentation showed the criteria to be applied for many cases. He was aware of a number of soldiers for where the MEM had been approved, and they fell into that category. They were non-commissioned officers (NCOs), were between the ages of 50 and 58, and were long-term serving members -- but the chiefs had refused to sign off their MEM exits. The criteria seemed to not be implemented across the board, or it was selective. He could not see how the SANDF would be moving forward from here.

He challenged the Department to give the Committee scenarios where they could say that this was a practical implication; that this was the fitness level that the SANDF needed; and this was the kind of personnel that the SANDF needed and could not do without. The bad thing was that the South African economy was not stagnating, but was rather going down. The economy was under pressure and there was no more money, and he could not see in his wildest of dreams, in terms of this presentation, that any costs whatsoever would be cut. They would find themselves in 2025, when maybe none of the present Committee Members would be there, and there would be new excuses, plans, and strategies. However, this presentation did not provide them with that.

He used Germany as an example of what a progressive system looks like. He was of the opinion that the presentation would not convince National Treasury to give the SANDF more money to cover the cost of employees. This would not convince National Treasury that they would reduce numbers and the cost of employees over time and improve the defence competencies by their personnel. The presentation referred to the people that the SANDF preferred to exit and then mentioned the least officers. It was senior NCOs and least officers. What were "least officers"? Were these officers in the lower ranks? He recalled that Minister Thandi Modise was on record as stating that she had never in her life seen a defence force with so many one star, two star, and three star generals. They must not cut where they actually needed soldiers, but must cut where it was needed to be cut.

Mr D Ryder (DA, Gauteng) said he was not so welcoming of the presentation -- it gave really broad strokes, and there was no detail. He agreed with Mr Marais that there were no numbers, no targets, and nothing measurable in it. At this stage, it was kind of a vague idea. The reality was that it was so vague that the Committee might as well not really have had the presentation tonight. He had heard the Minister’s statements that this was kind of a warning shot, or almost a first draft, and something closer to the final product would be produced in more detail next year. He was just concerned about the urgency. The country was in a difficult financial situation. In one of her rare moments of accuracy, the previous Minister mentioned that the South African Cabinet needed to decide what kind of defence force it wanted. They were still at that stage where they did not know what they wanted. What had been presented to the Committee today was pretty much just a case of stating that “you are going to get more of the same, we are going to panel beat a little bit and we are going to put together a fancy presentation, maybe that would get us a bonus or not put our heads on the chopping block and it would buy us a little bit of time until next year.” He was not seeing anything that really provided a step change, because that was what was needed. A change in the step and a new direction was needed.

He understood the Defence Review, and what parts needed to be implemented and what parts could not be funded, but there was no urgency. They were not moving forward, and one of the issues they were sitting with here was that they had asked the turkeys to organise Christmas lunch. While they were getting the generals and senior officers within the defence force to tell the Committee how they would cull themselves, they were not going to get a good result. There needed to be an external view of what needed to be done.

There was a big directional role for the Department to play in terms of what they wanted the force to look like. Did the SANDF want a bunch of 40 or 39-year-old people who could sit around and play chess and talk to each other? Or did it want a bunch of young people who were able to go out and do the job? It was an unpleasant job that took vim, vigour, and a fair degree of youth. Some of the older dogs in the picture could teach the youngsters the old tricks and take strategic decisions. By and large, a young force was needed. Today’s presentation did not display that. He was looking for the step change, and was not seeing it. He had heard the Minister saying that they were batching for next year, but progress was too slow. The money was being spent every month. The irregular expenditure was adding up. The country was being pushed into further and further trouble, and they were taking the reputation of the SANDF and eroding it with every month that went by without making something that was workable and worth the effort.

Mr T Mmutle (ANC) said he did not want to start on a negative note, as he did not agree that the presentation on the strategy had been vague and did not provide direction as to how the Department was going to go about the implementation of the strategy. He did have clarity-seeking questions in some areas, however. He agrees with the Members saying that they wanted a force that was fairly young and would be able to execute the mandate as and when required without fail, and any other challenge that might result from an aging force. The Committee must not behave as if they did not understand the challenges the SANDF faced. In fact, the Committees knew that they were being held at gunpoint to reduce the force to a particular number, which was a discussion that the Committee should undertake some other day to confront whether it assisted in impressing the SANDF to reduce its numbers.

After scanning the environment in the African continent, with the emergence of coup d’etats in neighbouring countries, he had questions about the SANDF implementing this strategy versus rejuvenation. Had the SANDF scanned the environment and analysed where and when they were allowing people to exit, and did it balance with recruitment? If they let go of certain members, whether voluntarily or in terms of attrition, were they able to balance it with the recruitment drive to assure the Committee that in the future, they would not find themselves in a situation where they had a force that was focused on exiting members, and there were insufficient members coming in to replace those that had exited the system? He did not think that the Committee Members should be excited about this. In fact, as and when this was done, they should intensify their fight against National Treasury regarding the instruction they had given the defence force.

He believed it was fair that when SANDF members exited due to attrition, the SANDF must always ensure that there was young blood joining, to ensure that it was rejuvenated and could perform its duties effectively and efficiently. He was totally opposed to reducing the force when considering the population growth. The Committee and the SANDF needed to take guidance from the latest statistics issued by StatsSA, and use them to influence and put a stop to the instruction from National Treasury to the defence force to reduce its numbers. In fact, if anything should be done right now, it was for this battle to be taken to National Treasury and state that more recruitment needed to take place, and more funding must be made available to make it possible.

He referred the Committee to one of the slides that talked about contract-based employment, which would be implemented versus lifelong employment which the Department intended to phase out. His concern was how the Department intended to do that, and to what extent the SANDF had engaged the unions around these changes that it was going to implement. He was asking this to ensure that the SANDF avoided a situation where unions revolt during the implementation phase, because moving from long-term employment to contractual-based employment was something that the union would not easily agree to. He did not think that the move would encourage those who wanted to dedicate their life to serving their nation in uniform, because there would be less job security in the SANDF if they were in contract-based employment contracts. This might also create recruitment issues going forward. Had the SANDF looked into those issues? Had they consulted enough, and what had the consensus or the outcome of those consultations been insofar as the changes they wanted to make?

Ms P Phetlhe (ANC) welcomed the presentation, and felt that it had gone to detail. She urged Members not to throw the baby out with the bathwater regarding this application, as that would lead to them losing focus on how to help, what should be done, and how best the human resources department should apply the strategies. The Committee should not reject the report outright. The Committee’s responsibility was to ensure that they did not attack the report that the SANDF had brought to them for some help -- it was part of the Committee’s responsibility to help the SANDF.

She had heard Mr Marais saying he had particular information, and felt it would be better to put the information on the table in this meeting. What synergy could be achieved to ensure that the information that he had, and the information that had been provided openly in this presentation, could together help to ensure that the challenge they were all facing was going to be dealt with? Taking her cue from Mr Mmutle, she said that with consultation, one must have put everything in place that would find an expression. That would be a positive for everyone who wants to be involved. One should not bring labour in at the tail end, because that is where there may be resistance.

Where she disagreed with Mr Marais was where he did not understand the stagnation part of it, as she believed this was something that had been thoroughly explained. It had been appropriate for human resources to identify a kind of grouping or category of employees that was becoming more of a financial burden to the Department. The Committee needed to find a creative way to talk to those presenting to the Committee so that the presenters also had courage when they prepared their presentations and did their work diligently. The responsibility of this meeting was to help and put forward more positive notes. They all owned this particular baby, and we should therefore not distance ourselves. They should not find others distancing themselves, but should all make meaningful inputs.

Mr M Shelembe (DA) said that he and the Chairperson had met the Minister of Finance recently and had asked him why he was not assisting the Committee to resolve their issues with the Department of Defence and Military Veterans, as they were struggling financially. The Minister had offered his availability to meet with the Committee and the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans. Had the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans met with the Minister of Finance? What was the outcome of the meeting?

He asked what the issue was regarding the DoD's budgeting. He did not understand how they put their budget together -- whether it was zero-based budgeting, or whether it was taken from what had been happening over the years. If there was a suggestion that the SANDF needed to tighten its belt in response to the financial constraints, it meant it had to start from scratch. How could they reprioritise what they had? The procurement policy showed that there was a lot of money going out that could help to assist in the compensation of employees. Could the Department explain to the Committee how it budgets? Was it zero-based budgeting or was it just a budget based on what had been happening in the previous years?

The Chairperson said he did not think the Committee was on the same page as the Department. The Committee had asked the Department to present the Department’s exit strategy insofar as it would help the defence force rejuvenate. It was not about the defence force’s design. The Minister had said that they were reviewing the Defence Review, and only then would the issue of the force's design feature prominently, because the Department would then be looking at what type of force the country required, and that would serve both the mandate and fit within the budget that had been made available to the SANDF. That presentation was still coming. The Minister had committed herself.

Today’s discussion was not about that, but the Committee wanted the Department to give it comfort that they had implemented the exit strategy and were looking at the rejuvenation of the force. This Committee had stated before that rejuvenation would save money, bring down the median age of the force, and would ensure that there was a fit for purpose defence force. In that context, the Committee had asked the Department to come and present today. However, Members had asked the Department questions that the Committee had not asked the Department to present today. He would welcome a proposal that asked the DoD to be invited back to talk to the Committee about the ideas they had about reviewing the force design, but he believed that discussion would be too premature to have because that was part of the review that the Minister had promised, and had actually instructed the Department to start to look into. He was basically saying that this was a narrow view versus a wider one. One should not say to the Department that the presentation did not address the areas that the Members had started to speak about, because those areas involved a wider view and that starts to address the restructuring of the force as a whole. They should not fall into the trap of thinking that they were discussing the force design, when in fact they were just looking at the exit strategy as it helped the defence force to rejuvenate.

Department of Defence's response

Vice Admiral Kubu said that the Chairperson had hit the nail on the head in terms of the expectations for the Department’s presentation. It had been presenting a broad concept about “what to do,” considering the situation that the Department was in. The “how the work was going to be done” was still going to be presented. The Department would still go through all the forums to discuss the “how to do it.” The strategy was a broad concept.

On the SANDF's anticipation of breaking even in 2025/26, given the current underfunding, he said the Chairperson’s assertions were correct, because the Department had not anticipated the cuts by National Treasury when it came up with the interventions, and this was a serious concern to them. They also did not anticipate that National Treasury would be unable to fund the annual increments and pay progressions normally used to be funded by National Treasury. The Department also understood very well that money would not be coming from National Treasury. It had already authorised the Department to reprioritise. What did it mean for the Department to reprioritise? There was nothing to be reprioritised by the Department, which created a challenge for it. If the unions had already sat and signed a resolution that all the increases must be paid, and Treasury had said that it was not going to pay for the Department of Defence, understanding that all the other departments were facing the same situation, what would this do to the morale of the country’s people? It would be a difficult decision for the Department to make, not to pay all the increments that were authorised through the resolutions all the unions had signed. The Department was in a serious predicament. The Department’s salary increments were over R2.4 billion. That money had not been forecast when the Department started with its own interventions, because they always knew that it would come from National Treasury. The Department could safely say that it might still be a challenge to break even in 2025/26, depending on how many people it exited now, after all the separate severance packages have been paid, and how many people were brought into the system. New projections for 2025/26 needed to be made.

On whether the real purpose of the presentation had been about the cost of employees, or on reducing the numbers, he replied that this was a balancing act in terms of the intervention that the Department had presented to the Committee and the Portfolio Committee of Defence a few years ago, where the DoD had been clear that one could reduce only to a certain level of personnel strength. When they came with a figure of 73 000, they had believed that the 73 000 strength of the Department could actually get them somewhere, but additional responsibilities had been given to the military establishment. There were several internal challenges, and the military tended to get called upon at short notice to assist. The military needed time to prepare for that, and they were already heavily involved in internal operations such as assisting the police. Those requirements kept on coming on a regular basis.

Even now, the SANDF was supposed to be deploying until March next year, or even until June, to combat illegal mining activities. There were no plans for these activities, but the military had been responsible. It was difficult from the military side, and he hoped that Members of the Committee would understand that the projected numbers of what the SANDF might need were already under consideration. The Department had had a work session in June and in August with the Chief of the Army, and they had looked at all the internal challenges and threats. The Department still believed that they might require more deployable soldiers. It was going to be difficult to decide whether the Department could go lower than what they had discussed, and whether cuts could still be made to fit into the required compensation of employees. It would have been easier to cut the number of members until the SANDF got the CoE to the desired level if the Department was not facing the issues that they were currently facing.

The objective was still to position the military to be able to do what was expected of it. The SANDF was already in a difficult situation regarding its own assets, and the budget allocated to them was also not assisting. What the Department required now, more than anything else, was to have enough soldiers on the ground. It was not just about cutting until the CoE target was reached. What was also required was a balancing act between what was expected of the military and the military’s readiness to deploy at short notice, should there be a challenge in the country.

Regarding stagnation in ranks, he said the Department believed this would assist because the SANDF members who were stagnated in the ranks had reached the top positions in the SANDF, and knew there was no prospects of promotion for them, so their morale went down as they became aware that there were fewer posts available for them. This was evident in the military, where people were not actively participating in their jobs because they felt they were not progressing in their careers. It was always difficult to motivate those people.

The Department did not want to exit people who would go on to be jobless for the rest of their lives. It wanted a strategy that ensured its people would continue being cared for. The strategy did not want to see SANDF members destitute when they exited the force. The DoD's view was that the process of rejuvenating the SANDF involved appointing young people who were still energetic and could be deployed, and sacrificing senior members of the SANDF who were stagnating in their careers. The Department still needs to sit with the military command council to appreciate the “how” of the process, and to see whether certain high-ranking posts could be sacrificed to boost the junior ranks. However, the idea was not to cut the number of people.

He confirmed that the Department had dealt with the contract-based employment issue, and had implemented it since 2004. The Department’s intention when starting the Human Resources 2010 strategy had always been not to appoint people until they retired at 60. That had already been implemented. The Department had had a contract-based short-term service system and medium-term system in 1994, and the policy of not committing people to long-term service had already been implemented since then. The unions were aware of this issue, because it had always been there. All the SANDF members who belonged to the unions were part of this process.

Gen Richards responded to questions on budgeting. He said the DoD went out of its way to accurately forecast the numbers and cost of the personnel projected in the system. Critical to the human resources budgeting process was that it was based on a corporate human resources plan informed by government guidelines, and internal guidelines emanating from the Minister, and the secretary of the SANDF. It was not a finite zero-based budgeting process, but it was a process based on the governing guidelines issued for the medium-term strategic framework (MTSF), and it followed the progression of what the requirements for the capacity of the DoD and the SANDF would be, based on what they knew. The Department had employed systems to be able to support the development of its corporate human resources plan. It submits its corporate human resources strategy annually to the Department of Public Services and Administration (DPSA) for evaluation, and it has been accepted for its compliance and accuracy.

The Chairperson said the 2025/26 projections needed to be reviewed, as they might not be attainable given the country’s current fiscal position. The ground was shifting, and it impacted the assumptions that had informed the Department's projections at the time. Expectations need to be adjusted. The projections were no longer what they had been projected at the time, because the target had shifted.

The Chairperson gave the Minister the opportunity to comment.

Minister's comments

Minister Modise said the Chairperson had asked Mr Marais to share the list of the people who had applied and who were being denied MEM, so that the Department could see where the trouble was. She assured the Committee that when the list had been compiled, she had asked the human resources team whether members of the force had carefully considered whether they really wanted to participate in the MEM. The second question was how strategic the posts were that they were allowed to leave at this point. Even if the CoE needed to be dealt with and brought down, one did not want to lose critical skills unless one knew that as there were capable people to take the posts of those who had left.

She agreed with Mr Mmutle that the Committee should not be putting pressure on the SANDF regarding the figures and the numbers. Those would not enable the SANDF to be really able to defend this country. For now, the Department agreed with the cuts, because it Department wanted to rejuvenate and also because it meant that as one removed one of the top earners, one could bring in almost a dozen of the lower ones. Of the new dozen that would come in, one could soon tell who was going to slack and who would become real members of the defence force.

She said the Minister’s job was to look at morale, affordability, and capability. She was beginning to insist that those policies be implemented so that there was no large bulge at top and a large bulge at the bottom. A large bulge at the bottom led to a lack of inclination to go out and look for the needed skills as quickly as possible. The Department had also spoken about looking at how to ensure that even as members started leaving the system at the non-commissioned officer (NCO) level, they maintained an honourable life dignified for a service person. All of that was being considered.

She thought that Mr Shelembe’s statement that he had had a meeting with the Minister of Finance was out of order. Ministers were colleagues. The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans could meet anywhere. They could have a cup of tea and discuss business or discuss the weather. There were matters that Ministers met about and matters that they did not meet about. The Department of Defence was taking the fight to the Minister of Finance.

She said the DoD had taken the fight right back to Cabinet on why they were unable and should not be forced at this stage to shrink the defence force until the financial situation had improved, in order to deploy at the border. It needed to be understood that the minutes of every meeting between Ministers would not always be available, but the Minister of Defence would meet with other Ministers when it was important and when it affected the well-being of the defence force. When a meeting with a different Minister forced the Minister of Defence to come to the Committee and report on it, she would do so, but when it did not -- when it was outside the oversight purview of the Committee -- she would not do so.

One of the things that really affected the Department’s budget was that the more negatively the economy was impacted, the more negatively the economy affected the standing and sovereignty of the country, and would lead to the defence force being deployed. The SANDF had not planned for all of this, and therefore it often required diverting funds from what had already been budgeted for to go and do what needed to be done. One would expect that they would be recompensed, but sometimes they did not get a cent back, so it did not matter whether the Department was accurate with zero-based budgeting. The Department wanted to go the zero-budgeting route, but she thought National Treasury was sometimes unprepared for this. Sometimes, meeting with all the departments was a problem for National Treasury. The Department must indeed take the fight to National Treasury, but it must not believe that they were the only ones with financial [challenges].

The budget cuts over the last ten years had cost the DoD tens of billions of rands. It needed to claw back, look at its own structures, and take time to look at its own weaknesses. It was not just about bringing the cost of employment down. It was also about relooking at the defence force and all the other new challenges that it was facing. The world was changing. One needed to readjust one's perception of yesterday into today's perception, and project that into the future. It was also prudent on the Department’s side to look at its policies and systems, to see what could be changed to rejuvenate the defence force. Clearer measures needed to be set on the level at which members of the force would exit. The Department was applying itself and looking at all the problems from outside.

The Chairperson said that the day’s meeting had confirmed that the exit mechanism was to ensure that the Department was able to rejuvenate the army. The aim was not to reduce the force, but to ensure that the SANDF had an agile force. The Department could also consider still paying the exiting members until the age of retirement.

Deployment issues

The Chairperson turned to the next agenda item, and said that the Committee had received a deployment letter that sought to extend the deployment of soldiers tasked to attend to Eskom matters, at a cost of over R100 million. He read the letter to the Committee, and asked about new funding to back the extended deployment to Eskom, and how the SANDF would compensate for this deployment. Would the funds come from National Treasury, or would they be recovered from Eskom?

Mr Ryder asked whether the exit strategy was going to continue for the foreseeable future.  

Mr Marais asked whether the Eskom deployment was in the approved budget. The country was used to extra assistance from the defence force, irrespective of the difficult circumstances. His only concern was the budget, because the defence force would say that they were paying for a deployment from their own pockets, but it would turn out to be a situation where one robs Peter to pay Paul.

The Minister said that the Chairperson was correct. The Department would wait for the Minister of Finance to adjust the budget. They would use what they could, and sometimes, a bilateral agreement would be entered into with the responsible department. They would then wait for repayment, and if this did not happen, they would get a bad audit -- and it went on and on. The SANDF did not have an option in this particular instance. They had to stay there because it was not just about ordinary children playing around. Some of the installations were actually being deliberately destroyed, so it had become a matter of whether the Department had the money or not.

It was a war down in the mines with the zama zamas, and the SANDF needed to step in. The Minister of Finance could be empathetic and assist the Department. The SANDF did not have the finances for this deployment, but deployments would take place nonetheless. The SANDF would see where it could get reimbursement. The SANDF also stood to face criticism from South Africans. Sometimes it was better to go to a deployment and be damned, rather than to not go to a deployment and still be damned.

The Chairperson asked the Committee whether there was an objection to giving concurrence to this extension.

There were no objections from Committee Members. The concurrence was therefore granted by the Committee.

Committee matters

The Committee considered an invitation from Melco to witness a milestone flight at its airbase.

Mr Marais felt that this was an exciting and insightful opportunity for the Committee, and suggested that it attend towards the end of November.

Mr Mmutle proposed that the Committee attend on 13 November.

The Committee accepted the invitation.

The Committee also considered a media release from the navy for naming a Strategic Defence Force (SDF) vessel.

The Minister apologised that the Department had not formally invited the Committee, and extended an invitation to all the Members, as the event was part of the scope of the Committee’s interests.

She informed the Committee that their participation would be required during the Defence Review.

The Committee considered the minutes of 19 October.

Ms M Bartlett (ANC, Northern Cape) moved their adoption, and Ms A Mthembu (ANC) seconded.

The minutes were adopted.

The Chairperson adjourned the meeting.

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