Thabo Bester escape: G4S & Integritron; with Ministers

Meeting report

Opening Remarks by the Chairperson

Chairperson: Welcome, Honourable Members, the Department of Correctional Services (DCS), the Department of Police, the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS), and representatives from G4S and Integritron Integrated Solutions – to the meeting. Welcome to the Minister and Deputy Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, and the Minister of Police. The meeting is a continuation of last week's meeting which could not proceed for reasons known to all the Members. Thank you to everyone who is present for your patience and willingness to assist in the process to get to the bottom of the saga. We also note the recent developments regarding the re-arrest of Mr Bester and his associates, but this does not discharge the oversight responsibility of the Committee, as we still need to get to the bottom of the issue and what led to his escape from the Mangaung prison. We must ensure that we a report to the House as well as recommendations on what must be done. There must be clear recommendations at the end of this process, and we must set aside two days so that we can have sufficient time and we will make an assessment on Thursday as to whether we will need more time or what will need to be done.

Chairperson: Today, we will start with G4S, who have been summoned in terms of section 56 A of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, read with section 14, subsection 2 A of the Powers, Privileges, and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislature Act (Act number 44 of 2004). This follows their failure to avail themselves to appear before the Committee on 04 April 2023. The Committee reserved to summon them to appear before it to make presentations on circumstances around Mr Thabo Bester’s escape, and answer questions in respect of the above, and to produce any records in their possession that may assist the Committee in conducting its oversight in respect of A and B of the above.

Chairperson: To all the people who will be making presentations or answering questions, please be aware that failure to comply with a summons, especially to G4S, is a criminal offence. In terms of section 17 of the Act, any person who has been duly summoned and fails without sufficient cause to attend at a time and place specified in the summons, or to remain in attendance until excused from further attendance by the Chairperson or one called upon to do so, or refuses to be sworn in or to make an affirmation as a witness or fail without sufficient cause to answer fully and satisfactorily all questions lawfully put to him or her, or fails to produce any document in his or her possession or custody or under his or her control which he or she has been required to produce, commits an offence that may be punished by a fine or imprisonment after 12 months, or both. Because, G4S, you have been summoned in terms of sections 14 of the Powers, Privileges, and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislature Act, section 15 of the Act provides that prior to examination, or asking you to produce documents, the Chairperson may call upon and course oaths to be administered or accepted from such a person who has been summoned in terms of section 14 of the Act. I will now ask the Legal Adviser to administer the oath on G4S.

Oaths and Affirmations

Legal Advisor: The Chairperson has given a summary of the oath. However, I will repeat it. You have been summonsed or invited subject to the provisions of Section 16 of the Powers, Privileges, and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act (Act 44 of 2004) to appear before this Committee to answer questions in respect of the Committee's oversight meeting into the circumstances relating to the escape of Mr Thabo Bester from the Mangaung Correctional Centre, and related matters. Please be informed that, by law, you are required to answer fully and satisfactorily all the questions lawfully put to you, or to produce any documents that you are required to produce in connection with the subject matter of the inquiry, notwithstanding the fact that the answer or the document could incriminate you or expose you to criminal or civil proceedings or damages. You are, however, protected in that evidence given under oath or affirmation before a House or Committee may not be used against you in any court or place outside Parliament, except in criminal proceedings concerning a charge of perjury or a charge relating to the evidence or documents required in these proceedings. Please be aware that, in terms of section 17 (2) of the Powers, Privileges, and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act, a person who wilfully furnishes a House or Committee with information or makes a statement before it, which is false or misleading, commits an offence and is liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years. I would like the gentlemen before the Committee to please state their full names and designations for the record, this is for G4S.

Mr Groenewoud: My name is Jacobus Johannes Groenewoud, Director: BCC & G4S Care and Justice Services SA.

Mr Monyante: My name is Joseph Nqabisile Monyante, Head of Correctional Centre.  

Mr Beyleveld: My name is Gert Cornelius Beyleveld, Audit and Risk Director at Mangaung Correctional Facility.

Legal Advisor: I will begin with you, Mr Groenewoud. You are required to take an oath or affirm that the evidence you're about to give is truthful. You may choose to take the oath or affirmation which do you prefer?

Mr Groenewoud: The oath, please.

Legal Advisor: Please raise your right hand and repeat after me: “I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so Help me God.”

Mr Groenewoud: I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.

Legal Advisor: The Witness is duly sworn in.

Legal Advisor: Mr Monyante, you are required to take an oath or affirm that the evidence you are about to give is truthful. You may choose to take the oath or affirmation which do you prefer?

Mr Monyante: The oath.

Legal Advisor: Please raise your right hand and repeat after me: “I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.”

Mr Monyante: I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.

Legal Advisor: The Witness is duly sworn in.

Legal Advisor: Mr Beyleveld, you are required to take an oath or affirm that the evidence you are about to give is truthful. You may choose to take the oath or affirmation. Which do you prefer?

Mr Beyleveld: The oath.

Legal Advisor: Please raise your right hand and repeat after me: “I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.”

Mr Beyleveld: I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.

Legal Advisor: The Witness is duly sworn in. Thank you.

Chairperson: Thank you very much. We will now give this opportunity to G4S to make its presentations. But before you proceed, we were expecting this presentation latest yesterday, and up to now we did not receive the presentation, which is unfortunate because we must go through the presentation to prepare. You not giving us the presentation is making our work difficult, and I think it is common sense that you forward the presentation that you are going to make and give people sufficient time to go through the presentations. In your correspondence with us, you said that you would like to be summonsed after Good Friday, because you wanted to prepare yourselves, and we thought that part of that of preparation is to give us documents on time.

Mr Groenewoud: That is correct, Chair. I apologise for us submitting the documents late. We finished our preparation only around midnight last night. We did arrive early this morning to try and submit the documents to the Committee for consumption before this meeting, but we were unable to get the documents to the Committee. So, I apologise for that, Chair.

Chairperson: It does affect our oversight responsibility when we are not given time to go through documents to prepare, and we are doing this work on behalf of the people of South Africa. So, it is unacceptable.

Mr Groenewoud: I accept that. Our presentation, I believe, is brief and concise. We will take the Members through the presentation, I believe, within 40 minutes.

Chairperson: You can proceed.

Briefing by G4S and the Mangaung Correctional Facility

Mr Groenewoud: Thank you, Honourable Chair. Honourable Members of the Committee, good morning. My name is Cobus Groenewoud. I am the Director of G4S Care and Justice Services, and I am also the Director of BCC. Before I give my colleagues an opportunity to introduce themselves formally, allow me to thank you for sending us the summons that we asked for, and for making it possible for us to attend today. We have the greatest respect for this Committee and for its work, and we sincerely regret the inconvenience that we caused last week and for us not being available or possible to attend. Had we attended last week, we would have been legally barred, I think, for known reasons from acting and participating fully and sharing all information available to us with this Committee. Thanks to the summons, we are in that position today where we can participate fully, and we can answer all questions that you have, and Chair, we have participated fully from the outset with all investigating authorities. Chair, with your indulgence, I would like my two colleagues to introduce themselves to the Committee, this morning.

Mr Monyante: Thank you, Chair. Good morning, Chair and to the Honourable Members of the Committee. My name is Joseph Monyante, the Head of the Correctional Centre at Mangaung. My responsibility at the centre is to take care of the well-being of the inmates as well as the well-being of the employees that are employed in the centre and taking care of the facility itself. I have been serving in the corrections environment since 1987. And, in 2000, I joined G4S as one of the Unit Managers. Then, in 2014, I became the Director appointed in that centre. Thank you, Chair.

Mr Beyleveld: Morning, Chair. My name is Gert Beyleveld. I have got 46 years Correctional Services experience, 24 years in corrections, and currently 22 years with G4S. In my time in Corrections, I have served as the Auditor for the Free State province for a period of just over 10 years, and I am currently overseeing the contract at the centre as Director: Auditing and Risk. Thank you, Chair.

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Chair, Honourable Members of the Committee, our presentation today is split into a number of sections. Firstly, we have a section dealing with providing background to the Mangaung Correctional Facility. We also have a section dealing with the events on 03 May 2002, and I will ask Mr Monyante to deal with those slides. I will then take over from Mr Monyante, and I will deal with the three very distinct investigations that followed, conducted by various parties, including MCC. I will deal with the assistance that MCC gave the various parties. I will also make reference to the notice that we received from DCC dated 28 February 2023, and then I will make some concluding statements. That is the body of our presentation today.

Mr Monyante: Thank you, Chair. Like I said, my name is Joseph Monyante, the Head of the Correctional Centre at Mangaung. In that centre, there are 504 employees working in the centre. The Judicial Inspectorate is responsible for oversight over the centre. According to the annual report that we received, which was covering the period of 2021-2022, we learnt that the JICS evaluated and assessed 39 correctional centres. Out of the 39 correctional centres, seven of them were rated as good, and Mangaung Correctional Centre was amongst the seven. Within our centre, there are several independent and continuous monitoring by statutory and contractual compliance done by the DCS, which are represented by the controller and the deputy controller, as well as the five staff members of the controller that are on-site daily. There are also two officials from the Judicial Inspectorate that visit the Correctional Centre regularly. Both the controller and the Judicial Inspectorate officials have access to all parts of the centre and access to all information that is applicable in the centre. There is also a risk and audit function at MCC, where the operations and independency of the audit are also applicable to ensure that the centre complies with the set contractual standards. We learnt from the media about the contrary information that we are preventing the inmates to write. We want to assure the Committee that we do allow inmates to write to whatever body that they are allowed to write to. And to assist the inmates, we give them what we call the 'prepaid envelope’ that they request and then they can write to anybody that they want to write to. These bodies that they can write to include the Commission for Human Rights, which also visits the centre. I can also assure the Committee that, when we have family days – where we allow the family members to have an interaction with the inmates – we also invite the Human Rights representatives as well as the JICS representatives so that the inmates can have a platform where family members can raise concerns they may have. The centre also has unannounced visits from the High Courts by Judges, and the last visit that we received was on 12 October 2022. One of the remarks that were made by one of the Judges that visited the centre was really positive. In 2019, the South African Human Rights Commission recognised Mangaung Correctional Centre as the centre of excellence in ensuring the human dignity of the inmates. The infrastructure talks to this, where inmates can have access to all they are supposed to have as human beings. We have robust processes that are designed to prevent the escapes that might happen at MCC. In this regard, MCC has been one of the most secure correctional centres in South Africa. In a period of over 22 years, there have been two escape incidents from Mangaung, with the Thabo Bester incident being the second one and the first one being the inmate that escaped from the outside hospital when he went for medical attention. DCS reported 515 escaped inmates from South African correctional centres in the last 10 years.

Mr Monyante: On 30 April 2022, we received an application from inmate Bester, where he was requesting to be transferred to a single cell which we normally call Broadway, in one of the units at MCC. This request was his own request, as he was not sent there either for a disciplinary hearing or other circumstances. Procedurally, such applications are forwarded to the Office of the Controller which is a representative of DCS, and it was indeed approved accordingly, and inmate Bester was placed in cell 35. On 02 May 2022, at 19:30 in the evening, after the last roll count of the day, we can confirm that all the cells were locked in the night, including the cell of inmate Bester. At the same time, the Security Systems Technician went to central control to check whether all electronic systems were operational, and he confirmed them to be operational and functioning. In the central control room, we have two control officers or central control officers on duty, and their main function was to monitor camera footage to open doors and to manage the system. The next day, which was 03 May 2022, at 04:00 in the early hours of the morning, fire was discovered from cell 35, and it was extinguished by the MCC-trained personnel. After they distinguished the fire, that cell was cordoned off. And then from there, what we picked up is that MCC and DCS management that were called, as required by standard procedure. At 04:26, a nurse from the independent contractor on site called Life Faranani arrived to see what best they could do. Then, at 04:57, as picked up from the recordings, the DCS controller arrived. At 05:01, the MCC Operations Director arrived, and 10 minutes later, a doctor, who is also serving for the independent contractor, arrived and examined the body and then certified inmate Bester as dead.

Mr Monyante: On 03 May 2022, at 06:00, we also picked up the arrival of the area Commissioner as well as Duty Director. At 06:55, the SAPS arrived, and then at 10:30 during the day, the SAPS forensic team arrived. The SAPS completed its examination and took photos of the incident, and they removed the body to the state mortuary for the post-mortem. Once they completed their examination, they gave us a go-ahead that we can clean the cell and get the cell to be used again. After the body was removed, the MCC retrieved the deceased position for safekeeping in the administration building stores. Amongst the items that were found, was a laptop, which was authorised, as well as a cell phone which was not authorised to be in the possession of the inmate. That evening, at 19:30, when the final roll check was done, we can confirm that all the 2 928 inmates were accounted for. The next day, which was 04 May 2022, we received a notice of death for inmate Bester, where the pathologist certified the inmate with a certificate which was received from the Department of Health. On the same date, MCC administration staff raised concerns about a smell that they picked up from the position that the deceased was removed from in the cell, and then the MCC Operations Director informed the SAPS about the unusual petrol smell that was picked up from the from inmate Baster’s belongings. On 05 May 2022, based on the concerns raised by MCC, SAPS returned to MCC to inspect the position that the deceased was removed from as reported. On 06 May, the Department of Home Affairs then issued a death certificate for inmate Bester. Two days later, on 08 May, the SAPS forensics returned to MCC to collect the belongings recovered from cell 35, including the laptop as well as the cell phone. Chairperson, I will now hand over to Mr Groenewoud to continue with the presentation.

Mr Groenewoud: Thank you, honourable Chair. Mr Monyante has taken the Committee through some background regarding the Mangaung Correctional Centre, which has been in operation for almost 22 years and has also taken you through the events of 03 May 2022 and the days immediately thereafter. I would now like to turn to the three very separate investigations that followed the incident of 03 May. There was a criminal investigation launched by the South African Police Services. I think it is important to point out that, in the early days, this investigation took the form of a suicide. Then, from 25 May last year, the police changed this into a murder investigation. There was also an independent investigation into the unnatural cause. This is a standard procedure conducted by JICS. We, as MCC, then conducted the third and very independent investigation, which is a compliance investigation, and our compliance investigation commenced on that morning of 03 May 2022. Turning to the first investigation of the SAPS criminal investigation, I would like to say from the outset that MCC cooperated fully with the SAPS from the word go. On 03 May, as you heard, SAPS attended the scene to investigate what was then assumed to be a suicide. It was MCC who called the SAPS and made them aware of a petrol smell coming from the personal belongings of inmate Bester that had been moved, as you heard, for safekeeping, to the administrative block. This was done on 04 May. On 17 May, we requested a copy of the post-mortem report from SAPS, in writing. This was never provided to us, and that request was declined. On 25 May, SAPS informed us that they have now officially converted the investigation from a suicide into a homicide or rather into a murder, following the state autopsy report. On 02 June 2022, we provided SAPS with additional information that they had created, and on 14 January 2023, we understand that SAPS opened an investigation into an escape.

Mr Groenewoud: It is important to note that, prior to this date, we had received no formal communication from SAPS that they had now moved to do an investigation into an escape. This formed part of the SAPS documents that were produced for purposes of this Committee on 04 April 2023. Moving to the second investigation – this is the independent investigation into the unnatural death. Again, Honourable Chair, I would like to say that MCC cooperated with JICS throughout the process. We notified JICS on 09 May 2022 of the death. On 03 August, we produced to JICS our preliminary investigation report into the matter. On 19 October, we shared with JICS the available video footage. And on 02 February this year, we provided to JICS the MCC final investigation report. This report was handed over during a meeting between MCC and JICS. Honourable Chair, it is at this meeting that we as MCC were informed of the suspicion around the escape of inmate Baster. This is also the meeting at which MCC was shown the DNA report for the first time. Moving to the third investigation conducted by MCC – as I said, honourable Chair, we commenced this investigation on 03 May 2022. I want to point out that we do not, as MCC, have the authority nor the skills to conduct a criminal or a forensic investigation. This is in the purview of the other parties represented in the room today. We started this investigation on 03 May 2022. This was initiated by G4S Care and Justice Services. And, as I said, this is a compliance investigation. We had to analyse the actions of our staff leading up to the events of 03 May through that night and in the days that followed. We had to ensure and test our actions against the Correctional Services Act (our obligations in terms of that Act) and the contract that we have with BCC, which BCC in turn has with the Department of Correctional Services. Thirdly, we had to check the conduct against the very stringent policies and procedures that govern the management of the correctional facility.

Mr Groenewoud: Consistent with best practice, the Audit and Risk Director, Mr Beyleveld, who is independent of the centre director, Mr Monyante was assigned to lead the investigation. In conducting the investigation, we included interviews with staff members, and we considered registers, documents, and CCTV footage. DCS, through the members, present daily at the Correctional Centre, had full access to this evidence. And as you heard earlier on, we also shared this evidence with the South African Police Services. Evidence and reports, as you heard, were also shared with JICS. Honourable Chair, we made several notable findings through our investigation. The first finding was that the CCTV system was fully operational, except for the cameras covering the Broadway Unit where inmate Bester was held and the administrative building. The video cameras for these two buildings function off the same power circuit. It came to our attention that power to that circuit had failed during the period 19:38 on the evening of 02 May and 04:11 hours in the morning of 03 May. Other than this failure, there were no other power interruptions recorded at MCC during this time. Two central control room officials failed to follow clearly established MCC policies and procedures, and they did not monitor or report events in a timely manner. That was another notable finding. A further notable finding was that the on-site night duty supervisor, who was on duty from the evening of 02 May to the morning of 03 May, also failed to follow clear and well-established MCC policies and procedures. This person failed to complete his inspection rounds according to policy. This individual failed to attend to incidents on time. This individual directed staff to insignificant tasks. He ignored a call to attend to a report of smoke in Broadway cell 35, where inmate Bester was housed, and he failed to properly account for his movements and actions on the night of 02 May and the morning of 03 May. The last notable finding that we made, honourable Chair, was that there is distant video footage of two individuals running towards the administrative building in the early hours of that morning. The footage is distant because the cameras that I believe were better placed to record that movement were near the administrative building and the Broadway unit, but they were not working. We were unable to identify whether these two individuals were G4S staff members, Mangaung Prison officials, or whether they were inmates. We shared information as it became available to us. Video footage and information were shared with the DCS, SAPS and JICS. This information was shared from as early as May 2022 through to October 2022 to support them in their various investigations. Following the MCC investigation, we took three actions. Three employees were suspended shortly after the incident. I believe the first said suspension was as early as 06 May, and ultimately led to the dismissal of Mr Senohe Matsoara on 29 September 2022. Mr Matsoara was the on-site night duties supervisor between the evening of 02 May and the morning of 03 May on that date’s night shift. He was also arrested last week by the SAPS. We also reinforced physical access controls to the digital video recorder room where the recordings of these various cameras were to have been collated. We will be improving the latest Smart Lock technology to act to control, monitor, and audit access to this room. In addition, we have installed tamper-proof cameras following this event.

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Chair, I would now like to move to the cooperation that MCC provided to SAPS, followed by JICS, and then finally the DCS – in that order. On 03 May, the MCC, upon discovering the fire and what then appeared to be an attempted suicide, we called SAPS to the scene immediately. They arrived just before 07:00 in the morning, and the forensic team from SAPS arrived around 10:30. SAPS took control of the scene, completed their investigation, and took the necessary photographs. Once they had completed the investigation, they handed the cell back to us. SAPS gave no indication on that morning that anything other than a suicide appeared to be at play. As I mentioned before, the next morning on 04 May, staff in our administrative block noticed a smell of petrol – some accelerant coming from the personal belongings of inmate Bester that had been placed in that block for safekeeping to later be handed to his next of kin. We immediately advised SAPS of this issue. They attended the MCC via their forensic unit the next day, on 05 May. They concurred with us that there were traces of an accelerant present. On 08 May, SAPS returned to MCC, and they collected all the deceased’s possessions. They also again confirmed the presence of this accelerant. On 09 May, our MCC administrative staff handed to SAPS the State Mortuary Notification of Death Form that was dated 06 May 2022. Honourable Members, on 22 June, upon a formal request from SAPS, we provided the following information to them:

- Firstly, particulars and the duty list of all members who were on duty from 19:30 in the evening of 02 May until 07:30 in the morning of 03 May;
- We provided to them all available footage;
- We provided to them records of all visits to inmate Bester;
- We also provided details of inmate Bester’s belongings that we handed over to the next of kin.
- Details of the individuals who reported inmate Bester’s Death to the next of kin were also handed over to the SAPS;
- We gave them the MCC incident report of what transpired between 02 May and 03 May.

Mr Groenewoud: We gave our cooperation to JICS in the following manner:

- On 09 May 2022, we sent a Notification of Death Form to the office of the Inspecting Judge.
- On 03 August, we shared with JICS, the preliminary investigation report and supporting documentation.
- On 19 October, available footage was also shared with JICS.

Mr Groenewoud: Then there was the meeting of 02 February 2023, which I referred to earlier. This was the meeting between MCC and JICS, at which JICS mentioned to MCC that they had suspicions that inmate Bester had escaped. JICS also, at this meeting, showed us copies of the post-mortem report and the DNA analysis. This was a DNA analysis report that was issued on 01 July 2022. We were given access to that report on 02 February 2023. And then, at this meeting, we also shared with JICS our final investigation report. On 07 February, there was a follow-up meeting between MCC and JICS at the Bloemfontein offices of JICS at which the SAPS was not present. Then on 08 March, we received the JICS interim report.

Mr Groenewoud: Lastly, honourable Committee Members, in terms of our cooperation with the DCS, and a reminder here that there is a permanently stationed controller, deputy controller and five DCS staff members at the Mangaung Correctional Facility. We informed the DCS of the fire just after 04:05 in the morning, as I mentioned before, the DCS controller arrived at 04:57, and the area Commissioner arrived at 06:00 in the morning. We handled the incident, and we reported it in accordance with contractually stipulated procedures. Relevant documentation was completed in terms of legislation and contractual requirements. Two days later, on 05 May, all additional documents requested by the DCS controller were provided to the controller by MCC. In the months that followed, there was regular interaction between DCS via the controller and MCC. This culminated in the MCC delivering its final investigation report to the DCS on 30 March. Honourable Chair, allow me just to speak on the observation notice that we received from the DCS on 28 February of this year, before I conclude. Maybe just for the benefit of everyone – an observation notice is the official process through which the DCS escalates any perceived incidents of non-compliance to MCC. The observation notice that we received stated that, 10 months prior to the date of the observation notice, a vehicle had passed through the sally port, which is a vehicle gate that you pass from outside the secure part of the facility to the secure part of the facility without a gate boss. This incident happened on 29 April 2022. As I mentioned, we received the notification from the DCS on 28 February 2022. This observation notice was based by the DCS on an affidavit it had received from a G4S staff member around I believe it was mid-November of 2022. We immediately launched an investigation into the events cited in this observation notice. As I said, we were only made aware of this observation notice recently. For that reason, our investigation is still ongoing. And we will provide our response and our conclusions from our investigation to the DCS within the timeframes agreed with the DCS.

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Chair, I draw attention to this observation notice simply because the date of the incident is 29 February 2022, which predates the fire at Mangaung Correctional Centre by a few days. MCC immediately notified the SAPS on 04 May 2022 regarding concerns relating to the petrol smell; this is something of concern to us. We felt that this is not something normally associated with a suicide, and we immediately drew the attention of SAPS to this fact. From the outset and throughout, MCC and G4S have cooperated fully with the authorities. MCC and G4S also ensured that the authorities had full access to information. G4S acted immediately to investigate the incident, as I mentioned before our investigation started on the morning of the incident on 03 May 2022, and we moved quickly to suspend the employees who had not followed up very clear policies and procedures. The first suspension started on 06 June 2022. On that same day, we notified the DCS of the suspension. We also notify JICS of the suspension on 03 August 2022. Neither G4S nor MCC has made any findings or statements regarding the identity of the body, as this is the sole responsibility of the authorities. On 02 February 2023, G4S was informed by JICS of a possible escape. And as I mentioned, this was the first time that we were shown the DNA report, a report that was dated mid-2022. G4S and MCC welcome the opportunity to present to this Committee today. Honourable Chair, without a summons, as I mentioned at the start, we would have broken the law by sharing this information with you today. As Mr Monyante said during his presentation, MCC has been one of the most secure correctional centres in South Africa over the past 22 years. 01 July 2023 is the 22nd anniversary of the facility. It continues to be a well-run Correctional Centre as is reflected in the JICS reports and the other reports that have flowed from oversight entities. It operates under the daily presence of the JICS and DCS officials at the facility. Lastly, I would like to say, honourable Chair and Committee Members, we take this opportunity to express our deepest sympathy with the victims of Thabo Bester and with their families. Honourable Chair, thank you for your time.

Discussion

Chairperson: Thank you very much for the presentations. Honourable Members, as we have agreed, we are going to give each Member 30 minutes to interact with the presentations. If you have not concluded within 30 minutes and one Member of your party still has time for you, it can be credited to your time.

Ms A Ramolobeng (ANC): Thanks, Chair. Good morning to colleagues present, and we welcome G4S whom we expected in the last meeting without having to force them to be here. When they made a presentation, they indicated that they would have acted against the law by sharing this information that we have been presented with right now. So, they needed to be somewhat protected or given immunity of that information. I do not quite agree with that. You needed the immunity for something else, not for sharing the information that you just did. The information that you have given us is public knowledge by now. We did an unannounced visit last week and all that you have given us we had gotten it at that unannounced visit. In fact, some of the things that you would have spoken to contradict one another. The times you speak of are not consistent with each other. For me, it is pure lies. We have a legal representative here, who told you that there are consequences for lying to us. Chair, the report for me is a whitewash. G4S are exonerating themselves and in this report, there are several standard operational procedures that the centre must do that were not followed, which led to the escape. There are several security lapses in the process that are glaring and unaccounted for, in the report given to us. There seems to be no management oversight on the operations of the centre because the report does not speak on the processes that were followed after the escape. What is it that the management has done? What has been the oversight of the management throughout the process? He keeps on saying they have done a lot and provided authorities with information, but there is no accountability pointing out where they erred.

Chairperson: Sorry to interrupt you, Ms Ramolobeng. Perhaps you should ask questions and make observations when you are done with questions.

Ms Ramolobeng: Thanks, Chair. I just wanted to put it out there so that, when I raise questions, they are backed up by my comments because I do not want to make baseless remarks that are not informed by questions. I am saying this because I went to Mangaung, and that was my second visit to the centre. The centre manager took us through an official oversight. I know the facility has bed space of 2 928 in the centre. When we were there, there was also an indication that there were three escapes that had happened in the past when it was asked if the centre had any other escapes outside the Bester case. One of the cases was never traced or brought back. My question is, who are the people that escaped? Because it seems there is a trend of escapes, including the one that happened in December of someone that escaped from the hospital, who was then brought back. My reasoning for this is that it might be that the Bester issue would have gone out of hand because it is a high-profile case, and then the other cases are unknown because they are not high-profile. Were the other escapes reported, especially to the DCS or to the DCS controller, who is based in Mangaung? That is my first question, Chair.

Chairperson: Thank you. Your answer?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Chair, I'll ask Mr Beyleveld to provide the honourable member with details. There was an escape in 2003, then there was what we now know to be the inmate Bester escape of May 2022, and then there was also an incident from a health facility where an inmate was temporarily held for medical care in December 2022. But Mr Beyleveld can give the honourable Member further details.

Mr Beyleveld: Thank you, Honourable Member. I can just report that this, as requested, was reported to the Central Services controller on site, and it was investigated. In the case of 2003, we were found guilty by the supervisory committee, and a fine was posed on the contractor for that incident. The other two incidents are currently still pending, including the escapes from the hospital outside and the Thabo Bester case.

Ms Ramolobeng: Was the DCS controller based in Mangaung informed or was the DCS informed in totality of the two escapes?

Mr Beyleveld: The DCS controller was informed because he is the representative for the national commissioner at the centre. 

Ms Ramolobeng: Chair, they make mention that the fire broke at 04:00am in the morning and based on our visit when we went there and the footage that we saw, it says the fire broke at 2:30am, and at 02:59, it was reported that the fire broke. Which one is it?

Mr Beyleveld: There were two reports that night – the first was a report at 03:00, which reported that there was a fire. It was investigated by the supervisor, Mr Matsoara, and it formed part of the reason he was suspended and found guilty and dismissed, as he did not investigate that properly. At 04:00am is when the official incident happened and what led to the investigation, so that is why there is 04:00am on the document. There was an incident at 03:00 I confirm that, while the two officials that we refer to or two persons were viewed on the camera for a few seconds on the video footage that was shown to the Committee.

Ms Ramolobeng: Why are you not telling us that the fire broke between 02:30 and 02:59 in the report? Why are you only giving us four o'clock in the report?

Mr Beyleveld: Because that is the official time that the fire broke, honourable Member.

Ms Ramolobeng: But that is not the case. The CCTV footage says 02:59. It was reported. From your controller room, it was reported that the fire broke at 02:30 but you are saying the fire broke at 04:00. Why are you not saying to us that, at 04:00, in terms of your documentation and your administrative processes, this is when it was recorded? You are confirming that the fire broke at three o'clock, but you are writing to us here in black and white that it broke at four o'clock.

Mr Beyleveld: I can only say I am sorry that three o'clock is not included in the document. It was, however, included in our investigation. It was looked at and, as I have indicated, that gave the reasons why we acted against the employees.

Ms Ramolobeng: Okay, what happened to the two guys that were running across the building at 02:59? Where do you assume they ended up? And what happened afterwards? Did you try to trace them and see who they possibly could have been? Do you think one of them might have been Bester?

Mr Beyleveld: I cannot conclude that one of them was not Bester, as it was indicated that it was impossible to determine who the two people were because the video footage only showed a few seconds, and it was blurry. That is why we indicated that it is unknown, and we reported that to SAPS.

Ms Ramolobeng: There were two operators who were controlling the control room on the night of the fire. What happened to them? What was happening to them when the fire broke, because they were controlling the whole centre?

Mr Beyleveld: They were both investigated and found to be not in line with policies and procedures. Both of them were suspended and then afterwards dismissed, so they are not in the employ of the company anymore.

Ms Ramolobeng: When did the dismissal investigation start?

Mr Beyleveld: The investigation started on 03 May, and the suspension started on 06 June. And the operator was dismissed on 06 December 2022, and the other one on 31 January 2023.

Ms Ramolobeng: So, the investigation started on the 3rd and 6th of May. Am I correct?

Mr Beyleveld: The investigation started with affidavits having been taken on 03 May already on the day of the incident. Yes.

Ms Ramolobeng: And then the first suspension was when?

Mr Beyleveld: On 06 June 2022.

Ms Ramolobeng: When you started the investigation on 06 June, and got the autopsy report from SAPS, you might have been aware that this was an escape. In fact, you were aware that the body that burnt in the cell was not of Mr Bester.

Mr Beyleveld: I can confirm that we never received the autopsy report. The first time we received it was in the meeting with JICS as indicated in the presentation by my colleague.

Ms Ramolobeng: I want to ask this… Based on your contract with DCS or with the state, are you not in breach of it, especially with these escapes or in somehow withholding the information? Because, from my records and the unannounced visit we did, and from the investigations that you have carried out or you have done, they make a recollection that says, around June, when you started dismissing what suspending employees or officials that were working on the day of the incident, you had an idea that this was an escape, and you did not even inform authorities or the DCS. Therefore, you wanted to be summoned to this meeting so that you are protected with what you are going to say here for it not to be used against you outside. Is this why you wanted to be summoned to this meeting? Please do not bring the rhetoric of the legal issue you mentioned before.

Mr Groenewoud: We did not want to be summoned to seek immunity for fear of what we will say to this Committee. In terms of the Correctional Services Act and in terms of the contract that we have with BCC, and the contract BCC in turn has with the Department of Correctional Services, we are legally restricted from talking to any third party regarding the operations of the Mangaung facility. All information that we have regarding that facility must go to the ‘outside world’, for lack of a better word, through the DCS. And that is the sole reason why we sought a summons. The summons allows us to say to this Committee what we cannot say to anyone other than to DCS. We did not seek immunity for fear of saying something today that would incriminate ourselves.

Ms Ramolobeng: Okay, can I put it this bluntly? Do you agree there is a breach of contract between the DCS and G4S, with these escapes?

Mr Groenewoud: I do not know if it is a breach or not. I think that one would need to look at the contract. I think it is clear, as Mr Beyleveld and Mr Monyante said, that in 22 years of operations, we have had three incidences of escape. No incidents of escape should be condemned; these are serious matters.

Ms Ramolobeng: Chair, he is not answering me, I will pass on that because this is a breach. No matter how you put it in jargon, it is still a breach of contract between G4S and DCS. We are told that Thabo Bester applied for isolation that night for his own safety on the basis that he feared that he did not pay for the protection fee or whatever and needed to be taken away to isolation. This was done on 15 April 2022, two weeks before the actual day of the fire. He was on cell 16th Street two walls unit before he moved to segregation. Upon moving to segregation, his paperwork was still pending approval for him to be in segregation. He was automatically moved to cell 35. When he was taken to sell 35, there was an inmate already in that cell 35 who was moved for Thabo to be taken in. Who oversaw that process of approval? Why was Bester moved to cell 35 when he was supposed to be in holding cells waiting for approval to be taken into the cell?

Mr Groenewoud: I will ask Mr Beyleveld to answer the question in terms of the process that was applied. I just want to correct one date that you mentioned. Inmate Bester applied to be moved to Broadway on the 30th of April, and not as you suggested – on 15 April.

Ms Ramolobeng: Then it means that you officials of G4S and management are not speaking, because Mr Dondolo, who took us through the unannounced visit last week to Mangaung on Wednesday, told us that Thabo Bester applied on 15 April, and he was moved to isolation. And we were taken through that process. I speak on authority because I was there and I was taking notes. I normally use my phone for taking notes. It is unfortunate that you did not bring Mr Dondolo with you here, despite the fact that we asked last week that G4S bring Mr Dondolo to the meeting, so that he could corroborate what is said in the meeting to what was said during the unannounced visit.

Mr Groenewoud: Apologies, honourable Member. I thought that you mentioned that Mr Bester was moved to Broadway on 15 April. So, my apologies for that. You were referring to the date he was he applied to be moved?

Ms Ramolobeng: Yes, he applied on the 15th. Even when you moved him to segregation, his papers were pending approval. He was not approved, but he was moved. Why was he put in isolation whilst his papers were pending approval? Who authorised that?

Mr Beyleveld: There was two times that Mr Bester requested to be moved to Broadway segregation. The first time was on 15 April 2022, as mentioned by you correctly. But after two days, he cancelled his own safety application and went back to the unit. And then, on the 30th, he applied again to go back to Broadway.

Ms Ramolobeng: Was this planned? Because the sense we got when we were there is that cell 35 is normally not used because it is in blind spots, and cameras or video footage do not cover the area. We even did that walk and saw that one can come into isolation, take the stairs to cell 85, and the camera will not capture you because it is in the blind spot – even when you go out. The only person that knows where cell 35 is would be able to identify it on the CCTV.  Who authorised for him to be put in that blind spot? Why was the inmate that was in there moved for him to go in? Was it impossible for him to be allocated in an empty cell? Mr Dondolo mentioned that there was an inmate in cell 35 before Bester was moved there, so this implies that there was an orchestration of a plan for him to escape.

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, Mr Beyleveld can answer your question. But I want to state that there was an inmate in cell 35 on the morning of 02 May 2022. That inmate applied to be sent back to the normal part – the multi-accommodation part of the prison. That inmate applied on that day, and according with his wishes, he was reallocated. That inmate was not moved to accommodate inmate Bester in that area, or in that cell. That cell happened to become available on that day.

Ms Ramolobeng: So, you are saying the cell was empty when Bester was moved in?

Mr Groenewoud: An inmate was moved, to my knowledge, from that cell.

Ms Ramolobeng: I am asking, was the cell empty when Bester was moved in?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes.

Ms Ramolobeng: So, there was no one and the person that had applied to be moved was already moved?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes.

Ms Ramolobeng: This contradicts what your officials were saying. A person was moved on the actual day that Bester was brought in. So, what you are saying is a total contradiction.

Mr Groenewoud: No, it is not a contradiction, honourable Member. The question was whether the cell was empty when inmate Bester was moved into the cell. I can confirm it was because it is a single cell. Only one inmate can be housed there. What I added is that in that morning the person who was in that cell on the night of 01 May into 02 May applied to be moved out of Broadway. That inmate was moved, and that made cell 35 temporarily vacant on the day of 22 May.

Ms Ramolobeng: The day that Bester was moved in?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes.

Ms Ramolobeng: Coincidentally?

Mr Groenewoud: I cannot comment on the coincidence.

Ms Ramolobeng: No, it is fine. Chair, we equally found out through the report that the server or the switchboard for cameras, which can be tampered with by being switched off and on, ceased to operate at around 19:39, and they resumed operating at 04:10 in the morning. The incident started to happen between 02:30 and 03:00 in the morning and was not captured because the system was not working. Whilst we were there, there was an official from Integritron, who operates the server and switchboard for cameras, and he was able to show us that it is possible to tamper with the system not to work. In the reports, it shows that there was a person who was asked by officials to switch off the CCTV. From your view as G4S, after conducting the investigation, can you say that the system was tampered with for us to be able to lose 19:38pm up until 04:10am in the morning?

Mr Beyleveld: Honourable Member, on that question, I can only indicate that we are not technology specialists. Therefore, we requested Integritron to give us a proper report, as they are responsible for the system. According to the report that they gave us, there was a power failure due to the batteries of the UPS system that was not functioning properly. If somebody had tampered with that, they did not supply us with that information, so we had to work with a document that was submitted by the specialists on this.

Ms Ramolobeng: There was an inmate that wrote a letter to the President and the Minister seeking an audience on the event of the escape in detail, and we have an email coming from G4S officials stating that the letter must not be entertained. Why was the letter of that inmate withheld, and where is the inmate?

Mr Monyante: If one reads that email that was sent regarding this letter, the lady who responded to it was redirecting the complaint to say if that is the complaint, the inmate needed to use the prepaid envelope system so the complaint could be sent to the relevant party. She was not necessarily saying the letter must not go out.

Ms Ramolobeng: Why did she not reroute the letter seeing that the inmate did not use the prescribed standards for him to send that letter? Because that letter is from someone who was willing to come forth with evidence that this was not suicide, it is an escape. Why was the letter withheld? Whoever saw the letter had obviously read its contents. So, why did they keep it?

Mr Monyante: According to what we have learned regarding this letter, it had nothing to do with the Bester issue. The content of the letter, according to the information we received, was an inmate requesting to be provided with the footage of the use of planned force that was applied to him, and that request was denied. The sending of the letter was redirected to say the inmate should not use the means that he used and should rather use a prepaid envelope, which would be administered at the inmate information system office that would then send it to the relevant office.

Ms Ramolobeng: When did you learn of the escape? When did you realise that this was actually an escape?

Chairperson: Honourable Member, you have five minutes.

Ms Ramolobeng: When did you learn of the escape? When did you realise that this was an escape?

Mr Groenewoud: During the JICS meeting that I referred to, which was on 02 February this year, JICS mentioned to us that they suspected that inmate Bester had escaped. It is only in reading the SAPS papers prepared for purposes of this Committee, dated 04 April, that we saw that SAPS had, I believe, on 14 January, my date might be wrong, but it was somewhere in mid-January, opened a case of escape relating to inmate Bester.

Ms Ramolobeng: Why did you not ensure that all the units are covered with CCTVs and video? Why was cell 35 left in the blind spot, and especially the cells at the back?

Mr Monyante: According to our knowledge, the prison was designed and specified like that from the inception before it was even built.

Ms Ramolobeng: I will take my colleague’s time, Chair. I will take time from whomever of my colleagues does not finish their allocated time. I am trying to reroute my questions to see the ones they have answered, and I will come back with follow-ups. Thank you.

Chairperson: Thank you very much.

Mr R Dyantyi (ANC): I will leave some time so that she can get that back when I speak.

Chairperson: You have been credited with some time by Honourable Dyantyi but for the second round.

Mr X Nqola (ANC): Thank you very much, honourable Chair. I will plead with G4S not to answer my questions with apologies. Every report points out that the incident broke out at 03:00am, and you came here and spoke about 04:00am. How would you react to a statement that says you are a private company in a private-public partnership with the state that is dishonest and came and deliberately misled the people's Parliament? What would be your reaction to that?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, I would disagree with that statement. We have tabled all the facts available to us to the Committee. I can ask Mr Beyleveld to fill you in on the events of the fire because he investigated this and is much better briefed than what I am. But what I can say to you is that, when they were reports of smoke, they were ignored. And to our knowledge, the fire was detected at 04:00 on that morning.

Mr Nqola: So, you still maintain that the fire was detected at four o'clock?

Mr Groenewoud: There was smoke detected at three o'clock.

Mr Nqola: So, the fire started at half-past two, but your smoke detectors detected the fire at 04:00am? Is that what you are saying?

Mr Groenewoud: I have no knowledge, and I do not know what the source is that suggests that the fire started at 02:30.

Mr Nqola: Fire is an emergency. So, whatever system you put as an emergency system, reports an emergency immediately. You are saying fire breaks out at 02:30am, but your detectors detected it at 04:00am. Is that true? Is that the kind of honesty you want to bring to this Parliament and the people of South Africa?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, as I said before, I have no knowledge, and I have no proof that the fire started at 02:30.

Mr Nqola: Okay, fine. Was Bester moved to cell 35 on 28 April or on the 30th?

Mr Beyleveld: He was moved on the 30th.

Mr Nqola: The incident happened at 03:00am and was reported to the police at 06:11 in the morning. What were you doing with the corpse between these times? Are you forensic pathologists?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, Mr Beyleveld can take you through the events of that morning. But allow me to say that our first response was to extinguish the fire. Once the fire had been extinguished, and the door had to be open to extinguish the fire fully, the cell was cordoned off. And no one entered that cell to my knowledge, other than the nurse and the doctor who had to attend to the person until the police arrived. The scene, to my knowledge, was not contaminated until the police arrived. But I can say to you, the police were called immediately.

Mr Nqola: So, you mean you have no obligation of reporting to the police – a life-threatening emergency – while it is still happening? You wait until it calms down, then you can report it? Is that what you are saying on the record?

Mr Groenewoud: Not at all. The fire was detected, and the fire personnel were immediately dispatched to the cell, and the fire was put out. That was our immediate emergency – to put the fire out. The second emergency was to attend to the person in that cell.

Mr Nqola: What were you doing? What do you mean to “attend”?

Mr Groenewoud: To see whether the person was still alive and could be saved. Those two matters, in our view, took precedence. Only then was it important to call the police services. And perhaps Mr Beyleveld can confirm whether some of these actions took place concurrently. But our priority was to put out the fire for fear that it could spread. And the second priority was to attend to the person in that in that cell.

Chairperson: Sorry, Mr Nqola. I think you raise an important point, and I do not want us to pass without clarity on it. Honourable Nqola says that the fire broke out at 02:30, and your system by four o'clock had not picked it up. Would you not conclude that this is gross incompetency?

Mr Monyanti: I would like to highlight that, in the entire centre, we do not have any smoke detectors. We are heavily relying on human beings when they pick up unusual behaviours to report.

Mr Nqola: So, what does Mr Groenewoud mean when he says the smoke was detected at 04:00am if you have no smoke detectors?

Mr Monyante: What we are trying to say is that, based on the video recording that we have, seeing the time slots that appear on the screen that is where the times are quoted from, not necessarily to say we have a fire detector in all the sections. We do not have such in the prison.

Mr Nqola: Fine, Chair. We will attend to DCS to check if such kind of facilities do qualify to be in the PPP without a smoke detector. My second question is around what your security solutions expert says – that a man entered the server room around 19:38pm, on 02 April 2022. DVRs were reportedly not working until 04:11 in the morning, after you have detected them with the smoke. The security expert further says, when there is a malfunction in the DVRs, it automatically reports to the controls room operators. Was it reported? Who was working at the controls room in that night of the incident? Why did the DVRs not report the malfunction to the control room operators?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, Mr Beyleveld can tell you who was in the control room that evening. What I can say to you is that, of the three members that we suspended very soon after the incident, and of the three members that we dismissed for not following policies and procedures, two of them operated the control room that that night. Mr Beyleveld can give you the names of those individuals.

Mr Beyleveld: The one was a lady, Natasha Jansen. The other person was Frans Makotsa. Those are the two people that were working there. And just one clarification, Honourable Member, the system does not give you a report that the recordings are not working. I can confirm that. You can determine that by asking the question to Integritron who will be available to you as well.

Mr Nqola: Did you do a forensic investigation on what caused the fire? If the answer is yes, what were the findings of that forensic investigation? What caused the fire inside the prison cell?

Mr Groenewoud: No, we did not do a forensic investigation.

Mr Nqola: So, you do not know what caused the fire in the prison cell?

Mr Groenewoud: No, we do not.

Mr Nqola: Okay, leave it like that. You do not know what caused the fire in a prison cell that you are operating.

Mr Groenewoud: We suspected the accelerant.

Mr Nqola: No, we are not going to operate on suspicions. I am saying you do not know what caused the fire in a prison cell that you are operating.

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, I am trying to answer your question, with due respect.

Mr Nqola: No, you said you did not do any forensic investigation and that you do not know what caused the fire. What are you answering now?

Mr Groenewoud: I want to explain why we did not do a forensic investigation. As I said during my presentation, there were three very clear investigations that followed. I mentioned that MCC is not within our remit, and it is not within our skillset to perform a forensic investigation or pathological investigation or anything of that kind.

Mr Nqola: Thank you. You have covered that question. I want to ask you a very unpopular or popular question, and I want to plead with you to answer honestly. Thabo Bester gets convicted by a court of law. Amongst the crimes that he is convicted of are robbery with aggravating circumstances and other economic crimes. Are you a cash-in-transit company?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, I am here to answer truthfully. To your question..

Mr Nqola: No, just answer this one. Are you a cash-in-transit company?

Mr Groenewoud: G4S is a multinational group.

Mr Nqola: Including cash-in-transit?

Mr Groenewoud: Within that group, and particularly in South Africa, we do have a cash-in-transit and a cash-processingg business.

Mr Nqola: Thabo Bester is convicted and sentenced for robbery with aggravating circumstances. He was taken to a prison cell at a facility that is run by a cash-in-transit company. And later, there is an orchestration of a faked death in the same facility. I will submit my views about it in the Committee deliberations, not now.

Mr Nqola: Let us continue. You said that some of the things you found in the prison cell where the alleged offender died is a cell phone and a laptop. You said that the laptop was authorised. Reports across the world say Thabo Bester was running a multibillion company inside a prison cell. What was the laptop authorised to do in a cell? What was the purpose for the authorisation of a laptop inside a prison cell? What was the intention?

Mr Groenewoud: Inmates who formally registered students have the right. And I believe it is in terms of court cases that the DCS lost in 2015 and 2018 that they have the right if they are registered with a with a formal institution of learning to have access to a laptop. For that reason, inmate Bester had access to that laptop.

Chairperson: With which institution was he registered?

Mr Groenewoud: He was registered with Damelin.

Mr Nqola: Did the laptop belong to him, DCS or G4S?

Mr Monyante: Honourable Member, the laptop belonged to him.

Mr Nqola: Do our correctional centres provide personal laptops to offenders who are studying? You must understand that we talk from a point where we have travelled across the country going to correctional centres, where we found that there are laptops that are organised by DCS for their own students. Why did Thabo Bester have his personal laptop? How did it enter the prison facility?

Mr Groenewoud: I will ask Mr Monyanti to explain to you the controls that are put in place when a laptop is brought into the facility for use by an inmate to ensure that that laptop is used exclusively for study purposes.

Chairperson: But before you go there, I think the question was why that is so. Before you explain the security features, let us start with answering the first question.

Mr Monyante: Honourable Member, can I request you to repeat the first question?

Mr Nqola: You authorised the inmate to have a laptop inside their prison cell. What were the reasons behind that? And your colleague speaks about something related to education, and we are trying to tell him that we have visited prison cells where student inmates do not use their personal laptops but those of DCS or whoever is running the prison facility. Why was he especially given his personal laptop, which you may not know if he used that laptop to commit those crimes?

Mr Monyante: I can confirm that not only Bester was allowed to use his personal laptop.

Mr Nqola: No, let us talk about Bester. Let us leave the other inmates. Why was he allowed to have his personal laptop when you ran the risk of giving him a tool to commit crimes?

Mr Monyante: The reason is that he qualified based on the criteria that we have set to say that, before we can allocate a laptop to an inmate, there needs to be evidence that he has registered with an institution and that we are able to take note of the qualification in which he is studying in our prison. Therefore, those are the reasons that prompted us to allow Bester to be in possession of the laptop.

Mr Nqola: You took the inmate wherever he was serving his sentence to cell 35 in isolation. Is solitary confinement and segregation of inmates legal?

Mr Beyleveld: Section 30 of the Correctional Services Act stipulates that an inmate can apply for safety reasons to be kept in a single cell. In our case, that needs to be approved by the Department of Correctional Services person on site, and that was the case in Bester’s situation.

Mr Nqola: Was the cell segregation or solitary confinement?

Mr Beyleveld: No. It is called ‘own safety’.

Mr Nqola: Fine, let us go to the reasons. Part of the reasons you mentioned was that Thabo Bester could not pay is a protection fee to a 26 gang, which is something completely illegal within prison cells. But you approved an application based on illegal operations inside Correctional Centre. Does this not mean you approve of the illegal operations and gangsterism that are happening in those prison cells?

Mr Groenewoud: I will ask Mr Monyante to answer that, but I just want to clarify that I did not make the statement regarding the 26 gang during the session this morning.

Mr Monyante: It is not to say we are promoting gangsterism. The reasons that are provided to us by inmates. Even if we are of the view that the reason is not so legitimate, we cannot take a risk and deny the inmate such an opportunity because, if the inmate is of the view that his life is in danger, we need to be cautious and must take urgent steps. Inmates applying to be kept in single cells is a formal process that must be followed. There was nothing wrong with the administration and the placement of the inmate in that single cell.

Mr Nqola: So, you chose to isolate the inmate under threat and not deal with those who are threatening him?

Mr Monyante: Honourable Member, at that moment, we were dealing with the application from the inmate who feared that his life was in danger. Therefore, the Correctional Services Act gave us a direction for dealing with the application, which is why we followed section 30 of the Act.

Mr Nqola: What did you do to those who are alleged to be part of the 26 Gang inside the prison? Did you do anything about the people who threatened Thabo Bester?

Mr Monyante: At this moment I do not have that information.

Mr Nqola: You did nothing. The last issue I want to cover is that Mr Bester was taken to cell 35. Firstly, do you agree that cell 35 is in a blind spot from the cameras?

Mr Beyleveld: It is not a blind spot, but it is poorly seen on TV because the camera is a little bit far from that point.

Mr Nqola: That is a blind spot. How do you define a blind spot?

Mr Beyleveld: A blind spot is where you can see nothing.

Mr Nqola: Okay. Do you agree that cell 35 is next to an emergency exit?

Mr Beyleveld: I agree.

Mr Nqola: Why did you put Bester next to an emergency exit as though you anticipated that there is going to be an emergency?

Mr Beyleveld: During the placement of inmate Bester in that cell, there was no information available that indicated that a possible incident may happen. It is a proofed cell that is developed and built in accordance with the specifications received from the government on how the centre must be built. It was approved by the government in that situation and therefore the cell was used because it was available.

Mr Nqola: The question is whether it is a coincidence that you took Thabo Bester next to an emergency exit and that there was an emergency a day after he was moved and he escaped until he was caught in Tanzania.

Mr Beyleveld: In hindsight, it does look like a coincidence. But as informed during the incarceration during the movement of inmate Bester, there was no information available that could have led to anybody thinking that putting him in that cell would lead to the incident that happened on 02 and 03 May.

Mr Nqola: Chairperson, I will submit to the Committee that Thabo Bester was deliberately taken to a cell next to an emergency exit because the escape was carefully planned, but I will do that when the Committee deliberates for us to take the report to the National Assembly. Thabo Bester applied on 15 April 2022, and on 16 April 2022, he received a secret visit. Who is the person who visited Bester on that day?

Mr Groenewoud: Perhaps, honourable Chair, can I ask my colleagues? Mr Beyleveld, do you have knowledge of a visit regardless of the person on that day to inmate Bester?

Mr Beyleveld: I can confirm that his visit record showed no proof of visit on that specific day.

Mr Nqola: I will submit during the Committee deliberations that Bester had a secret visitor on 16 April 2022 and that G4S is dishonest. Thank you very much.

Chairperson: On the issue of the computer, what measures have you put in place to ensure that people who are using their private computers cannot use them for any other unlawful activities?

Mr Monyante: According to the direction of the ruling from the court, it says the laptops that are provided to inmates must not have a modem. So, the measures that we have put in place is that we need to have proof that indeed he has registered with the institution, which we can also confirm. After that, we do provide the laptops to the learner.

Chairperson: How many times do you check the laptops?

Mr Monyante: We do not physically check the laptops. But from our IT system office, they have a screen where they monitor the use of these laptops if the students are using their laptops in the school.

Chairperson: Thank you very much. Honourable Breytenbach.

Adv G Breytenbach (DA): Thank you, Chair. I would like to start off with a comment to G4S. You have provided us with a 21-page report which is largely exculpatory. In fact, it is completely exculpatory. It acknowledges no responsibility for this incident. You tell us how you have followed the correct processes that you should follow and how you have cooperated ex post facto with a variety of institutions which are questioned. That is what you tell us. You do not tell us what happened, how this happened, and what you have done about what happened. There is absolutely no indication in this report that G4S accept any responsibility for the fact that, until yesterday, there was a serial murderer and rapist on the run. Can you tell me why that is?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, as I mentioned, when it comes to the investigation of what happened that night, we could only investigate what happened under our control and what happened at the MCC that night. And I believe that we have done that investigation. We have determined who the people under our control and who did not comply with policies and procedures that evening that may have contributed to the escape. We suspended them and we dismissed them. Incidentally, they have taken their suspensions to the CCMA for review. So, they disagree with the decisions that we arrived at. But as far as the initial investigation around a suicide is concerned, we need to remind ourselves that was the initial fact that we had to deal with, and then later the murder investigation. As far as that is concerned, those are criminal and forensic matters that we do not have the skills nor the permission to investigate. Our obligation is to investigate internally, to deal with those individuals, and to pass that information to the Police Services so that they can take that information and use it in their investigations. I think, Honourable Member, with respect, it is harsh to say that we did nothing.

Adv Breytenbach: Harsh or not harsh, be that as it may, it is my view. You can like it, lump it – I do not really care. So, you are saying ‘we complied with protocols and procedures, and that is it. We stand back, and we have no further obligation here’? So, your job is merely to incarcerate people, and make sure that your bed count is full? Is that what you are telling me?

Mr Groenewoud: No, that is not what I am telling you.

Adv Breytenbach: It appears to be what you are telling me.

Mr Groenewoud: No. We investigated the actions of those under our control. We suspended them and we dismissed them.

Adv. Breytenbach: See, you aware of the fact that there is a view of DCS that you in fact suspended, fired and transferred a whole bunch of people, so that DCS could not get a hold of them, in fact, to the aid of the investigation. Have you got a comment on that?

Mr Groenewoud: I am not aware of those or perhaps my colleagues have knowledge of transfers.

Adv Breytenbach: Perhaps you or one of your colleagues can tell me who was investigated, who was suspended, who was fired and who was transferred, and why.

Mr Groenewoud: Mr Beyleveld can.

Adv Breytenbach: And I would have expected to find those details in this report. Not this whitewash, quite frankly. So, I would love to hear from you then, Mr Beyleveld. Can you help me?

Mr Beyleveld: Firstly, the night supervisor in charge Mr Senohe Matsoara was suspended and fired. Sorry, ‘dismissed’ – I am using the wrong word. Then, Natasha Jansen, the operator in the control room was suspended and dismissed. Dicks Makotsa, the person in the control room with Natasha that night, was also suspended and dismissed. No employees of ours are being transferred. Yes, we did indeed suspend these employees, but information can be made available to the Committee where the controller requested to see these people. He has given the times to us, and we have arranged with those people to come back to the centre to see the controller on-site for his investigation.

Adv Breytenbach: Do you do lifestyle audits on your employees?

Mr Monyante: We do not do any lifestyle audits.

Adv. Breytenbach: Why not?

Mr Monyante: We really do not have any reason to do the lifestyle audit on our employees.

Adv Breytenbach: I beg your pardon? You want to repeat that?

Mr Monyante: Yes, we do not see any reason to do lifestyle audits on our employees.

Adv Breytenbach: You employ people to look after hardened criminals. Your facility is a maximum-security facility, right? So, we are not looking at shoplifters, and you do not think it is necessary to do lifestyle audits on your staff?

Mr Monyante: Honourable member…

Adv Breytenbach: No, I am busy, and when I am done you will have an opportunity. And do not make the mistake of interrupting me again.

Mr Monyante: Sorry.

Adv Breytenbach: And you do not think it is necessary to do lifestyle audits on people who look after criminals like that, who have access to money, who are known for bribery and corruption. Are you saying your stuff is above that? And if you are saying so on what basis?

Mr Beyleveld: When employees are appointed at the centre, a full police investigation or a vetting process is done. That vetting report with other documentation is sent to the Department of Correctional Services who look at the documentation and training of the employees is conducted and then they are approved to operate within the Correctional Services Act as custodial officials.

Chairperson: Sorry, Honourable Breytenbach. But even a security clearance or a vetting has got a timeframe. You do it every five years. So, if I did that vetting 20 years ago, will it still apply now? Because that is what you are saying to the question asked by Honourable Breytenbach.

Mr Beyleveld: I could not speculate on that. The people from our HR department who deal directly with the employees are unfortunately not available, So, I will have to write that down and come back with an answer to Honourable Breytenbach on that one.

Adv Breytenbach: I presume the answer will be no. So, in this report, this document that you have provided that took you so long to prepare, that says nothing that is not in the public domain and for which you took you so long to prepare because we could only get it this morning since you only finished at around midnight last night.... Just incidentally, what were you doing for the previous year? If this is what you prepared until 12 o'clock last night? All this information must have been available on a computer somewhere, and all you had to do was print it. So, what took so long? I mean, just tell me that first.

Mr Groenewoud: We had to collate all the information, as it was not all available on a single laptop. We had to collate it from various sources. We had to analyse it and put the presentation together. We also wanted it independently vetted to ensure that everything contained in this report is factually correct.

Adv. Breytenbach: I see. You think you succeeded?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes, I think we have.

Adv. Breytenbach: So, I put it to you that my view is that you are evading responsibility here. You are ducking all the institutional and systemic issues that point to your own culpability in this matter. And the only things that you have included in this report or exculpatory. Attack if you do not agree.

Mr Groenewoud: I am sorry. English is my second language.

Adv Breytenbach: Do you want me to put it in Afrikaans?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes, please.

Adv Breytenbach: She translated what she had asked into Afrikaans.

Mr Groenewoud: I cannot agree with that statement that said we are not accepting any responsibility. We have disclosed that we have dismissed three members. We have made that information available to the police. The police, in the last few days, arrested one of them. And I would like to think that is based on the contribution that we have made. It is not for us to link those individuals to the ultimate crime. That is for the police services to do. So, I think I think it is incorrect to say that we did nothing and that we do not feel that we are culpable in this. Regarding your comment about us not warning the South African public, again, until 25 May 2022, we dealt with a suicide. On 25 May, a murder investigation was opened still pertaining to the individual who we found in that cell. The identity at that stage, as far as we were concerned, and based on knowledge available to us, was still that of Thabo Bester. And that remained the theme and the facts available, certainly to us until 02 February of this year, when JICS said they were investigating a possible escape. Until it became known to us that in the early months of this year, SAPS had opened an investigation into an escape. Until then, the facts that are now available to us with hindsight to judge our actions were not available to us at the time.

Adv. Breytenbach: I am glad you went there. Are you finished?

Mr Groenewoud: And, because of our contract with a DCS, we were not allowed to talk to the public and inform the public about a possible escape. We were not aware of any escape, and we did not have the right to talk to third parties about the activities of the Correctional Centre.

Adv Breytenbach: Okay, so because I only have a very short space of 30 minutes, and I could quite honestly be here for the next four or five days, I would like it if you could keep your answers brief, please. Thank you. So, I am glad you went to this issue of not knowing that it was an escape. Until very recently – I think just during this month – G4S was insisting that the body that was found in that cell was, in fact, Thabo Bester. That was your view, and it was articulated again to us on our visit last week. That is still your view. Regardless of the inconsistencies in the post-mortem report, and regardless of the practically irrefutable DNA evidence, G4S clung to this version – that the body was that of Thabo Bester. Why was that?

Mr Groenewoud: That was based on the information that was available to us. I was not at the briefing last week, so I do not know what was said. We asked for the pathology report, mid last year. We were not handed that report. It was only on 02 February this year that we were given a copy of the pathology report and the DNA report. Until then, at that stage, we had no evidence other than rumours that there had been an escape or that it was not Thabo Bester who had died in that in that cell.

Adv Breytenbach: I am sorry. Please let me interrupt you because I have already told you I do not have time. So, keep your answers brief. Why did G4S cling to the version that said that was Thabo Bester’s body that was found in that cell, even after it was very clear to everybody else in South Africa that it was not him? Just answer that question.

Mr Groenewoud: Because we were not the primary investigation authority, and we did not have access to the prime evidence.

Adv Breytenbach: And that is your answer?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes.

Adv Breytenbach: Wow, I wish we were in court. So, you have investigated and dismissed three people? Are you honestly sitting here this morning telling us that this escape of Hollywood proportions, about which some smart journalist is going to write a book and make a lot of money, was done with the assistance of three people? Is that what you are suggesting?

Mr Groenewoud: I am not suggesting that, honourable Member. I am saying that those are the individuals who did not follow policy and procedure.

Adv Breytenbach: That is just simply not possible. It must have been so many more. A simple walkthrough of your facility revealed that it had to be so many more. How can you honestly sit there this morning and tell not just me and the people in this room, but also the South African public, who have an absolute direct interest in this matter and have an interest in not having serial rapists and murderers running around the streets, and your job was to make sure that did not happen, a job you failed at miserably – do you honestly want to tell people that you think or that you are satisfied, or that the ambit of your investigation was satisfied after three people were suspended and fired? Really?

Mr Groenewoud: That is what we can say at this stage.

Adv Breytenbach: Good lord! Just tell me how would this propellant have gotten into the cell?

Mr Groenewoud: We do not know. We detected it and we alerted the police.

Adv Breytenbach: And where would the matches, the lighter or whatever it is that set it alight have come from?

Mr Groenewoud: I do not know.

Adv Breytenbach: You do not know, and you have done nothing to find out? Cell 35 has been traversed quite thoroughly by my colleagues, but you will agree with me that it is a massive confluence of coincidences that Bester was moved there to that cell on that particular date – right in the corner, where unless you are really paying attention, you will not see somebody walking up and down there. Because we looked and we did an experiment. We were able to see the person because we were watching him. If the controller was not paying 100% attention, maybe blowing their nose or whatever, they would not have seen it because it is the only cell that is so far away that you cannot see and it is right next to the fire escape. Can you tell me that that is a coincidence? Are you suggesting that that is a coincidence?

Mr Groenewoud: I have no information, Honourable Member, other than to regard that as a coincidence. What I am not ruling out is that certain members, together with Mr Bester, carefully planned this event. I am not ruling that out, but I have nothing tangible to present to you to say that this is anything other than a coincidence.

Adv Breytenbach: You have been investigating this for a year, and you have had the benefit of the JICS report, which is an excellent one. You have had the benefit of your interaction with DCS, and the benefit of the interaction with South African Police, but you tell me that, after a year and a bit later, the best you can say is you do not rule out the possibility that this was a well-planned monumentally logistical operation. I mean, I have a German shepherd puppy that can come to that conclusion. There is the arson – the setting alights of whoever that poor individual was in that cell. Then there is the corpse substitution. Who was that person in the cell? Where did that come from? Did he come from inside the prison, because then your headcount would not have matched? Did it come in from the outside? How? Did they walk in with him murdered in the prison? Did they come in dead? You cannot answer any of these questions.
 
Mr Groenewoud: We do not know.

Adv. Breytenbach: You do not know? A year and a bit later, you do not know.

Mr Groenewoud: We have provided all information pertaining to the movement of our personnel that evening to the SAPS, and it is for them to investigate based on our information,

Adv Breytenbach: I see. You have no responsibilities?

Mr Groenewoud: I am not saying we have no responsibilities. I am saying that we have investigated this matter to the extent possible.

Adv Breytenbach: You appear to be saying you have no responsibilities. You have done what you could, giving bits of papers to other people, and that is it, wash your hands?

Mr Groenewoud: Not at all.

Adv Breytenbach: Well, that is the impression you create, and I want to tell you, it is not good enough. It is impossible to believe that this whole operation could have taken place without the greasing of many palms. Where would that money have come from? Whose palms were greased? Which of your officials are living above their means? You do not know because you do not do lifestyle audits?

Mr Groenewoud: No, we do not.

Adv Breytenbach: I think you should.

Mr Groenewoud: We need to take that recommendation to heart, honourable Member.

Adv Breytenbach: How many G4S employees were on duty at that facility that night?

Mr Beyleveld: It was 23 people that were on duty.

Adv. Breytenbach: 23 people had to look the other way?

Mr Beyleveld: The investigation proved that the three people that were involved, who have been suspended… there were two people that were moved by the supervisor in charge and that formed part of his disciplinary offence. In hindsight, we now do realise that they were moved to be out of sight, and then the other people were inside units, making the viewing of that specific unit very limited.

Adv. Breytenbach: Just days prior to this incident, a vehicle made an unauthorised entry into the prison facility. Correct?

Mr Beyleveld: That is correct.

Adv Breytenbach: How come? Why?

Mr Beyleveld: That is currently being investigated. We were notified by the notice that my colleague referred to during the presentation, which we received on 28 February 2023.

Adv. Breytenbach: What precisely did you investigate for the past year? If you did not know that until February? What form did your investigation take?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, I think the timelines here should not be overlooked. The incident, as you pointed out, happened on 29 April 2022. It became known to the DCS through an affidavit filed by one of our employees in mid-November. The DCS made that information available to us for the first time, I believe, three and a half months later, on 28 February. And it is then that we started to investigate this matter. So, even though the incident happened 10 months ago, we have only had knowledge of this matter for a few weeks, and it is not that we have done nothing. We have commenced this investigation, and these investigations are very sensitive if you want to conduct them properly.

Adv. Breytenbach: Very sensitive if you want to conduct improperly? I know a thing or two about investigations.

Mr Groenewoud: Secondly, the incident book where it was recorded that the vehicle had entered and eight minutes later had left the facility suggests nothing untoward with that entry. So, by any independent party, looking at that log, they would not have detected anything untoward as far as that vehicle’s entry and exit are concerned.

Adv. Breytenbach: So, your system is deficient. There are no checks and balances. It does not pick up this kind of thing. This can go undetected for a year and there could have been many more such entries and exits. Who would know? So, clearly, your system is not failproof. Your staff did not report it, for some odd reason. How many people were on duty at the gate? One?

Mr Beyleveld: It was one on duty, honourable Member. Yes, correct.

Adv. Breytenbach: And how did the vehicle get in without authorisation?

Mr Beyleveld: The process will reveal it, but I can confirm that we suspended seven people pending this investigation on the involvement on that specific incident.

Adv. Breytenbach: You have had six weeks? So how far have you got with your investigation? Tell us; that is what you are here to do.

Mr Beyleveld: We have taken most of the affidavits. There was one affidavit that was still pending on an employee that was not available, and the investigator will deal with that. And then, unfortunately, the investigator that is investigating that had an operation and was out of contact for a week. Thank you.

Adv Breytenbach: So, the vehicle that came in it was bringing in what – a kist, box or quasi coffin? You agree with me? I presume the investigations, at least reveal that?

Mr Beyleveld: Yes, it was a TV stand cabinet.

Adv Breytenbach: A TV stand cabinet? Okay. And where did that TV stand cabinet go to?

Mr Beyleveld: It went into the skills development area. And, according to the people that are currently being investigated, the stand was brought in by the supervisor that has been dismissed. It came in for rectification purposes.

Adv Breytenbach: To be repaired? Was it repaired? Do you know?

Mr Beyleveld: No, it was not repaired.

Adv Breytenbach: And that did not raise a red flag because anybody? A large wooden box comes into the prison, in contravention of all the protocols, for repair and does not get repaired. Did that not bother anyone?

Mr Beyleveld: I cannot answer on that at this stage. As I said, I will be able to answer that when the investigation has been finalised.

Adv Breytenbach: Could a corpse have fitted into that TV stand?

Mr Beyleveld: I think so. Yeah.

Adv Breytenbach: And it was not searched? It was not inspected?

Mr Beyleveld: That is one of the reasons why the employee that was working there has been suspended. He did not do his work properly.

Adv Breytenbach: Yeah, but it is a year later. A bit sad, that? So, your cell depots have all these fancy mirrors and lights and cameras and whatever. Nobody noticed on any of the cameras that thing had come in and was not inspected?

Mr Beyleveld: Honourable Member, once again, the investigation is currently pending, but the people that were working in the CCR room that had to monitor this are also currently suspended because they did not report it.

Adv Breytenbach: So, the list of those whose palms were greased is getting longer; it is not just three people. We are standing at around 10, is that right?

Mr Beyleveld: We are currently there, but remember that we are still busy with the investigation.

Adv Breytenbach: I have no doubt that the numbers will increase.

Mr Beyleveld: It may be that, from the seven, some of them can come back to work because you suspend to ensure that you can conduct a proper investigation without the interference of people.

Chairperson: Honourable Breytenbach, you are left with four minutes – unless you can speak nicely to Honourable Nqola.

Adv Breytenbach: Honourable Horn is still struggling with his car battery, so I will take his 30 minutes. Oh, there he is. I have just told them that I have taken your time. So, you can come in and settle down.

Adv Breytenbach: So, it comes into the room for the inspection, no inspection takes place – all these fancy mirrorless cameras and wonderful stuff, to no avail, because it is not failproof. And there is no backup? There is no way to check and the system fails again. Do you agree?

Mr Groenewoud: The camera would not have detected whether the vehicle passed without a gate pass.

Adv Breytenbach: The question is simple – would the camera have detected that it was not inspected?

Mr Groenewoud: Correct.

Adv Breytenbach: But that was not detected.

Mr Groenewoud: It was detected by people in the control room. It was not reported on. For that reason, those individuals have been suspended, pending the investigation.

Adv Breytenbach: So again, the system failed?

Mr Groenewoud: You can say so. A system is only as good as the segregation of-

Adv Breytenbach: A system is only as good as the people who run it. I agree with you. But if you are running a maximum-security prison and you are under contract to keep the South African public safe, they expect you to have a backup. And they will expect it to work better than it did, because it did not work, and you would agree with me.

Mr Groenewoud: That is a fair comment.

Adv Breytenbach: And what about this fight that broke out elsewhere in the prison where people were called away to so that only one person had to authorise the passing of this vehicle?

Chairperson: Honourable Breytenbach, you are now on honourable Horn’s time.

Adv Breytenbach: That is fine, he has donated it to me.

Mr Beyleveld: The information is correct. It is currently part of our investigation to ensure that all possible steps are being taken to rectify if policies and procedures were breached, and to take action in that regard.

Adv Breytenbach: Mr Beyleveld, I do not understand how this information could only be valuable now. This happened over a year ago, and now suddenly in these last six weeks there is this big flurry of investigations. This cannot be news to you. G4S could not have lived in blissful ignorance of all these systemic failures until February this year. I just I do not believe you. Is that what you are telling me – you operated in blissful ignorance, failure, after failure after failure? As long as you handed over your forms to everybody and you have washed your hands off this matter, everything is just fine?

Mr Beyleveld: I cannot agree. We run a very good prison. We have run a very good facility with security, over the years. Our track record explains for itself. This unfortunate incident is the result of non-reporting, and because it was not reported and misused, we are currently investigating and taking actions to get this right and to sort it out. Thank you.

Adv Breytenbach: So, the little box came in, and it was perfectly capable of containing a corpse and just stayed there until after the escape. When did the box leave the facility?

Mr Beyleveld: I had it removed during the investigation to a secure place.

Adv Breytenbach: When?

Mr Beyleveld: I cannot exactly tell the date now. It was a few days after the notice of the controller was received informing us of the incident.

Adv Breytenbach: So, that should have been in February sometime.

Mr Beyleveld: No, early March because we only received the document on 28 February from the controller's office.

Adv Breytenbach: So, that box has been standing at the prison for a year, with no repair work done, no questions asked, and now you have had it moved to a safe place? Is that correct?

Mr Beyleveld: That is correct.

Adv Breytenbach: And has the box been examined? Has it been forensically examined?

Mr Beyleveld: We have reported to the SAPS and that is what we did because they are doing a criminal investigation on it.

Adv Breytenbach: I accept that you have no facility to do forensic examinations, but has the box been forensically examined? Have the police come and examined the box? This is an important piece of evidence?

Mr Beyleveld: They came over the weekend on Saturday. They were at the centre to have a view of the box and to take the box away.

Adv Breytenbach: They have taken the box away?

Mr Beyleveld: That was all I was informed. Unfortunately, I was not on-site at that point.
           
Adv Breytenbach: So, one can only hope that the police are doing some sort of forensic investigation of the box without contaminating it, similar to the forensic investigation of the house vacated by Bester a year later? So, you say you have no record of Bester being visited on the 16th?

Mr Beyleveld: The record that was presented to me on our inmate information system does not provide a record that he was visited on the 16th.

Adv Breytenbach: Is it possible that the system is incorrect?

Mr Beyleveld: I cannot guess on that.

Adv Breytenbach: I see. But bearing in mind that the system has been incorrect on so many other things, I suppose it could be. Is it possible to get a visit that is not recorded?

Mr Monyante: For the data to be captured on the system, we are heavily relying on human beings. Therefore, there is also a possibility that, if that visit happened, we were relying on our employees to capture that data. So, if the visit happened and the data is not captured, it cannot be a system problem. It should be a human being error or intentions not to capture that data.

Mr Groenewoud: We keep video footage for only seven days, so it is not possible for us to go back to the date that you mentioned.

Adv Breytenbach: I understand that system, but I assume that and when something happens – like a fire in a cell – you keep that video footage.

Mr Groenewoud: Correct.

Adv Breytenbach: Unfortunately, in this case, it was not – coincidentally.

Mr Groenewoud: Of those cameras on that suite, that is correct.

Adv Breytenbach: Yes, just for that short period of time. It worked until the evening and then started working again later in the morning? It did not work just for that little slot? Would you agree with me that that is not a coincidence?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes, that coincidence is strange.

Adv Breytenbach: It must stretch even your imagination, right?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes, it does.

Adv Breytenbach: So now, assuming the body came in in the box and was transferred to the cell – how would it get transferred to the cell unnoticed and undetected?

Mr Beyleveld: If the body was moved, it is currently not clear to us how the body was moved. And that will from part of the criminal investigation by SAPS. As we indicated before, we did a proper investigation on all the policies and procedures that had to be followed. Where these were not followed, we took action to ensure that the people responsible are held liable.

Adv Breytenbach: Here is the problem, Mr Beyleveld. Every time you respond to a question, you add that bit at the end to say that it is not really your responsibility. Nothing here is your responsibility. Every time there is this little exculpatory phrase about ‘we have done this, we have done that, we have reported’. You say ‘who sir, me sir, no sir’. It is wearing a bit thin. So, maybe you do not want to do that. So, you say ‘if the body was moved’. Well, it must have been moved, because it got into the cell. Are you suggesting that somebody walked in there, got murdered in the cell and then got set alight?

Mr Beyleveld: No, Honourable Member. I suggested no such thing. I have indicated what is available to my information and answered to the best of my ability to the Committee.

Adv Breytenbach: Okay, then how did Bester get out? Assuming you agree with me now that Bester got out, because until a few days ago, it was your position that it was him in it that cell. So, let us assume you agree with me now that Bester got out. How did he get out? With all those checks and balances, how did he get out?

Mr Beyleveld: I will pre-empt that is part of the SAPS investigation to say how he got out. I do not think that is my purpose now; the SAPS is doing the criminal investigation. And I know you said I keep on passing the buck. Unfortunately, that is how it operates. The SAPS are conducting the criminal investigation, and we do a due diligence investigation into the operations.

Adv Breytenbach: You do not think that it is part of your responsibility to determine how a murderer and a serial rapist walked out of your prison? That is somebody else's responsibility? Get real! You honestly think that is the answer to the question? It is not your responsibility?

Mr Beyleveld: Our responsibility is to assist the SAPS in every single way that we can, providing all information, and everything that we have, to the SAPS to assist them to do a proper criminal investigation into the situation.

Adv Breytenbach: It appears to me that the things that you do have are not helpful. It is the things that you do not have, that are the issue here, but I will leave that be. You say that Bester had a laptop, and no control is exercised over the use thereof?

Mr Monyante: Honourable Member, I responded when that question was asked to say that our IT office on site has linked the computers of the inmates to their system. So, when the inmates are plugged, they can monitor their use of the laptops. The inmates cannot send documents to anywhere if they do not make use of our computer centre. Our understanding is that those laptops do not have modems. So, once a laptop is plugged, in order to have access to send documents to institutions, it reflects on the screen of our IT office, and they can pick up when a particular inmate is using the system and then they can trace the website.

Adv. Breytenbach: I see. Do they check what they do?

Mr Monyante: I can confirm that because it was quite interesting for me to learn that they do spot checks on what the inmates are doing on the laptops.

Adv Breytenbach: Have you read reports about Bester running a business from his prison cell and appearing on all types of fancy glitzy shows? And this was not picked up in any of the spot checks?

Mr Monyante: I can say I have seen those media reports, but from what I have learned from the investigation, we did not pick up anything to confirm that what the media was saying is true or that it happened at MCC. I cannot commit myself to that.

Adv Breytenbach: There seem to be a lot of things that you cannot commit to. When the laptop comes in, do you check it? Is it inspected? If so, by whom?

Mr Monyante: The laptops are being checked even if they are not opened, because most of them are brand new and they still have the warranties.

Adv Breytenbach: So, you do not really check them?

Mr Monyante: No, they are checked. But I think the IT office would have explained the extent much better.

Adv. Breytenbach: Do you not know that? I mean, is it not something that you should know?

Mr Monyante: No, I know to say that they are checked.

Adv Breytenbach: Yeah, but you do not know how. So, do they just glance at the laptop and then they are done?

Mr Monyante: They are checked.

Adv Breytenbach: If they do not open them, how do they check them?

Mr Monyante: I do not know how to explain it.

Adv Breytenbach: Okay. Mr Horn, would you like some of your time?

Chairperson: Honourable Breytenbach, are you done?

Adv Breytenbach: No, Mr Horn wants to use some of his own time.

Chairperson: He was the last one, so he will be number nine.

Adv Breytenbach: Okay, fine. Whatever I have not used of his will be his. Thank you.

Chairperson: Honourable Engelbrecht.

Mr J Engelbrecht (DA): Thank you, Mr. Chair. Gentleman, in your report, and through the interactions that we had up to now, you stated that firstly you cooperated with DCS, SAPS, and JICS fully. And it also became clear that you said that you only found out on 02 February 2023 that the body in the cell was in fact not that of Bester. So, I just want to know, in a report that we received from JICS, it is stated there that, on 11 August 2022, the body found in the cell does not appear to be that of inmate Bester. That was 11 August 2022. Now, do you want to tell me or just provide clarity that, from 11 August 2022 until 02 February 2023, in all the interactions that you had with JICS, DCS and SAPS, that you were not made aware or that information was not shared with you up until 02 February 2023 – that the person that passed away in Bester’s cell was in fact not Bester?

Mr Groenewoud: No, we did not say that we were not aware. There was a lot of speculation going around at the time as to the identity of the body that was found in the cell. What we did say is that it is only on 02 February 2023 that we were given evidence by way of the DNA report and the pathology report to confirm these rumours.

Mr Engelbrecht: So, just a short follow-up on that one. So, what you are saying is that even if the inspecting judge or his representative or someone from the Department of Correctional Services or the South African Police Service, spoke to you and told you that they believe that the person who died was not in fact Bester, it would have meant nothing to you until you received a DNA report, and only then, you would have acted upon such information?

Mr Groenewoud: It was not up to us to act. We waited for this proof as confirmation of the fact that the person in that cell was not inmate Bester. We acted prior to that by doing our internal investigation and exhausting all information available to us to arrive at a conclusion as to what happened that evening. As far as the criminal investigation is concerned, other than providing the information available to us, we were not able to continue with the criminal investigation.

Mr Engelbrecht: About this missing video footage, in your report that you sent to us you said that the camera systems were working. Incident summary, 02 May 2022, 19:30, security systems technician confirmed security system is operational. I am not going to ask a question about the security system; it is just the lead-on. So, between 11 August and 02 February, when you became aware or that someone mentioned to you that they do not believe that the dead body was to Bester, and with everything that transpired with the cameras that were turned away and certain cameras that were switched off and not working, as well as footage that was not available and the very suspicious way that the vehicle entered the facility, the fire, which is a very serious incident – do you think that it would have probably been the correct thing for your company to check due diligence and whether all your systems are operational? It is very clear that a crime has been committed in a facility managed by yourself, where none other than people employed by you were involved. It is clear and indisputable, in answering up to this point, you stated that ‘yes, well, we entered it to the SAPS, and we told JICS and the DCS about it.’ Was there nothing done from your side, because there is obviously a big problem with your system and the security at that facility? And my question, and I am sure from any member of the public, is that, if this could have happened at the Mangaung centre, what else could have happened there? We need to acknowledge the good journalist from GroundUp because I am sure that, if he did not break the story, none of us sitting in this side would have been wiser about what transpired here. Only after the story broke everything seemed to start happening. From your side as well, if I look at your timeline, things started happening after the story broke. I just want to know, did you do a diligence check? Did you investigate, not in terms of covering your backsides in terms of the contract that you might lose but in terms of doing your job, making sure that the prisoners that are incarcerated in your facility are not able to escape from that facility?

Mr Groenewoud: The security system is managed by Integritron. I believe that there was a last-minute summons to them to come and report what they found to this Committee. I can say that, at 19:30, on the evening of the 2nd of May, in terms of standard protocol Integritron reported to us that the cameras were in a working condition. Subsequently, and I believe Mr Beyleveld can help me here, but I believe it was on 04 May, we immediately contacted Integritron to find out why the system failed during the hours mentioned in our report. We acted on that the very next day. As to your comment around the vehicle, again, I must emphasise the timelines here. We were made available only on 28 February 2023, by the DCS, of this incident.

Mr Engelbrecht: So, when Bester was moved to a single cell, in terms of the system, only a controller, who is a DCS official can allow that to happen. And by law, when an inmate is moved from a cellblock to isolation, you must inform JICS about that move. Was that done when Mr Bester was moved to Broadway?

Mr Beyleveld: Yes, the security system did not provide us with the video footage. We investigated and found that the person from Integritron, in accordance with our processes, did follow up on whether the systems were working or not. On 03 May, when we wanted to view the video footage of the incident and that was not available, they were immediately contacted and requested to assist us in a report on what happened and the reasons for this. That was regarding the report. The second question was whether JICS was informed. This incident happened on a Friday night; it was over a long weekend. So, the incident started on the Friday night with him being moved to Broadway. Approval had been received from the controller later that afternoon, to move the inmate into the cell. And the documentation informing JICS had been sent by the controller's office because they are the reliable people on the site and our correspondence to the JICS information. The incident occurred before they could have been informed of this removal of the inmate over the weekend.

Mr Engelbrecht: Let us come to the computer that was mentioned previously. You do know that, if you have a laptop and you have a cell phone, you do not need any other connection; you can connect to the internet? Because to pull off an operation like this, you need extensive planning to happen, and obviously, if you know that you are being monitored, you are not going to make use of the facility’s internet. When did you realise that there was a cell phone in Bester’s possession?

Mr Beyleveld: The cell phone was found after the SAPS gave the cell back or released the cell to us. After the body of the person that was in the cell was removed to the mortuary. It was then when the items in the cell were taken to be put in a box and into a black bag that the cell phone was found.

Mr Engelbrecht: When you are moved from one cell block to isolation, all your personal belongings need to be moved? Are those personal belongings checked before you enter your isolation cell?

Mr Beyleveld: You need to be searched, honourable Member. Yes. The employee that did not do that searching and was charged and received 12 months written warning on this case for not searching the inmate when he moved from one cell to another cell.

Mr Engelbrecht: I must note that a lot of things seem to not have happened the way that they should have happened, particularly when it comes to this inmate – from the time that he was incarcerated to the secret visits he received, and everything up to the time that he walked out of your facility without being noticed for months. When a serious incident occurs, a headcount must be done, and there is a very specific way that the headcount is done. It is not that ‘call a name and stick up your hand’. There is a piece of paper with your photograph on and you do a thumbprint to check. After this incident, a headcount was done, apparently, and everyone was accounted for. Was that procedure followed where you checked the thumbprint with the document of each inmate in that facility?

Mr Monyante: I can confirm it was not done the way the Honourable member is explaining it to be done.

Mr Engelbrecht: Was it not supposed to be done, or have the regulations changed in the meantime?

Mr Monyante: The procedure that we are doing to account for the inmates… since they are kept in about eight sections in that facility, the six units, the one unit in the hospital and the one unit which we call Broadway, where the incident took place – individually, those departments send their physical roll counts to a central control room where the whole calculation is done. If the numbers do tally, which is supposed to be 2 928, we take that all the inmates have been accounted for.

Mr Engelbrecht: Can you please tell me, from all the people that you have in your employ at Mangaung Correctional Centre, how many of your employees or either children or direct family members of Department of Correctional Services officials? If you know the answer, who are they, and to which DCS officials are they related?

Mr Monyante: I can confirm that we do have employees that are related to some of the DCS officials, although some of the DCS officials that I think of are no longer in the service of DCS.

Mr Engelbrecht: It would have been nice if we could have received that information when we requested it.

Chairperson: Honourable Engelbrecht, do you not think that it will still be important that the information is submitted?

Mr Engelbrecht: Yes, yes, of course. I would like to see that very much, Mr Chair.

Chairperson: Maybe we should give you (G4S) seven days to submit that information.

Mr Monyante: We took note of that, and we are committing that we will submit such information.

Mr Engelbrecht: Also, add the other information that we requested about every single programme that you offer at the facility, who is contracted, who is involved, what exactly they do, how long it takes, and what it costs. Lastly, I saw on social media that a journalist named Ruth Hopkins wrote an investigative journalistic piece on the Mangaung facility claiming that there were seven escapes that took place in that facility of which four were not reported. This is claimed by her. So, has this ever been investigated? Or are you not aware of Ms Hopkins’ expose on G4S Mangaung?

Mr Groenewoud: Maybe I can answer that question and then, specific to the escapes, my colleagues can address you on that. We are aware of all the allegations made by Ruth Hopkins. They were investigated, to my knowledge, by JICS and by the DCS at the time. No matters that raised any concern were brought to our attention. To my knowledge, we also received no observation notices in respect of the allegations that she had raised. I cannot comment on recent social media posts because I am not aware of those. As far as the additional escapes are concerned other than those that we have informed this Committee on, I need to defer to my colleagues.

Mr Engelbrecht: I have one more question. It entails the entering of the vehicle from outside the facility and the sally port. Nobody knows what happened there because the footage does not exist. But apparently, this body had to be taken to a holding area, which was a workshop or still is a workshop. When I was there last week, when you exit the sally port, it is to your right, and then there is a workshop right there. Now, according to the regulations, EST officials are not allowed to enter the workshop. There are also no cameras installed within the workshop. Now, if you think about a box or a wooden casket or something that contains a body, it is quite heavy. During our visit last week, I was told that the EST officials that worked on the day right there insisted to get to offload this box into the workshop. And then from there, obviously, nobody knows how that body was then transported or taken up the stairs into cell 35 and set alight, but that is another issue that I think was dealt with. I just want to know if any investigation has been done about the EST officials that were on duty on that day because they must have assisted offloading the dead body in a wooden box from the vehicle that entered the facility illegally to get the body into the holding area – the workshop that is not so very far away from Broadway.

Mr Beyleveld: Yes, I can confirm that there are two EST persons currently at the centre being investigated, pending this investigation because of their involvement on that specific day.

Chairperson: Honourable Engelbrecht, regrettably, your time is up.

Mr Engelbrecht: Thank you, Chair.

Chairperson: The last questions will come from Honourable Maseko-Jele before we adjourn for lunch. And then after lunch, it will be Honourable Dyantyi, Honourable Yako, Honourable Swart, and the last one will be honourable Horn.

Ms Y Yako (EFF): Order, Chair. I was number five on the list, so it is my turn to speak now. So, I will ask honourable Maseko-Jele to kindly allow me the space speak.

Chairperson: Okay, my apologies Honourable Yako, you may proceed.

Ms Yako: Thank you very much, Chairperson. I wanted to speak to the fact that I think that Mr Groenewoud, Mr Monyante, and Mr Beyleveld did caucus before coming here with G4S, and the caucused prior when everything started blowing up the quickest, and they decided that they would-

There was no audio throughout Ms Yako’s interaction with the witnesses.

The Chairperson then called for a recess, with the meeting scheduled to reconvene at 13:20.

Chairperson: Let us proceed. Honourable Yako.

Ms Yako: Thank you, Chairperson. I do not know what is happening with the sound, but I will proceed. Mr Beyleveld said that the prisoner on Star 35 was moved because he revoked his lack of safety. Is that correct?

Mr Beyleveld: That is correct.

Ms Yako: Do we have it on file that you revoked it? Do they write a statement saying ‘I hereby revoke my right’?

Mr Beyleveld: He indicated to the unit person in charge that he wanted to revoke section 30 incarceration in the cell, yes.

Ms Yako: I think the reason we are asking these questions is to see if there is a timeline that is specific in terms of black and white. Do they write a specific report saying ‘I, Yoliswa Yako, hereby feel that I am now safe’ and then sign?

Mr Monyante: Yes, that is correct. They do write on the ‘complaints and requests’ indicating that they want to cancel.

Ms Yako: Can we be furnished with that, please?

Mr Monyante: I will make sure that I do get those reports.

Ms Yako: Thank you very much. Moving on, I am looking at the timeline now. I have an issue with the possessions that were taken from the deceased were an authorised laptop because, in any correctional centre, I would think that, when there is time to study, and a laptop is allocated to a prisoner, they are given that laptop during the time of the study. And we have it on record that Mr Bester was doing other things with a laptop besides studying at Damelin. Secondly, did you G4S investigate the issue of the unauthorised cell phone? I think that, if there is contraband coming into your correctional centre, you would then have to investigate how that contraband came into his cell.

Mr Groenewoud: I will ask Mr Beyleveld to answer the first question. As to the second question pertaining to the cell phone – we were unable to determine exactly how that cell phone entered the facility. I think it is a known fact that, notwithstanding all steps that are taken by prisons, either public or private, cell phones are contraband that is often smuggled into the into the prisons. It is then our task to systematically and regularly work through the prisons to detect those and remove them.

Ms Yako: Obviously, you would have had to investigate how that came into his cell.

Mr Groenewoud: Yes.

Ms Yako: Was that investigation done?

Mr Groenewoud: I think Mr Beyleveld can talk more about the actual movement of inmate Bester from his previous cell to cell 35.

Ms Yako: Okay, my next question is on the notice of the death of the inmate. Who was the next of kin? Who was supposed to come and claim the body?

Mr Beyleveld: According to the investigation, honourable Member, the person that was at that point registered as his next of kin was his uncle, who could not be reached based on the information that was supplied by Bester. So, the next person who was informed was Dr Nandipha, who was on his contact list as a contact to inform her of the death.

Ms Yako: But she was not registered as the next of kin? So, in that case, when a prisoner dies in your cells, and you cannot locate the next of kin, do you just take any listed contact from the prisoner?

Mr Beyleveld: No, you do not just take any contact, honourable member; you investigate. You contact the person that visited the inmate over the past few years to find out if there is any other next of kin. In this case, Dr Nandipha informed us that the inmate was alone and did not have any other next of kin, except her, as she was customarily married to him.

Ms Yako: Did you seek any kind of documentation, because I cannot just claim a body if there is no black and white paper that confirms that I am married to this person via customary marriage. Was there any kind of paperwork that you did as G4S, or you do it on a systematic basis when a person dies on your premises?

Mr Beyleveld: There is paperwork, and we will submit it with the other documents that were requested by the Committee.

Ms Yako: Moving with the report that was given to us. Again, Mr Groenewoud, you speak a lot about the timeline and how that timeline exonerates you from lack of action and how the timeline speaks to how much action you conducted. But looking at this timeline that you have, an investigation was only opened in January 2023 by SAPS. Do you know why that is?

Mr Groenewoud: No, I do not. The SAPS investigation being a criminal investigation was not our remit.

Ms Yako: So, it was not within you to inform SAPS to do an investigation on the suspected of abscondment of Mr Bester?

Mr Groenewoud: No, we dealt with a suicide that was later amended to a murder by the Police Services on 25 May, and that was our knowledge – the facts until there was news of a possible escape.

Ms Yako: Chair, I'm not answered. Can you please repeat that?

Mr Groenewoud: I think your question was whether we informed the police on 25 January, and my answer is we did not inform them. We were dealing initially with a suicide based on what the police had identified having viewed the cell. On 25 May, the police changed that to a murder investigation. And as I mentioned earlier, it is only during February of this year that evidence was made available to us suggesting through the autopsy report and the DNA that the individual removed from the cell on the morning of 03 May was not that of Thabo Bester.

Ms Yako: A year later?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes, but I think the timelines you are quoting, honourable Member, are in the control of the SAPS and not our internal investigation that we launched on 03 May.

Ms Yako: Okay, with that internal investigation, do you not liaise with the police to say we suspect that this person was is not, in fact, Mr Thabo Bester, which means there is a dead body that we cannot account for in our prison system, knowing that the DNA has revealed that that person is not Thabo Bester and is not related to anyone who is connected to Thabo Bester?

Mr Groenewoud: We were given the DNA evidence only on 02 February 2023. Prior to that, we had no evidence available to us to factually suggest that the body in the prison was not that of Thabo Bester. We had no evidence. We did assist the police by availing the information that we had to the police to assist them in the investigation.

Ms Yako: I put it to you that Mr Groenewoud, you are not being honest with us because it cannot be that there is a murder or a death and you are not accounting for it and you do not investigate it, firstly, and that you do not know that there is something that happened. I think that you are merely reacting to an explosion that was about to come to your doorstep and that is why you then sent it to the SAPS. Otherwise, I think that as it looks right now, G4S would have kept quiet and Thabo Bester would have lived his best life and raped and murdered more people if this had not blown up the way it did.

Mr Groenewoud: Not at all, honourable Member. I think you will hear when the SAPS give their testimony that there was a very close and early cooperation between members of the MCC and members of the SAPS. As I said in my presentation this morning, as early as 26 June, we furnished the SAPS with all the information that they had requested to assist them in the criminal investigation. Prior to that, we conducted our internal investigation which was an investigation against policies and procedures. That was our remit, and the criminal investigation was the remit and fitted the skill sets of the SAPS.

Ms Yako: Okay, I'm looking at your timeline presentation on page 12, which says MCC compliance investigation. Firstly, it says that MCC does not have the authority to conduct a criminal or forensic investigation, but do you not request one? Is the onus not for you to request a criminal investigation or forensic investigation?

Mr Groenewoud: That was not necessary because the police were involved from as early as six o'clock on the morning of 03 May and remained involved right up to today. So, they were conducting their obligation, and there was no reason for us to formally request them to engage.

Ms Yako: That is against what you said in that you did your own internal investigation so that internal investigation would then have revealed that that person was not Thabo Bester.

Mr Groenewoud: I think that is where we are missing each other, honourable Member. Our investigation was not and could not have been a criminal investigation. We did not have the pathology report available; we did not have the DNA available. We requested on 01 July, if my memory serves correctly, that pathology report from SAPS to see if we could gain something from it. SAPS declined to give that information to us, so we tried to engage by getting access to some of these source documents.

Ms Yako: So, you are saying SAPS did not cooperate with you?

Mr Groenewoud: No, SAPS cooperated with us. They felt that there was no need for us to see the pathology report on the 1st of June or July. Forgive me, I have many dates to remember, but I think it was on 01 July that we requested the pathology report and they declined to give it to us. Other than that, I think you will hear through these proceedings that there was very good cooperation between the two parties.

Ms Yako: I do not think that is true. I do not think that is true. I am not convinced by your reply to me because you are saying you did an internal investigation. Are you saying that SAPS did not then want to turn over the forensic results of that body that was found in the cell? The pathology. Are you saying that is what happened?

Mr Groenewoud: The pathology report was not turned over to us when requested in mid-2022. The DNA report was made available to us at the end, it was on 02 February 2023 by JICS. It is the DNA report that links that body to the lady who purported to be Thabo Bester’s mother at the time. The pathology report, honourable Member, dealt with the cause of death.

Ms Yako: Okay. I am looking again at page 12, dealing with your timelines again, because it seems to me that there is no linear way in which you dealt with this. In as much as you have dates, you are talking about July, and you are talking about February. There seems to be no timelines in the bullets that you have put here. You said it was consistent with the best practices and investigations included staff interviews. Where are those reports of the staff interviews that you conducted? Documents of CCTV footage? What? Where is that? DCS had full access to evidence, so you had full access to evidence, but now you are saying you did not have all the evidence on you. The evidence was shared with SAPS, but there is no data aligned with that. Evidence reports were shared with JICS, but there are no dates that are telling us that you were proactive in dealing with the situation that you found yourself in. Let us just say that it had been Thabo Bester who had burned himself alive, would that not have triggered an alert at Red Alert with you, as G4S to say where maximum prison? Firstly, there is no accelerant that should have come into our prisons without anyone being involved at a high level. A person could never have allocated themselves to a cell and then burned himself alive. Secondly, that there is no footage of anyone going in and out for a certain time. Would that not have been your priority? Let us just say that it had been him who had burned himself alive in that cell. Why did that not happen?

Mr Groenewoud: Why did what not happen?

Ms Yako: Why did you not do any investigation?

Mr Groenewoud: No, we did. We called the SAPS to the scene immediately. We launched an internal investigation; I think I have made it clear that it is not our role to launch a forensic investigation. Keep in mind that in the early stages on the day of 03 May, and the days that followed that right up to 25 May, we were dealing with an apparent suicide. And we had a death notice for Thabo Bester. Those were the facts available to us. Those were the facts that were made available to the Police Services that they were investigating.

Ms Yako: I think Mr Groenewoud is not understanding my line of questioning. I am asking because you are here to account for your part in this whole debacle. And your part in this whole debacle was to investigate; what happened? How did an accelerant come in? In this report, you should have outlined directly what your responsibility was – which was to investigate, give us dates. How far did you go with that investigation? What was your liaising with the SAPS? What is the involvement of SAPS through you? We understand that you could not conduct a criminal investigation. We get that. However, as G4S who is tasked with keeping prisoners of that calibre within, how did that happen? Why did you not investigate, because there is no sign of investigation with what you have given us, and you keep shifting dates? The issue that we have is that it feels like you were not going to see the seriousness of this matter had it been Thabo Bester.

Mr Groenewoud: I am not shifting dates. I think that the dates that are in the report are clear. And I stand by those dates. We launched an investigation on 03 May 2022. The morning of the incident – that investigation was to assess the actions of members at the MCC to see to what extent they breached policies and procedures so that we could potentially link those breaches of policies and procedures to what happened at the facility on the night of the second on the morning of 03 May. That investigation was launched immediately, as you heard from Mr Beyleveld earlier today. We started suspending staff on 06 June, for the investigation to proceed.

Ms Yako: Speaking of those suspensions, are you still paying those that are suspended now?

Mr Beyleveld: They were they were suspended with pay, yes. But all three of them are not dismissed.  The supervisor was dismissed on 29 September – one of the CCR employees on 06 December, and the other one on 31 January 2023.

Ms Yako: So, they were being paid the entire time before they were dismissed?

Mr Beyleveld: That is correct.

Ms Yako: I am going to move back to your investigation. Can you confirm or deny that Mr Sehore left your prison and then came back just 10 minutes before the CCTV footage kicked back?

Mr Beyleveld: It can be reported that Mr Sehore did not only go out once, as found in the investigation; he went out a few times. That formed part of his disciplinary process and part of the reason why he was dismissed.

Chairperson: Ms Yako, you are left with 10 minutes.

Ms Yako: Mr Groenewoud is not being honest because there is a timeline here on page 16 which says that, on 03 May, SAPS gave no indication that a suicide is suspected. And I want to know, before this, had there ever been any suicides?

Mr Groenewoud: I will ask my colleagues to comment on that. I just want to draw your attention to the fact that you are misreading that page. We say that ‘on 03 May’, the final bullet point, that the SAPS made no indications that anything other than a suicide is suspected.

Ms Yako: Other than a suicide?

Mr Groenewoud: Anything other than a suicide. This means that, at that stage, we were dealing with a suicide. The SEPs concurred that that is what we were dealing with. I'll hand over to Mr Beyleveld.

Ms Yako: Hence, I am asking if there had been any suicides before.

Mr Beyleveld: Yes, there was suicides before.

Ms Yako: And what was your process of investigation for those suicides?

Mr Beyleveld: The same. To determine whether policies and procedures were followed to ensure that everything is in order, in line with operational procedures.

Ms Yako: You said in the report that the belongings of Mr Bester were given to the next of kin. Was that the uncle or the wife?

Mr Groenewoud: I will ask Mr Beyleveld to confirm that. I just want to draw your attention to the fact that there were two sets of personal belongings for inmate Bester. The one set was what was removed from cells 35 on the morning of 03 May. This was the set that was held in the administrative building, and it is with this set that we detected petrol smells generally referred to as the accelerant that the police later investigated and removed from our premises on 08 May. There is another set of personal belongings that was given to the next of kin, and these are the belongings that inmate Bester handed over the day he entered the prison, before he was taken to his cell on the very first dates. Those were another set of evidence.

Ms Yako: Are you saying that the cell phone and the laptop were given to someone else and the rest of his clothes were given to someone else?

Mr Groenewoud: No, that is not what I am saying. What I am saying is on the date inmate Bester originally was incarcerated at the Mangaung correctional facilities, his personal belongings were taken from him, and those were the ones that were sent to the next of kin.

Ms Yako: No, my question is who was the next of kin? Was it the wife or was it the uncle?

Mr Beyleveld: It was Dr Nandipha.

Ms Yako: I am not entirely covered by the answers of G4S. I do not think you came to account, and I do not think you came to answer. We are going to oscillate around the same questions, and we are not going to get any accountability because, looking at the timeline, you said that the MCC meets with JICS on 02 February and JICS informs MCC of their suspicions that inmate Bester had escaped. So, before that, no one had come to you as MCC to inform you of the suspicion? You had to wait for JICS to come to you?

Mr Groenewoud: Not to me personally.

Ms Yako: So, what was your final input after your investigation was done? What was your final report to say ‘as G4S we believe that this is what happened on that day’?

Mr Groenewoud: At the time that our final report was finalised, the forensic and the criminal investigation had moved on from a suicide to that of murder. Our report being an internal investigation concluded that the three individuals we have been referring to today could account for their actions in line with their operational duties for that day. These are the three individuals that were suspended and then eventually dismissed. One of those is the member who was arrested by the police over the past few days. That was the conclusion of our report.

Ms Yako: So, the outcome of your report was not to say ‘this is basically what happened, and these are the measures that we did not take for this suicide and murder to take place in our correctional facility’. Was the outcome of your report not to say ‘we cannot account for why there was accelerant in the correctional centre, which means that our facilities are tempered with and, therefore, we recommend this and this to take place’? Would these people have been arrested before everything blew up? According to your investigation, would you have asked SAPS to arrest them? Clearly, there was a lot going on in that prison.

Mr Groenewoud: I think our findings were shared with SAPS on an ongoing basis. SAPS was aware that these individuals were being questioned by us and had been suspended and were going through a disciplinary hearing. They knew that, and they had the information available. I cannot confirm. Perhaps my colleagues can on whether SAPS in the intervening period interviewed those individuals. I do not know; I need to defer to my colleagues.

Mr Beyleveld: I cannot confirm that the SAPS did investigate or contacted those people. All I can inform to you is that the SAPS continuously engaged with us up until last week on the circumstances of the incident.

Ms Yako: I think they did caucus because they cannot confirm anything now, and I do not know. I think there is something going on. And I think, as a Committee, we do need to take strict recommendations after this and debate after. But thank you very much.

Chairperson: You can take it up during deliberations. Thank you very much, honourable Yako. Honourable Maseko-Jele.

Ms N Maseko-Jele (ANC): I just want to ask follow-up questions on some of the issues that were not clear for me during the discussion. The first one is that it was reported that, when the CCTV cameras fail, there is back up personnel available in the control room. So, on the day of the incident were there any officials who were used as a backup? What happened to them, because they should have given you information? Are the officials a part of those who were suspended?

Mr Beyleveld: Regarding to the people on site, Integritron, the service provider provides people daily on-site to oversee the security system. And that is why, in our presentation, you would have seen that the person that left that evening just before the sign-off duty at 19:30 visited the control room and insured on the document in the control room, indicating that all systems were in order, there was no problem with assistance. He then left. If, at night time there is a problem as correctly identified for you by the members in the control room, they will inform the people who are on standby, who will immediately react and come back to the scene to rectify the problem.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Can I get the name of that person?

Mr Beyleveld: His name is Teboho Lipholo.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Okay. I will come back to that one. The other follow-up question – how many single cells do you have?

Mr Monyante: We have 17 sales single cells

Ms Maseko-Jele: The inmate that was removed from cell 35, when did he request to be moved back to the normal cells?

Mr Monyante: I do not have the exact date. But I think the other honourable Member had requested that we submit that document that is proving that he did apply. I think from that document it can be deduced as to when he applied.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Was that application immediately approved?

Mr Monyante: The request to be sent back to a normal unit – I do not have the information to say whether it was approved immediately or not. But with my response in terms of immediate approval, I was responding to a question when Thabo Bester was initially applying.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Noting the report of the external comments regarding the MCC, a good report, according to the quote that we have on page six of your report. If the judge of the Constitutional Court that is quoted in the report knew about some of the things that happened in the centre, they would have probably commented differently about the prison despite its beauty. So, from that point, I am going to say that, from here today, I am going to take home one quote by Mr Beyleveld when he said the track record of the prison speaks for itself and it is only this one unfortunate incident. I do not believe it, but I am just going to take it for myself and remember it when I think about this situation and the report that we received today. We were told that there are human errors, and I also believe that, even though the day when those CCTV happened not to be working, there was a human error. It has been reported that Mr Bester is being returned to the country, and all those arrangements are being made by the Minister of Police. I just want to find out from the G4S team, what arrangements and plans do you have currently, knowing very well that you are dealing with this intelligent, manipulative, and dangerous man preying on women, not just ordinary women, but the ones we as a country prides on and the ones that without undermining others, who we think that the cream of this country? What are your plans?

Mr Monyante: At this stage, we have not received any formal indication from DCS to say inmate Bester will be coming back to our facility because, as G4S, we do not have a say as to who or which inmate must come to the centre or which inmate must leave the centre. It is solely the mandate of the controller on site to decide which inmates must come in and which inmates must go out. Therefore, we do not have a plan to accommodate.

Ms Maseko-Jele: If the department decides that he comes back to his cell, what are you going to do? And it if happens tomorrow?

Mr Monyante: Based on the information that we will have received, there are lots of processes that we would follow. We would consider putting intelligence on him and try to monitor him very, very close as we do have resources and watch his movements around the centre.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Do you expect us to believe that? I should think that this was your plan even before, knowing that you had brought such a person to your facility.

Mr Monyante: Please do believe me. There are a lot of inmates with a very high profile being held in the centre, 2 928 very high-profile inmates.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Thank you. I just want to find out, we have directors who do very important work at the facility, for example, Mr Monyante is the centre director. I believe that you are supposed to be there every day, and Mr Beyleveld is responsible for risk management within the centre. I am sure you understand the work that you are doing. I want to know – are you always based in the centre?

Mr Monyante: No, because I do take vacation leave. I do experience some life challenges – health challenges. I do take vacation leave. And I do not work during the night shift. And I do take the weekend off depending on the challenges that are coming, then I will not find myself at the centre.

Ms Maseko-Jele: When you are not there, who is there on your behalf?

Mr Monyante: I do have a Deputy Director, Ms Dirk de Clerk.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Where was she on the day of the incident?

Mr Monyante: Yes, you will have realised on the slide when I did the presentation that she is one of the people that arrived at the scene, those early hours of the morning.

Ms Maseko-Jele: No, I mean at the time of the incident. Who was supposed to be the on-site operational manager? Or you do not have something like that?

Mr Monyante: Unless I do not understand the question, but how it works is that, during the night, there is a senior official on duty, whom we call the night duty operations supervisor.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Who is it?

Mr Monyante: In this case, it was Mr Senohe Matsoara.

Ms Maseko-Jele: The one that you talked about?

Mr Monyante: Yes.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Thank you very much. I would like to believe that you have a system of reporting. Can you tell us today how your reporting system goes?

Mr Groenewoud: My two colleagues who are intimately involved with the operations of the facility report in the G4S line of command to the director who oversees our southern Africa operations. So, these operations across South Africa and Southern African countries with the Mangaung facility than being one of those facilities or businesses that report to him.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Can you please raise your voice; I cannot hear you properly.

Mr Groenewoud: So, the facility reports to the cluster director. This is a senior person within G4S who is responsible for the activities in southern Africa, obviously South Africa, one of those countries, and the Mangaung facility being one of those businesses accountable to him, that information flows on a continuous basis. And there is a lot of cooperation between colleagues in the Mangaung facility and that individual. If you ask specifically about me, I am the commercial director for Africa. So, I have an Africa remit, dealing with commercial matters, pertaining to G4S activities. As I said this morning, in my introduction, I'm also the director of G4S Care and Justice, which is one of the entities related to the Mangaung facility.

Ms Maseko-Jele: I think I got that one early in the morning. So, I just wanted to find out exactly how you get reports, particularly from this team. But I think I got that one. Can I find out their reports? I just want to hear the content and the issues of the report, as to daily – do you report daily, hourly, monthly quarterly?

Mr Monyante: In terms of the inmate behaviours, let us say there is an unusual behaviour that is happening in the centre. We are obliged by the contract to report to the controller on site one hour after the incident has happened.

Ms Maseko-Jele: No, I do not mean your reporting in terms of the incident. I mean the reports in terms of the activities of the facility because, if there is something wrong within the facility, if the reports are done, something will be found along the way. So, I want to know your report from the ground, up to your level, to the level of the national.

Mr Beyleveld: The reporting line is directly to the controller who is on-site. There are daily reports being submitted to the controller on all activities at the same time daily. The controller in his case reports to the national Commissioner via the contract management office in Pretoria.

Ms Maseko-Jele: So, they do receive those reports every day?

Mr Beyleveld: Yes, there is a contractual obligation that, if we are not applying those reports, we will receive a notice and it will result into a penalty if we have been found guilty on that.

Ms Maseko-Jele: So, it means that, within your reports, there must be a risk, some risk that you have noticed in terms of what is happening within the facility, especially from your site.

Mr Beyleveld: The risk is not in the report. We have a risk register that we manage in the centre, which contains all the company risks that is that are involved in that and operational risks if it is like that. In this case, I can confirm that the investigation proved that, up until this incident, there was no confirmation of misbehaviour on the side of Bester. There were no disciplinary offences registered against Bester up until that point, and there was no information that was shared with us prior to this incident from baseline.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Okay but let me say about other reports within the centre. Did you get any reports in terms of the issues and complaints of the inmates and everything that is happening there in terms of how they are treated? There is a report that I have read about that I want to know if the national office has received. It is the report of 2013 about the beatings that are happening within the facilities, about the issue of the inmates being injected. I want to see if these reports do go to the places where they are supposed to go so that you are able to mitigate some of the problems that we are facing today about these dangerous inmates. Do you really get the report of the wrongdoings within the facility as you are supposed to be receiving?

Mr Groenewoud: Information filters through the organisation like any other organisation. The more material matters are raised to senior levels. So, for example, the report that you are referring to in 2013 is before my time, but that report would have gone to senior levels. There was mention earlier this morning of the Ruth Hopkins report. Being a controversial report and an important report, it would have gone through the channels where I sit on the BCC board. I get informed of the material matters pertaining to the facility quarterly. And I can assure you that when the incident was converted from the police, from a suicide to a murderer, that information would have gone way beyond my level and would have gone to the international head office because that is a material development.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Do you know if something was done about these things, those that were reported?

Chairperson: You have 10 minutes.

Ms Maseko-Jele: I want to know how you deal with whistle-blowers because there are so many things that has been reported that you have never attended to. So how do you deal with the issue of the whistle-blowers, people who are giving information about to the wrongs that are happening within the facility?

Mr Monyante: What we normally do when we get information from inmates is that we create a document where we write our findings and our recommendations and then we submit it to the controller on site, where we normally recommend that either the inmate must receive either 12-month remission of sentence or whatever that the DCS is promising for divulging information.

Ms Maseko-Jele: You are saying there are seven people who are suspended. Are Mr Matsoara, Ms Jansen, and Mr Mabotsa the three that you mentioned?

Mr Beyleveld. Yes, that is correct.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Are they the only people that have been found to be responsible in all that happened in the whole Bester saga?

Mr Groenewoud: As we said earlier today, those are the three members whose actions are not in accordance with their duties and with the policies and procedures. So we therefore questioned their motives on that evening, and for that reason, we dismissed them. It is also one of the reasons why SAPS arrested one of them in the last few days. Then we mentioned earlier today that pertaining to the sally port incident with a vehicle passed into the facility back in April 2022, seven members have to date been suspended. Whilst that investigation is ongoing. I hope I have answered your question.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Thank you very much. I have got names here. I want you to tell me, who are these people? And what is their duty at work? And where were these people when all this was happening? If possible, why are these people not suspended or fired? The first one is John Coanglae. Who is this person? That is number one. Number two is Annike le Grange; who is this person? There is also a person named Ida. All these people are part of your team in the centre, and the only people that have been suspended or fired or been found doing wrong are the three that you have mentioned. So, my question is, why only those three black people dismissed when there are all these other non-black people who were also part of the wrongdoing? I am sorry to be controversial, but I just want to say it, are you, as G4S, racist?

Mr Groenewoud: No, we are not.

Ms Maseko-Jele: You are not?

Mr Groenewoud: No, we are not.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Can I hear from you? Why only three people and blacks, for that matter? When there are other people who are managers? I will tell you because it seems as if you do not want to tell me who are those people? Number one, we have Ida, who is a security supervisor, and that person must know who said that car must get inside and must have a report. You do not have a report here about that security supervisor. We also have this le Grange who is an operational manager. I am telling you because you do not want to tell me. What is the report of that person because he is the manager and must take accountability of what was happened there? And then there is John, who was also there on that day of the incident. This is the report that we got when we arrived in Bloemfontein that this person was part of it. The reason why I am asking if you are racist is because they are all white and they are responsible. They are supposed to be part of the people who were held responsible and accountable for all these things that we are talking about today.

Mr Beyleveld: Ida is the newly-appointed supervisor after Mr Senohe Matsoara was dismissed. She is a lady that is working for us. She was not working as the supervisor at the date of the incident. Then John Coanglae was the person that worked in Broadway the night of the incident, and he reported all the information to us. The investigation did not prove any involvement from him, and he was therefore not suspended nor was there disciplinary action against him; the same goes with Annika, the operations manager.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Is this the John who left before the incident happened?

Mr Beyleveld: That is correct, but he did not leave. He was instructed by the supervisor and that formed part of the supervisor’s disciplinary action – why he instructed this person to leave his position to attend to a medical emergency.

Ms Maseko-Jele: The same supervisor who allowed the car to come in and removed the person who was refusing to give those people permission to get in?

Mr Beyleveld: No, honourable Member. That supervisor is the one that is currently being detained by the SAPS who was involved in the situation on both occasions on the 29th, as well as on 02 and 03 May that night.

Ms Maseko-Jele: You are saying that this Annike le Grange is a new person?

Mr Beyleveld: No, she is not a new person. She has been in her position for a long time as Operations Manager. Ida is the new person.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Where was Annike because these people were dealing with these operations?

Mr Beyleveld: She was not on duty during that incident. The person that was in charge was Senohe Matsoara.
 
Ms Maseko-Jele: Do you think it is a coincidence that these people decided to leave duty early on that day?

Mr Beyleveld: That person did not leave. There is a shift pattern according to which people work in it. It was not supposed to be them who were going to be on shift. The nightshift people were on shift when this incident happened, which was 23 of them – under the supervision of Mr Senohe Matsoara, who is currently dismissed.

Ms Maseko-Jele: If you look at this thing, you can see that it was planned. And I think we can all agree now that it was planned. It takes me back to the question from honourable Yako, on whether you do not think you should have investigated yourselves as the people who are responsible for the centre. My last question is that, after all that has been said in this house, are you still denying that you have failed DCS as a Department that you are contracted with and the government of this country? Thank you.

Mr Groenewoud: I am not denying, and I cannot recall that I have denied that we have not failed. This was a very carefully orchestrated plan for Bester to break out of MCC. And we have indicated to the police, those members whose actions on that night, we cannot reconcile. And we have given those numbers and those names to the police. I think, for me, the fact that the police recently arrested one of them, based amongst others on the information that we provided them, is testament to the fact that we have cooperated throughout. It also proves that certain of our members may have been well. We know at least one was involved in the incident that evening. I hope I have answered your question.

Ms Maseko-Jele: You mean only those three black people.

Chairperson: Honourable Swart.

Adv S Swart (ACDP): Thank you very much. Just following on with my colleague’s questions, a lot has gone around the role of Integritron and the issue around the cameras. Have you received any feedback from them as to the involvement of their technician that night?

Chairperson: Honourable Swart, your voice is too soft today. I do not know why.

Adv Swart: I just want to find out whether you have received any information from them relating to their investigations as to their technician.

Mr Beyleveld: No, I did not receive any feedback from them yet on any investigation conducted by them.

Adv Swart: I understand on the affidavit that there was a polygraph test done on one of the technicians, and I am sure we will deal with that at a later stage where that technician failed the polygraph test. Moving on to the notorious cell 35 – we were there last week. If you look at the corridor, besides the cameras that were not working, there is an official posted there. In the middle of the corridor, there is an official. So, what happened to that official that night? Was he there? Is he being investigated? Because besides the camera, which obviously you could not see what was going on there, there is an official there on night duty in that position. Where was he that night?

Mr Beyleveld: That employee is the one that was requested by the previous Committee Member, John. He was removed by the supervisor Senohe Matsoara that night, and he had sent him to attend to a medical emergency in one of the other living units in Waltz. That formed part of the disciplinary procedure against Senohe, which led to his dismissal because he removed employees from single positions – which he was not allowed to do within the policies and procedures.

Mr Swart: So, cell 35, which we know is at the right-hand side looking down, and the emergency exit is below that, which can only be controlled by the control room who are watching with cameras, but they are also the only ones that can open the emergency and the cell door? Is that correct?

Mr Beyleveld: That is correct.

Adv Swart: So, the control room and those were the two control room people that have been suspended and dismissed. Is that correct?

Mr Beyleveld: 100% correct.

Adv Swart: And they will be facing criminal action as well?

Mr Beyleveld: We have reported that to the SAPS as well, and we have given them all the documentation and the records that were kept in the control room.

Adv Swart: When was Mr Bester admitted to the facility?

Mr Beyleveld: I am not 100% sure, but I think it was 24 October 2014. I might be wrong with the year. 2013, yes.

Adv Swart: So, he had been around the prison for a long time and people know him, wardens would know him in the facility? He had been around for almost eight or nine years. Right?

Mr Beyleveld: That is correct.

Adv Swart: And yet he could allegedly conduct a business from prison. Is that not deeply concerning? Is G4S aware of all the allegations around him running the business? And has any investigation been done into that?

Mr Groenewoud: We are aware of the allegations. We have no evidence available to us that this happened.

Adv Swart: Sorry, Mr Groenewoud, but there is more than enough evidence. If you go on Facebook, if you can see videos of Mr Bester addressing a launch conference when he was supposed to be in prison. Are you aware of that?

Mr Groenewoud: I have not seen that video.

Adv Swart: But that is highly irresponsible, I put it to you, Sir.

Mr Groenewoud: And if the suggestion is that it is from New York, then I cannot know.

Adv Swart: No, the picture. It is very easy to ascertain and investigate whether a person who purports to be someone from New York is in fact from there. I am perturbed that you seem to bear no knowledge of it, or you are not concerned about it.

Mr Groenewoud: I am concerned about that.

Adv Swart: And no action has been taken at all in that regard.

Mr Groenewoud: We have not been able to substantiate those facts.

Adv Swart: Have you taken any steps at all to substantiate that?

Mr Groenewoud: Not to my knowledge.

Adv Swart: Well, that is inexcusable.

Chairperson: Sorry, honourable Swart. I mean, given your responses, why should the country vest its security in your hands, because it is either you are seriously incompetent or you do not care?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Chair, it is not true that we do not care.

Chairperson: If it is not that you do not care, then you are incompetent.

Mr Groenewoud: I think, if you look back at our track record over the last almost 22 years, we have a very good track record.

Chairperson: Leave the track record aside, but a company of your magnitude failing to answer this question asked by honourable Swart, would anybody listening take that company seriously?

Mr Groenewoud: The best I can answer that question is to say that there are many allegations on social media and the substance of what one sees nowadays in social media is very difficult to determine. We cannot investigate every social media allegation.

Adv Swart: Mr Groenewoud, given the outrage of the public about this incident, surely, when you read media reports or whatever, and given the fact that you sit on the board and given the fact that you indicated earlier this would have international repercussions, surely it would have had some attention from you? This is very serious; it goes to the heart of the reputation of your company. But I can understand that you are unable to give a satisfactory explanation for that, but it causes an uproar amongst the average South African and amongst us as well. I am sure you will agree with that. Can I just ask you then, back to the cell and back to the fact that Mr Bester was admitted in 2013, was he well known as he had been there almost eight years? How tall was Mr Bester? Do you know of that? Was he tall? Would you know how tall he is?

Mr Beyleveld: I did not work with Mr Bester myself so I cannot answer that question. But I can investigate the records at the centre to find all this information.

Mr Swart: Apparently, he is 1.7 metres tall. How long was the body that was found in the cell? Do you have any idea?

Mr Beyleveld: I saw the length in the report that we received from JICS on 02 February. And I think the length if I am not mistaken was 1.49 or 1.48.

Adv Swart: So, 1.45 metres? There is a big difference between 1.7 metres and 1.45 metres. So, at first glance, the warders that came to that cell would have known that the person that is burned there was highly unlikely to have been Mr Bester. Would you agree with that, given the fact that Mr Bester is 1.7 metres and the body was 1.45 metres, according to your own records? Do you not agree, given the fact that he has been around and is a tall person, and here you have a very short body that is there, surely it should have raised suspicions immediately? Can anyone explain that?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, my understanding… I did not see these photographs, but my understanding is that the body, once the cell was opened, and until the pathologists arrived, was covered in fire extinguisher residue. So, at that stage, when the police arrived and investigated the scene, and eventually removed the body, I do not think it is possible that our wardens other than extinguishing the fire, and then sealing the cell were able to make that kind of assessment.

Adv Swart: I will give you the benefit of the doubt, but it does raise questions as well, I am sure. One does not know exactly the chain of events where the body was taken, but there is a big difference between 1.7 metres and 1.45 metres. You are looking at a significant difference, but it does raise questions. Can I then just ask Mr Groenewoud? In your report, you have painted a glowing picture of the facility and we visited it, and it is an impressive facility. But take us back to 2013 when the prison was placed under administration. If you will recall that, I do not know if you were there, then.

Mr Groenewoud: No, honourable Member.

Adv Swart: But the prison was placed under administration due to unrest. A warder was taken hostage. What are the implications of a private prison been placed under administration?

Mr Groenewoud: My understanding, Honourable Member is that, in terms of section 112 of the Correctional Services Act, the government can step in and take control of the prison if it believes that an operator has lost control of the person. My understanding of the facts at the time was that there was an illegal strike. The prison went into lockdown mode. We were still able to staff the prison based on minimum staff levels. However, it was felt that we were not in control of the prison and section 112 was invoked.

Adv Swart: Now, there is an assertion that the section has been or may be invoked again. Obviously, that has dramatic implications on the companies involved as well. Would you agree?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes, I do. And I can confirm that section 112 has again been invoked.

Adv Swart: And you are busy with litigation in that regard, I presume as well.

Mr Groenewoud: We have written our legal advisors and have written to the Department to say that we do not agree with the fact that we have lost control of the prison. We can only assume that the actions in March of this year to suggest that we lost control of the prison goes back to the events of May last year.

Adv Swart: But would you not agree given everything that you have said and all the concessions you have made about this being a very carefully orchestrated plan for someone to escape, that it does indicate that that decision was warranted?

Mr Groenewoud: That is to be debated, and I think if one had to draw, and I do not want to make this comparison, but I think it is important to look at the numbers. If one had to look at the number of escapes from MCC over the last 22 years, and one would apply that ratio to the DCS statistics, then by now we should have suffered around 20 to 21 escapes. And I do not want to draw that and that analogy, but I think, on that basis, the very few escapes we have had is a record to be to be proud of. Having said that, every escape is a serious matter.

Adv Swart: Given the complicity of so many wardens in this matter, and as it is ongoing, it seems more and more like that would seem to vindicate the decision that the company has lost control of the of the facility, to me. This is not just an isolated escape. This is a carefully planned escape with a lot of money being paid off, which seems to vindicate that. But can I just ask you, for every escape is the company penalised? Is there financial penalty?

Mr Groenewoud: Yes, there is a penalty. I think Mr Beyleveld can help me on the on the amount.

Mr Beyleveld: Currently, the penalty is just under R1 million.

Adv Swart: So, obviously, it is in your best interests that an incident like this should rather be seen as a suicide as opposed to an escape, because it is a financial benefit. Do you not agree?

Mr Beyleveld: There is no difference in between the penalty for a suicide if negligence is proved and if there is an escape. The penalty stays the same.

Adv Swart: But I find it astounding that the company has continued to hold the view that this was a suicide despite the meetings with various state organisations. By the way, can I just ask you, when did you first hear of the high court application that was brought for the obtaining of the body in Gauteng? The June 2022 application that contained the post-mortem report – are you meeting with police on a regular basis? Surely someone would have mentioned that to you? Were you aware of that court case? Any of you? If so, when?

Mr Beyleveld: It was not mentioned to me during my discussions with the SAPS.

Adv Swart: Were any of you aware of that court case?

Mr Groenewoud: No, Honourable Member.

Adv Swart: Because I noticed that you had meetings with SAPS, with JICS, after that court case, and I find that amazing that that was not raised because that was in June 2022. Already where the affidavit was available, the post-mortem was available, which clearly indicated it could not have been Mr Bester. Firstly, there was no smoke in the lungs and the other issues that are raised there, as well, in that post-mortem report – that he was killed by a blunt instrument. There are other issues there. And I would think that that is very important. So, at what stage was the first time that you were became aware of the High Court application?

Mr Groenewoud: I cannot recall the exact date, but it was it was recently that I became aware of that of that application.

Adv Swart: I just want to get back to section 112 because there obviously are financial implications. I have been around a long time. I was here in 1999 when all those contracts were signed, and everyone supported it. They thought it was a good idea, but it is obviously for profit. Let us face it, it is about making a profit. So, section 112 in 2013 – it cost the company. Is that correct? There is litigation ongoing now about that?

Mr Groenewoud: That is correct.

Adv Swart: How much is involved in that litigation?

Mr Groenewoud: I believe the number is around R110 million.

Adv Swart: R110 million, right?

Mr Groenewoud: Correct, yes.

Adv Swart: So, to have another section 112 imposed on you now could have severe financial implications, you would agree with that?

Mr Groenewoud: I do.

Adv Swart: So, from your side, would it be incorrect to assume that you do everything to cover up as possible up to now from an objective outsider because there is a financial incentive here to protect and make sure that you do not have a section 112 imposed.?

Mr Groenewoud: To cover up what exactly, Honourable Member, If I may ask?

Adv Swart: To cover up what happened in the prison.

Mr Groenewoud: If we had the intention to cover up what happened in the prison, we would not have immediately called the police to the facility in the morning of 03 May and we would have not-

Adv Swart: But that was a suicide, a fire in a cell – a very innocent explanation that you continued with for many, many months. And it is only in the recent past that it has now come out when you say that it has now been brought to your attention that it is not a murder, and not a suicide.

Mr Groenewoud: I believe I addressed that earlier on when I said that, initially, there was a suicide and SAPS agreed with us. On 25 May 2022, they told us that they are now investigating, based on the pathology report, a murder. We asked for the pathology report, as I said, on 01 July 2022, and that was not provided to us. We continued to engage with the authorities. And it was only in the SAPS report to this Committee, dated 04 April, that we became aware that a case of escape had had been opened. Prior to that JICS did mention to us, I believe it was during the meeting of 02 February that they were investigating a possible escape. But we received no evidence of that.

Adv Swart: The wardens and officials that are at the private facility are paid well, when compared to the compatriots across the road. Would you agree with that? Are they paid more than their colleagues? Or would you say the same? Or does it vary?

Mr Beyleveld: I will say it varies, but it is the same on certain levels. There could be one or two other levels that are a little bit higher. I remember that, on 05 May, we requested SAPS to come back. So, if we wanted to write something, when the accelerant was found, we would not have informed the SAPS to come back if there was a possibility of hiding information.

Adv Swart: Well, at that stage, you were certain that it was a suicide. If you look at all the circumstances around and all the coincidences, and at whatever level, where even the Honourable Minister indicates that at least the night staff seem to have a very close conspiracy. But as you are investigating, it is getting broader and broader. The conspiracy to achieve this remarkable escape not only an escape, but the person is then declared and thought to be dead. It is a quite a remarkable achievement from his perspective. Nobody would be looking for him at all. And you do not have to report an escape with I can understand the financial penalties might be the same between a suicide and an escape, but an escape is far worse for your reputation. I am sure you will agree with that, Mr Groenewoud.

Mr Groenewoud: I would agree.

Chairperson: Honourable Swart, you have 10 minutes.

Adv Swart: Mr Groenewoud, you indicated that you have cooperated comprehensively with all the institutions involved. The DCS is concerned because, according to them, the outcome of your investigation was not provided to DCS until 31 March, despite the formal requests to obtain it. So, there does not seem to be that close cooperation. How would you comment about that? And why was your report only given to them on 31 March? The 31 March and this last week seem to be a great hive of activity for everyone.

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member, on the investigation that we conducted, all the relevant information was shared with DCS. It is the report that was only given to them on 31 March – correction, On 31 January. The reason why we delayed the report itself notwithstanding the DCS having access to all the information was because we wanted the DCS to conduct an independent investigation and arrive at their own conclusions. Secondly, we were busy with labour matters. We were busy acting against members of our staff who we had dismissed, as it was reported earlier today. Those dismissals have been taken or have been filed with the CCMA, and we did not want to prejudice those processes.

Adv Swart: I am trying to understand the relationship between you in terms of the contract, and we are aware that the DCS alleges a broad number of contract breaches which has led to the section 112 – which you would obviously dispute. But, according to DCS, they requested these reports, and they were not forthcoming. Are you saying it was purely for these reasons of disciplinary actions?

Mr Groenewoud: To my knowledge, that was the reason.

Adv Swart: You said those disciplinary actions are ongoing. So, that does not quite make sense to me because they could go on for years.

Mr Groenewoud: We were obliged to give the report to JICS as well, at the start of February 2022, which was two days after the date we gave the report for memory to DCS. And for that reason, we decided to disclose the report to DCS at that stage, although ideally, we would not have wanted to do so.

Adv Swart: Do you mind if I just ask you who gave the approval for Mr Bester to go to Broadway? I am sorry, I am jumping around; I have such limited time. Now, DCS says there was no approval given for that. You indicated, and I noticed the wording that was used carefully. You kept on saying that he applied and then he withdrew his application. He applied on 16 April; he withdrew the application and applied again and then he was moved. Was approval granted by the CSC at the time of him being moved?

Mr Beyleveld: That was on the night of the 30th, and that approval was sent via WhatsApp to the controller that was responsible that night as the person on standby, and he replied on WhatsApp to the duty director that he can go ahead.

Adv Swart: So, that is a point of dispute between you and DCS. I presume I am just trying to understand the perimeter security at night because now, somehow, Mr Bester got out. Was that fully operational? What types of security? Do you have cameras? And I understand that for many months you thought that Bester had passed away, but he escaped somehow. Was the perimeter security operating fully that night? Besides the cameras that went down, [what about] the perimeter?

Mr Beyleveld: These are no reports that could been obtained during the investigation that prove otherwise, and that is the reason why we acted against those three employees that were responsible for the perimeter – Senohe and the two people in the CCR.

Adv Swart: I am trying to understand – besides the cameras, surely you have other perimeter security as well besides just the cameras, because one of the allegations of DCS is that the contractor failed to monitor perimeter security, which led to the aided escape?

Mr Beyleveld: We have other systems in place on the parameters, but that was not reported, and it did not come out in our own investigation.

Adv Swart: Was that operating during that evening?

Mr Beyleveld: It was fully operating that evening, according to all the investigation information that we have obtained.

Adv Swart: So, there are several allegations, and I do appreciate that these are from the DCS’ perspective. But what I find difficult to understand as well as how the fire could have started in cell 35. We asked this question earlier, and we were advised that there are no smoke detectors and that you rely on human warning for smoke for fire. Surely that is a great deficiency? Is there any explanation as to how an accelerant arrived in that cell?

Mr Beyleveld: Unfortunately, that could not have been determined without, in hindsight, the information of Bester. The person who was on duty that night, Senohe, has already been dismissed. And in that investigation, it could not be obtained, specifically how that accelerant came into the centre.

Adv Swart: Lastly, that issue but the desk or the TV cabinet. Was it a TV cabinet or a desk?

Mr Beyleveld: It is a TV cabinet, a standing TV cabinet with drawers.

Adv Swart: It has been standing there since that incident, and it is now in the position of the police. Is that correct?

Mr Beyleveld: That is correct. It was in our position up until the weekend when the SAPS came to do a forensic investigation. And, in accordance, I was not at the centre, but I was informed that the cabinet has been taken away by the SAPS.

Adv Swart: Thank you, Chair. Just concluding, and I think you have made several concessions during our questioning that this was a very carefully planned operation, with the cooperation of several wardens, that has been further investigated. But I think, had GCS taken greater care from the word go, or maybe a month or two after, this whole incident would have come to light a lot earlier. And that it was damaging to your reputation and damaging to your finances that one could conclude resulted in you maybe not being as forthcoming with information as you could have been. It is only because of journalists that have investigated this that it does not come to light. We owe them a great debt of gratitude, so we just wanted to express that shame. That will be all from me. Thank you very much.

Chairperson: Thank you very much, Honourable Swart. Honourable Newhoudt-Druchen.

Dr W Newhoudt-Druchen (ANC): Thank you very much. Well, good afternoon to everyone. I am not going to go back to my own questions, but I do have some follow-ups of what other members have asked which I wanted clarity to understand better. Firstly, I wanted to know who the current controller is at MCC right now is. Is it the same controller that was there during the time of the fire?

Mr Monyante: The controller that is currently on site is not the controller that was there during the incident.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: So, where is the controller that was there during the time of the incident right now?

Mr Monyante: From the discussion or the information that was shared with me and the National Commissioner, they will be suspended from MCC. I am not sure where thy currently are.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Okay. Secondly, you said you have got single 17 single cells. Now I just want to understand why cell 35 was specifically allocated to baster during that time, and are the 17 cells that you have normally full?

Mr Beyleveld: Honourable Member, I would just like to rectify that it is not 17; it is 70.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Okay, 70, yes. And are all of them normally full?

Mr Beyleveld: I cannot confirm that out of my head if every cell was full that night. Sometimes they are full and in other times they are not.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Okay, the reason why I am specifically asking that is because Bester was specifically taken to a cell, close to an emergency exit. So, that is why I am asking if, during that time, all of them were full. But be that as it may then, just with regards to JICS. This is an unnatural death. So, whether it was a suicide or whether it was by fire, whatever the case may be, it was unnatural, but JICS was only informed six days later. I would like to know why it took some time before JICS was notified specifically that this was an unnatural death that occurred.

Mr Beyleveld: We report to the controller. The controller on site is the reporting line to the national commissioner's office as well as to the JICS office. Therefore, I cannot say why it was only reported six days later, but it was immediately reported to the controller's office on the same day.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: So, you do not know why it was not immediately reported to JICS, even though, as you said, all the while you have a good ongoing relationship with JICS themselves?

Mr Beyleveld: We do have a good relationship with JICS. But unfortunately, I cannot say why it was not only reported on the sixth.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Honourable Swart asked a question of when Bester first entered the prison, and you said it was around 2013. Now, does that mean that the customary wife was already there in 2013 noted as the next of kin? Because you said that his personal possessions when he entered were given to the next of kin when he was pronounced dead, was the customary wife already then noted as the next of kin?

Mr Beyleveld: Just a correction. I indicated that the uncle was the next of kin on his reporting, but we could not obtain contact with the uncle. So, that is why we updated contact with Dr Nandipha.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: When was it that you could not find the uncle?

Mr Beyleveld: When we wanted to inform him of the supposed death of inmate Bester.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Okay, no, I am not talking about the time of his death. I am talking about the time that he came in 2013. You said that the things he brought into prison was then already given to the next of kin at that time? That is why I am asking you if the customary wife was recorded as the next of kin.

Mr Beyleveld: No, a correction again. The stuff that was handed over to the next of kin was after the so-called death of inmate Bester. Remember, my colleague indicated that there were two sets. The one set that came from the cell, that all was added to the SAPS, and then the rest that was kept in the administration store where inmate belongings kept, which is not allowed with him – those were handed to Dr Nandipha.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: I wanted to get back to the laptop. Because, like honourable Jele who said we saw on TV last week, for example, that Bester was chasing and luring women on Facebook, which then means that he is a social media expert, obviously. It does not matter what you say that he was registered to study. I still cannot see the connection or get the understanding how a person who lured women to become his victims on Facebook using a cell phone or a laptop was given a device that enabled him to have meetings and have international meetings, maybe to lure women while he was in prison for all we know – because you do not know what he did with that laptop. So, I just wanted to understand why he was given a device that could enable him to still lure women on Facebook. Women have been hurt and the families of the victims have been hurt, yet you still gave him a device.

Mr Monyante: When we approved the issue of the laptop, our objective was to ensure that the inmate is also rehabilitated, and I also want to indicate that we do not treat inmates differently based on the crimes that they have committed at MCC. All inmates that are incarcerated in that centre – we see them as human beings, and we try our level best to treat them, according to what they are entitled to. Our objective has never been to promote whatever wrong things Bester did with the woman when he was committing the crime. Our sole objective was to ensure that he gets rehabilitation. We committed ourselves to provide whatever tools that he was entitled to, as per the court ruling that we have referred to.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: I hope that you understand, and you are aware that the people of South Africa are watching this meeting that we are having, and the women of South Africa who are affected by him are hearing what you are saying that it does not matter what his crime was. We gave him a device to continue doing what he was doing. I would have expected that it would not matter what the crime was and how it was committed. Your priority as G4S would be making sure that, if a person is in prison, the people outside are safe. But I can see that this has failed. And I am very sorry to say this, Chair, because they have not investigated or if they are still going to investigate. I think there are a lot of things that people have been telling us up to now. I think that the Risk and Audit really failed the women of South Africa. Thank you. That is all Chair.

Chairperson: Thank you, Honourable Newhoudt-Druchen. Honourable Horn you have 15 minutes.

Mr W Horn (DA): I just want to pick up on an answer to a question that was asked by Honourable Newhoudt-Druchen just now. Do you confirm that, as we sit here today, you do not know whether all 70 of the single cells were in use on the night of the incident?

Mr Beyleveld: I would be gossiping if I agreed to that.

Mr Horn: A lot has been said about your own investigation focusing on systems and possible failure of your personnel and the possible involvement of your staff in this grand scheme. Would you not agree that it is critical, given the strategic situation of cell 35 to determine as part of an investigation, whether cell 35 was the only option left or was chosen?

Mr Beyleveld: That was addressed, and it was confirmed by that person in charge of Broadway on the specific day of the 30th that there was no reason that was the empty cell and that is why he placed inmate Bester in that cell.

Mr Horn: But I would think that, in order for the investigation to be complete, one must ascertain whether that was the only empty cell. But let me move on. As the investigation intensified, was it double checked from your side with the inmate who cancelled the requests to be kept in isolation, whether that was indeed done voluntarily?

Mr Beyleveld: No, it was not ascertained.

Mr Horn: So, even though you say as things unfold and as SAPS levelled this up from suicide to murder and other entities ramped up their investigation, there are clearly still big loopholes in terms of your focus, which you say is only on-looking into your own systems.

Mr Beyleveld: We had a look at the documentation available on the inmate that requested to leave the cell and there was no indication that he was forced or that he was told to complete the document for any other reason and to say he wanted to leave that cell. If he was moved within the centre and within the unit, it would have most probably raised alarms. But the fact that he requested to go back to normal population did not raise any alarms.

Mr Horn: So, how would you see coercion or intimidation based on a document? You say, from the document itself, there was no indication that it was not voluntary.

Mr Beyleveld: One can look at this and asked a number of questions. It was during the investigation when it was conducted to look at the actions of the employees that were involved. That did not become evident and did not need me as the investigator, at that point in time, to take any further action at that time.

Mr Horn: Let me move on to the approval of applications to be proudly placed in isolation. Is there a document that must be filled in for this to be finalised?

Mr Monyante: That is correct.

Mr Horn: How often does it happen that this document is not used, yet somebody is placed in isolation?

Mr Monyante: According to my knowledge, I have not experienced such because, after the inmate has applied, we take that documentation and we give it to the controller's office, where they will capture the information on their computer system and then the printout that we get and put it on the door. So, I have not come across a case where the inmate was kept in a single cell without paperwork.

Mr Beyleveld: If you will allow me to explain a little bit further. The centre is monitored daily by the Department of Correctional Services controller and deputy controller and the two people from JICS ICCV who visit daily, and they are regularly monitoring the Broadway section to ensure that it is not misused.

Mr Horn: But on your own version, then there was no consent from DCS to move Thabo Bester to isolation.

Mr Monyante: Our version is that there was an approval, and that is the approval we referred to when we talked about the WhatsApp messages that were sent between the deputy director as well as the controller that were on standby that evening.

Mr Horn: But you just said that there is a form involved, and according to your understanding of how processes are adhered to within the centre, a form is always used?

Mr Monyante: That is correct, honourable Member because before the duty director contacts the controller that is on standby, he or she will have been informed by the application from the inmate. That is why the duty director will call the controller that is on standby and say ‘I am sitting here with the form where the inmate is requesting to be kept in single cells’.

Mr Horn: WhatsApp is, of course, something that is backed up and which one can extract from to text a level from cellular phones and databases. Have you, as part of your investigation, verified the existence of that WhatsApp?

Mr Beyleveld: Yes, that is correct. It is available.

Mr Horn: Will you then provide that to us?

Mr Beyleveld: We will provide it.

Mr Horn: Thank you. I move on to the role of the controller and the deputy controller. In a typical annual year, how many observation notices or citations are issued by the controllers in the controlling off the controller office at MCC?

Mr Beyleveld: Since the incident, we have received three notices from the Office of the controller. The one was about a psychologist that had resigned, and the document did not reach the controller within 72 hours according to his interpretation. The second one was an escape from the hospital on the outside which was discussed earlier. And then the last one was the vehicle that went in without a gate boss. Those are the three that were received.

Mr Horn: Before the incident, how many did you typically receive in a year?

Mr Beyleveld: The previous year, there were also three issues.

Mr Horn: Okay, and is it so that, towards the end of the tenure of the previous National Commissioner of Correctional Services, G4S complained to the previous National Commissioner that they were inundated with violation notices by the then deputy controller who acted as the controller?

Mr Beyleveld: I have no knowledge of that. I cannot comment on that.

Mr Horn: Were you there at the time?

Mr Beyleveld: I have been at the centre for 22 years, yes.

Mr Horn: Can you confirm whether the previous national Commissioner visited the centre to just before his contract came to an end?

Mr Monyante: If I understand your question, you are you referring to Mr. Fraser?

Mr Horn: Yes.

Mr Monyante: Yes, I can confirm that he did come on his last day because I am the one that welcomed him with the team. He did visit the centre.

Mr Horn: So, on his very last day in office, he visited the centre

Mr Monyante: That is correct.

Mr Horn: And is it correct to say that the deputy controller was subsequently moved by DCS in a unilateral manner without a disciplinary hearing, because I understand there was no controller at that stage?

Mr Monyante: I really cannot confirm on that on that.

Mr Horn: But you were there – surely you know whether the controller was replaced by the deputy controller after Mr Fraser’s visit?

Mr Monyante: Yes, I do know, Honourable Member. But the reasons that informed that decision were not shared with me.

Mr Horn: But can you confirm that, after that visit, there was a new controller and deputy controller in place?

Mr Monyante: That is correct on because I know that the former controller has gone on pension, and the post was advertised because I saw the advert. And I took it that the newly appointed controller went through the application process, but I cannot commit myself to that. That is just my assumption.

Mr Horn: And was it that deputy controller who became the new controller after the visit of Mr Fraser, who was still in office at the time of the incident?

Mr Monyante: That is correct.

Mr Horn: Let me move on to the hospital. I am from Bloemfontein and many people say that the private hospital there is better than the private hospitals. Those who can afford private medical health care can visit within the city. So, is it correct that it is, in fact, a state-of-the-art facility?

Mr Beyleveld: That is correct.

Mr Horn: And is there sometimes an eventuality where inmates, despite the state-of-the-art facility, are taken to other hospitals, private or public, within the city for treatment?

Mr Monyante: That is correct.

Mr Horn: Okay, and Thabo Bester? Was he afforded visits to other hospitals?

Mr Beyleveld: During the investigation it was something that I had a specific look at. In 2015, he went five times to an outside specialist and hospital and one time in 2016.

Chairperson: You have five minutes.

Mr Horn: Thank you, Chair. As part of your investigation, did you investigate what was type of treatment necessitated visits to private hospitals?

Mr Beyleveld: No, because I did not link it to the incident at that point.

Mr Horn: Okay. In terms of your investigation, how often did Dr Nandipha visit?

Mr Beyleveld: She visited regularly until November 2021.

Mr Horn: And if you say regularly, how often was that?

Mr Beyleveld: I do not want to commit; I would rather send a document to the Committee as all the visits were recorded.

Mr Horn: Okay, and when did she start visiting?

Mr Beyleveld: I do not want to commit myself, but I think it was in 2017.

Mr Horn: So, I would assume that, as part of your intelligence activities at G4S, you have a careful look at visits to inmates, frequency of new visitors, specifically also visits that do stop. Is that correct?

Mr Beyleveld: I need to answer that on behalf of the people at the centre. I am not directly responsible for that. But, according to my knowledge, yes, visits are monitored carefully and stopped whenever there are reasons to stop them – which is legal and not just stopped because of the nature of stop.

Mr Horn: Can inmates be favoured with gifts, provisions or items they may need, which fall within the protocol by visitors?

Mr Monyante: During the training of employees, we have got a module that we call Improper Dealing. In that module, we have listed all instances that can lead to irregularities by the employees. And one of those things is that we do not approve that employees must have wrong dealings with the inmates. So, we did not approve that if it happened.

Mr Horn: Lastly, Chair, in terms of your protocols, and I am not talking human beings, I am talking your systems, which you I think we are at pains today to say that was the primary focus of your investigation... What has been amended and specifically strengthened based on your investigation?

Mr Beyleveld: The door that gives access to the system at the back, entrance is restricted. It is now only the personnel of Integritron and G4S employees who are allowed in there, and the key is also managed according to that. We have requested the service provider to install an intelligent lock on the door so that there can be biometric readers available when someone enters and to ensure that there is no possibility of tampering with the security system in future.

Chairperson: Thank you very much, Honourable Horn. Honourable Dyantyi.

Mr R Dyantyi (ANC): Thank you, Chair. The advantage of being last is that you would have been covered by everybody, so it gives me a free licence to just do follow-ups. Maybe the first thing to do is just to make a brief comment so that you know where my headspace is. We are not interested in Thabo Bester or G4S. Our interest must be about how we fix the system that we have in our institutions. If you take a mental patient to Valkenberg, your interest is not about differentiating these patients; it is about whether that system is going to take care of that patient when you take them there. That, for me, is the issue. So, Mr Groenewoud, this is a law that has rules, and this is a country that has rules. I want to take you back to page two of your input because part of what we want to do here is to use the opportunity to get out of this crisis, to be able to see what the operation failures and lapses are, as well as what policy failures exist so that we can fix them. This is about us fixing our country, and these institutions, so we expect you, since you have taken an oath to help us do that, by telling the truth. I want to make this point, Chair – G4S is an international company, and you have had these challenges in the United Kingdom (UK). So, when you all went to appear in Parliament there do you ask for summons, when you go to that Parliament? You do not, do you?

Mr Groenewoud: I do not know what the system is for appearing in front of this type of Committee in the UK.

Mr Dyantyi: We have done the research. You do not look for summons; you appear because that is a Parliament of that country, and everybody goes there. This is a Portfolio Committee of the Parliament of this country. Your statement says that, if you continued last week, it would have been unlawful. We do not operate on summons; that is the last thing that we attend to. And I think it is important that we make that point because tomorrow we are going to ask somebody else to come in and account to this body. I want us to bury that issue because it does not sit well with me. I still do not understand why G4S wanted a summons. Mr Beyleveld, you are responsible for audit and risk as a director?

Mr Beyleveld: Correct.

Mr Dyantyi: You also mentioned that contract is one of the issues that you are responsible for. Is that correct?

Mr Beyleveld: Correct.

Mr Dyantyi: So, I want to go straight into the contract that you have with DCS. You do have a contract with DCS that is 20 something years long, right?

Mr Beyleveld: There is a contract with the Department of Correctional Services, yes.

Mr Dyantyi: Who is the consortium, and who are the shareholders of G4S?

Mr Beyleveld: Bloemfontein Correctional Contracts is the main contractor. The shareholders are Old Mutual (20%), G4S (20%) Fikile Projects (20%), and Ten Alliance (20%).

Mr Dyantyi: Okay. In your own view, because the three of you are holding different positions… Those two sitting there are more operational, and yours is away from the operations. I was very curious from how you were answering questions on operational matters. I have been watching that space. And when questions are thrown, they start looking at you when it is an operational matter, and you ventured into it. And I will bring some of those. Still with you, Mr Beyleveld – so, with everything else that has happened, because from where I am sitting chair, the escape of Mr Bester is not the start of the rot in that prison. The problem did not start with the escape. It seems that there have been problems throughout, and the escape is just a culmination of issues. Mr Groenewoud, where is Mr Bester? Where is Thabo Bester?

Mr Groenewoud: I learned from the news that he was arrested by the authorities near Arusha in Dar es Salaam. Other than that I have no further information.

Mr Dyantyi: In your presentation here today, under oath, you told us Thabo Bester died, so I am repeating the question to you – where is Thabo Bester?

Mr Groenewoud: I think the presentation needs to be put into context. What we did say was that, on 03 May, a body was discovered in cell 35, and we received a notice of death and a death certificate for Thabo Bester relating to that body only. So, that is the information we had at hand. I appreciate that today we are looking back with 2020 vision. That is the information we had up to that point. On 25 May, we were informed by SAPS that it is not a suicide. This person died from blunt force trauma. And there was no smoke in the trachea, if I recall.

Mr Dyantyi: You can pause there, because part of your report, you have not believed what you have been told by the other stakeholders. Mr Beyleveld, where is Thabo Bester?

Mr Beyleveld: I think my colleague has indicated that, according to the information that we have, he is now arrested.

Mr Dyantyi: And today this morning, you said Thabo Bester has died, so which one must I take?

Mr Beyleveld: My colleague has explained.

Mr Dyantyi: I am asking Mr Beyleveld, not your colleague.

Mr Beyleveld: I have indicated that my colleague has explained that the way that the presentation was done is based on the information that we had during the investigation and that the escape was only reported to us later, at the beginning of this year.

Mr Dyantyi: Mr Monyante, two questions to you… The first one is, when all of this happened, who was the Mangaung Correctional Centre director? Was it you?

Mr Monyante: Yes, honourable Member. It was still me.

Mr Dyantyi: Everything happened under you?

Mr Monyante: That is correct.

Mr Dyantyi: You are still the director there?

Mr Monyante: Not currently as we are talking.

Mr Dyantyi: Have you been dismissed?

Mr Monyante: No.

Mr Dyantyi: Why?

Mr Monyante: No, I did not commit any misconduct.

Mr Dyantyi: When everything else happened under you?

Mr Monyante: Yes.

Mr Dyantyi: Wow. Okay. Let me proceed. Just to be quick, so that we do not assume things here. These reports are not secret reports. So, I just want you to indicate, who are the Bloemfontein High Court Judge and the Constitutional Court judges? They are not named here. These judges do this work, they share it with us, and then we follow it as the Portfolio Committee. I do not know why their names are not mentioned. You mentioned these judges to lift what they would have seen not the totality of things, because this is not the report of the judges. You took out a quote, which seems to be suiting you. So, who are the two judges?

Mr Beyleveld: The ConCourt judge is Justice Trond, and the judges that visited the centre once were judge van Rhyn and Daniso.

Mr Dyantyi: Thank you. This information should have been in the report. So, here is the issue, in this centre, and this is a heads up to DCS because they are going to have to deal with this as well. Do you have a risk assessment that you do of the inmates when they raise these issues? Do you do risk assessments when an inmate says I do not feel safe here? Is there a process where somebody assesses what this inmate says? Or you just do what the inmate says, as you did what Thabo Bester said to you?

Mr Monyante: We do not do a recorded assessment, because if you were to ask me the record, I will not be able to give you that assessment.

Mr Dyantyi: What assessment do you do?

Mr Monyante: If, for example, the inmate has disclosed in his application, our security Department will have followed that information. I am quoting this because, in some of the applications, the inmates will say they do not want to disclose.

Mr Dyanyi: So, if have a situation in St. Albans, where 20 inmates come to you and all of them say they are at risk in a cell or in the Mongolian Correctional Centre, how do you move on that? You seem to be agreeing once an inmate says that it must be done.

Mr Beyleveld: The Correctional Services Act Section 30 determines that an inmate may apply to be kept in own-safety, and that is what we apply.

Mr Dyantyi: But the Act would not go into how you design that system. It is about operations. The Act is not an operational matter, based on that Act you need to build a system as to how you are going to implement what the Act says. You do not have to generate it if it does not exist. All you can say is that you do not do this risk assessment; you share what the inmate says and then you proceed along those ways as you did with Thabo Bester. Am I correct in that understanding?

Mr Monyante: You are correct.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay. In the Mangaung Correctional Centre before Thabo Bester came, how many inmates would have asked for this transfer?

Mr Monyante: Honestly, when I remember I will not have it in my mind to say exactly how.

Mr Dyantyi: No, I do not want it to be in your mind. Do you have it on records?

Mr Monyante: Yes, we have the register in that single cell building.

Mr Dyantyi: Can we get it tomorrow because it is available information?

Mr Monyante: I will contact the centre and check if they can send it for tomorrow.

Mr Dyantyi: We will be here tomorrow. The colleagues have also followed that up to understand because, with Thabo Bester, it looks like it was on the day. That inmate asked for this it happened immediately. Is that how it normally happens at the facility?

Mr Monyante: That is correct.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay, maybe just also summarise on record. What are the actual threats that Thabo Bester said he was afraid of?

Mr Beyleveld: The document that he completed indicated – that he is scared for his life because of the 26 gang, and that he did not have money to pay them off.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay, thank you. Before I go to the next short issue – in your documents, you say you informed JICS six days later, on 09 May. Is that the standard then when there is an inmate that would have died? Is JICS informed a week later?

Mr Monyante: My colleagues have indicated that the responsibility of reporting was with the controller’s office and not necessarily with our office. Our office’s duty is to report to the controller on site.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay. Back to systems. Do you keep a visitor's register and the footage in the Mangaung Correctional Centre?

Mr Monyante: The records of people that come to visit the inmates are kept because we use an electronic system, but we do not keep the footage.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay. Can we get the records of visitors that would have been there from 14 April to 29 April 2022, tomorrow morning, when we start because this is available information?

Mr Beyleveld: It will not be possible.

Mr Dyantyi: Why?

Mr Beyleveld: Information is only kept for seven days. If there is an incident, a backup is made of all the information regarding the incident. There is no record of every day being kept for a long period.

Mr Dyantyi: There is no record?

Mr Groenewoud: If I may just help my colleague with your question… the Honourable Member’s question is not regarding the video footage that we retain only for seven days. The question is around physical evidence of visitations to inmate Bester.

Mr Beyleveld: That is available. I was talking about the video footage that was referred to.

Mr Dyantyi: Can we get that tomorrow?

Mr Beyleveld: Yes, you can get it tomorrow.

Mr Dyantyi: Thank you. Does it happen that you would have this register say, for example, for a month and then in this register there would have been a visitor who not in the register? Has that ever happened in the Mangaung Correctional Centre?

Mr Beyleveld: It was never reported to me that somebody who was at the precinct was not registered in the register. There are different controls and people doing the bookings for the visit. It is not the same people who accept visitors and conduct visits daily.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay, thank you. Back to you Mr Groenewoud and Mr Beyleveld. It is about the contract itself. Have you picked up any red flags about this contract that you have between the DCS and yourself?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Member if you refer to red flags, can you be a bit more specific? Please?

Mr Dyantyi: Okay, let me do it this way. If this Committee asked DCS to terminate the contract with you, would that be a problem – based on what has been presented to us, based on issues of performance, competence, maybe not this Committee but those that are signing the contract?

Mr Groenewoud: I think the correct thing would be for the performance to be judged against the obligations in the contract and for a determination then to be made as to whether there are grounds for early termination or not.

Mr Dyantyi: What we have witnessed throughout the day today, not just listening to TV, not social media, from your own presentation… The questions posed to you is that, as I am sitting here, my first inclination when we get to DCS is that they have got to tell us why they cannot terminate the contract. So, can you assist us to indicate why would you have difficulty with a contract being terminated, when there is no performance on that contract? Before you respond – this is a serious reputational risk not to DCS but to the countries in Southern Africa. That is how seriously we take it, because we take people who have wronged society to these institutions, and they need to be kept and looked after in a particular way. And what we have heard here is that you can have an inmate that can have a party and a big thing whilst he is still in prison. You indicated to Mr Swart that you do not know about that and that it is mind-boggling. Why must we keep this contract?

Mr Groenewoud: That is up to the parties to the contract to decide whether there are merits to this contract. We are discussing one major event here, and I do not take anything away from that. But I think this event needs to be seen from the perspective of 22 years of operation. That is not my decision to make. That is for the parties to the contract to make.

Mr Dyantyi: Would all three of you agree that this contract does not deserve any further day to continue?

Mr Groenewoud: I would disagree with it.

Mr Dyantyi: Why?

Mr Groenewoud: Because I think our performance – l we are discussing a single event here. As I said, I am not taking anything away from the gravity of the event. Our track record over 22 years is a good track record, if compared to other private and public facilities.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay. Let me leave that. Back to both of you. Thabo Bester and his studies – what did he study? What did he register for? Forget now about the laptop, because it was linked to his studies. What did he study for?

Mr Beyleveld: Graphic design.

Mr Dyantyi: In complete, Principles of Graphic Design?

Mr Beyleveld:  That is correct.

Mr Dyantyi: How long was that course?

Mr Beyleveld: You cannot say you do not know. How long was that graphic design course that Thabo Bester as an inmate was registered for that that allowed him to have a laptop? The laptop has been explained here that Thabo Bester was studying principles of graphic design. How long was that?

Mr Monyante: Honestly, I do not know. But I can find out from the institution, the term of that course.

Mr Dyantyi: And that is your inmate?

Mr Monyante: That is correct.

Mr Dyantyi: Now. Here is information. So, I want you to deny or confirm this. The principles of graphic design course – in terms of the schedule, he would have ended this in January 2021. I do not know whether he passed or whatever, but that was the end of the course. So, why would he still have had a laptop to do all these kinds of things? Please assist me. I am already also assisting you to fill the gaps.

Mr Beyleveld: From my side, I cannot answer that question. Once again, we will have to go back to the principal who deals with this to give us a proper answer on that. I do not want to guess and bring the Committee on a wrong perception of what might be the case.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay, thank you. We are going to interact with SAPS. Maybe before I make that point, Mr Groenewoud, do you blame SAPS? And let me explain this, based on the tone of your presentation here today and everything else you have said, there is a grief about SAPS.

Chairperson: You have five minutes.

Mr Dyantyi: Thank you. Do you blame SAPS?

Mr Groenewoud: There is no grief about steps, and I certainly do not blame SAPS. My presentation and the facts that we have tabled to this Committee were to factually record what happened. To explain to the Committee that there were three concurrent investigations running – SAPS was dealing with a forensic investigation, as I have explained, and SAPS set the pace of that investigation. At certain times, they did not want to make certain information available to us. I am not sure why that decision was taken. When they asked for information from us from 01 June 2022, we submitted all information to them and as you heard from my colleague, Mr Beyleveld, earlier today. There was, has been and still is a very good working relationship regarding this matter between ourselves and SAPS. I certainly do not blame them.

Mr Dyantyi: That is good to hear. Thank you. The crime scene at the cell where the body that we later found out was not Thabo Bester’s was burnt – did you clean that scene before the police arrived?

Mr Beyleveld: According to the information that I have, that cell was cleaned after the SAPS released the cell after the body of the person that was in there was removed.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay. Well, we will find that out because, just listening in on the court proceedings, the charges are quite serious. Aiding, abetting, but more seriously, defeating the ends of justice is one other charge that is there, but we will hear that. We are not there yet. I want you to confirm this. You made this point quite early and very emphatically – the issue of smoke detectors. I want you to walk slowly with me. Are you saying there are no smoke detectors there or are you saying they do not work?

Mr Monyante: There are no smoke detectors in Broadway.

Mr Dyantyi: They do not exist?

Mr Monyante: They do not exist.

Mr Dyantyi: And if we do find that there are smoke detectors?

Mr Monyante: It will really be a shock for me because I have never seen smoke detectors in single cells.

Mr Dyantyi: Okay, Chair, Thank you for now.

Chairperson: Since you gave us your presentation today, we did not have an opportunity to go to your presentation. Can you assist us? Which part of your presentations are a contravention of the law or contract?

Mr Beyleveld: Can you just repeat the question please, honourable Chair?

Chairperson: I am saying which part of your presentations are a contravention of the law or contract? I am asking because you said one of the reasons you wanted to be summonsed was because there are things that you did not want to say that would violate your contractual obligation or legal obligation. So, based on what you have presented, which parts are a contravention of the law or contract?

Mr Groenewoud: Honourable Chair, if I may answer that… And it is a very important point that I made this morning. We did not seek privilege to get immunity. We did not seek privilege because we were fearful that we would come here and say anything that would incriminate ourselves. For that reason, we wanted immunity. That was not the case. In terms of the Correctional Services Act, we are prevented from speaking to any third party without consent. We then could not come here without a summons that allows us to speak freely here without that consent, knowing that what we say here will go into the public domain. Secondly, in terms of the contract between MCC and BCC, and between BCC and the Department, we are precluded contractually from speaking to third parties. All information pertaining to the operations of the Mangaung facility must be communicated through the Department of Correctional Services and we would have breached that legal obligation on us had we appeared here without the summons. For that reason, and I believe it should be seen in a positive way. We sought to get a summons so that we could appear here without breaking the law. It is a very important point I needed to make. Had we appeared without that summons, we would have contravened the Correctional Services Act; we would have contravened the contract that we have with the Department.

Chairperson: No, we will come back to that maybe even tomorrow, because you will not be excused until this process is over. We will come back to that. Would you agree with me that financial crime was committed in a prison that is under your control?

Mr Groenewoud: I have no evidence of a financial crime. What we know today for the benefit of hindsight is that inmate Bester escaped from Mangaung Correctional Centre, but I have no evidence of a financial crime having been committed.

Chairperson: It is even possible that, with the lapses in your system, that people could easily commit or plan terrorist attacks, because your systems cannot detect those things.

Mr Groenewoud: I think it would be irresponsible of me to speculate on what is possible. I can only go on the facts that are available to me of what happened and the actions that we that we took. Moving beyond that would be speculation on my part. I am sorry. I cannot answer that question.

Chairperson: Thank you very much. I think we are done for now. I think we are done. I think it is important that we must hear the next presentation. They will not be excused. Should there be a need to come back to them, we will do that. So, we will release you for now from sitting there. But you are not released from these proceedings. It is highly possible that, during our interaction with other people, we might want one or two things to be clarified. So, you must be around. Can we have a 10-minute break? Then Integritron will take the seat after.

Chairperson: Now, we will be receiving a presentation from Integritron. But before we do that, I will hand over to the Legal Adviser to administer oath.

Oaths and Affirmations

Legal Advisor: You have been invited subject to the provisions of Section 16 of Powers, Privileges, and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act 44 of 2004, to appear before this Committee as a witness and to ask the questions in respect of the Committee's oversight with meeting into the circumstances relating to the escape of Mr Thabo Bester from the Mangaung Correctional Centre and related matters. Please be informed that, by law, you are required to answer fully and satisfactorily all the questions lawfully put to you, or to produce any documents that you are required to produce in connection with the subject matter of the inquiry, notwithstanding the fact that the answer or the documents could incriminate you or expose you to criminal or civil proceedings or damages. You are, however, protected in that evidence given under oath or affirmation before a House or Committee may not be used against you in any court or place outside Parliament, except in criminal proceedings concerning a charge of perjury or a charge relating to the evidence or documents required in these proceedings. Please be aware that, in terms of section 17, two of the Powers, Privileges, and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act, a person who wilfully furnishes a House or Committee with information or makes a statement before it, which is false or misleading, commits an offence and is liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years. Could you kindly state your full name and designation for the record please?

Ms Pedro: Litichia Pedro, Director at Integritron.

Legal Advisor: Thanks, Ms Leticia Pedro. You are required to take an oath or affirm that the evidence you are about to give is truthful. You may choose to take the oath or the affirmation. Which do you prefer?

Ms Pedro: An oath, please.

Legal Advisor: Please raise your right hand and repeat after me: ‘I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God’.

Ms Pedro: I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.

Legal Advisor: The witness is duly sworn in.

Legal Advisor: Sir, please state your full name and designation for the record.

Mr Williams: Dylan Williams, Internal Legal Advisor for Integritron.

Legal Advisor: Thanks, Mr. Dylan Williams. You are required to take an oath or affirm that the evidence you are about to give is truthful. You may choose to take the oath or the affirmation. Which do you prefer?

Mr Williams: The oath, please.

Legal Advisor: Please raise your right hand and repeat after me. ‘I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God’.

Mr Williams: I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.

Legal Advisor: The witness is duly sworn in. Thank you.

Chairperson: Thank you very much now. You can now make your presentation.

Briefing by Integritron

Mr Williams: Honourable Chair and Committee Members, good afternoon. We have not specifically done a presentation which will be posted. We have even furnished the honourable Committee and the Committee Secretariat with affidavits which I believe you are put in possession of. If we may briefly run you through that, as we know that time is of the utmost importance... So, without detracting from the severity of the matter, we would like to run you through the contents of our affidavit which my colleague has deposed you. So, considering the recent developments, and media publicity, which has come to light, we received a notice from the Department of Correctional Services on 22 March 2023, requesting certain information which could aid the Department of Correctional Services, and, of course, the Committee in the investigations. I wish to place on record or at the outset that it should be noted that Integritron was merely contracted by G4S to provide qualified technical resources to maintain the security installation for G4S at the Mangaung Correctional Services. With that being said, the management of the system is done by G4S. Integritron is not contracted to manage the system, but rather maintain the system. Further to that, excluded from our scope of work is the maintenance of the security installation, which excludes ICT infrastructure – which is the information and Community Technology Infrastructure and the power for electrical installations including backup power. In accordance with the notice received, as alluded to earlier on 22 March 2023… As mentioned, certain information was requested from our offices. And amongst that information was information regarding the salco buttons, the cameras, their respective DVR recordings, and the SCADA logs for sound calls – as will be noted from the affidavit. It should also be noted that it is a daily function that the Integritron Integrated Solution technician on duty for maintenance is required to check the equipment in the equipment room prior to leaving site. Footage available confirms that the respective technician on the morning or rather on 02 May 2022 entered the equipment expected at close of shifts on the evening of the 2nd on or about 19:38. Recordings from the DVR see shortly after, according to the DVR logs and time displayed on the footage. Considering the recent news headlines regarding the incident, what was thought to be a suicide is now being investigated as a murder. Based on this new information, we undertook to initiate our internal investigations and subjected the said individual to said polygraph test. As alluded to by the honourable Committee Member Swart earlier, the results of the said polygraph test came back negative. We have recently received information that this individual has subsequently had himself over to the SAPS, and I believe that they are conducting further investigations. Further to this, there were four individuals from Integritron Integrated Solutions who arrived on site on 04 May to conduct their respective investigations into what had transpired and the subsequent escape of Thabo Bester. These individuals who were on site on the day conducted their respective investigations and it was found that all the systems were operational, and everything was in working order. But, when the DVR systems went off at 19:38 and then appeared the following morning at 04:11, during that period is when the incident occurred. And that is all I wish to state.

Discussion

Ms Ramolobeng: Thanks, Chair. Good afternoon, colleagues. And we welcome the presentation even though it was not flagged. Who have resigned from Integritron? Is it Van Tonder? 

Ms Pedro: That is correct.

Ms Ramolobeng: What was the reasons for him to resign?

Ms Pedro: He had other opportunities lined up for him as per his resignation

Ms Ramolobeng: When was the resignation?

Ms Pedro: On 03 August 2022.

Ms Ramolobeng: When did you start conducting investigations?

Ms Pedro: We started investigations on 04 May 2022, so he was part of the investigation team.

Ms Ramolobeng: 04 May 2022?

Ms Pedro: That is correct.

Ms Ramolobeng: And then he resigned in August and there was nothing on him?

Ms Pedro: Well, we cannot really investigate him and at the time; we did not have any reason to.

Ms Ramolobeng: Did you try to investigate him?

Ms Pedro: At the time, we did not have any reason to.

Ms Ramolobeng: And did you try to investigate him this time?

Ms Pedro: He is out of our employ.

Ms Ramolobeng: The guy that did the polygraph test – it is cited in one of your affidavits that some of his answers were evasive or not conclusive and you got that report. What is it that you have done? I have recently read that you kept him regardless of that, even though the polygraph test would have said negative, but there is a remark on it.

Mr Williams: So, what we subsequently undertook to do rather was to subject him to disciplinary hearings. We have suspended him, and as earlier mentioned, he has now handed himself to SAPS.

Ms Ramolobeng: When did you suspend him?

Mr Williams: Speaking under correction, but considering the recent public holidays, it would have been the following Tuesday. So, we found this information out on 31 March. We undertook our internal meetings, and we subjected him to disciplinary action on the 31st.

Ms Pedro: So, he was suspended, effectively on 03 April.

Ms Ramolobeng: 31 of March 2023. When did you do that polygraph test?

Mr Williams: So, the polygraph test was done on the 31st. Let me clarify, so that following Tuesday upon receipt of this and taking into consideration the respective public holidays, his disciplinary was held on that Tuesday, and he was suspended immediately.

Ms Ramolobeng: Okay, based on the missing footage, between 19:38 on the said day of 03 May, or early hours of the same day, there is missing footage between 19:38 to 04:11am, when it resumed recording, and you indicate that it is based on power cuts, and so forth. Is it possible that it might have emanated from being played with, and in this insistence on someone tampering with it?

Mr Williams: What I can say is that the only logical conclusion that one can deduce based on this individual who was there during that time is that it may have been possible that he tampered with the cables, the DVR cables.

Ms Ramolobeng: And those the server of that system that is behind Broadway? Is it behind Broadway? The setup of that system? Where can you tamper with it?

Mr Williams: I am not able to answer that. I am not aware of that.

Ms Ramolobeng: The said official that was there – you mentioned in page two that the daily technician who is responsible must make sure that before leaving on the said day must make sure that all maintenance regarding equipment prior to leaving the site are correctly checked and functional, and so forth. Did the said official do exactly as what you would have stated here?

Mr Williams: I cannot with certainty say that he acted.

Ms Ramolobeng: Did you try to find out?

Mr Williams: What we can very well say is that the video footage will show that an individual walks in at approximately 19:38 towards the so-called server room the control room, which you are alluding to. Then minutes after that, the system ceases to display any footage.

Ms Ramolobeng: Okay, between me and all of us in this room, we can safely say it was tampered with.

Mr Williams: I cannot with certainty say it was, but if that is the deduction one wants to make, then yes.

Ms Ramolobeng: One of the affidavits that was written indicates that the official eventually opened on the said event and made and indicated that eventually there was a plan from G4S officials that resulted in the escape of Bester and so forth and so on – to an extent that he was asked to play a role in switching off the cameras. Did we find out that he did eventually switch off the cameras?

Mr Williams: Like I mentioned earlier, he has now subsequently, considering what has transpired and this information coming to light, handed himself over to SAPS.

Ms Ramolobeng: Did we give this information to SAPS?

Mr Williams: I have provided this information to the respective individuals at the Mangaung Correctional Centre as well as the Lieutenant Colonel, who we received a notice from.

Ms Ramolobeng: So, you have been cooperating with SAPS?

Mr Williams: We have been cooperating with SAPS over and above the information that has been requested from us. Thank you.

Ms Ramolobeng: Thank you, Chair.

Chairperson: Honourable Jele.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Thank you very much. My first question is that upon getting that contract. Were you aware that there is a blind spot around in that area?

Ms Pedro: I cannot confirm. Unfortunately, the technicians are the people with the technical knowledge. We can ask the question to them and revert to the Committee on that.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Now that you know, how do you think you can assist G4S to fix that?

Ms Pedro: We have not got that far, but considering the events, we were not able to get the site and look at an action plan to prevent any of this from happening again, going forward.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Did G4S inform you about the occurrence of the switching off?

Mr Williams: Sorry, just repeat the question.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Did G4S contact you or informed you? When did they inform you about the occurrence?

Mr Williams: I cannot certainly say when we were informed. I am speaking under correction that we came there the day after the incident to conduct our investigations into the specific cameras, the DVR recordings, the SCADA logs, and the buttons.

Ms Maseko-Jele: So, no one informed you – you just came as a routine?

Ms Pedro: No, we were informed, and I speak under correction, either on the third or the fourth, but we were inside on the fourth, so it could have been the third.

Ms Maseko-Jele: How many days?

Ms Pedro: If were informed on the third, we were inside the next day.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Okay. My other question is that, would you say it is strange that the incident occurred, according to your own judgement, knowing the devices because they are yours?

Mr Williams: Which incident are you referring to?

Ms Maseko-Jele: I am talking about the switching off the server within that timeframe because you said the whole thing was in order when you went there, and nothing was wrong with the machines. So, I am asking, would you say it is strange? I am repeating the same question that was asked before because I did not get a clear answer.

Mr Williams: It was certainly strange, and one would presume that it is not within standard protocol, that the system would be switched off.

Ms Maseko-Jele: So, would you say it was deliberate?

Mr Williams: Like I said, it was not within standard protocol.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Would you say it is deliberate, according to your own observation?

Mr Williams: I cannot say that it was deliberate. What I can say is that this respective individual who was involved has handed himself over to SAPS.

Ms Maseko-Jele: According to the observation that we did, that place where cell 35 is, is not clear from when you are in the control room when. Hence, you can see that there is that blind spot. Were you aware of this during the camera installation process?

Mr Williams: I am sorry, I'm not understanding the question.

Ms Maseko-Jele: Were you aware of the blind spots near cell 35 during the camera installation process?

Ms Pedro: As I mentioned, I cannot confirm that this was the fact, but I will speak to the technicians on site, and they will be the best people to give a response on that. So, we will revert tomorrow.

Ms Maseko-Jele: I saw your reaction on the issue of Mr Van Tonder when you were asked if you are going to investigate him. Did you mean you are not going to investigate him?

Ms Pedro: I will try and get information. But as I mentioned, he is not under our employ. Hence, we have mentioned in the report for SAPS to take this further if they see fit. But I do not mind. If I am in the means to request the information or to question him I will do that to try and with assist with this investigation.
 
Ms Maseko-Jele: I want to confirm that you said you have nothing to do with the officials that are working there? Are you confirming that those officials who are operating that system are hired by G4S?

Ms Pedro: So, we have our technicians – Integritron technicians. The officials working in the control room are either from DCS or G4S. So, we can only report on our staff – the Integritron technicians.

Mr Williams: If I may just add to your previous question with regards to Mr Van Tonder… at the time of the incident, Mr Van Tonder did depose two affidavits which were provided to G4S. Thank you.

Chairperson: Thank you, honourable Jele. Honourable Yako.

Ms Yako: Thank you very much, Chairperson. Integritron says that its responsibility is maintenance, and G4S is responsible for managing the equipment. So, upon your investigation on 04 May 2022, did you then compile a report and have further talks with G4S prior to the involvement that you are in this year with SAPS?

Ms Pedro: Yes, we compiled the report after the investigation and it was submitted to G4S, and it is one of the appendices.

Ms Yako: May I ask when it was submitted?

Mr Williams: It was submitted on 12 May 2022.

Ms Yako: In the same month? And what responsibility did you take for the lack of functioning of the equipment?

Mr Williams: As per our report, we made certain recommendations and conclusions based on the findings we found on the 4th – certain recommendations to improve and enhance the system and to ensure that a similar situation may not happen again.

Ms Yako: Okay, and how many times has the system been off before?

Mr Williams: I cannot have certainty to say. As my colleague alluded to earlier, the technical team may be able to shed light on that.

Ms Yako: Okay, upon your discussions with G4S, you compiled a report at the same time. What was the reaction from G4S with regard to your report on 24 May? What was the response from G4S upon your compiled report to them as to how the system malfunctioned? And what was your role in it?

Ms Pedro: Well, after submitting the report to Mr Johann at the time, we did not receive a response. But along with the report and along with the recommendations, we submitted quotations to get the system where it should be with the desired working conditions. But as I have just said, we have not received any response. For some of the recommendations and the quotations we have submitted, we have received purchase orders and we went ahead. We are still waiting for some of the main implementations to be made.

Ms Yako: So, G4S never responded positively to your recommendations?

Ms Pedro: Upon submitting this report, no.

Ms Yako: Okay, thank you very much.

Ms Pedro: We did, however… my colleague, who is not currently here, had a telephone with Mr Johann afterwards, but there was no further discussion around that.

Ms Yako: Just one last question, Chair, with your indulgence. After that incident, and you recommended those measures with the G4S and they did not respond to you, have you ever been called again to come and do maintenance of the same systems?

Ms Pedro: Yes.

Ms Yako: For the same thing?

Ms Pedro: Every day. So, we just do preventative maintenance on those pieces of equipment.

Ms Yako: Thank you.

Mr Nqola: I have only one question but before that, allow me to submit that the country is being taken for a ride here. Honourable Dyantyi is correct in saying that the last learning programme and the date of Mr Bester is 20 January 2021. We are told in this Committee that, on 04 April 2022, a laptop was found, which was authorised to Mr Bester for purposes of studying – a year after the end date of his studies. So, the country is being taken for a ride. In the affidavit you deposed, you give a scenario of what happened between 19:00pm on 02 May and 04:00am on 03 May. You give a scenario of a man who enters a room where the operating arrangement is kept, and the man enters the room at 19:38pm. But in your investigation, you pick up that some DVRS stopped functioning at that time until 04:11 on 03 May 2022, which is immediately after the incident. You equally explain to us that people, who know less about the ICT profession, usually when such malfunctions happen in the system, directly report to the operators in the operating room. Can you explain to us, just briefly, what these DVRs that you are talking about are, for a layman like me? And what is their role for record-keeping purposes? Thank you.

Ms Pedro: I will just touch on this. But as I mentioned, I would need to give a technical response to this. So, the DVR does the recording. So, as we mentioned in the report, the DVR was for recording. The recording was available because the footage was available afterwards for that period. And immediately as he entered the server room, the recording was offline. And then the recording went back online the next morning after four.

Mr Nqola. That is enough. Thank you, Chairperson.

Ms Newhoudt-Druchen: Thank you, Chair. Some questions from myself for clarity. I want to know, when you were talking about your technicians you said there are four of them. Do they take turns within a 24-hour service?

Mr Williams: So, as I understand it, and speaking under correction, there was a technician there on 02 May 2022. The remaining technicians that I speak of were dispatched upon the incident happening. I am not entirely sure how many individuals were there on the said day.

Ms Pedro: For clarification, the four technicians referred to in the report were assisting with the investigation. So, two of them were dispatched from head office and one of the senior techs assisted telephonically. Normally, we have three guys on site, and they do take turns on the 24-hour standby.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Okay, so on 24-hour standby, right? So, when there is a switch-off on your system, does nobody get notified? Or did anybody know that the system was switched off?

Ms Pedro: So, if you refer to the recommendations – unfortunately, there was no heads up, or indication that the system was offline or did not record. That plus one of our recommendations for the system to alert the officials that the recording has stopped.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: I am not talking about the recommendations; I am talking about the day that the fire happened. We are told the system was switched off. So, I want to know from those of you, who were not in the control room, but outside. I mean, if you are the director of the company, nobody, none of your stuff picked up that the system was off? Nobody?

Ms Pedro: No. So, he was the only one, and he was about to knock off after 19:00 that evening. And as I mentioned, and again, in the report, it was submitted to G4S. We made the recommendation that we should implement this for the superiors or the officials to be alerted or notified when the system is not recording or the system is offline, while the cameras are offline, etc.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Okay, so that is only in the recommendations. So, on that day, nothing like that happened. So now, when was this report given with recommendation? When was it given to G4S?

Ms Pedro: On 12 May 2022.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: So, 12 May 2022. And you said there was no response except the telephonic response? When was the telephonic response?

Ms Pedro: I cannot recall. My apologies that I cannot.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: But it was still in 2022?

Ms Pedro: Yes, it was.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: So, I am asking because from May 2022 up until today, 2023 you have had no response to the recommendations that you gave. I am assuming you still have a contract with G4S?

Ms Pedro: Yes, we do have a contract. We are in talks with them and there are emails of correspondence in terms of updating the quotes, so they are looking into upgrading the system or getting the necessary measures in place to avoid what happened. So, they are looking into following their recommendations.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Okay, but there was no response for something to be implemented one year later, or up until now nothing to be implemented and no response with regards to something that needs to be implemented?

Ms Pedro: No, there was. Like I have just mentioned that there was a telephone call, and the quotations were submitted but nothing was finalised at the time.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Okay, so now with the load shedding that has been happening and G4S telling us that the electricity for that box failed, what does your investigation say into why the electricity failed on that box?

Ms Pedro: Well, at the time, as per the report, it was a power failure, but that has been resolved up until now as I am aware that the UPS has been installed.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: I wanted to add to what my colleague said about the blind spot. I do not know when you first signed your contract with the G4S or whether you have seen that area where there are no cameras. Did you not see prior to the fire happening or the incident that there is a blind spot so that you can put a camera there? Because like it was said, I mean it was near an emergency exit? Did you not see that there was a need for a camera prior to the fire happening?

Ms Pedro: I will have to come back on that one specifically. I will liaise with our technicians and revert.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Okay. Thank you.

Adv Swart: Thank you very much. I am just trying to understand the affidavit which we only received today and some of the processes. So, your job is the maintenance of security installation, which excludes the ICT infrastructure and the PA, but you got to make sure the cameras are operating, that the recorder is operating? Is that correct?

Mr Williams: That is correct.

Adv Swart: At this time, we have spent the whole morning looking at this exact time when the both the cameras were turned off from 19:38 on 02 May to 04:11am on 03 May. All the cameras were offline, plus the DVRs.

Mr Williams: That is correct.

Adv Swart: And you have got a screening of someone coming into the server room and turning off the recorder? Is that correct?

Ms Pedro: That is correct.

Adv Swart: Were all the cameras off?

Ms Pedro: No, the cameras were not off. The cameras were in working order; it was only at the DVR for that period that was not recording.

Mr Swart: I am trying to understand this whole thing about your letter, which is first in May last year when you indicate in your initial report. I mean, we are living in 2022. And we are still dealing with cassette recorders and VHS tapes. It is beyond comprehension. Can you explain how you as a company make use of VHS tapes that are re-recorded and reused multiple times currently when there is modern storage of information? I am referring to 17 May 2022. You have the duration of the recording system at G4S. The system uses video cassette recorders with VHS tapes. Two tapes were used per day, 12 hours each and reused multiple times. What I am trying to ascertain, firstly, is the integrity of the system. But secondly, the fact that six months later, we have got a challenge trying to get hold of types if they are reused, obviously.

Mr Williams: That is correct. You will note from our initial report on 12 May that those form part of the recommendations to improve and enhance the system.

Adv Swart: Yes, and it was correctly pointed out that there is a need to enhance the system. But it is just a combination of coincidences and issues that played into the hands of this escape. I am trying to also understand this issue related to the cell call and door, which was also not operating. That is in your letter from 12 May 2022. You have a lot of very technical terms. Explain to me, what is the cell call and door? What is that process? It is on page two of your letter to GCS. And there is another error with that, with the SQL database. Can you follow that and just explain that to us? What is the cell call and door? Obviously, that would presume that the logs for cell call logs where person calls from a cell or doors opened should be logged automatically. And there is a problem with that as well. So, we cannot ascertain at what time was that cell 45 door opened? Is that correct?

Ms Pedro: I will refer you to page 17, and it is part of the report that was submitted to G4S. Please allow me just to read that section. Cell call and door, when investigating the SCADA logs for cell call logs, and door status changes, Integritron noted that the historic data was not available in the adroit SCADA database. Integritron contacted the third-party service provider for assistance. It was noted that the audit agent was not running this agent logs all device status changes.

Adv Swart: Sorry to interrupt you. What do you mean by device status changes? What is this mean? Is this referring to doors opening and closing?

Ms Pedro: So, this report was compiled by our technicians. What it basically said is that the adroit SCADA system, which is the software, is a very old version that is running, and it is not doing what it is supposed to be doing. Hence, we have recommended an upgrade of that system.

Adv Swart: What data does it record?

Ms Pedro: The opening and the closing of the doors.

Adv Swart: So, Cell 35 plus the emergency door? So, that should be recorded but was not recorded due to problems with a system. Is that correct?

Ms Pedro: I would like to confirm that with our technicians.

Adv Swart: But you say it here, displayed errors. As a result, the connecting agents such as the audit had stopped. That is on 12 May 2022. So, there is another problem here. So, where we could have thought here is a system, and at least it has been in place at great cost, we can now find out what time the doors were opened and what time was the emergency door opened. We have been there, and we have seen that is the place this escape took place. So, there is another challenge that you are faced with. So, you make wonderful recommendations. The failures due to an unexpected error in SQL are resulting in the connection being suspended. And that means the data and the information relating to the opening of the cell door – the opening of the emergency door is not recorded. Is that correct? It is not rocket science. You said it. Is that correct?

Mr Williams: I cannot say with certainty.

Adv Swart: Well, look, you do not have to say it for certainty. You have already said it in your letter that you are recommending an upgrade of the system. And here, you say it was noted, and the database displayed errors. And connecting agents such as the audit agent had stopped. This is afterwards. I am trying to understand this issue of the power brakes. You also make great mention about that. And I appreciate that is not your responsibility – the power outages. Of course, when your own technician goes and unplugs it, then it is your responsibility. Would you not concede that? I mean, assuming and all probabilities indicate that everyone has, does everyone have access to the server room? Only your technicians have access to the server room? Is that correct?

Ms Pedro: Yes, that is correct. But the server room at this moment is not.

Adv Swart: I am not talking about now; I am talking about then?

Ms Pedro: No. So they were not the only ones. The controllers in the control room, they also would have access to the server.

Mr Swart: So, it is either the controllers who are supposed to be sitting at their control room, but where is the server room? It is not the same place, as I understand now.

Ms Pedro: It is like one room, and then you have the controllers, yes, and then is a doorway. And that is the control room.

Adv Swart: So, on the assumption that your technician went in, you see that someone comes in and unplugs it and that same person fails the polygraph test. There is a high probability that it was your technician, do you not agree?

Mr Williams: What we can say is that all evidence seems to suggest that.

Adv Swart: But can I just ask about the power system? I am intrigued about all the power breaks in your letter of 12 May, where the DVR logs your system operating power outages; 14 April,15 April, 16 April, 19 April, 28 April, and 29 April – that is when the power outages were for the recorder. On your letter from the second last paragraph, you say that, at those times, the recording was out. You also say that the UPSs that supported the equipment in the event of power loss and protect the equipment are not operational. So, in other words, there is no backup for all those dates, for whatever happened on those dates there was no backup system, and the DVR system did not work. I find it astonishing that you, as the technical group come in, and you are supposed to maintain the information. And yes, the power outages are not great, but on all these dates, the power is out, so all your system is down. Do you not agree? Is it not astonishing? That is just for one month. Do you have data or for January, February, March of that year? Can you provide that data for us as well? It will probably be the same thing.

Mr Williams: Not that I am aware of, but I can request that it is made available to you.

Adv Swart: Surely you as maintaining the system would have brought this to their attention and say, look, it is not my problem, but our systems are being affected by the fact that the power is down, and therefore our system is worth nothing. Do you not agree?

Mr Williams: Like I said, I cannot answer to what the technical team.

Adv Swart: I am sorry, what technical team are you referring to? Are you referring to your own technical team?

Mr Williams: That is correct.

Adv Swart: But then who must? Miss Pedro can you respond on behalf of your technical team? You indicate in here severe breaches of power for the month of April. We have this massive incident on 02 May, and now we are wise after the event. But what happens if the whole place burnt down or something far worse than this situation? Surely, there was something that should have been done to bring to the attention that these power outages and the backup systems are not working? And I find it very hard to believe that this was not brought to the attention of the authorities of GCS, and I am sure you did.

Ms Pedro: It was indeed brought to their attention. And as my colleague mentioned, we are there to maintain the system, and that is what we did. Hence, we have recommended our recommendations in our report. And we are managing those DVR specifically looking at them daily just to ensure that this is not happening again. But fortunately, with the UPSs being up and running now, we have not seen those recordings failing.

Adv Swart: So, it is another coincidence that, during this event, the power backups were not working. It is another coincidence which just plays into the conspiracy theory that this was carefully planned. And I am not accusing you of being involved, but there were people inside the prison that were aware of these deficiencies. And I put it to you that you contributed to this by not ensuring that the maintenance of the system was up to scratch in as much as there were power outages, which you say is out of your control. But you cannot say all these dates, yet nothing has happened until now. I am sure you must agree with me that it points out an egregious negligence. Do you have anything to comment on that?

Ms Pedro: No comment.

Adv Swart: Okay. I do not quite understand this strange affidavit that you have added by the interpreter who did the polygraph report. And this is part of an annexure that he has now provided on 31 May. And by the way, it seems that a lot of attention has only been given now in the last month or week. The incident took place last year. Now suddenly, everyone is running around doing polygraph tests. Cats are on a hot tin roof – everyone is jumping around. But this is an affidavit by the interpreter at the polygraph report who did the polygraph, and he indicates that there is some informal discussion that took place after this. Can you explain why is this attached? Was this given to the police?

Mr Williams: If I may shed some light on this matter. What happened is, on the day of the polygraph test when it was conducted… This individual whose affidavit you are referring to is indeed the translator that we had arranged to accompany the polygraph examinator on the day. Now, prior to the polygraph test, certain pertinent information was divulged to this translator, which was then relayed to us. We sought to have this individual pose to the affidavit.

Adv Swart: So, it is headed ‘Bester case versus Teboho Lipolo’, and this is an interpreter. Is this an affidavit that was given to the police? I see it was signed on 31 March. Where is this affidavit now? Is it in a police docket?

Mr Williams: That affidavit, I believe, was commissioned at a SAPS branch, and it has been furnished to the respective investigating officers.

Adv Swart: I am not going to go through it all, but it just indicates that there was a lot of discussion about prison, planning to kidnap a person and just this last paragraph. On the last week of February, Matsi and Sethlabi and Teboho Lipolo – that is the person that did the polygraph that underwent the polygraph test. It was the technician that went and possibly unplugged the DCR, asked that he must switch the camera off as he worked as the technician, and told them that he can make it a demo. So, it seems that there was a discussion whilst the polygraph or before the polygraph where this information was divulged by the technician to the person interpreting the polygraph where he in effect admitted. One must test the veracity of this. But he admitted that he worked as the technician and that he can make it happen. Would you agree with that?

Mr Williams: That is correct. Because of these new developments, he has subsequently handed himself over to SAPS.

Adv Swart: Again, it is highly regrettable that this information only comes out on 31 March because of the work of Investigative Journalists. Otherwise, we would never have had this. Otherwise, you would not have even conducted this polygraph test, etc., because it raises serious questions about what the level of maintenance that you did do. I am reaching a conclusion, but it seems to be so many coincidences. It indicates again, as we have heard time and again, careful involvement of not only the night staff there, but now also the involvement of your official. And obviously, one would be interested to find out whether there has been a lifestyle audit done on him, and whether there has suddenly been some cash in his bank account or not. I see he has worked for your company for 19 years, and he probably has a very good reputation, but what steps what further steps did you say he has been suspended?

Mr Williams: Yes, so after the polygraph test, he was suspended and subjected to further disciplinary action where he was going to be charged. I am not aware of the results of that at this stage, but we have been informed that he has subsequently had himself over to SAPS.

Adv Swart: I must say I find it highly unsatisfactory that this information has all come out at this very late stage, whilst there were letters written already raising these issues way back. On 12 May 2022, this information was given to G4S. Was this information, at that stage, given to anybody else, such as the investigating police or JICS?

Ms Pedro: It was only issued to G4S at the time.

Mr Swart: Well, maybe we should ask them to explain why this information was not provided to JICS and to other institutions. The JICS Inspectorate judges is here, and I am sure he will confirm he had no knowledge of this. It is shocking. Thank you, Chair.

Mr Engelbrecht: Thank you, Chair. I am not going into who did what and when. I am referring to your document in annexure D, in the last sentence of the second paragraph, where you said that all equipment is working as expected. So, for a layman, when it comes to these technical things, does this mean that on 04 May, the cameras and all other related equipment were functioning? What does ‘working as expected’ mean?

Mr Williams: My understanding is that the system was operational. The cameras were working, they had not been tampered with, and the DVR recordings were recording as expected. Further than that, I cannot comment.

Mr Engelbrecht: Okay, so the power fluctuations and the malfunctioning UPS was no longer an issue in the morning after the incident?

Mr Williams: That is correct. So, if I can just add to that, my understanding is that the system would reboot and then everything would come back online and operate as expected.

Mr Englebrecht: Okay. So, somehow crucial equipment did not function during the time that the incident occurred. But it worked again shortly after the incident? Is that correct?

Mr Williams: That is correct.

Mr Engelbrecht: When we visited the facility, I saw that there is a camera inside the control room, at the door, just when you enter from the little boardroom that is inside there. As I understand it, to gain access to the server room, you must go through the control room. Was that camera also not functioning during that time?

Mr Williams: That is a 100% correct, and this is the footage we are referring to that detected this individual.

Mr Engelbrecht: So, there is footage of this individual?

Mr Williams: As I understand, that is correct.

Mr Engelbrecht: Can that individual be identified in the footage? Because it is not very far away, It is very close by.

Mr Williams:  Yes, he can be identified.

Mr Engelbrecht: Where is that footage?

Mr Williams: We are not in possession of that footage. The footage lies with the respective investigating officers.

Mr Engelbrecht: Okay. After you gave a report to G4S on the morning after you had investigated the malfunction, did you get a request from G4S to fix the system in any way or form? Because clearly there was a malfunction. Did you have to fix anything after the investigation?

Ms Pedro: Well, after our investigation, we did what we could at the time with the electronic resources that we had.

Mr Engelbrecht: Which was what?

Ms Pedro: This was now the DVR. So, the DVR was online again, and the cameras were online. The only thing that we could have done at the time, which is in our report, was our recommendations and the quotations that we submitted to G4S.

Mr Engelbrecht: But in the meantime, did you fix the system?

Ms Pedro: We could not fix most of it due to the recommendations. So, we had to implement that before the system could be fully functional.

Mr Engelbrecht: Okay. So, from a technical perspective, speaking now, in your opinion, could this be pulled off successfully without help with the technical aspects of this very complicated system? This whole escape? Is it possible without technical assistance?

Ms Pedro: I cannot comment on that.

Mr Engelbrecht: You cannot comment? It is easy. I mean, you work for these guys. You are technical in the job that you perform every day. In your opinion, is it possible or not for an individual to escape a maximum-security prison with a very highly technical and complicated security system as the one that is installed here without being assisted with various technical aspects of exactly how this system works?

Ms Pedro: I cannot comment on that.

Mr Engelbrecht: You cannot comment, you do not know, or you do not want to say?

Ms Pedro: I do not know.

Mr Engelbrecht: Okay. So, you do not think it is possible that someone with the necessary technical expertise in exactly how this system functions, way to switch what off and on, or whatever the case, may be for your company assisted Mr Bester and his accomplices that assist the team in getting away? I do not think that employees that are trained in correctional management would necessarily possess the skill set to know exactly what is going on there. Do you think that it is not in the realm of possibility?

Mr Williams: As mentioned earlier, it seems to all evidence seems to suggest that, but once again, it is all assumptions and speculations.

Mr Engelbrecht: My last question, just from your own perspective, why did it take so long to investigate everything that transpired on that specific day? From a technical point of view, in terms of the system failures, and recommendations, and suddenly, as mentioned, polygraph tests and interviews with a whole variety of people were done since there was proof that something is amiss over there, but it was done a week or two ago…

Mr Williams: So, it only recently come to light that this has now moved from suicide to a murder. Since the recent media uproar, we conducted our internal investigations activated with due diligence. Like I said, from the outset, we have been open and transparent, and we have provided all the documentation that we are in possession of to the relevant authorities and respective investigating officers.

Mr Engelbrecht: Thank you, Mr Chair. I have no further questions.

Adv Breytenbach: Mr Williams, I just need to understand this. You are the Legal Adviser?

Mr Williams: That is correct.

Adv Breytenbach: You have no personal knowledge of any of these incidents?

Mr Williams: I only have personal knowledge of what has recently been covered in the media.

Adv. Breytenbach: Yeah, so you read it, just like me. You do not have personal knowledge? You are a lawyer but you do not have personal knowledge?

Mr Williams: That is correct.

Adv Breytenbach: And you made them also have no personal knowledge?

Ms Pedro: Sorry. What do you mean by personnel knowledge?

Adv Breytenbach: Did you conduct the investigation?

Ms Pedro: Sorry. No, I did not conduct the investigation. This is a report I received from our technicians.

Adv Breytenbach: Who did conduct the investigation?

Ms Pedro: That would be our senior technicians.

Adv. Breytenbach: And why have they not deposed an affidavit?
‘
Mr Williams: They do confirm. So, the notice we received from the Department of Correctional Services specifically requested that Litichia had to depose an affidavit. There are confirmatory affidavits of the technical team that were there on the day, confirming.

Adv Breytenbach: So, the person who was not there deposes an affidavit, and the people who were there deposed the confirmatory? It is a little odd, is it not? You are a lawyer.

Mr Williams: That is what was requested from us and that is what we have provided.

Adv Breytenbach: That is not the question. The question is, do you not find it odd? You are a lawyer. Do you not normally use the best evidence and the best evidence is the person who conducted the investigation?

Mr Williams: Those individuals’ report has been disclosed, and it forms part of the affidavit and they confirmed that they were there on the day.

Adv Breytenbach: So, would they not have been the best people to be here to tell us about what they did and what they found there? In fairness to you, because neither of you did the investigation, you are sitting there answering questions that you cannot answer because you were not there.

Mr Williams: I suppose so.

Adv Breytenbach: And where are these people who did the investigation?

Mr Williams: I cannot answer to that.

Adv Breytenbach: Perhaps you can, madam?

Ms Pedro: They are in Johannesburg.

Adv. Breytenbach: They are in Johannesburg, in just a small slip away from Cape Town. So, you could bring them here and they could come and give us first-hand evidence – the best evidence? You could do that?

Ms Pedro: Yes.

Adv Breytenbach: Okay. And will they be willing to come without being summonsed?

Mr Williams: They will.

Adv Breytenbach: Good. So, Mr Chairman, I ask that we consider calling those people to get first hand evidence as opposed to second-hand evidence or third-hand evidence or whatever this is. Tell me a little bit about Integritron. Who is the holding company and mother company of Integritron?

Mr Williams: I cannot for certainty answer that. I have only been in the employ since last year June. The holding company if I am not mistaken, and Leticia will correct, is Bona Ikamva.

Adv Breytenbach: Are they involved at all with SA Fence and Gate?

Mr Williams: Yes, they are.

Adv Breytenbach: How?

Mr Williams: It is also the holding company of SA Fence and Gate as well.

Adv Breytenbach: I see, and Africa Spec?

Mr Williams: Spec Africa Holdings also falls under that branch.

Adv Breytenbach: And these are all companies that their largest shareholder is one Mr Jeff Gralan [sic] correct?

Mr Williams: That is correct.

Adv Breytenbach: And he is somebody who the inimitable Angelo Agrizzi had a lot to say about at the Zondo Commission. Is that correct?
.
Mr Williams: I believe so.

Adv Breytenbach: Also, a member of the Progressive Business Forum of the ANC?

Mr Williams: Not that I know of.

Adv Breytenbach:  Well, I can help you there. He is a donor and quite a big one. So, moving on, swiftly, you said something that intrigued me. It intrigued me because you are a lawyer, and it is an odd statement. So, the only logical conclusion that you could reach from the video footage of this person going into the room, and then the footage, the recording function being switched off, is that it may have been possible for him to have been involved. The only logical conclusion is that it may have been possible. It either is or it is not; this is not a maybe situation. So, you have the footage? Have you seen the footage yourself? Have you watched it?

Mr Williams: I have seen the footage.

Adv Breytenbach: Okay, so, can you tell us about it? Did anybody else walk into this room after him?

Mr Williams: No.

Adv Breytenbach: Did anybody else walk into the room after him and before somebody went to restore the function I presume from your office?

Mr Williams: I cannot say for certainty. The video footage is only a snippet of that specific incident.

Adv Breytenbach: Where is the rest of it?

Mr Williams: We are not in possession of that.

Adv. Breytenbach: Who is in possession of it?

Mr Williams: The investigating officers.

Adv Breytenbach: But you were initially in possession of it?

Mr Williams: We are only possession of a snippet of the individual entering the room.

Adv Breytenbach: Why? Why are you an imposition of a snippet?

Mr Williams: So, we were instructed that we may not remove the footage because that is the possession of G4S, as I understand it. As such, the video footage is with the investigating officer of the Mangaung Correctional Centre.

Adv Breytenbach: So, if we want to, we can watch the footage and we can see how many people entered the room between switch off time at seven o'clock till come back time at four o'clock in the morning?

Mr Williams: I suppose that is possible.

Adv Breytenbach: I suppose we should do that. You say that you supply qualified technical resources to maintain the security installation for G4S at the Mangaung facility?

Mr Williams: That is correct.

Adv Breytenbach: Those are your words, not mine. So, if you are supplying qualified technical resources to maintain security installation, for G4S at the Mangaung facility, how did this happen? How is it possible that there is no backup system – that this intervention by humans is possible? Why is this system not able to be overridden? How are you supplying qualified technical resources to maintain the security installation when somebody can walk in and pull the plug out?

Ms Pedro: I do not have an answer. I cannot comment.

Adv Breytenbach: The answer is simple. You are not supplying qualified technical resources to maintain the security installation. If you were, you would not be able to walk in and pull the plug out. That is what happened, right? Somebody pulled the plug out and it rebooted and came back online when somebody pulled the plug back in. I suppose that was one of your suitably qualified technical resources who plugged back in. I am not a suitably qualified technical resource, and even I can push a plug back in. So, I do not know what job it is you are doing, and I do not know how much you are getting paid for it, but it sounds unbelievably dodgy to me. Somebody can walk into a room have access to a room of that sensitivity, and whip the plug out the wall and boom, no more recording, and there is no way to see that. Why is there not a function that warns you that recording is stopped? Why can you not see on the screen, the screen that says people are sitting watching that the recording is stuck? Why is there no backup to that? What kind of qualified technical resources are maintaining security inspections? You want to comment?

Ms Pedro: No.

Adv Breytenbach: I did not think so. So, all of this happened in May, last year. By October, at least, everybody should have known that Bester was no longer in prison. But you knew immediately after the incident took place, whether you thought it was an escape or suicide. You knew that somebody had unplugged the security system, because you had a movie of it. And you knew who it was. Well, you should have known or had a very good idea, yet you waited a year to start investigating and take a polygraph. Why? What was the reason for that delay?

Mr Williams: So, that footage does not necessarily show the individual pulling the plugs off. For argument's sake, the individual walks through the door, like you have mentioned, into the control room. And then it is on the other side, the footage just depicts the individual standing there. It does not necessarily show the individual entering past that point.

Adv Breytenbach: What kind of a camera does not show you walking past it? How does it miss you walking past and pick you up standing over there but not walking there?

Mr Williams: I cannot answer to that.

Adv Breytenbach: Yeah, there are so many things both of you cannot answer, with respect. And I am not blaming you because you were sent by your company to be the fore guys for this for this inquiry. I really think you need to bring your technical people who did the investigation, so they could come and answer this and they cannot say they cannot answer that. They must answer, because if they cannot answer it, then what you need to do is you need to repay GCS for every cent they have ever spent on you because you are not doing the job that you are supposed to do. So, I think that you should really bring those people so you can question them. Because in fairness to you, you do not have first-hand knowledge. And so, you are here looking a little silly, and it is not your fault. So, nobody can blame you for that. It is your company; they should not have sent you. They should have sent the right people. And just sending the Legal Adviser and the Director, who have no first-hand knowledge of this entire escapade is quite frankly, I do not know what it is. I think you should take it up with them. I would consider other employment If we you. Why did you polygraph this individual?

Mr Williams: We polygraphed the individuals after the footage was seen.

Adv Breytenbach: I see. So, a year ago, you knew it was him? But nobody investigated, and nobody asked any questions? He walks into the room and he stood there looking like a banana, and then the footage went off, and no one made that connection? As soon as the incident in the prison was over, the footage came back on? Nobody investigated and nobody asked him any questions for a year, even though he was in your employ doing whatever it is that he did? And now you investigate a year later because GroundUp did an investigation and said that he escaped on your watch? Am I correct?

Mr Williams: I suppose so. Yeah.

Adv Breytenbach: It is unfair for me to continue questioning you like this because you cannot answer this, and it is not your fault. So, we need people who can answer. And, Mr Chair, I would request that we make time to talk to people to do the investigation and they must come and answer these questions. It is unfair for you to sit in like this. Thank you.

Mr Horn: Since when have you provided this service to G4s at the Mangaung centre?

Mr Williams: Speaking under correction, but I believe it is from 2004.

Mr Horn: And did you provide the systems that you now maintain?

Ms Pedro: No, I speak under correction, but I do not think so. So, we are just maintaining the equipment in the system.

Mr Horn: It says here that you assess the maintenance of security installation, but I would think it refers to ensuring that, as part of part of the security operations at this prison, there is an uninterrupted video oversight of what is happening as far as possible. Am I correct in saying that is ultimately the purpose of your service there?

Ms Pedro: You can say that.

Mr Horn: Okay, so you see the interruption on the night of the incident different to the interruptions caused by what you refer to in your affidavit as power interruptions?

Ms Pedro: Please repeat.

Mr Horn: In your affidavit, you refer to that, in the month of April preceding the event, there were several power interruptions at the centre. So, without now having the hindsight of knowing somebody walked into the control room and unplugged the DVR? How did you view the absence of recording at the time? Was it according to your systems different to an ordinary power interruption?

Ms Pedro: My apologies. But again, this will have to go back to the technical team.

Mr Horn: Were there previous incidences where the recording stopped for a period?

Mr Williams: Not that I am aware of.

Ms Pedro: That, again for the team, and we can draw logs to confirm that.

Mr Horn: So, your report of 12 May 2022, in which you made some recommendations about improving the systems to build in certain alerts for future happenings. If this was the first incident of this nature, why did it necessitate this type of recommendation?

Ms Pedro: My apologies, but again, I will have to revert.

Mr Horn: On whose initiative was this report drafted?

Ms Pedro: This was based on the investigation that technicians did, so that is why we had to compile the report and submit it to G4S.

Mr Horn: So, this footage of the control room – why was that kept for longer than all other footage at the centre?

Mr Williams: I cannot answer to that.

Mr Horn: Miss Pedro, you are looking at me like I am making no sense, but we have heard all day long that all footage is wiped out after two weeks of every camera at that institution.

Ms Pedro: I cannot respond to that. All I can say is that the footage is the property of G4S and whether they still have the footage. I cannot comment on that.

Mr Horn: So, when were you told not to wipe it out?

Ms Pedro: I was not told to not wipe it out.

Mr Horn: It is your company and your representatives. You cannot say that. So, in terms of paragraph seven timeframe, you claim that only on 27 March was this discussion with Mr Xander Snyder of G4S had, and they transpired that the cables had been unplugged. So once again, in terms of your report of the 12 May 2022, how could you have been known that the cables were unplugged, and that some sort of alerts were now necessary to be built into the system?

Ms Pedro: So, for paragraph seven, there is technical explanation for that, and I will highlight that as well for the team to get the proper response on that one.

Mr Horn: No, but this is not a technical question that needs a technical answer. On the one end, you say just that, after the incident on 12 May, you did an investigation on your own initiative. And you advised the client that the system must now be improved to include an alert that the type of eventualities that leads to a stop in recording should at least have an alert in the system when that happens again. How could you have deduced that this was the cause of the lack of recording, if you only heard on 27 March that this was what happened?

Ms Pedro: At this time, I cannot respond to that.

Mr Horn: I do not know whether it is because we are 6pm, but I mean the responses have dried up. I will then also wait for the technical team to ask those questions. Thank you.

Mr Dyantyi: I suggest that you pause there for the day.

Committee Deliberations

Chairperson: Colleagues, before we adjourn, there are a few issues. One, I will ask the Committee Secretary to read the documents or information that was asked for during the day that needs to be provided to the Committee. I think certain Members asked for certain information to be given in writing. And just to remind everybody of the information that is required, I will ask him to take us through that.

Committee Secretary: From G4S, we requested records of visitors to Mr Bester, as well as more information regarding the person who moved out of cell 35 on information on when he applied to move out and the reasons given. There was one about the number of relatives of officials employed by DCS, who are working at the Mangaung Correctional Centre. And then there was details on transfers and dismissals related to this matter. And then, we also wanted all programmes offered at the centre and the contractors involved and the nature of services rendered.

Adv Swart: There is a very important reference in this affidavit, and I wondered where that could be. This is the affidavit in paragraph 12 by Mr Van Tonder, because that seems to be a very critical one. Whether you have it or whether we can ask G4S, would that be remiss of me to ask for that as well?

Chairperson: Can you please repeat what you said?

Adv Swart: The affidavit of Mr Van Tonder, who was the senior technician and onsite maintenance manager. He resigned, but at the time of the incident he provided an affidavit to G4S for their records. This was provided to Rudy Mathee, who presumably is the G4S investigator. Maybe we can try to get that affidavit if it is available from G4S. Thank you, Chair.

Committee Secretary: To two more requests. I think it is Dr Nandipha’s visiting records to the centre. And then there was one about the duration of Mr Bester’s studies at Damelin.

Ms Yako: Sorry Chair, I am just a little confused with the process that we are on now. Are we asking any other questions we would have wanted to ask so that he can note that if we want documentation and certain things, or are we concluding now on what we have already discussed because tomorrow is another day for us to have more questions posed to G4S and other entities? I just want to have clarity, are we going to keep adding to what is on that list, or will we be carrying on with the new day having new questions to ask?

Chairperson: We are making a summary of documents that were requested today. Any addition, Members – not on something that you are going to ask tomorrow, but on issues that you asked today that were not captured by the Secretary?

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen: Sorry, maybe I did not catch that, but I would like to see the Integritron recommendations that they made in their report to G4S.

Ms Ramolobeng: Thank you, Chair. And thank you for correctly pronouncing my surname. Part of a follow-up that I wanted to make was on the inmate that was moved from cell 35 on the day that Bester was moved into. The name of the inmate is Mukhulu Sebatana. He was moved on 30 March 2022, and he was quite unhappy with being removed from the cell to a point that he cancelled. He was angry and ended up cancelling his own safety and was moved to Port Phillip. G4S should confirm all of this for us based on that report. Thank you.

Mr Nqola: The important learning programme of Mr Bester from the beginning to the end, a record on that please…

Chairperson: Did you request that?

Mr Nqola: Yes, I did, and Mr Dyantyi also requested it.

Ms Maseko-Jele: I mentioned of the names of those officials with the surnames that I could not pronounce. Those people were there before the day of the incident, and we did not get their reports. We did not hear what they knew because, from the looks of things, this was planned, and the occurrences unfolded before the day of the incident. Can we also get a report from those managers about what they noticed leading up to the incident?

Chairperson: Okay. I think we are done. Tomorrow we are starting at 09:00. We are starting with JICS. I think we are done here, with the request that was made by Honourable Breytenbach supported by honourable Horn. Maybe we will take it out of this meeting as to what we will do with that. Maybe we might need to call Integritron again, but that will be discussed. So, tomorrow we are starting with JICS, followed by SAPS, and then followed by DCS. If Members would want to recall any company, we will discuss it. The meeting is adjourned.