ATC210820: Oversight Report of the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs visit to the KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces, dated17 August2021.

Home Affairs

Oversight Report of the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs visit to the KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces, dated17 August2021.

 

The Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs (the Committee), having conducted an oversight visit to the KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces, reports as follows:

 

1. Introduction.

1.1. The Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs conducted an oversight visit to KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces following the unrest that took place from 11 until 23 July 2021. The oversight visit to the two provinces took place from 1 until 6 August 2021. In KwaZulu-Natal, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Mr NjabuloNzuza and the Acting Provincial Manager, Ms Tersia Hanekom accompanied the Committee from 2 to 3 August 2021.

 

1.2. The Committee travelled to Gauteng on 4 August 2021oversight took place on 5 August 2021. In Gauteng, the Committee conducted an oversight visit to the Bara Mall office, the Chris Baragwanath hospital and the Mamelodi office at the Mams Mall. The Minister of Home Affairs, the Director-General and the Deputy Director-General responsible for Civic Services accompanied the Committee.

 

2. Purpose of the oversight visit

2.1.The purpose of the oversight visit was to assess the damage caused during the unrest in the two provinces and how quickly the Department of Home Affairs would be able to restore its services.

 

3. Background

3.1.It was reported that the riots and protests in KwaZulu-Natal Province were triggered, in part, by the arrest of former President Jacob Zuma having to serve a 15 months sentence. The looting and damage to properties started in certain parts of Kwazulu-Natal and spread to certain parts of the Gauteng Provinces. The South African Police Service (SAPS) was unable to contain a large group of people from looting and damaging infrastructure. The looting was focused on shopping malls and warehouses in certain parts of Kwazulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces. Some offices of the DHA were unfortunately broken into and looted.

 

3.2. The riots and looting have elements of insurgencybecause not only shops in the malls were looted, the Department of Home Affairs were also looted and damaged. It was reported that in Kwazulu-Natal, three offices were damaged and looted and these are the Eshowe andImpendle officesas well asthe satellite office in Ugu District. In Gauteng, it was an office at the Bara Mall in Soweto and the Mamelodi office in Tshwane.

 

3.3. The looting and damage to Department of Home Affairs’ offices harmed service delivery in the affected provinces. As a result of the high rate of Coronavirus infections in the country, the DHA was already operating at only 50 percent capacity. With the damage to these offices, the situation will be worse in the affected areas. The situation is also made worse by the cutting of the DHA budget by the National Treasury (NT) in the financial year 2021-22. In the meantime, the DHA has to find a creative way to ensure that service delivery is not interrupted in those communities where the DHA offices were damaged. The DHA is still assessing which personal information of applicants may have been lost.

 

4. Composition of the delegation.

The delegation comprised of the following

African National Congress (ANC):

Mr MS Chabane (Leader of the delegation)

Ms TI Legwase

Ms M Modise

Mr KB Pillay

Ms TI Legwase

Ms M Molekwa

Democratic Alliance (DA):

Ms TA Khanyile

Mr AC Roos

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

Ms LL Van Der Merwe

Parliamentary Staff:

Mr Eddy Mathonsi – Committee Secretary

Ms Adam Salmon – Content Advisor

Ms S Govender – Communication officer

Mr EM Molepo – Communication Officer

5.Briefing by the Acting Provincial Managers of the Department of Home Affairs on the extent of the damages in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces.

 

The Provincial Managers of the two provinces reported that there was five (5) office that was damaged. In KwaZulu-Natal, there were three (3) offices, namely the Eshowe office, the Impendle office and the Vulamehlo offices. The Vulamhelo office was not visited since it had not been operation due to Covid, even prior to the recent unrest. In Gauteng, there were two (2) offices that were damaged, namely the Bara Mall office in Soweto and the Mamelodi office in Tshwane.

 

The Committee visited the Eshowe office, the Impendle office, the Bara Mall Office, Mamelodi Office, the Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital office and it should be noted that the Chris Hani Baragwanath hospital was not looted and vandalised but took over some responsibilities of the Mamelodi office.

 

5.1. Briefing by the Kwazulu-Natal Acting Provincial Manager.

5.1.1.    On 02 August 2021, the Committee travelled to Eshowe and it met with the Deputy Minister and Acting Provincial Manager of Home Affairs and the Eshowe Mayor. The Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and the Mayor welcomed the delegation.

 

5.1.2. The Acting Provincial Manager made the presentation on the extent of the damages and looting in the DHA offices in Eshowe, Impendle and Vulamehlo offices. She indicated that between 12 and 16 July 2021, South Africa experienced protest action in Kwazulu-Nataland Gauteng Provinces and it led to looting and damage to infrastructure and disruptions to service and transportation. The protests also affected DHA service delivery and several DHA offices had to temporarily close due to the safety of the officials, unavailability of transport and to prevent damage to state property. DHA has 412 offices across the country and Kwazulu-Nata has 77 offices. Of the 77 offices, 58 offices were closed due to unrest on 13 July 2021. The numbers of the affected offices decreased to one (1) by 23 July 2021. The situation stabilised by 23 July 2021 when only one office remainedclosed. In KwaZulu-Natal, the Eshowe offices, Impendle and Vulamehlo offices incurred damages and looting.

 

5.1.3. The DHA issued directives that death in the vandalised offices should be registered in selected health facilities as close as possible to the vandalised offices. It was reported that the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs visited the Eshowe office and Pietermaritzburg on 16 July 2021 on the relatedclean-up campaign to fast track the reopening of the Eshowe office.

 

5.1.4. The unrest affected the operations at the Port of Durban, where roads were closed and public transport was not available and officials could not reach their offices. The Port remained opened with limited services. The South African Navy was deployed to secure the Port on 12 July 2021. In terms of vessels, priority was provided to essential commodities such as food, medical supplies and fuel. The vessel movements continued but no crew changes were processed.Imports such as agricultural products remained in a queue withexports diverted to other ports.

 

5.1.5. The Port of Richards Bay remained opened and the South African Navy secured the Port on 15 July 2021 and the Golela land port remained open. The road leading to the port wasblocked and the movement between South Africa and eSwatini was heavily affected. The Kosibay land port also remained operational and operations were affected on 12 July 2021 when the road was blocked and no movement occurred between South Africa and Mozambique.

 

5.2.       Briefing by the Gauteng Provincial Manager.

 

5.2.1.    The Provincial Manager reported that DHA offices had temporarily closed due to the safety of its officials andclients as well asto avoid damage to state property. It was reported that the Gauteng Province had 62 offices and it included 17 banks, 33 medium to large offices and 12 small offices or service points. Of the 62 offices in the province, it was reported that 17 offices were closed on 12 July 2021 and by 23 July 2021; only one (1) office at Bara Mall was closed. Standard Bank, ABSA and Nedbank officesexcept for the Lakeview branch were closed.

 

5.2.2.    Two (2) officeswere looted and damaged at Bara Mall office in Soweto and the Mamelodi office at Mams Mall. The Bara Mall office was still completely closedat the time of the oversight visit having not yet been repaired at all from the extensive damage inflicted.

 

6. Oversight Visit to offices in KwaZulu-Natal Province.

The Committee did not visit the Vulamehlo office in KwaZulu-Natal because the office has not been in operation since March 2020 due to Covid comorbidities of staff and it would not be reopened because a mobile truck has since serviced the areaonce a week. The community can apply for Smart ID Cards through the mobile office wherasthe office itself had not yet been modernised.

 

 

 

 

6.1.Eshowe Office

6.1.1 After the presentation by the Acting Provincial Manager, the Committee visited the Eshowe office.The office is in the uMlalazi Municipality and it serves a population of approximately 225 000.

 

6.1.2.The office was looted and vandalised on 13 July 2021.It was reported that the following items were stolen during the looting: 10 computers, two (2) fridges, a microwave, scanners, telephone handsets, online verificationscanners, cleaning materials and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

 

6.1.3. The cash office was opened but the safe was locked and no money was stolen, the server room and the strong room were still locked, there were rubber bullets inside the office and the office was wide open.

 

6.1.4. On the day of the oversight, the office was operational after the intervention of the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs. It was reported that computers were borrowed from other offices and legacy services were restored by the 19th of July 2021.

 

6.1.5. The office has been modernised which means that people can apply for Smart ID Cards.

 

6.2.ImpendleThusongOffice.

6.2.1. The Impendle office is in the UMgungundlovu Municipality and services a population of approximately 10 000.

 

6.2.2. The office offers limited legacy services such as Green ID applications, birth registration and death registration. The office is at the Thusong Centre with other government stakeholders. Whisltthe Centre did have security,there were no DHA office specific security. The office has been reopened after the unrest. The office is not modernised and most people working in Pietermaritzburg prefer to get DHA services in town.

 

6.1.2.3. It was reported that the following items were stolen and looted during the riots: one fridge, one microwave, one computer, one monitor and one kettle and R6 540. No identity documents were stolen.

 

6.2.4. In the cash office, there were two safes; there was an old safe and the new one. The new safe has been in the office for two (2) years but officials have not been trained to use it. The R6 540 was stolen from the old safe that only uses a padlock.

 

6.2.5. The window to the cash office did not have burglar bars and whatever was done in the cash office was visible from outside. In other words, the office was vulnerable even before the riots. There were no formal arrangements for the collection of the revenue given the low revenue collection versus the cost of cash in transit collecting money daily. The small offices are allowed to collect money every five (days). An example was made that if the cash in transit can collect money daily, the DHA might pay R500 to collect R20. The office did not have a vehicle and but was linked to thePietermaritzburg infrastructure which arranged ad hoc collection of cash.

 

6.2.6. The office did not have security cameras and it was reported that in the ThusongCentre there was a camera in the passage, however, it belongs to the municipality and was discovered to not be working on the day of the looting.

 

6.2.7. The office did not have a Covid-19 screen and it was reported the matter of the screens was left to the province to deal with. The Umngeni Office in Durban received donations from the EThekwini municipality to have screens installed.

 

6.2.8. It was reported that after the looting, fewer people were coming for services and the office had two computers withone that was stolen having sincebeen replaced. The office does not have a permanent supervisor but one that comes on a rotational basis sincethe office was unable to replace the supervisor who left. The DHA was unable to fill the vacancy due to financial constraints.

 

6.2.9. The airconditioning system was also not working in the public area because the cable that was supposed to be used to connect it has been stolen from the Centre Manager’s office during the looting before it was fully installed.

 

6.2.10. The lease to the Thusong Centre has recently been renewed for another three (3) years.

 

6.3. VulamehloThusongOffice

6.3.1. TheVulamehlo office at Ugu District was the third office to be vandalism in KwaZulu-Natal Province. The office is situated at the VulamehloThusong Centre and services a population of approximately 77 400.

 

6.3.2. It was reported that the office has only one (1) official and the officials were not in the office since March 2020 due to comorbidities. From March 2020, the office has been visited by a mobile truck once a month to provide the service. As mentioned, the Committees thus decided it was not necessary to visit the office.

 

6.3.3. The Office had provided the following services: Green bar-coded Identity Documents, registration of birth, death and Customary marriages and all other services were provided at the Scottburgh, which is 20 kilometres from the Vulamehlo office.

 

6.3.4. It has been suggested that the office should not be reopened because the statistics of demand were extremely low. The Scottburgh office is modernized and is offering Smart Identity Cards. The mobile truck that visits the VulamehloThusong Centre once a month provides an opportunity for the community to apply for Smart Identity Cards.

 

7. Oversight Visit to offices in Gauteng Province

 

The Committee visited the Bara Office and the Mamelodi office as well as the Chris Hani Baragwanath hospital where death registration was redirected after the looting. The hospital office was not looted and damaged.

 

7.1. Bara Mall office.

7.1.1. It was reported that the Bara Mall Office closed on 11 July 2021 because the official could see that the situation was not safe.On the night of 11 July 2021 towards the morning of 12 July 2021, the whole Bara Mall was looted.

 

7.1.2.It was reported tothe Committee during the oversight that the office was vandalised and the following assets were stolen or damaged: Three(3) computers, fingerprint and BACM scanners, barcode scanners, one (1), a fridge, microwave, three (3) heaters, four (4) counter chairs, two (2) client chairs, a router, and a fan. A fax and Xerox machine, counters broken, electrical wiring, taps and basins were also damaged.

 

7.1.4.The Bara Mall Office was only providing birth, death, marriage and amendments as well as Temporary Identity Certificates (TIC). During the Covid-19 period, the office was dedicated to issuing death certificates and before the Covid-19; the office would provide all services except identity documents and passports. Concerning death, the office would process about 120 deaths per day before Covid-19 and the number increased to 200 – 300 deaths per day during Covid-19.

 

7.1.5. The community of Soweto were directed to the large office that is based in Orlando and there is a medium office at Maponya Mall that is few kilometres from the Bara Mall and there are other small offices that are within 15 kilometres radius (Lenasia, Ennerdale,      Eldorado and OrangeFarm).

 

7.1.6. It was reported that the situation was stabilised by 23 July 2021 and Bara Mall office was the only office that remained closed and it was not operational.

 

7.1.7. The death registration clients from the Bara Mall were redirected to Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital where they had already beenconducting birth registration 2 kilometres away from theBara Mall office. The Minister reported that South Africa has about 4000 health facilities and 1400 registered births and offices at the health facilities, which are mostly next to the labour wards.

 

7.1.8. The staff that wereat the Bara Mall office hadbeen relocated to other offices to assist with death registration and it was further indicated that during the riots, the Bara Mall Office might have had some, as yet unverified, death records destroyed because there was water damage all over the office.

 

7.1.9. The Bara Mall office did not have security cameras and covid-19 screens.

 

7.1.10. The Bara Mall Office was being rented from the landlord who owns the mall and the challenge to renovate the mall was that the people who vandalised the mall were demanding that they should be giving the work to renovate. There was a stalemate between the landlord and the community and the Department of Home Affairs was caught in between. As far as the Department was concerned, they could already have restored the services. The advantage to have offices in malls was a large number of people at the malls and the disadvantage is that if something happens to the mall, the Department’s collateral damage is dependent of the landlord ability to repair.

 

7.1.11. Nationally the DHA was engaging with the Presidential Infrastructure office to ensure that the Department builds its own offices according to their standards with the necessary features. The Presidential Infrastructure office has approved 15 DHA offices  to be built includingthe Lusikisiki office in the Eastern Cape, Taung office in the Northwest and two offices in Limpopo (Mokopane and Thohoyandou).

 

7.1.12.The Bara Mall office did not have its own security and depended on the mall security and it was reported that cash was collected daily and by an official from the Orlando office so during the looting, no cash was stolen.

 

7.2.       Chris Baragwanath Hospital.

7.2.1.As reported, since the looting and damages that occurred at the Bara Mall Office, the death registration has been moved to the Bara Hospital where birth is registered. There is a waiting room for mothers and death registration to observe social distancing. Two officials assist mothers to register births after they have been discharged. There was a separate room where the funeral undertakers would drop their documents to register death.

 

7.2.2. TheBaragwanath hospital where births and deaths wereregistered was the only office that had covid-19 screens since it was renovated during covid-19. The office registers between 60 -70 births daily after mothers are discharge from the hospital.

 

7.2.3. It was reported that the challenge for some mothers was that they could not register births within 30 days because the child has to be named by elders and some teenage mothers reported that the respective fathers do not acknowledge paternity.

 

7.3. Mamelodi Office.

7.3.1. TheMamelodi office is based at the Mams Mall in Tshwane. There was a South Africa Social Security Agency (SASSA) and the Post Office close to the office but only three windowpanes were broken with no looting. The landlord immediately fixed the windows..

 

7.3.2. The office is modernised which means that offers services such as the Smart ID Cards with demand growing. It was difficult to accommodate people inside the office before Covid-19. The population in Mamelodi has more than doubled and people had toqueue outside. The office was under a lot of pressure. The City of Tshwane is satisfied that Home Affairs should have offices at malls with discussionsto expand to the Menlyn,Soshanguve Junction and Jubilee Malls.

 

7.3.3. The office has outsourced 1 security outside and one (1) DHA security inside the office and there were no security cameras at the office. The office also did not have Covid-19 screens.

 

7.3.4.The office has a cash office that reported to collects approximately R500 000 per month collected daily by cash-in-transit.

           

7.3.5. There were many uncollected Smart ID Cards and it was reported that per day there are 200 collections.

           

7.3.6. There were two (2) mobile offices parked nextto the office. This was not a daily arrangement because the mobile offices havea standing programme with localschools. When schools are closed, the mobile offices are redirected as needed. The mobile offices were assisting with whatever services were putting pressure on the office. The mobile mainly assists with the first time issue of ID documents and Temporary Identity Certificates (TIC).

 

7.3.7. Whereas the mobile offices are functional in urban areas; they experiencednetwork connection problems in rural areas . The trucks are equipped with the same equipment as in the office. The trucks have generators to use in rural areas.

 

8. Committee Observations.

8.1. Except for the Impendle and VulamehloThusong offices, all offices that were vandalised in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces were located at malls.

8.2. The Committee noted that the VulamehloThusong Office would not be reopened because the mobile office was able to service the area once a month.

8.3. What could have attracted people to vandalise the ImpendleThusong Office, could be the nearby ATM that was looted.

8.4. The ImpendleThusong office has two safes and the staff have not been trained to operate the new safe even after two years. That money that was stolen was in the old safe that uses a padlock to lock. The cash office is vulnerablebecause it did not have burglar bars.

8.5. The services at the Eshowe office, ImpendleThusong Office and Mamelodioffices were soon restored by the Department of Home Affairs after the looting.

8.6. The Bara Mall office services have not been restored due to the demands from the community to the landlord that they are giving the work to renovate the mall. The registration of deaths has been moved to Chris Baragwanath Hospital where birthsare registered.

8.7. IT equipment were stolen at the Eshowe office, ImpendleThusong Office, VulamehloThusong and Bara Mall office. The Bara Mall office was also stripped of all basins and counters. All IT equipment at Impendle and Eshowe were since replaced.

8.8. In the Mamelodi office, only three windows were broken and two mobile trucks were stationed to assist with services.

8.9. The Mamelodi office was too small for the community which hasdoubled since 2009 and lacks sufficient staff to service the area.

8.10. All offices that were visited did not have security cameras and the Committee was concerned about security as well as oversight of potential fraud/corruption..

8.11. Except for the Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital, all other offices visited did not have Covid-19 screens to protect the staff and members of the public.

8.12. The Committee noted the pro-activeness of the Department of Home Affairs to ensure that communities where the offices were vandalised, had services restored and where not possible, redirected to the nearest service points. The Committee also commended the commitment of the  staff  that had worked hard to restore services despite the turbulent circumstances.

8.13 It was noted that some landlords in shopping malls were able repair damaged offices very quickly assisting in quick restoration of DHA services.

 

9. Recommendations.

In light of the oversight visit to KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces, the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs recommends that the Minister of Home Affairs:

 

9.1. Ensure that the Department of Home Affairs assess the viability of more offices at malls across the country because of the large number of people and convenience at malls versus the security risks.

9.2. Asses and report as soon as possible to the Committee on the cost and benefit of having security cameras, security services and cash collection for the staff and clients at vulnerableDHA offices.

9.3.Ensure that the Department of Home Affairs works with landlords to ensure that the Bara Mall Office is renovated and reopened as soon as possible.

9.4. Ensure that the Department of Home Affairs secure a big enough office space and staff contingent for the Mamelodi office.

9.5. Assess the cost and benefit of Covid-19 screens being installed in all offices of the Department of Home Affairs.

9.6 The staff at ImpendleThusong Office should be trained as soon as possible to operate new safes and have burglar bars installed. The viability of strong rooms in some offices to be considered.

9.7 Increase smart card modernisation and report on progress of roll out.

9.8 The relevant planning and risk committees needed to be established or made more efficient in  preventing and addressing such security challenges including rapid deployment of more Mobile units.

9.10 It was noted that although management of social distancing was occurring at offices, it needed to be monitored in the event of increased demand arising.

 

 

 

Report to be considered.

 

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