ATC210805: Report of the Oversight visit of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence to Review Military Deployments as part of Operation Prosper in the Kwazulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces over the Period 20 to 21 July 2021, Dated 30 July 2021

Defence

REPORT OF THE OVERSIGHT VISIT OF THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE TO REVIEW MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS AS PART OF OPERATION PROSPER IN THE KWAZULU-NATAL AND GAUTENG PROVINCES OVER THE PERIOD 20 TO 21 JULY 2021, DATED 30 JULY 2021.

 

1.         INTRODUCTION

 

The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) conducted an oversight visit to KwaZulu-Natal andGauteng on 20 and 21 July 2021 to review the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF) role in Operation Prosper in conjunction with the South African Police Service (SAPS). Operation Prosper involves the deployment of up to 25 000 members of the SANDF, in support of the SAPS, to address widespread looting, rioting and violence that emerged in the two provinces from 9 July 2021. The JSCD’s visit therefore centred on affected areas in Ethekwini, Pietermaritzburg, Ekurhuleni and Johannesburg.

 

1. Primary aim of the oversight visit

 

The key focus of the SANDF deployment under Operation Prosper is to “support the SAPS in maintaining law and order and to bring stability in response to the widespread riotous behaviour, looting and destruction taking place in various places in the country.” As such, the main aim of the JSCD oversight visit was to review the SANDF’s role and participation in Operation Prosper, examine the level of cooperation with the SAPS and determine operational successes and challenges.

 

1.2        Defence Committee Members and Support Staff

 

The Delegation comprised of the following Members and support personnel:

 

African National Congress

Mr ME Nchabeleng (Co-chairperson – NCOP)

Mr VC Xaba (Co-chairperson – NA)

Ms TI Legwase

Mr TN Mmutle

Ms M Modise

Ms AH Mthembu

Ms NE Nkosi

Democratic Alliance

Mr SJF Marais

Mr D Ryder

Mr ML Shelembe

Economic Freedom Fighters

Mr TWI Mafanya

Mr K Motsamai

Inkatha Freedom Party

Mr R Cebekhulu

 

 

Support Staff

Dr W Janse van Rensburg         -           Committee Researcher

Mr G Mankay                            -          Committee Assistant

 

1.3        Programme

 

On Tuesday 20 July 2021, oversight activities in KwaZulu-Natal commenced with a briefing by the SANDF and SAPS to the JSCD and the Portfolio Committee on Police on Operation Prosper, held at the Chatsworth Police Station in Ethekwini. Following the briefing, the JSCD held a separate engagement with the Minister of Defence and SANDF operational commanders responsible for Operation Prosper in the province. Upon the conclusion of the briefings, the JSCD was escorted to several areas affected by violence and looting in Pinetown. The SA Air Force then transported Members of the Committee with a SA Air Force Oryx Transport Helicopter to several of the areas where the SANDF has deployed soldiers as part of Operation Prosper, including Pietermaritzburg, the N3 highway, Greytown, Eshowe and Mooi River.

 

On 21 July 2021, the JSCD convened at the Doornkop Military Base in Johannesburg where it received an extensive situation analysis briefing on Operation Prosper in Gauteng. This included an engagement with the Commander of the Joint Tactical Headquarters of Gauteng and the Chief of Joint Operations. The briefings were followed by a visit to several deployment areas where the SANDF have soldiersstationed, including a medical production facility, the Meadowlands Mall, Jabulani Mall and Naledi Mall.

 

2.         OVERSIGHT VISIT TO KWAZULU-NATAL

 

The JSCD Delegation joined the Portfolio Committee of Police at the Chatsworth Police Station inEthekwini to receive a briefing by both the SANDF and the SAPS on Operation Prosper in the province. Ms TM Joemat-Pettersson, Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Police, Mr VC Xaba and Mr E Nchabeleng, Co-chairpersons of the JSCD, opened the meeting and welcomed the presence of the Minister of Defence, Ms N Mapisa-Nqakula, the Minister of Police, Mr B Cele as well as several members from the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature.

 

2.1        Presentation by the SANDF

 

Major-General Dube, Provincial SANDF Commander for Operation Prosper, briefed Members of the two parliamentary committees on SANDF activities in KwaZulu-Natal.He noted that all SANDF operations take place in support of the SAPS. The initial focus of the SANDF operations in KwaZulu-Natal has been to secure national key points as well as important access routes, notably vulnerable sections of the N2 and N3 highways. This was an essential component of Operation Prosper to ensure that delivery vehicles and cargo carriers had freedom of movement in the province. As SANDF support evolved, with the arrival of additional personnel, deployments with the SAPS increased with a focus on neutralising the destabilisers and achieving an end-state where the province will return to normal. At the time of the briefing, several SANDF units were present in the province including elements of 121 Battalion, 1, 4 and 5 SA Infantry Battalions, the Ingobamakhosi, Umvoti and Umzimvubu Regiments (Reserve Force), 1 Special Services Battalion, 2 Field Engineer Regiment, 20 Air Defence Artillery Regiment, 4 Artillery Regiment and the Maritime Reaction Squadron (SA Navy). Key operations of these units, carried out in support of the SAPS, included:

• securing national key points;
• enhancing the visibility of security forces;
• securing important access routes;
• conducting roadblocks;
• assisting with road clearing;
• protection of hospitals;
• keeping forces on standby for reaction capabilities;
• protection of courts;
• assisting in the protection of key agricultural routes; and
• the removal of barricades.

 

2.2 Presentation by the SAPS

 

Major-General P Makoba from the SAPS in KwaZulu-Natal briefed the two parliamentary committees on SAPS activities in the province. The presentation commenced with an extensive background to the violence and centred on activities surrounding the incarceration of the former president, Mr JG Zuma. Focus then shifted to security threats that emerged as riots and looting spread across the province. General Makoba indicated that threats were made against critical infrastructure, including the Port of Durban and courts in the province. She also highlighted the modus operandi of rioters that included petrol bombing, discharging of firearms, torching of infrastructure and using tipper trucks to block rocks. The SAPS emphasised the role of social media in organising/instigating continued violence and highlighted that this aspect is under investigation. To combat these activities, the SAPS carried out several actions around the province, including (as on 18 July 2021):

• 112 roadblocks;
• 9 642 vehicles stopped and searched;
• 2 097 vehicle check-points conducted;
• 190 patrols on national roads;
• 18 530 people searched;
• 765 premises searched;
• 1 560 national key points visited;
• 336 incidents attended by the Public Order Policing (POPS).

 

In order to effect the above actions, the SAPS deployed a wide array of capabilities in the province, including Visible Policing (VISPOL), the POPS, the Operational Response Service, Crime Intelligence and Reservists. These were assisted by the SANDF deployment as well as the Metro Police and the Road Traffic Inspectorate. All SAPS members were recalled from leave amid the escalating violence and shift changes were implemented to maximize deployment.As a result of these actions, the SAPS achieved several successes in the province. By 20 July 2021, a total of 2 466 cases have been reported, including 138 murders, 15 attempted murders, 143 cases of malicious damage to property and 54 cases of arson. By 20 July 2021, a total of 2 051 arrests have been effected in KwaZulu-Natal. In addition, 155 dangerous weapons, 63 firearms, 39 vehicles and 5 171 rounds of ammunition have been confiscated.

 

Of concern to the SAPS was the theft of around 1 million rounds of ammunition from a warehouse in Ethekwini. While a small amount of ammunition has been recovered by the SAPS, the majority of the ammunition still remains missing and the DPCI was investigating the theft. In addition, the SAPS remained concerned about the situation in the neighbourhood of Phoenix in Ethekwini and the accompanying racial tensions that emerged during the period of unrest. However, a dedicated team of investigators were investigating the deaths reported in the Phoenix area.

 

In conclusion, the SAPS admitted several shortcomings in its policing approach. First, it highlighted the need for better intelligence to drive SAPS operations. Second, better crowd management training is required, with the presenter noting the possible need to improve the training of ordinary station members in crowd management. Third, the SAPS highlighted that broader concerns of poverty and unemployment needs to be addressed as an underlying solution to these problems. The SAPS noted additional lessons learntincluding the need:

• To enhance the use of technology for intelligence gathering purposes.
• For accurate and timeous information to operational teams.
• To focus on information gathering on social networks in order to identify instigators.
• To address inadequate security measures at warehouses and malls.
• To enhance SAPS physical, human and financial resources.

 

2.3        Observations by Committee Members

 

The Chairperson of the PC on Police allowed an opportunity for some questions of clarity from Members based on the two presentations, prior to the two Committees meeting separately with the SANDF and Police.

 

• A Member expressed concern around the perceived lack of intelligence support operations. The SAPS indicated that intelligence sharing structures were in place through the National and Provincial Joint Operations structures. The SANDF also noted that there have been some successes. For example, information was received of a planned motorcade to Escort and a joint operation was launched in response which deterred the event. Whenever an alert is received, action is taken, but it may be difficult to measure the impact of such actions as pre-emptive action may serve as a deterrent in itself. It was further noted that technology is not being optimally utilised as a means to boost intelligence.
• Members enquired whether there were any challenges in the cooperation between the SAPS and the SANDF. Both the SAPS and SANDF indicated that no challenges were experienced in the province that required escalation to a national level.
• The Delegation required further clarity on the ammunition that was stolen from a warehouse. It was indicated that, during looting in Ethekwin, SAPS discovered boxes of ammunition in the street. The SAPS was then approached by a private security company that indicated they transported a container of ammunition from the harbour to a holding facility that was looted. The ammunition consisted mostly of 9mm rounds and pellets. The original movement of the container from the harbour is under investigation as it was explained that the SAPS initially refused the movement of the container from a Transnet holding facility to a private warehouse. SAPS was under the impression that the ammunition was still with Transnet and is conducting an investigation into the parties responsible for giving permission for the container to be moved. The Minister of Defence then added that KwaZulu-Natal is a province with a proliferation of small arms and perhaps this period offers an opportunity to address thehigh levels of small arms in this province.
• A Member requested clarity on the total number of SANDF troops deployed in the province and it was indicated that, as of 20 July 2021, the number was nearing 5 000 with additional troops still in transit to the province.
• Finally, the Delegation expressed real concern around the situation in Phoenix, the number of deaths in the neighbourhood and the perceived racial tensions characterising the period of instability. The Minister of Police reassured Members that the concern is shared and that the situation in Phoenix is being prioritised by the Police and other role-players. He indicated that representatives of all communities in and around Phoenix have been brought together and three representatives from each community elected. These representatives are meeting daily in an effort to restore calm and unity to the area. Concerns emerged around roadblocks that were put in place by the Phoenix community as well as the apparent abuse of power by private security companies in the area. The Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) was therefore investigating the behaviour of private security in the area. Furthermore, the Minister indicated that a team was established by SAPS and the local community to ensure that families have access to bodies in mortuaries. In addition, a 10-member detective team has been put together, consisting of SAPS members not affiliated to Phoenix, to investigate the murders. By this date, one person had been arrested. A total of 70 POPS members as well as a sub-unit of the SANDF were deployed to the area to maintain calm. The Department of Social Development and the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal have also been involved in finding a lasting solution to the situation. The Minister of Police concluded that an extra effort is needed in this community, but that a lot has been done over the last week.

 

2.4        JSCD engagement with the Minister of Defence

 

Following the joint SANDF-SAPS briefing, the JSCD moved to a different location at the Chatsworth Police Station for interaction with the Minister of Defence and operational commanders of the SANDF involved in Operation Prosper. The engagement took the form of a confidential session where some operational matters were shared with the JSCD. Due to operational security considerations, these details are not included in this report of the JSCD. However, some aspects noted by Members of the JSCD during this engagement included the following:

 

• Members expressed concern around the capability of the SAPS as they were unable to quell the violence in the province and therefore the domestic deployment of the SANDF was required.
• Members observed that there seems to be an elevated level of trust in the SANDF among local communities and that professionalism and discipline will be required to maintain this trust.
• Given the volatile situation, Members expressed the need for the SANDF to maintain a rapid reaction capability to shift forces, with the SAPS, if violence erupts in areas where the SANDF is not present.
• The Committee expressed concern around the volatility of the N3 and, specifically, the Mooi River area as this area has been subject to violent attacks on trucks and motorists for some time.
• Members expressed the need for effective intelligence coordination between the SAPS and the SANDF.
• The Committee highlighted the need for joint operations between the SANDF and SAPS to ensure stability not only of urban areas, but also rural areas in the province.
• The Committee noted with concern that, despite reports to the contrary in the previous presentations, some high-level challenges were initially observed in terms of the cooperation between the SANDF and the SAPS.
• Committee members also inquired about the safeguarding of routes to transport milk, perishable and non-perishable food products, and the possibility to provide protected convoy support if required. The response was that security forces are liaising with organised agriculture to provide any essential support services to assure the safe transport of food products in order to contribute to food security.
• Members noted that the violent events that emerged in July 2021highlighted the need for the maintenance of a well-equipped and appropriately funded SANDF.

 

2.5        JSCD site visits to affected areas

 

The JSCD was escorted to several of areas affected by violence and looting in Pinetown. Members observed first-hand the violence and destruction caused by the looting at two shopping centres in Pinetownand the Distell Warehouse in New Germany. Members expressed their concern about the economic impact of the looting and noted that, in many cases, the looting was accompanied by extremely high levels of property destruction. Where business owners and employees were present, the Committee encouraged them in their recovery process. The Committee noted the gratitude for the SANDF’s deployment expressed by several business owners and employees of affected businesses present during the oversight visit.

 

The SA Air Force then transported Members of the Committee via Oryx Transport Helicopter to several of the areas where the SANDF have deployed soldiers as part of Operation Prosper, including Pietermaritzburg, the N3 highway, Greytown, Eshowe and Mooi River. The Committee observed that the N3 was free-flowing and no obstructions to traffic were visible. It was especially encouraging to see the flow of cargo traffic on the N3. The Committee’s concern aroundthe Mooi River toll gate was also confirmed during the visit given the proximity of the urban area to the toll-gate, meaning that trucks and other vehicles stopping at the toll gate could be targeted more easily. In this regard, the Committee welcomed the deployment of an SANDF contingent in the area. Members also noted the extensive damage to infrastructure in Pietermaritzburg, Greytown and Eshowe and welcomed the SANDF’s commitment to implement plans to ensure, alongside the SAPS, stability in smaller towns in KwaZulu-Natal.

 

3.         OVERSIGHT VISIT TO GAUTENG

 

The Gauteng leg of the JSCD oversight visit was attended by a smaller number of Members and support staff as a result of administrative constraints and limited flight availability to Gauteng. Members partaking in the Gauteng leg of the visit included the Co-chairperson, Mr E Nchabeleng, Ms TI Legwase, Mr TN Mmutle, Ms M Modise, Ms NE Nkosi, Mr SJF Marais, Mr D Ryder, Mr TWI Mafanya and Mr K Motsamai. They were supported by the Committee Researcher, Dr WK Janse van Rensburg.

 

On 21 July 2021, the Committee (as outlined above) convened at the Doornkop Military Base in Johannesburg for a briefing on the roll-out of Operation Prosper in Gauteng. The aim of the meeting was for Members of the JSCD to engage the SANDF’s Chief of Joint Operations (CJ Ops), Lieutenant-General Sangweni, as well as the military commanders in control of Operation Prosper in Gauteng. In addition to the CJ Ops, military personnel present included Rear Admiral Mhlana, the Chief of Staff of Joint Operations, Brigadier-General Pharo, the Head of Internal Operations at the Joint Operations Division, Colonel Motloung, the SANDF’s Parliamentary Liaison Officer, Colonel Maseko from the Directorate Corporate Communication, Colonel Maine, the Officer Commanding of the Joint Tactical Headquarters Gauteng and Lieutenant-Colonel van Vuuren, the Intelligence Officer of the Joint Tactical Headquarters Gauteng.

 

3.1        Opening remarks and Committee expectations

 

The Co-chairperson of the JSCD, Mr E Nchabeleng, opened the engagement by noting the expectations of the JSCD for the meeting. He then requested other Members to also voice their expectations for the engagement. Members of the JSCD raised the following focus areas for the oversight visit in Gauteng on 21 July 2021:

 

• Reviewing the status of the SANDF deployment in Gauteng, to ensure the deployment is taking place in line with the mandate.
• Assessing operational success and determining factors that prevent the achievement of operational success.
• Discussing the level of cooperation between the SANDF and SAPS.
• Discussing the SANDF equipment used and whether it is appropriate for the mission. This will help Parliament to refer back to these matters when debating the DOD budget in future.
• Engaging the SANDF on whether they are able to maintain a disciplined deployment.
• Assessing whether there is enough support from SA Air Force aircraft.
• Assessing whether critical infrastructure and critical routes have been secured in Gauteng.
• Assessing the status of the vaccination roll-out among deployed soldiers.
• Receiving clarity on deployment numbers.
• Assessing the provision of intelligence to drive operations.

 

3.2        Presentation by the Joint Tactical Headquarters Gauteng

 

Two presentations were made to the Committee by personnel from the Joint Tactical Headquarters Gauteng. The presentations were conducted by Colonel Maine, the Officer Commanding and Lieutenant-Colonel van Vuuren, the Unit’s Intelligence Officer.

 

The presentation commenced with a situational analysis of the SANDF deployment in Gauteng. During the initial period of instability, violence emerged in several areas and the SANDF identified key hotspots for potential deployment in cooperation with the SAPS. Most businesses opted to close their doors on Tuesday 13 July 2021 as a precaution and the M2 highway was closed for several days in some areas. This was the only road blocked for extended periods in Gauteng. The instability was characterised by a complete disregard and disobedience of Covid-19 lockdown rules and regulations and criminal elements tookadvantage of the situation for self-enrichment. Criminal activities included the blockage of roads, business burglaries with the intention of looting, notably liquor outlets, and attacks on law enforcement personnel. The time period between 21:00 to 04:00 posed a specific security concern. A comprehensive list of looted and affected businesses and infrastructure was also presented to the Committee.  A total of 33 fatalities were reported in Gauteng between 13 and 16 July 2021.

 

The second part of the presentation focused on the SANDF’s role in Gauteng. Two battalions were deployed in various areas around Ekurhuleni, Tshwane, Johannesburg and Soweto, Sedibeng, the West Rand, national key points, critical infrastructure and other areas around Gauteng. SANDF activities in support of the SAPS included the following:

• vehicle patrols;
• manning control points;
• conducting foot patrols;
• the protection of national key points;
• conducting visibility patrols;
• apprehending suspected individuals (and handing them over to the SAPS);
• cordon and search operations; and,
• escort duties.

 

In terms of air assets and operations related to Operation Prosper, all operations are centrally controlled from Air Force Base Waterkloof. SA Air Force activities include force projection and medical evacuations, intelligence gathering as well as command and control operations. The SA Air Force also provides strategic assets such as C130 Transport Aircraft that are used for logistical support, specifically the movement of equipment and personnel between Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal.

The presentation concluded with an overview of the levels of cooperation between the SANDF and the SAPS. Colonel Maine noted that, in Gauteng, cooperative planning starts at Provincial Command with engagement between the provincial SAPS and SANDF commanders. The SANDF Officer Commanding of the Joint Tactical Headquarters (Gauteng) sits on the Provincial Command. Joint planning with the SAPS is done to ensure effective cooperation and the SANDF is generally asked to provide input on SAPS plans in order to provide an effective support capability. Colonel Maine stated that the first week of cooperation on Operation Prosper has been characterised by good levels of cooperation. The main approach to operations is characterised by the SAPS being in command of directing operations with SANDF in support.

3.3        Observations by Committee Members

 

The Co-chairperson opened the floor to Members of the JSCD to pose questions to the CJ Ops and other SANDF personnel present. Key questions that emerged around Operation Prosper included the following:

 

• Members requested further information around the tactical intelligence picture (deployment-level intelligence) and whether tactical intelligence received has been accurate and helpful to inform SANDF deployments. Members requested that the response be structured in such a way that it does not compromise operational security. The response indicated that strategic intelligence is processed through the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) and this is reworked for tactical intelligence purposes. Intelligence Officers also form part of provincial intelligence structures to ensure that strategic intelligence is operationalised. The SANDF indicated that it does not engage in covert intelligence collection, but overt collection for operations. Overt intelligence collection takes place on the frontlines through own forces deployed and is relayed back to commanders and tactical intelligence operatives.
• Members requested clarity on the status and appropriateness of equipment utilised by the SANDF in Operation Prosper. The CJ Ops noted that there is a concern around equipment and he reiterated that it is a well-known fact that the SANDF is not adequately capacitated. Much of the SANDF equipment is old and obsolete and the Force’s facilities are often not fit for purpose. Militaries are designed for conventional warfare, and peacetime operations bring different challenges. Therefore, for internal operations, conventional equipment is not the best suited. For example, smaller vehicles with more manoeuvrability in an urban environment are required.Air assets are also limited and many of the assets are aged, posing operational limitations as there are not sufficient air assets in the SA Air Force for adequate support. Specific reference was made to the limited availability of strategic airlift capability which is caused by a shortage of C-130 transport aircraft. The CJ Ops noted, however, that these concerns around equipment is a strategic-level concern and that the SANDF is managing to execute the objectives of Operation Prosper with the equipment at hand, despite strategic limitations.
• The Committee requested information on the status of Covid-19 vaccination among deployed troops. It was indicated that the vaccination process in the SANDF is ongoing, which means that many of the troops deployed in Operation Prosper are not vaccinated, but awaiting their turn. The SANDF is continuing with the roll-out of its vaccination drive.
• Members requested clarity on how the SANDF characterises the insecurity that surfaced in July 2021. SANDF personnel noted that this question is best answered at strategic level and cannot be answered at operational and tactical level. However, at operational and tactical level, the SANDF and SAPS are dealing with criminality. The operations carried out are merely to address the immediate concerns which are looting, criminality, arson and vandalism.
• The Delegation required clarity on the composition of the deployed force in terms of Permanent Force and Reserve Force components. The SANDF indicated that, in Gauteng, the deployment is largely Reserve Force based while more Permanent Force elements are deployed in KwaZulu-Natal.
• The Committee requested the CJ Ops to indicate the SANDF’s recommendation about the future safeguarding of national key points after the SANDF withdraws. He indicated that the SANDF is only required now to assist with safeguarding of national key points due to the Operation Prosper deployment and that this task, as per current legislation resorts under the SAPS.
• Members asked for a detailed breakdown of deployment numbers in Gauteng and other provinces. It was indicated that, as on 21 July 2021, there were 8 companies (sub-units) deployed in Gauteng and that additional forces were being moved from Gauteng and other areas to KwaZulu-Natal. However, the deployment is not ‘doctrinal’, meaning that a sub-unit does not necessarily align with standard infantry battalion composition The SANDF also makes use of various levels of standby to ensure a rapid deployment capability.
• The Committee wanted to know if there were any specific future threats and whether the SANDF was expecting a further flare-up. The SANDF indicated that, along with the SAPS, it was continuing to monitor the situation on the ground.
• Members also requested information on the level of joint planning and cooperation and whether there is a Joint Operations Centre. The Officer Commanding of the Joint Tactical Headquarters for Gauteng indicated that there is a Joint Operations Centre that is staffed 24/7 with SAPS and SANDF members. This structure is separate from the Provincial Command that meets daily.

 

3.4        JSCD site visits to affected areas

 

The Committee was escorted by road to several affected areas in Gauteng, all of which have SANDF deployments as part of Operation Prosper. Members first visited a medical factory close to the Doornkop Military Base where the SANDF is maintaining a permanent presence. Their presence at the factory is based on tactical intelligence directives and the underlying risk assessment. The factory itself was not affected by the initial looting and riots, but due to the strategic importance of the facility, the SANDF maintains a presence in this area with the SAPS.

 

Members were then escorted to the Meadowlands Mall where clean-up operations were underway by staff of the affected retail outlets. The Committee witnessed a significant SANDF presence in the area and was informed that the deployment was to prevent any further damage to the mall. It was reported that looted infrastructure faces a significant risk in terms of further damage as it is susceptible to cable and copper theft as well as further vandalism. Members observed the conventional SANDF equipment, mostly Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicles, deployed at the mall and questioned why these specific conventional units and equipment were deployed in the area. It was indicated that the SA Army is responsible for troop provision and that the Joint Operation is responsible for deployment. The CJ Ops therefore does not determine force availability and provision. Members were also informed of the need for improved troop-carrying equipment in the SANDF and for equipment better suited to urban missions such as Operation Prosper.

 

At the Jabulani mall in Soweto, the Committee observed similar levels of infrastructure damage as at other malls. Members also noted with interest that several of the affected areas such as the Meadowlands and Jabulani Malls were located opposite SAPS stations. Members observed recovery efforts and cleaning by personnel at the mall and was informed that calm was restored to the area. The SANDF, along with the SAPS, is maintaining a permanent presence in the area. The oversight visit concluded with a visit to the Naledi Mall in Volsoorus. Albeit a smaller mall, it was extensively damaged as the upper floor of the building was set alight following extensive looting. The SANDF maintains a presence in the area and Members were again informed of the need for more appropriate equipment for urban operations for the SANDF.

 

4.         GENERAL COMMITTEE OBSERVATIONS

 

The following are some of the key observations made by the Delegation, largely related to the JSCD’s oversight mandate as it relates to the SANDF:

 

• The Committee observed the extensive damage caused to infrastructure in both KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng and expressed its serious concernaround the potential economic impact of this violence as well as the impact on people’s livelihoods.
• The Committee noted the gratitude of local communities and business owners towards the SANDF’s deployment and the contribution of Operation Prosper to the return of stability to affected areas.
• Members welcomed planning by the SANDF and the SAPS to support and safeguard communities and infrastructure in rural areas and smaller towns in KwaZulu-Natal as well as efforts to secure important agricultural routes.
• Members expressed concern around a clear lack of intelligence to adequately inform the security forces of the initial outbreak of violence in July 2021. This points to a serious concern around South Africa’s strategic intelligence capacity. However, at a tactical intelligence level, the Committee observed good cooperation between the SAPS and the SANDF under Operation Prosper characterised by regular information exchange and the establishment of appropriate structures to facilitate such information exchange. The Committee is of the view that the success in quelling the violence was significantly aided by good intelligence sharing at tactical level.
• The Committee noted the rapid escalation of the SANDF deployment under Operation Prosper and welcomed the extensive and urgent planning the SANDF put into the deployment immediately following the request by the President.
• Members observed both Reserve Force and Permanent Force SANDF deployments in the two provinces. The Committee specifically noted the value of the Reserve Force to allow a quick force surge when required by the SANDF.
• In KwaZulu-Natal, Members observed the serious risk that violence posed to the functioning of the N3 highway. Some Members expressed the opinion that this should be considered as a national key point or at least be considered as strategic infrastructure that warrants improved security planning.
• The Committee noted that the SANDF’s Covid-19 vaccination rollout is still underway, and highlighted the need to vaccinate those currently being deployed.
• The Committee expressed significant concern around the state of equipment of the SANDF and reiterated the need for fit-for-purpose equipment. Members specifically observed the fact that most SANDF equipment is old and that troop transport capabilities in the SANDF seems to be under severe pressure.
• Members expressed serious concern around the SA Air Force’s capability to support extensive operations. While the SA Air Force should be commended for the level of support it managed to offer to Operation Prosper, it is evident that aircraft constraints have a serious impact on effective mission support as well as troop and logistics movement.
• Members welcomed the high levels of discipline portrayed by members of the SANDF thus far in the deployment.
• Members noted the stark difference between the unrest in KZN and in Gauteng. While KZN saw damage over long stretches of road, with seemingly wanton destruction accompanying the looting and theft, the Gauteng incidents were largely limited to malls, and the malice and destruction for the sake of destruction was not witnessed to anywhere near the same levels.
• The Committee also noted that there was no material disagreement or tension between the SAPS command and the SANDF Command in Gauteng, such as the reported (and confirmed) issues experienced in KZN. This despite the SANDF Commander in Gauteng being a Female Officer at the level of Colonel.
• The Committee observed the complexity of an SANDF urban mission in support of the SAPS for a military that is largely geared as a conventional military force.
• The Committee further noted that the Commander in Chief has relied heavily on the SANDF to assist the country both in this instance and with the management of the Covid-19 related lockdowns. This despite repeated years of declining budget and constraints placed on the Defence Force.

 

5.         RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE

 

Based on the observations of the JSCD during its oversight visit of Operation Prosper to KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, the Committee makes the following recommendations as it relates to the defence portfolio:

 

• The Committee welcomes the SANDF deployment and congratulates the SANDF commanders, notably the Chief of Joint Operations and his staff, on its rapid response to the order to assist the SAPS under Operation Prosper. The Committee urges the SANDF to maintain its support levels to the SAPS both in planning and execution and, in so doing, continue its contribution to security and stability in South Africa.
• The Committee noted the gratitude of local communities towards the SANDF’s deployment and the positive impact that the deployment has had. The Committee therefore urges the Commander-in-Chief to maintain the SANDF presence in support of the SAPS should the risk assessment demand it. However, the Committee also urges a balanced approachto domestic SANDF deployments, as protracted deployments can negatively affect the state of civil-military relations in the country and ultimately erode the trust that South Africans place in the SANDF. The Committee will continue to oversee the letters of deployment from the President.
• The Committee noted serious concerns in relation to the provision of strategic intelligence to the security services. This brings into question the capabilities of the strategic intelligence services and/or the platforms for intelligence sharing. The JSCD expresses this concern as strategic intelligence informs operational and tactical-level intelligence, thus impacting on SANDF operations. For the success of future SANDF (and SAPS) operations, South Africa requires a coherent and capable strategic intelligence capability. The Committee therefore recommends that appropriate steps be taken to ensure a coherent and capable intelligence capability in the country, and that structures such as NICOC be optimised to ensure adequate intelligence provision for SANDF missions.
• The Committee noted the value of the Reserve Force to Operation Prosper. However, the Committee is also aware of the various constraints faced by the Reserve Force, notably budget constraints and an ageing force. The Committee therefore recommends to the PC on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) to include in its upcoming Budgetary Review and Recommendations Report (BRRR) a request to the National Treasury for increased funding for recruitment and deployment of the SANDF’s Reserve Force contingent. Additional funds for Reserve Force deployment should be specifically directed at domestic deployments such as support to the SAPS and increased border safeguarding.
• The JSCD should recommend that the PCDMV, during the BRRR process, raise the issues of the substantial reliance on the SANDF during times of extreme need, and the decreasing ability of the SANDF to meet expectations as a result of declining budget allocations.
• The Committee recommends that the South African Military Health Services (SAMHS) prioritise the vaccination of deployed soldiers.
• The Committee expressed its concern around the status of equipment of the SANDF and acknowledges that this has been the subject of debate by Parliament’s defence committees for some time. However, the negative impact of budget constraints on the status of the SANDF’s equipment and the resultant operational impact was clearly visible during the most recent oversight visit. In line with the JSCD’s Constitutional mandate to make recommendations on the defence budget and armaments, the Committee will request a joint report from the SANDF and the National Treasury on critical equipment requirements and the potential for funding thereof.
• Related to the need for equipment upgrades, the JSCD also recommends that funding be provided to renew or update the SA Air Force’s strategic airlift capability, the current state of which puts the SANDF at a significant operational disadvantage for both domestic and international deployments. In line with the JSCD’s Constitutional mandate to make recommendations on the defence budget and armaments, the Committee will request a joint report from the SANDF and the National Treasury on critical SA Air Force requirements, notably strategic airlift capabilities, and the potential for funding thereof.
• The Committee welcomes the high level of discipline portrayed by members of the SANDF deployed as part of Operation Prosper. The Committee recommends that the SANDF take all steps to maintain the current levels of professionalism and discipline portrayed and, should cases of ill-discipline be reported, immediate and appropriate steps be taken to correct it. The JSCD also recommends that the Office of the Military Ombud increases its efforts to make its services known to communities where the SANDF is deployed.

• The Committee observed the complexity of an SANDF urban mission in support of the SAPS for a military that is largely geared as a conventional military force. This complexity brings into focus the need for debate around the utilisation of the SANDF and the appropriate funding thereof. In recent years, both the JSCD and the PCDMV have noted the detrimental impact of the budget cuts on the SANDF. The Committees also observedthe lack of strategic direction given the limited funding available to implement the 2015 Defence Review. As such, the JSCD recommends that the Speaker of the NA schedules an urgent, separate parliamentary debate on the future utilisation, funding and strategic direction of the SANDF.

 

Report to be considered