ATC130612: Report of the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Development on its visit to the Groenpunt Maximum Security Correctional Centre in the Free State Province, dated 12 June 2013
NCOP Security and Justice
Report of the Select Committee on
Security and Constitutional Development on its visit to the Groenpunt Maximum
Security Correctional Centre in the Free State Province, dated 12 June 2013
1.
Introduction
1.1
Purpose of the oversight visit
i
The Select Committee on Security and
Constitutional Development was informed of a prison riot that broke out at the
Groenpunt Maximum Security Correctional Centre (the Centre) on 7 January 2013.
A delegation of the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Development
joined a delegation of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services (the
delegation), on a joint oversight visit to the Groenpunt Maximum Security
Correctional Centre on 16 January 2013. The delegation undertook a tour of the
facilities affected by the riots, met with inmates and officials who had been
present during the riot and received a debriefing from the Department of
Correctional Services (DCS), led by Mrs V Moodley the Regional Commissioner for
Free State and Northern Cape region.
1.2
SC Security oversight delegation and
officials of DCS
i
The delegation was led by Mr T.M.H Mofokeng
and in attendance was Mr D.V. Bloem, Mr J.J. Gunda, Mr M.W. Makhubela, Mr V.M.
Manzini, and Mr L.P.M. Nzimande who met with the Department of Correctional
Services (DCS), led by Mrs V Moodley the Regional Commissioner for Free State
and Northern Cape region, the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services
(JICS), the Independent Correctional Centre Visitor (ICCV); the Correctional
Supervision and Parole Board Chairperson (CSPB) and the South African Police
Service (SAPS).
2.
Judicial
Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS) preliminary investigation into
the cause of the riot.
2.1
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional
Services (JICS) preliminary report on the investigation into the incident at
the Groenpunt Maximum Correctional Centre between 7-9 January 2013
i
The JICS report indicated that Mr Sekele,
the head of the correctional centre (HCC), had met with inmates in B1 Unit on 7
January 2013. The inmates were unhappy with the HCCs feedback on complaints
they had submitted to him and wanted to see Area Commissioner instead. The HCC
had left and inmates were locked in their cells but witnesses reported that the
cells were not properly locked since it was close to supper time when the HCC
left and the inmates would shortly have gone to supper. Only the grill doors on
the cells were locked.
ii
Some inmates who were not locked in to
their cells pelted prison officials with rocks forcing them to retreat outside
the unit. The unit has two sets of doors, an inner door directly accessing the
prison cells and some offices and an outer door leading to the prison grounds.
Between the inner and outer doors of the unit is an office, tuck shop and
clinic. During the retreat prison officials only managed to lock the outer
doors of the unit.
iii
The inmates broke into the offices within
the inner doors and after looting it burned it by setting mattresses alight.
iv
The inmates broke into and looted the tuck
shop and offices between the inner and outer doors and then set them alight.
The inmates also burned their case files believing DCS would not be able to
transfer them without the case files. The clinic was not looted.
v
The inmates used drain covers to destroy
locks and removed the court yards steel poles with the concrete bases intact
and used these as battering rams to free other inmates. Windows were destroyed
but no cells were burned.
vi
The entrance to the unit was barricaded and
set alight to prevent access by the SAPS and DCS. The responding units used
three teargas canisters but these had no effect. The inmates also pelted prison
officials who tried to gain access via the roof, forcing a retreat.
vii
Due to
the fire the electrical supply ceased.
viii
The SAPS
and DCS officials used shock grenades and shot guns with rubber bullets to
disperse the rioters who fled back to their cells. The prisoners were then
locked in their cells.
ix
The
armoury noted all weapons and ammunition were returned and accounted for..
x
The lock-up total of the unit was 728
prisoners with ten officials on day duty. This amounted to a ratio of 1:73 in
B-Unit.
2.2
Concerns
raised by JICS
i
Assaults
on inmates by EST officials
a.
The JICS
preliminary report further indicated that assaults from Emergency Services Task
Team (EST) officials on inmates had escalated after the riot was brought under
control.
b.
Two
inmates at the hospital had been admitted on 8 January 2013 injuries to the
face and head and hands.
c.
The
hospital records recorded 74 injuries to inmates from 7 9 January 2013. In
subsequent reports the JICS indicated the number had risen to 104 inmates.
d.
Subsequent
information confirmed that nine officials were injured during the unrest with
three admitted to hospital.
ii
Shortage
of staff
a.
A
concern raised by the JICS investigator was the staff offender ratio on the day
of the incident that stood at one official to 73 inmates.
3.
Committee
investigation of factors contributing to prison riot
3.1
Provisional suspension of Head of
Correctional Centre and Area Commissioner and internal investigation
i
The Regional Commissioner informed the
delegation that the Department had suspended the Head of the Correctional
Centre, Mr Sekele, and the Area Commissioner. The suspensions were
precautionary whilst an internal investigation was underway to determine the
causes of the riot. An Acting head had been appointed in the mean time.
3.2
Grievances by offenders
i
The prisoner population had submitted
grievances, contained in a memorandum, to the centre management on the
following issues:
a.
kitchens
were poorly managed with frequent food shortages;
b.
poor
infrastructure maintenance and a lack of urgency when attending to broken
plumbing;
c.
inadequate
medical care and a frequent shortage of nurses;
d.
rehabilitation
programmes were poorly managed;
e.
poor
case management and absence of offender development programmes;
f.
slow reclassification processes;
g.
poor
management of administrative functions resulting in delays in appeals and
grievance resolution;
h.
inadequate
functioning of existing prisoner management committees;
i.
officials failure to maintain adequate
internal security and provide a safe and secure environment;
j.
exploitation of offenders by officials.
3.3
Overcrowding
i
The delegation was informed that the Centre
was built to accommodate 1193 offenders but it currently has a total of 2767
offenders amounting to overcrowding of 132%.
3.4
Shortage of personnel
i
The staff complement amounted to 308
personnel but the DCS reported that 21 officials, who had migrated to Groenpunt
maximum, were being used at the Area Commissioners office. The DCS also
reported a further 11 vacant posts.
3.5
Shift system
i
The delegation was informed of the four
shift system that comprised:
a.
Unlock (06:00 13:30),
b.
Lock-up (08:00 16:30)
c.
1
st
watch 16h00 - 23h30
d.
2
nd
watch 23h00 07h00
ii
The Department noted that although the
Centre was not adhering to the meal intervals as outlined in terms of section
8(5) of the Act
[1]
,
the Centre was providing inmates with three meals a day.
iii
The officials on duty at Groenpunt reported
frustration with the shift system and had placed requests for the DCS to return
to a two-shift system. It was reported that due to the staff shortages the
officials on duty during a four shift system operated on half its available
staff complement.
iv
Officials also reported higher incidents of
unruly behaviour occurring during the shift changes and under staffed periods.
v
Injury on duty and officials on sick leave
further exacerbated the situation.
3.6
Breaches of Security
i
Assault incidents and Unnatural
deaths:
a.
The DCS
presentation reported no incidents of assault for 2011/12. In 2012/13 there
were no offender-on-official assaults, and three offender-on-offender assaults.
One official-on-offender assault was reported in 2011/12, and none in 2012/13.
Officials however claimed there were at least five incidents in which officials
were stabbed during the understaffed periods identified above that took place
before the 9 January 2013 riot.
ii
Simcards and unauthorised cellular
telephones
a.
The DCS
reported it had conducted numerous searches after the riot and had found a
number of unauthorised simcards and cellular telephones in cells. The DCs had
charged two officials with breach of security.
b.
The DCS
noted that policies were in place that required officials to have written
permission for the use of cellular phones in the cells.
3.7
Influence of gangs and violence
i
The DCS reported that gang-related
incidents were rife at the Centre.
ii
The DCS believed that gang related
activity was a contributor to the unrest although the JICS investigator did not
determine this in his findings.
iii
The DCS also confirmed that most of the
gang affiliated members were locked in other units on the day of the riot.
iv
The DCS reported it had put a gang
management strategy in place.
3.8
Prison response to unrest
i
The Committee noted from the reports that
the Area Commissioner and the Head of the Correctional Centre (HCC) had not
responded immediately to prisoners grievances.
ii
The DCS reports revealed that the HCC had
managed the situation from his office. The Area Commissioner had also not been
at the centre leaving the Chief Operations Officer to assume responsibility.
iii
The Centre had used the EST officials to
force inmates into their cells and this had worsened the situation leading to
the unrest.
iv
Proper procedure had not been followed in
locking up inmates prior to serving dinner. The JICs report indicated the grill
doors were locked but the prison bars were left open.
v
Due to the poor condition of the road
leading to the prison the SAPS had taken approximately two and a half hours to
respond and the condition of the road had also delayed the fire brigades
progress to assist with the fire.
3.9
Damage to infrastructure
i
The Committee had visited the affected area
and had observed extensive fire damage to the tuck shop and offices between the
inner and outer doors. The locks of the prison doors were destroyed and
extensive damage occurred to prison windows. The cafeteria ceiling was
destroyed and the roof tiles were exposed. The inmates had caused extensive
damage to the recreational court yard as they had uprooted the steel poles with
concrete footings and had used these as battering rams. The inmates had also
broken pieces off the brick walls to uses as ammunition with which to pelt the
EST and police officers.
3.10
Hospital
i
The Centre has a primary health care
facility (the facility) that is also an accredited ARV facility. The delegation
visited the facility on the day of the oversight visit and met with the nursing
staff on duty and the 38 inmates cared for at the facility.
The facility was clean and well maintained at
the time of the visit. Two nursing staff was on duty and reported the following
situation:
a.
Inmates
with more serious injuries were transferred to the local hospital for treatment
whilst the facility cared for and observed those suffering chronic and
psychological conditions.
b.
The
facility cared for 800 HIV patients.
c.
The
facility was serviced by a dentist once a week.
d.
One
pharmacist and 3 sessional doctors visit the centre twice a week.
e.
The
facility is run by one operational manager and three nurses.
ii
Areas of
concern
a.
The
facility is a primary health care facility an according to policy it should be
serviced by 1 nurse for every 30 inmates but the current ratio is one nurse to
1000 inmates.
b.
The
situation is made worse by the shift system as only two nurses were on duty per
shift.
c.
Due to
the working conditions nurses were under pressure and were often off sick.
d.
The
nurses reported that mentally-ill patients were housed with inmates who had
suffered physical injuries as no separate wings existed. When mentally ill
patients suffered violent relapses, the situation was harder to control during
the night shift due to the mentally ill patients and physically ill inmates
being housed together.
e.
A
psychologist visited once a month but only met with inmates serving life
sentences.
iii
Recommendation
a.
The
nurses proposed the DCS should identify one centre in the region that could
accommodate all mentally ill offenders. This would assist in them receiving the
proper medical care they needed.
3.11
Correctional
Supervision and Parole
i
During the briefing session the Chairperson
of the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board (CSPB) had indicated that:
a.
The CSPB
had operated without a chairperson between 2005 and 2009.
b.
The CSPB
had lost the services of its secretary in 2009 and has not had another
appointed.
c.
Of the
two public represented position on the CSPB one was vacant since 2009 and the
other since 2012.
d.
The
vacancies had been brought to the attention of the regional management since
2009.
e.
The CSPB
Chairperson indicated that suitably qualified board members were vital to
uphold the integrity of the board and emphasised the need to train board
members.
f.
The Chairperson had indicated that there
were no major backlogs but due to the board member shortages the backlogs would
mount.
ii
Recommendations
a.
The CSPB
chairperson was of the view that should the one community representative, and
one case management committee representative required be appointed to serve on
the board, the situation would improve.
3.12
Nutrition
services
i
The Regional Commissioner noted the Centre
had not adhered to the three meals a day separated by four hour intervals as
required by legislation. The Centre served breakfast and then lunch and supper
together.
ii
The Regional Commissioner indicated the
Centre had, after the riots, reverted back to adhering to the policy.
iii
The DCS indicated that it often ran short
of meat and had to substitute it with eggs.
iv
The Centre, since 2010, served meals to
units P1 and P2 separately from the other inmates due to gang violence when the
units ate together in the main mess hall.
3.13
Management
i
The Delegation was informed of the
following matters related to the management of the centre:
a.
There
was a breakdown of the relationship between the personnel and management;
b.
The
management was unable to contain the riot;
c.
The area
management had failed to adhere to complaints policy and procedures;
d.
Poor
record keeping resulted in cases not being properly managed;
e.
Allegations
of unqualified and inexperienced officials placed in strategic positions;
f.
Officials had expressed their grievances
with the shift system to management who had not adequately handled the
situation;
g.
Poor
working conditions and understaffed officials on shifts were not adequately
addressed.
h.
The lack
of performance monitoring and visits by regional managers was a cause for
concern and attributed to the slack performance of officials in the units and
on shifts.
4.
Unrest
at the Prison during the delegations visit
4.1
During
the delegations visit to the prison a DCS official was stabbed by inmates. The
delegation was moved out of the prison for its safety. The delegation requested
a report on the incident. At the time of adoption of this report the
information had not been submitted but media reports indicated one of the inmates
had died whilst being subdued by the EST officials. The JICS indicated that a
criminal investigation is underway and its findings would be referred to
Parliament.
5.
Conclusion
5.1
The
delegation noted a number of causes had contributed to the unrest at the Centre
and draws the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) attention to the
following:
i
Break down in management of Centre:
The delegation observed that a number of issues raised by
inmates and officials could have been dealt with in a timely manner and
improved the moral of inmates and officials. In numerous instances the role of
management was lacking. Although the delegation welcomes the intervention by
the DCS management to suspend the Head of the Correctional Centre and the Area
Commissioner whilst it conducts its investigations the timing of the
suspensions denied the delegation the opportunity of interrogating the
managements role before and during the riot. The delegation expects an updated
report on the JICS investigation into the riot and outcome of disciplinary
investigations and procedures. The delegation further notes the following areas
for improvement:
a.
Inadequate
riot plan and unpreparedness of Centre for unrest;
b.
Safety
requirements not adhered to by Centre;
c.
Security
requirements for lock up of offenders not adhered to by Centre;
d.
Staff
shortages specifically on shift system and medical facility in particular;
e.
The
inmates were not receiving their medication timeously from the Centre;
f.
Not dealing with complaints by offenders
and officials in a timely manner;
g.
No
support given to Parole Board and not enough effort given to fill vacancies;
h.
Shift
system inadequate, specifically with relation to staff shortages. This
compromises the security of the Centre.
i.
Not maintaining meal policies (Non compliance
with policies and procedures);
ii
Use of excessive force by EST officials. An
EST policy must be formulated that delineates the use of force and must be
conveyed to EST officials.
iii
Inadequate gang management strategy. The
gang management strategy proved ineffective and must be reviewed.
6.
Recommendations
6.1
The DCS must fill the outstanding posts on
the Parole Board within 90 days of publication of report so that it has the
full complement of members.
The DCS must
include the work done to date with regard to parole and identify and indicate
action plans to alleviate bottlenecks.
6.2
The DCS must submit the Gang Management
Strategy for the Correctional Centre within 90 days of the tabling of this
report and report on whether the strategy has been implemented.
6.3
The JICS must submit its final report on
the unrest at the Groenpunt Correctional Centre and the unrest experienced at
other prisons around the country within 30 days.
6.4
The DCS must submit its findings on the
investigation into the unrest and the disciplinary measures, if any, that were
meted out within 30 days.
Report to be considered.
[1]
Section 8(5) of
the Correctional Services Act, Act 111 of 1998 stipulates.
Food to be
served at intervals of not less than four and a half hours and not more than 14
hours between evening meal and breakfast.
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