ATC130311: Report of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on its visit to the Groenpunt Maximum Security Correctional Centre in the Free State Province, dated 6 March 2013

REPORT OF THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ON ITS VISIT TO THE GROENPUNT MAXIMUM SECURITY CORRECTIONAL CENTRE IN THE FREE STATE PROVINCE , DATED 6 MARCH 2013

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 A delegation of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services (the Committee), and the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Development visited the Groenpunt Maximum Security Correctional Centre on 16 January 2013, to assess the situation at the centre following a riot which broke out at the centre a week earlier. The Groenpunt management area which comprises the office of the area commissioner as well as the Groenpunt Maximum and Medium correctional centres is situated in Deneysville near Vereeniging, and is managed by the DCS Free State/Northern Cape regional management.

1.2 During the visit the delegation received a briefing by the Department of Correctional Services’ (DCS) Northern Cape/Free State regional management, undertook tours of the hospital, kitchen and maximum facilities affected by the riot, and met with inmates and officials who had been at the centre during the riot. The Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services’ (JICS) independent correctional centre visitor (ICCV), the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board (CSPB) chairperson, and officials from the South African Police Service (SAPS) also participated in the visit which concluded with a debriefing session during which officials responded to the delegation’s prelimenary observations.

1.3 This report comprises the background to the riot, observations made during the visit and upon interrogation of the JICS’ preliminary reports on the incident, and finally the Committee’s recommendations.

1.4. The Committee received numerous requests for intervention from officials and offenders at the centre before and after the visit. Inmates, alleging poor rehabilitation and other services received at the centre, requested transfers. Officials alleged that their concerns, particularly those about the shift system employed at the centre, the implementation of the second phase of the occupational specific dispensation (OSD), and overtime compensation, were being ignored. In an anonymous letter, it was claimed that the poor morale and frustration of officials may have been a major cause of the incident. All correspondence received was, and will continue to be referred to the Inspecting Judge, and/or Minister of Correctional Services and National Commissioner for investigation and response. The matters raised in the correspondence will be revisited once the DCS and the JICS have had opportunity to investigate and report on them.

1.5 The Committee notes that a number of the contributing factors identified by DCS and JICS officials in preliminary reports, and during the oversight visit, have repeatedly been brought to the attention of the DCS’ senior management in the course of our oversight activities, and in our reports adopted by the National Assembly. These recommendations have in the main not been responded to, and very few, if any, have been implemented.

1.6 The Committee regularly informs the media of its oversight visits to allow journalists opportunity to report on our activities in order for the broader public to be made more aware of, amongst others, conditions in correctional centres. Given the media interest the riot had attracted, several journalists were present during the visit. The media and delegation had before the site visit agreed that journalists and photographers would, owing to security-related concerns, not be allowed to accompany the delegation on the site visit, but that they could be present during the orientation and debriefing sessions before and after. Unfortunately the agreement was breached and photographs were taken following the attack on an official, elaborated on below. According to media reports DCS authorities intervened and allegedly destroyed the footage, causing much distress among the press, and certain civil society organisations. The debate that ensued in the media following the incident has been noted. We would like to emphasise that as our regular stakeholders are aware, the Committee remains available to discuss, at appropriate forums, any concerns related to the rendering of safe detention, rehabilitation and reintegration services to inmates, and any concerns related to the effective oversight over those charged with delivering such services.

2. 7-9 JANUARY 2013 RIOT: BACKGROUND AND PRELIMENARY FINDINGS

2.1 Department of Correctional Services’ presentation on the incident

2.1.1 On the afternoon of 7 January 2013 half of the maximum offenders accommodated in Unit A refused to enter their cells, and demanded to meet with the head of the correctional centre (HCC) about a memorandum listing their grievances submitted some time earlier, but which had not been responded to. The HCC met with the inmates who, dissatisfied with his responses, demanded to meet with the Area Commissioner, who was then informed of the situation. The ensuing unrest, which took approximately two days to defuse, started later that afternoon, and saw inmates throwing rocks at officials, breaking open cells, setting fire to mattresses and offices in the unit, and looting.

2.1.2 Although the DCS’ presentation gave little detail with regard to how the situation was brought under control, it did reveal that emergency support teams (EST) from the Groenpunt, Boksburg and Baviaanspoort management areas, and the SAPS were deployed late on 7 January. The SAPS withdrew from the operation after the situation was ‘normalised’ on 14 January.

2.1.3 Twenty-five offenders were immediately identified as instigators and transferred to the Leeuwkop Correctional Centre, and the Ebongweni Super-Maximum Security Correctional Centre. The number of those transferred to the Ebongweni centre eventually rose to 197. A further 160 offenders were later transferred to the Pretoria Central (50), Baviaanspoort (10), Barberton (50) and Thohoyandou (50) correctional centres. An additional 500 offenders were identified for transfer out of the maximum centre, presumably to different units in the management area. At the time of the visit 408 such transfers had already taken place.

2.1.4 According to the DCS’ report three of the nine officials injured during the unrest were admitted to hospital. At the time of the visit they had already been discharged. The DCS provided officials with wellness services.

2.1.5 The presentation stated that fifty offenders had sustained injuries during the unrest, but that that number had since risen. The injured were treated at the centre’s medical facility, and local public hospital.

2.1.6 The grievances contained in the memorandum referred to above included: food shortages, and poor management of the kitchens; poor infrastructure maintenance including lack of urgency when attending to broken plumbing; poor medical care, in particular the absence of nurses; poor rehabilitation programmes; absence of offender development programmes; slow reclassification processes; poor case management; poor management of internal security; poor management of administrative functions resulting in delays in appeals and grievance resolution; the functioning of existing prisoner management committees; exploitation of offenders by officials; and officials’ failure to maintain a safe and secure environment. The area managers responsible for Corrections, and Development and Care have since the riot been given the responsibility of attending to the grievances.

2.1.7 Following the unrest all offenders in the area were visited by national, regional and area managers, and staff members were addressed by the regional management. A framework for the management of similar incidents was developed at a special regional management board meeting; the regional executive will be responsible for its implementation.

2.1.8 After the riot search operations were undertaken at the Groenpunt Medium, Heilbron and Vereeniging correctional centres. At both Heilbron and Groenpunt cellphones and “unauthorised items” were confiscated from DCS officials; at Vereeniging knives, batteries and simcards were confiscated from offenders.

2.1.9 In its preliminary assessment of what had led to the unrest the DCS found that gang activity, ‘influential’ offenders’ manipulation of fellow offenders to threaten security and destabilise the management of the centre, official-corruption, a breakdown in the relationship between the management and officials at the centre, and non-compliance with offender-grievance procedures may have contributed to the riot.

2.1.10 At the time of the visit a team led by the Deputy Regional Commissioner: Eastern Cape had already been appointed to conduct an investigation which will include an assessment of the health care and parole processes at the centre. The Free State/Northern Cape region will be monitoring the investigation. A week before the visit the Committee had communicated its intention to meet with the HCC, as well as the Area Commissioner. On the day of the visit however, the delegation was informed that both managers were placed on precautionary suspension on 15 January 2013, and were therefore unavailable to meet with the delegation. No indication was given of when the investigation would be concluded.

2.2 Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services preliminary investigation

2.2.1 The JICS’ preliminary report on the incident was submitted to the DCS’ Chief Operations Officer (COO) on 11 January 2013, and copied to the Committee. Their second report, containing preliminary findings was submitted to the Free State/Northern Cape regional management on 13 February 2013, and copied to the Committee. The report contains detailed eyewitness accounts taken from inmates and officials present during the unrest, and the subsequent days during which transfers took place. The DCS is expected to comment on its contents by 6 March 2013, whereupon the JICS will finalise its findings and recommendations.

2.2.2 The JICS’ investigation revealed that the Prisoner Management Committee (PMC) had submitted the memorandum referred to above to the HCC on 15 November 2012. Centre management discussed the contents on 28 November, and met with the PMC on 30 November to provide feedback. Officials responsible for managing the kitchens and case management were instructed to meet with the PMC. The meeting with the case management committee (CMC) had had to be aborted; no meeting between the PMC and kitchen managers was called. The JICS pointed out that the first memorandum of concerns was submitted in April 2012.

2.2.3 Inmates in the affected unit had been granted permission to play an early morning soccer match on 7 January 2013. Despite the unit manager having granted permission, officials working in the unit convened a meeting on the morning in question. Inmates were therefore not unlocked at 09h00 as usual but remained in their cells until 11h00 at which time they had grown exceedingly agitated, not least because it had grown too hot to continue with the soccer match. Inmates refused to enter the cells before lunch, and demanded to meet with the HCC. During the meeting they raised their dissatisfaction about the attitude displayed by the unit manager and officials responsible for the unit. The HCC was unable to restore calm, and when he informed inmates that their concerns did not warrant immediate attention, they demanded to meet with the Area Commissioner. This request was not granted, and the Area Commissioner never visited the unit. The EST was summoned in an attempt to force the inmates into their cells. Inmates retaliated by throwing stones at the officials, and shortly thereafter the unrest erupted. The situation was eventually brought under control at 23h00 with the assistance of the SAPS.

2.2.4 After the situation had been brought under control, inmates were assaulted by DCS officials, including the EST members who, the JICS’ inspector observed, assaulted inmates who were posing no threat, and were cooperating with them. The assaults were among the immediate concerns raised in the JICS’ 11 January report to the COO, which had by 13 February 2013 neither been acknowledged, nor responded to.

2.2.5 The JICS identified a number of serious matters, not reported in the DCS’ 16 January 2013 presentation, but nevertheless of major concern. These are summarised in paragraphs 2.2.6-2.2.13 below.

2.2.6 The severe staff shortage on the day was a major contributing factor to the DCS’ inability to prevent the riot. Despite the fact that there were only 10 officials to guard them, all 728 inmates in the unit were unlocked at the same time. The JICS had raised concerns about the staff shortage as early as 9 March 2012. In discussions between the Deputy Regional Commissioner and the JICS which took place in February 2013, the Inspecting Judge described the still acute staff shortage as a “ticking time bomb”.

2.2.7 On the day of the riot off-duty officials were also summoned to return to the centre to assist in the efforts to restore order. Some officials did not respond to the initial alarm, and a second had to be issued. The HCC claimed that because many of those who were off duty were “non-centre-based” officials and were not required to assist during emergencies, they were reluctant to respond to the call for assistance. The JICS’ investigator could not verify this claim.

2.2.8 The HCC and Area Commissioner’s response to the unrest situation is of major concern. According to the JICS’ report the HCC opted to manage the situation from his office, while the Area Commissioner was not on the premises at all. The COO was forced to take control of the situation when she arrived on the scene.

The JICS was unable to secure a meeting with the Area Commissioner, and therefore their report does not contain his version of events, or an explanation for his absence on the day. The JICS argues that had the HCC and Area Commissioner done more to contain the inmates’ agitation before the EST was deployed, it may have been possible to prevent the riot. The claims that the EST had threatened the offenders when they refused to re-enter their cells before the unrest had broken out, are a cause for concern as it may have added to the frustration that eventually led to the unrest. The role the regional commissioner and her deputy played was not mentioned in the JICS’ report.

2.2.9 The centre was unprepared for the crisis: the generator was faulty and could not immediately be used after the electricity flow was disrupted. Some of the fire-fighting equipment had not been serviced since 2008. As the DCS was unable to contain the fire, the centre was forced to seek assistance from the fire brigade which took some time to respond to the alert. When in the course of his investigation the JICS’ inspector requested that equipment be made available, the key to the door of the room where the equipment was stored could not be located immediately.

2.2.10 According to inmates’ accounts of the incident several DCS officials were observed video-recording the incident as is required when ESTs are deployed. DCS officials however claim that no video footage of the incident is available, as the batteries of the video recording equipment were flat at the time of the incident.

2.2.11 The SAPS had taken approximately two and a half hours to respond to the DCS’ call for assistance. From the JICS report this appears due in part, but not entirely, to the poor condition of the road leading to the centre.

2.2.12 The road to the centre is riddled with potholes, and extremely difficult to navigate. This slowed down the ESTs, the SAPS and the fire-brigade.

2.2.13 The transfer process appears to have been very poorly managed. Inmates appear to have been transferred regardless of whether they had had a role in the riot. Many of those transferred claim that they were misled during the process, and had had no idea that they were volunteering to be transferred to the Ebongweni centre. It further appears as though the centre used the opportunity to transfer inmates who had been perceived as trouble-makers, although they had not necessarily been involved in the incident. It is not clear why those initially identified as instigators were first transferred to the Leeuwkop centre, then returned to the Groenpunt centre, eventually to be transferred to the Ebongweni centre. From the JICS’ interview with the Head of the Ebongweni centre it is apparent that the receiving centre, which specialises in behaviour modification programmes that are implemented under specific conditions, was not prepared for the influx. Although inmates ought to have been searched before being transferred, three cellphones were confiscated upon their arrival at.

2.2.14 While the DCS reported in writing that fifty inmates were injured, and added only that that number had subsequently increased, the JICS during its first investigation established that 74 offenders had been injured and admitted for treatment between 7 and 9 January 2013. By the time the JICS’ final report was compiled that number had risen to 104 injured. It is not clear when the additional 40 inmates sustained their injuries, or whether the injuries were sustained during the riot, but not immediately reported.

3. OBSERVATIONS

3.1 Overcrowding

3.1.1 At the time of the visit the Maximum Correctional Centre, which was built to accommodate 1 193 offenders, was 132% overcrowded. This combined with the acute staff shortage, impacted very negatively on all services rendered to inmates. As was the case at most correctional centres visited by the Committee, the unit management system implemented did not function as intended owing to the staff shortages, and overcrowding.

3.2 Shift system

3.2.1 During the delegation’s interaction with the officials who had been present during the riot, frustration was voiced about their complaints regarding the impact the shift system having been ignored by the centre’s management. According to the officials they had repeatedly requested a return to a two-shift system. The four-shift system employed at the time of the riot, and which at the time of the visit was still being used, left periods of time during which the centre operated on half its available staff complement i.e. 13h30 and 16h00; and 07h00 and 08h00. Most incidents occurred during those periods. It was felt that calls for a return to the two-shift system were being ignored, as some had personal interest in retaining that shift system. Officials made clear that their morale was low because of the manner in which they were being treated. Despite the negative impact the four-shift system has had, the DCS apparently did nothing to assist those officials who fell victim to the assaults as a result of the staff shortage, and inappropriate shift-system,.

3.3 Security

3.3.1 The DCS presentation reflected no offender-on-offender, or offender-on-official assaults in 2011/12. In 2012/13 there were no offender-on-official assaults, and three offender-on-offender assaults. One official-on-offender assault was reported in 2011/12, and none in 2012/13. Officials however claimed that at least five incidents in which officials were stabbed during the understaffed periods identified above, took place before the 9 January 2013 riot.

3.3.2 The JICS in both its 11 January and 13 February reports mentioned that its inspector had observed inmates being assaulted by EST members, and that the HCC had been made aware of the assaults. These assaults were not mentioned in the DCS’ report. While the Committee acknowledges that the allegations are still under investigation, it is a cause for concern that this information was omitted entirely from the DCS’ presentation.

3.3.3 The delegation noted the number of cellphones and simcards found in possession of inmates and officials. The DCS explained that certain officials had written authorisation to enter facilities with cellphones, and that authorisation should always be in writing. In relation to the matters above, two officials from the Medium B centre had been charged internally for breach of security. It was pointed out that the DCS did not have the intelligence to establish how the cellphones were used, and therefore could not prove whether they had been used in wrongdoing, or whether the only contravention was that no written permission had been provided for their use. The DCS acknowledged that while it viewed the contravention of the cellphone policy in a serious light, sanctions imposed have to date not reflected this.

3.4 Grievance procedure (inmates)

3.4.1 The manner in which the centre had managed complaints received from inmates was identified as a major concern. When questioned about the implementation of the grievance policy, the DCS reiterated what the Correctional Services legislation requires, but could not give an assessment of why those processes appeared to have been completely ignored at the centre.

3.5 Infrastructure

3.5.1 The delegation observed that as per the JICS’ preliminary report, and the DCS’ presentation, extensive damage had been done to, in particular, the offices in the unit. While, according to the DCS, many involved in the riot had been transferred, some cells that had not been damaged were accommodating inmates.

3.5.2 It was immediately apparent that not taking into account the damage done by the fire, the unit appeared wholly unsuitable for accommodating inmates. The common area in the centre of the unit, where it is assumed the inmates took exercise, was nothing but a dusty open piece of land, with no lawn. It was clear that the building had been poorly maintained. A manager present during the debriefing session confirmed that the structure was unsuited to the incarceration of maximum security offenders, who served long sentences. He identified the Tswelopele Correctional Centre as a more suitable facility; none of the senior managers present contradicted his statement [1] . The delegation emphasised that the offenders held in the structure should be moved to more suitable accommodation as soon as possible.

3.5.3 The DCS reported that preliminary estimates found that the cost of the damage done during the riot amounted to approximately R2 million. This amount did not include professional fees, post and pre-contract escalation, etc. At the time of the visit the DCS and the Department of Public Works (DPW) were in discussions about the total cost of the damage.

3.6 Hospital

3.6.1 At the time of the visit only two nurses were on duty, and the hospital section appeared well-maintained and clean. The centre only provided primary health care services; those with serious conditions were transferred to the local hospital. At the time of the visit the centre’s hospital accommodated 38 inmates, and was not overcrowded. The hospital admitted those suffering chronic and psychological conditions, and those requiring observation. It is an accredited anti-retroviral-site catering to about 800 HIV positive inmates. A dentist visited once a week. The centre had one pharmacist. Three sessional doctors who visited the centre twice a week.

3.6.2 The centre is experiencing an extreme medical staff shortage. At the time of the visit it employed only four medical professionals one of whom was the operational manager. The three nurses worked in shifts of two. At some point there had been 12 professional nurses, but given the conditions, most leave after about two to three months. Nurses were often absent from work owing to depression and burn-out brought on by the extreme working conditions.

3.6.3 Medical staff explained that as the centre is a primary health care site, it should employ one nurse for every 30 inmates. Owing to the shift system, and the staff shortage two of the three nurses were on duty at a time, and had to take care of the 2 000 inmates at the centre i.e. 1 nurse to 1 000 inmates. This resulted in them not being able to adequately attend to those not hospitalised. They emphasised that they had no choice but to prioritise those who have been admitted to the hospital for observation.

3.6.4 A seriously ill inmate who had been referred to the Sebokeng Hospital , but had been discharged and returned to the DCS’ care. The local hospital had discharged him because his condition was terminal. The nursing staff have no choice but to provide him with the palliative care he needs. This places further strain on medical resources. According to the JICS’ report the Sebokeng hospital has on several occasions suspended the DCS’ account owing to non-payment for services rendered. This claim is still to be responded to by the DCS.

3.6.5 The nurses reported that care for mentally-ill inmates in the hospital was a major challenge. They were currently being accommodated in the hospital with inmates who have physical but not mental conditions. The centre did not have its own psychologist, and was visited by one only once a month. According to centre management this monthly visit is aimed mainly at meeting with inmates serving life sentences. Although the mentally-ill inmates in the hospital unit were well controlled, they suffered occasional relapses. During the day these relapses which were often accompanied by violent behaviour, were manageable. At night however, nurses are at home and on call, and ill inmates were housed together regardless of their mental state. Then the situation was harder to manage, and often became dangerous for all the patients. The medical staff felt that identifying one centre in the region that could accommodate all mentally ill offenders would assist in ensuring that they received the psychological services they needed, in a more secure environment.

3.7 Correctional Supervision and Parole

3.7.1 The chairperson of the CSPB explained that given the large population the management area ought to have two CSPBs, but had only one which was under staffed. Between 2005 and 2009 the CSPB operated without a vice-chairperson. Although one has since been appointed, the CSPB has operated without a secretary since 2009. One of community members left in 2009, and that position had at the time of the visit not yet been filled. The position of the second member of the public to serve on the CSPB has been vacant since the contract expired in December 2012. The CSPB chairperson was of the view that should the one community representative, and one CMC representative be appointed to serve on the board as per the requirements, the situation would improve. The vacancies have, since 2009, regularly been brought to the regional management’s attention.

3.7.2 The CSPB chairperson emphasised that in addition to ensuring that all positions were filled, it was essential to ensure that those appointed are suitably qualified. Though dedicated training for CSPB members was vital, such training was not provided. Those taking part in parole decisions should be adequately experienced, and trained so as to ensure that the integrity of the process was maintained.

3.7.3 The CSPB did not report major backlogs, but emphasised that given the overcrowding, and given the staff shortages it would not be able to implement their strategy for ensuring that applications were considered timeously. In that case backlogs would be inevitable.

3.7.4 Inmates had complained of long delays in receiving responses to their applications for medical parole. These could not be substantiated, as according to the area management no applications for parole on medical grounds had been received. It was not clear why the critically-ill inmate, who was receiving palliative care in the hospital section, had not been considered for medical parole. The CSPB chairperson confirmed that as the Medical Parole Advisory Board (MPBA) was responsible for the consideration of medical parole applications, CSPBs had little role in the process. He confirmed that, in his experience, the process was fraught with challenges.

3.8 Nutrition services

3.8.1 The management confirmed that the centre did not adhere to the four hours which had to separate the three meals inmates should receive daily. Instead, lunch and supper were being served at the same time, with the intention that inmates should save the supper portion of what is distributed, until the early evening.

3.8.2 Officials interviewed during the visit confirmed that the centre often ran short of meat during mealtimes and that in those instances eggs were served as a substitute. Owing to the manner in which meals were distributed, mainly the maximum centre was affected by the meat shortage. According to the official it was impractical to alter the order in which centres served meals.

3.8.3 Although the kitchens appeared in good order during the visit, an inspection by the JICS in March 2012 found that the condition of kitchen equipment, the levels of hygiene and the preparation of food were all unsatisfactory. According to the JICS’ records, meals were, at that time, served as required by the legislation.

3.8.4 When the JICS visited the kitchen subsequent to the incident, it found that the kitchen was clean. The inspector was told that since officials working in the kitchen had started attending catering courses, service had vastly improved. The freezer and cold rooms had been out of order since early November 2012, and neither of the two DPW-appointed contractors has been able to repair them. In the interim, meat was stored in the freezers at the centre’s abattoir, but milk often became sour before being served.

3.8.5 In an effort to curb gang violence, inmates accommodated in units P1 and P2 have since 2010 received their meals in a sub-kitchen near the units. An official interviewed by the JICS confirmed that at times these units received insufficient food. In his view food was correctly rationed at the main kitchen but that poor management of the transportation and distribution of the meals to the sub-kitchen resulted in theft, which contributed to smuggling. The JICS’ second visit to the kitchen revealed that only two officials were responsible for serving meals, thus increasing the risk of food being smuggled, and for breaches of security.

3.8.6 The Regional Commissioner pointed out that immediately after the riot, meals were being served as per the policy, appearing to take this as in indication that the challenge was not as great as alluded to by the inmates.

3.9 Gang management

3.9.1 The regional management stated that the management area was infamous for its gang activity. Since the gang activity that took place at the centre in 2010, the area was considered a prison gang hotspot, but a gang management strategy was being put in place at the centre. The DCS’ preliminary investigation into the riot revealed that the predominant gang at the centre, the “Airforce”, infamous for escape attempts mainly, may have contributed to the unrest. Although members of this gang posed an escape risk, they were not considered as dangerous as some of the other gang members.

3.9.2 According to senior officials present, most gang members were accommodated in the maximum centre, but not exclusively in the unit in which the riot took place. The most radical gang members were accommodated in another unit, and had therefore not been involved in the riot.

3.9.3 Though the DCS had alluded to possible gang-involvement in the riot, the JICS’ investigation has to date not identified gang activity as a possible contributor.

3.10 Prisoner Management Committees

3.10.1 The role the PMC, which comprises members elected by inmates to be their representatives in meetings with the centre-management, may have played in the riot is noted with concern. Although the DCS did not identify the PMC as a possible contributor, the JICS found that the members of the PMC failed to communicate the outcomes of meetings with the management, and apparently encouraged inmates to throw rocks at officials at the start of the unrest.

3.11 Management

3.11.1 The DCS has acknowledged the risk inherent in the management of a correctional centre, particularly one accommodating maximum offenders, and that this risk is exacerbated by the DCS’ long-standing staff shortages and overcrowding challenges. In addition, it has been acknowledged that the Groenpunt area has a history of gang-related violence. Given these facts, the Centre’s obvious unpreparedness for an emergency of the nature described above is unacceptable. That a regional framework for the management of similar incidents is only now being developed is of major concern.

3.11.2 In addition to not having had a strategy for dealing with emergency security situations, it is apparent that basic safety requirements had not been met: fire extinguishing equipment were not serviced regularly, and the generator was not operational. Had the equipment been working the damage to the infrastructure would undoubtedly have been minimised. The JICS in its report mentioned that the condition of the road leading to the centre had delayed both the SAPS and the fire brigade. Again, given the nature of its work the DCS should have done everything in its power to ensure that the road all vehicles had to use in the event of an emergency were accessible, and in good condition. The apparent failure to bring the impact of the state of the road to the relevant authorities’ attention so that a solution may have been negotiated, showed not only a disregard for security, but also neglect as far as the management of its vehicle fleet.

3.11.3 Per the JICS’ report, the head of the Ebongweni centre was unprepared for the 197 inmates transferred there following the riot. That unauthorised items were confiscated from those transferred there upon their arrival, indicates that searches done before leaving Groenpunt were inadequate. In light of the above, it may be surmised that the management decision to transfer the inmates did not take into consideration the potential risk to the security arrangements at the Ebongweni facility which accommodates some of the country’s most dangerous criminals.

3.11.4 The report does not elaborate on the reasons why those initially transferred to Leeuwkop were sent back to Groenpunt, and eventually transferred to the Ebongweni centre. What is clear is that by transporting inmates identified as instigators of a riot unnecessarily, security was jeopardised and resources wasted.

3.11.5 The breakdown in the relationship between the personnel and management of the centre had contributed to the riot and the centre’s inability to manage the crisis situation on the day. This was confirmed by both the DCS’ regional management, and the JICS’ investigation.

3.11.6 The area management had failed to ensure that complaints processes and procedures were adhered to. Compliance inspections revealed that compliance with DCS policies and procedures had dropped from 86% in 2011 to 57% in 2012, the lowest in four years. The Deputy Regional Commissioner confirmed that a regional team had visited the area to determine the reasons for the drop in compliance. A number of challenges, including poor record-keeping were identified, and measures were put in place to strengthen compliance. It was not clear why that action plan had not yielded results, or whether the radical decrease in compliance had been escalated for intervention by the national management.

3.11.7 During the delegation’s meeting with them, officials claimed that unqualified and/or inexperienced officials were appointed in strategic positions which should be reserved for senior officials. Officials were frustrated that correctional officials on levels 1 and 2 were being appointed to manage units, and felt that their inexperience was jeopardising security.

3.11.8 Members having noted the anonymous complaints received from officials, the JICS’ reports that an inmate had allegedly been intimidated not to cooperate with the investigators, and the DCS’ poor response to grievances by inmates, enquired whether regional managers had been aware of the level of frustration and disillusion felt by officials, and whether that had not been perceived as a threat to order and security within the centre.

3.11.9 Major concern was raised that although the regional management had been aware of extreme challenges as far as staffing, it did little if anything to accelerate the finalisation of the migration of 21 employees from the area commissioner’s office, to the centre. Like the national office, regional offices appeared to be overpopulated, while the centres where the real work of the DCS takes place were in most cases, grossly and dangerously understaffed.

3.11.10It was felt that especially given the serious challenges the area had clearly been

experiencing, senior managers ought to have more regularly visited the centre to

track progress made in turning the situation around. The lack of performance monitoring, even at national level, encouraged the levels of ill-discipline which was to a large degree fuelled by poor working conditions.

3.12. Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services

3.12.1 The Committee’s enquiries prior the visit revealed that the ICCV post at the maximum centre had been vacant since 20 November 2012, with the new ICCV only due to start visiting the centre on 21 January 2013. Although the ICCV assigned to the medium centre had visited the maximum facility approximately a week before the riot, the JICS had not indicated whether it was aware of inmates’ growing frustration.

4. RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

4.1 During the visit an official was attacked and stabbed by three maximum security inmates. After the incident the delegation had emphasised that the manner in which officials’ lives were being placed at risk was unacceptable, and that those responsible should be held fully accountable. The delegation requested that once the investigation into the incident had been completed the committees should be provided with the outcome. At the time of the adoption of this report, that information had not yet been received.

4.2 A day after the stabbing the delegation learnt, through the media, that one of the inmates allegedly responsible for the attack succumbed to injuries apparently sustained during the EST’s efforts to restrain him. The JICS and DCS were requested to verify the reports, and to submit the outcome of their investigations to the Committee. The JICS’ report on the incident was submitted to the Regional Commissioner: Free State/Northern Cape on 13 February 2012 for comment, and copied to the Committee. At the time of the adoption of this report, the DCS’ report had not yet been received. According to the JICS, a criminal investigation is underway, and this is welcomed.

4.3 Although the JICS’ findings in relation to the above-mentioned unnatural death will not be discussed here, the Committee must register its serious concern that the DCS had apparently not reported the death to the JICS as required by the Correctional Services Act, and the allegation that the DCS is withholding information relating to the cause of death from the JICS’ regional inspector.

5 RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee requests that the Minister ensures that the following recommendations are considered, and where possible, implemented. The Minister should further ensure that responses with regard to their feasibility and/or implementation progress reports are submitted to the Committee within a reasonable time of the report having been adopted . As stated in the introduction to this report, the Committee has in the past made several recommendations in relation to services provided to inmates. Those recommendations remain applicable, and are therefore not repeated here.

5.1. Management

5.1.1 It is noted that in the JICS’ assessment the riot may have been averted had the centre and area management done more to discuss the inmates’ concerns in an attempt to defuse the situation, before deploying the EST. In the Committee’s view, and given the specific function ESTs have, such teams should only be deployed under conditions where security is threatened, and not as an alternative to custodial officials and centre managers performing their duties.

5.1.2 The allegations that the EST had assaulted offenders, and used unnecessary force are cause for serious concern. Similar allegations have been made during visits to other centres, and in a number of complaints submitted to the Committee. How the EST functions in the absence of a clear., well-communicated strategy for dealing with emergencies, is uncertain. Given that ESTs may under specific conditions use necessary force, it is absolutely vital that the parameters within which that force may be used are clearly defined. Legislative provisions must be translated into a specific strategy that is explained to both officials and inmates, and consistently applied.

5.1.3 The DCS should present the Committee with the current status of its strategies for managing emergency situations, particularly those standard operating procedures governing the functioning of ESTs. The Committee should also be provided with a detailed account of how the ESTs deployed at the centre had attempted to manage the situation, the procedures they had followed, and to what extent they had complied with the legal provisions governing their activities

5.1.4 Clarity should be provided on the role the HCC, area commissioner, as well as regional commissioner had played in a) preventing the unrest, and b) managing the emergency situation that arose. Should the claim that the COO had had to take control of the situation upon arrival at the centre be substantiated, appropriate action should be taken against those centre-, area and regional managers who had failed to act with the necessary haste to contain the situation.

5.1.5 Officials interviewed were clearly frustrated by the pressure the shift system employed at the centre placed on them. The concern about custodial staff being placed under even more strain by the fact that some officials, who have migrated to centre-based posts, were still performing administrative functions, was raised during visits to other centres too, and again at Groenpunt. Where the DCS’ management does not take reasonable measures to ensure that the correctional environment is as secure as it can be, it should be held ultimately accountable for breaches of security, and assaults such as the ones described above.

5.1.6 The Committee reiterates that the improper use of human resources as illustrated above, draws into question the integrity of the DCS’ reporting on its vacancies and post establishment. Where security staff are deployed to perform any functions other than custodial, centre-based duties, it is impossible to adequately develop strategies (including shift systems) that will address centres’ needs. In addition, such inaccurate reporting makes the DCS’ own management of its human resources, as well as proper planning, impossible. The DCS should provide a breakdown of its establishment, indicating where the discrepancies are e.g. where posts are incorrectly classified. The report should include how, and by when the discrepancies would be addressed.

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5.2 Management of inmate-grievances

5.2.1 In November 2012, the Committee reported that according to the JICS’ 2011/12 annual report ICCVs received training to encourage inmates to follow the DCS’ internal complaints process outlined in Section 21 of the Correctional Services legislation. We reiterate what we then recommended i.e. that the DCS should ensure that all HCCs adhere to the provisions, and that all inmates are made aware of the complaints procedure, not only at admission, but for the duration of their incarceration. Failure to adequately respond to complaints not only contravened the provisions of the Correctional Services legislation, but also violated inmates’ right to just administrative action, and as illustrated above, threatened security.

5.2.2 In the same report we recommended that adequately explaining how a correctional centre, and the correctional system works, was an essential component of managing the inmate population, through managing inmates’ expectations. According to the DCS, all sentenced offenders are, upon admission, provided with a booklet explaining the parole process. In our opinion, that booklet should be expanded to include explanations of all processes related to the functioning of a correctional centre . As per our recommendation in relation to the dissemination of parole-related information, the booklet should be simple, providing clear information in a language the inmates will understand. Centres should regularly engage inmates in activities that reinforce and/or provide clarity regarding the system.

5.2.3 The Committee acknowledges that forums at which inmates are able to voice their concerns and seek clarity regarding policies and/or matters they do not fully understand are absolutely vital. However, we have serious reservations about the function and effectiveness of PMCs. We are of the opinion that given the staffing and overcrowding challenges, and the impact these have on order and security, allowing PMCs to act as representatives, and enjoy the influence they appear to be enjoying, may pose too much of a risk. The Committee therefore recommends that the appropriateness of PMCs be reviewed.

5.3 Corruption

5.3.1 Given the apparent ease with which cellphones may be smuggled into correctional centres, it has become essential that the DCS should explore the use of technology to make the use of cellphones in correctional centres impossible as a long term measure, and in the short term explore how through consistently imposed and appropriate sanctions, officials are deterred from smuggling cellphones to inmates, and/or reneging on their duty to ensure that no inmate is in possession of a cellphone, or any other unauthorised items. Where security is breached in this manner, criminal charges should always be pursued.

5.4 Transfers

5.4.1 The apparently chaotic and irregular application of the transfer policy following the riot, confirms what has frequently been reported by the JICS, and raised by the Committee: the punitive manner in which transfers are applied. Unwarranted transfers destabilise offenders, and cause unnecessary trauma to their families, and should therefore be avoided.

5.4.2 Given the specialised nature of the programmes provided by the Ebongweni centre, and the stringent procedures followed in caring for, and managing that inmate population, clarity should be provided on the procedure followed to ascertain whether the 197 inmates transferred there were in need of the interventions that the centre specialises in.

5.5 Official on Offender assaults

5.5.1 The Committee has repeatedly spoken out against assaults on inmates by officials. While we recognise that given the challenges of the correctional environment, and given how dangerous many of the offenders in the care of already over-extended custodial officers’ care are, we cannot condone any assault, on any offender regardless of the transgression he or she has committed . The alleged assault of offenders by the EST, and the alleged death at the hands of correctional officials on 16 January 2013 should not only be investigated internally, but criminally too. Dismissal should be the only acceptable sanction for assaulting and/or killing an offender.

5.6 Investigations

5.6.1 The delegation had voiced concerns about the integrity of an investigation into the riot, by the DCS itself. These concerns have been intensified by the claims that the Area Commissioner had to date refused to be interviewed by the JICS, and that DCS officials are refusing to cooperate with the JICS’ inspector investigating the unnatural death that occurred on 16 January 2013. Although the Committee had requested to be provided with the outcome of the investigation and/or status reports on progress made, those reports had not been received at the time of the adoption of this report. In a letter to the Chairperson, the National Commissioner indicated that status reports on progress made in the investigation could not be provided, owing to the “complexity of the information” requested. The Committee is of the opinion that it is inappropriate for DCS officials to lead investigations into serious incidents particularly those in which officials are likely to be implicated, and which may have been caused by mismanagement . All measures to ensure that investigations are performed in a manner that is transparent and impartial should be explored.

5.7 Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services

5.7.1 Upon considering the JICS’ 1 September to 31 December 2011, and the 1 January to 31 March 2012 quarterly reports, the Committee had noted with extreme concern that the DCS virtually ignored the JICS’ recommendations and findings, and at that time recommended that the relationship be drastically improved to ensure that the JICS’ execution of its mandate was possible. In August 2012 the JICS reported that since the responsibility of liaising with the JICS had been assigned to the COO, the relationship had drastically improved. Of concern is that despite the reported improvement, the JICS’ initial report on the Groenpunt incident had gone unacknowledged, and unresponded to, and officials resisted efforts by JICS’ inspectors to investigate both the riot, and the unnatural death that took place on 16 January 2013. In addition, the above-mentioned unnatural death was not reported to the JICS as per the legislative requirements. This blatant undermining of the Office of the Inspecting Judge is a further illustration of why, if it is to be an effective oversight body, the independence of that office should be definitively asserted.

5.8 Inter-departmental cooperation

5.8.1 Given the severity of the challenges facing the DCS, many of which appearing insurmountable if left only to the DCS to resolve, the Committee recommends that ways in which the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) cluster departments could assist, should be explored .

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The Committee expresses its appreciation to the regional management, and especially the management and staff at the Groenpunt Correctional Centre, for their co-operation during the visits. The JICS’ timeous response to requests for reports and information is appreciated.

Report to be considered