Questions and Replies

Reply:

(1) No criminal charges were brought against any officials at this stage as the arbitration processes are still ongoing and the outcome of the arbitration may strengthen any criminal case that the Department would institute.

(2) No money has been recovered from officials thus far.

 

Reply:

The 14th BRICS Summit, held on 23 June 2022, adopted the BRICS Beijing Declaration. In paragraph 73, BRICS Leaders supported promoting discussions among BRICS members on a BRICS expansion process. BRICS Leaders stressed the need to clarify the guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures for this expansion process on the basis of full consultation and consensus.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia together with other countries have expressed an interest to join the BRICS formation.

At this stage, there is no common BRICS understanding on what process potential candidates should follow to officially apply for admission to BRICS and no common understanding on what standards and criteria should be taken into account when considering potential candidates.

Discussions among BRICS members to clarify the guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures for a BRICS membership expansion process will continue in 2023. The outcomes of these discussions will provide clarity on the procedures to apply for admission to join BRICS. The outcomes will further provide clarity on the guiding principles, standards and criteria to be applied by BRICS members in the consideration of potential candidates to join BRICS.

 

Reply:

As DIRCO, we received confirmation from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) confirming an incident where an Oryx helicopter came under fire in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo, on 05 February 2023. A crew member, Sergeant Vusumuzi Joseph Mabena, was fatally shot. Major Omolemo Matlapeng suffered injuries but managed to continue flying the chopper and managed to land safely at Goma airport.

We believe that the investigation of the incident remains the responsibility of the SANDF, working with the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). DIRCO will be informed of the progress and outcomes once the investigation is completed and shared.

Reply:

The Government of the Republic of South Africa, through the SADC and AU Heads of Mission, continues to encourage all political parties and other role-players in Zimbabwe to adhere to the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and to create conducive conditions for holding credible, inclusive, transparent, and peaceful elections.

Upon the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, South Africa will observe the 2023 elections as a member of the SADC Electoral Observer Mission to Zimbabwe. South Africa will also form part of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) to assess the country’s readiness to hold the elections and to also evaluate the implementation of SEAC recommendations made after the 2018 elections.

Reply:

The African Union has developed a focused strategy to deal with African migration to Europe through its Migration Policy Framework for Africa 2018-2030 and its Plan of Action. The Migration Policy Framework for Africa provides comprehensive policy guidelines to the African Union Member States and the Regional Economic Communities in nine thematic areas, namely:

• Migration Governance;
• Labour Migration and Education;
• Diaspora Engagement;
• Border Governance;
• Irregular Migration;
• Forced Displacement;
• Internal Migration; and
• Migration and Trade and other cross-cutting issues.

The Plan of Action focusses on activities to be undertaken by the African Union Commission to facilitate a coherent management of migration.

Additionally, the African Union has also developed the following tools:

• A training manual on migration governance;
• The Continental Policy on Combatting Human Trafficking;
• The Continental Policy on Addressing Migrant Smuggling;
• Guidelines on Return, Re-Admission and Sustainable Re-Integration; and
• The convening of the first meeting on Missing Migrants in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In July 2018 the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government endorsed the creation of the African Observatory on Migration to improve migration governance in Africa and the appointment of a Special Envoy for Migration to promote a better management of migration in the Continent. Three Migration Centres are currently being operationalised namely:

• The African Migration Observatory (Morocco);
• The Continental Operational Centre (Sudan); and
• The African Centre for the Study and Research on Migration (Mali).

Reply:

(a) There are no salaries of (i) chief executive officers and (ii) top executive positions in state-owned entities reporting to the Minister, as well as (ii) the total amount they are paid to attend a meeting. Thus, there are no state-owned entities that report to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation.

Reply:

His Excellency President Cyril Ramaphosa during his tenure as Chairperson of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, was seized with finding a lasting solution to the political challenges in Eswatini.

As a SADC member, South Africa concurs with the decisions taken by SADC, including the most recent decisions of the Extraordinary SADC Organ Troika Summit held in Namibia on 31 January 2023, regarding the Kingdom of Eswatini. These decisions, amongst others, condemn all killings and property destruction in the Kingdom, and calls for the Government of the Kingdom of Eswatini to urgently initiate the National Dialogue process. The Summit also calls for the Government of the Kingdom of Eswatini to conduct a swift, transparent, and comprehensive investigation into the killing of Mr Thulani Maseko.

South Africa, therefore, continues to urge all affected parties in the Kingdom of Eswatini to maintain calm and peacefully engage in the National Dialogue. South Africa is always available to contribute to the stabilisation efforts in the Kingdom of Eswatini for the benefit of the two countries.

South Africa aligns itself with the decision of the 36th African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government which expressed concern at the unfolding situation in the Kingdom of Eswatini. The Assembly requested the African Union Commission to work in partnership with SADC and the Kingdom to coordinate interventions for the promotion of peace and inclusive dialogue amongst the Kingdom’s stakeholders, with a view to achieving a peaceful resolution to the political and social crisis in the country. This decision is based on the well-established AU principle of subsidiarity and the ethos of the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture. Also, the decision was taken following the consideration, by the Assembly, of the report of the AU Peace and Security Council, chaired by South Africa for the month of February 2023, on its activities and the status of peace and security on the Continent.

Reply:

(i) No official vehicle has been purchased for the use of the Minister since 1 June 2019.

(ii) Approval was obtained for the procurement of official vehicles for the two (2) Deputy Ministers on 14 October 2021. Two official orders were placed with the approved suppliers on 01 December 2021:

Deputy Minister K Mashego-Dlamini

(a) Toyota

(b) Fortuner 2.8 GD-6 VX A/T

(c) 2022

(d) R667 333.50

(e) Vehicle delivered in June 2022

Deputy Minister A Botes

(a) Audi

(b) Q5 TDI QUATTRO S TRONIC

(C) 2022

(d) R718 459.99

(e) Vehicle delivered in September 2022

Reply:

1. The details of the (a) destination and (b) total costs for (i) accommodation, (ii) travel and (iii) any other costs incurred for international travel of the (aa) Minister and (bb) Deputy Ministers since 1 June 2019 are as follows:

(aa) Since 1 June 2019, Minister Pandor travelled mainly to the following destinations (a) Africa, Americas, Europe, as well as Asia and the Middle East. The (b) total costs for (i) accommodation, (ii) travel and (iii) any other costs incurred for international travel were: R5 108 912.00.

(bb) Since 1 June 2019, Deputy Minister Botes travelled mainly to the following destinations (a) Americas and Europe. The (b) total costs for (i) accommodation, (ii) travel and (iii) any other costs incurred for international travel were: R R2 135 913.00

(bb) Since 1 June 2019, Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini travelled mainly to the following destinations (a) Asia and the Middle East. The (b) total costs for (i) accommodation, (ii) travel and (iii) any other costs incurred for international travel were: R1 674 935.00

2. The total cost incurred for domestic air travel for the (a) Minister and each (b) Deputy Minister since 1 June 2019 are as follows:

(a) The total costs incurred for Minister Pandor’s domestic travel since 1 June 2019 are: R495 382.00.

(b) The total costs incurred for Deputy Minister Botes’s domestic travel since 1 June 2019 are R1 501 404.00. The total costs incurred by Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini’s domestic travel since 1 June 2019 are R1 674 935.00

Reply:

a) During the period 2021/22 the Department concluded the closure of 10 missions. The remaining two missions are earmarked for closure during 2023.

b) Three construction projects were prioritised over the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) namely, New Delhi, Luanda and Gaborone. However, it may be noted that the Gaborone project is under review as the Government of Botswana has intentions to acquire the state-owned land portion from DIRCO.

Reply:

1. South Africa’s position on the self-determination of Western Sahara is based on the principles of multilateralism and international legality in seeking a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara; the centrality of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) in the resolution of the conflict; the Constitutive Act of the AU, in particular the principle of the sanctity of inherited colonial borders in Africa and the right of peoples of former colonial territories to self-determination and independence; respect of international human rights law in the occupied territories, notably the right to freedom of association, assembly, movement and expression; respect of international humanitarian law and support for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Saharawi refugees in a way that is predictable, sustainable and timely; and an end to the illegal exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of Western Sahara in the illegally occupied territory and the discouragement of the involvement of foreign companies in such activities.

South Africa consistently raises the issue of the right of self-determination of the people of Western Sahara during discussions on the matter at the UN and the AU and through bilateral engagements.

2. Concerning the position and integrity of the African Union on Western Sahara, it should be noted that South Africa completed its term as Chair of the African Union in 2020. To this end, South Africa cannot pronounce on behalf of the African Union on the matter regarding allegations of Moroccan bribery and spying activities. However, South Africa will to the fullest extent, ensure the safeguarding of its own position and integrity vis-à-vis Western Sahara. As a Member State of the African Union, South Africa will continue to support and champion the role of the African Union and its effective functioning.

Reply:

a) The total rental per month as at 31 December 2022 for office space for South Africa’s foreign missions amounts to R34 789 518.06.

b) The total rental per month as at 31 December 2022 for the residences for heads of foreign missions across the globe amounts to R10 701 028.57

Reply:

As DIRCO, we received confirmation from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) confirming an incident where an Oryx helicopter came under fire in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo, on 05 February 2023. A crew member, Sergeant Vusumuzi Joseph Mabena, was fatally shot. Major Omolemo Matlapeng suffered injuries but managed to continue flying the chopper and managed to land safely at Goma airport.

We believe that the investigation of the incident remains the responsibility of the SANDF, working with the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). DIRCO will be informed of the progress and outcomes once the investigation is completed and shared.

Reply:

a) Six (6)

b) No action relevant to a search for justice was required. The department liaised with the affected families and assisted where required.

Reply:

1.  Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been implemented. Chief Directorate Property and Facilities Management in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation liaises with the Missions on active accommodation lease agreements, as well as the signing of the indemnity forms once officials occupy the accommodation. Debt management is implemented once officials are informed of their date of return to South Africa by Corporate Management.

2. The current irregular expenditure has been reduced significantly in the last two financial years by terminating major irregular contracts and implementing audit action plan controls including a checklist, to curtail and prevent irregular expenditure. Policies, delegations and SOP are also being amended as per need and circulars are being drafted to address compliance matters.

The Department will also focus on finalising investigations and disciplinary actions and that must be finalised in line with the National Treasury Framework, to condone historical irregular expenditure.

A financial misconduct committee has been established in order to assist management with implementing consequence management within the whole department. Audit steering committee has also been appointed to strengthen financial control and oversee audit related matters.

Reply:

1. Yes, the Department is considering purchasing properties for Chanceries and residential purposes.

2. The Department is currently considering the purchase of a Chancery property in Nairobi. It is envisaged that a feasibility study, as well as valuation for the proposed acquisition of the Chancery in Nairobi will be finalised by end of January 2023. The outcomes of the two studies will inform the decision to purchase the targeted property.

Reply:

DIRCO’s role would be, firstly, focused on assessing the bilateral and multilateral foreign policy implications of the BRI, FOCAC, and potential Chinese investments in key economic sectors e.g., energy and transport, and secondly, in facilitating cooperation between the government of China and relevant South African government departments that would be key implementing partners on projects where Chinese programmes complement national development projects, including those aligned to the EERP.

More specifically, DIRCO’s mandate and role is to promote the national interests of South Africa vis-à-vis the BRI, FOCAC and Chinese investments by:

• Positioning South Africa vis-à-vis the PRC in such a way that delivers maximum political and socio-economic benefit from the strategic relationship.
• Delivering bilateral consultations at high level on issues that include FOCAC, infrastructure development, and the BRI in Africa. For example, through the upcoming Binational Commission, Strategic Dialogue, and the BRICS Summit.
• Advising partner government departments on developments and trends in the bilateral relationship and in the international political milieu that may affect their involvement in associated projects.
• Facilitate bilateral cooperation between the relevant departments of the government of China and partner departments in their various areas of specialisation, including trade, investment, agriculture, infrastructure, education, training, and tourism.
• Coordinate efforts with partner government departments in:
  • Identifying and assessing potential opportunities for economic reconstruction and development that stem from the bilateral relationship, including FOCAC and the BRI.
  • Reporting on the progress achieved by partner government departments in delivering on FOCAC projects.
  • Proactively identifying and work through obstacles to the implementation of bilateral commitments.

Reply:

a)  On 11 October 2022, South Africa was voted overwhelmingly by United Nations (UN) member states to take a seat in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) beginning 1 January 2023 for the next period of three years (2023-2025). In support of its campaign, South Africa submitted pledges to the UN General Assembly detailing what meaningful contributions the country would make, namely, to work with other countries in the Council to promote and advance human rights globally; to ensure that the mandate of the Council (to promote human rights) is kept intact and that the Council is not ‘manipulated’ by other countries to promote their own political objectives (politicisation and securitisation of human rights); to ensure that the Council pays equal attention to all human rights (civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights); and that the agenda items dealing with the fight against racism and the self-determination of the Palestinian people, amongst other issues, are kept intact and their objectives promoted. Consistent with our constitutional commitment, South Africa intends to take its rightful place as a sovereign and responsible state in the HRC to contribute to the development of norms and standards in the field of human rights that will promote global cooperation, multilateralism, peaceful resolution of conflicts, women empowerment, and a system of interstate relations based on agreed rules (respect for the rule of international law) and not brute economic and military force.

b) With regard to decisions South Africa will make in the HRC regarding the instabilities caused by the western powers on the African continent, it should be noted that issues of peace and security are addressed by the UN, primarily through the UN Security Council and the General Assembly and not in the HRC. South Africa is opposed to the idea (which idea is cherished by some big powers) of “securitisation of human rights,” meaning, the use of human rights to achieve political-security objectives.

It is trite, that some of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5) members try to bypass the Security Council (in order to avoid a situation where their resolutions would be vetoed by other P5 members) and use institutions such as the HRC (where no country has veto rights) to pursue their narrow political-security objectives. In this regard, South Africa will continue playing a key role in the HRC, particularly in the ongoing discussions aimed at considering how the activities of private military and security companies (PMSCs), transnational corporations (TNCs) and other business enterprise (OBEs) can be regulated to ensure that these entities do not violate human rights, and where human rights violations are detected, which flow from the activities of these entities. that accountability and redress are fostered.

 

Reply:

With regard to the State of Palestine, South Africa’s position has always been clear and consistent. South Africa has called on the UN to decisively act on all conflicts and not ignore long-standing ones such as Palestine that has been on the United Nations agenda throughout the seven decades of the existence of the UN.

Furthermore, South Africa’s stance is that Israel should be classified as an “Apartheid State” and a Committee be established under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to verify that it meets the criteria. South Africa is of the view that there should be effective ways to make use of the General Assembly to call for international action on Israel.

South Africa remains deeply concerned as to how Israel’s policies impact on the human rights and the unequal treatment of Palestinians, the application of different standards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) and Israel’s failure to ensure the protection and welfare of Palestinians living under its occupation.

In this regard, South Africa has expressed its support for Palestine’s request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to urgently render an advisory opinion and has stressed the need for revitalized international action amid mounting violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in East Jerusalem.

With regard to the situation in the Kingdom of Eswatini, South Africa is working with other Member States within the framework of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to assist Eswatini to address the worrying political and security situation in that country. During South Africa’s tenure as the Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, South Africa facilitated a high-level and technical fact-finding mission to Eswatini. The outcome of this mission was a Draft Framework for the Conduct of National Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue in Eswatini, which was shared with the Government of Eswatini. South Africa is still awaiting feedback from the Government of Eswatini

Meanwhile, the Government of Eswatini briefed the 42nd SADC Summit on the security situation in that country. The Summit mandated the Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security, which is now chaired by Namibia, assisted by the Panel of Elders (PoE) and Secretariat, to conduct a follow-up fact-finding mission to Eswatini. The Chairperson of the Organ, President Hage Geingob of Namibia, paid a courtesy call on His Majesty King Mswati III on 18 November 2022. An Extra-Ordinary Organ Troika Summit, which also include Eswatini is slated to take place in January 2023. South Africa believes that such persistent regional efforts, and not unilateral efforts, will yield positive results in resolving the situation in Eswatini as was the case with other countries in the region that went through challenging political transitions.

Reply:

South Africa attaches significant importance to the maintenance of international peace and security, a key mandate of the United Nations, through its Security Council.

South Africa has consistently maintained in relation to the Russia-Ukraine matter, like any other armed conflict, that diplomacy and negotiations are the best avenues towards durable peace. The position is not only premised on the strong belief that wars have no winners and that the real heroes are those that work for peace, but by Article 2(3) of Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations that directs all Members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

Furthermore, Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations urges Member States to seek the pacific settlement of disputes that are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Means of doing so include, inter alia, negotiation, enquiry, mediation and other peaceful means of the disputing parties. South Africa remains resolute in appealing to the parties to choose diplomacy and negotiation over violence to resolve their differences. A cessation of hostilities is thus required to create the necessary environment for a political process that would lead to sustainable peace in Ukraine.

Over and beyond advocating for the peaceful resolution of the conflict through diplomacy and negotiations, South Africa has further reiterated that the territorial integrity of States, including that of Ukraine, must be respected and that we reject all actions that undermine the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter, and International Law.

South Africa also believes that the UN Security Council should play a constructive role in the resolution of this conflict, in line with its Charter mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security. South Africa regrets that in the case of the war in Ukraine the Security Council continues to abdicate this mandated responsibility. Due to the paralysis of the Security Council on this issue, the UN General Assembly henceforth convened a Special Emergency Session to address the matter. Through this format, the General Assembly adopted five resolutions on the matter.

With regard to the voting, aside from the principle relating to diplomacy and negotiation over war being overlooked, South Africa abstained during the voting of the General Assembly resolutions on Ukraine because it believed the resolutions would further polarise the General Assembly, thus prolonging the war. The first four resolutions were devoid of actions that would persuade the parties to the conflict to engage in political dialogue to end the hostilities. Furthermore, the last resolution sought to create a problematic precedence for the General Assembly and exceptionalism that reparations matter in some cases and do not matter in others.

It should be underlined that during the past seven decades the General Assembly has heard clarion calls for reparations from slavery, colonialism, apartheid and from many other contemporary conflicts. Regrettably, in all these instances Member States have not been able to find agreement on reparations due to the opposition of many countries in the Global North. We need to avoid double standards if indeed all Member States have equal standing in the UN.

Article 14 of the United Nations Charter directs that the role of the General Assembly be guided by the interest of establishing peace when the provisions of the Charter have been violated. Therefore, the immediate focus of the General Assembly should be to seek peace and call for an immediate end to the war.

In the absence of constructive and decisive action by the Security Council, the General Assembly should then focus on efforts to stop the conflict and consider resolutions that contain concrete proposals towards that end. The General Assembly should create conditions conducive to dialogue, mediation, and diplomacy as the only path that will lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This is a role that the General Assembly has played before and there is no reason it cannot do so now.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General should directly engage the parties to the conflict towards an immediate cessation of hostilities. This is a process that should contain clear deliverables and timelines.

The Secretary-General has already illustrated the constructive role that he can play by facilitating the agreement on the Black Sea Grain Initiative. As we have stated before, this important example could be the basis for an agreement leading to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Constructive actions, such as these are urgently required to ensure that we move towards peace.

Our proposed way forward is consistent with Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations which states that the purpose of the UN is “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”. This is what the international community should be endeavouring to do.

 

Reply:

The United Nations Security Council should play a constructive role in the resolution of conflict, in line with its Charter mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security.

We regret that in the case of the war in Ukraine the Security Council continues to abdicate this mandated responsibility. The Security Council has thus far failed the people of Ukraine as it has in the case of long-standing matters on its agenda such as the situation in Palestine and the Western Sahara.

A key reason for its failure to act is that the failure of the Council to reform and reflect current global dynamics.

South Africa will therefore continue to consistently call for the reform of the United Nations, including its Security Council, and to that end will continue to engage extensively with all member states of the United Nations to advance the reform agenda.

South Africa believes that there must be a common acknowledgment, particularly by those member states maintaining the status quo, that the international political and economic system remains unequal, unfair, unjust and represents a world created in the aftermath of the Second World War. The reform of the international order must therefore be primarily to ensure that the contemporary international order becomes equitable, fair, and just.

South Africa subscribes to the Ezulwini Consensus, agreed to by the African Union in 2005, which calls for two permanent, and five non-permanent seats for the African continent. Further, it states that the veto privilege, which accrues to the five permanent members of the Security Council should be abolished, but for as long as the privilege exists, it should be extended to new members of an extended permanent category in a reformed Council. The Ezulwini Consensus also states that the African Union would choose which African states will get the seats in a reformed permanent category of the Security Council.

Reply:

During the State Visit to South Africa on 27 October 2022 by H.E. Mr Pedro Sánchez, the President of Spain, a total of four (4) Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) were signed between South Africa and Spain.

1. Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Industry 4.0

The MoU seeks to promote cooperation and exchanges between the governments, governmental institutes, related governmental organisations, enterprises and any other institutions of the two countries in the field of Industry 4.0. Specific areas of focus include knowledge exchanges and sharing policies and technologies to increase added value and skilled employment in the industrial sector; sharing policies, technologies and related research to strengthen and develop digital solutions for the industrial sector; exploring new opportunities for industrial cooperation through the sharing of information on industrial areas with a potential for cooperation; identifying sectors with high potential for new diversification for smart manufacturing that could be mutually beneficial; participating in congresses, conferences and events related to Industry 4.0 hosted by the other country; and jointly hosting events such as seminars and workshops related to Industry 4.0.

2. Memorandum of Understanding between the National Library of Spain and the National Library of South Africa

The MoU falls within the purview of the Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Arts and Culture between South Africa and Spain, signed in 2004. The MoU encompasses the following: Cooperation in the fields of research; information and communication; technology (lCT); librarianship; exchange of documentary information or publications of mutual interest; and the sharing of knowledge of modern technology; Facilitation of the participation of experts in meetings; training courses; workshops; seminars; exhibitions; events and conferences on Library and Information Services (LIS) Sector; Exchange of experience with specialists in the areas of digitisation, preservation, conservation, cataloguing, technical information and public service; Exchange of exhibits reflecting the cultural heritage and social life of both countries; Facilitation of reciprocal official visits of experts and officials of their respective institutions; Protection and safeguarding of bibliographic heritage;

3. Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Sport

The MoU seeks to implement programmes of cooperation in the field of sport on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit and to strengthen and intensify the partnership between the public or private structures responsible for the development of sport. Areas of Cooperation include: the development of athletes and coaches; institutional cooperation; the field of science and technology applied to sport; sports medicine; anti-doping; the fight against harassment and discrimination in sport; sport and inclusion; sports sponsorship and patronage; the organisation of sports events; the training of sports specialists and managers; programmes to support and promote sports for disabled people; the protection of young athletes; women and sports; sports education; sports for all; the maintenance of sports facilities; and school and university sports programmes.

4. Memorandum of Understanding between South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation and Spain’s Compañía Española de Financiación del Desarrollo (COFIDES)

The MoU establishes a framework for cooperation between South Africa’s IDC and Spanish-owned COFIDES with the main objective to enhance the relationship between the two entities. Potential collaboration in private sector investments in various industries will be explored and special focus will be given to initiatives on climate change related investments, Just Energy Transition, automotive industry and agribusiness. The MoU was signed during the South Africa – Spain Business Forum. In addition, President Sánchez announced that Spain will make available €2.11 billion in the next five years to support the participation of Spanish companies in renewable energy and climate-related projects in South Africa.

 

Reply:

a)  Czech Republic

No.

Why not: No bilateral agreements were scheduled for signing, and none were agreed to during the visit.

(b) Lithuania

No.

Why not: No bilateral agreements were scheduled for signing, and none were agreed to during the visit.

Additional details on the Czech Republic Visit

Deputy Minister Botes undertook an official visit to the Czech Republic from 10 to 12 October 2022 at the invitation of his Czech counterpart, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Martin Tlapa. The purpose of the visit was to conduct political consultations, promote trade and investments, and explore more areas of cooperation.

While in Prague, Deputy Minister Botes also promoted economic diplomacy in line with the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s priority focus, and promoted cooperation in areas of trade and investment, higher education and science and technology, amongst others. In addition, the Deputy Minister met with existing and prospective Czech investors.

Economic relations between South Africa and Czech Republic are managed through a Joint Committee on Economic Cooperation (JCEC). The JCEC was established through the signing of an Agreement on Economic Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Czech Republic in December 2006.

In terms of Agreement, the Department of Science and Innovation is currently engaged in a process of developing a science technology and innovation cooperation instrument with the Czech Republic. Much progress has been achieved, negotiations are being finalised and both sides are in agreement with the contents and provisions of the draft partnership agreement.

Although the formal bilateral Defence relationship is currently still limited in scope, it has progressed to the level where it was formalised by means of the signing of two bilateral agreements. Despite the two agreements, high level contacts have been established and defence-industrial cooperation has expanded during the recent past. No substantial business transactions have been concluded recently. It is, however, foreseen that future defence-industrial cooperation has the potential to expand and that joint ventures could become a possibility.

Additional details on the Lithuania Visit

Deputy Minister Botes undertook an official visit to Lithuania from 12 to 13 October 2022 at the invitation of his Lithuanian counterpart, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Mantas Adomėnas. The purpose of the visit was to conduct political consultations, promote trade and investments, and explore areas of technical cooperation. The visit was also in recognition of 30 years of bilateral relations with Lithuania.

During the visit Deputy Minister Botes met with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Mantas Adomėnas, the Vice Minister of Economy and Innovation, and participated in a Business Roundtable hosted by the Vilnius Chamber of Commerce and Crafts.

In terms of bilateral Agreements, South Africa and Lithuania had signed a Visa Waiver Agreement for Diplomatic and Official passport holders on 29 August 2022. Parliamentary processes have been completed on both sides and the Agreement will enter into force on 14 December 2022. An agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation is under consideration by the parties but this did not form part of the Deputy Minister’s discussions.

Reply:

1. South Africa continues to enjoy cordial bilateral relations with the United States, which are underpinned by robust cooperation across a wide range of sectors that are aligned to South Africa’s national interests and domestic priorities. The strategic nature of these relations has been reinforced by recent high-level engagements at Head of State, Minister and Director-General level, which were conducted in a spirit of mutual respect and a common desire to advance bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation in areas of shared interest and concern.

2. The Department considers it an unfortunate breach of diplomatic protocol. The Embassy was of the view that their actions were in accordance with their duty to warn American citizens of credible threats to safeguard US Government employees.

3. No. The mandate to conduct threat assessments lies with the Security Cluster.

a) The Department has conveyed to the US Embassy that sensitive information of this nature should be formally communicated to DIRCO in accordance with the relevant diplomatic protocols.

b) The security agencies from the two countries also have established channels of communication through which to engage and share information related to terrorist activities, amongst others. These channels should always be utilised to allow for proper assessment and communication to the public about possible terror attacks.

Reply:

South Africa views the Indian Ocean Region as a region of peace, stability, development, and prosperity within which to pursue the goal of promoting economic cooperation for the well-being and development of the countries and peoples of the Indian Ocean Rim.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association’s (IORA) Working Group on the Blue Economy has adopted in its workplan a programme of action for combating, amongst others, Illegal Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in the IORA region. The Working Group has also made progress in the assessment of capacity needs for the IORA region including, prioritising the exchange of information on IUU fishing vessels amongst IORA member states. Member states and dialogue partners are currently implementing appropriate measures against IUU vessels and other illegal activities. What is currently significant is the funding mechanism required to undertake military-type exercises and render training for maritime personnel, port managers, maritime inspectors, law enforcement and legal personnel within the IORA region.

The Maritime Safety and Security (MSS) Coordinating Country within IORA, which is Sri Lanka, has:

• Established legal frameworks in the Indian Ocean region in the field of Maritime security, working together with India.
• Held an IORA Workshop on Maritime Assistance, Search and Rescue, and Search and Rescue Exercise, working together with Australia.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association is therefore playing an important role in preventing ocean piracy and ocean crimes.

Reply:

The Agreement on the Audio-Visual Co-Production is an Agreement for Audio-Visual works only and that includes film and television productions of varying lengths. Participants will be from both South Africa and Nigeria. The filmmakers will make use of locations and post-production facilities of both countries. Minimum financial contribution is set at 10% and maximum at 90%. This is the contribution to the overall production budget of the project. The production once certified as an official co-production, will qualify for maximum local financial benefits. This will be 35% of the film and television incentive as administered by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC).

The production will also qualify as national film in terms of local quotas. The film will qualify to be entered into the South African Film and Television Awards as a local production where the categories feature South Africa. It will also be eligible under the best film category should the director be South African. The agreement will offer films from the two countries to access each other’s markets. The overall benefits at local level will be the promotion of South African technical expertise, locations, crew, cast and facilities.

The agreement between the two countries was signed in Abuja, Nigeria, during the State Visit to that country in December 2021. South Africa has met with all its constitutional requirements to bring this Agreement into force and is awaiting confirmation from Nigeria to indicate whether all the constitutional requirements to bring the Agreement into force have been met.

Reply:

The Indian Ocean region faces many traditional and non-traditional safety and security challenges including piracy, armed robberies at sea, terrorism, human trafficking, irregular movement of persons, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in wildlife, trafficking of weapons, crimes in the fisheries sector, degradation of ocean health, unlawful exploitation of marine resources and climate change with its related repercussions on environmental security.

Over 60% of the world’s trade passes through the Indian Ocean and nine African states are members of the Association. Therefore, any impact on trade will impact on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). It is therefore important that it is able to succeed and that the safety of sea routes from any of the listed threats is crucial.

In this regard, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) has an established Working Group on Maritime Safety and Security which coordinated the IORA’s role in securing trade routes. Covering a vast maritime zone of nearly 68.56 million sq. km, IORA’s Maritime Security includes elements of international peace and security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, security from crimes at sea, security of resources and environmental security, while Maritime Safety is concerned with training (both technical and personnel), transport, construction and equipment-related issues, and assistance in distress situations.

A focussed discussion on the AfCFTA is critical to help guide the IORA’s role in enabling the free trade area to ensure mutual benefit. This discussion is encouraged by both the African Union (AU), and the IORA. The IORA has proposed a draft MoU with the AU and this would be crucial to consolidating Africa’s regional maritime interests.

The existing Maritime Safety and Security (MSS) initiatives are the following:

• The ‘IORA Working Group on Maritime Safety and Security’, also known as the WGMSS, established in September 2018 and presently chaired by Sri Lanka. In August 2019, Sri Lanka hosted the First Meeting of the IORA Maritime Safety and Security Working Group, which finalized the regional Work Plan drawn up for a period of two years (2019 – 2021). This meeting provided an opportunity for Member States to discuss the way forward and to initiate concrete actions in the sphere of MSS.

• During the Council of Ministers (COM) held in Dhaka on 24 November 2022, India advised that the Discussion Paper on the draft legal frameworks in the Indian Ocean region in the field of Maritime Safety and Security had been finalised. The draft discussion paper will be taken forward by the Working Group on Maritime Safety and Security (WGMSS) for further implementation.

• Sri Lanka to host the Third Meeting of the IORA WGMSS in the first quarter of 2023 (possibly March), along with a Workshop on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

• IORA has also devised flagship initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Dialogue, which is held annually, bringing together key representatives including scholars, experts, analysts, and policy makers from think tanks, civil societies and governments from IORA Member States to discuss pertinent issues including MSS.

• The IORA aims at building upon existing national, regional and multilateral measures to support a more effective utilization of resources for enhanced cross-border cooperation and sharing of knowledge, experiences and best practices to secure the Indian Ocean as an ocean strengthening maritime cooperation for a peaceful, stable, and prosperous region.

Reply:

a) Practical steps taken by South Africa over the past five years include:

• In May 2018, South Africa downgraded the Embassy in Tel Aviv by recalling its Ambassador;

• The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) hosted the State of Palestine Africa Heads of Mission Conferences in South Africa during the periods 2018 and 2022;

• On 8 June 2021, the Permanent Missions of South Africa and Namibia to the United Nations (UN) in New York jointly hosted a Ministerial virtual side event in partnership with the State of Palestine on “The Importance of Upholding the Principles of Self-Determination and Non-discrimination: Justice for the Palestinian People”. The event was borne from South Africa and Namibia’s own experience against racial segregation and oppression in their fight for liberation against Apartheid.

The purpose of the event was to create awareness around the political, economic and social subjugation Palestinians face daily under Israeli laws; to recognise Israel as an Apartheid state, and to mobilise the UN and its member states, the international community and civil society to double its efforts to strengthen international action and coordination to uphold international norms and apply pressure on Israel to implement UN resolutions and to end its targeted violations of human rights and discriminatory practices;

• South Africa’s objection to the granting of official observer status by the African Union (AU) on 22 July 2021. The matter was raised by South Africa at the AU Summit on 6 February 2022. As a result of this action, the decision to grant Israel observer status was unanimously suspended. In this regard, a committee was set up to study the issue and the conclusions thereof to be presented at the AU Summit in 2023. The objection was based on the fact that, the decision to grant observer status to Israel was taken unilaterally and without adequate consultation with all AU Members. The AU strenuously objected to the deaths of Palestinians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. It is trusted that this misstep will be corrected; and

• In August 2022, Honourable Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini’s undertook a working visit Palestine. The main objectives of the visit to Palestine were: (i) To establish a strategic dialogue on all key issues; (ii) Reaffirm South Africa’s commitment to the Palestinian cause, domestically and globally; (iii) Review South Africa’s initiatives and strengthen bilateral relations, discussions on coordination of efforts aimed at the establishment of the State of Palestine based on UN Resolutions and international law, and strategies for galvanising support in the international community; and (iv) Exchange views on recent political developments in Africa and the Middle East.

• During the working visit, Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini together with her Palestinian counterpart, Dr Amal Jadou, launched the Strategic Dialogue on 21 August 2022. The formation of the Strategic Dialogue between the two countries is aimed at galvanising support for the Palestinian cause on the African continent, as well as in the international arena.

The Strategic Dialogue agreed to:

• Mobilise African countries to support Palestine and to enhance bilateral relations with Palestine on the Continent;
• Exchange views based on the South African experience that will assist to end Israeli domination in Palestinian territories, and raise international awareness of the plight of Palestinians, especially the increase of settlements by Israel in the Occupied Territory;
• Lobby for the withdrawal of Israel as an observer member of the African Union;
• Continuation of efforts towards support for the two-state solution and the right to self-determination;
• Support Palestinian efforts for full membership of the United Nations and the creation of positive, credible, and lasting international mechanisms to address the Palestinian cause based on international law;
• Formulate practical strategies towards taking up the Palestinian cause to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to declare Israel as an Apartheid state; and
• Mobilise civil society both in South Africa and Palestine, as well as internationally, to support the Palestinian cause.

b) As the custodian of foreign policy and inter-state relations, DIRCO gave effect to a resolution taken at the governing party’s 54th National Conference of December 2017, whereby the South African Government was directed to downgrade its Embassy in Israel to a Liaison Office.

The downgrade was aimed at giving “practical expression of support to the oppressed people of Palestine,” and the Government’s concern at the violation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the refusal of the government of Israel to enter into meaningful negotiations.

The governing party’s resolution was also guided by a sentiment that given the continued intransigence and belligerence of the Government of Israel, that relationship with South Africa and the Government of Israel could not be typified as being ‘business as usual.”

To give effect to this decision, South Africa currently does not have an Ambassador accredited to Israel. The Government of South Africa recalled its Ambassador to Israel in May 2018, the South African Mission in Tel Aviv is currently headed by a Chargé D’Affaires.

The ongoing flagrant abuse of the human rights of Palestinians places a moral responsibility on South Africa to act. South Africa is therefore in the process of conceptualising a comprehensive South African Initiative on Palestine (SAIP), to support and consolidate the Palestinian cause, build international consensus, and recalibrate our relations with Israel.

South Africa cannot have normal relations with Israel until the creation of a free Palestine. In 2023, South Africa will continue to strengthen her fraternal relations with Palestine through the holding of various structured bilateral meetings, culminating in a State Visit by President Mahmoud Abbas to South Africa.

Reply:

(a) total number of staff employed and/or provided as departmental support in

(i) Office of the Minister : 14 employees

(ii) Office of Deputy Minister 1: 9 employees

(ii) Office of Deputy Minister 2: 11 employees

(b) (i) job title and (ii) annual remuneration package of each specified person

Office of the Minister:

i) Job title	ii) Annual remuneration package
Chief of Staff	(SL14) R1 473 537 pa
Senior Secretary	(SL7) R269 214 pa
Administrative Secretary	(SL13) R1 302 102 pa
Private Secretary	(SL12) R1 070 169
Director: Media Liaison	(SL13) R1 302 102 pa
Parliamentary Liaison Officer	(SL13) R1 208 691 pa
Personal Assistant to the Chief of Staff	(SL8) R367 575 pa
Assistant Appointment Secretary	(SL10) R578 841 pa
Assistant Stakeholder Relations Officer	(SL9) R417 858 pa
Chief Registry Clerk	(SL7) R 281 514 pa
Driver/ Messenger	(SL5) R201 537 pa
Domestic Worker	(SL3) R128 166 pa
Domestic Worker	(SL3) R128 166 pa
Food Service Aid	(SL3) R128 166 pa

Office of Deputy Minister 1

Job title	Annual remuneration package
Head of Office	(SL13) R1 302 102 pa
Technical Specialist	(SL13) R1 105 383 pa
Private Secretary	(SL12) R964 257 pa
Parliamentary & Cabinet Coordination	(SL12) R1 070 169 pa
Community Outreach Officer	(SL11) R766 584 pa
Secretary	(SL7) R317 127 pa
Driver	(SL5) R207 639 pa
Domestic Worker	(SL3) R128 166 pa
Domestic Worker	(SL3) R128 166 pa

Office of Deputy Minister 2

i) Job title	ii) Annual remuneration package
Head of Office	(SL14) R1 347 606 pa
Technical Specialist	(SL13) R1 121 979 pa
Personal Assistant	(SL7) R269 214 pa
Private Secretary	(SL12) R908 502 pa
Parliamentary & Cabinet Coordination	(SL11) R766 584 pa
Community Outreach Officer	(SL11) R778 080 pa
Chief Registry Clerk	(SL7) R269 214 pa
Driver	(SL5) R181 599 pa
Domestic Worker	(SL3) R130 092 pa
Domestic Worker	(SL3) R128 166 pa
Food Service Aid	(SL2) R107 196 pa

Reply:

South Africa was requested by the African Union to host the Peace Talks between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, and also to nominate a representative to join the Facilitation Team.

The request was received positively by South Africa and in addition, nominated former Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa, Dr Phumzile Mlambo Ngcuka, to serve on the Facilitation Team, together with the former President of the Republic of Kenya, Mr Uhuru Kenyatta, in support of the African Union High Representative for the Horn of Africa, and former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Mr Olusegun Obasanjo. The Peace Talks took place from 24 October until 3 November 2022.

South Africa’s role is as per the invitation by the African Union Commission and remains ready to contribute should the Union and/or the Parties request further contribution in the implementation of the “Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the Government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front” signed on 2 November 2022 in Pretoria.

South Africa, therefore, plays an important role in the process and will continue to do whatever is required to ensure that this historic Agreement is implemented, so as to silence the guns in Ethiopia.

Reply:

Following the comments to a Zimbabwean patient by Dr Phophi Ramathuba, MEC for Health in Limpopo, that appeared in a video clip recorded in Bela Bela hospital, His Excellency, Mr DD Hamadziripi, Zimbabwean Ambassador to South Africa has had engagements with my Department on this matter.

In discussions between my Department and Zimbabwe’s Ambassador to South Africa, both sides agreed that the concerns raised by the MEC should be discussed through existing diplomatic channels and existing bilateral mechanism instruments as contained in the Bi-National Commission Agreement.

Both parties agreed that the Bela Bela incident should not be looked at in isolation but holistically as a problem that both our governments need to urgently address to the benefit of both our peoples.

In addition, my Department reminded Ambassador Hamadziripi of the continued collaboration that South Africa and Zimbabwe has with each other within the context of the Agreement on Health Matters.

It should further be noted that the National Department of Health issued a statement on 24 August 2022 regarding this matter. Furthermore, President Ramaphosa also addressed this matter during his oral replies to the Q and A Session of Parliament held in the National Assembly on 30 August 2022.

Reply:

1. An invitation was extended by President Ramaphosa to the former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr Hassan Rouhani to undertake a State Visit to South Africa in 2020. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the visit did not materialise. Following the elections in Iran in June 2021, an invitation was extended to the new Iranian President, Dr Raisi, to undertake a State Visit to South Africa in 2023. The exact dates for the State Visit are yet to be confirmed and mutually convenient dates are being discussed through diplomatic channels.

Dr Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, will participate in the 15th Session of the South Africa-Iran Joint Commission of Cooperation (JCC), which will be hosted in South Africa on 29 November 2022. The previous Session of the JCC was held in 2019 and could not convene in 2020 or 2021 because of COVID-19.

2. South Africa honours United Nations sanctions in keeping with the traditional Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and African Union (AU) positions of not recognising unilateral coercive measures. In this regard, South Africa does not recognise the unilateral and secondary sanctions imposed by countries outside of the United Nations sanctions mechanisms. However, South Africa is mindful of the impact thereof on its political and economic engagements and the relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, South Africa conducts its bilateral relations within the context of international law and in the context of the relevant international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation.

3. A State Visit by President Raisi to South Africa will allow for engagement at the highest political level with the objective of strengthening bilateral relations and exchanging views on a number of political, economic and social issues including issues on human rights as South Africa will serve as a member of the Human Rights Council from 2023. Sectoral visits to Iran earlier this year in May, August and October already focused on policies and programmes by the two countries to support women empowerment. In this regard, I am of the view that an engagement between the two Presidents could enrich the efforts of both countries towards the empowerment of women. A delegation from South Africa participated in the 2nd Session of the South Africa-Iran Structured Dialogue Forum on Human Rights held in Iran, Tehran from 3 - 4 October 2022.

South Africa welcomed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) when it was adopted in 2015, between Iran and the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany (the P5+1 countries) as well as the European Union (EU). South Africa noted that the JCPOA was probably the most important diplomatic achievement in the area of nuclear non-proliferation since the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 (2015) endorsed the JCPOA and lifted all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.

However, in May 2018, the US - under the administration of former President Donald Trump –unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed all US sanctions lifted under the agreement. This has tentatively remained the status quo under President Biden, with the US preferring to negotiate with Iran on the terms of its return to the JCPOA. This follows Iran’s approach (in response to the US withdrawal) to gradually reduce its compliance with the JCPOA in the face of the US’s enforcement of punitive sanctions against it, in a quid pro quo manner. The other parties to the JCPOA have also been involved in efforts to determine the terms under which both the US and Iran would return to compliance with the agreement.

South Africa has strongly supported the talks taking place between Iran and the United States and continues to encourage all Parties, especially the United States and Iran, to undertake every effort to reinstate the Plan of Action in full and without delay. South Africa reiterates that given the current outstanding issues on the agreement, only strong political will on the side of Iran and the United States to reach an agreement, can break the deadlock.

4. We are concerned about discrimination and oppression based on race, sex, gender, sexual orientation, religion and origin as outlined by our Constitution. In this regard, South Africa makes its views heard in different forums, depending on the context and individual incidents. We will engage with Iran on concerns we have regarding discrimination and violence against women.

5. No.

Reply:

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s Office of the Chief State Law Adviser OCSLA(International Law) has not received a request for legal advice on the Renewal of the Treaty on the Grand Inga Hydropower Project with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.   The responsible Department, namely, the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy would be best placed to provide an answer on the policy decision to be taken to renew the Treaty.

Reply:

At the onset, it should be clarified that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a Regional Economic Community (REC), while the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is a trade bloc, which is composed of a free trade area with a common external tariff amongst the member countries.

The SACU is the oldest Customs Union in the world which was formed in 1910 among countries of Southern Africa namely: - Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa, with headquarters in Windhoek, Namibia. Since adopting the 2002 Agreement, SACU has often been used as a benchmark for arrangement of this nature, particularly in the African continent where different regions seek to integrate their economies further.

The SACU is complemented well by the Common Monetary Area (CMA) wherein four of the

five countries are member namely: - South Africa, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia. Under this arrangement, the South African Rand is a legal tender. The South African Rand therefore is the common currency in the CMA.

Botswana is the only member of SACU that does not recognise the Rand as a legal tender due to its withdrawal from the arrangement in 1975, which replaced the Rand as the official legal tender in 1976. The revised and improved version of this arrangement was adopted in February 1992 when the Multilateral Monetary Agreement (MMA) which underpins the CMA was signed and came into force in 1994. The South African Rand is therefore a common currency in four of the five Member States of SACU, which also belong to the CMA. No date has been set to get Botswana back into the CMA.

Reply:

1 a) Minister Pandor participated in the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on 21 September 2020. The theme of the meeting was “The Role for the Non-Aligned Movement in Post-Pandemic Global Recovery: The Way Forward”, which formed the basis and the context for the discussions. The revitalisation of the Non-Aligned Movement with a view to strengthen and make the organisation fit for purpose in a post-COVID-19 era was topical and thus dominated the discussions. Additionally, the discussions focused on reaffirming the commitment of NAM members to the organisation and its principles as established in the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the need to buttress efforts to achieve its goals towards the promotion of global peace and security, nuclear non-proliferation and attainment of sustainable development. Members stressed the importance of strengthening coordination in the implementation of the NAM agenda and in support of the self-determination of Western Sahara and Palestine.

1 b) On 22 September, Minister Pandor participated in the High-Level Ministerial meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) focusing on preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism on the continent. The meeting took place against the backdrop of increasing incidents of terrorism and violent extremism across all regions in the African Continent. In this regard, the meeting deliberated on ways to strengthen the AU’s efforts towards addressing the threat. The meeting recognised the existing peace and security frameworks of the AU and reaffirmed that focused implementation and enhanced coordination is vital in the AU’s efforts to address the challenge posed by terrorism. In this regard, the PSC underscored the need to strengthen the oversight role of the AUPSC to ensure effective coordination and collaboration between all stakeholders, including Member States, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), the AU Commission, notably the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), as well as other relevant AU Organs and institutions.

The meeting adopted a Communiqué as an outcome of the meeting. Please see attached additional information. The Communique emphasises the need for collaboration by all Regional Economic Communities (RECs), mobilise necessary resources and implementation of relevant decision such as the Malabo Summit on Terrorism and Violent Extremism.

1 c) Minister Pandor held eleven bilateral meetings on the margins of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA77) High-Level Week to discuss multilateral issues, as well as ways to strengthen bilateral political and economic relations. The list of countries that were engaged were: Cuba, France, Ghana (President Nana-Addo), the President of the General Assembly, Latvia, Nicaragua, Tanzania (Former President Jakaya Kikwete), The Netherlands and Russia.

2. On 23 September, a Memorandum of Understanding on Political Consultations between South Africa and Paraguay was signed by Minister Pandor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Paraguay, Mr Julio César Arriola Ramirez. The Memorandum of Understanding serves as a framework for the development and consolidation of cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.

3. The Minister’s working visit to New York was budgeted for as the High-level Week of the UN General Assembly takes place annually in September at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.

COMPILER DETAILS

Additional Information

AFRICAN UNION		UNION AFRICAINE
		UNIÃO AFRICANA

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, P.O. Box: 3243 Tel.: (251-11) 5513 822 Fax: (251-11) 5519 321

Email: [email protected]

PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

1107TH MEETING

23 SEPTEMBER 2022

NEW YORK, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PSC/MIN/COMM. 1107 (2022)

DRAFT COMMUNIQUÉ

Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1107th meeting, held on 23 September 2022, on the theme – Strengthening Regional Organizations for the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Africa: Preventing and Combating Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the Continent:

The Peace and Security Council,

Recalling the Declaration and Decision [Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.(XVI)] adopted during the 16th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa held on 28 May 2022, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, which decided, amongst others, the establishment of a Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism to give impetus to the Continental fight against terrorism;

 

Committed to the implementation of its previous decisions and pronouncements on preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism in Africa and related themes, particularly, Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM.1048(2021)] adopted at its 1048th meeting held on 15 November 2021; and Communiqué [PSC/MIN/COMM.1040(2021)] adopted at its 1040th meeting held at the Ministerial level on 22 October 2021;

Emphasizing the cardinal principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, which guide the significant role played by the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), who, on many occasions, are primary responders to crises and conflict situations in their respective geographic areas of jurisdiction;

Noting the opening remarks by H.E. Shirley Ayorkor Botchwey, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of the Republic of Ghana and PSC Chairperson for September 2022, the remarks by H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission, the statement by H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and Mr. Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism; also noting the statements made by the representatives of the RECs/RMs;

Reaffirming the solidarity of the AU with the people of the Continent, particularly those adversely impacted by the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism; and

Acting under Article 7 of its Protocol, the Peace and Security Council: 

1. Expresses grave concern over the expanding and worsening scourge of terrorism and violent extremism on the Continent, exacerbated by the influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), mercenaries and private military enterprises, and deplores the growing linkages between terrorism and transnational organized crime, including illicit exploitation of, and trade in minerals, and illicit financial flows with debilitating impact on the economies of the Continent;

1. Strongly condemns the barbaric acts of terrorism and their attendant adverse impact on ordinary citizens and civilians, committed on the Continent by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes; reiterates the AU’s determination to rid Africa of the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism, which cannot be justified under any circumstances, and expresses AU’s full solidarity with the affected countries and the victims of terrorism;

1. Underlines the imperative of enhancing comprehensive regional and continental approaches to address the growing scourge of terrorism and the underlying root causes and structural drivers associated with youth participation in violence including redressing the socio-economic imbalances that exist, with the view to economically empowering the people, especially the women and youth, in this regard, stresses the need to prioritize political solutions alongside military and security interventions; while recognizing that terrorism, radicalization and recruitment have been attributed to many causal factors such as democratic governance deficits, economic deprivation and marginalization, and lack of effective and legitimate governance structures for the provision of sustainable political and socio-economic infrastructures ;

1. Underscores the need to further enhance cooperation, coordination and complementarity of the regional and continental efforts, strengthening synergy and harmonization of interventions, as well as information and intelligence sharing and lessons arising from countering terrorism to reinforce the overall response to the threat of terrorism;

1. Highlights the need for context-specific interventions tailored to address the security, governance, development and humanitarian needs of the affected countries and regions with the participation of local community leaders, faith-based leaders, youth, women and the representatives of children;

1. Emphasizes the need to leverage the immense resource espoused by Traditional, Cultural, Religious and Community Leaders in an effort to de-radicalize the youth, given the enormous respect and influence these leaders command in the communities they lead;

1. Underscores the need to strengthen the oversight role of the PSC to ensure effective coordination and collaboration between all stakeholders, including Member States, RECs/RMs, the AU Commission, notably the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), as well as other relevant AU Organs and institutions;

1. Encourages the RECs/RMs, who are yet to do so, to establish policy organs on peace and security, to ensure that all the regions have right architectures to respond to conflicts and crises, as well as terrorism and violent extremism; further encourages RECs/RMs with policy organs on peace and security to share expertise with those who are yet to establish theirs, and requests the AU Commission to provide the requisite support, where required and upon request;

1. Urges the RECs/RMs to fully utilize the cooperative mechanisms established to address country- and region-specific issues, most notably the Sahel Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL), the Nouakchott Process on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan Region, the Djibouti Process and the Accra Initiatives established to respond to growing insecurity linked to violent extremism in the region;

1. Urges international partners to ensure zero tolerance for terrorism regardless of the targets or motives, and to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that their respective territories are not used by terrorists for inciting, instigating, organizing, facilitating, participating in, financing, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens;

1. Reiterates the need to further enhance collaboration between the AU Commission and RECs/RMs; in this regard, requests the AU Commission to support the RECs/RMs to undertake the following:

1. Explore best ways and means of further improving the implementation of policy interventions aimed at addressing the root causes and drivers of terrorism and violent extremism, especially the democratic governance deficit and the absence or weakness of governance structures in peripheral and remote territories, as well as political, social and economic marginalization;

1. Accompany the Member States affected by the scourge of terrorism through mobilization of requisite resources, including funding needed for strengthening institutions for delivery of social services, such as education, justice, health care and entrenching democracy, good governance and the rule of law;

1. Promote the development of economic opportunities, in particular trade facilitation and cross-border infrastructure and cooperation, to strengthen the regional integration necessary for the consolidation of peace and security, and reorient the people away from terrorism and violent extremism;

1. Strengthen existing mechanisms at the level of RECs/RMs, to compile a list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including FTFs, as well as those sponsoring them; with a view to tracking, monitoring, reporting on, and proposing policy responses to prevent the expansion of the threats of terrorism and violent extremism with the support of the AFRIPOL, CISSA and  ACSRT;

1. Establish regional counter-terrorism centres to support national efforts in preventing and combating terrorism;

1. Put in place mechanisms for supporting initiatives of local communities both for deradicalization, reconciliation, inter-communal dialogue and for implementing measures for addressing the humanitarian and socio-economic needs of affected populations;

1. Harness the comparative technical advantages of Africa’s governance and development institutions, including the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), the African Development Bank (ADB), and relevant AU Commission Departments, in developing and implementing peace enhancing development projects, including quick impact projects in areas liberated from terrorist groups, that are aimed at promoting the provision of social services and support the livelihoods of people in marginalized regions;

1. Convene inter-RECs/RMs policy coordination meetings horizontally among RECs/RMs, including at ministerial and heads of state and government levels taking note of the best practices of the Joint Summit of ECOWAS and ECCAS on peace, security and stability and the fight against terrorism and violent extremism held in Lomé, Togo in July 2018;

1. Use existing platforms and mechanisms, including the inter-regional knowledge platform (I-RECKE) for early warning and experience sharing, joint planning and collective action, launched in July 2022, in Lusaka, Zambia;

1. Support national Governments in investing in community policing and civil military relations in order to mobilize and sensitize the population against terrorism and violent extremism with the view to capturing the hearts and minds of the population, and creating a mindset change; and

1. Harmonize counter-terrorism and related laws at the regional level to facilitate greater regional integration and effective response mechanisms to terrorism, violent extremism and other related crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and maritime piracy.

1. Underscores the need for RECs/RMs to be adequately financed, well-resourced and equipped to ensure that the Regional Standby Forces (RSFs) and security institutions engaging in conflict management and counter terrorist operations have the capacity for early and effective response;

1. Looks forward to the convening of the first meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Terrorism as established by the Decision [Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.(XVI)] adopted during the 16th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa in May 2022;

1. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Reply:

• In the context of Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) at large, reference is made to “integration” and not “unification”. The integration agenda of the African Union is driven by the respective Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
• • In the case of South Africa, the SADC remains the primary focus of the country’s foreign policy, which is aimed at the promotion of security and political stability, which are pathways towards addressing key challenges of underdevelopment, unemployment, and poverty.

• • Since its formation in 1980, SADC has adopted dozens of legal instruments aimed at deepening the regional integration agenda. Accordingly, South Africa continues to reaffirm her commitment to the regional integration agenda in line with the provisions of these instruments, which cover such sectors as trade and investment, energy security, food security, infrastructure development, health and education, mineral resources as well as peace and security.

• • The SADC integration objectives and strategies are articulated in the SADC Blueprints namely, the SADC Vision 2050 and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 2020-2030. South Africa was one of the key contributors in the development of the RISDP and it is involved in the development of its Implementation Plan.

• • In the context of the foundation aspect of RISDP 2020- 2030, which underpins the pursuit of Peace, Security and Good Governance in the region, South Africa plays an active role in efforts to ensure peace and security in the region. In this regard, SADC is engaged in finding a lasting solution in the Republic of Mozambique, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Kingdom of Eswatini and the Democratic Republic of Congo. SADC also deploys electoral observer missions in countries that conduct elections as was the case in Angola on 24 August 2022 and in Lesotho on 7 October 2022. This is in line with the SADC Principles and Guidelines governing democratic elections.

Reply:

1. Yes, Deputy Minister Ms Candith Mashego-Dlamini accomplished all the goals set for the visits to (a) Sierra Leone and (b) Liberia in West Africa to deliver vaccines.

The Deputy Minister visited Liberia on 24-28 September 2022 and Sierra Leone on 28-30 September 2022, respectively, to handover 79, 200 doses of the Johnson and Johnson (J&J) COVID-19 vaccines to each of the countries. These vaccines were handed over as part of a gift of the partnership and friendship between the Republic of South Africa and the two governments. The contribution of COVID-19 J&J vaccines has deepened the mutually beneficial cooperation with Liberia and Sierra Leone and enhanced bilateral relations. South Africa is striving to ensure that the Continent is "COVID Free" and to ensure that Africans are vaccinated to meet the World Health Organization (WHO) threshold. The doses presented to these countries were produced at the pharmaceutical manufacturing plant in Gqebera, South Africa, which is being operated by Aspen Pharma. The vaccine is proudly manufactured at a South African plant under license approved by the WHO. Liberia and Sierra Leone are among the first of 26 countries benefiting from this initiative.

2. No bilateral agreements were signed in both countries as the purpose of the visit was to deliver COVID-19 vaccines.

3. Total cost of the Deputy Minister’s travel to West Africa was R299 698.20.

Reply:

a) The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) as one of the organs of the African Union (AU) was established in terms of Article 2 of the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament. In terms of this Protocol, the PAP shall evolve into an institution with full legislative powers. However, this Protocol only confers the PAP with consultative and advisory powers.

To fulfil the aim of the PAP of becoming an institution with full legislative powers, the African Union Assembly during its Summit in June 2014 adopted the Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union Relating to the Pan-African Parliament.

Article 8 of this Protocol provides that the PAP shall be the legislative organ of the AU to draft Model Laws. Meaning that the PAP is vested with the quasi-legislative power of formulating Model Laws for the AU Member States. However, as of April 2022, the Protocol had 22 signatures and 14 ratifications, and it requires simple majority of ratifications by the AU Member States to enter into force. The Republic of South Africa signed the Protocol in January 2019 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A presentation on the Malabo Protocol was delivered by DIRCO to the Portfolio Committee in the National Assembly on 1 June 2022. In this regard, the National Assembly is busy finalizing the Protocol's ratification through its internal processes.

b) As an advisory and consultative organ of the African Union, the current mandate of the PAP is wide enough to empower it to propose and formulate model laws. As of 2018, the PAP has formulated or contributed to the formulation of two model laws and is planning to kick-start the formulation of about five other model laws.

Furthermore, DIRCO’s role regarding the PAP is only limited to providing support as guided by the Host Country Agreement entered into between the African Union and South Africa in 2004. The Agreement and its seven Annexes thereto, place an obligation on South Africa, through DIRCO, to provide accommodation for the premises, fixtures, fittings and furniture for the premises, security, accreditation and transport services to the PAP. Due to the separation of powers as is the case with South Africa under its democratic constitution, DIRCO does not participate in substantive meetings of the PAP. 

Also, the founding instruments of the PAP assert its independence and non-interference by Executives of member states. This precludes DIRCO playing any active role in the proceedings of the PAP.

Reply:

(a) Since re-joining the Commonwealth in 1994, South Africa has not made any plans to withdraw from the Commonwealth. South Africa continues to actively participate in the Commonwealth Ministerial and Heads of Government Meetings to make sure that the needs and the voice of Africa and the countries of the South are heard. The Commonwealth is a growing Organisation. During the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Kigali, Rwanda in June 2022, Gabon and Togo, joined the Commonwealth. Membership has now grown from 54 to 56 members. The opening of the membership of the Commonwealth to former French and Portuguese colonies will ensure that the Commonwealth will remain growing in the future.

(b) Not applicable.

Reply:

a) South Africa and Zimbabwe use the Bi-National Commission (BNC) to discuss all matters of mutual interest, including political and security situations in both countries. It should be recalled that for the July 2018 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwean Government invited international observers, a move that was commended by the international community. It would also be recalled that the 2018 Elections were pronounced as having proceeded relatively quiet, free, and fair, notwithstanding recommended areas of improvement, as per AU and SADC Election Observer Missions. The violence erupted following the disputing of the election results by the leader of the then MDC-T, and the subsequent government response is well documented. President Mnangagwa established a Commission of Enquiry on the post-election violence, which was chaired by former President Kgalema Mothlanthe. The recommendations were released in public, which in South Africa’s view, was an indication of the commitment by the Zimbabwean Government to their implementation.

South Africa believes in peace, security, and stability in the region. Free and fair elections are a prerequisite of good governance for the attainment of the SADC Vision 2050, and the aspirations of the AU’s Agenda 2063. South Africa participates in electoral activities of the region through the SADC Electoral Advisory Council and is always part of the SADC Observer Mission.

b) With regard to the Job Sikhala matter, we will make further enquiries on the nature of his imprisonment. South Africa does not support any form of detention without trial or administrative detention as this is referred to in some jurisdictions. We will engage further with our counterparts on matters such as these.

COMPILER DETAILS

NAME AND SURNAME: Mr MJ Gininda

CONTACT: 012 351 1663

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the Minister signs Parliamentary Reply 3332

 

MR Z DANGOR

DIRECTOR–GENERAL: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION

DATE:

PARLIAMENTARY REPLY 3332 IS APPROVED / NOT APPROVED / AMENDED.

COMMENT/S

DR GNM PANDOR, MP

MINISTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION

DATE:

Additional information

The Government of the Republic of South Africa has not yet received any communication for the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe regarding the forthcoming harmonised elections to be held in 2023.

Reply:

South Africa is not indifferent to what is going on in Ukraine. We are deeply concerned about the continuing conflict, the loss of lives and the deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation. As a matter of urgency, there must be a cessation of hostilities, which would be the first step in a comprehensive response to the humanitarian crisis. We continue to stress that dialogue, mediation, and diplomacy are the only means to end the current conflict. As South Africa stated in the United Nations General Assembly, wars end when dialogue begins, and wars endure when there is no dialogue.

We have in our statements made calls for all parties in this conflict to respect The Laws of Wars, including respect for the Principles of Distinction, which enjoins all combatants to ensure civilians are not harmed.

Reply:

South Africa has always opposed violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, in keeping with the UN Charter. South Africa is continuing to encourage all the parties, through diplomatic channels, within all relevant international mechanisms and in various bilateral engagements to find a lasting solution to the current situation in Ukraine, in full compliance with the UN Charter and universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms.

South Africa believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat. The concept of nuclear deterrence, which is included in the military and security doctrines of all nuclear-weapon States, as well as States in nuclear security alliances and States under extended nuclear security guarantees, is itself a threat of use to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. For this reason, any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances are unequivocally opposed by South Africa.

Reply:

a) In the past five (5) financial years, the Government of the Republic of South Africa has not provided any financial support and/ or loans to Zimbabwe.

b) However, following an appeal for assistance from the Zimbabwean Government, the South African Government, through the African Renaissance Fund (ARF), provided R50 million worth of humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe following the 2019 Cyclone Idai which destroyed infrastructure and left scores of people homeless and without food. The aid was in the form of 450 000 x 12,5 kg of maize meal procured from South Africa and delivered to Zimbabwe. This project was completed in February 2022.

Reply:

1. Since the pandemic, South Africa has played a more prominent role as an official bilateral creditor and G20 member to provide constructive solutions to the debt challenges on the African continent, first through its participation in the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) that was in force from May 2020 until December 2021, and now as vice-chair of Zambia’s official creditor committee (OCC) under the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment beyond the DSSI. South Africa has supported the Common Framework which was established in November 2020 as a great improvement in the international debt architecture as it involves the first ever formal coordination between the G20 and the Paris Club creditors on debt treatments for the 73 Low Income Countries (LICs) eligible for the DSSI. The framework is to ensure broad participation of creditors, including the private sector, with fair burden sharing to ensure timely debt resolutions.

South Africa has agreed to become a prospective member of the Paris Club this year, after being an ad hoc participant since 2015. The Paris Club consists of a group of officials from major creditor countries whose role is to find co-ordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. South Africa’s enhanced status in the Paris Club provides it with the opportunity to become a full member of the Paris Club within a set period or revert to its former status as ad hoc participant.

The reform of the international debt architecture entails an end objective of broader multilateral cooperation in addressing sovereign debt issues and shifting away from plurilateral arrangements.

2. South Africa previously participated in some of the Paris Club debt treatments and restructuring processes in the 1990s. Also, South Africa participated in the Seychelles restructuring in 2015, during which it became an ad hoc member to the Paris Club. South Africa has credit exposure to Zambia who requested a debt treatment in 2021 from its creditors. This year, South Africa became vice-chair of Zambia’s official creditor committee (OCC) under the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment beyond the DSSI, with China and France co-chairing the OCC. The OCC brings together Zambia’s official bilateral creditors to negotiate the parameters of a debt treatment for the country. South Africa’s participation in international debt treatments and restructurings are guided by its status as an African creditor that seeks to implement fair solutions to the debt challenges experienced on the African continent. South Africa has exposure as a creditor through loans provided by its Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) on the continent.

Reply:

A) What total number of (i) staff personnel and/ or delegates are working in the office and (ii) floors and/or offices are included within the rental?

(i) The total staff establishment of transferred staff and locally recruited personnel for the two (2) missions occupying the premises is 67.

(ii) The missions occupy two (2) floors on these premises. They are occupying the 9th and 10th floor respectively.

B) What is the (i) total square footage of the office and (ii) reason and/or justification for the high rental figure of almost R2,7 million per month?

(i) The total square footage for the two and (ii) reason and/or justification for the high rental figure of almost R2,7 million per month?

(i) The total square footage for the two Missions is 51 843 square feet, and

(ii) The building wherein the Missions are now situated is within close proximity to the United Nations and the transit system. These are critical considerations with regard to the accessibility and mobility requirements of the Missions’ operations.

Reply:

To the best of our knowledge, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation has not submitted any policy review document and/or any other government policy document to structures outside of the Government, nor to private and/or external structures or structures of any political affiliation during the past five years. a) There are no documents to be furnished as the Department has no information in respect to any of these matters.

Reply:

1.a) During the Strategic Dialogue, the delegations of South Africa and the United States held fruitful discussions in the Trade and Investment and Infrastructure Commissions, amongst others. Discussions centred largely around the following topics, which are aimed at supporting economic recovery in South Africa and the continent.

• The establishment of a bilateral Trade and Investment Forum/Advisory Council: This body will have a strong focus on investment matters at a strategic level but will also deal with trade issues as they emerge. Its objective is to significantly boost trade and investment levels. It was proposed that the Forum be anchored by the DTIC, but also include participation by organisations such as Business Unity SA (BUSA) and business chambers.

• JET-P: The US indicated that it would consider providing additional funding based on the strength of the Investment Plan and its level of ambition. The Investment Plan will outline the investments required to achieve South Africa’s ambitious NDC targets and enable a just transition. The US offer amounts to just over US$1 billion. The bulk of this funding will be deployed to private sector projects through the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC), with the rest of the funding comprising small grants provided through a range of US aid agencies in the energy sector (up to $10m of grants and $10.5m of technical assistance).

• Extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): South Africa advocated for the renewal of AGOA beyond 2025 in line with the African Common position, as it will open opportunities for enhanced exports to the US market, including value-added products from South Africa. The US pledged to support South Africa to maximise its advantages in this regard.

• Agriculture: South Africa called on the US to address non-tariff barriers around expanded market access for animal and plant products, which include poultry, egg products, avocado and citrus. An Agriculture Task Force has been established to focus on constructive collaboration, which will assist in resolving some of these market impediments on a product by product basis.

• Removal of tariffs: The removal of Section 232 tariffs on South African steel and aluminium imports into the US will allow for increased exports and assist with job creation. South Africa lobbied for a country exemption from these tariffs.

• Improvement of the Trade and Investment climate: Both sides agreed to review regulatory issues that stand in the way of greater levels of two-trade and investment, such as incentives in the film production and electric vehicle industries and South African concerns around anti-dumping duties.

• African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA): Both sides agreed that the AfCFTA and AGOA could play a pivotal role in boosting economic relations.

• Global Supply Chains: The parties expressed concern about the challenges posed by dysfunctional global supply chains and undertook to collaborate, support and learn from each other to overcome obstacles. This issue also impacted negatively on continental trade and on food security, where it is believed the two sides could cooperate.

1. (b) The trade and investment relationship with the US is mutually beneficial and has created jobs in both countries. South Africa offers an attractive investment proposition because of its solid industrial base, manufacturing capacity, advanced technology, and world-class financial sector. South Africa is well placed to be a springboard for manufactured exports in the region and to foster the drive for enhanced regional integration, industrialisation, and infrastructure development under the auspices of the AfCFTA. The US private sector sees numerous opportunities for productive investments, including in the digital and green economy, that could be a catalyst for the development of regional supply chains. This would boost employment in South Africa, especially for the youth, and contribute to skills development and technology transfer.

2. The Strategic Partnership encompasses targeted support for vulnerable groups. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides funding and technical support for programmes and interventions, which include the following, amongst others:

• The PEFPAR DREAMS programme, which contains various interventions to address key risk factors that make girls and young women particularly vulnerable to HIV. These address social vulnerabilities of adolescent girls and boys and young men and women by expanding testing options for youth and specialised prevention, including through pre-exposure prophylaxis for HIV, among children, adolescents, and youth.

• Partnership with the Department of Basic Education to strengthen the capacity of teachers to teach healthy sexuality and HIV education lessons that can improve life skills and reduce risky behaviours and early drop-out amongst school-going youth. The support is at national, provincial, district, and school levels to reduce the rate of new HIV infections among vulnerable youth, include the reduction of unwanted early teenage pregnancies, supporting direct linkages to health services, including the prevention of gender-based violence (GBV) and retention of adolescent girls in schools.

• Through its Democracy, Rights, and Governance work, USAID supports the Masiphephe Network to strengthen the local governance response to Gender Based Violence (GBV). For the 2022-2024 financial years, the priorities will include improving access to justice to decrease the incidence of violence against children, adolescents, and young women.

Reply:

South Africa is not indifferent to what is going on in Ukraine. We are deeply concerned about the continuing conflict, the loss of lives and the deteriorating humanitarian situation. As a matter of urgency, there must be a cessation of hostilities, which would be the first step in a comprehensive response to the humanitarian crisis. We continue to stress that dialogue, mediation, and diplomacy are the only means to end the current conflict. As South Africa stated in the General Assembly, wars end when dialogue begins, and wars endure when there is no dialogue.

The international community must focus on finding a sustainable solution. It will not be found in isolating one party or bringing it to its knees. We do not want to go down the route following the Treaty of Versailles.

Constructive solutions focussed on addressing the humanitarian situation and promoting peaceful dialogue remains imperative. President Cyril Ramaphosa conveyed to all key stakeholders that South Africa stood ready to support the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, with a view to bringing the violence to an end as speedily as possible. We are fully cognisant of the deliberate opposition to our call for peace and negotiations and continue to hold the view that in the end, negotiations will end the conflict.

South Africa encourages all parties to return to the negotiating table and to approach dialogue with the spirit of compromise in order to move the process forward without accusing any party, something that will not be helpful in the efforts to resolve the conflict. South Africa would like to see intensified efforts at increased diplomacy utilising the United Nations, particularly the Secretary-General and other leaders who may be of weight in terms of persuading the interlocutors to negotiate a settlement to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Reply:

1. I have not attended any outside meeting of the type described in the question;

2. I have not had any meeting to discuss these matters outside my department.

Reply:

1. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) has made an annual contribution to the running costs of the Embassy of the State of Palestine in Pretoria since 1995. The Department has also since 2018 provided financial assistance for the operational needs of the Embassy of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Pretoria.

2. (a) As stated above, foreign countries which have received financial aid during the specified years to operate in the Republic are the State of Palestine and SADR.

(b) The details of the expenses covered by the financial aid include maintenance of the Palestinian and SADR Embassies in Pretoria. From the 2018/2019 to the 2022/2023 financial year, the Department paid a total of R8 999 932 to the Palestinian Embassy, which is approximately R1,3 million a year. With regard to the SADR Embassy in Pretoria, the Department contributes R1 948 100 annually with a 10% adjustment after every two years.

3. (a) Training payments issued during the above years for foreign delegations coming to the Republic were for DIRCO’s annual International Women’s Programme for Mediation, Negotiation, and Conflict Resolution; and for the Gertrude Shope Annual Dialogue Forum and Capacity-Building Programme for Women Mediators and Peacebuilders.

(b) The expenses for the aforementioned training programmes for foreign delegations have been paid from DIRCO’s budget for training and skills development. These training payments are not regarded as foreign aid. DIRCO procures a service provider to present these training programmes and pays the training fees directly to the service provider. Fees paid to South African training presenters are based on the Department of Public Service and Administration’s (DPSA) guidelines. In addition to the presenter’s fees, the training expenditure also cover subsistence and travel, as well as international air travel for participants. Due to COVID-19, DIRCO’s training programme was held virtually in 2021. Therefore, DIRCO did not incur costs during that year.

4. The Minister will not make a statement on the matter.