




China peak intensity achieved 2020-2025


Demand growth implied 5-6% p.a. (16% p.a. since 1999)




*From McKay et al.: China's metal intensity in comparative perspective, 2010


Economic Development GDP per Capita (\$US 2009 PPP)

And the next billion? India, SE Asia, S. America, Africa?











Global Steel Pipeline

Independent

Transformers

VA: 30 B US\$

Tube makers Wire drawers

Rerollers

Minimill Sector: 650 companies; 882 plants; 2198 EAF's; 537 Mt crude nameplate capacity; 350 Mt Production

Turnover : 65 Billion US\$ worldwide (Scrap purchase 35 BUS\$)

Integrated Sector: 165 companies 207 plants; 733 BOF's + 211 OHF 774 Mt crude capacity; 550 Mt production

Turnover: 160 Billion US\$ worldwide (iron ore and coking coal 53 BUS\$)

Top 10 companies : 26 % Top 20 : 37 % Top 100 : 75 %

2005 data- further consolidation since then (state driven in China)

Traders 2 BUS\$

Service Centres VA:20 BUS\$ Others

Structural steelwork

Construction

Tubes

Metal products

Mechanical engineering


Appliances

Automotive

In all so-called "developmental states" (command economies) the state ensured that steel was supplied at competitive prices (often "utility" returns) resulting in much higher growth rates than the western "free market" states.


SA: The importance of steel in downstream sectors Sector **Sub-sector** % Direct inputs % Direct inputs + Indirect inputs **Metal products** Structural metal 42.7% 32.0% products Other fabricated 36.6% 42.2% metal products Treated metal 35.8% 40.9% products **Machinery** and General 19.3% 24.9% machinery **Equipment** Mining machinery 24.4% 18.8%

Food machinery 18.4% 23.4%









Net trade - 2016 (kmt) 697

(4.231)

(2.886)

(1.301)

(406)

1,439

(15,588)

1.148

5.278

3,679

1.030

(1,302)

(3,534)

155


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



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













South Africa's Natural Resources

SA's natural (static) comparative advantage lies in its natural resources endowment as well as potential, particularly:


- Minerals & energy;
- Agriculture & Animal husbandry;
- Forestry & Biomass;
- Water;
- Fisheries & Aquaculture; and
- Tourism (natural endowment-based).
- However, of these only its mineral and tourism resources could be considered as "exceptional" in global terms.
- Its energy resources are predominantly problematic as they are mainly based on fossil fuels (coal, CBM, gas), though there could be long-term solar potential with new technologies.
- South Africa is a water scarce country with increasing water imports, which also curtails its agricultural & animal husbandry potential (2/3 <500mm/an = minimum for dry-land farming).
- Natural harvesting of sea fisheries has peaked, but its ~2500km coastline could give a relative mariculture advantage (still nascent).
- Natural harvesting of forests is in decline and plantation forestry has reached its limit, if not over-reached it, in terms of water consumption.










+++ ++ 44.00 44.00 12% Interest Total 95.6 284.78 380.37 100%








If the mineral linkages cannot be made, the people's mineral assets would be best left in the ground (only get one chance to optimise)!





The resource curse can be avoided!

"Deepening" the resource sector linkages: development of the resource inputs & outputs industries is critical, but requires the development of a resources tech capacity!



Finland: 1970 on primary commodities (pc- mining & forestry) inverted U-curve, but shifts to 1998 manufacturing curve (mf-resources inputs &

Chile: 1970 on manufacturing U-curve (ISI), but shifts to 1998 primary commodities

Finland managed to shift from a 1970 resources (pc) trajectory to a 1998 manufactures (mf) trajectory, CMFV@gaftes apendable its resources inputs (machinery) and @copoon(xa(copup)) in oth) e sectors (source Palma, G. 2004)

70's.



Using a <u>natural comparative</u> advantage to develop a <u>competitive advantage</u>

Finland: The mature forestry industrial cluster 1997a

BACKWARD LINKAGES

- Specialized inputs
 Chemical and biological inputs (for production of fibres, fillers, bleaches)
- Machinery and equipment
 For harvesting (cutting, stripping, haulage)
 For processing (for production of chips, sawmills, pulverization)
 For paper manufacture
 (30% of the world market)
- Specialized services Consultancy services on forest management Research institutes on biogenetics, chemistry and silviculture

Source: Ramos 1998 p111 (CEPAL Review, #68, 12/1998);

NATURAL COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Abundant forestry reserves and plantations (400-600m3 per capita)b



SIDE LINKAGES

Related activities
Electricity generation
Process automation
Marketing
Logistics
Environment industries
(paper)


Mining (sulphuric acid)

FORWARD LINKAGES

- Roundwood
 Sawnwood
 Plywood (40% of the world market)
- 2. Wood products Furniture For construction
- 3. Wood pulp
- Paper and cardboard
 Newsprint
 Art paper (25% of the world market)
 Toilet paper
 Packaging
 Special products

a: Generates 25% of Finland's exports;

b: Compared with 25-30m3 per capita in the rest of the world.



TNCs also tend to locate their high level HRD in OECD countries (often linked to their P&D university partners), which could deny states the In order to rapidly acquire the requisite capital and skills, African states have opted to realise their resource endowments through attracting foreign resource companies (TNCs & JRCs), rather than mainly relying on domestic capital. SA domestic mining houses have "converted" into foreign TNCs (relistings/sales) with concomitant disadvantages. The foreign investment (DFI) "trade-off" comes with several possible "threats"

- 1. TNCs usually have global purchasing strategies which are less likely to develop local suppliers (linkages),
- 2. TNCs tend to optimise their global processing (beneficiation) facilities which can deny local downstream opportunities;


3. TNCs locate their tech development (R&D) in OECD countries, thereby

- denying the development of this critical side-stream capacity;

 4. TNCs also tend to locate their high level HRD in OECD countries (often linked to their R&D university partners), which could deny states the
- development of this seminal capacity;
 5. In the longer term there are clearly political downsides to a resource sector dominated by foreign capital;
- 6. Finally there is the TNC "core competence" (dirt-digging = no linkages) conundrum.

However, all of these threats can be overcome or ameliorated through appropriate state actions, policies and interventions!

Inappropriate Mineral Regimes Africa is not capturing mineral rents! Steel **High Prices:** WB "free mining" **High prices:** regimes- minimal Apartheid: pvt. mineral linkages! Need rights Africa: Colonial free-mining revision regimes 7.00 6.00 Phase III 5.00 4.00 Low prices: 3.00 **WB revisions: SA: MPRDC** 2.00 Overly pro-TNC! Global intensity of minerals in growth 0.00 " Sto " Sty " Sty " Sto " Sty " Sty " Sty " Sto " Sty " Sto Steel- good proxy for most minerals (US\$ PPP)




participation, and community welfare."+


Free mining originated in small enclaves in Medieval Europe but was formalised in California and other European colonies in the 19th century, as a vehicle to promote dispossession & colonisation. But is the wholesale application of this

doctrine in the interests of South Africa?

(origin of the KIO-AMSA mineral rights mess) Campbell 2010









SA Example- The lost potential impact of concessioning the state's manganese assets against developmental goals


In 2002/3 the state's manganese assets were given a diverse group of B-B BEE companies that have failed to optimise the potential developmental impacts of this world-class mineral asset (possibly the best unexploited manganese property in the world).


Before these assets were "given" to the B-B BEE interests several steel majors had shown a great interest in acquiring them. This led to a high level check, in India & China, on the appetite for steel companies to establish a world scale steel plant in South Africa in exchange for this asset and the response was positive. Consequently it was that the state's unique manganese resources should rather be auctioned against the following criteria:


- Job creation (direct & indirect);
- Downstream beneficiation (ferro-alloys, Mn, Mn salts, etc.);
- The establishment of a world-scale steel plant for flat & long products that would sell into the SA market at EPPs (export parity prices) and thereby discipline Mittal's monopoly pricing;
- Revenue stream to government (royalty, taxes: RRT?);
- . Technology transfer & local R&D;
- B-B BEE.


Unfortunately this proposal was rejected and instead these assets were given to several B-B BEE companies that lacked the resources to optimise the propulsive impact of these national assets. A rough calculation on the potential jobs lost by this "give away" came up with a figure of over 100,000, mainly due to the impact of lowering steel prices to our manufacturing sector by 30% to 50% (after labour, steel is the most important input by


ortance of the ste de instream de Estimated output and employment responsiveness of downstream steel firms to reductions in the domestic price of steel % reduction in % of firms that % of firms that the domestic would increase would increase price of steel output by more employment by than 10% more than 10% 10% lower steel 43.5% 21.8% prices 20% lower steel 67.7% 44.9% prices 30% lower steel 80.9% 56.7% prices Source, Zalk (dti, 2010) from CSID


















All ullallocated little at properties (& other flational resources, water, land/servitudes, etc.), should be transparently and competitively auctioned to optimise the developmental impact. Establish a Resources Concessions & Competitive Concession (RCCC) under the National developmental impact: develop Implome atifre guidelina H, meth theoToration REEntres fontibthee CIGS resources parmars sting in the treatisin in the resources parmars sting in the resources parmars still in the resources parmars still in the resource parmars still i developmental impacts (linkages) of the auction; oversee all mineral and other state resources (water, land, rights, etc.) of concessibination as interpretation of the concessibination of the concessibility of the concessibili appropriate fetated en archestis / SOFF " kndwn" state mineral assets by to moniter angeing complians parting uncerexploitations amanapies with the rice terms & conditions of their concession/license; mpacts; All unallocated mineral properties (& other national resources: water, land/servitudes, etc.), should be transparently and competitively auctioned to optimise the developmental impact. **Establish a Resources Concessions & Compliance Commission** (RCCC) under the National Treasury to: develop best practice guidelines, with the Treasury PPP Unit, for competitive resources concessioning to realise price discovery & the optimal developmental impacts (linkages) of the auction; oversee all mineral and other state resources (water, land, rights, etc.) concessioning/leasing, with, for the proposed "Mindevco" & DMR and other appropriate state departments/SOEs; and to monitor ongoing compliance of resource exploitation companies with the terms & conditions of their concession/license;








- Impose selective and judicious export tariffs on unprocessed minerals where there is a viable case for further beneficiation
- Consider the use of differentiated infrastructure tariffs (transport, power, water, etc.) to incentivise value-addition
- Insert a clause in all mineral concessions (mining licenses) obligating the operator to sell all products into the domestic market at competitive (export parity) prices and on-obligating
- Consider the efficacy of a system of varying royalties for each mineral that decrease with increasing value-addition, to
- & EDD) for the provision of low-cost critical feedstocks for manufacturing, particularly steel & polymers, including the possible re-creation of state utilities to supply these feedstocks, to underpin manufacturing competitiveness and job creation;

SHELL CONTROLS CONTROLS

Mineral Linkages

- 2. Upstream (backward) linkages:
 - Develop clear *local content milestones* (5, 10, 15 year targets) for all mining contracts (licenses) in order to maximise local value addition. Such milestones should also reward regional content, possibly at a discount to SA content, to encourage regional sourcing of inputs. The concession contract should make it clear that failure to achieve the asset owner's targets could result in a cancellation of the contract and the re-concessioning of the asset;
 - Make *local content commitments a bid variable* with significant weighting (30%?) for all new competitive mineral concessions;
 - Change the current BB *BEE procurement* obligation to a *BEE value-added obligation* to eliminate fronting, decrease job destruction and to increase the upstream developmental impact, and amend the Mining Charter to cater for this;
 - Task DTI (with DMR & EDD) with developing and implementing comprehensive *industrial sub-sectoral strategies* to grow the mineral upstream sectors (capital goods, services, consumables) including the use of instruments such as import tariffs, investment incentives, innovation stimuli, market access, etc.





Sugnifications (controls

Resource Rents:

- Resource Rent Tax (RRT) of 25% to 50% on all mining operations, trigger in above the "expected" rate of return (Treasury long-bond rate + 5%?) from the concessionaire's investments
- Exploration right transfer tax of 50% capital gains tax on the gains from prospecting license transfers ("flips") before mining;
- Regional Sovereign Fund: Assess the efficacy of creating an offshore minerals "sovereign" fund, financed from the RRT & mineral export tax, for reinvestment over 10 15 years into long-term technology development and long-term infrastructure development, both in South Africa and the region. Such a regional fund, for long-term physical, human & technology infrastructure, could form part of the financial architecture for an extension of the SACU, together with the revenue-sharing formula, to increase the southern African market size and intra-regional trade. The government should also encourage other SACU states to contribute a portion of excessive mineral profits to such a fund to facilitate an equitable distribution of the benefits of integration;
- Royalties: Consider the efficacy of a mineral royalties system that incentivises downstream investment (beneficiation) through decreasing royalty rates with increasing value addition;
 AFRICA SO
- Minerals Marketing. Establish a minerals auditing office within SARS (as per the RDP) and stipulate (within Mining License conditions) that a small proportion (possibly 10%?) of all production must be sold through a local minerals/metals exchange, where appropriate, to flush out a competitive and transparent prices. Amend the MPRDA to realise this.



State Minerals Development Company:

Task the IDC with establishing a State Minerals Development Company

- 1. hold all the state's holdings (ex-PIC) in mining & hold all known (but unconcessioned) resources. To prepare them for auction, with the RCCC;
- 2. hold selected "partly-known" mineral prospects, to carry out further exploration to determine their potential for competitive concessioning,
- 3. hold the state's free-carry (10-20%?) in each competitive concession (the % free-carry could be a biddable variable, with a low weighting),
- state and SOEs, to cater for the nation's future energy and other strategic needs. If necessary, establish key feedstock producers to supply at EPP/cost
- 5. develop and execute a strategy to *optimise the mineral linkages* industries;
- 6. partner B-B BEE mineral companies (<50%) in developing new mineral
- z fund R&D into critical requisite technologies for safer and efficient mining & processing & mineral inputs, especially capital goods; and
- a develop the appropriate human resources to optimise the developmental

"Mindevco" should be given first-sight of all new state-funded CGS geodata, for a limited period (3 months?), in order to identify potential state assets, requiring further exploration and to prepare them for competitive concessioning, under the proposed "RCCC";




- Relistings: Impose moratorium on all offshore relistings until government has developed guidelines to govern such applications, that include an assessment of anti-developmental implications, particularly the loss of local linkage industries and activities and the loss of leverage over such companies, in
- BB BEE equity. As the representative of the people, the state's holdings in all mineral enterprises should be considered as effective BB BEE holdings (ex-PIC), to ensure that such holdings promote genuine broad-based empowerment through the optimisation of job creation. Consideration could be given to increasing the BB BEE equity minimum (currently 26%) to cater

With 35% black unemployment, the ultimate empowerment is a

Critical feedstocks: State ownership should be considered if other measures fail to discipline monopoly pricing by the producers of critical feedstocks.

Proposed Governance of DDS Mineral Resources



(Nat. Treasury) "Future Fund"

(EDD) IDC: "Mindevco"*

(Nat. Treasury)
"RCCC"*

(DMR)

(DST)
"MRTC"*

- Offshore fund to accumulate min. rents: RRT &, poss, royalties.
- "Drip feed" back into local & regional economies for longterm:
- 1.infrastructure,
- 2.HRD,
- 3.geo-knowledge & 4.tech development

- · Hold all state equity in mining & beneficiation;
- Hold & develop state
 Strategic Mineral
 assets:
- Hold & dev. "partially known" mineral assets:
- 1st sight of all new CGS geo-data (3m);
- Partner BEE co's,<50%.

- Develop systems for resources competitive concessioning;
- Dev. assessment criteria & relative weightings;
- · Oversee resource auctions/concession s:
- M&E of concessions &


- Categorise SA into "known", "unknown" & "partially known" assets:
- M&E of all exploration/ prospecting licenses;
- Work w/Mindevco in ID & dev. of new assets;
- Accel. geo-mapping
 ID of new assets


- Develop a SA resources tech & HRD strategy;
- Rebuild/reinforce the tech cluster: Mintek, Necsa, CSIR (ex Comro), etc. & HRD cluster (HEIs);
- M&E of resource tech cluster & resource HRD institutions (HEIs, etc.).

^{*} proposed "Mineral Development Corporation", "Resources Concessions & Compliance Commission", "Mineral Resources Technology Commission"



- 1. Urgent consideration should be given to expanding the SACU to increase the local market size for resources linkages industries and activities (up-, down- and side-stream) and the tariff structures should be reviewed (within WTO constraints) as part of a comprehensive regional resources-linkages strategy, that optimises such opportunities within South Africa and within the region. Common external tariff integration should be part of an overall regional economic strategy that includes energy, transport & regional spatial development (SDIs) and investment funds to facilitate the equitable distribution of benefits. Establish an interdepartmental task force to assess this.
- 2. Assess the efficacy of linking into the enormous hydro-power (HEP) potential in the region (SADC-SAPP) as a sustainable long-term alternative to fossil fuels, to underpin the competitiveness of southern African industries and to enable low-cost electricity to households across the sub-continent, to be effected as part of a broader regional integration exercise. Establish an inter-departmental task force to assess this.





Other Actions: Amend the MPRDA to make the realsation of mineral backward and forward linkage an explicit objective of the Act, to allow the state to attach the appropriate conditions to mining licenses Insert a competitive pricing condition into all

- nining licences that obligates the concessionaire to sell all mineral products into the local market at EPP, and on-obligates local customers likewise
- Freeze the granting of all exploration licenses until the CGS has determined that the area has no known resources. All known resources should be transparently and competitively auctioned against developmental criteria (linkages).

