Parliamentary Hearings on Mobile Termination Rate (MTR)

Lars P. Reichelt

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- Cell C has been operational for almost 8 years and had 6.4 Million customers EOY 08
 - started with a 2 year delay due to court cases
- Cell C is
 - 75% foreign owned
 - 25% South African owned
 - 33 BEE companies incl.
 - Contralesa
 - Hawkers Association
 - Military Veterans Association
 - Returned Exiles Association
 - National Rural Womens Association
 - Youth & Physically Challenged Organizations
 - Small companies from each of the provinces



- 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- 2. CONTEXT
- 3. CELL C POSITION
 - APPROACH
 - PROPOSED TERMINATION RATES
- 4. CONCLUSION



- SA mobile termination rates are unjustifiably high, leading to high price levels
- High price levels damage the entire economy and the poor disproportionately
- Only asymmetry will bring the level of competition needed to get prices down
- Cell C is in favour of an immediate move to an all-day MTR of ZAR 0.75 for the dominant mobile players and ZAR 0.65 for the mobile challengers
- The ultimate interconnect regime needs to be determined by ICASA on the basis of true long-run costs



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- The objective of parliament and the regulator is to increase the affordability of mobile telecommunications
- Increasing affordability of mobile telecommunications is Cell C's raison d'être
 - Cell C has provided much required competition to the mobile market
 - Cell C has made mobile telephony significantly more affordable within its network
 - Cell C recently dropped its prepaid peak retail price by 47%, from R2.85 to R1.50
- Cell C has over the last years consistently called for reduction in MTRs and for asymmetry





- The objective of increasing affordability of mobile telecommunications can best be accomplished by increasing competition
- International best practice is to put in place a regulatory regime to create a level playing field
- The level playing field is a pre-requisite for increasing competition in the market, which in turn creates pressure to reduce the retail rates charged to consumers



- MTRs need to be determined based on costs
- This will require ICASA to complete Chapter 10 process
- Whilst this process is under way, an emergency intervention aimed at reducing MTRs should be put in place
- The intervention needs to be reasonable and measured, in order not to eradicate the economic viability of the telecommunications industry
 - Mobile Network Operators employ directly 12,900 people in South Africa
 - Telecommunications contributes 6% to the GDP of the country



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


- Once-off reduction in MTRs rather than over a glide path
 - Expedites consumer benefits
- Same MTR for peak and off-peak
 - Enables the poor and marginalised to also call during peak hours
- Asymmetric MTR towards dominant market players
 - Promotes competition, which is the most effective way to put pressure on retail rates



Relative share of traffic between off-net and on-net destinations


Illustrative example



• In this illustrative example, 90% of the traffic of the smaller player is subject to interconnect, whilst dominant players retain 40-50% of their minutes within their network, and thus do not pay interconnect




% Variance in MTR (incumbent vs. 3rd operator)




Source: EU: "13th EU Implementation Report", October 2007.




Mobile to Fixed Multiplier (last mobile entrant MTR to local fixed termination)







- The European Commission set its directive for MTRs in a new Regulatory framework already in 2002
- By 2007 only 6 EU countries differentiate peak and offpeak MTRs






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• In the absence of publicly available information on the termination costs, current off-peak rate could represent an appropriate departure point for determining MTR for the emergency intervention





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Proposal from the Portfolio Committee on Communications

- Mobile and telecoms operators drop the interconnection rates with effect from 1 November 2009 to R 0.60 per minute during peak times;
- Interconnection rates be further reduced by R 0.15 annually on the 1 November for each successive year until 2012;
- As a general rule the progressive reductions in interconnection rates between 2009 and 2012 should yield concomitant reductions in the actual consumer (retail) prices of telecommunications

Cell C response

- MTR needs to be determined based on costs
- Whilst this process is under way, an emergency intervention on MTRs should be put in place
- Cell C supports once-off drop in MTR to R 0.75 (DMP) and R 0.65 (Cell C) rather than a glide path as an emergency intervention, until cost base for MTR has been determined
- Based on observable data point being the current off-peak MTR, which is R 0.77
- Level playing field and increase in competition is the best way to drive towards reduction in retail rates



- Lowering MTR and asymmetry will bring the level of competition needed to get prices down
- Cell C is in favour of an immediate move to an all-day MTR of ZAR 0.75 for the dominant mobile players and ZAR 0.65 for the mobile challengers
- The ultimate interconnect regime needs to be determined by ICASA on the basis of true long-run costs
- Competition will increase further if following issues are tackled:
 - Standardized, more reliable and significantly faster site approval for network build-out
 - Frequencies for backhaul to be allocated based on need and not first come, first serve



Thank You!