AFRICA COMMAND: BENEVOLENT OR MALEVOLENT US INTERESTS IN AFRICA?
A BRIEF TO THE PORTFOLIO ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
20 FEBRUARY 2008
Cape Town
AFRICA COMMAND: BENEVOLENT OR MALEVOLENT
INTERESTS?
On the 7th
of February 2007, the US
President G.W. Bush announced the establishment of a Unified Command for Africa, known as the Africa Command or AFRICOM. He stated
that “(AFRICOM) will enhance [US] efforts to help bring peace and security to
the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health,
education, democracy and economic growth in Africa”.
The Africa Command is said to mark an innovative change in US policy of supporting the changing security
needs of the continent and it will help to support programs implemented by
other US
government agencies. The Africa Command, according to official reports, will
become fully operational by October 2008, after extensive consultation and
dialogue with African partners. However, despite these efforts of assurance to
clarify the strategic aims and intentions behind the establishment of the
AFRICOM, many in Africa remain sceptical.
The
objective of this brief is to assess the rationale behind the US Government’s
announcement to establish AFRICOM and the pervasive distrust amongst Africans.
This brief will begin with a focus on the background and stated
mission/objectives of AFRICOM. The second part will look into the structure and
organisation of the Africa Command. The third part will focus on the prevailing
reservations and distrust for this new US
initiative within Africa. The fourth part will
assess the implications and opportunities of the AFRICOM on the emerging
African peace and security architecture of the African Union.
Background
and Mission of
AFRICOM
To many,
Africa has largely remained on the periphery of the US foreign policy. This policy has
been described variously, including being referred to as “benign neglect”.
When there was a change, the US
posture was defined or driven by its national strategic security interests.
Previously, the US interests
in Africa were mainly a response to the
perceived threat posed by the Soviet expansion on the continent and this had
shaped the US/Soviet proxy competition that characterized the Cold War era. At the end of the Cold War, US policy towards Africa
returned to the margins of its strategic national interests.
The
events of September 11, 2001 (known as 9/11) marked a radical change in US
security interests and policy prioritization. In the post-9/11, the US embarked on
what it calls a “Global War on Terrorism”. As such, the US actively undertook initiatives to
counter-terrorism and insurgency around the world, including in Africa. Against this background, Africa
emerged as an area of strategic importance to US foreign policy planners.
Whilst the initial US policy
interests were to address the perceived security threats emanating from Africa;
the continent has further become strategically important to the US in other
areas as well. These include, amongst other things, the emergence of Africa as
the largest regional supplier of oil to the US
(especially countries such as Nigeria,
Angola, Chad and Algeria);
the emergence of China and India as strategic competitors for Africa’s
expanding energy and mineral resources; and, the emergence of Africa’s
economic importance, with an average growth of 5,5% by 2006.
Therefore,
the launch of the AFRICOM, or African Command, is seen as a direct consequence
of the increasing threats to US security interests and the recognition of Africa as a strategic area of importance.
Whilst the US military
engagement in Africa is not necessarily new; various US government agencies are engaged
in humanitarian assistance, medical care and disaster relief. The US has also
undertaken joint military exercises and training programs with many African
nations to assist them in developing professionalism in their military forces.
Indeed, examples of this engagement include the African Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program; Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans
Sahara (OEF-TS), focusing on military training and exercises aimed towards
counter-terrorism in the Sahel and Sahara regions; and the Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the latter also operates in the context of the
US ‘global war on terrorism’.
AFRICOM’s
mission and objectives
AFRICOM
is said to be a unique command in US military organization. In this
respect, it is the first US Command that involves inter-agency cooperation
between various US
government agencies, and it will include innovative organizational constructs
and mission sets for a command dedicated solely to Africa.
An initial working draft of the AFRICOM’s mission states that
“US Africa Command
promotes US National Security objectives by working with African States
and regional organisations to help strengthen stability and security in the
area of responsibility. US
Africa Command leads the in-theater Department of Defence response to support
other US Government Agencies in implementing US Government’s security policies
and strategies. In concert with other US Government and international partners,
US Africa Command conducts theatre security cooperation activities to assist in
building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, US
Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to
crises.”
Furthermore,
the Africa Command’s objective is to ensure that it oversees security
cooperation, building partnership capability, and defence support to
non-military missions. In this regard, the AFRICOM’s primary objective would be
on efforts aimed towards prevention rather than reaction, utilization of
non-kinetic versus kinetic methods, and to support US diplomacy and development
efforts on the continent. The command also aims to assist in building African
countries’ capacities to reduce conflict, improve security, deny terrorists
sanctuary, and to support crisis response.
AFRICOM’s
organisational structure
According
to the US Department of Defence (DoD), AFRICOM will be organised differently
from the current unified commands that have heretofore been responsible for US
security activities in Africa. Africa was previously placed under the area of
responsibility of three unified commands, the European Command, Central Command
and Pacific Command. The DoD has emphasized that the new Africa Command will
not affect the US
project of a major global force restructuring involving the withdrawal of US
troops from bases overseas.
Based on
this, the Africa Command will only entail a staff headquarters and not a troop
deployment that characterised other US unified commands. This means
that the AFRICOM will entail a staff component which is likely to be small and
discrete. Any US military
personnel that are likely to be involved in training or exercises in Africa
will deploy from their home bases in the US.
Equally
important, AFRICOM will be distinctive from other US Commands by incorporating
an integrated civilian-military architecture, based on non-kinetic (non-lethal
or combat) missions such as capacity building training, security sector reform,
military professionalization, support humanitarian assistance, disaster relief
and medical assistance of other US Government agencies such as the State Department
and USAID.
In terms
of composition, AFRICOM will be headed by General William Ward. He will be
assisted by two deputy-Commanders, one of whom is a senior-level State
Department official. A number of other senior-level civilian representatives
from other US
government agencies will collaborate to ensure a better integration of US
capacity building efforts. The view of organizing the structure of the AFRICOM
in this manner is to ensure that sustainable security and stability are
predicated on the principles of good governance, the rule of law and economic
opportunity. As such, the view of US policy-makers was to establish a 21st
century command that is tailored to address the unique security challenges
facing Africa.
Prevailing
perceptions about AFRICOM
Despite
efforts by US officials to reassure many sceptical African leaders and policy
observers that the purpose of the Africa Command is to enhance US efforts to
bring peace and security to Africa and, that, its intent is to promote common
goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth.
Furthermore, the US has
sought to emphasise that the Africa Command is an overdue reform to rationalise
the DoD response structure in Africa that will bring about bureaucratic
efficiency, military coherence and synchronization with Africa’s
evolving security architecture. However, many legitimate concerns and questions
have been raised by various African leaders and members of civil society
regarding the real intentions of the US government.
The oft
raised question is “why is Africa suddenly important to the US”, especially
after being on the periphery of US strategic policy interests after the end of
the Cold War. Varied reasons for much of the reservations and distrust
regarding US intentions and aims with the Africa Command have been proffered.
These include, amongst others, the following:
·
The
militarization of US foreign policy towards Africa;
·
Widespread
perceptions of lack of proper consultations with African countries and formal
structures, and the presentation of AFRICOM as a fait accompli;
·
Competition
for strategic energy resources as a response to China
and India, reminiscent of 19th
century scramble for Africa;
·
The
establishment of US bases in Africa, which will lead to significant number of
US troops being used to intervene around the continent where US interests are
threatened;
·
US military presence and installations will
attract terrorism to African countries that will host the Africa Command or
have US
troops presence;
·
Deep
African antipathy to US
post-9/11 posture and the pre-emptive military engagement such as that which
took place in Iraq and Afghanistan, and threats of similar activities
directed at Iran, Syria, and many
it conceives as threats;
·
Assumptions
that instability in Africa poses direct threat to US security and weak African states
will translate into terrorist safe-havens;
·
The
AFRICOM will undermine Africa’s common policies on African defence and security
and the emerging AU’s peace and security architecture; etc.
AFRICOM
and the emerging African Peace and Security Architecture
One of
the challenges facing AFRICOM is how it will fit into the emerging continental
and regional African Peace and Security Architecture. Specifically, there are
concerns relating to whether AFRICOM will usurp or undermine African leadership
on security issues on the continent. US Government leaders have sought to
address this issue, when they emphasize that the purpose of the new command is
to encourage and support African leadership that is needed to confront diffuse
and unpredictable global security challenges. Indeed, it is often pointed out
the AFRICOM’s interagency structure offers a more effective means of achieving
a collaborative and coherent US
policy toward Africa.
According
to the DoD, the Civil/Military Activities Directorate within AFRICOM, led by a
Senior Foreign Service officer from the State Department, will oversee all
capacity-building assistance at the bilateral and multi-lateral levels. This
Directorate will also serve as the primary interface between AFRICOM and the
African Union. In this regard, the Africa Command will support other agencies
such as the State Department’s ACOTA program, which is geared towards building
peace support operations capacity in Africa,
as well as others such as the Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises such
as the OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA. However, a major concern with joint training
exercises is that these activities are often linked to the GWOT-framed US
policies.
There is perception that such training exercises are linked to or they mask US
special forces operations similar to those that supported the Ethiopian
invasion of Somalia
in 2006.
In
motivating for the opportunities presented by the establishment of AFRICOM,
some observers have pointed out that both the security and developmental needs
of Africa which impact on the lack of strong
and effective governance.
They also note that the lack of stability also hampers the prospects for
growth. Thus, the major preoccupation, including for the Africa Command, is the
need to build effective institutions and entrenching values and principles
necessary for a viable security framework. This raises the question of what
forms of external engagement and support arises. Shillinger correctly proposes
that what is required of the US
and AFRICOM is an engagement with Africa based
on convergence of interests. Adding that there is “the need for (the US) to reassure
its prospective African partners that AFRICOM acknowledges the lead role of
Africans themselves in determining their own security, development and
governance priorities”.
Conclusion
Whilst
there is an acknowledgement of an emphasis on security and stability, including
terrorism; greater emphasis should equally be placed on addressing issues such
as debilitating poverty, rampant disease, oppressive regimes, and internecine
warfare, which are Africa’s primary security priorities. In this regard,
AFRICOM must define and clarify its linkages, mission and objectives with those
of the AU and regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and
resolution. The questions that arise is how will AFRICOM link with AU
mechanisms and policies relating to peace and security on the continent – these
include the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy; the Common
African Defence and Security Policy and others?
Indeed,
one of the practical areas where AFRICOM can demonstrate its cooperation is the
determination of how it can provide effective training, advisory and technical
support to the development of the African Standby Force. Similarly, there is a
need for Africans to remain robust and ensure that they frame the needs of the
continent – in line with the call for “African solutions to African problems”.
Furthermore, it is critical that whatever the policies adopted by international
actors relating to Africa, Africans should
continue to provide strategic leadership and ownership. To this end, it is
prudent that African leaders should not shun the newly established US command, but
rather, should encourage that such initiatives should include their direct
participation and consultation.