Child Justice Bill: [B49-2002]
Written comments: Prof SS Terblanche
Background
My interest in
the Child Justice Bill centres on the sentencing of child offenders. I am an
expert on sentencing, have been researching sentencing since 1985, have written
numerous research articles and papers on the topic and is the author of the
current standard textbook on sentencing titled A guide to sentencing in
I also request to
be permitted to present oral evidence to the Committee on the date set aside
for such evidence.
General
In general I
support the Bill and its basic premises. The South African Law Research
Commission did sterling work in researching the issue and as far as the Bill is
based on that research it clearly is the result of much consultation, research
and experience in the field.
Specific comments
Clause 58
Clause 58 becomes
part of the sentencing provisions through the reference in clause 73. See
clause 73 for comments on aspects of clause 58.
Clause 70
I support the fact
that clause 70 includes specific factors that the courts should take into
account when deciding on the imposition of sentences such as imprisonment, in
subclause (3). I request the Committee to seriously consider further explaining
the “seriousness of the offence”, specifically by including
(1) the amount of harm done or
risked through the offence, and
(2) the culpability of the offender
in causing or risking the harm.
These two factors
are universally used to determine the seriousness of the offence and are very
useful guidelines in determining the true severity of an offence. See, in this
connection, the South African Law Reform Commission Report: Sentencing (A new
sentencing framework) 2000 (clause 3 of the proposed Bill).
Clause 71
I fully support
the specific provision for victim impact statements to be produced in court. I
also notice that the wording of this clause closely follows the wording
proposed by the SA Law Reform Commission in the above-mentioned report. However,
it is submitted that the responsibility to accept the statement should be on
the court rather than on the prosecutor. Such a responsibility falls outside
the normal responsibilities of prosecutors, who are also often still
inexperienced. On the other hand, determining all the factors that should
impact the sentence falls squarely within the role of the sentencing court.
Clause 72
I fully support
the decision (as explained in this provision) that no child may be incarcerated
or sent to a residential facility unless a pre-sentence report has been
obtained first.
Clause 73
This clause
contains a few technical problems:
Clause 74
I fully support
the inclusion of restorative justice options as part of the provisions for
sentences for child offenders. I leave it to experts in this field to comment
on the details of the provisions that are introduced into clause 74 from
clauses 61 and 62. Unfortunately, these details strike me as unnecessarily
detailed and potentially prone to misunderstanding as a result.
Clause 75
I fully support
this provision.
Clause 76
The inclusion of
correctional supervision as one of the sentences that a court may impose on a
child offender is essential. Clause 76 is strongly supported.
However, I have already expressed my
concerns about possible confusion between correctional supervision, as
community-based sentence, and the other community-based sentences in clause 73.
There is another logical problem in clause
76(a). It permits a court to impose “…a sentence of correctional supervision – in the case of a child
who is 14 years or older, in terms of section 276(1)(h) or (i) of the Criminal
Procedure Act.” However, section 276(1)(i) is not correctional supervision. It
is imprisonment, from which the Commission of Correctional Services may release
the prisoner on correctional supervision. The court has no role in deciding whether
such release on correctional supervision will actually take place or not. That
this is the case is abundantly clear from the Criminal Procedure Act, where
section 276A(2) provides that punishment “shall only be imposed under s
276(1)(i) -- (a) if the court is of the opinion that the offence justifies the
imposing of imprisonment, with or without the option of a fine, for a period
not exceeding five years; and (b) for a fixed period not exceeding five years.”
Our courts have also consistently held the sentence to amount to ordinary imprisonment
(cf S v Slabbert 1998 (1) SACR 646 (SCA) at 647h-i; S v Rheeder 1997 (1) SACR 666 (T) at 674a-b; S v Stanley 1996
(2) SACR 570 (A) at 575f-g; S v Van der Westhuizen 1995 (1) SACR
601 (A) at 603i-j; S v Randell 1995 (1) SACR 403 (NC) at
404b-c; S v Msenti 1998 (1) SACR 401 (W) at 408b-d.) For
example, in S v Slabbert 1998
(1) SACR 646 (SCA) the court specifically stated that where section 276A(2)
refers to the “punishment” which shall not exceed five years, it means
imprisonment. As a result, subclause (b) should be deleted, as should the age
limitations in clause (a). Courts already have the authority to impose
imprisonment in terms of section 276(1)(i) under clause 78, which deals with
the imposition of imprisonment.
Clause 77
It is striking
that the Bill contains copious guidelines and considerations that should be
heeded
regarding the
imposition of community-based sentences, restorative justice sentences and
imprisonment. However, there is nothing on residential facilities. I request
the Committee to give sentencers an indication of when this sentence should be
considered appropriate. Between the lines it is clear that education will be
the focus of the residential facility, but there is no indication of the
severity of this punishment, or even whether it should be considered as punishment
at all. It would be very useful if the legislature were to give such indications
to sentencers, for several reasons, such as that inexperienced sentencers might
have no idea when to impose this kind of sentence; that until a authoritative
judgment is passed, there will be differences of opinion as to when this option
will be appropriate. In including this option, the legislature should have a
view as to why it is needed: my request is simply that the legislature put this
view into words.
Clause 78
I fully support
the inclusion of subclause (1), to remind everybody involved that it is
essential, in terms of
In connection with clause (2), I must,
unfortunately, challenge the idea created in the Bill that life imprisonment is
considered an acceptable sentence in terms of international obligations, in
particular the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. There is a logical
problem with the sentence of life imprisonment as well. Since life imprisonment
is the longest sentence that a court may impose, I fail to see how it could
ever, at the same time, be the shortest period possible in the case of a child
offender.
I urge the Committee to reconsider clause (3).
As long as Act 105 of 1997 is in force, children would have to be sentenced in
terms of its provisions anyway. The amendment to 51(6) of that Act is
sufficiently clear in connection with the issue of children of 16 and older.
I urge the Committee to reconsider the rest
of clause 78 as well. It
is impossibly complicated. It is going to be desperately difficult and
time-consuming for judges and magistrates to sort out all the fine details; it
is going to be impossibly difficult for prosecutors to sort out in order to
adequately inform the accused of the punishment he or she is facing if
convicted (this information must, in terms of our current law and in the
interests of a fair trial, be included in the charge sheet); it is going to be
even more impossible if the charge sheet includes main and alternative counts.
More importantly, I submit, is that the over-regulation contained in these
provisions, read with the various Schedules, is undecipherable for any
potential offender – legislation like this has no educative value as nobody
will be able to form an overall idea of what is involved. In addition, “substantial and compelling
circumstances” have until now been used as exception when the severe prescribed
sentences in the minimum sentences legislation should not be applied. It
does not follow that the same principles could be used for the opposite, namely
as an exception when the more severe sentence of imprisonment is to be used. My
argument is that it is not and that it will further confuse the issue and makes
the law in this connection even less accessible to everybody.
If the Committee decides to go through with
the detailed provisions, it should at least note the following problems with
respect to Part I of Schedule 3, item 4 (b). In (i) mention is made of rape “in
circumstances where the victim was raped more than once whether by the child in
question or by any co-perpetrator or accomplice…”. It is a well-known fact in
our criminal law that every rapist is a main perpetrator – there are no
co-perpetrators and also no accomplices. A similar problem exists with respect
to item 4(b)(ii), which refers to rape by “more than one person where such
persons acted in the furtherance of a common purpose or a conspiracy…”. Neither
common purpose nor conspiracy exists in our criminal law as far as rape is
concerned (cf S v Kimberley 2005 (2) SACR 663 (SCA)).
Schedule 6
Amendments of
Criminal Procedural Act
I support the
amendment of s 276A(1). However, the amendment of s 276A(2) is not supported,
based on my previous comment regarding describing the imprisonment that is
referred to in section 276(1)(i) of the Act as correctional supervision.
The repeal of
sections 290 and 291 is supported as a necessary change in view of the new
sentencing options for children.
The amendment of
section 297, through the deletion of subs (1A), is strongly supported.
The amendment of
section 302, which would cause referrals to a residential facility lasting more
than three months to be automatically reviewable, is strongly supported.
Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1997
It should be
noted that section 51(3)(b) has already been deleted, by the Criminal Law
Amendment (Sentencing) Act 38 of 2007.
The deletion of
section 51(7) is supported. It does not make a difference anyway.
Subject to what
has been commented above in connection with clause 78 of the Child Justice
Bill, the amendment of section 51(6) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 is
supported. In particular, a reference to clause 78(1) is particularly useful to
give greater clarity on the legislature’s acknowledgement that the imprisoning
of children should be approached in a different manner to imprisonment for
adults.
Closing comment
I appreciate the
opportunity to present these written comments and wish the Committee all the
best with the important task of passing the Child Justice Bill into
legislation.
Signed: SS
Terblanche
Department of
Criminal and Procedural Law
PO Box 392
UNISA
0003