Report of the Ad hoc Committee on Report 13 of Public Protector, dated 28 February 2001:
The Ad hoc Committee on Report 13 of Public Protector, having considered Report No 13 (Special Report): Report on the alleged irregularities with regard to the affairs and financial statements of the SFF Association, and on the relevant reports of the Auditor-General to Parliament, and having heard evidence, reports as follows:
1. Introduction
(1) On 21 January 2000, Report No 13 of the Public Protector was tabled in Parliament.
(2) The Committee was established in terms of Rule 214 of the National Assembly, by decision of the Speaker, on 19 January 2000, which decision was ratified by the National Assembly on 21 January 2000. The Committee was established to consider Report No 13 and to report to the National Assembly. The Committee was formally constituted on 20 January 2000.
(3) The Committee presented its first Report to the National Assembly on 25 February 2000, in which the Committee set out what it understood to be its terms of reference and work method:
"The Committee, mindful of the fact that its terms of reference is to consider the report as a whole, proposes to deal with the report, its findings and recommendations in a comprehensive and holistic manner.
The Committee notes that the report deals with matters and makes recommendations which go beyond the terms of reference derived from the Resolution dated 21 August 1997, adopted by the National Assembly, requesting the Public Protector to investigate and report on the alleged irregularities with respect to the affairs and financial statements of the SFF Association, including, having due regard to the Report of the Minister of Minerals and Energy and to the applicable law, whether the reports of the Auditor-General to Parliament thereon were correct and proper. This adds to the complexity of the Committee's task.
In pursuance of its approach, the Committee will consider, when necessary, calling evidence on the findings and matters contained in the report and on the extent to which the recommendations contained in the report have been implemented.
The Committee may further consider referring matters arising from the report to structures best suited to deal with them.
Mindful of the need to deal with these matters as expeditiously as possible, but also mindful of the scope, range and complexity of the matters dealt with in the Public Protector's report, the Committee is of the opinion that it will require a period of at least three calendar months, from the date of adoption of this Report, to complete its work, provided that the Committee may need to approach the House with a view to extending this period, if necessary".
(4) The Committee has taken considerable time in completing its work, both due to the complexity of the matters it was asked to deal with as well as lengthy recesses in Parliament's schedule during an election year.
(5) The Committee has considered the report of the Public Protector and has also considered written and oral submissions by the Public Protector, presented at public hearings held on 4 and 18 April 2000.
(6) The Committee would like to express its sincere gratitude to the Public Protector, Adv S A M Baqwa SC, and the staff in his Office, for the assistance they provided to the Committee, and the very cordial and constructive manner in which it was able to interact with them.
(7) The Committee is pleased to submit its final Report to the National Assembly.
2. Report of Public Protector
(1) The Committee would like to express its appreciation to the Public Protector for the investigation conducted by his Office and the comprehensive report that has been submitted to Parliament.
(2) On 21 August 1997 the National Assembly adopted the following resolution which constituted the terms of reference of the Public Protector:
"That the House resolves to request the Public Protector, in terms of section 182(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution, 1996, to investigate, and to report to the National Assembly on, the alleged irregularities with regard to the affairs and financial statements of the SFF Association, including having due regard to the Report of the Minister of Minerals and Energy and to the applicable law, whether reports of the Auditor-General to Parliament thereon were correct and proper".
(3) The investigation conducted by the Public Protector spanned an extensive period. There were 25 000 pages of written evidence and extensive oral evidence presented to the Public Protector. Parties who had an interest in the investigation were represented by senior legal teams.
In his submission to the Committee the Public Protector addressed the question of the money and time spent on this investigation and indicated that the investigation was fully justified in view of the fact that the SFF Association was a wholly-owned government company worth more than R13 billion. He indicated that the money spent was mainly in the form of legal fees incurred by interested parties. He concluded that he believed that every cent spent was well worth it.
3. Findings of Public Protector
The findings of the Public Protector can be summarised as follows:
(1) General approach
The Public Protector took the following approach with his investigation:
The key driving force to this investigation was to protect the public interest. When it appeared that no loss had occurred, he had to weigh whether the benefit of investigating further would be justified by the cost of the investigation. He did not investigate matters which had been dealt with elsewhere or in other investigations. He also did not investigate matters which would not have been of practical benefit to the public.
(2) Change in accounting policy (R170 million issue)
(a) During the 1992-93 financial year, the Strategic Fuel Fund Association (SFF) Management decided to change the accounting policy relating to strategic oil stock that had been sold from one storage facility and replaced elsewhere, during the previous three years. This change in accounting policy gave rise to a R170 million loss, which the former Minister of Minerals and Energy Affairs, Dr P M Maduna, referred to in his responses to questions in Parliament. The Minister indicated that this was possibly a physical loss to the SFF.
(b) During the initial hearings in June 1998, Counsel for the Minister put on record that the R170 million was not a physical loss, as the Minister had indicated in his responses in Parliament, but an accounting loss caused by the change in accounting policy.
Considering and evaluating the accounting policy change was only necessary for as long as it appeared that the R170 million was a physical loss. Given that there was no physical loss associated with the change in accounting policy, the Public Protector therefore made no finding regarding the reasonableness of the change in accounting policy and its disclosure (see also paragraph 4(6) below).
(3) Payments to Interstate
(a) The SFF contracted directly with the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) to purchase Egyptian crude oil in 1992. Prior to this date, due to sanctions, the SFF had effectively purchased Egyptian crude oil through a company called Interstate, paying Interstate a margin for this service, as was normal practice at the time.
(b) The SFF continued to pay Interstate a reduced margin (US$ 0,06 a barrel) on all oil purchased through EGPC after 1992. Interstate paid the SFF US$ 0,05 a barrel if they, instead of the SFF, lifted the oil under the contract.
(c) Allegations were made that the payments to Interstate were of no value and were perhaps improper or fraudulent.
(d) Evidence showed that the payments were made for the effective relinquishing to SFF of Interstate's Egyptian oil contract volumes with EGPC, as EGPC did not have additional oil volumes to contract with the SFF, without Interstate giving up their volumes. Interstate also provided ad hoc logistical services, but these were not the main causa for the payments to Interstate.
(e) Whilst there were many deficiencies in the documentation of the contract with Interstate, which gave rise to the suspicions of impropriety, the Public Protector finds that there was a valid reason or causa for the payments to Interstate. It is, however, equally true that the benefit received for the payments to Interstate reduced or weakened over the years as the oil procurement environment improved.
(4) Salem recovery
(a) Allegations were also made with regard to the R1 450 million payment by SFF to the Government in April 1997, and the incorrect posting in the books of SFF of moneys recovered from the Salem oil tanker incident.
(b) Whilst the Public Protector needed to investigate these allegations and covered these issues in the report, he regarded it as common cause that no losses arose from these issues. As such these issues did not form the primary focus of his investigation.
(5) Auditor-General's Report to Parliament
Audit of SFF
(a) The general allegation was that the audits of the SFF by the Auditor-General and his agent, Price Waterhouse, should have identified the problems with regard to the contract underlying the payments to Interstate (referred to as the Six Cents Agreement) and the other alleged irregularities.
(b) The Public Protector indicates that Parliament specifically requested him to look at the alleged irregularities and therefore he considered the audit process only in so far as it related to the alleged irregularities noted above.
(c) Given that he found that there was a valid causa for the Interstate payments and that the issue regarding the change in accounting policy did not cause an actual loss, he found no basis on which the audit of the SFF could be criticised for not identifying these issues.
Auditor-General's Reports
(d) The main criticism of the Auditor-General's reporting to Parliament was that the 1992-93 management financial statements, which in previous years had not been published, were published for the first time in 1992-93 in an abridged format. The abridged financial statements summarised the management financial statements and did not separately disclose the R170 million relating to the change in the accounting policy.
(e) The argument was that the secrecy provisions, which had previously restricted the publishing of crude oil information, were sufficiently relaxed to allow full publication of the financial statements. The allegations went further to imply that the abbreviation had occurred to cover up the R170 million loss.
(f) Based on the evidence the Public Protector finds that it appears that the Auditor-General (who had the discretion after consultation to decide what information to publish) in fact published the SFF information much earlier than he was required to do. In addition he finds that whilst there were minor technical difficulties with the abbreviated 1992-93 financial statements, they could not be said to be misleading or inappropriate.
(g) While the Committee accepts the findings of the Public Protector outlined above, it wishes to draw the attention of the National Assembly to the following matters:
(i) The CEF Group and the SFF Association were instrumental in attempts by the Apartheid State to break the international oil embargo imposed by the United Nations in protest against Apartheid.
(ii) As such these organisations operated behind a veil of secrecy and conducted operations that were, by definition, in contravention of international law.
(iii) The structure and functioning of the SFF was such that it made political and administrative accountability difficult.
(iv) There are certain allegations, in particular concerning the diversion of funds from the SFF for political purposes, that the Committee is not necessarily satisfied were isolated incidents. The Committee is of the view that a forensic investigation into such matters would have been in the public interest.
(v) During the course of its work further allegations of irregularities in the operations of the SFF Association were reported.
(vi) The Committee wishes to state that, if the accounting policy was adequately discussed with and explained to the Minister and the National Assembly, much of the misunderstanding could have been avoided.
(6) Findings regarding actions of Minister
The Public Protector makes the following findings regarding the actions of the Minister:
(a) The Public Protector finds that the Minister's statements, both in Parliament and outside Parliament, were tantamount to suggesting that the Office of the Auditor-General had either covered up the loss of R170 million or that he had not done his duty properly by ascertaining and disclosing that such a loss had occurred. The Public Protector finds that this unfortunate impression could easily have been dispelled by an appropriate consultation with his Management Auditor or by a direct in-depth discussion with the Auditor-General himself. Even though there were meetings between the Minister and the Office of the Auditor-General, it did not seem to him that they were in the spirit of section 181 or section 41(1), which provides as follows:
"(1) All spheres of government and all organs of State within each sphere must -
(a) preserve the peace, the national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic;
(b) secure the well-being of the people of the Republic;
(c) provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole;
(d) be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people;
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other spheres;
(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution;
(g) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; and
(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by -
(i) fostering friendly relations;
(ii) assisting and supporting one another;
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest;
(iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another;
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another..."
(b) With regard to protection of institutions, functional or institutional integrity, fostering good relations, supporting one another, consulting one another and adhering to agreed procedures, the Public Protector finds that the Minister violated the spirit of the Constitution by not upholding the principles and prescripts contained particularly in the quoted sections of the Constitution. Adherence thereto would have led to the immediate rectification of any incorrect perception which the Minister might have had.
(c) The Public Protector indicates that he has not suggested and he does not suggest that the Minister acted mala fide. None of the evidence presented before him suggested that the Minister had any bone to pick with the Office of the Auditor-General prior to the reports he received which led to the Management Audit. The Public Protector finds that the Constitution can be transgressed even if the Minister's allegations were made bona fide and had been correct.
(d) The Public Protector holds that the Minister is duty-bound to uphold the constitutional principles and follow correct procedures at all times, and that it is absolutely imperative for all South Africans, both in and outside Parliament, to accept the consequences of the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land. One of those consequences is to uphold and protect the dignity, the integrity and independence of the institutions mentioned in Chapter 9 of the Constitution.
(e) The Public Protector points out that neither section 181 nor section 41 provides any sanction for their transgression, and that he is not possessed of any power to prescribe such sanctions. He regards this as a constitutional weakness that can only be remedied by Parliament itself. Parliament has to provide such remedy because he considers these matters to be serious enough "not even to be adequately addressed by a simple apology". Parliament therefore needs to devise a mechanism with which to deal with such matters when they arise. This is necessary also to endorse not only the fact that the Constitution is a living document, but also one that is effective. The public needs to be assured that the Constitution is not a document of mere words.
(f) The Public Protector points out that the Minister is a Member of Parliament and a Member of the Cabinet, and in this regard section 92 of the Constitution provides as follows:
"(2) Members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.
(3) Members of the Cabinet must -
(a) act in accordance with the Constitution; and
(b) provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control."
(g) The Committee is of the view that the National Assembly has already found that the Minister acted in contravention of the then Rule 99 (now Rule 66) by reflecting upon the competence or honour of the Auditor-General, and that the remarks were not in keeping with the spirit of sections 181 and 41 of the Constitution.
(h) The Committee deals more extensively with matters relating to sections 181 and 41 under paragraph 5(4).
4. Recommendations by Public Protector
The recommendations contained in the Public Protector's report can be summarised as follows:
(1) With regard to the failure to record the Six Cents Agreement with Interstate in writing, and the issues raised with regard to the causa for the payments to Interstate, the Public Protector found it to be untenable that the causa for the payments was not recorded in the facsimile of 2 July 1992 and that the term contract was not in writing in accordance with the Company Policy R02. It was found that the policy with regard to term contracts, namely that they had to be in writing, was a salutary one, and that all contracts should be formalised and authorised at the appropriate levels, as a written contract would probably have gone a long way to allay the suspicions that had arisen around the US$ 0,06 payments to Interstate. It was also found to be unacceptable that this matter was not addressed by internal controls such as Internal Audit, which is an indication of a material defect in the organisational structure.
Strict application of the written contracts policy is therefore recommended, and this has to be drawn especially to the attention of Internal Audit of SFF, and specifically incorporated as one of the imperatives into the rules and regulations in terms of which they approve payments.
(2) With regard to the absence of reference in minutes of the Board/Crude Oil Committee for 1992 and 1993 to the Six Cents Agreement with Interstate, and the fact that minutes of the Crude Oil Committee meetings were kept by a member of the crude oil department, and not by the regular Board secretary, it was noted that no relaxation or laxity of standards should be tolerated in any State entity, and in particular one which deals in billions of rands on behalf of the tax payer. The Public Protector took it that minuting is now undertaken by a competent person trained to do so. If not, it is recommended to the Board of the SFF that this be effected. It is also recommended that the Directors and committee members, when checking minutes, ensure that these fully record the matters of importance with regard to the management of the business as well as key decisions in this regard.
(3) With regard to the issues arising from the alleged absence of Board approval for the EGAM contract and the level of authorisation needed for an evergreen contract, it was noted that contracts longer than a year should go to the Board. As an evergreen contract is intended to last for more than a year, it is recommended that evergreen contracts also be reviewed by the Board in future.
With reference to the delay in bringing the EGAM contract to the attention of the Board, it is recommended that such delays be strongly discouraged, since it is improper not to keep the Board informed at all times.
(4) With regard to the Ivory Coast payment, it appears to have been an isolated incident representing a classic case of political manipulation of a state-owned company for political gain. It is indeed hoped that this case represents an aberration which will never be repeated within the CEF group or any similar organisation. It is a lesson about what ought never to be allowed to happen by all State institutions and para-statals.
(5) With regard to the Salem issue, and the incorrect posting of monies received: This practice should be deprecated as inappropriate. Though it did not have any practical negative consequences, it ought not to have been done and reflects a practice that should not be repeated in the future.
(6) With regard to the change in accounting policy, the Public Protector is of the opinion that the processes followed and the expertise utilised in considering the change and its disclosure, were reasonable. However, should there still be concerns, the Public Protector states that the Minister is entitled to request the Board to review the matter further and to obtain further expert advice.
(7) With regard to the old Company Policy R05, which was silent on whether funds for return cargoes should be retained: The new policy is explicit that the funds must be set aside from the original sale. Therefore the Public Protector has no further recommendation in this regard, other than to say that this is more desirable. As it was common cause that there was no actual cash shortage caused by these payments (cash transfers to the Government based on oil sales which had not yet occurred), and in view of the fact that the cash flow forecasts are subjective projections into the future, the Public Protector did not go into too much detail on the various cash flow forecasts prepared and the differences between them. It is recommended, however, that if a cash flow shortage is forecast, even a short-term one, this should be clearly communicated to the Board so that the matter can be addressed in whatever manner deemed appropriate by the Board.
(8) With regard to company policy on whether strategic oil reserves should be held in wet or paper barrels, the Public Protector is of the opinion that Company Policy R02 was in fact not complied with, as 11 million barrels were held in paper barrels. Consequently the required reserves were below the minimum standard required at the time. At that stage (31 March 1997) the breach of policy did not have any serious consequences for the SFF or South Africa. In saying so, he does not seek to justify the aforementioned breach, which potentially could have had serious consequences for the country. Such breaches of company policy should never be countenanced or allowed to occur in future.
(9) With regard to the Interstate payments, the change in accounting policy and the R1 450 million payment to the Government, and the allegations raised by NSN that the General Manager acted without the appropriate authority and knowledge of the Board, and did not provide them with adequate information regarding the key issues: The position would have been different had the SFF had both Executive and Non-Executive Directors, in that the flow of information would not have been open to potential limitations by one person as was alleged.
The Public Protector therefore recommends that SFF and other similar Government organisations should have a Board of Directors consisting of Executive and Non-Executive Directors, as suggested by the King Report. This would not necessarily require additional people. It would be expected that the non-executive Board would remain, but that the General Manager and Deputy General Managers be appointed Executive Directors. This would prevent the Board being dominated by an individual or individuals whilst ensuring that it is fully informed on all matters at all stages. The Chairperson would, however, continue to be independent and non-executive.
(10)With regard to other Corporate Governance issues: The Public Protector is of the view that State institutions should form the model for good Corporate Governance. Whilst these institutions do not always operate in the same way as a normal business, the Corporate Governance principles outlined in the King Report are still applicable. Given the highlighting of fraud in business today, it is vital that as part of this Corporate Governance fraud be specifically addressed. It is therefore recommended that all State institutions should have a finalised fraud strategy as part of their overall strategy, which should include the following:
(a) How fraud risks will be assessed on an ongoing basis.
(b) An ongoing methodology for ensuring that the controls in place correctly identify, deter and prevent fraud.
(c) A fraud response plan to ensure that any fraud detected is responded to appropriately.
(d) Specific responsibilities for ensuring that the fraud strategy is implemented and followed up on an ongoing basis.
(11)With regard to the interaction between the Minister and the Auditor-General, the Public Protector states that he found the Minister's conduct in regard to the accusations made with regard to the implied cover-up of a loss of R170 million by the Auditor-General to be unacceptable. In this regard, he recommends that not only the Minister, but all officials of the State, should take heed of the prescribed relationship between institutions and organs of State as spelt out in the Constitution. Section 41(1) and section 181 of the Constitution specifically deal with this. Section 41 provides that organs of State must respect the constitutional status, the one of the other. They must not exercise their powers in a manner that encroaches on the institutional integrity of another. It furthermore provides that organs of State should co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by consulting one another on matters of common interest, and adhering to agreed procedures. The correct channels and procedure must be followed when addressing concerns one might have about a Chapter 9 institution. The Public Protector accordingly recommends that the Speaker of the National Assembly takes the necessary steps to ensure that not only this report, but also, more specifically, matters regarding sections 181 and 41 of the Constitution, be raised in the Legislature with a view to a pronouncement regarding the accountability of the Minister and any possible sanction which the Legislature might consider appropriate.
5. Recommendations of Committee
The Committee considered the above recommendations and wishes to recommend to the National Assembly, as follows:
(1) Matters relating to corporate governance of SFF
That the recommendations contained in paragraphs 4(1), 4(2), 4(3), 4(4), 4(5), 4(7), 4(8), 4(9) and 4(10) be referred to the Portfolio Committee on Minerals and Energy, the Committee to consider these matters and to report to the National Assembly.
(2) Matters relating to corporate governance of public enterprises
That the recommendations contained in paragraphs 4(4), 4(9) and 4(10) be referred to the Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises, the Committee to consider these matters and to report to the National Assembly.
(3) Matters relating to public service and administration
That the recommendations contained in paragraph 4(10) be referred to the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration, the Committee to consider these matters and to report to the National Assembly.
(4) Matters relating to sections 181 and 41 of Constitution
(a) The Public Protector points out that neither section 181 nor section 41 of the Constitution provides any sanction for their transgression. This is held to be a "constitutional weakness" that can only be remedied by Parliament itself. These matters are considered to be serious enough "not even to be adequately addressed by a simple apology".
(b) The Committee concurs with the Public Protector regarding the importance of the institutions supporting democracy created in Chapter 9 of the Constitution and their role in supporting democracy and human rights, and consequently the need for the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these institutions to be protected.
(c) The Committee agrees with the Public Protector that the Constitution does not provide for sanctions for the contravention of sections 181 and 41(1) of the Constitution. However, the Committee does not wish to express itself on whether this constitutes a "constitutional weakness" in view of the fact that section 181 of the Constitution itself provides that "other organs of State through legislative and other measures must assist and protect these institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these institutions." (Committee's emphasis.)
(d) The Committee recommends that these matters be referred to the Constitutional Review Committee and the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development, the committees to consider the above matters and to report to Parliament.
6. Accountability of Minister and appropriate sanction
(1) The Public Protector recommends that Parliament make a pronouncement regarding the accountability of the Minister and any possible sanction which Parliament might consider appropriate.
(2) In considering the above recommendation, the Committee considered the following factors:
(a) The process of pronouncing on accountability and sanctions is a judicial or quasi-judicial one that would entail, inter alia, adherence to the principles of natural justice. This clearly fell outside the mandate of the Committee. The Committee was not constituted as a disciplinary committee.
(b) The National Assembly has already found that the Minister acted in contravention of the then Rule 99 (now Rule 66) by reflecting on the honour and integrity of the Auditor-General other than by way of substantive motion and ordered him to withdraw his statements and to apologise. The Minister duly apologised unreservedly and unconditionally retracted his remarks on 4 September 1998. The Committee cannot concur with the assertion by the Public Protector that the Minister apologised but did not retract his statements. Hansard and the Minutes of the National Assembly reflect otherwise.
(c) The Supreme Court of Appeal stated, per Mohammed, CJ, in the matter of The Speaker of the National Assembly vs De Lille and Another 1999 (4 SA 863 SCA), that -
"This enquiry must crucially rest on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. It is Supreme - not Parliament. It is the ultimate source of all lawful authority in the country. No Parliament, however bona fide or eminent its membership, no President, however formidable be his reputation or scholarship, and no official, however efficient or well-meaning, can make any law or perform any act which is not sanctioned by the Constitution. Section 2 of the Constitution expressly provides that law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. It follows that any citizen adversely affected by any decree, order or action of any official or body, which is not properly authorised by the Constitution is entitled to the protection of the Courts. No Parliament, no official and no institution is immune from Judicial scrutiny in such circumstances." (p 868-9.)
"There is therefore nothing in the "Rules and orders" of the Assembly which qualifies, in any respect relevant to the appeal, the right to freedom of speech in the Assembly which s58(1) guarantees. More directly, there is nothing which provides any constitutional authority for the Assembly to punish any Member of the Assembly for making a speech through an order suspending such Member from the proceedings of the Assembly. The right of free speech in the Assembly protected by s58(1) is a fundamental right crucial to representative government in a democratic society. Its tenor and spirit must conform to all other provisions of the Constitution relevant to the conduct of proceedings in Parliament." (p 874.) (Committee's emphasis.)
The judgment states that section 57 of the Constitution "provides that the National Assembly 'may determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures'. There can be no doubt that this authority is wide enough to enable the Assembly to maintain internal order and discipline in its proceedings by means which it considers appropriate for this purpose. This would, for example, include the power to exclude from the Assembly for temporary periods any member who is disrupting or obstructing its proceedings or impairing unreasonably its ability to conduct its business in an orderly or regular manner acceptable in a democratic society. Without some internal mechanism of control and discipline, the Assembly would be impotent to maintain effective discipline and order during debates." (p 869.) (Committee's emphasis.)
(3) In view of the above the Committee recommends that it would not be appropriate to make a pronouncement on an appropriate sanction in the instant case.
(4) The Committee recommends that these matters be referred to the Rules Committee of the National Assembly to consider any amendments to the Rules of the National Assembly and/or the Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act that might be appropriate, the Committee to report to the National Assembly.