2. Concerns

2.1. Firearms legally owned under the present Act but prohibited in the new Act.

Schedule 1, item 1 presents serious difficulties. The Gun Control Alliance has already asked why existing gun owners should be exempted from disposing of their guns through registered gun dealers (Schedule 1, Item 1 subitem(2) paragraph(b) ). I would like to take the matter further.

One of the serious drawbacks of the proposals contained in the new Bill is the absence of a buyback programme. The notion that if you leave something for long enough it will rectify itself is wishful thinking. This Bill provides the state with the opportunity to significantly reduce the number of firearms in circulation. If all we are hoping for is to maintain the present levels of gun ownership then high levels of gun violence will continue. There is an inescapable logic that the more guns in society the more gun violence there will be. (correct the Swiss example)

It is critical that having prohibited multiple gun ownership and the possession of certain guns, that the state demonstrate a similar commitment to remove and destroy those guns. Although no reason has been given for the "5 year plan" envisaged in Schedule 1 Item 1 subitem(1) it seems likely that the drafters fear the financial cost of a buy back and the resistance they are likely to meet from the gun lobby who will resist handing back their weapons. Postponing pain does not deal with it. An unwillingness to follow through even if it be at great cost, can cost a nation dearly. In 5 years time we will face a similar crisis and decisions will have to be made. This lapse represents the achilles heel of the new Bill and could well compromise it’s effectiveness.

When one considers the direct and indirect costs of gun violence to South Africa, then an appeal for strong, committed action is not an emotional appeal. It is my strong belief that transitional provisions should include a buyback of firearms which are legally held under the present Act but which will be prohibited under the new Act.

Here are some concrete suggestions on how it could be done.

0. Compensation should be at the market related price for the weapon as laid down in state guidelines. (cf the Australian model)

0. If it is felt that a buy back will be too expensive then, compensation could be in the form of a tax rebate to the value of the firearm spread over 5 years. (This spreads the load on the state budget over 5 years). It is likely that most firearm owners are taxpayers. In situations where this is not the case, cash payments could be made once the Receiver is convinced that the person is not eligible for tax. Having said this, government needs to carefully weigh up the message they are conveying when they agree to spend 32 billion Rands on Defence weapons but are unwilling to spend less than 1 billion Rands on reducing the number of firearms in our society which afterall are killing 33 citizens each day.

0. The Receiver of Revenue offices could serve as collection points and the SARS officials could process all the details necessary for the tax rebates. Computer linkages could be made between the Central Firearm Registry and SARS to simplify the process. SAPS personnel could be on hand to render weapons safe and provide security. Civilians could be present to disable the weapons and monitor the process leading to the meltdown of these weapons.

0. The period required to conduct such a buyback would need careful planning to ensure that it is implementable whilst not being dragged out. A sense of urgency is important throughout the process.

0. Throughout the process people will need to be treated gently and with restraint. At the same time the threat for non-compliance should also be made clear and the deadlines and penalties clearly spelt out.

Key to the effective implementation of this, is the will and the passion to make it happen. It must start with government’s unequivocal support for the process, including the considerable funding that will be required. This must be affirmed as short term pain for long term gain.

In addition the state has the opportunity to conduct an audit of state held firearms in order to identify the number of surplus weapons in state hands. According to the secretariat for Safety and Security, government departments have 288 779 handguns, 60 082 shotguns and 137 505 rifles registered with the firearms registry. It is likely that a considerable number of these could be identified as surplus weapons and handed over for destruction. These weapons should be destroyed with great fanfare so as to build momentum around a concerted ca

mpaign to decrease the number of firearms in circulation in our country.

According to the secretatriat for Safety and Security, just over 2 million individuals are registered owners of 2, 137 million handguns, 1, 048 million rifles, 349 500 shotguns and 18 723 other guns.

1, 365 million (67,3%) of these licensed owners have only one firearm and so are unlikely to be affected by the new legislation. The remaining 662 140 licence holders own 2,23 million firearms (62% of firearms licensed to individuals) between them. If one removes the firearms held by dedicated hunters, collectors and sportspeople from this figure (these statistics have not been published) then it is possible that more than 1 million firearms (many of them handguns) will be released into the market for the next 5 years.

If the state is serious about reducing the number of firearms then it should resolve to buy these surplus firearms back and destroy them. At the very least, there should be a buyback and destruction of surplus handguns. Other surplus firearms (eg rifles and shotguns) could then be sold through dealers over a 5 year period. The reason for the focus on handguns is that SAPS research has shown that 88% of weapons stolen are handguns and 57,4% of firearm murders are committed with handguns. The handgun is the weapon of choice of criminals and the more than 2 million handguns owned by legal gun owners represents the largest source of supply for criminals. If we are serious about reducing firearm violence then let us strike a significant blow to the major source of illegal weapons by reducing the number of handguns in circulation considerably.

It is not unrealistic to assume that many hundreds of thousands of firearms will be collected and destroyed in this way. This will represent a significant dent in the number of firearms in our country and more importantly should equate to significant reductions in loss of life.

Dealing with illegal weapons.

Some may argue that the real problem is with illegal firearms. Whilst conceding that there is truth in this I would contend that this is not about an either/or strategy. We must ensure the rigorous regulation of licensed firearms and we must seize illegal weapons. When we remember that close to 3 000 legal firearms fall into the hands of criminals each month, then the linkage between legal and illegal becomes obvious. The Bill provides adequate measures to seize illegal weapons and punish offenders. Section 148 provides for amnesties to be declared in order to collect illegal weapons. I believe that the passage of this legislation offers the opportunity for a major drive to collect illegal weapons. With this in mind I have taken the liberty of offering suggestions on how this might be done. Although this does not speak to the content of the Bill it offers a way of implementing it in such a way as to give effect to it’s stated aim of "preventing the proliferation of illegally possessed firarms" (Section 2 paragraph (c) ).

As has been demonstrated in our own and other countries there are two ingredients necessary for a successful Voluntary Weapons Collection Programme (VWCP). On the one hand there is the need for a "stick" On the other hand there is the need for a "carrot". 1. The Stick

In order for the carrot to be effective it requires the effective and certain threat of the stick. The stick will be effective during the VWCP in rooting out many illegal firearms held by otherwise law abiding citizens and in eliciting some illegal weapons held by criminals who feel particularly vulnerable. The stick will need to be shown to be effective and determined in the period before the VWCP and will have to have a well publicised strategy for what it intends to do after the VWCP with those who are still in possession of illegal firearms. The stick must of necessity be driven by the security cluster in government. It’s strategy could include:

0. Heavy Penalties for offenders (these are already contained in the new Bill).

0. The establishment of illegal firearm seizure units (IFS) comprising suitable Personnel drawn from Security forces and Justice personnel. These units could have as their sole focus the seizure of illegal weapons and the arrest of offenders. It could be argued that this would divert resources from grassroots policing but this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. Gun related crimes comprise the largest and fastest growing form of crime. The lethality of the gun makes these crimes much more of a threat to society. Grassroots policing has proved itself to be largely ineffectual in combatting gun related crime or even bringing illegal gun owners to justice. In some areas, police personnel are thought to be major suppliers of illegal guns. A dedicated team, even if it has a limited lifespan of just a couple of years, will strike at the heart of the problem and restore the public’s belief that effective gun control is possible and that offenders will be caught and heavily punished.

0. These units could undergo intensive training and could begin operations 3 months before the VWCP. Each unit could aim to make at least one substantial weapons seizure prior to the VWCP. This effective Policing strategy would need to receive wide publicty and reinforce the government’s determination to deal ruthlessly with illegal gun owners. Prosecution of offenders would need to be fastracked with convictions and heavy sentences being widely publicised.

0. A toll free number could be introduced for members of the Public to give information on illegal firearms. Rewards could be offered.

0. 2.2. The Carrot

The history of VWCPs around the world has shown that threats are not enough to ensure success. If there is nothing to be gained from handing a weapon in then many will take the risk of retaining their weapons in the hope that they will not be caught. People tend to have a negative response to threats especially in societies where high levels of crime are committed with impunity. Incentives are a necessary tool to counteract apathy and cynicism. People tend to operate from a place of self interest and if something can be shown to be in their interest they will respond positively.

Incentives can take many forms. Examples from around the world include: "Goods for Guns" (shopping vouchers), "Tools for Guns", "Toys for Guns", Buybacks (where guns were bought back at commercial prices), Community development incentives (used in Mali as incentives to villages for residents to hand in guns), Lucky draws (used by GFSA in 1994) and amnesty from prosecution.

Because we are dealing with a multiplicity of factors we will need a comprehensive strategy. The primary purpose will need to be the reduction of firearms and all other objectives will have to be subject to this overriding goal.

Implementing "the carrot"

0. The first priority when dealing with this category is amnesty from prosecution. As with the GFSA campaign of 1994, this would, of necessity, mean no ballistics tests. Whilst this may mean the destruction of key evidence in criminal trials, this sacrifice must be made if it is to have any chance of success. Once again the primary goal of reducing firearms must be adhered to unflinchingly and no secondary objectives must be allowed to lessen it’s chances of success.

0. Secondly, the weapons must be handed in on "neutral territory". This model is used effectively in El Salvador and was a key factor during the GFSA campaign in 1994. The neutral territory in these cases was religious buildings.

0. Thirdly, the weapon must be handed to a "neutral person". In the examples referred to above these were clergypersons. Our evaluation of the GFSA campaign, led us to propose that in future VWCPs, the police should take a backroom role at most. It may, in fact be most useful to employ the services of the SANDF to secure the premises and make the weapons being handed in safe.

0. Fourthly, the weapon should be rendered inoperable in the presence of the person handing it in. During the GFSA campaign this was done with angle grinders and welding machines. In conversations with engineers they have suggested a "press" to bend weapons.

0. Fifthly, a meaningful incentive should be offered. Under no circumstances should this be cash. A shopping voucher to the value of R50 or R100 would be a worthwhile incentive. The voucher should not be redeeemable for cash and should be for supermarkets, appliance stores, hardware stores, furniture stores, clothing stores and bookstores. Businesses could participate in a Rand for Rand scheme with government if necessary.

0. Sixthly, the GFSA campaign taught us that time is needed for a VWCP to catch the imagination of the people. The GFSA hand in, although disappointing in the number of weapons it collected, collected more weapons on a single day than any other in recent history. It’s major drawback was that it lasted only a single day.

Sufficient time should be allowed for the build up to the VWCP. It is also important that sufficient time be allowed for the VWCP to be conducted effectively. One day is clearly insufficient for momentum to build up through word of mouth etc. It may be that a period of between 10 days and 3 weeks is more appropriate.

0. Seventhly it must be made very clear that this is the one and only never to be repeated amnesty and VWCP for South Africa. In the past we had a number of amnesties declared at different times. Each time an amnesty is repeated it diminishes it’s effectiveness. People hold out for a better deal. This part of the carrot must be presented with the clear and unambiguous commitment to enforce the stick vigorously and relentlessly thereafter.

0. Eighthly, incentives could be offered to communities where large numbers of weapons are handed in. The European Union or another suitable funder could be asked to sponsor the development of "Peace Parks" in areas where the highest number of weapons per capita are handed in. A Peace Park could be developed on an open field or at a school and should include facilities for the youth (playground equipment, basketball hoops, trees etc) . This suggestion is an adaptation of a strategy used in Mali and could be effective in mobilising communities where there are large numbers of weapons held with the knowledge of the wider community.

I offer these in the hope that they will generate discussion aimed at solutions rather than at the cynical nitpicking which often characterises debates on crime and violence in this country. There are things that can be done and this legislation offers us the opportunity to make a significant impact on our land.

We are poised at a hinge of history. The decisions made now will determine the country we pass on to our children. Let it never be said of our generation that we lacked the passion, the creativity and the will, to stop the downward spiral of our land into a country resembling an armed camp

I am deeply grateful for the opportunity to make this submission and wish you well in your deliberations.