E C A A R

ECONOMISTS ALLIED FOR ARMS REDUCTION

The Conventional Arms Control Bill was withdrawn in September 2000 following representations by non-governmental organisations, including ECAAR-SA. The chair of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) was reported to have complained to the Speaker of Parliament about the cheek of upstart NGOs in embarrassing the government. The newly circulated bill is as objectionable as its 2000 version. It is a retrogressive piece of legislation reminiscent of the obsessive secrecy of the apartheid era and, similarly, should be rejected by the Portfolio Committee on Defence.

The introduction to the bill declares:

To establish the National Conventional Arms Control Committee; to ensure compliance with the policy of the Government in respect of arms control; to ensure the implementation of a legitimate, effective and transparent control process; to foster national and international confidence in the control procedures; to provide for an inspectorate to ensure trade compliance; to provide criteria to be used when assessing applications including consideration of human rights and fundamental freedoms; to ensure adherence to international treaties and agreements; to ensure proper accountability in the trade and export of conventional arms; and to provide for matters connected with the work and conduct of the committee and its secretariat; and to provide for matters connected therewith.

The perversity of glib references to "legitimate, effective and transparent control" and the Committee's contempt for Parliament are illustrated by the fact that it is already September 2001, yet the NCACC's report of South Africa's arms exports for the year 2000 has still not been released.

During hearings in September 2000, the Director of the NCACC Frederic Marais made it abundantly clear that the function of the NCACC is merely to process and "rubber-stamp" permits in implementation of government policy. Just what is "government policy?"

Mr Marais said then that if it is government policy to export armaments to countries such as Algeria and Colombia, then it is the function of NCACC to implement that policy without question. In response to a query on how South Africa can justify selling armaments to Saudi Arabia given that country's human rights record, Mr Marais replied:

"Arabs don't object to Saudi human rights practices. Who are we in South Africa to impose our values on the Saudis?"

The preamble to the bill declares:

Since the adequate protection of rights to life and security of the person against acts of aggression is fundamental to the well-being and to the social and economic development of every country; and since it is the duty of every government to protect and safeguard the rights of its people; and since every responsible country has the right to acquire arms to equip itself against acts of aggression; and since the Republic is playing an increasingly important role in the manufacturing and export of conventional arms; and since it is vitally important to ensure accountability in all matters concerning conventional arms and services provided in connection with conventional arms;

Amongst the numerous objections last year to the Bill was the fact that it made no reference to the NCACC's original rationale and principles which, at least on paper, has been one of the world's most comprehensive commitments to limit the proliferation of weapons. In practice, the non-enforcement of the NCACC's rationale and principles has made a mockery of democratic South Africa's professed commitment to human rights.

The United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, church leaders and NGOs have complained repeatedly about South Africa's lax controls over arms exports. This preamble is evidently written by and on behalf of the armaments industry in contempt of such complaints, and fails dismally as any expression of remorse or apology for the misery that the industry has inflicted throughout the African continent, and beyond.

Section 5 regarding Composition of Committee again makes no provision for monitoring the workings of the NCACC by representatives of civil society, and violates assurances by the Deputy Minister of Defence at the Swedish-South African Civil Encounter in November 1999 and other occasions. Instead, the committee members are appointed at the behest and pleasure of the President. There is also no reference to Parliament despite the recommendation of the 1994/1995 Cameron Commission of Inquiry into Armscor that Parliament must be given oversight over all exports of armaments. In the words some years ago of Minister Kader Asmal: "pigeon policy must not be determined by cats."

Sections 8 and 9 regarding the Secretariat and Inspectorate similarly make no provision for inclusion of members either of Parliament or of civil society. Thus the claims of a legitimate, effective and transparent control process to foster national and international confidence in the control procedures -- as supposedly assured in the introduction to the Bill -- are plainly spurious. Pigeon policy, quite obviously, is being determined by the cats!

Section 15 regarding Guiding principles and criteria differ very markedly from the NCACC's 1995 rationale and principles that declare that transfers and trade will be avoided, which would be likely to:

      1. be used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms
      2. contravene South Africa's international commitments, in particular its obligations under arms embargoes adopted by the UN Security Council and other arms control agreements or responsibilities in terms of internationally accepted custom;
      3. endanger peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into a region, or otherwise contribute to regional instability and negatively influence the balance of power;
      4. be diverted within the recipient country or re-exported for purposes contrary to the aims of this document;
      5. have a negative impact on South Africa's diplomatic and trade relations with other countries;
      6. support or encourage terrorism;
      7. be used for purposes other than the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient country; and
      8. contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts.

Instead, the proposed principles regarding applications for permits weakly declare that the Committee must--

  1. assess each application on a case-by-case basis;
  2. safeguard the national and security interests of the Republic and those of its allies;
  3. avoid contributing to internal repression, including the systematic violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
  4. avoid endangering regional and international peace and stability by introducing destabilising military capabilities into a region, which could aggravate or prolong any existing armed conflicts;
  5. adhere to international law, norms and practices and the international obligations and commitments of the Republic, including United Nations arms embargoes;
  6. consider the nature and cost of the arms to be transferred in relation to the legitimate security and defence needs of the recipient country;
  7. avoid contributing to terrorism and crime;
  8. consider the commitment of the recipient country to, and their record of compliance with, End User Certificate undertakings; and
  9. take into account the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence of all sovereign countries in terms of the United Nations Charter.

These "principles" represent a disgraceful and massive watering-down of South Africa's previous commitments against proliferation of armaments. In response to the first five points:

  1. case-by-case ad-hoc decisions are notorious for their propensity for corruption, most especially in the armaments industry;
  2. what constitutes the national and security interests of the Republic and those of its allies? Are the "security interests" of Saudi Arabia or Algeria, for instance, to be paramount in approving exports of armaments?
  3. how is systematic to be determined?
  4. the proliferation of armaments into regions such as the Middle East or Africa inherently endangers regional and international peace.
  5. the United Nations' "Fowler Report" of March 2000, plus the UN report of April 2001 on the plunder of the DRC which, with others, have repeatedly drawn attention to the complicity of South Africa in non-compliance of UN arms embargoes.

Human Rights Watch in June 1995 wrote to President Mandela offering to testify against South African residents involved in supplying weapons to the Hutu militias in Goma, Zaire, in particular the aide to former President PW Botha, Ters Ehlers. The letter was hand-delivered by Judge Edwin Cameron. Over 800 000 people died in the Rwanda genocide, and South Africa was one of the major sources of arms. No action has yet been taken.

Human Rights Watch in October 2000 in a document entitled A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights again drew attention to the lax enforcement of South Africa's own export policies.

Amnesty International has complained to Minister Kader Asmal about torture equipment supplied to China and Burma. No action has been taken. In March 1998 Minister Asmal told Parliament that "Algeria has a democratically-elected, internationally-recognised government, and that weapons sold to Algeria would only be used for external self-defence." In 1999 Algeria became South Africa's largest export market, with sales of R290 million, reportedly including large quantities of small arms. Amnesty International estimates that over 100 000 people have died since 1992 in Algeria's protracted civil war.

Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane of the Anglican Church, and others including Amnesty International, in 1996 objected to intentions to supply armaments to the government of Rwanda. In overruling these objections, Minister Asmal declared that the Hutu militias had stolen previous supplies of weaponry, and that the government of President Kagame was "defenceless." The Rwandan army invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo three weeks later, thus beginning a war in which over 2 500 000 Congolese have died.

In April 2001 the United Nations Security Council accused Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe of plundering the DRC's mineral resources, and declared:

The conflict has become mainly about access, control and trade of five key mineral resources, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt and copper. Rwanda's President Paul Kagame and Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni are on the verge of becoming the godfathers of illegal exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the conflict in Congo. They have indirectly given criminal cartels a unique opportunity to organise and operate in this fragile and sensitive Great Lakes region.

Zimbabwe's soldiers were paid bonuses from profits derived from Gecamines, the DRC state-owned copper and cobalt mining company, with various mining concessions being given directly to the Zimbabwean Defence Force.

The late President Laurant Kabila understandably rejected South African attempts to mediate the DRC conflict on the reasoning that South African weapons were being supplied to all parties in the conflict.

South African airports continue to be used to transport weapons to destinations all over Africa, to Angola, Burundi, the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville. Yurand Air, associated with Ehlers, Wonder Air (whose registered owners include the former Defence Minister Magnus Malan and Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha's business associate Gert de Klerk) and Ibis Air Cargo (part of Executive Outcomes) are merely three of the carriers.

The Russian/Ukrainian arms and diamond trafficker, Viktor Bout referred to in the Fowler Report apparently uses Lanseria airport as a transit point without hindrance. His associates in this country are allegedly household names amongst the South African business community.

 

Representatives of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka during the recent World Conference Against Racism in Durban insisted that South Africa has been the major supplier of ammunition to the Sri Lankan government in contravention of the South African embargo on arms exports to Sri Lanka. The NCACC will presumably argue, and despicably so, (per Section 1 (iv) c of this Bill) that exports of light calibre ammunition are governed by the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1969 and are thus outside its jurisdiction and responsibility.

India was the major destination for South African arms exports during 1997, being mainly heavy calibre ammunition for Bofors artillery used during the 1999 war between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have been involved in several wars since they became independent in 1947, and both countries have developed nuclear weapons in defiance of international opinion. Despite this, South Africa continues aggressively to market arms to the region. Denel, with active marketing support of the Minister of Defence, hopes to conclude an export contract to India for G6 artillery, reportedly worth R8 billion.

Exports to Pakistan continued even after the overthrow of the Pakistani government by a military regime. President Thabo Mbeki and several other Cabinet ministers have been actively involved in marketing G6 artillery to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is not only notorious for abuses of human rights, but is increasingly politically unstable. In addition, growing military collaboration between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan raises the probability that G6 artillery exported to Saudi Arabia could be transferred to Pakistan and equipped with nuclear and/or chemical and biological warheads for use against India.

The risk that South African G6 artillery might be supplied to both India and Pakistan -- and be equipped with nuclear warheads -- could have disastrous consequences for relationships between South Africa's own Hindu and Muslim communities.

Despite China's reputation for abuses of human rights and the close collaboration between the Chinese armaments industry and Armscor during the apartheid era, President Mbeki and Defence Minister Lekota have been heavily involved in marketing the armaments industry in China. Similarly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declares that "the government is ready to sell arms to China or to develop weapons jointly and will not be influenced by western countries' arms embargoes against China."

Under no circumstances can South African armaments exports to any destination in Africa or Asia be deemed anything other than a blatant infraction of both 3.6.3 of the NCACCC rationale and principles and point d) of the Bill's guiding principles and criteria.

The Bill has been amended since last year to include requirements under Section 17 for an End-user Certificate:

Whenever conventional arms are exported, a person authorised by the government of the country to which the arms are exported must issue a certificate---

  1. setting out the name and address of the declared end-user;
  2. giving a description of the conventional arms and quantities involved;
  3. undertaking that the conventional arms will not be transferred or re-exported to any other party or country without the authorisation of the South African government;
  4. undertaking that proof of importation will be supplied, by way of a Delivery Verification Certificate;
  5. containing the authorisation to issue the certificate in question; and
  6. containing such other matters as may be prescribed.

The international experience of end-user certificates is that they are not worth the paper they are written on. The armaments industry has no compunction about flouting arms embargoes or other administrative attempts to limit the proliferation of weaponry. It will be recalled that in 1994 Armscor insisted that the Lebanese government was the buyer of a shipment of AK-47s and G3 rifles exported from South Africa to Yemen for transhipment to Croatia. That scandal led to the establishment of the Cameron Commission of Inquiry into Armscor, which found that Armscor was riddled through by both mismanagement and corruption.

The United Nations "Fowler Report" finds that countries such as Togo, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic have little compunction about issuing end-user certificates to supply weapons to UNITA. That the Bill proposes a requirement of end-user certificates as sufficient to stem the proliferation of armaments in Africa confirms that the NCACC is not serious in enforcing either its original rationale and principles or even its new, watered-down guiding principles and criteria.

The original bill, under its old Section 24, had included a waiver of indemnity for the State in "so far as criminal liability is concerned." This provision has now been deleted. It is however, appropriate to bring to the Portfolio Committee's attention that the State, as sole shareholder of Denel, could well be liable for criminal prosecution as the result of weapons and ammunition supplied, illicitly or otherwise, to Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, the DRC, Sri Lanka and numerous other countries.

Members of the Committee should ponder how they would face a mother whose child has been killed by a South African-manufactured weapon or bullet, and to tell her that the bullet provided someone with a job. This Bill endeavours to avoid the reality that the sole purpose of armaments is to kill people. The notion that the armaments industry is a viable business whose commercial interests must be protected is grotesque and obscene.

Section 23 of the Bill dealing with Prohibition of disclosure of certain information is essentially unchanged from the original version, except for inclusion of the word "brokering" in paragraph 23 (1) and that paragraph 23 (2) c which had declared "to the extent necessary to comply with a law dealing with access to information" has been deleted. Section 23 (1) now declares:

No person may disclose any information in relation to the acquisition, supply, marketing, importation, exportation, design, trade, brokering, development, manufacture, production, maintenance, repair of or research in connection with conventional arms, where such disclosure would be detrimental to the national interest or security of the Republic or to the commercial interests of the manufacturer, or otherwise, without the written authority of a competent authority.

This is the most disgraceful and ominous provision, given the history of corruption that characterises the armaments industry, and the South African armaments industry in particular. It is reminiscent of the obsessive secrecy of the apartheid era. During the year since the original version of the Bill was rejected, South Africa has closely followed allegations of corruption relating to the armaments acquisition programme. These have included public hearings by the parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and the hearings by the Public Protector, and also revelations in the media regarding provision of Mercedes-Benz vehicles to politically influential people.

In addition, allegations of corruption were submitted to the Heath Special Investigating Unit in November 1999 that influential members of Umkhonto-we-Sizwe and other ANC officials would be major beneficiaries of the arms deal sub-contracts. It is alleged that the same people are involved in similar schemes relating to the Cell C cellphone bid, tollroads, the taxi recapitalisation project, smart card technology relating to new ID cards, drug and arms trafficking and money laundering. These and other related allegations were amongst the matters being investigated by Judge Willem Heath until his effective removal from office in January 2001.

The objection to Section 23 (1) of the National Conventional Arms Control Bill is that it would cast a blanket prohibition on any public discussion -- including by the media -- of any issue related to armaments industry. Even this submission would become illegal without the written authority of a competent authority. It is a diabolical piece of legislation, which must again be rejected in its entirety.

The Anglican Church has repeatedly called for a total prohibition on exports of armaments from South Africa, and for conversion of Armscor and Denel to peaceful purposes. The disgraceful record of the South African armaments industry -- both during the apartheid era and subsequently -- confirms the validity of the Church's stance.

Terry Crawford-Browne

September 6, 2001