**Midterm Strategic Review of the South African National Defence Force, in Terms of Joint Rule 120 D, by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, Dated 23 March 2023.**

**1. INTRODUCTION**

Joint Rule 120 (d) (i) outlines that the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) should “conduct a strategic review of the SANDF mid-term in the life of a particular Parliament and submit recommendations to both Houses on its transformation, integration, equity, morale and defence readiness.” In the compilation of this Midterm Strategic Review, the annual activities of both the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) and those of the JSCD have been utilised from the start of the 6th Parliament in July 2019.

The Midterm Strategic Review of the SANDF was considered by the JSCD on the 15 September 2022, 13 October 2022, 23 February 2023, 23 March 2023 and adopted on 23 March 2023.

**2. SCOPE**

This Midterm Strategic Review covers matters related to the transformation, integration, equity, morale and defence readiness of the Defence Force, as dictated by Joint Rule 120 (d). These issues will be discussed against the background of the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the 1998 Defence Review and the 2015 Defence Review respectively. The foregoing will be linked to briefings, oversight visits and discussions by the two Parliamentary Defence Committees from the inception of the 6th Parliament in July 2019 until December 2022.

**3. TRANSFORMATION**

**3.1 The 1996 White Paper on Defence**

The 1996 White Paper on Defence discusses transformation in Chapter 2 under the heading “The Challenge of Transformation”. It positions this discussion on a new approach to defence matters against the background that this new approach to security is of paramount concern to the security of people.[[1]](#footnote-1) It further states that the theme of the White Paper is the formulation of new defence policy and the transformation of the Department of Defence (DOD). It views transformation as essential in the light of three sets of factors, namely (1) the history of armed forces in the country, (2) the new strategic environment at international, regional and domestic levels and, (3) most importantly, the advent of democracy in South Africa. It outlines that the process of transformation should be guided by the constitutional principles and government policy. It is these pronouncements that were further developed by the 1998 Defence Review.

**3.2 The 1998 Defence Review**

The 1998 Defence Review[[2]](#footnote-2) dedicates significant attention to transformation and, Chapter 9 (ForceStructure), refers specifically to the transformation of the DOD and later to the kind of transformation envisaged in the Part-Time Forces. The 1998 Review is premised on the 1996 White Paper on Defence and states in Chapter 1 that “the overarching theme of the White Paper is the transformation of defence policy and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in the light of the momentous political and strategic developments which have occurred at national, regional and international levels following the demise of the Cold War and the ending of apartheid.”[[3]](#footnote-3)

It emphasised that the matter of transformation be approached from a holistic perspective in that these two major defence policy guidelines should work in tandem in light of the integration of the former statutory and non-statutory forces, where the challenge of transformation was substantial and complex. The 1998 Defence Review states that the transformation process in particular, will impact directly on the Force Structure required to support the Force Design. It posits that the Force Structure is subject to the DOD’s transformation project which was discussed in detail in the course of the Defence Review process.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Chapter 9 (Force Design) further explains that the transformation of the DOD covers three major areas namely:

* **Civil-Military Relations,** where itfocuses on constitutional and legal transformation and oversight mechanisms.
* **Normative and Cultural Transformation,** which refer to itstransformation of the culture of the DOD in relation to its values, traditions, human resource practices and managerial practices.
* **Organisational Restructuring,** whichrefers to the rationalisation and right-sizing of the DOD so as to ensure the more efficient and effective utilisation of state resources.[[5]](#footnote-5)

**3.3 The 2015 Defence Review**

The Minister, in her Foreword to the 2015 Defence Review, stresses that the issues that informed the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review centred on the transition to democracy and the resultant transformation of the DOD.[[6]](#footnote-6) Regarding the Reserves, the 2015 Defence Review states that its transformation has been slow due to a lack of investment in the Reserves. The requirement for a relatively small Regular component backed by a sufficiently large Reserve component has not been complied with and, consequently, the strategic imperative of being able to rapidly and cost-effectively expand through a Reserve component is limited.[[7]](#footnote-7)

The 2015 Defence Review further focuses on two specific aspects that may impact on transformation, namely (1) personnel management and (2) defence career management.

**3.3.1 Personnel Management**

Chapter 14 of the 2015 Defence Review focuses on Defence Resource Systems with emphasis on the Defence Personnel System which consist of Personnel Strategic Direction and Policy, Personnel Development, Personnel Management and Personnel Transformation. These core elements are supported by Personnel Policies and Processes, Personnel Technology, Personnel Functionaries, Commanders/Managers and the Personnel Budget.

It is especially the Personnel Policies and Processes which Parliament’s Defence Committees have engaged with and will continue to engage with its pursuit of clarity on issues such as **Career Management and Succession Planning**.[[8]](#footnote-8) Similarly, specific focus have been placed on matters related to the **Personnel Budget** and this is expected to remain a prime focus area for both Defence Committees in the 6th Parliament as it tracks parliamentary recommendations to the DOD in this regard.

**3.3.2 Defence Career Management**

The 2015 Defence Review[[9]](#footnote-9) further states that Defence Career Management will be managed by the Combat Services and Staff Divisions through a standardised career management process that aligns organisational requirements with individual career development or progression. The Department of Defence should ensure clear career-pathing and development programmes per mustering and speciality. Importantly, it states that the following principles will be pursued to enhance defence career management:

a. Career and succession planning promotes the transfer of skills and competencies.

 b. A synergetic relationship is created between individual career plans and workplace skill
 plans with individuals taking co-responsibility for their own career management and development.

c. Career paths are effectively communicated and individual career plans are regularly updated and compiled in consultation with the member or employee.

d. Succession plans are available two years in advance.

e. Commanders and line managers are actively involved in the career management process.

It should be highlighted that, given the JSCD’s focus on the concepts of personnel management and defence career management in the 6th Parliament, it remains a concern that these issues are not being effectively dealt with within the DOD.

**4. INTEGRATION**

On the eve of the 1994 first democratic general election, the SANDF replaced the South African Defence Force (SADF) as a result of the decision to integrate the SADF, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), and the defence forces of the four homelands (Ciskei, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda). Included later was the KwaZulu Self-Protection Force (KZSPF) of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).[[10]](#footnote-10) The integration process was an important step in stabilising the South African military environment and aligning it with a democratic political dispensation.

**4.1. Termination of the Integration Intake Act of 2001**

With the integration process largely completed in the late 1990s, the Termination of the Integration Intake Act of 2001 and the Demobilisation Amendment Act of 2001 formally and legally brought the Integration process to an end as at 31 December 2002. Accordingly, the reason for the repeal of the Act was because the integration process ended in December 2002. The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) stated that this Act has no surviving or independent provisions and should thus be repealed. The Deputy Minister of Defence and Military Veterans at the time stated that “the integration process closed on 31 March 2002 and any other member of the statutory forces or non-statutory forces who did not submit to the integration process at that time will unfortunately not be entertained now.”[[11]](#footnote-11)

Despite the Act being repealed and integration process closed, there were further attempts at integration that impacted Parliament’s work. Most recently, the Khoisan Nation Self Defence Unit[[12]](#footnote-12) attempted to be integrated with the SANDF on numerous occasions. The PCDMV, after engaging extensively with the merits of their case during the 6th Parliament, found that no legislative provision allows for such integration.

Given that 28 years have since passed, and that many of those who have integrated are slowly exiting the military system, lesser attention is being paid to the issue of integration. During a JSCD symposium on succession planning in 2022, external experts, Dr M Khanyile and Prof S Tshehla, pointed out that the Phase between 1994 and 2014 focused on Integration, but that currently a Consolidation Phase (2015 to 2025) characterises issues of with a focus on Transformation (diversity), Professionalisation (Skills focus) and the execution of Operations. It against this context that the following is presented.

**4.2 The White Paper on Defence, 1996.**

The 1996 White Paper states that, following South Africa's first democratic election in April 1994, the SANDF was established through the integration of former statutory and non-statutory forces. It stressed that the integration of these forces, many of which were once enemies-in-arms, is a powerful symbol and practical demonstration of our country's commitment to national reconciliation and unity.[[13]](#footnote-13) It further discusses integration in Chapter 6 (Human Resources), where it emphasises that the DOD has three governing principles for integration, namely (1) all members of the SANDF shall be treated with respect and dignity, (2) integration shall proceed in a spirit of partnership and (3) as required by the Constitution, there shall be no discrimination.[[14]](#footnote-14) It is also pointed out that representativeness refers to the racial, and gender composition of the SANDF and to the fair integration and equitable representation of the constituent integrating forces at all ranks. “Failure to meet this goal will critically undermine the legitimacy of the SANDF.”[[15]](#footnote-15)

**4.3 Former military structures**

The DOD does not list the number and gender of members from the various former military structures that integrated to form the SANDF in 1994. However, the Department of Military Veterans do provide statistics on former military structures in, for instance, its Annual Performance Reports of 2018/19 and 2019/20.

**4.4 Related Committee observations**

During oversight visits by the two Defence Committees, some matters that can be related to Integration were raised by members of the SANDF. During an oversight visit to selected military bases in the Western Cape (October 2019), some SANDF members at 9 SA Infantry Battalion raised issues around promotions; downscaling of allowances/benefits; discrimination against former Non Statutory Forces in favour of Military Skills Development System (MSDS) intakes.[[16]](#footnote-16) At Air Force Base Ysterplaat, concern was for instance raised around the treatment of former Non-Statutory Force members who seem to be disqualified when it comes to selection to officers’ courses.[[17]](#footnote-17)

In addition to oversight visits, the Defence Committees have also observed matters related to integration during its engagements with the DOD and related structures such as the Defence Force Service Commission (DFSC). One of the recommendations of the Interim DFSC, was “the review of the Force number allocation system for members and employees of the Department of Defence.”[[18]](#footnote-18) It stated that there was dissatisfaction with the lack of transformation in the SANDF, including the severe consequences of legacy decisions regarding ranking and utilisation, during the integration process. It therefore recommended that the discriminatory force number system be scrapped at once and be replaced by a neutral way of assigning new force numbers. However, in June 2018, the DOD reported to the JSCD on the status of DFSC recommendation and noted that the recommendation around Force Numbers “is not implementable, as it has the potential for the loss of critical historical records. This perceived discrimination is [therefore] time lapse[d].”[[19]](#footnote-19)

**5. EQUITY**

**5.1 Equity policy directives**

The 1998 Defence Review stated unequivocally that the DoD's most valuable resource is its personnel. Human resource policies are directed at ensuring maximum efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness, accountability and affordability, and providing job satisfaction, fairness and equity. The members of the DOD shall be non-partisan, subject to the control and oversight of the duly elected and appointed civil authority and obliged to perform all functions and conduct all operations within the parameters of the Constitution, domestic legislation and international humanitarian law and the law on armed conflict.[[20]](#footnote-20)

It also alludes to the fact that affirmative action and equal opportunity are fundamental principles of public sector transformation as reflected in the 1995 White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service. These principles are particularly applicable in the DOD as they are essential for the operational readiness of the SANDF. Members of the SANDF are challenged to adapt their lifestyle, attitudes and behaviour to a specific military culture. The SANDF will have to gradually evolve an acceptable military culture in which all members, irrespective of their own culture, can coexist and in which operational readiness can be assured.

The 2015 Defence Review points out that “there needs to be a balance between the constitutional imperative for redistribution, the need to escape the shadow of the past, and the need to build inclusivity for all – both black and white.”[[21]](#footnote-21) Reference is also made to recruitment having to be broadly representative of the people of South Africa, with due consideration being given to matters of equity.[[22]](#footnote-22)

Much progress has been made since 1994 to rectify the SANDF in terms of being representative of the people of South Africa, which is an important factor for maintaining healthy civil-military relations, specifically in terms of the composition of the SANDF officer corps. However, these efforts should be continued by the SANDF.

**5.2 Comparative Personnel Statistics**

The following section provides an overview of the DOD personnel composition. It uses the 1998 Defence Review personnel statistics and composition as a baseline for comparison to more recent publications of equity targets by the DOD.

The 1998 Defence Review tabulates the SANDF’s composition (including civilians) in terms of race and gender in May 1996 as follows:

|  |
| --- |
| **SANDF COMPOSITION MAY 1996 [[23]](#footnote-23)** |
| Males | Females | Total |
| ***African***  | 38 619  | ***African***  | 3 644 | 42 263 |
| ***Coloured [[24]](#footnote-24)*** | 6 555 | ***Coloured***  | 623 | 7 178 |
| ***Indian***  | 791 | ***Indian***  | 95 | 886 |
| ***White***  | 17 836 | ***White***  | 5 128 | 22 964 |
| ***Total***  | **63 801** | ***Total***  | **9 490** | **73 291** |

**Table 1**

For 2018/19,[[25]](#footnote-25) the DOD planned and budgeted for an average personnel strength of
75 211 at a cost of R30.3 billion. The National Treasury’s final letter of allocation allocated R27.1 billion to the DOD for Compensation of Employees (CoE) for 2018/19 and the DOD maintained an average strength of 74 343, resulting in a CoE shortfall of R2.9 billion. On a year-on-year basis, the average human resource strength reduced by 543 members from 75 053 in 2017/18 to 74 510 in 2018/19. The vacancy rate was 17% with Programme 5 (Maritime Defence) the highest at 26% and
Programme 8 (General Support) the lowest at 7%. The Annual Report also mentions that the DOD issued the revised Policy on Transformation Management on 23 August 2018 to ensure the DOD adheres to governmental policy on transformation targets. The Department reported 366 employees with disabilities of which 306 were males.[[26]](#footnote-26) The Employment Equity statistics were reported as:[[27]](#footnote-27)

|  |
| --- |
| **Employment equity 2018/19** |
| Males | Females | Total |
| ***African***  | 39 326 | ***African***  | 16 560 | 55 886 |
| ***Coloured [[28]](#footnote-28)*** | 677 | ***Coloured***  | 304 | 981 |
| ***Indian***  | 6 191 | ***Indian***  | 2 971 | 9 162 |
| ***White***  | 5 490 | ***White***  | 2 989 | 8 479 |
| ***Total***  | **51 684** | ***Total***  | **22 824** | **74 508** |
| ***Employees with disabilities***  | 306 | ***Employees with Disabilities*** | 60 | 366 |

**Table 2**

For 2019/20, the Department planned an average personnel strength of 74 901. As at 31 March 2020, the average strength was 74 096. The CoE allocation for the 2019/20 was R29.193 billion.[[29]](#footnote-29) The vacancy rate was 17% with Programme 1 (Administration) the highest at 26% and Programme 8 (General Support), the lowest at 6%. The Department reported 348 employees with disabilities of which 289 were males.[[30]](#footnote-30) The Employment Equity statistics were reported as:[[31]](#footnote-31)

|  |
| --- |
| **Employment equity 2019/20** |
| Males | Females | Total |
| ***African***  | 39 194 | ***African***  | 16 922 | 56 116 |
| ***Coloured***  | 6 002 | ***Coloured***  | 2 944 | 8 946 |
| ***Indian***  | 678 | ***Indian***  | 291 | 969 |
| ***White***  | 5 148 | ***White***  | 2 808 | 7 956 |
| ***Total***  | **51 022** | ***Total***  | **22 965** | **73 987**  |
| ***Employees with disabilities***  | 289 | ***Employees with Disabilities*** | 59 | 348 |

**Table 3**

For 2020/21, the planned average personnel strength was 75 000, aimed at replacing personnel losses according to attrition and maintaining Reserve Force mandays at 2 695 963. The actual personnel strength as at 31 March 2021 was 72 322. During the course of the year under review, the CoE allocation was adjusted downwards to R30.985 billion. This downward adjustment contributed to a CoE deficit of R1.775 billion for the year ended 31 March 2021. With concurrence by National Treasury, the DOD was able to internally reprioritise funds, mainly its operating budget, in order to fund the deficit of the CoE allocation.[[32]](#footnote-32)

The vacancy rate was 19% with Programme 1 (administration) the highest at 27% and Programme 8 (General Support), the lowest at 7%. The Department reported 377 employees with disabilities of which 277 were males.[[33]](#footnote-33) The Employment Equity statistics were reported as:[[34]](#footnote-34)

|  |
| --- |
| **Employment equity 2020/21** |
| Males | Females | Total |
| ***African***  | 38 299 | ***African***  | 16 842 | 55 141 |
| ***Coloured[[35]](#footnote-35)***  | 655 | ***Coloured***  | 295 | 950 |
| ***Indian***  | 5 842 | ***Indian***  | 2 899 | 8 741 |
| ***White***  | 4 833 | ***White***  | 2 657 | 7 490 |
| ***Total***  | **49 629** | ***Total***  | **22 693** | **72 322** |
| ***Employees with disabilities***  | 277 | ***Employees with Disabilities*** | 54 | 331 |

**Table 4**

**Employment statistics: Comparing May 1996 to financial years of the 6th Parliament**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Males** | **Females** | **Males** | **Females** | **Disabilities** | **Vacancy** | **Males** | **Females** | **Disabilities** | **Vacancy** | **Males** | **Females** | **Disabilities** | **Vacancy** |
|  | **May 1996** | **2018/19** | **2019/20** | **2020/21** |
| African  | 38 619 | 3 644 | 39 326 | 16 560 | 190 | 17% | 39 194 | 16 922 | 176 | 17% | 38 299 | 16 842 | 168 | 19% |
| Coloured | 6 555 | 623 | 677 | 304 | 4 | 6 002 | 2 944 | 46 | 655 | 295 | 4 |
| Indian | 791 | 95 | 6 191 | 2 971 | 47 | 678 | 291 | 4 | 5 842 | 2 899 | 44 |
| White | 17 836 | 5 128 | 5 490 | 2 989 | 125 | 5 148 | 2 808 | 122 | 4 833 | 2 657 | 115 |
| **TOTAL** | **63 801** | **9 490** | **51 684** | **22 824** | **366** | **51 022** | **22 965** | **348** | **49 629** | **22 693** | **331** |

**Table 5**

The progress visible in terms of establish an equitable SANDF is visible in Table 5. The progress was further well summarised during a DOD briefing to the JSCD in May 2021, as follows: [[36]](#footnote-36)

“The DOD is gradually progressing to be seen as a represented, equitable and a gender aligned asset for the RSA. It reported that there was a significant increase of Africans from 38% in 1994 to 76% in 2020, a notable decrease of Whites from 45% in 1994 to 11% in 2020. Coloureds decrease by 4% and Indians remains constant. The equity status per population group by 31 March 2021 stayed the same for all. It is evident that the DOD has made a significant improvement to achieve the desired overall equity status in terms of population group representivity.”

**5.3 JSCD oversight of equity**

The 2015 Defence Review states that one of the guiding defence principles is that “the Defence Force is broadly representative of the people of South Africa, with due consideration being given to matters of equity, including gender and otherwise enabled persons.”[[37]](#footnote-37) The Defence Committees have, during the 6th Parliament, engaged with issues of equity on various occasions, including:

* 10 May 2021: JSCD engagement on gender parity and the March 2022 presentation by the Chief Directorate Transformation Management regarding Progress on Transformation Management in the SANDF.
* 10 March 2022: JSCD engagement on the DOD’s transformation management, including equity.

On 6 May 2021, the Chief Directorate Transformation Management reported the following to the JSCD regarding Progress on Transformation Management in the SANDF:

* Transformation as a phenomenon has evolved drastically, thereby requiring a new approach to position the organisation to be on par with the new milestones and increasing changes.
* The DOD has put in place quarterly Transformation Management Board meetings where Services and Divisions give feedback on all activities and events on their equity to enhance transformation.
* The military culture remains constant, but it is challenged by the new generational changes and new culture change that has influenced transformation.
* The DOD is aligning the organisational transformation culture to create a competitive transformation environment in the DOD.
* The DOD is establishing a consistent long term strategic transformation goals that are tangible.
* It was indicated that, as at 31 January 2022, employees with disabilities amounted to 316 with the biggest group from the SA Army at 145, followed by the SA Air Force at 44, and the SA Navy and SA Military Health Services accounting for 33 employees each.
* The Chief Directorate stressed that disability management is a government imperative and that they have embarked on Disability Equity Workshops to share knowledge with the members of the DOD regarding the reporting mechanism, career advancement, and disclosure process. However, they stressed that their current challenge is how to manage the careers and development of employees with disabilities.

While noting the significant progress made in terms of equity since the 1996 figures, the JSCD has noted in submitted reports that the MSDS intake in recent times have not been fully representative of the people of South Africa. For example, in 2020/21, there were 1 956 MSDS personnel in the SANDF system of which only 1.90% were coloured and 3.36% were white. In total, 85.89% of the MSDS personnel were African. Should this trend continue, it will post a challenge to the SANDF to keep its staff complement generally representative of the South African people in future.[[38]](#footnote-38)

The above can be measured against the Revised DOD Equity Targets, namely: Approved population group targets for Africans (74%), Whites (12%), Coloured (13%) and Indians (1%). Gender Equity should be 30% Female and 70% Male at all levels and 40% Females at entry level. The DOD also aims to have 2% People with Disabilities.

**6. MORALE**

The morale of soldiers is a critical ingredient for any military, especially as it prepares to conduct operations. The 1998 Defence Review, for instance, states that the SANDF must maintain an effective supporting capability which includes operational medical support, operational logistics support, land, air and sea transport and operational personnel services to ensure the high morale of soldiers engaged in operations.[[39]](#footnote-39) The 2015 Defence Review, in reference to the Guiding Defence Principles, points out that soldiers should be skilled, healthy, fit, and highly disciplined professionals imbued with a high level of morale, professionals imbued with a high level of morale.[[40]](#footnote-40)

**6.1 Observations by the Interim Defence Force Service Commission**

The Interim DFSC, in its Final Report, listed morale as one of the issues that the DOD will have to address.[[41]](#footnote-41) The Interim DFSC made two specific observations/recommendations that relate to morale:

* **Transport**: A well-maintained transport fleet is an essential prerequisite for the effective, efficient and productive execution of the SANDF’s mission, whilst also serving to enhance morale and dignity.
* **Total Wellness of the DOD**: Notwithstanding the many drivers of low morale which have been observed, it remains a fact that despite everything our soldiers and their civilian counterparts continue to perform remarkably.

**6.2 Observations by the Defence Force Service Commission**

In its Consolidated and Categorised Recommendations[[42]](#footnote-42) to the Minister in March 2022, the DFSC has a specific category dedicated to “Morale” as the 5thRecommendations for decision making by Senior DOD Officials. The recommendation refers to salaries, conditions of service and the revision of policies on conditions of service are cutting across various aspects of morale. The person/section responsible for progress feedback is listed as the Inspectorate Division which has to present and submit the latest Inspectorate Division Report “Attitudes and Opinions of the Personnel in the Department of Defence Regarding Morale.” It furtherlists the issue of morale when it, for instance, states under the Procurement that the morale of employees can be improved with minor maintenance and repair work in Military Bases and Units.

**7. DEFENCE READINESS**

**7.1 Legislative directives**

Defence readiness as a principle is derived from the Constitution of 1996 which states in Section 200(2), that the “primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.” The Defence Act (No. 42 of 2002) reiterates this principal directive contained in the Constitution in Section 2(b). In addition, Section 63 of the Defence Act makes provision for training institutions to ensure defence readiness and preparation. Section 63 (5) of the Defence Act also highlights the importance of the provision and maintenance of training tools and equipment in force preparation.

**7.1 The 1998 Defence Review**

The 1998 Defence Review, in Option 4 (Defensive Operational Concept Force Design), states that for the Defence Force “to remain affordable, lower levels of defence readiness must be accepted. This assumes longer warning periods”[[43]](#footnote-43) It further states, under the heading “Deterrence”, that South Africa's approach to deterrence revolve around its collective capabilities that should also deter threats to the region as a whole. These Capabilities to neutralise possible threats should be at a level of readiness commensurate with the lead time for such threats to develop. Care must be taken not to open strategic gaps in the capability of the SANDF when reducing force levels. Deterrence will not only be pursued against potential short-term aggression through immediate force readiness.

**7.3 The 2015 Defence Review**

The 2015 Defence Review similarly expresses itself of defence readiness as the Chairperson of the Defence Review Committee states, in his Foreword, that the achievement of the blueprint force design will be critically informed by available resources and developments in the strategic environment. Resource constraints will be ameliorated by adjusting levels of readiness, balancing core-growth with operational necessity and through a careful mix of Regulars and Reserves within the one-force approach.[[44]](#footnote-44) Crucially, its states in Chapter 9 (Defence Strategic Trajectory), that:

“The operating budget must provide the funding to enable the Defence Force to sustain itself at the strength and readiness levels that are required to meet standing tasks and identified contingencies as developed from Defence Policy, as well as the additional operational costs incurred in respect of standing tasks. The operating budget must, therefore, provide steady funding to cover:

* Personnel costs (salaries and allowances; accommodation; health support; etc);
* Personnel development costs (education, training, development; etc);
* Unit, formation, joint and multinational field training exercises;
* Maintenance, repair and overhaul costs in respect of equipment and systems;
* Modernisation of equipment and systems;
* Maintenance, repair and refurbishment costs in respect of facilities; and
* The additional operational costs incurred in respect of standing tasks.”

**7.4 Defence Committee observations on defence readiness**

During the 6th Parliament, both Defence Committees have engaged in oversight of defence matters that impact directly on defence readiness. These observations are captured in the sections below.

**7.4.1 Increased reliance on the SANDF**

The JSCD has noted, during the period preceding the 6th Parliament, and increasingly so since 2019, an amplified reliance on the SANDF for internal support to other government departments as well as external conventional military support. During the 6th Parliament, the JSCD has considered presidential letters of deployment related to, *inter alia*, the following internal SANDF deployments:

* The 2018 to 2019 deployment of SANDF engineers to address the pollution of the Vaal River.
* The 2019 deployment with the SA Police Service to combat crime in the Western Cape.
* Several largescale deployments in 2020 and 2021 as part of efforts to combat the Covid-19 pandemic.
* Largescale deployments in 2021 to Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal in response to widespread civil unrest.
* The 2022 deployments to KwaZulu-Natal following flooding in the province.

The above deployments were in addition to the SANDF’s standing deployment of 15 sub-units for the purpose of border safeguarding of South Africa’s land borders.

Furthermore, the JSCD has also considered several external deployments that the SANDF participates in, including (1) the continued provision of roughly 1 000 soldiers to the UN Peacekeeping Operation in the DRC, (2) the provision of roughly 1 450 soldiers to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) military mission in Mozambique, and (3) the provision of 200 soldiers as well as naval and/or air assets for operations to safeguard the Mozambican Channel.

It must be noted that internal deployments of the SANDF in support of the Police or other government departments is aligned to its Constitutional mandate of the Force. However, the SANDF may not be fully suited, trained, funded and equipped for these internal deployments. Increased deployments of the SANDF under these condition place significant strain on the force to maintain high levels of defence readiness. It also impacts negatively on training schedules as well the DOD’s budget. In addition, equipment and other hardware utilised in such deployments have a reduced lifespan and requires often costly repair and maintenance or replacement. These concerns are aggravated given that, in many instances, the levels of reimbursement that the DOD receives for deployments are not fully aligned to actual expenditure, or reimbursements received very late in the financial year impacting on budgeting and planning. Extended and regular internal non-military deployments further have the potential to detract from efforts of the SANDF to maintain a conventional military defence-readiness posture.

**7.4.2 The impact of a decreasing defence budget**

The Defence Committees have observed a decreasing defence budget during the 6th Parliament (in real terms). The allocation to the DOD has grown only marginally from R47.865 billion in 2018/19 to R49.090 billion in 2022/23.[[45]](#footnote-45) In real terms, as adjusted for inflation, this signifies a significant reduction in the country’s defence allocation. Over the MTEF, the defence allocation is expected to grow by only 0.3%, signifying a continued real percentage reduction in the allocation.

Defence spending should also be seen in the broader context of spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This provides an indication of the country’s prioritisation of defence spending. South Africa’s defence spending falls well below the norm adopted by many states of 2% of GDP spending on defence. South Africa also compares poorly in regional terms in terms of defence spending as a percentage of GDP, with the current defence allocation comprising only 0.76% of GDP.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2018/19** | **2019/20** | **2020/21** | **2021/22** | **2022/23** |
| **DOD Allocation** | R47.865 bn | R50.230 bn | R54.086 bn | R48.796 bn | R49.090 bn |
| **Defence spending as % of GDP** | 0.95% | 0.92% | 0.99% | 0.91% | 0.76% |

**Table 6**

A real percentage reduction in the defence allocation has a direct negative impact on defence readiness as it diminishes the funds available for key readiness activities, notably training, operations and the acquisition and maintenance of relevant equipment.

The reduced defence allocation also impacts negatively on the domestic defence industry, which is a crucial contributor to defence readiness. The lack of a vibrant and self-sustaining defence industry in any country should be seen as a conventional military limitation as it makes such a military force reliant on international arms imports. The JSCD has interacted extensively with the South African Defence Industry during the 6th Parliament and has noted that the industry relies almost exclusively on exportation for its income due to a lack of acquisition by the SANDF. Concerns around Denel has had a negative impact on the defence industry as a whole, with many smaller suppliers reliant on Denel for subcontracting. Without the realignment of Denel and the Defence Industry as a whole, the domestic defence industry runs the risk of losing key sovereign capabilities which impacts on defence readiness.

**7.4.3 The increasing misalignment of defence expenditure**

The 1998 Defence Review pegged the defence personnel budget at 40% of the total budget with 30% to be spent on operating costs and the remaining 30% to be spent on capital costs (40:30:30 ratio). However, the 2015 Defence Review found that this was only maintained until 2009/10, where after personnel spending, as a percentage of the defence budget, climbed substantially beyond the envisaged 40% of the budgetary allocation to 55% by 2011 (See Figure 1).[[46]](#footnote-46)

The PCDMV and JSCD have, in the 6th Parliament, noted the further deterioration of this defence spending trajectory. By 2022, the DOD is expected to spend 68.7% of its allocation on CoE. The implication thereof is a significant reduction in funds available for spending on operations and equipment. Given the high operational demand of the SANDF and the increased spending on CoE, this leaves little funds available for equipment maintenance, upgrades and acquisition, which impacts negatively on defence readiness.

**Figure 1: 2015 Defence Review illustration of misaligned spending since 2010**



It should be noted that both Defence Committees have placed emphasis on the misaligned spending of the DOD and made efforts to address this. The PCDMV has made several suggestions to National Treasury for the reinstatement of a Mobility Exit Mechanism (MEM) to reduce the number of personnel in the DOD and in so doing stabilise CoE expenditure. National Treasury ultimately acceded to the Committee’s recommendation in the Budgetary Review and Recommendations Report (BRRR) and allocated R1.8 billion to the MEM initiative in 2022/23 and 2023/24. The PCDMV further held dedicated meetings with the DOD regarding plans to reduce irregular expenditure on CoE above the CoE ceiling imposed by National Treasury. Such initiatives include limiting military intakes to every second year, capping operational allowances, reducing Reserve Force man-days and re-introducing the Mobility Exit Mechanism. The DOD presented plans to stabilise CoE expenditure within three years by 2024/25.[[47]](#footnote-47) Furthermore, the JSCD has held engagements on the matter of succession planning to ensure a better managed SANDF personnel structure commensurate with the financial limitations of the department. This remains an area in ongoing need of oversight.

**7.4.4 The status of Prime Mission Equipment**

Conventional defence readiness is highly dependent on readily available, well-maintained and prepared prime mission equipment. Amid a decreasing defence allocation characterised by limited capital expenditure, Parliament’s Defence Committees have observed significant concerns around the status of prime mission equipment.

In 2019, the JSCD conducted oversight visits to several military bases in the Western Cape and made observations around prime mission equipment. Key examples include (1) The SA Navy Frigates and submarines were in urgent need of their midlife upgrades; (2) The SA Air Force has a very limited maritime patrol capability as it operates a limited number of Dakota aircraft which is well beyond their lifespan and in need of replacement; and, (3) the SA Army is in need of an upgraded Infantry Fighting Vehicle fleet. During engagements with the SANDF on external deployments, the JSCD also noted concerns around prime mission equipment. For example, the limited number of strategic and tactical airlift platforms available to SANDF forces deployed in Mozambique.

The JSCD also took note of serious maintenance constraints in terms of prime mission equipment. On 16 February 2022, Armscor briefed the Committee on the status of maintenance of SA Air Force aircraft, reflecting very limited serviceability of aircraft. For example, at the time, none of the SA Air Force’s Gripen fighter aircraft were serviceable, thus impacting on the SANDF’s force readiness. Similarly, only one C-130 transport aircraft was serviceable at the time, meaning strategic airlift capabilities are very limited which negatively affects force readiness. On 24 August 2022, Armscor informed the JSCD that new maintenance contracts were now in place for most SA Air Force aircraft. However, during a PCDMV oversight visit to Bloemfontein in December 2022, further concerns were expressed around aircraft maintenance, notably the ability of Denel Aviation to maintain the Oryx and Rooivalk fleet of the SA Air Force.

Acquisition constraints were also investigated by the JSCD, notably around Project Hoefyster that aims to replace the SA Army’s ageing Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle fleet. The Project has been delayed by more than a decade with Denel unable to produce the vehicles according to specifications. The JSCD has instructed Armscor, Denel and the SANDF to work together to make a final decision on the way forward on Project Hoefyster. On 24 August 2022, Armscor reported that it agreed with Denel that completion of Phase 1 of Project Hoefyster is deemed to be feasible, based on certain conditions. The JSCD continues to monitor this development.

The PCDMV has made BRRR recommendations regarding prime mission equipment in relation to the midlife upgrades of the SA Navy Frigates and Submarines and requested National Treasury to ring-fence funds for these upgrades. However, by December 2022, National Treasury did not accede to these requests in previous due to general funding constraints.[[48]](#footnote-48)

The combination of maintenance constraints and a lack of investment in new prime mission equipment is therefore of concern to the two Defence Committees as it impacts directly on the level of SANDF force readiness.

**7.4.5 Reduced training activities**

The Defence Act (No 42 of 2002) highlights the importance of training in terms of force readiness. Training is of specific importance to maintain force readiness in the utilisation of prime mission equipment. In September 2019, the JSCD held an engagement to consider the SA Air Force’s flying hours and the SA Navy’s sea hours. The Committee noted a decline in these hours in recent years, as noted in the tables below.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2015/16** | **2016/17** | **2017/18** | **2018/19** | **2019/20** |
| **Target** | 12 000 | 12 000 | 12 000 | 12 000 | 10 000 |
| **Achieved** | 10 710 | 8 131 | 6 046 | 7 704 | 6 612 |
| **Reason** | Human Resourcesconstraints and limited Dockyard capacity | Unavailability of vessels delayed in maintenance cycles and operational defects | Unavailability of vessels delayed in maintenance cycles and operational defects | Unavailability of vessels at the directed level of capability due to maintenance cycle delays. | Unaffordable refits and maintenance and repair.  |
| **Allocation for Logistics Support Capability**  | R803.9 million | R814.8 million | R924.2 million | R1 131.1 million  | R1 013.3 million |
| **Allocation for Fuel, Oil & Gas** | R92.6 million | R85.2 million | R46.1 million | R109.2 million | R119.5 million |

**Table 7: SA Navy sea hours**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2015/16** | **2016/17** | **2017/18** | **2018/19** | **2019/20** |
| **Flying hours Target** | 6 500(target only includes force employment hours) | 5000(target only includes force employment hours) | 5 000(target only includes force employment hours) | 25 000 (new target inclusive of *all* flying hours) | 17 200(target inclusive of *all* flying hours) |
| **Flying hours Achieved** | 4 785 | 4 032 | 4 125 | 17 870 | 16 232 |
| **VIP hours (included)** | 893 | 340 | 496 | 545 | 907.1 |
| **Allocation for Helicopter Capability** | R619.7 million | R728.4 million | R1 099.9 million | R948.5 million | R761.9 million |
| **Allocation for Transport & Maritime Capability** | R684.4 million | R594.1 million | R521.8 million | R675.8 million | R564.7 million |
| **Allocation for Air Combat Capability** | R1 368.8 million | R1 230.1 million | R783.4 million | R840.1 million | R659.5 million |
| **Allocation for Fuel, Oil & Gas** | R244.3 million | R189.9 million | R212.1 million | R173.0 million | R248.2 million |

**Table 8: SA Air Force flying hours**

The Covid-19 pandemic also had a significant impact on the SANDF’s training schedule. In this regard, the PCDMV made a recommendation in its 2021 BRRR that “while the Committee expressed understanding that the Covid-19 pandemic impacted on the DOD’s training programme, the Department should ensure that training targets in various programmes are met going forward.” The Committee also noted that Covid-19 impacted on the number of Joint, Interdepartmental, Interagency and Multinational military exercises conducted. These integrated exercises are central to maintaining conventional force readiness.

**8. OBSERVATIONS**

Based on the above, the Committee makes the following observations:

1. The Committee notes that the integration process has formally been concluded and subsequent efforts at integration appropriately finalised by parliamentary structures. The Committee notes that minor concerns around the integration process, such as the use of dated force numbers and queries around military promotions, still remain.
2. The Committee appreciates the immense work done since 1996 in making the SANDF more representative of the people of South Africa. Yet, the Committee also observes concerns going forward in maintaining this goal given the skewed nature of recent MSDS intakes as it relates to equity targets.
3. As of December 2022, the Committee accepts that it is yet to undertake a detailed study of the level of morale in the DOD, but it notes indicators from structures such as the DFSC that efforts to boost morale should be enhanced.
4. In relation to defence readiness, the Committee confirms the finding of the 2015 Defence Review that the SANDF is “in a critical state of decline” and that, by December 2022, the *status quo* remains with little progress made to address ongoing challenges.
5. The Committee observes an increased reliance on the SANDF for both internal (domestic) deployments in support of the SAPS and other government departments, in addition to its external conventional peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. While aligned to its Constitutional mandate, the SANDF is, in some instances, not fully suited, trained, funded and equipped for these internal deployments.
6. The Committee acknowledges that the decreasing (in real terms) defence budgetary allocation is not commensurate with the increasing operational and unbudgeted deployment demands being placed on the SANDF.
7. The Committee notes that the declining defence allocation as a percentage of the GDP is of concern, out of step with international trends and impacts negatively on long-term defence sustainability. The Committee notes the ongoing disjuncture between Treasury and the DOD, whereby the Department current has an unfunded organigram, and has had this for numerous consecutive years.  Neither department has been able to correct this issue, resulting in a funding deficit which impacts on the financial performance of the Department.
8. The Committee notes that the reduced defence allocation impacts negatively on the maintenance of sovereign defence capabilities.
9. The Committee acknowledges that while the defence allocation may not be sufficient, there is misalignment of defence spending, notably the increasing expenditure on Compensation of Employees as a percentage of the defence budget since 2010. The Committee acknowledges that efforts are under way in the DOD to address this.
10. The Committee expresses its concern around the decreasing availability of Prime Mission Equipment and inadequate logistical support due to maintenance constraints as well as the lack of new acquisition initiatives. However, the Committee remains hopeful that National Treasury will accede to the request of the PCDMV in its 2022 BRRR to urgently fund selected prime mission equipment maintenance and acquisition, especially as it relates to logistical support provision for deployed forces.
11. The Committee notes decreased training efforts, specifically around Prime Mission Equipment in the SA Air Force and SA Navy. Further engagements by the JSCD also revealed similar concerns around training in other arms of service and especially in the Reserve Force.
12. The Committee concludes that the level of defence readiness of the SANDF, including its conventional and secondary military roles, is deteriorating and is in urgent need of redress to prevent the loss of capabilities and conventional obsolescence. Delays in addressing this decline will impact the SANDF’s ability to fulfil its Constitutional mandate.

**9. RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE TO THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT**

Based on the prescripts of Joint Rule 120 (d) (i), the JSCD makes the following recommendations to the Houses of Parliament:

1. The JSCD makes the following undertakings to the Houses of Parliament in relation to Rule 120 (d)(i) on which will be further reported at the end of the 6th Parliament (in the JSCD Legacy Report):
	1. The JSCD will request the DOD to explain the populations figures in the Annual Reports of 2018/19 and 2020/21, as it is unlikely that these figures were captured correctly. The Committee encourages the DOD to avoid such misstatements in future.[[49]](#footnote-49)
	2. The JSCD will request from the DOD the figures of MSDS members retained in the SANDF and report in its Legacy Report how this and other Reserve Force recruitment efforts impact on force rejuvenation.
	3. The JSCD will engage the DOD and relevant structures on the status of SANDF morale.
2. The Committee recommends that the DOD enhance its efforts to address representivity regarding both race and gender. The Houses of Parliament should encourage the SANDF to increase its efforts to keep the Force broadly representative of the people of South Africa, specifically through its intake of young South Africans, and that the SANDF should continue to report to the Houses on this matter through the JSCD.
3. The Committee encourages the DoD and Treasury to meet with a view of reviewing the existing Compensation of Employees ceiling affecting the funding of the organisational staff structure.
4. Based on the concerns expressed by the JSCD in this report regarding the state of defence readiness in South Africa, both Houses of Parliament should consider a debate on the status of the SANDF with specific focus on the following:
	1. The desired roles and functions for the SANDF.
	2. The appropriate funding of the SANDF to fulfil its desired roles and functions.
	3. The reduced level of force readiness of the SANDF, specifically as it relates to its conventional role and its ability to fulfil its Constitutional mandate.
	4. The medium to long-term acquisition and maintenance of prime mission equipment and logistical support equipment to meet the Force’s conventional operational requirement.

**Report to be considered.**

1. The White Paper on Defence. Defence in a democracy. May 1996. p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. South African Defence Review 1998. Chapter 9 – Force Structure [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. South African Defence Review 1998. p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. South African Defence Review 1998. p. 53 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. South African Defence Review 1998. p. 70 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. South African Defence Review 2015. p. v. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. South African Defence Review 2015p. 9-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. South African Defence Review 2015. p. 14-7 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. South African Defence Review 2015. p. 14-10 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Jansen van Rensburg, J.L. 2007. A comparative overview of the organisational culture in the Department of Defence. Politeia, Vol 122, No 2 2007. pp 122 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Manganyi, C. 2015. Repealing the Termination of Integration Act, No 44 of 2001: Defence Laws Repeal and Amendment Bill Proposal. 07 September 2015. Research Unit. Parliament of the RSA. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See for instance W.K. Janse van Rensburg , 2020. An Overview of the South Africa Military Integration Process and Matters Related to the Khoisan Self Defence Units, 5 November 2020. Research Unit. Parliament of the RSA [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The White Paper on Defence. Defence in a democracy. May 1996. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. White Paper 1996, p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. White Paper 1996, p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Consolidated Oversight Report of the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans to selected military bases in the Western Cape. 27 August to 30 October 2019 p. 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Consolidated Oversight Report of the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans to selected military bases in the Western Cape. 27 August to 30 October 2019 p. 17 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. IDFSC, 2010. Recommendations made by the Interim National Defence Force Service Commission in The Final Report. November 2010. p.7 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. IDFSC. 2018. PowerPoint Presentation on the Recommendations of the Interim Defence Force Service Commission (IDFSC) to the JSCD on 8 June 2018. p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. South African Defence Review 1998 p. 9 and 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. South African Defence Review 2015. p. 1-7 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. South African Defence Review 2015. p. 11-4 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Excluding Auxiliary services which had 1 African female, and 234 males with 162 being African, 26 Coloured, and 45 white. Defence Review 1998: 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. It appears that the figures for the Coloured and Indian populations have been switched around in this Annual Report. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. DOD Annual Report FY2018/19. p. 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. DOD Annual Report FY2018/19. p. 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. DOD Annual Report FY2018/19. p. 165 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. It appears that the figures for the Coloured and Indian populations have been switched around in this Annual Report. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. DOD Annual Report FY2019/20. p. 173. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. DOD Annual Report FY2019/20. p. 187. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. DOD Annual Report FY2019/20. p. 185 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. DOD Annual Report FY2020/21. p. 129 [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. DOD Annual Report FY2019/20. p. 187. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. DOD Annual Report FY2020/21. p. 141 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. The figures for the Coloured and Indian populations have also been switched around in this Annual Report. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Presentation to the JSCD on 6 May 2022 by the Chief Director Transformation Management on 6 May 2021, entitled Gender Parity & Youth Development [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. South African Defence Review 2015. p. 11-2 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. DOD. 2021. DOD Annual Report for 202 Gender Parity & Youth Development0/21. P. 141 [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Defence Review 1998, p. 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Defence Review 2015. P. 11-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. IDFSC. 2018. PowerPoint Presentation on the Recommendations of the Interim Defence Force Service Commission (IDFSC) to the JSCD on 8 June 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. DFSC, 2022. Consolidated and Categorised Recommendations by the Defence Force Service Commission. March 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. South African Defence Review 1998 p. 64 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. South African Defence Review p. ix. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. National Treasury, 2022, Estimates of National Expenditure, p. 405. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. South African Defence Review 2015. p. 9-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. SANDF Human Resources Division, 2022, Letter CHR/DHRS&P/R/504/3/1 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. In the 2023 Estimates of National Expenditure, National Treasury provided additional ring-fenced funds for the midlife upgrades of SA Navy vessels over the medium-term. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. DOD, 2017. Annual Report FY2016.17. p 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)