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Department:
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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Website: http://www.doj.gov.za
Date: 18 February 2022

Ms Yoliswa Makasi

Director-General

Department of Public Service and Administration

Private Bag X916

PRETORIA

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Dear

Attention: Ms Renisha Naidoo (Chief Director: Legal Services)

REQUEST FOR LEGAL OPINION ON THE PETITION TO PARLIAMENT ON PENSION REDRESS: YOUR PENSION REDRESS DATED 18 JUNE 2021

Preliminary remarks

1. Although the submission of the Department of Public Service and Administration (hereinafter referred to as "the Department") is dated 18 June 2021

we wish to make it clear that we received the submission back from the Solicitor-General only on 25 January 2022. The submission had been received by us, but referred by us to the Solicitor-General, who on 25 January 2022 informed us and the Department that we should furnish the opinion. On 26 January 2022 the Department informed us that the matter was no longer urgent and requested that we furnish them with an opinion on or before 20 February 2022.

Background information

2. The Department informs us that on 4 December 2020 the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration received a petition from the Civil Servants Pension Redress Movement (hereinafter referred to as "the CSPRM") that demands the inclusion of certain current and former public service employees (hereinafter referred to as "the employees") in the pension redress program established in terms of the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council Resolutions (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Resolutions") 7 of 1998, 12 of 2002, 3 of 2012 and 2 of 2018, respectively. In terms of paragraph 2.1 read with paragraph 9 of Resolution 7 of 1998, the Resolutions are applicable to employees who were employed in the Public Service on 2 September 1998.[1] The petition identifies three categories of employees who were not included in the pension redress program, namely—

(a) former employees who were discriminated against with regard to pension but who were no longer employed in the Public Service on 2 September 1998;

(b) employees who were eligible for pension redress but applied for redress after the closing date for applications;

(c) employees who were not aware that they were eligible for pension redress in terms of the Resolutions and therefore they did not apply.

The CSPRM contends that the exclusion of the abovementioned categories of employees from the pension redress program provided for in the Resolutions is discriminatory, procedurally unfair and unjust.[2] Consequently, the CSPRM sets out

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1 This is the date on which Resolution 7 of 1998 was signed.

2 See paragraph 19.1 of the petition (obtained from the Internet at https://pmg.org.za/files/210825Petition_to_Parliament_-_Pension_Restitution_Civil_Servants_Pension_Redress_Movement_CSPRM.Nov2021-1.pdf (accessed on 26 January 2022)).

its request for rectification of the pension redress program in paragraphs 19.1 to 19. 7 of the petition.[3]

Department's contentions

3. The Department is, for the reasons that follow, of the opinion that the contentions of the CSPRM with regard to the persons excluded from the pension redress program in the petition are unfounded.

3.1 With regard to the employees referred to in paragraph 2(a) above, the Department remarks that they have no legal claim in terms of the pension redress program as paragraph 2.1 read with paragraph 9 of Resolution 7 of 1998[4] clearly provides that the Resolution is applicable only to persons who were employed in the Public Service on the date of signature of the resolution which was 2 September 1998.

3.2. In terms of paragraph 3.5 of Resolution 3 of 2012 the closing date for applications is determined as 31 March 2012. However, subparagraph 4.2.1 of the said Resolution provides that late applications may be accepted up to 31 July 2012. In paragraph 3 of the said Resolution it is remarked that the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (hereinafter referred to as "the Council") extended the closing date for applications for the program on various occasions over a period of 10 years. With regard to the employees referred to in paragraph 2(b) above, the Department points out that potential candidates for the pension redress program had a period of 10 years in which they could have submitted their applications. The Department also remarks that the Council conducted an extensive publicity campaign to inform potential candidates about the pension redress program.

3.3 The Department is of the opinion that the employees referred to in paragraph 2(c) above, cannot contend that they were not aware of Resolution 7 of 1998. The Department points out that in addition to the abovementioned publicity campaign, the

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3 These requests cover 4 pages of the petition and are therefore not included here.

4 Paragraphs 2.1 and 9 of Resolution 7 of 1998 respectively, provides as follows:
"This agreement applies to the employer and to all employees
2.1 who are employed by the employer"
"This agreement shall, in respect of parties and non-parties to the PSCBC, come into effect on the date it is signed in Council."

employees should have been aware of the Resolution as they also received a cost-of-living adjustment in terms of the said Resolution.

Department's request

4. The Department requests our opinion on the following legal questions:

Is the State as employer under a legal or constitutional obligation to—

(a) accede to the CSPRM's demands in the petition;

(b) amend the Resolutions to provide that—

(i) the employees who did not fall within the scope of the Resolutions are included in the pension redress program;

(ii) the period of application for the pension redress program is extended?

CSPRM's contentions in the petition

5. We deem it appropriate, in the first place, to refer to the CSPRM's contentions with regard to the exclusion of the former employees who were discriminated against before 1994 but were no longer employees on 2 September 1998. The CSPRM remarks as follows in paragraphs 8.1.4 and 8.1.5 of the petition:

> "8.1.4. The implication of the above-mentioned is that the majority of civil servants who had been discriminated against since 1961, and who should qualify for pension redress, are also "former employees of the state", with the difference that they are not active employees anymore. As such, these former employees have now been **excluded** from the pension redress programme by the PSCBC, government and the GEPF;
>
> 8.1.5. This **exclusion** is **unconstitutional** in terms of section 9(1) – (4) of the Bill of Rights, *Constitution of South Africa*, 1996 as it unfairly discriminates against the majority of previously disadvantaged government employees, because they had not been in the employment of the State on the 2nd September 1998".

In addition to section 9(1) to (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") the CSPRM also contends that

the exclusion of the former employees from the pension redress program is in conflict with sections 3(2) of the Constitution[5]. In paragraph 8.2.5 of the petition it is remarked that the Constitution guarantees equal citizenship and that the PSCBC, the State and the GEPF cannot give pension redress to some of the citizens and exclude the former employees who had also suffered the same unfair discrimination.

6. In the second place, the CSPRM contends that some of the employees who were eligible to receive benefits in terms of the pension redress program were not made aware thereof that—

(a) the closing date for applications was on 31 March 2012;

(b) they were eligible to receive benefits under the pension redress program.

7. In the third place the CSPRM is of the opinion that the funding provision in paragraph 7.2 of Resolution 7 of 1998 does not allow enough funding for all the employees that should benefit in terms of the pension redress program. In paragraphs 7.4.1 and 19.5.1 of the petition the CSPRM remarks that eligible employees have been misled in that they were told that the funding provision would be sufficient for all applicants. With regard to this misrepresentation the CSPRM contends that the employees' guaranteed right to just administrative action has been infringed. Therefore, the CSPRM contends that paragraph 7.2 of Resolution 7 of 1998 is in conflict with section 33(1) of the Constitution.

Section 9 of the Constitution

8. Section 9 of the Constitution provides as follows:

> "(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.
>
> (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.

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5 Section 3(2) of the Constitution provides as follows:
"All citizens are-
(a) equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and
(b) equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship."

> (3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
>
> (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
>
> (5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair."

It is an accepted principle that the Government may differentiate between persons if there are legitimate reasons for such differentiation. In this regard the Constitutional Court remarked as follows in **Sithole and Another v Sithole and Another** 2021 (5) SA 34 (CC), (hereinafter referred to as "the **Sithole** case") at p. 42:

> "The idea of differentiation lies at the heart of equality jurisprudence in general. Equality jurisprudence deals with differentiation in two ways: differentiation which does not involve unfair discrimination, and another which does. The principle of equality does not require everyone to be treated the same, but simply that people in the same position should be treated the same. However, the government may classify people and treat them differently for a variety of legitimate reasons. For, '[i]t is impossible to [regulate the affairs of inhabitants] without differentiation and without classifications which treat people differently and which impact on people differently'. Mere differentiation will be valid as long as it does not deny equal protection or benefit of the law, or does not amount to unequal treatment under the law in violation of s 9(1) of the Constitution.

From the remarks in the CSPRM's petition, quoted in paragraph 5 above, it is clear that it is contended that the exclusion of former employees of the State from the pension redress program amounts to unequal treatment under the law in violation of section 9(1) of the Constitution. In the **Sithole** case it is remarked that in such a case it is necessary to follow the stages of enquiry identified in **Harksen v Lane NO and**

Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), (hereinafter referred to as "the **Harksen** case"). The Court listed these stages as follows in the **Harksen** case at pp. 324-325:

> "At the cost of repetition, it may be as well to tabulate the stages of enquiry which become necessary where an attack is made on a provision in reliance on s 8 of the interim Constitution. They are:
>
> *(a)* Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose? If it does not then there is a violation of s 8(1). Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination.
>
> *(b)* Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two-stage analysis:
>
> (i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to 'discrimination'? If it is on a specified ground, then discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.
>
> (ii) If the differentiation amounts to 'discrimination', does it amount to 'unfair discrimination'? If it has been found to have been on a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation.
>
> If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation of s 8(2).

(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause (s 33 of the interim Constitution)."[6] (Our underlining.)

We are of the opinion that to address the CSPRM's contentions with regard to section 9 of the Constitution it must first be determined whether paragraph 2.1 read with paragraph 9 of Resolution 7 of 1998 differentiates between people or categories of people.

Analysis of Resolution 7 of 1998

9. Resolution 7 of 1998 is a collective agreement as defined in section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995), (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The definition of "collective agreement" provides as follows:

> "**'collective agreement'** means a written agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest concluded by one or more registered *trade unions*, on the one hand and, on the other hand-
>
> (a) one or more employers;
>
> (b) one or more registered *employers' organisations*; or
>
> (c) one or more employers and one or more registered *employers' organisations*;"

Section 213 of the Act defines a "trade union" as follows:

> "**'trade union'** means an association of *employees* whose principal purpose is to regulate relations between *employees* and employers, including any *employers' organisations*;"

When these two definitions are considered together it appears that a collective agreement is an agreement between employees, organised into trade unions, and employers dealing with—

(a) terms and conditions of employment; or

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6 Section 8 of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993) is the predecessor of section 9 of the Constitution.

(b) any other matter of mutual interest.

From these definitions it appears that Resolution 7 of 1998 is a collective agreement between various employees of the State, organised into different trade unions, and the State as employer. It also appears that it is only employees, acting through trade unions, that may enter into a collective agreement with an employer.

10. In view of the underlined remarks in the **Harksen** case, it must be determined whether paragraph 2.1 read with paragraph 9 of Resolution 7 of 1998 differentiates between people or categories of people. The CSPRM contends that the said paragraphs differentiate between persons who were employees of the State on 2 September 1998 and disadvantaged former employees of the State on that date. Paragraph 1 of Resolution 7 of 1998 deals with the objective of the Resolution and provides as follows:

> "The objective of this agreement is to improve salaries and other conditions of service for employees in the public service for 1998/1999."

From this paragraph it is clear that Resolution 7 of 1998 can only be applicable to persons who are employed by the State, in other words, employees as defined in section 213 of the Act and paragraph 11 of the said Resolution. It stands to reason that the Resolution cannot be applicable to former employees of the State who may be on pension or may be deceased or may be employed by other employers. Consequently, we are of the opinion that in view thereof that Resolution 7 of 1998 cannot be applicable to former employees of the State it cannot be contended that paragraph 2.1 read with paragraph 9 of the said Resolution differentiates between people or categories of people. The question whether the said paragraphs differentiate between people or categories of people can only arise if they were employees of the State. The attack on the constitutionality of paragraph 2.1 read with paragraph 9 of Resolution 7 of 1998 fails at the first stage of the enquiry referred to in the **Harksen** case.

Legality of the exclusion of eligible employees who did not apply before 31 July 2012

11. Section 36 of the Act provides as follows:

"(1) The Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council must be established in accordance with Schedule 1.

(2) The Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council may perform all the functions of a *bargaining council* in respect of those matters that-

(a) are regulated by uniform rules, norms and standards that apply across the *public service*; or

(b) apply to terms and conditions of service that apply to two or more *sectors*; or

(c) are assigned to the State as employer in respect of the *public service* that are not assigned to the State as employer in any *sector*."

Section 28(1)*(a)* and *(b)*[7] of the Act provides as follows:

"The powers and functions of a *bargaining council* in relation to its *registered scope* include the following-

(a) to conclude *collective agreements*;

(b) to enforce those *collective agreements*;".

When sections 28(1)*(a)* and 36(2)*(b)* of the Act are read together it is clear that the Council had the power to conclude a collective agreement that provides for the establishment of the pension redress program. As far as we could ascertain, the CSPRM does not contend that the parties that concluded the Resolutions were not authorised to do so. Therefore, it is accepted, for the purposes of this opinion, that the Resolutions are valid collective agreements. Concomitantly, it must be accepted that the parties all agreed that the last date on which applications could be submitted was on 31 July 2012. Section 23(1) of the Act provides as follows:

"A *collective agreement* binds-

(a) the parties to the *collective agreement*;

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7 Although section 28(1) provides for more functions for a bargaining council, it is only the functions in paragraphs *(a)* and *(b)* that are relevant for the purposes of this opinion.

(b) each party to the *collective agreement* and the members of every other party to the *collective agreement*, in so far as the provisions are applicable between them;

(c) the members of a registered *trade union* and the employers who are members of a registered *employers' organisation* that are party to the *collective agreement* if the *collective agreement* regulates-

(i) terms and conditions of employment; or

(ii) the conduct of the employers in relation to their *employees* or the conduct of the *employees* in relation to their employers;

(d) *employees* who are not members of the registered *trade union* or *trade unions* party to the agreement if-

(i) the employees are identified in the agreement;

(ii) the agreement expressly binds the employees; and

(iii) that *trade union* or those *trade unions* have as their members the majority of *employees* employed by the employer in the *workplace*."

In terms of section 23 of the Act the Resolutions are binding. That means that no party to the Resolutions can contend that any employee bound in terms of section 23 of the Act should have been able to submit an application after 31 July 2012.

Exclusion of employees who were not made aware that they were eligible to receive benefits under the pension redress program

12. From the remarks in Resolution 3 of 2012 regarding the extensive publicity campaign that was conducted to inform potential beneficiaries of the pension redress program it is clear that it is a factual question whether the said beneficiaries were made aware of the said program. As we are not in a position to render a legal opinion on a factual question like this, we cannot comment on the legality of the exclusion of employees that were not aware that they are eligible to receive benefits under the pension redress program.

Conflict between paragraph 7.2 of Resolution 7 of 1998 and section 33(1) of the Constitution

13. If the CSPRM chose to take the question whether paragraph 7.2 of Resolution 7 of 1998 is constitutional to court, the court would have had to decide whether the subsidiarity principle requires that the said paragraph must be reviewed in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act No. 3 of 2000), (hereinafter referred to as "the PAJ Act") rather than section 33(1) of the Constitution. Albertyn, 2018 **SALJ** 403 discusses the subsidiarity principle and remarks as follows at p 413:

> "The principle is quite clear. In general, the rule of subsidiarity states that 'a litigant cannot circumvent legislation enacted to give effect to a constitutional right by attempting to rely directly on the constitutional rights' (*MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay* 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 40). To do so would be to 'fail to recognise the important task conferred upon the legislature by the Constitution to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights' (*Pillay* ibid para 40, citing *South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence* 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) para 52). In addition, as the Constitution itself mandates the legislation (as in s 33(3) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 ('PAJA') or s 9(5) and the Equality Act), to circumvent these laws is to defeat the very purpose of the Constitution (*Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd* 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 96)... The principle of subsidiarity seeks both to develop a coherent system of law and to balance the principles of judicial deference and constitutional supremacy. It does so by giving priority to acts of Parliament that seek to give effect to a constitutional right, and only allowing resort to the Constitution when the statute is 'constitutionally inadequate'... In a series of cases, mostly in administrative law, the Constitutional Court has clarified the process to be followed: one must first determine whether the relevant legislation applies and, only if it is found wanting, does one turn to the constitutional provision." (Our underlining.)

In view of the underlined remarks, quoted above, we deem it expedient to first determine whether the PAJ Act must be applied in the circumstances under discussion.

14. In **Free Market Foundation v Minister of Labour and Others** 2016 (4) SA 496 (GP), (hereinafter referred to as "the **FMF** case") the Court discussed the applicability of the PAJ Act to collective agreements and remarked as follows at p. 541:

> "There is a possibility that bargaining council decisions may be reviewed on PAJA or rationality grounds, but, even if they cannot be, the discretionary power of the Minister to extend minority collective agreements certainly is reviewable on PAJA grounds or for rationality, and the attenuated power to review the extension of majority collective agreements is a reasonable and justifiable limitation upon the rights of administrative justice, by reason of the legitimate and rational basis for the application of the majoritarian principle in collective bargaining, the proportional safeguards afforded by the exemption system, the protection against discrimination granted by s 32(3)*(g)*, and the common law."

In **Minister of Justice and Correctional Services v Ramaila** 2020 JDR 2488 (LAC), (hereinafter referred to as "the **Ramaila** case") the Labour Appeal Court remarked as follows with regard to the remarks in the **FMF** case, quoted above, in paragraph [35]:

> "I do not read *Free Market Foundation* (FMF) to be definitive of the question that a bargaining council collective agreement is reviewable under PAJA . The views articulated by Murphy J *supra* were *obiter* and show that collective agreements are not free from judicial checks and supervision."

The Court in the **Ramaila** case went on and remarked as follows in paragraphs [39] and [40]:

> "[39] One of the purposes of the LRA is to provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, employers and employers' organisations can collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual interest. A collective agreement is a written agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest concluded by one or more registered *trade union*, on the one hand and, on the other, one or more employers; one or

more registered *employers' organisations*; or one or more employers and one or more registered *employers' organisations.*

[40] When a bargaining council concludes a collective agreement regulating conditions of services it does so as an organ of state or as a juristic person exercising a public power or performing a statutory public function under the LRA. However, a collective agreement remains a product of collective bargaining described *in Metal & Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd*, as being "a haggle or wrangle" process so as to arrive at some agreement on terms of 'give and take". It has deliberative characteristics. The subject matter for negotiations with a view to sealing a collective deal is of a private nature." (Our underlining.)

After dealing with the facts of the matter in the **Ramaila** case the Court came to the following conclusion based on the underlined remarks of the Court, quoted above, in paragraph [44]:

"Against the background sketched, a collective agreement, regulating conditions of service of employees falling within its coverage, although adversely affecting Mr Ramaila, is purely contractual in nature and has no external legal effect outside the bargaining council. Therefore, it does not constitute an administrative action reviewable under PAJA.

From the remarks of the Court in the **Ramaila** case it can be deduced that the constitutionality of paragraph 7.2 of Resolution 7 of 1998 cannot be reviewed in terms of the PAJ Act.

15. In view of our conclusion in paragraph 14 and the underlined remarks of Albertyn, *(supra)*, quoted in paragraph 13 above, it must be determined whether paragraph 7.2 of Resolution 7 of 1998 is in conflict with section 33(1) of the Constitution. Tsele, 2019 **SALJ** 328, describes the review of administrative actions in terms of the Constitution as follows at pp. 330-331:

"In its early years, the Constitutional Court developed a principle that every exercise of public power is justiciable. The court attributed this principle to s 1*(c)* of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ('the Constitution') which, inter alia, states that South Africa is a democratic state

> founded on 'the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law'. In recent years, academic commentators have spoken of the exponential growth or 'evolution' of the rule of law, together with its incidents, which include the principle of legality. The legality principle in turn encapsulates the notion that every exercise of public power must be rational."

The legality of the decision to include paragraph 7.2 in Resolution 7 of 1998 cannot be impugned. In view of our remarks in paragraph 11 above it is clear that the Council and the parties to the collective agreement were authorised to conclude the collective agreement. Therefore, it must be determined whether the decision to include paragraph 7.2 was rational. The test for rationality was set out as follows in **Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others** 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at p. 708:

> "It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the Executive and other functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement. It follows that in order to pass constitutional scrutiny the exercise of public power by the Executive and other functionaries must, at least, comply with this requirement. If it does not, it falls short of the standards demanded by our Constitution for such action."

It must be accepted that the parties that concluded Resolution 7 of 1998 had to make provision for the necessary funds to implement the pension redress program as provided for in the said Resolution and Resolution 12 of 2002. It must also be accepted that the necessary calculations were made to ensure that adequate funds would be available for the pension redress program. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the funding provisions in paragraph 7.2 of Resolution 7 of 1998 were rational.

Conclusion

16. In view of our remarks in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 15 above, we are of the opinion that the State as employer is not under a legal or constitutional obligation to accede to the CSPRM's demands in the petition. Also, the State does not have a

legal obligation to amend the Resolutions. It must be borne in mind that the Resolutions may be amended only by another resolution concluded in the Council. In their discussion of the definition of "collective agreement" in section 213 of the Act, Du Toit, *et alii*, **Labour Relations Law - A Comprehensive Guide**, remark as follows at p 309:

> "The first point to note is that only a registered trade union or unions can enter into a collective agreement. An agreement with an unregistered union, a group of employees or a workplace forum thus cannot be a collective agreement. On the employer side, however, not only registered employers' organisations but also a group of employers, or even a single employer, may enter into a collective agreement."

From the definition of "collective agreement" and the quoted remarks it is clear that at least two parties are necessary to enter into a collective agreement. However, although the State as employer may enter into a collective agreement it does not appear from the Department's submission or the CSPRM's petition that there is any other party that intends to enter into a collective agreement with the State to amend the Resolutions. Therefore, if the State should be amenable to amend the Resolutions, it may only do so when the matter can be negotiated with one or more registered trade unions.

Yours sincerely

FOR THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF STATE LAW ADVISER

JN McLACHLAN/JV NURSE/SM MASAPU