Appendix A

Whilst Deloitte agrees with some of the broader objectives of Bill 1 of 2019 ("the Bill") as it pertains to the proposed amendments to the Auditing Profession Act, 2005 ("APA"), we have articulated our concerns in this letter as set out below.

1. Matters of principle

1.1 The legislative process

Whilst we appreciate the opportunity to comment, we are concerned that the legislative process followed to date is not conducive to the facilitation of adequate public awareness and involvement for the following reasons:

a) The initial 14-day period to comment on the Treasury's Draft Bill (of 24 August 2018) and the 6-day period, to prepare for public hearings on Bill 1 of 2019 were insufficient. We submit that the process was lacking with respect to the provision of sufficient time and sufficient notification. A more detailed timeline of events and notices in the process is set out in Appendix C.

b) Section 10 of the APA gives the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors ("IRBA") the power to make rules and prescribe the procedure for making such rules. The IRBA is obliged to publish draft proposed rules in the Government Gazette together with a notice calling on the public to provide comment in writing within a period stated in the notice. This period may not be less than 30 days. We submit that from a procedural perspective, this section provides a benchmark for what could be considered reasonable, namely, the publication of a draft with a call for comment within a period of no less than 30 days.

c) Notices were not always published or timeously published on the website of the IRBA despite the fact that this website is routinely used for the publication of developments on legislation.

d) Awareness of the APA amendments was obfuscated by their inclusion in a "General Amendment Bill" regarding "Financial Matters" with a variety of miscellaneous amendments to different pieces of legislation. Public participation was undermined because:
   - Less extensive or cosmetic amendments are normally included in a Bill of this nature.
   - The format of the Bill creates the perception that the amendments are not sufficiently important to be dealt with in a standalone Bill.
   - Stakeholders are not likely to expect amendments of profession specific legislation in a General Amendment Bill.
   - Previous amendments in 2015 to the APA were contained in a standalone Amendment Act.

e) Section 59(1) of the Constitution imposes a duty on the National Assembly to facilitate meaningful public involvement in the legislative process. The Constitutional Court, during 2018 in the matter of the *South African Veterinary Association v The Speaker of the National Assembly and others (CCT 27/18, 5 December 2018)*, reaffirmed the duties of Parliament pertaining to public involvement. The Court re-iterated that:
   - The obligation to facilitate public involvement is *"a material part of the law-making process and the failure to comply with this requirement renders the resulting legislation invalid";*
   - The requirement of "*reasonable opportunity*" must be afforded to members of the public and all interested parties to know about the issues and to have an adequate say in relation to the legislation under consideration, and that the required standard of reasonableness will vary from case to case; and
   - *"the more discrete and identifiable the potentially affected section of the population, and the more intense the possible effect on their interests, the more reasonable it would be to expect the Legislature to be astute to ensure that the potentially affected*

section of the population is given a reasonable opportunity to have a say".

In conclusion, we respectfully submit that the process that has been followed to date will not pass Constitutional muster from the perspective of informing the profession and the public and providing for the requisite opportunity for public participation in the legislative process.

1.2 Search and entry

1.2.1 Comment:

1.2.1.1 International perspective

a) Section 2(c) of the APA identifies one of its objects being "*to improve the development and maintenance of internationally comparable ethical standards and auditing standards for auditors that promote investment and as a consequence employment in the Republic".*

b) We have not been able, in the limited time afforded to comment on the proposed amendments, to undertake a comprehensive analysis of international and foreign regulatory regimes in order to compare the search and entry powers proposed in the Bill against international benchmarks. We are furthermore unaware whether Treasury or the IRBA has undertaken such an exercise.

1.2.1.2 South African position

a) Section 14 (read with section 36) of the Constitution of South Africa governs Constitutional rights relating to search and entry (also referred to as search and seizure) powers. These rights were deliberated in the Constitutional Court in *inter alia Gaertner and Others v Minister of Finance and Others*; and *Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others.* These Constitutional Court precedents point out that when a legitimate expectation of privacy is frustrated, the limitation must be justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution: it must serve a sufficiently valuable public purpose in a proportionate manner in terms of a law of general application.

1.2.1.3 We submit that the extended requirement for search and entry is not justifiable and proportionate for the following reasons:

1.2.1.3.1 The APA as it currently stands (together with some of the proposed amendments to sections 48 and 50) affords IRBA sufficient powers to request and obtain documentation. There is no need to increase the powers to the extent proposed.

a) Section 47 of the APA gives the IRBA, or any person authorised by it, the power to inspect or review the practice of an auditor at any time and may, for these purposes, inspect and make copies of any information, including but not limited to any working papers, statements, correspondence, books or other documents, in the possession or under the control of an auditor.

b) An auditor may not refuse to produce any information, including but not limited to any working papers, statements, correspondence, books or other documents, and, subject to the provisions of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, or any other law, requested by the IRBA, even though the registered auditor is of the opinion that the information contains confidential information about a client.

c) Non-compliance with section 47(3) or obstruction or hindrance of any person in the performance of the functions in that section constitutes an offence in terms of section 54(2) (a) of the APA.

d) The amended section 48(5) allows an investigating committee to require or subpoena the person investigated or any other "*person with specific knowledge of the matter under investigation*" to "*produce any information including*

working papers, statements, correspondence, books or other documents". Failure to comply with such a request would entitle the investigating committee to obtain court orders requiring compliance by the person in question under penalty of imprisonment for contempt and, if necessary, orders entitling the sheriff to obtain them.

e) The amended sections 50(4) – (7), 50(11) (c), 50(12) (a) (iv) and 50(12) (f) provides for similar powers at hearing stage.

1.2.1.3.2 The consequence of the current proposal is that not only auditors but also any other person may be subject to the search and entry procedure.

We respectfully submit that interested parties and stakeholders have not been sufficiently alerted to the proposed powers in view of the inadequate legislative process as well as the fact that this is not specifically advertised in the explanatory memorandum. The wording in the memorandum conflates the subpoena and search and entry processes, and the investigation and disciplinary committees. The disciplinary committee has always had the power of subpoena. This is not new. The power of the investigating committee to subpoena is indeed a new insertion and not contested. The memorandum creates the impression that this search and entry process will be confined to registered auditors in circumstances where there is non-co-operation by them. The memorandum states that it seeks '*to address the challenges faced by the IRBA due to non-cooperation by auditing firms during investigations into improper conduct by registered auditors*.' That might have been the intention, but the powers as drafted are far wider and goes well beyond the stated objective. We recognise that the memorandum does not form part of the legislation *per se*, but it nevertheless alerts interested parties of what can be expected in the proposed amendments.

1.2.2 Recommendation:

1.2.2.1 If it is however believed that IRBA's powers must be extended notwithstanding the above concerns, we recommend the following:

a) A search and entry warrant must be the **exceptional remedy** of absolute **last resort** after all available remedies have been exhausted and the judicial officer is satisfied that no other recourse is available.

b) Search and entry procedure should only be applicable to circumstances where a judicial officer is satisfied that there are **reasonable grounds to suspect non-compliance** with section 47(3), 50(4), 50(5), 50(11) (c) or 50(12) and that the entry and investigation of the premises are likely to yield information pertaining to such non-compliance.

c) Search and entry **may not be conducted on the grounds of mere consent** by the respondent due to the extensive liability that may be incurred where third party information is held and an ignorant respondent had no access to legal advice or representation. Provisions allowing for search and entry with consent should be deleted.

d) **The right to question:** In any event, the right to question contemplated in section 24(6)(a)(ii) should be subject to **limitations** similar to those contained in the Companies Act, S 179(3):

> "*A person who enters and searches premises under section […], before questioning anyone-*
> *(a) must advise that person of the right to be assisted at the time by an advocate or attorney; and*
> (b) *allow that person to exercise the right contemplated in paragraph (a).*"

e) **The issue of the warrant:** The issue of a warrant by a judge or magistrate as contemplated by section 24B should be subject by specific criteria similar to the provisions contained in the Companies Act, section 177. We propose the following wording:

"(1) A judge of the High Court or a magistrate, may issue a warrant to enter and search any premises that are within the jurisdiction of that judge or magistrate, if, from information on oath or affirmation, there are reasonable grounds to believe that—
(a) a contravention of sections 47(3), 50(4), 50(5), 50(11) (c) or 50(12) has taken place, is taking place, or is likely to take place and that entry and investigation of the premises are likely to yield information pertaining to the contravention; and
(b) that any information or document connected with an inspection, investigation or enquiry required to be produced or subpoenaed in terms of sections 47(3), 50(4), 50(5), 50(11)(c) or 50(12) is in the possession of, or under the control of, a person who is on or in those premises and
(c) all available remedies in terms of this Act has been exhausted.

(2) A warrant to enter and search may be issued at any time and must specifically—
(a) identify the premises that may be entered and searched; and
(b) authorise an inspector from the Board to enter and search the premises.

(3) A warrant to enter and search is valid until one of the following events occurs:
(a) The warrant is executed;
(b) the warrant is cancelled by the person who issued it or, in that person's absence, by a person with similar authority;
(c) the purpose for issuing it has lapsed; or
(d) the expiry of one month after the date it was issued.

(4) A warrant to enter and search may be executed only during the day, unless the judge or magistrate who issued it authorises that it may be executed at night at a time that is reasonable in the circumstances.

(5) A person authorised by a warrant issued in terms of subsection (2) may enter and search premises named in that warrant.

(6) Immediately before commencing with the execution of a warrant, a person executing that warrant must either—

(a) if the owner, or person in control, of the premises to be searched is present—

(i) provide identification to that person and explain to that person the authority by which the warrant is being executed; and

(ii) hand a copy of the warrant to that person or to the person named in it; or

(b) if none of those persons is present, affix a copy of the warrant to the premises in a prominent and visible place."

1.3 Unlimited sanctions with no recourse to an appeal procedure may be a deterrent to entry and continued service in the profession

Unlimited sanctions with no recourse to an appeal procedure may be a deterrent to entry and continued service in the profession. The Bill sets no monetary limit for the setting by the Minister of the maximum fine that may be imposed in terms of the proposed section 51B (ii). We propose that a maximum be placed on the limit that the Minister may determine. This would be similar to the approach adopted in other pieces of legislation such as section 7(1) of the National Credit Act, 2005 or section 74(1) of the Competition Act, 1998.

We submit that this power to allow unlimited sanctions may serve as a deterrent for entry into the profession, as well as continued service in the audit profession – the failure to impose a maximum fine is exacerbated by the absence of an Appeal procedure. Smaller firms and individuals may not have the economic means or desire to remain in such a highly regulated profession with unlimited liability and no indication of what the limit of potential sanctions may be and no recourse to an Appeal.

1.4 Reduced expertise in investigations and disciplinary process

It is evident that the Bill aims to diminish legal and audit expertise applied to both the investigation and disciplinary committees. Although the Bill appears to be an improvement on the proposals in the draft Bill, the legal and audit profession specialists are still in the minority in the Board and committee structures. Whilst we support an improved and expeditious process, a lack of legal and audit expertise may have the opposite result. We propose that the numbers of the persons with such expertise on the structures be improved as suggested in the detailed comments below. We further propose that the requirement for a retired judge as chairperson of the Disciplinary Committee be retained, as the expertise is much needed in complicated matters.

Appendix B

Our detailed comments in relation to the specific sections of the Bill are set out below:

2. Detailed comments on proposed amended or inserted sections

2.1 Ad 15: Proposed amendment of section 11 of the APA

Proposed amendment:

The proposed wording on the Minister's appointment of members on the Regulatory Board is an improvement to the previous wording contained in the Draft Bill and welcomed. We however submit that the percentage of persons with audit and legal experience in relation to the rest of the Board can still be improved. The provisions do not go far enough. It is still not clear what the specific credentials of the ex-registered auditor must be other than that he or she '*has at least 10 years' experience in auditing.*'

This begs the questions of the level at which that experience must have been (a trainee accountant has experience in auditing). It does not actually state that the person must have been a registered auditor for 10 years.

Comment:

Whilst we recognise that the proposed amendment should be viewed against the prevailing regulatory philosophy, which elevates the principles of independence and 'public interest', and we understand the exclusion of auditors engaged in practice as registered auditors, one should not ignore the potential impact of an insufficient number of experienced auditors and lawyers on the Board. It is untenable that the Regulatory Board of such a complexly regulated profession will be deprived of their valuable insights.

Principles of good governance dictate that any well-functioning Board should bring the qualities of 'challenge', scepticism and 'recommendation' into the Boardroom. Without a sufficient number of experienced auditors and lawyers, none of the members might be able to bring sufficiently robust and current technical challenge and scepticism to the meeting.

Recommendation:
We would prefer to see a stipulation that at least a third of Board members should have previously been registered auditors for at least ten years and a third lawyers.

With respect to the qualification of the auditor to serve on the Board or respective committees, we propose the following wording instead: *'a person who has been a registered auditor [engaged in public practice and performing the attest function for at least 10 consecutive years] for at least 10 years'*.

The proposed section 11(8) (a) should remove references to '*registered candidate auditors*' as they are not partners and do not have profits to share.

2.2 Ad 16 and 18: Proposed amendment of sections 12 and 20 of the APA

Comment:
The terms of office for committee members and that of the chairperson do not align.

Recommendation
A consequential amendment is required to the term of office of the chairperson and vice chairperson (section 14(1)(b)) to align with the term of office of committee members.

2.3 Ad 17: Insertion of section 17A in the APA

Proposed amendment:
The establishment of the Enforcement Committee appears to be the formalisation of what was previously known as the Disciplinary Advisory Committee (DAC).

Comment:
The question arises as to whether the enforcement committee is intentionally being established as a subcommittee of the Board (as is currently the case with the DAC) or whether this has not been considered and simply represents the default position. Presumably, the DAC is currently constituted as a subcommittee

of the Board as to accommodate the various references to 'the Board' in the Act in relation to the investigation and disciplinary process (see for example sections 48(7), 48(8), 49(1) and 49(2)). If 'the Board' were to carry out all the functions attributed to it, it would have to meet far more regularly. For this purpose, the DAC 'stood in the place' of 'the Board'. There is no apparent reason for it to remain a subcommittee of the Board. It is uncertain why the amendments do not establish the Enforcement Committee as a regular committee of the Board.

Recommendation:

The Enforcement Committee should be treated similarly to the other statutory committees in the Act and its functions should be more clearly articulated. For the sake of regulatory certainty and consistent drafting, all statutory committees should have clear sections setting out their composition and functions, akin to sections 21 and 22 dealing with the Committees for Ethics and Auditing Standards. There is no justification for not clearly setting out these requirements in the Act and it is now the opportune time to do so.

We furthermore propose that the qualifications of the ex-registered auditor should be amended to align with the proposal made above in relation to section 11 of the APA.

2.4. Ad 19: Substitution of section 24

This is an improvement on the previous draft, as it is more specific about the experience and qualifications required by members. The above comments under 2.1 above of this letter re the amendment of section 11 similarly apply to this proposed amendment.

2.5. Ad 20: Insertion of sections 24A to 24C

2.5.1 Proposed insertion of sections 24A and 24B - Powers to enter and search

Comment:

Refer to the comment under matters of principle.

Recommendations:

Refer to the wording proposed under recommendations under matters of principle.

2.5.2 Proposed insertion of section 24D - Disciplinary Committee

Comment:

This is an improvement on the previous draft but the following comments apply:

Recommendation:

- Section 24C(2) and (3) - refer to the comments above regarding the amendment of section 11**.**
- Section 24C(6) should instead refer to "*at least three members*". It is envisaged that in certain complex cases it may be desirable to have a greater range of expertise on a disciplinary hearing panel.
- Section 24C(7): It is proposed that the chairperson of the Disciplinary Committee should appoint the chair of the panel and that it should be required that the appointee should be a retired judge or senior legal representative of more than 20 years' experience to ensure that the necessary expertise is available for complex matters.

2.6 Ad 21: Amendment of section 37 by the insertion of section 37(1A) in the APA

Comment

The section is not only ambiguous, it is potentially unworkable. Must a person be a member of an accredited professional body (e.g. SAICA) only at the time of registration, or continuously? In other words, do the words '*be registered*' refer to the initial act of registration, or the continuing status of registration? If the former, there is no issue; if the latter, there are quite far reaching implications. Bear in mind that the act of signing an audit report whilst not registered with the IRBA constitutes the offence of 'holding out'.

Consider the following:

- SAICA normally terminates registration for non-payment of fees, although there are other reasons such as disciplinary removal, death or resignation.
- If this amendment proceeds, a registered auditor's registration with the IRBA would lapse *ipso facto* on the date that his registration is cancelled by SAICA, whether the IRBA was aware of it or not. SAICA would

obviously need to inform the IRBA of these cancellations and the IRBA would have to retro-date these on its database.

- However, what of the 21-days' notice of termination, as required by section 39(3), on these grounds? How would that affect the process?
- What would happen if a person's registration was re-instated at SAICA, or if they were re-registered with SAICA? Would they need to re-apply to the IRBA or would their registration automatically be re-instated with effect from the date of re-instatement at SAICA?
- This makes it impossible to respond to the simple (and frequent, and important) enquiry regarding someone's registration status at the IRBA.

Of even greater concern is that requiring ongoing membership of an accredited professional body could potentially result in the functions of Regulatory Board relating to the registration (and even discipline) of auditors being usurped by professional bodies.

Recommendation:

The implications of this amendment and of the importance of clarity as to the registration status of a person requires further consideration by the IRBA.

2.7 Ad 22: Amendment of section 45 of the APA

Recommendation:

It is an opportune time to amend current deficiencies in the Act and the IRBA should make use of this opportunity to do so. Section 45 dealing with reportable irregularities proved to be challenging in the past, regarding the practical interpretation of what the term "*fiduciary duty*" encompasses. The IRBA is aware of the challenges. We propose that the ambit of fiduciary duty is extended by the addition of the concept "*duty of care and skill*" (in addition to the fiduciary duty) to section 45. This will ensure that matters will be reported within the scope of "*care and skill*", where there is uncertainty about the meaning of "*fiduciary duty*". The duty of "*care and skill*" will extend the ambit of the reportable irregularity definition to include matters pertaining to non-compliance with laws – something that is excluded by some in their interpretation of "*fiduciary duty*". It is our view that this addition will go a long way to addressing some of the concerns

government might have with respect to non-compliance with laws by both the public and private sector.

2.8 Ad 23: Amendment of section 48 of the APA

2.8.1 Proposed amendment:

The inclusion of subsection (1A) envisages that the enforcement committee of the Regulatory Board may refer non-audit matters against a registered auditor to a professional body accredited in terms of section 32(2) of the APA for investigation.

Comment:

The Regulatory Board must currently investigate all allegations of misconduct against a Registered Auditor (RA) provided they are reasonable and justified. The amendment seeks to allow the Board to refer non-audit matters to an accredited professional body such as SAICA. The following extract from the contents of the '*communiqué*' issued by the Regulatory Board dated 14 December 2017 and headed 'Notification of Changes regarding Sanctions for Improper Conduct' ('the communiqué'), regarding this issue states:

'*In line with global auditor regulator practice, the IRBA is of the view that it should primarily focus its investigations on complaints that involve RAs providing services to public interest entities [as per the definition of public interest entities in the IRBA Code of Professional Conduct in paragraphs 290.25, 290.26 and 290.26(a)]. Section 48 of the APA will therefore, need to be amended to allow the Board at its discretion, to consider alternative processes that will deal with certain non-assurance matters that do not relate to public interest. Implementation details and the necessary general public education regarding this change will still be undertaken'*

Clauses 19.2 and 19.3 of SAICA's By-Laws currently compel it to refer all cases regarding improper conduct by chartered accountants who are also registered auditors to the Regulatory Board for investigation, and stipulate what must happen once the Regulatory Board has made a determination. The amendment would have two effects

- it would require an amendment of SAICA's By-Laws to remove the requirement to refer all matters involving registered auditors to the Regulatory Board; and
- It would allow the Regulatory Board instead to refer cases to SAICA.

It is however not clear exactly what type of non-audit matters the Regulatory Board will elect to investigate and what the process would be for the accredited professional body to follow. It is also not clear how this process will be designed to ensure consistency in process and sanctions between the different organisations (i.e. the IRBA process and the process of the professional body). A professional body such as SAICA has no jurisdiction by law over RAs who are not its members. Sanctions imposed by SAICA on a RA will be unenforceable and arguably *ultra vires* in terms of the current regulatory regime.

One can only assume that this process would commence with a memorandum of understanding with the professional body as to what exactly the intentions and criteria are. It would also be necessary to determine what effects a sanction imposed by the professional body would have on the person *qua* registered auditor.

Is it competent for the IRBA simply to adopt the finding of the professional body? Would IRBA representatives need to attend the professional body's Professional Conduct Committee meetings to appreciate the context of a finding? Alternatively, is this in fact prejudicial to the Respondent? Would the IRBA hold a truncated sanction hearing? Would SAICA's compliance with the processes and procedures determined by the Board [section 21(2A) (b)] be one of the processes that are evaluated during the monitoring process? Can the IRBA over-rule a finding or sanction of the professional body? Is there an appeal back to the IRBA if the RA wants to challenge the finding/sanction of the professional body? Can the IRBA prescribe qualifications/experience of the professional body's investigators/ panel? Clear criteria must be legislated in terms of which the IRBA may delegate to professional bodies.

Recommendation:

The above and many more issues would need to be thoroughly considered and debated, before the requisite agreements and processes can be implemented. We understand from its stance taken on various matters, that the IRBA approves the model followed by the PCAOB. We understand the PCAOB to be a national regulator, and to investigate and discipline only cases pertaining to audit aspects of listed entities. We understand further that all cases referred come from their equivalent of the Inspections Department. Perhaps this is what the IRBA seeks to emulate by providing for cases to be referred to professional bodies. A fuller airing of what happens in other jurisdictions would place this amendment in context.

We propose that the Regulatory Board consults more widely on the implementation plan for this proposal to enable the public to comment comprehensively on the entire process.

2.8.2 Proposed amendment: Section 50 – disciplinary hearing

This draft is an improvement on the previous one, but the section still raises some questions:

The reference in section 50(1) to section 49 should specifically be to "*section 49(1)(b)*".

Section 50(6)(a) is impractical and may result in subpoenas that have been validly served not being complied with on the simple ground that it has not in fact come to the relevant person's attention. At the very least, it should be made clear that this section applies only to registered auditors, and not to any person in respect of which the Regulatory Board happens to have a record of a "last known address".

2.8.3 Proposed amendment: Amendment/substitution of section 51 – sanctions in admission of guilt process

Proposed amendment:

The proposed amendments deal with the imposition of sanctions in the admission of guilt process.

Comment:

The bald reference to a '*any other relevant non-monetary sanction*' is far too vague.

Recommendation:

Competent non-monetary sanctions should be stipulated in the Act. Clear criteria for imposing the proposed sanctions should not be left to the discretion or interpretation of the IRBA's enforcement committee. In the absence of such criteria, the IRBA may be found to act outside the scope of its authority. This is especially problematic in the absence of any possibility of an appeal.

2.9 Ad 26: Insertion of section 51B – sanctions in disciplinary hearings

- It would be desirable to insert the word *'qualified*' in section 51B(3)(a)(iv) as follows: "*disqualify the registered auditor from registration as a registered auditor on a temporary, **qualified,** or permanent basis'.*
- It may prove helpful to set conditions for (re) registration under section 40(2) of the APA. With the new emphasis on corrective non-monetary sanctions, it is a good opportunity to effect these.
- The criteria for the publication of findings and sanctions imposed pursuant should also be clearly articulated.

2.10 Ad 28 : Insertion of section 57A

Proposed amendment

The amendments propose the insertion of section 57(A) in terms of which the Regulatory Board must ensure that appropriate measures are taken in respect of personal information in its possession or under its control.

Comment:

It appears that the wording from section 19 of the Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013 (PoPIA) was copied verbatim. Certain words are however omitted. Section 19(1) of PoPIA inter alia states that a "*responsible party must secure the integrity and confidentiality of personal information in its possession or*

under its control by taking appropriate, reasonable technical and organisational measures".

Recommendation:

We propose that the complete wording of the section should be incorporated in the APA due to the vast amounts of personal information IRBA as a responsible party has under its control.

Appendix C

By the time of collating this submission on 1 February 2019:

- The Draft Amendment Bill of 24 August 2018 was still indicated as the subject of Parliamentary hearings on the Parliamentary website.
- Bill 1 of 2019 became accessible on National Treasury's website overnight on 31 January 2019.
- No formal Gazette communication existed that Bill 1 of 2019 is the subject of Parliamentary hearings on 12 February 2019 nor that it was introduced in Parliament during January, as was indicated in the National Treasury Notice 13 of 2019.
- Telephonic enquiry with the Standing Committee on Finance's secretary and Parliament on or about 28 January 2019 revealed that uncertainty existed as to the version of the Bill on which comment was sought via the Parliamentary website.
- A short period of 6 working days was granted to consider, collate and submit comments on an unconfirmed version of the Bill.