

#### Scope

- Constitutional Mandate
- · Organisation and Programmes
- Historical Perspectives
- Budget Allocation
- · Decline in Capabilities
- · Human Resource Challenges
- Combat Readiness
- · Transformation and Equity
- Defence Review 2014
- Conclusion





#### Aim

To provide a Strategic Overview of the South African National Defence Force to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (Decline)







# CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF THE SANDF

The Constitution of the RSA, 1996








#### MANDATE (Section 200)

- The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.
- The Defence Force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force





# ORGANISATION AND PROGRAMMES

#### Programme 1: Administration

- Purpose. Develop policy, and manage and administer the department.
- Outputs
  - Sound ministerial and departmental direction.
  - Defence policy advice.
  - Strategic direction.
  - Corporate planning and reporting.



#### Programme 2: Force Employment

<u>Purpose</u>. Provide and employ defence capabilities, including an operational capability, to successfully conduct all operations as well as join, interdepartmental and multinational military exercises.

#### Outputs

- Provide and employ a special operations capability iaw national requirements.
- Ensure full participation in the number of peace missions as instructed by the President.
- Conduct 25 joint, interdepartmental and multinational military force preparation exercise over the next three years.
- Conduct four operations per year protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the RSA, supporting other departments and complying with international obligations.











# Programme 6: Military Health Support Purpose. Provides prepared and supported health capabilities for the defence and protection of South Africa by means of a dual mission. Force Protection. To support the SANDF by providing health services for the full range of military deployments. Force Sustainment. To sustain the health of members of the Defence Force, their families and others eligible for care by the SAMHS by providing comprehensive multi-disciplinary military health services to a projected patient population of 302 000 members per year.

#### Programme 8: General Support

 <u>Purpose</u>. Provide general support capabilities and services for the department.



### Programme 7: Defence Intelligence

Purpose. Provide defence intelligence capability.



# HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: Defence Review 1998

#### Historical Perspective: Defence Review 1998

- Emphasizes Defence in a Democracy
- Doctrine based on a strategic defensive posture.
- · Primary function (Defence of the RSA) confirmed and "core force" approach proposed for the structure of the "peace-time force".
- · Secondary functions and tasks related to regional security, peace support operations, cooperation with the SAPS and non-military tasks.







#### Historical Perspective: Defence Review 1998 (3)

- · Narrow approach to Defence .
  - · Primary function defence against external aggression.
  - Other functions secondary.
- Budget for maintenance, development and preparation of a peace-time force.
- Special budgetary arrangements for operations.
- To be involved, in time (page 6 par 40), in multi-national peace support operations (One battalion, page 26 par 35).





#### Historical Perspective: Defence Review 1998 (2)

- · Four Force Design options. Option 1 recommended.
  - Option 1: Growth-Core FD (Grow according to threat profile) = 22 000 Reg F and 70 000 Res F @ RB 5 (1996 R Value)
  - . Option 2: DOD Long -Term Vision FD (Broad range of contingencies) =36 000 Reg F and 98 000 Res F @ RB 6
  - Option 3: Lower Level Demonstration (Below minimum) growth-core)
  - · Option 4: Defensive Operational Concept









#### Historical Perspective: Defence Review 1998 (4)

- · Internal deployment undesirable.
- · "In terms of the mandate of the SANDF participation in international PSO is a secondary function. The SANDF will therefore not normally create special structures for such operations but will rather provide for them within the primary structures" (Page 26 par 34)
- Deployment in cooperation with the SAPS likely to persist for some time (page 6 par 43).







#### Historical Perspective: Defence Review 1998 (4)

- The approach of the 1998 Defence Review was based on the assumptions that;
  - · No Conventional military threat against the RSA exists.
  - RSA has no aggressive intention against other states.
  - Early warning of 3-5 years.
  - Long-term predictions not accurate enough to plan and structure on.
  - A peacetime force based on a threat independent approach.

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## Historical Perspective: Operational Developments since 1998

- · Deployed in Lesotho 1999.
- Deployed in Burundi 2001. (Much earlier than anticipated)
- Deployed in the DRC and Sudan in 2003.
- Handed over borderline responsibilities to SAPS. (Cabinet instruction)
- Closed down 183 Commando units and 20 Group HQs. (Cabinet instr)
- · Representation at International institutions (AU, UN, SADC).
- Deployment of Defence Attachés (which increased drastically).
- · Closed down various bases and units







# HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: Operational Developments since 1998







# Historical Perspective: Operational Developments since 1998 (2)

- · Acquisition of SDPs.
- SDP equipment commissioned without concomitant allocation for operationalization and support (Through Life Cycle).
  - Four Frigates 2006 2007.
  - · Three Submarines 2005 2008.
  - Fighter aircraft (Gripen) 2008 2012.
  - Training aircraft (Hawk) 2006 2008.
  - Light utility helicopters (A109) 2005 2009.
- · Army (landward defence) excluded from the SDP.







## Historical Perspective: Operational Developments since 1998 (3)

- · Standby for deployment to Haiti.
- Peacekeeping commitments gradually increased. (Threat patterns in Africa) – only planned for Chapter 6 operations.
- · Assistance Military Training.
- Commitments to stand-by arrangements (AU, SADC, ACIRC).
- Regular deployment in Regional humanitarian assistance (floods).
- · Support to other Government Department.





# Historical Perspective: Operational Developments since 1998 (5)

- Maritime Piracy increased
  - SADC Maritime Security Strategy (Tri-lateral agreement)
  - · Permanent deployment in Mozambique Channel
  - No support from Multinational Partners (i.e. Tanzania)
- Increased support to other departments
  - · Cooperation with SAPS
  - · Search and rescue
  - Humanitarian aid (Floods, drought, epidemics, bridges)
  - · Big events (Soccer World Cup)
  - National Youth Service Support







### Historical Perspective: Operational Developments since 1998 (4)

- · Radical increase in illegal immigration.
- Cabinet decision to return to borders
  - 22 Coys on rotation required with all support needed for land border. (13 currently deployed)
  - · Specialized infantry to be resurrected.
  - · Lack of "eyes and ears" (closed units).

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### Historical Perspective: Operational Developments since 1998 (6)


- · Funding model not adjusted over time
- "As a result of the improved external strategic environment and changing government spending priorities, the defence budget has been cut by 50% over the pass 5 years in real terms."
- Requirement for update of Defence Review based on changed environment.
  - · International expectation for RSA to take lead in Africa.
  - Ever increasing international and domestic defence commitments.
  - · Structures not aligned to the current requirements.
  - Ever increasing state of decline of military capabilities.















Programme	Vote 2014/15	Medium-term Expenditure Estimate (R'000)		
		2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Administration	4 860 362	4 827 173	5 081 057	5 329 655
Force Employment	3 436 958	3 603 153	3 761 249	3 928 564
Landward Defence	13 851 825	14 805 303	15 612 828	16 024 777
Air Defence	7 166 896	7 049 155	6 804 166	8 223 880
Maritime Defence	3 678 505	3 717 249	4 761 087	4 800 712
Military Health Support	3 849 063	3 932 914	4 179 083	4 535 672
Defence Intelligence	792 112	827 451	872 880	915 074
General Support	5 195 513	5 816 992	6 046 348	6 355 188
TOTAL (Nov 14)	42 831 234	44 579 390	47 118 698	50 113 522
TOTAL (Jun 14)	42 831 234	45 301 264	48 180 459	51 098 731

#### **Decline in Capabilities**

- · Very Limited Conventional Capability.
- · CSANDF Reserve requirement cannot be fully satisfied .
- Very limited 1<sup>st</sup> to 4<sup>th</sup> Line Support Capability.
- · Limited Airborne Infantry and Parachute Capability.
- · Limited Air Defence Capability.
- Reduced LOC of Ships and Submarines Limited Maritime Defence Capability.
- SAMHS Capability cannot satisfy current operational requirements.
- · PSO Capacity is reaching culmination.
- · Very limited Collateral Capacity for "Support to the People"





#### **Decline in Capabilities**

- · Training is limited.
- Capabilities are not operationally sustainable and only maintained at Critical Mass.
- · Stock Levels are low.
- · Maintenance Backlog on all major systems.
- · Equipment Obsolescence.
- Loss of Scarce Skills and "In-house" capacity to repair and maintain especially the SDP's.
- Landward renewal not coming to full fruition leading to high costs to keep old systems operational.
- Medical facilities, equipment and the availability of Pharmaceuticals and medicals consumablesin critical state.





#### **Decline in Capabilities**

- · It takes time and costs to build capabilities.
- Any requirement is likely to be longer than five years before such a capability is operational.
- · Capabilities must be constantly maintained.
- · If no or limited capabilities exist deterrence is lost.
- No military business inhibits the local defence industry capacity and skills. This will increase costs to restart production.

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#### Human Resource Challenges

- Recruitment and retention of scarce skills (Pilots, naval combat officers, engineers, technicians, divers)
- Rank/age profile (Aging troops)
- Health status
- Rotation schedule (Morale affected negatively by long deployment periods)
- Unionisation (Undermining command and control)
- Growing HR budget (51% of total allocation)
- Over-utilisation of available HR pool has massive social implications.
- · Troops do not deploy as cohesive units.







#### **Human Resource Challenges**

- The SANDF requires young, medically fit and well-trained soldiers
- The SANDF requires sufficient personnel (boots-on-theground) if it is to be able to execute additional missions. Hence there is a requirement to increase the current MSDS intakes.
- · Spending pressure on the compensation of employees.
- No Exit mechanism available.
- · No Res F rejuvenation.







#### **Common Facilities Challenges**

- · Unsuitable and dilapidated which is already an OHS risk.
- · Available facilities are insufficient.
- Impact
  - Litigation against the DOD.
  - · Closure of facilities.











# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE TRANSFORMATION AND EQUITY STATUS





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#### Transformation Advancements

\* 2014 Defence Review. "South Africa's military capability must be commensurate with South Africa's international status, strategic posture and continental leadership role". Therefore transformation should strive to be seen as a representative, equitable and gender aligned national asset. DOD members will be skilled, healthy, fit and highly disciplined professionals with a high level of moral and sense of duty. Transformation should further include the transformation of structures with an accompanying budget.







# Transformation Described and End State

Transformation of the military goes beyond gender, race and disability representivity. It further includes the transformation of structures, military equipment, training and capabilities to adapt to a changing environment and to ensure mission readiness.

It is also the constant evaluation of the military's policies, procedures, processes, current and future situation by ensuring continuous improvement on the "way we do business"

This will enable the DOD to respond timeously and appropriately to a challenging internal and external environment.

A workforce that is transformed in its leadership style, culture, mindsets, attitudes and behaviour, is the enabler for a sustained mission ready force.







#### **Transformation Strategy**

#### Transformation Strategy.

- Building human capital through transformation empowerment programmes, national and international events.
- · Gender and Disability mainstreaming.
- · Youth rejuvenation and leadership development.
- · Accountability, monitoring of progress and evaluation of impact.
- · Transformation Management Structures.
- Transformation is embedded in all spheres of the DOD and is a line function.







#### Integration, Change and Advancement

- · 1994 JMCC. The Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) was the forum that planned the new SANDF that brought together seven (7) forces, different military cultures and experiences. This process also entailed addressing gender and race imbalances to create a SANDF/DOD representative of the demographic composition of the RSA. Although not without hurdles and resistance the SANDF managed this process professionally and with dedication.
- · 1994 Defence Command Council. On 20 Oct 94 the DCC stated that women were to follow the same career paths as men and no mustering, including combat roles were reserved exclusively for men. It further stated that men and women were to be trained and employed on the same basis







#### Integration, Change and Advancement

- · 1998 Defence Review. The Defence Review of 1998 stated that "The DOD is committed to a non-racist, non-sexist and representative work environment that broadly represents the South African population."
- 1997 Establishment of the EOCD. The Chief Directorate Equal Opportunity (currently known as Chief Directorate Transformation Management ) was established in 1998 and from then they were responsible for all transformation and diversity sensitisation programmes which also includes shared values and ethics.
- 1998 DOD Policy on EO and AA promulgated in the DOD. This policy addressed EO and AA in the SANDF and DOD. From 1998 onwards all DOD policies had to be aligned with the principles of EO and AA.








#### Integration, Change and Advancement

- · 1995 DEOMI. Since 1995 identified SANDF members were trained as Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Advisors (EOAs) at the Defence Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) in Florida USA.
- · 1997 Cultural Diversity Sensitisation. Members of the SANDF multidisciplinary team was trained as Cultural Diversity Facilitators (1997), who sensitised SANDF officials on cultural diversity to positively enhance the integration process.







#### Integration, Change and Advancement

- · 1998 Statement by CSANDF on Representivity. In 1998 Gen Siphiwe Nyanda (then C SANDF) stated "My dream is that the Defence Force of the future reflects the demographics of the country."
- 2001 Language Policy. The Language policy in the DOD states that "English shall be the thread language of the Department of Defence" (DODI, 54/2001).
- Recognition of NSF Service: Members admitted to the GEPF for pension benefits and recognition of prior service.
- · Exit Mechanisms. EIP (employer initiated package) not attractive enough.
- . Re-skilling. The Service Corps responsible for the re-skilling of members leaving the DOD to enable them to re-integrate in civil society.








#### 11/13/2014

#### **Further Transformation Advancements**

- MSDS. The MSDS to rejuvenate the SANDF 2003.
- · Military Ombuds. Military Ombud established.
- <u>Defence Service Commission</u>. Service Commission established.
- Improvement in Service Conditions. New salary grading system for SANDF members. Occupational Specific Dispensation to achieve parity with rest of Public Sector.\*
- Recognition of Previous Service Benefit for non-statutory force members.






#### Gender Representivity: Sharp-end and SMS


- 1994 Females Sharp End
  - · Almost no females in sharp-end.
- 2014 Females Sharp End
  - · 19,5% female officers in the sharp.
  - · 26% females in other rank groups (WO and NCO's).
  - · Critical musterings 26% females.
- 1998 Females SMS
  - Five female (1 Maj Gen and 4 Brig Gens) generals and four women female civilian directors.
- 2014 Females SMS
  - · Five Maj Gen and 32 Brig Gen.

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# Department of Defence Initiatives for People with Disabilities

- The DOD Disability Committee with representatives of all Services and Divisions was established iot promote, protect, develop and attain equal opportunities for PwDs.
- · Awareness raising and accessibility audit are conducted in the DOD.
- The DOD strives to provide individualised reasonable accommodation for members with disabilities in terms of their working environments, eg barrier free access, access to information, specialised courses and transport.
- Empowerment workshops are conducted with DOD Career Managers to enable them to successfully manage the careers of PwDs.
- In order to enable hearing impaired with access to communication the DOD has successfully trained a few Junior Sign Language Interpreters.
- In order to conform to Governmental requirements PwDs are encouraged to declare their disability, which is recorded in a DOD Disability database to empower management to manage PwDs successfully.







# Department of Defence People with Disabilities Background

- Pre- 1994 Curamus was managed by the South African Military Health Services that rendered support for the disabled soldiers. Post-1994 Curamus was registered as a Non-Profit organisation, providing mobility and social support, as well as legal assistance for all DOD officials and veterans with disabilities.
- The Disability Equity section was established in accordance with Governmental imperatives in 2000. Since then disability became one of the Transformational priorities within the DOD.









#### **Military Justice**

- The current Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act, Act 16 of 1999, disempowers the Commander to enforce discipline.
- In terms of sections 11 and 29(6) of the Act, Commanders cannot handle minor disciplinary offences if the accused plead not guilty but must refer the case to the military courts.
- As a solution to this challenge, the DOD has drafted the Military Discipline Bill in order to empower Commanders to enforce discipline. The Bill is with the office of the State Law Adviser.
- Military Unions being misused to bypass military channels of command and grievance processes.
- · Bill must serve before Parliament before the end of 2014.

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#### Morale

- Qualitative(units in the SANDF) and Quantitative (focus groups interviews) surveys done on a continuous basis in units to determine the morale of SANDF members.
- · DOD Average in latest survey Neutral.
- · Lowest levels of satisfaction :
  - Career Management.
  - Logistics( availability and quality of equipment).
  - Training in meeting personal needs.







#### **Defence Review**


- DOD has appointed a Project team to work on the Implementation of the Defence Review 2014.
- Planning is underway with a focus on the Arrest of the Decline and Long-term Capability Development.
- · Focus on Quick Wins with No or little Financial implications.
- All Defence Review 2014 Implementation proposals will be presented for approval starting from FD/FS to Cap Dev Plans.
- Cost implications will be made visible upon completion of the plans.
















#### **Concluding Remarks**

- The SANDF is currently structured iaw a reduced version of the 1998 Defence Review Force Design.
- Planning is underway to implement the Defence Review 2014.
- Despite all the challenges, the SANDF remains committed to its Constitutional mandate to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people.
- Disconnect between defence commitments and resource allocation.



