SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) AMENDMENT BILL,
2007
Clause no. |
Name of
person or body |
Comment |
1 |
ARMSA |
1.
The jurisdiction to impose a sentence above the general jurisdiction
of the regional courts (currently 15 years imprisonment) but less than life
imprisonment is not explicitly conferred.
In order to promote clarity ARMSA submits that such jurisdiction
should be explicitly indicated, perhaps by means of a suitably worded proviso
to section 51(1). 2.
With regard to section 51(2), ARMSA submitted that a similar situation
arises whereby it is not clear if a regional court has authority to impose a
sentence above the current general jurisdiction of 15 years if a presiding
officer wants to impose a lesser sentence than the prescribed minimum which
is a higher sentence than the 15 year general jurisdiction (for a third
offender in a Part III offence for instance).
They submitted that a proviso should be considered in this regard. 3.
With reference to the Drugs and Drugs Trafficking Act, 1992 and the
Firearms Control Act, 2000, which provide for higher penalties than the
general fifteen year jurisdiction of the regional courts, ARMSA submitted
that the proviso in section 51(2) could be interpreted to limit the penal
jurisdiction of the regional courts even where another statute confers
increased jurisdiction on regional courts.
They submitted that a second proviso to section 51(2) should clarify
this situation. 4.
ARMSA pointed out that a further problem may arise with the repeal of
the sections that currently permit a referral in respect of an offence listed
in Parts II, III and IV of Schedule 2 of the Act. They argue that there may be instances
tried before a regional court which merits punishment in excess of that
conferred by the Act and that if these sections are repealed then the accused
would escape with an inappropriately lenient sentence. Therefore, ARMSA submitted that an increase
in the general penal jurisdiction of the regional court should be
considered. Alternatively, they
submitted that consideration should be given to increasing the penal
jurisdiction of the regional courts in respect of certain (common law)
offences listed in Schedule 2 to the Act.
An increase of the jurisdiction to 25 or 30 years will, they submitted,
ensure that the regional court will be able to deal adequately with all the
offences listed in all the parts of Schedule 2. ARMSA submitted in this regard that the
current proviso in section 51(2) should be deleted and should be replaced by
the following “When a regional court is imposing a sentence in respect of an
offence listed in section 51(1) or section 51(2), regardless whether it is
imposing a lesser sentence as envisaged in section 51(3) or not, the sentence
may not exceed 30 years of imprisonment.”. 5.
With regard to the suspension of a sentence in terms of section 51(5),
ARMSA submitted that the legislature had to clarify whether in those
instances where a lesser sentence is imposed (due to the existence of substantial
and compelling circumstances) section 51 is applicable and the sentence can
only be suspended in accordance with subsection (5) or whether section 51 is
not applicable and a court is free to suspend the whole or a portion of such
sentence. 6.
ARMSA submitted that in order to avoid ambiguity and to promote
uniformity (different divisions of the High Court may give different
interpretations) the legislature should make clear its intention with regard
to the application of section 276(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 in
instances where a lesser sentence is imposed after applying section 51(3) of
the Act. 7.
ARMSA submitted that the legislature should make clear its intention
with regard to the application of section 73(6)(b)(v) of the Correctional
Services Act, 1998 to cases where a lesser sentence was given in terms of
section 51(3) of the Act. In other
words, if a lesser sentence is given in terms of section 51(3) of the Act
does it amount to “…imprisonment as contemplated in section 51 …” as stated
in section 73(6)(b)(v). 8.
ARMSA supports the substitution of section 51(6), (7), (8) and (9). |
1 |
Basil
King |
1.
It is submitted that section 51(3)(a) is hardly a necessary amendment,
because following a finding of circumstances that justify the imposition of a
lesser sentence, it is extremely unlikely that a court will impose anything
other than a lesser sentence. However,
by stipulating that the court must “impose such lesser sentence” the
legislature appears to exclude the use of section 297(1)(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Act, 1977 (the postponing of the passing of sentence) which is in
itself not a sentence but an order and this it is submitted should be
rectified at this opportunity. 2.
It is submitted that subsection 3(aA) not be included in the
Bill. In this regard it was argued
that subsection (3)(aA) is almost in direct conflict with the remarks of the
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Malgas 2001(1) SACR 469 at 472 and could it
was submitted result in a constitutional challenge given that it appears to
be an attempt by the legislature to prescribe what sentence must be imposed
by stipulating what must be ignored. 3.
It is submitted that section 51(5) should not be amended. It is submitted that proposed subsection
(b) is unnecessary and complicates the sentencing process almost to the
extent of defeating the aim of the minimum sentencing provisions regarding
offences listed in Part IV. It is
argued that by the inclusion of this provision, it would mean that, although
the court finds no substantial and compelling circumstances warranting a
lesser sentence, it can in any event find some circumstances justifying the
suspension of up to half of the ‘prescribed’ sentence. 4.
It is submitted that the proposed amendment to section 51(6) is
totally unnecessary as it again brings in factors and ‘circumstances’ that
might or might not be such which would, in the ordinary course of events,
amount to ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ warranting a lesser
punishment anyway and which may lead to revising of the Brandt decision, due
to the differentiation of ages in the proposal. |
1 |
Tshwaranang
Legal Advocacy Centre and others |
1.
It is submitted that the proposed substitution of the title of section
51 is confusing, since this wording potentially suggests that in future minimum
sentences may be applied at the presiding officer’s discretion. If so, then this it was submitted that this
dilutes the current approach to minimum sentences. It was further submitted in this regard
that the proposed amendment of section
(3)(a), whereby “may” which is discretionary is substituted for “must” which
is peremptory, also seems at odds with the notion that these are
discretionary minimum sentences. 2.
It is submitted that the proposed additions to “substantial and
compelling circumstances” for rape contained in subsection (3)(aA) do not go
far enough in ensuring that courts do not rely on factors that undermine
women’s rights to dignity and equality.
At the same time it is submitted with regard to “any relationship
between the accused person and the complainant prior to the rape” that a
careful balance needs to be struck between punishing sexual violence
committed by family members or intimate partners on the one hand, and
respecting the victim’s wishes on the other – particularly when such
perpetrators may escape punishment altogether if the complainant withdraws
the charge. Therefore, they submitted
that the entire approach to sentencing rapists must be reconsidered –
including the mitigating factors taken into account in relation to the
accused. 3.
It is submitted that consideration should be given to adding an
additional ground to subsection (3)(aA), namely, “Perceived lack of
psychological impact upon the complainant”. |
1 |
Redpath
& O’Donovan |
It is submitted that the regional
courts’ jurisdiction should not increase, since this will lead to a rise in
the number of long sentences, which in turn will lead to more frequent mass
early releases from prison and the proportion of persons serving heavy
sentences included in early releases will increase in line with the
increasing proportion of all prisoners serving heavy sentences. |
1 |
NPA |
1.
The NPA submitted that they do not foresee any constitutional problems
with granting regional courts jurisdiction to impose life sentences. The NPA further submitted that the PC
should also consider the following factors and alternatives before taking a
final decision: 1.1 The proposed procedure would not necessary
expedite the finalisation of serious criminal cases, since cases in the
regional court are often postponed several times for long periods of time
before being finalised, while the High Court has a continuous roll and
normally postpones cases from day to day to finish it. 1.2 It is foreseen that to a large extent long
terms of imprisonment will be imposed and that Judges President would be
petitioned for leave to appeal and that all instances where imprisonment for
life is imposed, appeals will be noted.
The NPA submitted that cases which are now referred to the High Court
for sentencing do not normally take longer to finalise than an appeal. 1.3 The Shinga judgment will have an impact on
the roll of the High Court and the availability of judges to deal with
appeals emanating from the proposed amendment. The NPA submitted that the PC should consider
providing for automatic review (which is quicker and involves one judge
sitting in chambers) instead of providing for an automatic right of appeal. 1.4 The NPA submitted that there exists an
anomaly in as far as the regional court in finding substantial and compelling
circumstances, which justifies the imposition of a lesser sentence than life
imprisonment for Part I of Schedule 2 offences, can only impose a sentence of
15 years for a first time offender. It
submitted that the problem can be solved by inserting a further provision
similar to section 51(2) of the Act, in terms of which the regional court is
given increased jurisdiction in respect of Part I offences. The NPA submitted that such proviso may
also be inserted as a substantive provision in section 51. The following proviso is proposed: “Provided further than in respect
of such lesser sentence, the regional court shall in the case of – (aa) a first offender, have jurisdiction to
impose imprisonment for a period not exceeding 20 years; (bb) a second offender, have jurisdiction to
impose imprisonment for a period not exceeding 25 years; (cc) a third or subsequent offender, have
jurisdiction to impose imprisonment for a period not exceeding 30 years.”. 2.
The NPA submitted that the objective of the Bill, to “expedite the
finalisation of serious criminal cases” can also be achieved by giving the
regional court magistrate jurisdiction to impose such lesser sentence himself
or herself after having found that substantial and compelling circumstances
exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than imprisonment for
life. The NPA submitted that instead
of giving the regional court jurisdiction to impose imprisonment for life, it
should be considered to add the following proviso to section 52(1): “Provided that if, after having
convicted an accused person of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule
2, the regional court is satisfied that substantial and compelling
circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than
the sentence prescribed in section 51(1), it shall enter those circumstances
on the record of the proceedings and may thereupon impose such lesser
sentence.”. 4.
The NPA submitted that they support the proposed amendment set out in
section 51(3)(aA). 5.
The NPA submitted that they support the proposed amendment set out in
section 51(5). 6.
With regard to section 51(6), the NPA submitted that the wording of
the provision was confusing and that it was of the view that it should be
amended to make it clear that it refers to an accused person. They proposed amending paragraph (a) to
read as follows “This section does not apply in respect of [a] an accused
person whom was under the age of - “. 7.
The NPA submitted that it is of the view that section 3 of the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998, should also be amended. |
1 |
SAHRC |
1.
With regard to the removal of the referral process and the granting of
jurisdiction to impose life sentences to regional courts, the SAHRC submitted
that regional courts are not higher courts and therefore giving these courts
the power to impose the highest possible sentence is problematic for the
commission. The Commission submitted
that the necessary inbuilt checks and balances to ensure that a life sentence
is handed down in the appropriate manner do not exist at the lower court
levels. The Commission further
submitted that the granting of an automatic right of appeal will lead to
increased court backlogs arguing that a substantial amount of cases that
would have come before the high court will still come before the high court
by way of appeal. 2.
With regard to section 3(aA), the Commision submitted that although
the amendment is welcomed it is of the view that a broader debate on
sentencing rape perpetrators is needed. 3.
The Commission welcomed the repeal of section 51(4). 4.
With regard to section 51(6), the Commission submitted that minimum
sentencing provisions ought not be applicable to children. |
1 |
OSF-SA |
1.
The OSF-SA submitted that it remained unconvinced that increasing the
sentencing jurisdiction of the regional courts is the appropriate route to
take in remedying the problems identified with the referral process. In this regard, they submitted that since
life imprisonment is the strongest mechanism that the courts have at their
disposal a rigorous process should be followed in handing down this sentence
and that it should be reserved for the most serious cases that would have
warranted the death penalty. They
further submitted that restricting its imposition to our highest courts and
most senior members of the judiciary, will signal to the public to recognise
life imprisonment as a serious and most weighty sanction. 2.
The OSF-SA submitted that although they supported the abolition of the
referral process they are of the view that regional court magistrates should
not have the power to impose life sentences.
They submitted that regional court magistrates should continue to
sentence within their jurisdiction and that if the state seeks a life
sentence then the case must be prosecuted in the High Court from the
outset. If, however, the sentencing
jurisdiction is increased the Foundation submitted that there should be an
automatic right of appeal. 3.
With regard to subsection 3(aA), the Foundation submitted that the
proposed amendments limit the ambit of the exception to mandatory sentences
on grounds of substantial and compelling circumstances. The Foundation submitted that this would
open the door to a renewed challenge to the constitutionality of these
provisions on the ground of disproportionality. The OSF did however submit that they did
not disagree with the existing contents of the list, but did submit that it
is limited. 4.
With regard to subsection (6), the Foundation submitted that the Bill seeks
to ensure that minimum sentences apply to children in certain circumstances
and that applying a minimum sentence to any child, in terms of the
Constitution and international instruments to which South Africa is a
signatory, regardless of the crime or age of the child would be directly
contradictory to these provisions as minimum sentences by its nature is a
measure of first or only resort. |
1 |
CSVR |
CSVR submitted that they do not
support the argument that the regional court should be empowered to impose
the maximum possible sentence of life imprisonment on a person, believing
that this should be the remit of the High Court. |
1 |
|
1.
The 2.
With regard to section 51(3)(a), the Council submitted that it is
opposed to the proposed amendment since the effect of obliging the court to
impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum when there are compelling
and substantial circumstances justifying a departure from the prescribed
minimum is considered to be an unwarranted interference in the court’s
discretionary power to determine an appropriate sentence. The Council submitted that there may be
situations where the prescribed minimum sentence is coincidentally also
considered to be the appropriate sentence even though there are compelling
and substantial circumstances which would objectively justify a departure
from the prescribed minimum sentence regime.
The Council therefore submitted that the existing permissive “may”
should remain and that it should not be replaced by a peremptory “must”. |
1 |
Prof
SS Terblanche |
1.
Prof Terblanche’s submission indicates that he is not in favour of
giving regional courts the jurisdiction to impose life imprisonment. This submission is made based on the following
reasons: (1) Tampering with the
hierarchy in the sentence jurisdiction of the different levels of courts will
inevitably create anomalies; (2) The truly pragmatic solution is not to
argue that High Courts do not have the capacity to try and sentence all the
offenders that are liable to be sentenced to life imprisonment , but would be
for the legislature to create a system which will be within the capacity or
expected capacity of the High Courts to implement; (3)
In real terms, it would seem that potentially, life imprisonment is a
much longer sentence than the current maximum that a regional court may
impose; (4) If a second-tier trial
court, such as the regional court, gets the authority to impose life
sentence, it will inevitably sacrifice much of its symbolic value as the most
sever and onerous sentence; (5) It is submitted that the regional courts
are not sufficiently competent to be allowed to impose the most severe
sentence that our criminal justice system permits; (6) In terms of section
73(5) of the Correctional Services Act, 1998, the parole of an offender
sentenced to life imprisonment will have to be considered by the court
imposing the sentence, it is submitted that it will be difficult enough for
judges to deal with and that regional magistrates will not be able to deal
with it at all. 2.
It is submitted that the deletion of section 51(3)(a) [we assume that
the reference should be to 51(3)(b)] means that children of 16 and 17 years
old are fully included within the minimum sentences. It is submitted that this is a shocking
amendment in light of section 28(2) of the Constitution and 3.
With regard to the automatic right of appeal, it was submitted that
important practical questions have to be considered such as whether this
process will not simply create another cause for backlogs in the High Courts. 4.
With reference to section 51(3)(aA), Prof Terblanche submitted that in
determining whether a lesser sentence than the prescribed is justified, based
on S v Malgas, it is the cumulative effect of all the circumstances of a
case, including mitigating and aggravating circumstances, that should be
considered. Therefore, it is submitted
that it would be better if the Bill read as follows: “(aA) When imposing a sentence in respect of the
offence of rape the following shall not be considered when determining
whether [constitute] substantial and compelling circumstances exist
justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence: (i) The complainant’s [previous] relevant sexual
history; (ii) an accused person’s cultural or religious
beliefs about rape; or (iii) any close, personal
relationship between the accused person and the complainant prior to the
offence being committed”. 5.
Further in reference to section 51(3)(aA), Prof Terblanche submitted
that he does not support the first limitation, because when one considers
that the sexual history of the complainant may be relevant to the merits of
the case, based on considerations mentioned in section 227 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, 1977, the likelihood of unfair sentences if this factor may
never be taken into account is very high. 6.
The second limitation is supported by Prof Terblanche. 7.
With reference to the third limitation, Prof Terblanche submitted that
the wording “any relationship” is too wide and should be narrowed to protect
the interests that are likely at stake here, namely that of close or formerly
close relationships. It is therefore,
submitted that the wording of section 51(3)(aA) should be tightened and
should be phrased acknowledging that single factors are not considered to be
substantial and compelling circumstances. 8.
It is submitted that there is no single valid reason from the
perspective of sentencing principle for now changing the heading of section
51 as if these prescriptions permit more discretion than in the past. 9.
It is submitted that if rape as contained in Part I of Schedule 2 is
moved to Part II regional courts will have the power to try and sentence all
charges of rape. This should it is
submitted be sufficient punishment for the vast majority of convicted rapists
and such a move will have the following advantages: (1)
there is no need for a committal procedure and section 52 can still be
deleted; (2) sentencing takes place in
a court where the trial was conducted , which means there are no reductions,
but without resorting to increasing the jurisdiction of regional courts; (3)
life imprisonment can still be imposed for rape when appropriate (where
prosecution takes place in the High Court); (4) it fits in with the logic of the prescribed
sentences for murder, where aggravated forms are in Part I and the rest in
Part II – for rape the equivalent it would mean the aggravated forms are in Part
II and the rest (as it is currently) in Part III. This submission also supports retaining the
amendment to section 21 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998, if a
higher sentence in the High Court is required or foreseen. In this regard, the amendment of section
309 of the Criminal Procedure Act becomes unnecessary. |
1 |
Practice
committee of the |
1. The Committee is opposed to the proposed
extension of the jurisdiction of the regional court. Their submission is based on the fact that
there are material differences between the High Court and the lower courts
and nothing has happened to eliminate or decrease this disparity or to reduce
“the risk of an error leading to injustice”.
The Committee also submitted that life imprisonment remains the
ultimate sentence in our law and in their view the currency of sentencing
would be debased if sentences of life imprisonment were to be imposed by what
is still described as “lower courts”. 2. In reference to subsection (3)(aA), the
Practice Committee submitted that they are opposed to the suggested amendment
of the present criteria. The Committee
further submitted that in view of the interpretation given in S v Malgas the
proposed amendment will offend against this process of interpretation should
particular factors now be identified by the legislature and excluded in
advance from enquiry. The Committee
also submitted that there is a risk that once particular circumstances have
been expressly excluded by the legislature, affected parties or interest
groups may decide to complain about other individual factors leading to a
series of knee-jerk legislative reactions to include or exclude facts or
circumstances. 3. The Practice Committee welcomed the repeal
of section 51(4) and the amendment of section 51(5). |
1 |
Judge
Bertelsmann |
1. It is submitted that the abolition of the
referral process is welcomed. 2. It is, however, further submitted that the
proposed increase in the jurisdiction of the regional court is worrisome,
since history has shown that every increase in the penal jurisdiction of the
lower judiciary has resulted in all courts in the increase of the sentences
imposed. 3. It is further submitted that the current
clogging of the High Court rolls by section 52 referrals will be replaced by
a significantly more severe bottleneck of appeals that will be launched as a
matter of course against the imposition of life sentences in the regional
court. 4. It is submitted that subsection (3)(aA)
will further restrict the discretion of the Judiciary. 5. Finally, it is submitted that apart from
welcoming the abolition of the referral process and the reintroduction of the
ability to take time spent in custody while awaiting trial into account in
imposing sentence, the rest of the proposals must be rejected. |
1 |
CSPRI |
It is
submitted that the Bill will have a significant impact on the size of the
prison population by effectively increasing the sentence jurisdiction of the
regional courts. |
1 |
Child
Justice Alliance |
1. It is submitted that section 51(6)(a) is
unconstitutional and violates |
1 |
Southern
African Catholic Bishop’s Conference |
1. They welcomed the amendment to section
51(4). 2. In reference to section 51(6) read with the
repeal of section 51(3)(b), it is submitted that it makes it more likely that
prescribed sentences, including life imprisonment will be imposed on youthful
offenders as young as 16. It is
submitted that the younger the offender the greater should the discretion of
a court be to determine a sentence that is appropriate to the circumstances
of the offender and in this regard the advantage of section 51(3)(b) as it
currently stands is that it leaves the matter far more to the discretion of
the court. |
2 |
ARMSA |
ARMSA
supports the repeal of these sections. |
2 |
Basil
King |
1. It is submitted that without a referral
being at all possible, some offenders may still receive inadequate
punishment. It is therefore submitted
that since the Bill contains certain provisions amending the Criminal Procedure
Act, 1977 it also further amends section 114 or 116 (which relates to
referral from District Courts) or inserts new provisions in Chapters 17 and
18 to cater for a referral from a regional court to a High Court, not only to
provide machinery for any such case but also in the promotion of
independence, that is that the judiciary makes the final decision as to the
proper punishment and not the prosecution service. Or is it submitted that the Bill should
contain a provision allowing a regional court to commit the accused for
sentence by a High Court in circumstances similar to the original section
52(1), if the regional court is of the opinion that the offence concerned
warrants punishment in excess of its jurisdiction. |
3 |
ARMSA |
ARMSA supports the repeal of
sections 53(1), (2) and (2A). |
3 |
Basil
King |
1.
It is submitted that it is not clear why clause 3 only causes a
deletion of subsections (1), (2) and (2A).
Subsections (3) and (5), it was further submitted, will play no meaningful
role in view of the new transitional process set out in clause 6 of the Bill
and should thus also be repealed. 2.
Clause 6 should effect an amendment to the Act so that the
transitional provision is not left standing in some other Act. Section 53, it was submitted, should rather
reflect the transitional process. 3.
It is submitted that the words “and 52” should be deleted from section
53(4). |
3 |
SAHRC |
The Commission does not support
the removal of the provision that allowed for minimum sentencing to be
extended every two years. The
Commission submitted in this regard that it would prefer for minimum
sentencing to be done away with and for there to be a serious debate about
appropriate sentencing frameworks in |
3 |
OSF-SA |
The OSF-SA does not support the
repeal of sections 53(1) and (2).
They submitted that Parliament
is hereby essentially entrenching minimum sentencing in our law as a
permanent feature and that they supported the development of a comprehensive
and coherent sentencing framework that deals with sentencing across all crime
categories and at all levels. |
3 |
CSVR |
CSVR submitted that section
53(1)(2) and (2A) should be retained, or a fixed period for the retention of
this legislation should be stipulated, whilst a review of the current system
and a redrafting of a new and comprehensive framework is undertaken. |
3 |
Prof
SS Terblanche |
Prof Terblanche submitted that
making the legislation permanent will readily result in a reassessment of the
situation and the legislation might well not survive another constitutional
challenge. It is submitted that
section 53(1) and (2) should remain in place. |
3 |
CSPRI |
It is submitted that the deletion
of section 53 is premature and that further dialogue is required on a
sentencing reform programme. |
3 |
Southern
African Catholic Bishop’s Conference |
It is submitted that removing
section 53(1) from the effective oversight of Parliament is a retrograde step
and an admission of defeat in the fight against crime. |
4 |
ARMSA
|
ARMSA supports clause
4. |
4 |
Basil
King |
1.
It is submitted that further textual amendments be effected at this
stage, particularly to what was section 309(1)(a)(iii) [now to be
309(1)(a)(i)(cc)] namely by rectifying
the ‘rather ridiculous’ situation that currently exists regarding the use of
the words “any form of imprisonment contemplated in section 276(1)”. The problem, it was submitted, with this
phrase is that an accused person under the age of 21 years, who is sent to a
reform school by a district or regional court, has to apply for leave to
appeal as imprisonment contemplated in section 276(1) excludes a referral to
a reform school made in terms of section 290(1)(d) – although the matter is
subject to automatic review. 2.
It is further submitted that a sentence of life imprisonment should be
automatically reviewable by a judge of the provincial or local division
having jurisdiction and that an appropriate amendment in this regard should
be made to section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. |
4 |
CSVR |
CSVR submitted that while doing
away with the split procedure of referring cases to the High Court for
sentencing may reduce the number of backlogs at the High Court, the proposed
automatic right of appeal will introduce problems of its own. They submitted that in order to fully
utilise the appeal procedures the accused person should have access to legal
assistance, which is not always available and that the number of appeal
generated by this process will further exacerbate the backlog of appeals
before the High Courts. |
4 |
Child
Justice Alliance |
It is submitted that although the
CJA welcomed the amendments made to the ages of children in this amendment,
they requested that it should be amended further to provide all children with
an automatic right of appeal. |
4 |
Southern
African Catholic Bishop’s Conference |
It is submitted that delays and
backlogs will continue even if
provision is made for an automatic right of appeal against life
sentences, since the regional courts will take more time to finalise such
cases with due diligence and thoroughness and the fact that there will be an
increase in the appeal roll in the High Court. |
5 |
ARMSA |
ARMSA supports clause 5. |
5 |
Basil
King |
It is submitted that whilst the
directive may be clear in its terms, the possibility of a serious case
‘slipping through’ merely because the investigation is not complete or adequate
or covers aspects that may be necessary for a determination of forum may
result in an offender escaping ‘proper’ justice. It is therefore submitted that although
such directives may be necessary, the only ‘safe’ solution is to make
provision for a referral, in appropriate cases, from a regional court to a
High Court for sentence purposes. |
5 |
NPA |
1.
The NPA posed a question as to what criteria could be used to
determine which of the relevant cases must still be tried in the High Court
if the regional court has jurisdiction to impose life sentences
notwithstanding the seriousness or complexity of a case. The NPA further submitted in this regard
that to direct that the seriousness or complexity of the case are factors
would be inconsistent with the paramount principle contained in the Bill,
namely, to provide the regional court with the same penal jurisdiction as the
High Court. Similarly, the NPA
submitted that to direct that “high profile” or “controversial” cases must be
tried in the High Court, would be inconsistent with the constitutional right
that “everyone is equal before the law”. 2.
The NPA submitted that if the PC approves the principle to grant a
regional court jurisdiction to impose life imprisonment, the NPA would
undertake to issue policy directives to ensure that cases are tried in the
High Court as court of first instance where the facts are such that it would
in the opinion of the prosecuting authority warrant the imposition of
imprisonment for life. 2.
The NPA submitted that they did not support this amendment and stated
that the NPA is of the view that it is not desirable to include this
provision in the Act. The NPA further submitted
that should the Committee approve this amendment then it is recommended that
the first line of subsection (3) be amended to read as follows “The policy
directives or amendments thereto must include …”. This will make clear the distinction made
in the Constitution between “policy directives” and “prosecution policy”. |
6 |
ARMSA |
ARMSA
submitted that these mere referrals could take months to finalise since these
cases will have to be placed on the rolls of the High Courts in order for
them to be referred back and therefore they submitted that in order to speed
up the finalisation of these cases in the transitional phase, the legislation
must allow the regional court to maintain jurisdiction over those cases
referred to the High Court which have not yet been heard by it. The “If a
regional court has, prior to the commencement of the Act, committed an
accused for sentence by a High Court under the Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1997, and – (a) The
case has not been allocated a court date in the High Court prior to the date
of the commencing of this Act, then the regional court will have jurisdiction
to impose sentence as prescribed in this Act as if the accused was never
committed for sentence by a High Court. (b) The
case has been allocated a court date, prior to the date of the commencing of
this Act then the High Court must on the allocated or any earliest possible
date refer the matter back to the Regional Court for sentencing. (c) The
High Court has heard the matter prior to the date of the commencing of this
Act, or it was on the court roll on a date prior to it, then the High Court
must dispose of the matter as if the Act had not been passed.”. |
6 |
NPA |
The NPA
submitted that the transitional provision should be deleted. Instead they recommended a practical
arrangement whereby cases already in the High Court should be finalised by
the High Court and cases in the regional court should be adjourned (instead of
referred to the High Court for sentencing) to be resumed after the law came
into effect. |
6 |
Basil King |
It is
submitted that a word other than “heard” be employed in the text. The High Courts have already had to debate
whether a judge is or is not ‘seized’ with a matter after referral and a query
has been raised by a judge, and a similar situation could again arise in this
regard as to when a matter is or has been ‘heard’. |
Schedule 2 |
ARMSA |
1. ARMSA submitted that in order to enhance
case flow management in respect of Schedule 2 offences, a section should be
included in the Bill which obliges the prosecution to provide a summary of
facts and a list of state witnesses to the clerk of the court and the defence
representatives before the matter is finally placed for trial in the regional
court in the case of trials for offences listed in Parts I, II and III of
Schedule 2. (This is done in the High
Court in terms of section 144(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977). 2. ARMSA submitted that the current reference
in Part II of Schedule 2 of the Act to the possession of a semi-automatic
firearm should exclude a semi-automatic pistol, since the various divisions
of the High Court have interpreted section 51(2) of the Act in such a way
that it is now virtually impossible to impose the minimum sentence for such
an offence. 3. ARMSA submitted that rape (other than that
described in Part I of Schedule 2) should be moved from Part III to Part II
of the Schedule in order to address the seemingly inordinate disparity
between rapes as described in Part I which carries a sentence of life
imprisonment and all other rapes which carries a minimum sentence of only ten
years, while there may be extremely serious cases of rape which warrant a
severe sentence but does not fall within Part I. |