SUBMISSION TO THE
PARLIAMENTARY PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
THE CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) AMENDMENT BILL
Prepared by:
Tshwaranang
15 June 2007
Submission to the Parliamentary
portfolio committee on Justice and Constitutional Development:
The Criminal Law (Sentencing)
Amendment Bill
We make this submission on behalf of
Tshwaranang
We thank Parliament for the
opportunity to comment on the proposed Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill
[B15 – 2007]. The overall effect of the proposed amendments is to make minimum
sentences for certain crimes “permanent fixtures”, amongst other things.
We acknowledge that the minimum
sentences originally set out in the Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 105 of
1997) (“the Act”) have increased the overall length of sentences handed down
for rape. The length of some of these sentences is welcome recognition by the
courts that rape is deserving of severe punishment. Nonetheless, while we
support the principle that sentencing guidelines and minima are necessary in
cases of rape, as well as other forms of gender-based violence, we do not
consider the current Act or the Amendment Bill to provide a framework adequate to
this task.
Background
to the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill
Minimum sentences, in the form of
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, were introduced at least partially
in response to public concerns about serious crimes. In the leading case on the
interpretation of Act 105, the Supreme Court of Appeals (SCA) noted: “That
situation was and remains notorious: an alarming burgeoning in the commission
of crimes of the kind specified resulting in government, the police,
prosecutors and the courts constantly being exhorted to use their best efforts
to stem the tide of criminality which threatened and continues to threaten to
engulf society.”[1] In
addition, there also appeared to be a public perception that the courts were
too lenient and were handing down “soft” sentences.
Several cases have challenged the
constitutionality of the Act, suggesting that minimum sentencing legislation
violates the principle of separation of powers, the fair trial rights and the
right not to be punished in a cruel, degrading and inhuman way. The discretion to deviate from the prescribed
minimum sentences, located in a finding that “substantial and compelling
circumstances” exist, has been particularly contested. The debate has however
been settled by both the SCA and the
A temporary measure
From the outset it was made clear
that the Act was temporary. Section 53 stated that the provisions of sections
51 and 52 would lapse two years after the commencement of the Act (1998),
unless extended by the President by proclamation in the Government Gazette for
a year at a time. Parliament would have
to concur with the extension. The operations of the provisions have indeed been
extended by the President and the Act continues to be in operation.
Prior to the introduction of the
minimum sentences contained in the Act, in 1996 the then-Minister of Justice
appointed a new project committee of the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC)
to investigate all aspects of sentencing. This committee, known as the Van den
Heever committee, operated from late 1996 to March 1998. Later that year a new committee, under the
leadership of Professor Dirk van Zyl Smit, was appointed by the Minister of
Justice. This committee undertook research to determine the impact of the minimum
sentencing legislation both on sentencing outcomes as well as on the
perceptions of this form of sentencing by key role players in the criminal
justice system. The committee also issued a discussion paper, number 91,
entitled Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) which included draft
legislation. Closing date for comments on this discussion paper was given as 31
May 2000. For reasons unknown to us, the draft legislation proposed never
proceeded beyond this point and the minimum sentencing legislation was renewed
regularly instead.
This history too suggests that the
minimum sentences were intended to be a stopgap while the SALRC completed its
comprehensive overview.
Limited scope of the Act
The current minimum sentences are
applicable only to rape, murder and robbery. Under defined circumstances
minimum sentences are also applicable to drug trafficking; dealing in and
smuggling of ammunitions, firearms, explosives or armaments; possessing
explosives, armaments and automatic or semi-automatic firearms; and exchange
control, extortion, fraud, forgery, uttering or theft. They are thus both
narrow and highly specific in scope.
By contrast, the project committee's
investigations and recommendations were wide-ranging and comprehensive and intended
to apply to all crimes. Amongst other things, they proposed the establishment
of a Sentencing Council which would produce guidelines around the length of
sentences; procedures for a variety of sentence types (such as fines, suspended
and postponed sentences and periodic imprisonment); restitution and
compensation orders; committals to treatment centres; and procedures for dealing
with dangerous criminals and persistent offenders. The last recommendation
could be of particular help in dealing with certain sex offenders.
The narrowness in scope and content
of the current Act not only excludes other serious crimes (such as kidnapping
and abduction which are sometimes associated with rape), but it also treats
only one crime against women – rape - as being sufficiently serious to warrant
sentencing guidelines. Other sexual offences such as attempted rape, incest, or
statutory rape are not dealt with at all – despite the fact that these crimes
too are dealt with in ways that are highly inconsistent and suggestive of
inappropriate leniency.
The question of how to sentence in
cases of domestic violence is not dealt with at all – despite concerns around the
inconsistent, inappropriate and lenient treatment meted out to perpetrators of
domestic violence. Guidelines around the use of fines, suspended sentences,
correctional supervision, imprisonment and periodic imprisonment, mediation and
restorative justice are urgently needed in this regard. Further, by
concentrating on murder only, the minimum sentences do not entirely address the
serious problem of men’s killing of their intimate female partners, the most
extreme form of domestic violence. Rather than being treated as murder, many of
these cases are dealt with as culpable homicide or as assaults with intent to
cause grievous bodily harm and therefore slip out of the minimum sentencing net
entirely.
In addition, these sentences have
been used with devastating effect on a group of female victims of domestic
violence: women who kill their abusive male partners. Prior to S v Ferreira, Chilambo and Koesyn[3]
domestic violence was not recognised as a substantial and compelling circumstance,
with the result that women like Ms Ferreira were sentenced to life
imprisonment. Unfortunately, not all abused women have access to competent
legal representatives familiar with defending abused women. Thus despite the
landmark Ferreira decision, abused
women are still being sentenced to very lengthy terms of imprisonment on the
basis of minimum sentence legislation.
The Sexual Offences Bill recently
passed by the National Assembly introduces a range of new offences, including
against children. These too will require
sentencing guidelines. The current Act and the proposed amendment do not take
these new offences into account and will not be applicable to the full scope of
offences contained in the Act. This will
undermine one of the key objectives of the act, namely to protect women and
children and to ensure a consistent and non-discriminatory approach by all
stakeholders. In the context of “corrective” rape targeting lesbians, it is
necessary to also consider hate crimes enacted in the form of sexual violence.
We are
therefore concerned that making the current minimum sentencing legislation
permanent, in the manner prescribed in the proposed amendment, endorses an ad
hoc and piecemeal approach to sentencing as a whole in the context of a much
broader problem of gender-based violence.
On balance, the legislation has not produced
the results assumed
Despite the extension of sections 51
and 52 of the minimum sentencing legislation on several occasions, the
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development does not appear to have evaluated
whether or not minimum sentences have reduced the crimes concerned; led to more
consistent sentencing patterns; or allayed public fears around crime. A cursory perusal of recent media reports,
including the debacle earlier this year around First National Bank’s anti-crime
campaign, suggests that at least in respect of public perceptions, minimum
sentences have had little impact. There is also no evidence to suggest that
minimum sentences have dramatically reduced the crime of rape.
Research commissioned by the Open
Society Foundation (OSF) for
Impact on
administration of justice
The OSF research also found
sentences for the prescribed crimes tended to have increased as a result of the
legislation.[5] However,
they also observed that the legislation was neither systematically nor
consistently applied.[6]
This seems to be particularly the case in respect of rape, with a submission by
the Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against Women, made in 2005 to the
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, illustrating the wide
discrepancies in sentences for rape. The submission, which contains an analysis
of recent rape judgments, notes that rape myths and gender stereotypes continue
to inform the interpretation of “substantial and compelling circumstances” by
the courts and are used by the courts to justify a departure from the
legislation and the imposition of lower sentences.
The OSF research notes too the
impact of the minimum sentencing legislation on court processes and
performance. These effects include an increase in the number of appeals against
conviction and sentence (with obvious implications for the court rolls of the
High Courts and Supreme Court); more ‘not guilty’ pleas and increased requests
for legal aid (increasing the number of trials as well as the use of state
resources for legal aid); and increased demands for probation officers’
reports. Given the limited number of probation officers, cases will be further
delayed while waiting for such reports.[7]
The increasing length of case cycles, which the minimum sentencing legislation
contributes to, is also reducing court efficiency according to the OSF report.
Between 2002 and 2005 the number of cases finalised in the regional courts fell
an average of 260 to 179 cases for each court.[8]
The authors of the OSF report also
find that rape cases are considerably more likely to be withdrawn at court than
other serious crimes. They suggest that pressure on prosecutors to increase the
number of convictions is leading to a greater number of cases being withdrawn
before the trial commences.[9]
Therefore, while heavier sentences for rape are sometimes being handed down, the
symbolic or deterrent effect of this must be offset against the fact that fewer
rape victims are being permitted their day in court.
Costs of the legislation to the
criminal justice system
The
memorandum attached to the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Bill states that no costs
are attached to this proposed legislation. We submit that this cannot be
correct. Allowing for automatic appeals in cases where magistrates have handed
down life sentences will continue to impact on the High Court’s already-clogged
roll. Such appeals must also be heard by two judges (which also has cost
implications). The Bill also has cost implications for the Department of
Correctional Services (DCS). An analysis of the impact of the current Act on
the size of the South African prison population suggests that if current trends
are maintained, the current prison population will swell to over 226 000 in
2015 (from the 157 402 people imprisoned by December 2005).[10]
Continued growth in the prison population has definite financial implications
for DCS.
Non-financial
costs, which will largely be borne by complainants, include a loss of faith in
the criminal justice system by the increasing number of rape complainants’
whose matters are withdrawn at court, as well as the reduced efficiency of the
criminal justice system. In addition, efforts to reduce prison overcrowding
frequently include amnesties and remissions. These periodic releases not only
undermine public faith in the criminal justice system but also weaken the
supposed deterrent or punitive consequences of crime – thus contradicting the
imposition of lengthy sentences in the first place.
The proposed Bill
Some of
the proposed amendments are ambiguous and could lead to confusion amongst
presiding officers. The proposed substitution for section 51 is entitled “Discretionary
minimum sentences for certain serious offences.” Currently minimum sentences
shall be imposed unless “substantial and compelling circumstances” are found.
Potentially this wording suggests that in future minimum sentences may be
applied at the presiding officer’s discretion. If so, then this dilutes the
current approach to minimum sentences.
A
dilution also seems implicit in the wording of section (3) (a). If “substantial
and compelling circumstances” are found, it is proposed that a lesser sentence must
be imposed. Currently the act states that it may be imposed. ‘Must’ is
peremptory while ‘may’ is discretionary so this wording seems at odds with the
notion that these are discretionary minimum sentences.
Additions to “substantial and
compelling circumstances”
As Rape Crisis and others have noted
previously,[11] the
interpretation of “substantial and compelling circumstances” is concerning,
especially, with respect, at the High Court level where judges frequently rely
on rape myths and gender stereotypes and fail to understand the manner in which
sexual violence undermines and infringes the constitutional rights of women and
girls to dignity, equality and freedom and security of the person.
The
The case analysis conducted by the
Western Cape Consortium highlights the following factors being relied on to
justify lesser sentences for rapists:
·
the previous sexual history of the complainant[14];
·
an accused’s cultural beliefs about sexual assault[15];
·
an accused’s use of intoxicating substances prior to the
assault[16];
·
an accused’s lack of intention to cause harm to the
complainant in committing the rape[17];
·
a lack of education, sophistication or a disadvantaged
background of the accused[18];
·
a lack of “excessive force” used to perpetrate the rape[19];
·
a lack or apparent lack of physical harm to the complainant[20];
·
a lack or apparent lack of psychological harm to the
complainant[21]; or
·
any relationship between the accused and the complainant
prior to the offence being committed (including a consensual sexual
relationship)[22].
In light
of this, the proposed additions to “substantial and compelling circumstances” for
rape contained in 3(aA) do not go far enough in ensuring that courts do not rely
on factors that undermine women’s rights to dignity and equality. The Bill only
excludes three of these concerns as “substantial and compelling circumstances”:
the complainant’s previous sexual history; the accused person’s cultural or
religious beliefs about rape; and any relationship between the accused person
and the complainant prior to the rape. The inclusion of the last factor, the
prior relationship between the complainant and the accused, is also potentially
difficult and requires careful consideration. Rape by a family member, or in
the context of an intimate relationship, is as serious as rape by a stranger.
However, it is our experience that women and children are sometimes unwilling
to pursue cases of rape (or domestic violence) when they become aware of the
long-term imprisonment that may result. While they would like to see the
perpetrator sanctioned and held responsible for their wrongs, they do not necessarily
wish to see them imprisoned for lengthy periods of time. A very careful balance
needs to be struck between punishing sexual violence committed by family
members and intimate partners on the one hand, and respecting the victim’s
wishes on the other – particularly when such perpetrators may escape punishment
altogether if the complainant withdraws the charge. Therefore, we would submit
that the entire approach to sentencing rapists must be reconsidered – including
the mitigating factors taken into account in relation to the accused.
Recommendations:
1. We submit that the Committee allow the
current period of the minimum sentencing to run its course. While it is doing
so, we recommend that the Sentencing Framework Bill be resuscitated and
submitted to Parliament for consideration, as well as public participation. This
would allow for the issues canvassed here to be widely debated and a more
comprehensive and inclusive approach taken to sentencing generally. We submit
further that the issue of minimum sentencing is one that requires a holistic
approach and that a piecemeal approach will only perpetuate greater injustice
and inconsistency in treatment of cases.
2. We further submit that the minimum
sentencing legislation was introduced without opportunity for adequate public
participation. Limited notice has also been given to make written submissions
on the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill. We therefore urge to Committee
to consider inviting oral submissions around this Bill as well.
[1] S v Malgas 2001
(1) SACR 469 at 476 e - f
[2] See S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC); S v Dzukuda 2000 (11) BCLR 1252
(CC); S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (2001 (1) SA 1222).
[3] CCT case
245/03 (SCA)
[4] Ron Paschke and Heather Sherwin, Quantitative Research Report on Sentencing Study conducted on
behalf of the South African Law Commission (2000), 7.
[5] Michael O’ Donovan and Jean Redpath, The Impact of Minimum Sentencing in
[6] See note 5, 54,
55.
[7] See note 5, 47,
48
[8] See note 5, 47
[9] See note 5, 71
[10] Chris Giffard and
[11] Western
Justice and Constitutional Development in Response to the Evaluation
of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, (2005).
[12] Carmichele
v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SACR 166 (C)
[13] Nkomo v The
State [2006] SCA 167 RSA.
[14] S v Mahamotsa, unreported Judgment dated
[15] S v Mvamvu 2004 SCA (Case No: 350/2003).
[16] S v Njikelana 2003 (2) SACR 166 (C).
[17] See note 13.
[18] See note 14.
[19] See S v G 2004 (2) SACR 296 (W); and S v Shongwe 2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA).
[20] See notes 16 and 19.
[21] See notes 15 and S v Shongwe in note 19.
[22] See Mvamvu and Abrahams below.