CHILD JUSTICE ALLIANCE


Submission on Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill 15 of 2007

 

We refer to the above and wish to make the following submission on behalf of the Child Justice Alliance. The Child Justice Alliance was formed in February 2001. From 2001 – 2003, the Alliance was aiming at creating an awareness campaign around the Child Justice Bill and garnering support for it during the parliamentary process. However, from 2003, once the public hearings on the Bill were completed, the work of the Alliance took on a new focus. The work of the Alliance now concentrated primarily on research projects and awareness raising activities around the content of the law, implementation of the Child Justice Act and monitoring such implementation.

 

The Child Justice Alliance consists of over 400 members and friends, who are either civil society organisations or concerned individuals. The Alliance is run by a driver group that consists of a number of organisations concerned with child justice issues. These are: The Restorative Justice Centre; the Children’s Rights Project at the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape (CLC);the Defence, Peace, Safety and Security (DPSS) Crime Prevention (CP) Research Group (formerly the Crime Prevention Centre) at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR); Lawyers for Human Rights; NICRO National Office; the Youth Justice Project at the Institute of Criminology UCT; the Centre for Child Law, University of Pretoria; the Institute for Security Studies; the Campus Law Clinic, University of Kwa Zulu-Natal; the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative at the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape; Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN) and the University of Cape Town Social Development Department at the Faculty of Humanities.

 

Submission on section 51 (6)(a) of the Amendment Bill

 

It is the submission of the Child Justice Alliance that section 51 (6)(a) of Bill 15 of 2007 is unconstitutional and violates South Africa’s international obligations.  

 

The section reads as follows:

 

“(6) [The provisions of this] This section [shall] does not [be applicable] apply in respect of a [child] person who was under the age of—

(a) 16 years at the time of the commission of [the act which constituted the offence in question] an offence contemplated in subsection (1) or (2)(a) or (b);”

It is our submission that the section violates the rights contained in sections 28(1) (g) and 28(2) of the bill of rights in that it makes minimum sentences applicable to 16 and 17 year olds.

 

What follows below is an explanation for this assertion.

 

1.             Section 28(2) of the bill of rights

 

This section reads as follows:

 

“A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning a child”.

 

In South African law, this is a right that all children enjoy (Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000(3) SA 422 (CC)).  It is more than a principle.[1]

 

It is now well established that section 28(2) is highly relevant to the exercise of a court’s sentencing discretion and a court, when sentencing a child is obliged to consider that child’s best interests.  Of relevance is the case of Brandt v S [2005] 2 All SA 1 (SCA) where the court stated:

 

In sentencing a young offender, the presiding officer must be guided in the decision-making process by certain principles: including the principle of proportionality; the best interests of the child; and, the least possible restrictive deprivation of the child’s liberty, which should be a measure of last resort and restricted to the shortest possible period of time.”

 

In order for a court to take the best interests of a child into account in sentencing, the court must be able to exercise it’s discretion and the requirement that a minimum sentence must be imposed on 16 and 17 year olds as required in section 51(6)(a) is contrary to the right contained in section 28(2).[2] The need for a court to take the child’s best interests into account and adopt an individualized approach was set out in the case of S v Kwalase 2000 (2) SACR 135(C) where the court stated as follows:

 

“The judicial approach towards the sentencing of juvenile offenders must therefore be re-appraised and developed in order to promote an individualised response which is not only in proportion to the nature and gravity of the offence and the needs of society, but which is also appropriate to the needs and interests of the juvenile offender. If at all possible, the sentencing judicial officer must structure the punishment in such a way so as to promote the reintegration of the juvenile concerned into his or her family and community”

 

 

2.             Section 28(1)(g) of the bill of rights

 

The section states:

 

Every child has the right “not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time…”

 

The imposition of a minimum sentence on a child as contemplated in section 51(6)(a) not only envisages the imposition of a minimum sentence as a measure of first resort but the very nature of minimum sentences also means that the detention will not be for the shortest appropriate period of time.

 

This was held in Brandt v S [2005] 2 All SA 1 (SCA), where the Court found minimum sentences were not applicable to 16 and 17 year olds relying on constitutional and international law obligations. The Court in this case stated as follows:

 

“If the notional starting point for the category of offender envisaged in subsection 3(b) is that the minimum prescribed sentence is applicable, as the majority in the court a quo and the full bench in Makwetsja (supra[3]) suggest, then imprisonment (the prescribed sentence) would be the first resort for children aged 16 and 17 years in respect of offences covered by the Act instead of the last resort….[n]evertheless, on the approach of the majority in the court a quo and of the Transvaal Provincial Division in Makwetsja, a sentencing court would be unable to depart from the statutorily prescribed minimum unless the child offender establishes the existence of substantial and compelling circumstances. To this extent the offender under 18 would be burdened in the same way as an offender over 18. This would infringe the principle that imprisonment as a sentencing option should be used for child offenders as a last resort and only for the shortest appropriate period of time.”

 

The right of a child to be detained as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time was also addressed in DPP KwaZulu Natal v P 2006(1) SACR 243 (SCA) where the court stated:

 

Having regard to s 28 (1) (g) of the Constitution and the relevant international instruments, as already indicated, it is clear that in every case involving a juvenile offender, the ambit and scope of sentencing will have to be widened in order to give effect to the principle that a child offender is ‘not to be detained except, as a measure of last resort’ and if detention of a child is unavoidable, this should be ‘only for the shortest appropriate period of time’.”

 

It is submitted that section 51(6)(a) of Bill 15 of 2007 falls foul of section 28(1)(g) of the bill of rights as it removes the discretion of a court to apply the right contained in section 28(1)(g) unless substantial and compelling reasons exist to do so, a situation that does not observe the spirit, import and obligation of section 28(1)(g).

 

 

South Africa’s international obligations 

 

South Africa has ratified both the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as well as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC).

 

Both of these instruments oblige states to adopt legislative, administrative or other measures to realise the rights contained therein (Article 4 of the CRC and Article 1 of the ACRWC).

 

Both of these instruments require states to respect the principle that in all actions concerning a child, the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration (Article 3 of the CRC and Article 4 of the ACRWC).

 

 The CRC explicitly states that the arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be used only as a matter last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time (Article 37 (b)).

 

In 2007 the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child released General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children’s rights in Juvenile Justice (GC No. 10).

 

In relation to the best interests of the child principle, GC No. 10 states:

 

 “[t]he protection of the best interests of the child means, for instance, that the traditional objectives of criminal justice (repression/retribution) must give way to rehabilitation and restorative justice objectives in dealing with child offenders. This can be done in concert with attention to effective public safety.”

 

In addition, in relation to the right of a child only be detained as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time, GC NO. 10 states:

 

“The laws must provide the court/judge, or other competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body, with a wide variety of possible alternatives to institutional care and deprivation of liberty…to assure that deprivation of liberty be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period of time. …The Committee wants to emphasize that the reaction to an offence should always be in proportion not only to the circumstances and the gravity of the offence, but also to the age, lesser culpability, circumstances and needs of the child, as well as the various and in particular long term needs of the society. A strictly punitive approach is not in accordance with the leading principles for juvenile justice spelled out in article 40(1) CRC[4]…..In cases of severe offences by children, dispositions proportional to the circumstances of the offender and (the gravity) the offence may be considered, including considerations of the needs of public safety and sanctions, but in cases of children such considerations must always be outweighed by the need to safeguard the well-being and the best interests of and to promote the reintegration of the young person.”

 

In Government of the RSA and others v Grootboom and others 2001(1) SA 46 (CC) at para 29 et seq the Constitutional Court relied on general comments of this sort in interpreting the bill of rights.

 

4.             Conclusion

It is the submission of the Child Justice Alliance that section 51(6)(a) is unconstitutional and in conflict with South Africa’s regional and international obligations. This assertion is made relying on judicial interpretation of sections 28(1)(g) and section 28(2) of the bill of rights as well as the interpretations made in the context of child justice applicable to  South Africa’s international obligations. 

 

We therefore propose that no minimum sentences should be applicable to persons under 18 years of age.

 

 

Jacqui Gallinetti

Co-ordinator of the Child Justice Alliance

Senior Researcher

Community Law Centre UWC

 

THIS SUBMISSION IS ALSO ENDORSED BY THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS OF THE CHILD JUSTICE ALLIANCE DRIVER GROUP:

 

·         The Institute for Security Studies

·         The Centre for Child Law, University of Pretoria

·         RAPCAN

·         The Restorative Justice Centre

·         The Defence, Peace, Safety and Security (DPSS) Crime Prevention (CP) Research Group (formerly the Crime Prevention Centre) at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)

·         The Institute of Criminology at the University of Cape Town

·         Lawyers for Human Rights, Pietmaritzburg

·         Children’s Rights Project, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape



[1] The principle is recognized in international law: Article 3 of the CRC and Article 4 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.

[2] Section 28(3) of the bill of rights defines a child to be a person under the age of 18 years.

[3] Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, Transvaal v Makwetsja (2004 (2) SACR 1) (T).

[4] States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child's age and the desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society.