ASSOCIATION OF REGIONAL MAGISTRATES

OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

 

VERENIGING VAN STREEKLANDDROSTE

VAN SUIDELIKE AFRIKA

 

EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

AC BEKKER (PRESIDENT) LH CLAASSEN (SECRETARY) GN TRAVERS (TREASURER)

 

 

COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW

(SENTENCING) AMENDMENT BILL, 2007

 

 

INTRODUCTION   

 

The Association of Regional Magistrates of Southern Africa (ARMSA) represents just over 90% of all regional magistrates in this country. We support the objects of this Bill fully and are committed to ensure that this Bill, if it is put into operation, shall be properly and responsibly applied. We are also committed to providing training and guidance to our members pertaining to the appropriate use of the new sentencing powers extended to us in the Bill. ARMSA is already busy with training on the new Sexual Offences Bill, made possible by the generous support of the Department of Justice. Substantial resource guides and overviews on the Sexual Offences Bill have been drafted, discussed and distributed amongst regional magistrates.  We hope to do the same with the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill as soon as possible.

 

There is no doubt that this Bill, if it becomes law, will expedite the finalization of serious criminal cases as listed in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1997. Currently these cases are delayed for substantial periods of time due to the fact that they must be referred to the High Courts for sentencing. By conferring the Regional Courts with jurisdiction to impose imprisonment for life as envisaged in the Bill, these delays as well as secondary victimization of complainants in sexual offences cases will be avoided. The number of awaiting-trial prisoners will also be substantially reduced. We believe that any fears that the implementation of this Bill will lead to a sharp increase in the percentage of convicted persons serving life imprisonment are unfounded and speculative. In any event those convicted, according to the Bill, will have an automatic right of appeal should life imprisonment be imposed. These cases will simply be dealt with much sooner than in the past. Regional magistrates are already dealing with these cases on a regular basis and deliver verdicts in these cases accordingly. They are now in addition expected to impose an appropriate sentence. With respect, the regional magistrates are often far more experienced in dealing with these cases than Judges and there is therefore every reason to believe that they can also impose sentence appropriately.

 

Since the introduction of the legislation regarding minimum sentences in the late nineties, the vast majority of regional magistrates have applied it wisely and appropriately. We believe that the same will apply should life imprisonment jurisdiction be granted to us. We have already referred to our commitment to and the need for further training and sensitization in relation to the newly-envisaged jurisdiction in order to enhance proper adjudication of these matters.

 

We are confident that this Bill, if put into operation, will only enhance speedy access to justice and will be applied appropriately by the Regional Courts.

 

COMMENTS ON THE CONTENTS OF THE BILL

 

The purpose of these comments is to highlight certain anticipated problem areas and perhaps suggest some improvements.

 

 

AD CLAUSE 1:  SUBSTITUTION OF SECTION 51(1)

 

 Discretionary minimum sentences for certain serious offences

51. (1) Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court or a High Court shall sentence a person it has convicted of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to imprisonment for life.

 

 

·         The proposed clause clearly confers jurisdiction upon a regional court to impose life imprisonment (the prescribed sentence) for the specified offences. 

 

 

·         The authority / jurisdiction to impose a sentence above the general jurisdiction of the regional courts (currently 15 years imprisonment) but less than life imprisonment is not explicitly conferred.

 

 

·         In order to promote clarity it is submitted that such jurisdiction should be explicitly indicated, perhaps by means of a suitably worded proviso to section 51(1).

 

 

                                                             

AD CLAUSE 1:  SUBSTITUTION OF SECTION 51(2)

 

51(2) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court or a High Court shall sentence a person who has been convicted of an offence referred to in—

(a) Part II of Schedule 2, in the case of—

(i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15 years;

 

(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 20 years; and

 

(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 25 years;

 

(b) Part III of Schedule 2, in the case of—

 

(i)  a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 10 years;

 

(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not   less than 15 years; and

 

(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a  period not less than 20 years; and

 

(c) Part IV of Schedule 2, in the case of—

 

(i)  a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 5 years;

 

(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 7 years; and

 

(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 10 years:

 

Provided that the maximum term of imprisonment that a regional court may impose in terms of this subsection shall not be more than five years longer than the minimum term of imprisonment that it may impose in terms of this subsection.

 

·         The substance of section 51(2) is unchanged. However the same problem arises here as that which arises with the proposed extension of life imprisonment jurisdiction to the Regional Court: if the presiding officer decides to impose a lesser sentence than the minimum prescribed in the instance of a second or third offender of a Part II offence or for a third offender in a Part III offence, there is no indication in Section 51(2) whether he or she has authority to impose a sentence above his current general jurisdiction of 15 years.

 

·         We respectfully submit that consideration should be given to adding a suitably worded proviso to Section 51(2).

 

·         An anomaly arises in regard to certain statutory offences referred to in Part II of Schedule 2, for instance under the Drugs and Drugs Trafficking Act, (Act 140 of 1992)[1], the Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act 60 of 2000)[2] which provide maximum penalties higher than the general fifteen year jurisdiction of the regional courts and confer jurisdiction to impose these increased penalties on the magistrates’ courts.

 

·         For instance a regional court can impose up to 25 (twenty-five) years imprisonment for possession of a machine gun (automatic rifle) in contravention of section 4(a) of Act 60 of 2000 under section 121 read with Schedule 4 of the same Act.

 

·         The proviso to Section 51(2) can be interpreted to limit the penal jurisdiction of the regional courts even where another statute confers increased penal jurisdiction on the regional courts (that is jurisdiction in excess of its jurisdiction under 92(1) (a) of Act 32 of 1944.

 

·         This is unlikely to have been the intention of the legislature. We submit that this (apparent) anomaly should be clarified possibly by adding a second proviso to Section 51 (2)

 

·         A further problem may arise with the repeal of sections 52(1)(a)(ii) or (b)(ii) and 52A(1)(a)(ii) or (b)(ii) of the current Act.  The sections currently permit a referral in respect of an offence listed in Parts II, III or IV of Schedule 2 to the Act where “the court is of the opinion that the offence concerned merits punishment in excess of the jurisdiction of a regional court in terms of section 51(2)”.

 

·         There may be instances tried before a regional court where such offences (particularly murder and rape in circumstances other than those referred to in Part I and III respectively and robbery with aggravating circumstances) may merit punishment in excess of that conferred by the Act.  If the aforementioned sections are repealed the accused would escape with an inappropriately lenient sentence.

 

·         Seen in the light of the above-mentioned problems, it is our humble submission that an increase in the general penal jurisdiction of the Regional Courts should perhaps be considered. 

 

·         Alternatively, consideration should be given to increasing the penal jurisdiction of the regional courts in respect of certain (common law) offences listed in Schedule 2 to the Act.

 

·         We submit that consideration should be given to increasing the jurisdiction to 25 or 30 years. Such an increase will ensure that the Regional Courts will be able to deal adequately with all the offences listed in all the parts of Schedule 2.

 

 AD CLAUSE 1:  SUBSTITUTION OF SECTION 51(3)

 

  • The exclusion of certain circumstances as possible substantial and compelling circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence in Section 51(3)(aA) will most probably be criticized as being an attempt to further interfere with the presiding officer’s discretion at the sentencing stage. Some of our members expressed such sentiments while others were satisfied with the wording of the proposed section.

 

 

AD CLAUSE 1:  SUBSTITUTION OF SECTION 51(5)

 

(5) (a)  Subject to paragraph (b), the operation of a sentence imposed in terms of this section shall not be suspended as contemplated in section 297(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977).

 

 (b) If a sentence is imposed in terms of subsection (2)(c), not more than half of that sentence may be suspended as contemplated in section 297(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977). 

 

·         The proposed amendment is supported.

 

·         There are differing opinions as to whether the operation of a sentence of imprisonment imposed for an offence listed in Schedule 2 can be suspended in terms of section 297(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977)[3] where the court “is satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist that justify the imposition of a lesser sentence” and imposes a lesser sentence.

 

·         One view holds that such a sentence is nevertheless still a sentence in terms of this section (i.e., section 51) and the court may not suspend the operation of the sentence imposed.

 

·         The other view holds that in such a case the court no longer imposes a sentence in terms of section 51 and is free to suspend the whole or a portion of such a sentence.

 

·         We submit that this ambiguity should be clarified so that the intention of the legislature is clearly stated.

 

 

MINIMUM SENTENCES AND THE IMPOSITION OF A SENTENCE IN TERMS OF SECTION 276(1)(h) OR (i) OF ACT 51 OF 1977

 

 

276 (3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained, other than the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 105 of 1997), the provisions of subsection (1) shall not be construed as prohibiting the court-

 

 (a) from imposing imprisonment together with correctional supervision; or

 

(b) from imposing the punishment referred to in subsection (1) (h) or (i) in respect of any offence, whether under the common law or a statutory provision, irrespective of whether the law in question provides for such or any other punishment: Provided that any punishment contemplated in this paragraph may not be imposed in any case where the court is obliged to impose a sentence contemplated in section 51 (1) or (2), read with section 52, of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997.

 

·         A further problem arises with regard to the interpretation of section 297(3) of Act 51 of 1977 which provides for the imposition of correctional supervision[4] and “imprisonment from which such a person may be placed under correctional supervision in the discretion of the Commissioner or a parole board”[5] as punishments.

 

·         Obviously where a court imposes a prescribed minimum sentence, particularly in respect of an offence listed in Parts I and II of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1997,  the court cannot impose a sentence in terms of section 276(1)(h) or (i) of Act 51 of 1977.

 

·         The difficulty arises where the court imposes a lesser sentence after applying section 51(3) of Act 105 of 1997.

                         

·         In order to avoid any ambiguity and to promote uniformity (different divisions of the High Court may give different interpretations) the legislature should make clear its intention.

 

 

MINIMUM SENTENCES AND THE PRESCRIBED MINIMUM NON PAROLE PERIODS SPECIFIED IN TERMS OF SECTION 73(6)(b)(v) of Act 111 of 1998

 

 

73 Length and form of sentences

    (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act- 

         (a) a sentenced prisoner remains in prison for the full period of sentence; and

 

(b) a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment remains in prison for the rest of his or her life. 

 

(4) In accordance with the provisions of this Chapter a prisoner may be placed under correctional supervision or on day parole or on parole before the expiration of his or her term of imprisonment.

 

 (6) (a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b), a prisoner serving a determinate sentence may not be placed on parole until such prisoner has served either the stipulated non-parole period, or if no non-parole period was stipulated, half of the sentence, but parole must be considered whenever a prisoner has served 25 years of a sentence or cumulative sentences.

 

(b) A person who has been sentenced to- 

 

(iv) life imprisonment, may not be placed on parole until he or she has served at least 25 years of the sentence but a prisoner on reaching the age of 65 years may be placed on parole if he or she has served at least 15 years of such sentence;

 

 (v) imprisonment contemplated in section 51 or 52 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 105 of 1997), may not be placed on parole unless he or she has served at least four fifths of the term of imprisonment imposed or 25 years, whichever is the shorter, but the court, when imposing imprisonment, may order that the prisoner be considered for placement on parole after he or she has served two thirds of such term.

 

 

 

·         A further problem arises in regard to the interpretation of section 73(6)(b)(v) of the Correctional Services Act, 1998 (Act 111 of 1998) which regulates the “length and form of sentences” including non-parole period.

 

·         The issue is whether the imposition of a lesser sentence in terms of section 51(3) of Act 105 of 1997 is “….imprisonment contemplated in section 51….of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 105 of 1997)”.

 

·         If the answer is in the affirmative then the provisions of section 73(6)(b)(v) of Act 111 of 1998 apply to such a sentence and the higher non-parole periods apply; if not then the provisions of section 73(6)(a) of Act 111 of 1997 read with section 276B of Act 51 of 19776[6] will apply.

 

·         The legislature should make its intention in this regard clear.

 

 

AD CLAUSE 1:  SUBSTITUTION OF SECTION 51(6)

 

(6) This section does not apply in respect of a person who was under the age of:

 

(a) 16 years at the time of the commission of an offence contemplated in subsection (1) or (2)(a) or (b);  or

 

(b) 18 years at the time of the commission of an offence contemplated in  subsection (2)(c).

 

·         The substituted sub-section (6) clearly indicates the intention of the legislature.  This clause is supported.

 

 

AD CLAUSE 1:  AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 51(7), (8) AND (9)

                         

 These amendments are supported.

 

 

AD CLAUSE 2: REPEAL OF SECTIONS 52, 52A AND 52B

 

·         The proposed repeal of above-mentioned sections is supported.

 

AD CLAUSE 3: REPEAL OF SECTIONS 53(1), (2) AND (2A)

 

·         This clause is supported.

 

AD CLAUSE 4, 5 AND 6

  

4.   Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, is amended by the substitution in subsection (1) for paragraph (a) of the following paragraph:

 

"(a) Any person convicted of any offence by any lower court (including a person discharged after conviction) may, subject to leave to appeal being granted in terms of section 309B or 309C, appeal against such conviction and against any resultant sentence or order to the High Court having jurisdiction: Provided that:-

 

(i) if that person was, at the time of the commission of the offence:

 

(aa)  below the age of 16 years; or

 

(bb) at least 16 years of age but below the age of 18 years and was not assisted by   a legal representative at the time of conviction in a regional court;  and

 

(cc) was sentenced to any form of imprisonment as contemplated in section 276 (1) that was not wholly suspended;  or

 

(ii) if that person was sentenced to life imprisonment by a regional court under section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act No. 105 of 1997),

 

he or she may note such an appeal without having to apply for leave in terms of section 309B:  Provided further that the provisions of section 302(1)(b) shall apply in respect of a person who duly notes an appeal against a conviction, sentence or order as contemplated in section 302(1)(a).".

 

 Amendment of section 21 of Act 32 of 1998

 

5.    Section 21 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998, is amended by the addition of the following subsections:

 

"(3) The prosecution policy or amendments to such policy must include directives indicating in which instances prosecutions in respect of offences referred to in Schedule 2 to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act No. 105 of 1997),  must be instituted in a High Court as a court of first instance.

 

(4) The policy directives contemplated in subsection (3) must be issued within three months of the date of the commencement of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act, 2007."

 

      TRANSITIONAL PROVISION

6.   If a regional court has, prior to the commencement of this Act, committed an accused for sentence by a High Court under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act No. 105 of 1997), and –

 

(a) the High Court has not heard the matter, then the High Court must refer the matter back to the regional court for sentencing in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act No. 105 of 1997);  or

(b) the High Court has heard the matter, then the High Court must dispose of the matter as if this Act has not been passed. 

 

·         Clause 4 and 5 are supported.

 

·         We welcome the fact that the cases must be referred back to us as envisaged in clause 6. However we fear undue delays if the High Courts must refer those cases back which they have not yet heard. The only way this can be done is to place the cases on their rolls in order for them to be referred back. These mere referrals can take months to finalize.

 

·         We humbly submit that in order to speed up the finalization of these cases in the transitional phase, the proposed legislation must allow the Regional court to maintain jurisdiction over those cases referred to the High Court which have not been heard by it.  The Regional court can then simply proceed with the matter as soon as possible without the delay of a referral.  

 

 

 

POSSIBLE TOOLS TO ENHANCE CASE FLOW MANAGEMENT IN RESPECT OF OFFENCES LISTED IN SCHEDULE 2

 

 Summary of Substantial Facts and List of Witnesses

 

·         To successfully hear trials on a continuous basis the court when placing the matter for trial needs to have access to certain information so that it can determine as accurately as possible how long the matter is likely to proceed. 

                         

·         In particular the court needs to know how many witnesses the respective parties (State and defence) are likely to call and the nature of the evidence to be tendered, particularly by the prosecution, for instance whether it is the evidence of a DNA expert or medical doctor or of the complainant.

 

·         In High Court trials this information is obtained from the summary of substantial facts and the list of state witnesses that has to be furnished with the indictment (see 144(3)(a) of Criminal Procedure Act, 1977)[7].

 

·         In the case of a High Court trial the accused first appears in the magistrate’s court and only once the matter is “trial ready” is the accused committed for trial in the High Court.

 

·         In some areas in the Republic an accused makes his first appearance in the regional court and the matter is later placed for trial in the same court.

 

  • We propose that possible consideration should be given to including a section in the Act which obliges the prosecution to likewise provide a summary of substantial facts and a list of state witnesses to the clerk of the court and the defence representatives before the matter is finally placed for trial in the Regional Court in the case of trials for offences listed in Parts I, II and III of Schedule 2 to the Act. 

                         

·         This will enable the presiding regional magistrate to properly determine the estimated duration of the trial.

 

 

ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE OFFENCES LISTED IN PARTS I, II AND III OF SCHEDULE 2      

                      

Although the Bill does not contain any references to the above-mentioned offences, we deem it necessary to bring the following to your attention for possible consideration.

 

Possession of a semi-automatic pistol

 

  • Possession of a semi-automatic pistol is listed in Part II of Schedule 2 (semi automatic firearm) and carries a 15-year minimum sentence.

                         

·         The Firearms Control Act of 2000 provides a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment or a fine in the case of possession of any firearm (other than a “prohibited firearm”) without the requisite license.

 

  • The various divisions of the High Court of South Africa have interpreted section 51(2) of the Act (in relation to unlawful possession of a semi-automatic pistol) in such a way that it is now virtually impossible to impose the minimum sentence for such an offence.  This is not so where the offence is possession of a fully-automatic firearm.

                         

·         The current reference in Part II of Schedule 2 to possession of a semi-automatic firearm should exclude a semi-automatic pistol.

 

Rape of a female person older than 16 years

 

  • Rape other than that described in Part I of Schedule 2 is listed in Part III of Schedule 2 and carries a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment.

                         

·         There seems to be an inordinate disparity between rapes as described in Part I of the Schedule carrying a sentence of life imprisonment and all other rapes carrying a minimum sentence of only ten years imprisonment.

 

·         Sometimes a rape can be extremely serious and warrant a severe sentence but does not fall within the ambit of the rape specified in Part I of Schedule 2.

 

·         We propose that rape (other than that described in Part I of Schedule 2) be moved from Part III to Part II of the Schedule.

 

 

 

 

 

____________________

PRESIDENT: ARMSA

A.C. BEKKER

 

 

 

 

 

________________________________

CHAIR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

G.N. TRAVERS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                         

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



[1] Section 64 of Act 140 of 1992 provides –

64 Jurisdiction of magistrate's courts

  A magistrate's court shall have jurisdiction-

(a) to impose any penalty mentioned in section 17, even though that penalty may exceed the punitive jurisdiction of a magistrate's court”

 

[2] Section 151 of Act 60 of 2000 provides

151 Jurisdiction of magistrates' courts

 

Despite any law to the contrary, any magistrates' court has jurisdiction to impose any penalty provided for in terms of this Act

[3] Section 297(4) of Act 51 of 1997 provides

 

297 Conditional or unconditional postponement or suspension of sentence, and caution or reprimand

 

(4)  Where a court convicts a person of an offence in respect of which any law prescribes a minimum punishment, the court may in its discretion pass sentence but order the operation of a part thereof to be suspended for a period not exceeding five years on any condition referred to in paragraph (a) (i) of subsection (1).”

 

[4] Section 276(1)(h) of Act 51 of 1977.

[5] Section 276(1)(i) of Act 51 of 1977

[6] The section provides –

 

276B Fixing of non-parole-period

(1) (a) If a court sentences a person convicted of an offence to imprisonment for a period of two years or longer, the court may as part of the sentence, fix a period during which the person shall not be placed on parole. 

              

               (b) Such period shall be referred to as the non-parole-period, and may not exceed two thirds of the term of imprisonment imposed or 25 years, whichever is the shorter.

 

 (2) If a person who is convicted of two or more offences is sentenced to imprisonment and the court directs that the sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently, the court shall, subject to subsection (1) (b), fix the non-parole-period in respect of the effective period of imprisonment

[7] The relevant part of section 144 provides

 

144 Charge in superior court to be laid in an indictment

 

(3) (a) Where an attorney-general under section 75, 121 (3) (b) or 122 (2) (i) arraigns an accused for a summary trial in a superior court, the indictment shall be accompanied by a summary of the substantial facts of the case that, in the opinion of the attorney-general, are necessary to inform the accused of the allegations against him and that will not be prejudicial to the administration of justice or the security of the State, as well as a list of the names and addresses of the witnesses the attorney-general intends calling at the summary trial on behalf of the State: Provided that-

 

(i) this provision shall not be so construed that the State shall be bound by the contents of the summary;

 

 (ii) the attorney-general may withhold the name and address of a witness if he is of the opinion that such witness may be tampered with or be intimidated or that it would be in the interest of the security of the State that the name and address of such witness be withheld;

 

(iii) the omission of the name or address of a witness from such list shall in no way affect the validity of the trial.