Department of Justice & Constitutional Development

Preliminary questions to the Accounting Officer from SCOPA

 

(Report of the Auditor-General on the 1999/2000 financial year)

 

 

Question:

Answer:

 

Report of the Auditor-General on the 1999/200 financial year

 

1.

With regard to the unauthorised expenditure reported in the Auditor-General's report, significant instances of non-compliance with directives and regulations were identified. What steps are being taken to address the trend of serious non-compliance?

Since taking up his position in February 2001, the CFO, Alan Mackenzie has implemented many changes with the view to improving controls in the Department. This process has not yet reached the stage where current day-to-day transactions are conducted within a sound internal control environment that can be relied upon to produce financial reports that fairly present operations. In short:

  1. The internal audit co-sourcing agreement was extended.
  2. The Performance Enhancement Programme (PEP) is well under way.
  3. Regional Finance heads have been addressed.
  4. A anti-fraud and corruption hotline has been launched 0800 00 59 33
  5. Persons serving jail sentences for fraud have been dismissed.
  6. A R10 million forensic audit reserve has been created and the "contract" has been awarded to the Auditor General with whom an initiation meeting has been held. The Auditor General is investigating various leads.
  7. All audit reports have been analysed by internal audit and the cause of transgressions have been analysed as between non-compliance and incompetence. The file has been handed over to Human resources to take action. DPSA at the request of their Minister will be kept informed of developments.
  8. By the end of March we plan to have had 1800 finance staff trained within the capacity building training contract. This is will provide 15hrs of training to each person in 270 venues. Full training manuals will be given and trainees will be required to sign a declaration on their competence at the end of the training period.
  9. Compliance reviews of the worst offices have begun. Umtata, Puthatitjaba and Randburg have been visited by a senior team (eg DG, CFO, Internal Audit, A-G, Court Services ). These visits are to continue.
  10. Project Managers and Senior Staff were trained for close to a month in Denmark on Project Management and Donor Fund Management.
  11. The entire Executive and some 70 Senior Management have been trained for three days on budget management, performance assessment etc Eight budget coaches have commenced a two week intensive course at the UCT Graduate School of Business prior to taking up full-time secondments as budget coaches. They are to not only work with the business units on budget determination but will also monitor budget spending and performance.
  12. In conclusion, non-compliance is normally as a result of a lack of internal control and or supervision. This position will continue to be a problem until the capacity of the people and the systems is improved. A good start has been made but momentum will have to be maintained.
  13. The CFO has recommended a follow-up compliance audit once the training per 7 above has been completed.

2.

In the previous resolution of the Committee, it was recommended that the review of the effect of decentralisation be expedited. Please briefly update the Committee on the outcome of the review.

From the point of view of finance, it has been recommended that the payroll and financial operations functions be centralised prior to the development of a shared service centre. As a generalisation the regional decentralisation was not a success as the regional offices were not given the "tools to do the job" as a result of budget constraints. A detailed response can be obtained from the September PEP Information Pack. Implementation of these suggestions was mapped out on the PEP Gantt Charts but is delayed pending appointment of suitably qualified staff. From a non-financial point of view the deliberations of court services is attached as Annexure A

3.

As in previous audits, documentation not submitted timeously has placed restrictions on the scope of the audit. Please indicate what your instructions as accounting officer are to all staff in this regard, and how you will ensure that the audit information prepared for Parliament is not restricted in any way.

Documentation is often not available for audit as the required documentation is not written up. Whilst a receipts and payments system is maintained the extent of accruals is not accounted for. An extensive backlog reduction project has begun which the CFO calls "Rolling Stone". A report on this project which has recently commenced and is attached as Annexure B. In many offices vacancies exist and the extent of vacancies means that backlogs accumulate. See Annexure C. It is hoped that appointments at head office will begin to be filled shortly. In the Eastern Cape where there is no head of finance nor a deputy head (posts are shortly to be advertised) the head of finance from the North West is relieving on a one week on (in the Eastern Cape) and one week back ( in the North West )on a rotational basis. Instructions are in place requiring that unless documentation has been processed payment cannot be made. The head of finance of the Western Cape is acting as the head of finance for the Masters Office where there is no such post. All warrant vouchers in respect of transactions that are not "on the system" are being returned by the National Treasury

4.

The audit on the Witness Protection Programme has again revealed non-compliance with directives and shortcomings in internal control. (a) What steps have been taken to put the Programme on sound footing? (b) Has the State Tender Board granted ex post facto approval for the non-compliance with State Tender Board Procedures?

(a) In consultation with the A-G the witness protection programme has:

    • Conducted a full review of financial control processes.
    • Conducted inspections at selected Regional Offices
    • Reviewed Head Office Procedures
    • Instituted training programme for the Regional Heads
    • Issued several policy directives
    • Requested further follow-up audit work.

(b) Because compliance with Tender Board procedures could jeopardise the safety of witnesses this was not done in the case of the purchase of furniture and the rental of safe houses. A request for a permanent exemption is being dealt with by the executive manager logistics of the NDPP corporate services.

5.

Problems with suspense and disallowance accounts is recurring in audit reports. We understand that a task team has been appointed to clear all amounts in suspense as there are long outstanding amounts in these accounts. What is the brief of the task team and what is the deadline is for the completion of the project?

Task teams are being assembled with the view to visiting all Magistrate’s offices in order to clear the suspense accounts. However, due to the enormity of the task no time limit can be set at this time. A budget of R 2 million has been appropriated for this task and it is highly probable that that money will expended before the task is complete. The CFO has discussed this matter with the Ministers Committee on the budget who have noted the need for an additional allocation in this respect. Because the books of account have, in certain regions, not been fully written up since 1982 it is not possible to estimate how long the unknown will take to complete. See Annexure B.

2000/2001 FINANCIAL YEAR

Regularity audit questions –Part A (VOTE ACCOUNT)

1.

Paragraph 2.2.1 (a): Expenditure

The Auditor-General once again reported that expenditure could not always be verified as a result of non-submission of supporting documentation and information:

(a) What has been done to address this matter

See 3 above. In addition an audit facilitator has been nominated by the CFO who will liase with our staff to ensure that cases where staff refused to assist the A-G to find documentation are swiftly dealt with.

 

(b) Can assurance be given that the expenditure in question represent valid and that no irregularities took place?

No

2.

The backlogs in capturing transactions on the Financial Management System is also an issue which has been reported on each year:

(a) What measures were instituted to ensure that all backlogs are cleared as a matter of urgency and to ensure that transactions are recorded in the correct accounting period? (Please provide timeframes in respect of the elimination of the backlogs.)

See project "Rolling Stone" above plus please note that the receipts and payments accounting system in use does not distinguish between financial years in which debts were incurred and paid. Unprocessed prior year unauthorised expenditure taken to the Balance Sheet by the A-G may when processed in the current year be treated as a double payment when the balance sheet amount is written off. This matter is being monitored by the CFO and the A-G.

 

(b) How will you ensure that the focus by the CFO’s office on the clearing of backlogs will be sustained in order to prevent the build-up of backlogs in future?

Project "Rolling Stone" is so named as, where possible, staff once assisted by the project, will "gather" some "assisted staff" and take them to the next one or two offices visited to entrench their on the job training. In offices where there is insufficient staff to permit a person leave of absence, this will not occur. In addition the training programme in 270 centres will see staff being trained by way of multiple course attendance as on the job trainers to be able to induct new staff at a later stage. Whether all of this will be sufficient remains to be seen as the staff in many sub-offices have serious skills deficiencies. The CFO is of the opinion that staff will require much more training to correct and an option was framed for the MTEF submission for the establishment of a finance training division at the Justice College.

3.

What measures were instituted to recover the excess payments and double payments made? What progress has been made with these measures?

Where we are aware of the errors corrective steps to recover the monies have or are being instituted. Certain system checks such as, no salary payments above R30000 are permitted without special clearance, have been instituted. The proper management of this aspect will depend on control measures that will be more effective once the PEP has been implemented..

4.

Please respond to the following questions regarding the split of the DSO from the NPA with the proclamation of the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act (Act No 61 of 2000):

4.1 Why was it not possible to split the transactions of the NPA and the DSO with effect from the effective date?

Adequate steps were not instituted before the time which would have enabled a split of the transactions between the two departments from the effective date. Many vouchers and payments were presented / paid that were in the name of the NDPP which were for the DSO. This change was effected from 1 April.

 

4.2 Were all the effects of the relevant Amendment Act taken into account and was adequate planning performed to prepare for the implementation of the Amendment Act?

Yes, planning was done. From a finance and Human Resources perspective new systems were installed in the NPA from 2 April 2001. This system will allow for separate accounting for the NPA and the DSO. The DG remains the accounting officer for the NPA while the DSO has its own accounting officer. A number of other regulations required for the operations work of the DSO have been drafted and are being considered by the National Director and the DSO Management.

 

4.3 Briefly explain the purpose of the separation of the DSO and the NPA in terms of their functions and activities.

The purpose of the separation of these two departments was to enable the DSO to concentrate on gathering intelligence and to investigate and prosecute offences which were identified as being of a specially serious nature and to handle offences committed in an organised fashion or offences which could endanger the safety or security of the public on conspiracy, incitement or an attempt to commit any such offences.

The NPA ensures that perpetrators of crime are prosecuted and it has the power to institute criminal proceeding on behalf of the state. It also has the power to carry out all necessary functions, incidental to instituting criminal proceedings. It may also intervene in the prosecuting process when policy directives are not complied with. It also has the power to review decisions to prosecute.

 

4.4 When was the CEO of the DSO appointed in accordance with section 15(3A)(b) of the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act, No. 61 of 2000?

The CEO of NPA was appointed CEO of DSO in March 2001 by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.

 

4.5 Has a performance agreement and/or any other accountability arrangement been entered into between:

    • the CEO of the DSO and the Minister of Justice and/or the CEO of the DSO and the Director General of the Department of Justice and/or the CEO of the DSO and the National Director of Pubic Prosecutions?
    • If so, please provide a copy/copies of the relevant documents to the Committee.

The National Director will be signing performance contracts with senior management in the NPA, including the CEO, on the 22 November 2001. A copy of this agreement will be forwarded to the committee in due course. Since the CEO of the NPA is also the CEO of the DSO one performance contract will be signed with the National Director. The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development has directed that the contract should be signed with the National Director.

5.

Personnel expenditure:

5.1 Why was a reconciliation of the difference of R39,4 m between the FMS and the PERSAL not performed?

The Financial Management System (FMS) is the accounting system of the Department and therefore all amounts reflected on the FMS is respect of personnel expenditure is the total amount incurred of personnel expenditure.

Expenditure incurred on other sub-systems e.g. PERSAL and there- after interfaced to the FMS

Personnel expenditure incurred via PERSAL is programmatically updated on the FMS, and therefore a reconciliation was not performed.

 

5.2 Is such a reconciliation being performed currently and on a monthly basis?

Yes

 

5.3 What has been done to rectify the shortcomings relating to leave credits? Why hasn’t this matter received attention earlier, as it has been reported on each year?

There was a system problem during 1998 that was rectified programmatically by PERSAL. The auditing of leave is currently being done by the Department to compare the system with the actual leave forms on the files and to correct the system where it is necessary.

 

5.4 Are judges’ secretaries complying with the directives for leave? If not, why not and what has been done regarding this issue?

The judges’ secretaries are not complying with the directives for leave and the matter has been referred to the DPSA as it is viewed as a policy matter of long standing that requires their intervention iro conditions of service.

6.

Professional and Special services:

6.1 What measures have been taken against those not complying with State Tender Board Regulations?

See 4 (b) above on page 1

 

6.2 What measures are being put into place to ensure that all staff comply with laid down rules and regulations?

See 4 (b) above on page 1

 

6.3 Why can the irregular expenditure with regard to the witness protection programme not be quantified?

An investigation of this matter has commenced by the Heath Commission and the A-G but this investigation is as yet not complete.

7.

Revenue:

7.1 Why is the amount on the FMS less than the amount collected and accounted for in the SARS statements and why was a reconciliation of the difference not performed? This was also reported on during previous years.

This difference arose because of problems emanating from the old system at the time the information was transferred to the new State Attorney System. Correcting journal entries were made by teams sent down to investigate this problem. However, the old system had already been closed and did not disclose these adjustments.

 

7.2 Why was uncashed/stale warrant vouchers not written back to revenue?

Personnel shortage – will be corrected by the task teams

 

7.3 Please inform the Committee on the immediate steps taken to address the shortcomings in the Auditor-General’s report.

A new department known as the Revenue Department has been formed to address this problem. Selection of suitable candidates to fill this position will shortly be made.

 

7.4 What has been done to address the shortcomings relating to State Attorney’s debt collection on behalf of client departments?

In past these claims were made through the Regional Offices and did not function properly. Arrangements have now been made to enable the various State Attorney Offices to effect their own claims.

8.

Foreign aid assistance / Donor funding:

8.1 (a) Why were project managers not available to assist the auditors?

The Auditor-General’s staff have been requested to identify the managers concerned. To date we have not received a response. It is suspected that this matter arose as the managers concerned were away on project management training in Denmark.

 

(b) Have properly qualified project managers now been appointed for each of the projects?

A letter was sent out by the CFO advising all project managers to have valid letters of appointment in hand as soon as possible. These letters will be finalised by this office in the month ahead.

 

8.2 What is being done regarding the numerous weaknesses in project management in general?

Mr Colin Wright has been appointed to drive the implementation of proper accounting controls and to wrap up backlogs. See project management training course details given above re project managers. In addition weaknesses highlighted at our meeting with USAID were incorporated in a letter circulated to the project managers. One of these problems was the centralisation of original vouchers at National Office. Mr Colin Leeb is project managing project "Rolling Stone" in the rest of the country. The NPA met with Ms. Johnson and Labuschagne and it was agreed that they do their own project management. This is contrary to a Donor stipulation that these funds be administered from a central source. A meeting will have to be arranged to settle this problem with the NPA and a workshop is to be organised to inform the project managers of all requirements of the administration of these funds.

 

8.3 What measures have been implemented to ensure that expenditure is accounted for in the correct financial year and against the correct account?

While the cash basis of accounting continues there can be no guarantee that expenses accrued in one year will be accounted for in the same financial year. Only when accrual accounting is implemented can this problem be overcome. The only practical solution at present is for project managers to pay the expenditures incurred as soon as possible.

 

8.4 Why did the department not include a narrative report in the Statement of Foreign Aid Assistance, outlining the performance information on the use of assistance, as required in the guideline issued by the Accountant-General?

Many Project Managers were in Denmark at the time and it appears that they were unaware to this requirement.

 

8.5 Why were the donor funds relating to the NPA not administered in terms of the prescribed procedures and why was it not accounted for in the department’s records? What steps have been taken to remedy the position?

The NPA did their own project management on the basis that the records were maintained by the DoJ&CD and it was considered that this was a compliant arrangement. In the current year the record keeping is administered by the NPA and the meeting detailed in 8.2 is being arranged to determine if this is required by USAID. The CIDA funding is administered by Business Against Crime on behalf of the NPA which is at the request of CIDA. See question 8.2 above. Another matter, not raised, relates to the requirement that costs are shared as between the Department and USAID on the basis that the Department funds 25% of expenditure. This cost sharing reconciliation is outstanding.

 

8.6 Has internal guidelines for the handling of donor funds been developed and approved? What will be the implementation date of these guidelines?

A Treasury Guideline has been issued outlining the accounting steps to be followed in future. National Office staff are in the process of clearing the various suspense accounts and opening new accounts in terms of the Treasury requirements. These instructions were received in September but are being effected as from 1 April 2001.

9.

Suspense and disallowance accounts:

9.1 Has a task team been appointed as a matter of urgency to clear all balances in suspense and disallowance accounts as recommended by the Auditor-General? Please provide this Committee with details on the successes with this process.

These task teams are in their early stages of being formed and only a few offices have been visited to date. As momentum increases these problems will be attended to at an every increasing rate.

 

9.2 (a) Has all transactions relating to the Public Protector and the DSO been recorded in separate accounts for the year ended 2002?

(b) Have the transactions relating to the 2001 financial year been identified and provided to the Public Protector and the DSO for disclosure in their own financials?

  1. The DSO is incorporated within the NPA. The Public Protector have their own bank account and their transactions are separately recorded
  2. Yes.

 

9.3 With reference to the second last paragraph on page 4 of the Auditor-General’s report, what steps have been taken by the Department to determine the transactions relating to the Directorate of Special Operations and the Public Protector? Were these amounts subsequently taken out of the suspense and disallowance accounts?

 

We have read this to refer to point 2.2.1 (d) on page 5. Yes this matter is receiving attention but is, as yet, not complete.

 

9.4 Briefly state what your policy is with regard to the proper management of suspense and disallowance accounts?

These have been formulated in the latest Departmental Financial Instructions, dated 28 September 2001 Suspense accounts are now cleared monthly but backlogs remain which as discussed above are being attended to by the task team under Colin Wright at head office. This task team is clearing various backlogs at the head office and consists of seventeen people.

10.

Contingent liabilities:

    1. Please inform the Committee on the successes of the task team investigating the shortcomings relating to housing guarantees and also on whether assurance can be provided that this matter will not be included in the next audit report.

 

 

Assurances cannot be given as the matter has not been audited. A task team visited all nine Regional Offices and reconciled the department’s records with those of the various banks. Local staff have been trained on how to maintain this system on a current basis and thus this matter should not be a recurring item.

11.

Unauthorised expenditure: NPA

11.1 Briefly explain the salient reasons for the unauthorised expenditure incurred by the NPA.

The amount involved related to five different items from different suppliers. Approval from the DCC together with requisite procurement procedures was carried out in three of these cases out of the five. In the case of the other two payments was approved by the DG.

 

11.2 Why was this not included in the annual financial statements?

At the time the Financial Statements were prepared expenditure was assumed to be authorised and thus was excluded from the listed unauthorised expenditure – The unauthorised status was determined by the A-G during the audit and hence it was not in the AFS which were prepared before the start of the audit. See comment above.

 

11.3 What steps have been taken to rectify the situation?

The NPA has established it’s own control committee and/ or Tender Board, depending on the amount to be approved. As the committee does pre-evaluation, submissions found to have not followed procedures are referred back for correction or amendment. A process is embarked upon to ensure that processes are clearly identified and streamlined to eliminate possible shortcomings and duplications. The NPA has started a process of recovering all amounts identified as being fruitless and wasteful and recovering such sums from the salaries of those individuals who incurred such expenditure.

12.

Internal checking and control:

12.1 What measures have been instituted to address the shortcomings in internal control systems?

At this stage the situation is such that adequate internal control measures are not in operation.

 

12.2 Was all irregular expenditure treated as prescribed in terms of the PFMA and Treasury Regulations

Where such expenditure has been identified it has been so treated. See comments on task teams clearing suspense accounts.

13.

Paragraph 3.1: Thefts and Losses

Did the department address all unsatisfactory matters relating to Thefts and Losses as reported by the Auditor-General? Please provide brief details on steps taken as per the listing on page 6 of the audit report.

This matter was referred to the Legal Department who advised that great effort was made to clear the backlogs and currently matters referred to them are being analysed, identified and dealt with in a planned manner. Many of these losses are the result of inadequate accounting and asset management routines.

14.

Paragraph 3.2: Unauthorised and material irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure:

Please elaborate on the fruitless and wasteful expenditure incurred in respect of the witness protection programme. Has an investigation been done regarding this and were any disciplinary steps taken?

The investigator that placed witnesses in protection has been reported for investigation and has now been charged with fraud as witnesses were put under protection even though no case was brought against them. They thus received free housing etc. Witnesses involved have been given notice to vacate the programme.

15.

Paragraph 3.3: Witness Protection Programme

Please inform the Committee on the steps that have been taken to address the shortcomings in the audit report. Why hasn’t steps taken earlier to address the shortcomings included in the audit reports of the Auditor-General for the past financial years?

 

See 4 on page 1.

Earlier steps should have been taken but this was not highlighted for action by the DG.

 

16.

Paragraph 3.4: Control over assets:

16.1 What steps have been taken to address all the shortcomings listed in the audit report that relates to poor control over assets (inventory and equipment)?

Current checking has revealed instances where physical assets do not agree with the records and efforts are currently under way to bring this matter under control.

 

16.2 Has a stocktaking been performed for the 2002 financial year?

See above.

17.

Paragraph 3.5: Unresolved matters previously reported:

17.1 Please provide the Committee with the progress made on the matters mentioned in the audit report. Please also provide reasons why these were not attended to during the year under review.

Arrest of State Attorney Bisho – Mr. Mnyamana

This case concerned the over charging of legal fees in a case involving the Defence Department. The amount involved was R 14,775,170. An amount of R 14,006,649 has been recovered leaving a shortfall of R 768,521. The Courts Taxing Master has estimated the "true" legal cost at about R 1,2 million. The shortfall (net legal fee) will be recovered from the Dept of Defence.

Abuse of maintenance benefits (allowances) by officials of various offices

The contractor involved in this case has been arrested and investigations are under way with the view to recovering these funds from the defendant. The inspectorate are of the opinion that this process needs to unfold before action is taken on Departmental officials.

Amalgamation of the Departments of the former TBVC countries with the National Office

Done

Expenditure re Witness Protection could not be verified – State Tender Board Procedures

Approval for non-submission has been sought with the Tender Board. The matter is as yet not finalised.

 

 

17.2 Please keep this Committee up to date with the developments regarding the judgement whereby the findings of the Judge White Commission was set aside.

We will do so.

18

Paragraph 3.6: Financial Management

    1. Please update the Committee on the developments regarding improving the financial management of the department.

The CFO sends a monthly report to the Committee. The last of which was a consolidating report of a few thousand pages of reference material on a CD. As promised, at the last hearing of the committee, the CFO has availed himself for "open days" to the committee in Cape Town in order that members are afforded the opportunity to debate the Performance Enhancement Programme and the progress thereon with him. The next report will be made available to the committee next Monday when the CFO visits Cape Town for the Portfolio Committee meeting. The monthly accounts are expected to be completed by the end of the week which is what is outstanding at this time.

 

18.2 Please also inform the Committee on the progress made with the Financial Management Improvement Plan.

See above

19.

Paragraph 3.7: Internal audit and the Audit Committee

19.1 Briefly describe the effectiveness and efficiency of the internal audit section within your department.

Internal Audit conducts audit throughout the year and reports to the DG. Client satisfaction surveys are conducted at the end of every audit. Positive comments have been received on the work of the Internal Audit component. Shirley Machaba has sent you copies of the latest internal audit report. It is a large bound document (book) and has thus not been attached.

 

19.2 Have all posts in the internal audit section been filled, and if not, how is the matter being resolved?

Twenty-four positions have been approved of which twenty-two have been filled. The vacancies have been advertised and the closing date is 3 December 2001.

 

19.3 What is the progress with regard to the extension of the internal audit co-sourcing agreement? (The CFO stated that he was "…firmly of the opinion that the internal audit and the capacity building co-sourcing agreements will need to be extended and expanded." Please indicate what steps have been taken to ensure this extension and expansion is affected.)

The Internal Audit Co-sourcing agreement was extended to December 2001 and was approved by the State Tender Board. The CFO is currently of the opinion that the capacity building expansion and extension should be decided upon after evaluating the current training programme. As an alternative he put forward an MTEF option for this matter to be considered for funding to establish a component within the Justice College to train finance officials.

 

19.4 Does the composition of the Audit Committee adhere to the criteria as set out in section 77 of the PFMA and Treasury Regulation 3.1?

Yes . The Audit Committee consists of four members - all from outside the public service.

 

19.5 Are you satisfied with the risk assessment(s) conducted by the internal auditors (provide reasons please)?

Yes. Risk assessment audits were conducted in November 2000 and are being repeated this month

 

19.6 How do you ensure adequate response from management to the findings and recommendations of the internal auditors?

By adequate planning and communication. Internal audit are satisfied with this aspect.

20.

National Directorate of Public Prosecutions: Unresolved matters relating to the 1999/2000 (2001?) financial year:

20.1 (a) Please provide the Committee with brief details on the unauthorised expenditure of R523 000 relating to the non-compliance with state tender board procedures (e.g. what does the expenditure relate to? Indicate how value for money was received for the expenditure? Were disciplinary steps appropriate, and if so what has been the outcome?).

 

The amount involved consists of five different charges from different suppliers. Approval from the DCC together with requisite procurement procedures was obtained in three of these cases out of five. Payment was approved by the DG In the case of the other two payments.

 

(b) Was this treated in terms of the stipulations of the PFMA and the Treasury Regulations?

No, but these expenditures were approved after the fact.

 

(c) What steps have been taken to prevent a re-occurrence of this in future?

Since the first of April 2001 new procedures have been put into place to ensure that Tender Board requirements are followed. An NPA Control and Tender Committee have been established to manage the process and to ensure compliance with procedures.

 

20.2 Please elaborate on the reasons why the documentation was not submitted to the auditors. Can you give the Committee the necessary assurance that the expenditure vouchers not submitted represent valid expenditure and that no fraud/irregularities are suspected?

See comment in 20.1 above.

With the take over of the procurement functions from Justice, assurance can now be given that these incidents should not occur in the future.

 

20.3 Please explain why donor funds were not administered in terms of the laid down procedures as well as why it was not accounted for in the department’s records.

See our comments under question 8.5 The procedural problem will be corrected shortly. The NPA did their own project management as they were incorrectly of the opinion that this was in order.

 

20.4 What steps have been taken to prevent re-occurrence of the issues included in the audit report and related to the NPA which should include relevant target dates and progress made with corrective actions.

All findings and recommendations by the Auditor-General are reduced to an action plan with clear time frames for implementation. These processes are also monitored on a regular basis for implementation and a report is tabled at the NPA’s management meetings.

21.

Paragraph 3.9: Public Protector:

What is the status with regard to the situation where your department is rendering certain administrative and accounting functions on behalf of the office of the Public Protector? Were the terms of such an agreement agreed upon by the parties concerned? What are the terms of the agreement?

In terms of an agreement between the Department of Justice and the Public Protector, the Public Protector has maintained their own bank account and records as from 1 July 2001.

22.

Paragraph 3.10: Judges’ salaries

What steps have been taken to address the shortcomings highlighted in the audit report?

The remuneration of Judges is now administered centrally at the National Office and are paid via the PERSAL system with effect from July 2001.

Certain Judges act on a temporary basis requiring monthly authorisations and it is these procedures which appear to be causing the problem. This will be taken up with the HR division.

23.

Paragraph 3.11: Budget process

Please provide the Committee with brief details regarding the steps taken to address the various shortcomings relating to the budgeting process.

Exco-members attended a 3 day budgeting training course at Head Office and seventy-four officials attended the same course at a later stage. Currently eight budget coaches are attending an intensive two week course at the UCT GSB in Cape Town and on their return will assist the business units in the preparation and monitoring of their budgets on a full-time basis. In addition the costing, zero based budgeting and right-sizing project has commenced and the Department in conjunction with the University of Cape Town has established a B Com. Hons degree specifically for the Department that will commence in January 2002.

24.

Paragraph 3.13: Computer audit of the network security

Please provide the Committee with brief details regarding the corrective steps taken to address all the shortcomings highlighted during the audit.

Corrective action as advised by the Auditor-General has been taken.

See Annexure D

25.

Financial Statements of the Department:

25.1 Income Statement:: Briefly indicate the reasons for

(a) the increase of approximately 11,6% in personnel expenditure;

Personnel expenditure increased as a result of posts being filled at the NPA together with salary increases of prosecutors and magistrates

 

(b) the reduction in inventory by approximately R117 475.

A detailed analysis of the seven stores has been undertaken during the current financial year. All figures set out below are as at 1July 2001 when the last in-depth analysis of stock was undertaken. Stock to the value of R332,547.64 was held on which no stock movement was recorded for a year. Stock to the value of R1,654,652.67 was considered to be surplus to requirements against normal order cycles. Stock on hand to the value of R36,405.64 is damaged. Shortages amounted to R424.90 against a total stock holding in all classes of R691,725,770.57 We hope to achieve a 0.8% reduction on e-class stock of R2,008,270.57 The value of inventory was R689,664,300.48 The CFO is of the opinion that the focus in this area should be on the more speedy delivery of purchases to speed up service delivery.

 

25.2 Notes to income statement (p12): What criteria do you as accounting officer apply when considering virement approval?

If there is a change in plan regarding a project or where a saving in a department has occurred virement may be requested to adjust budget requirements elsewhere.

 

    1. Notes to income statement (bottom of p14):

(a) Why did you not comply with section 38(1)(j) of the PFMA during 2000-2001?

(a) This was an oversight. However the CFO is of the view that in terms of par 8.5.2 of the Government Gazette 21249 dated 31 May 2000 such institutions as those that we service audited by the Office of the Auditor- General need not provide this certificate. Notwithstanding this the certificates have been obtained in the current year as a result of the audit report highlighting this matter.

 

(b) (b) How do you assess the "written assurances" from departments received during 2001-2002 in order to decide what, if any, conditions or remedial measures you will require from receiver entities?

(b) With regard to the audit report no written assurance was obtained in the previous year – see comment in (a) above as to the applicability of this clause re the current year.

 

(c) Have conditions or remedial measures been attached to any transfer payments in the current year? (If so, provide brief details, please.)

No – see above.

 

26.

General:

26.1 What lessons have you learnt regarding the submission of the annual financial statements in terms of the PFMA deadlines for submission of financial statements? (two months after financial year end); the production and tabling of an annual report within one month (given a reasonably high number of errors in the 2000-2001 report.)

The financial statements were prepared within the stipulated time limit but the signing of these statements was delayed. The unsigned accounts were made available to the A-G in time but these were only signed at a later stage as the DG was away at the time of submission to the A-G. A valuable lesson has been learnt by our communication services who felt they could edit the A-G’s report in terms of their normal licence to edit copy provided by officials. This was not intentional and they are to deal with this matter in terms of the requirements of the A-G.

 

26.2 What measures have been put into place to ensure that annual financial statements will be submitted within good time in future?

This Department currently prepares financial statements on a monthly basis. As such there should be no trouble in meeting the deadlines for the year end submission of financial statements.

 

26.3 Given the statement by the current CFO that the: "Department requires a cohesive leadership team that possesses the enthusiasm to ensure success and determine a clear focus for the Department" in order to have a sustainable turnaround in the lack of compliance in the Department. Could you as Accounting Officer inform the Committee what steps have been taken to ensure such a leadership team is put in place? Briefly indicate who they are and what role they play in making the turnaround sustainable.

This comment was made in relation to the management of the Office of the CFO. The necessary steps required to install and sustain a cohesive leadership team with the necessary enthusiasm to ensure success was discussed in detail by Alan Mackenzie in his September 2001 PEP Progress Report. This report underlines the fact that no permanent leadership team exists in the Department, in the Office of the CFO, at present. Interviews for a number of senior posts that are vacant are being short listed and or interviewed in the current month. Please review the detailed reports in your possession. Weaknesses which exist in all areas were summarised by the CFO as follows in his September progress report:

 

The Department does not have the capacity to provide the necessitated financial services to meet the requirements of the PFMA.

    • Problems relate to people, systems, funding and culture.
      • People
        • A critical shortage of skilled staff exists.
          • "Head Office" vacancies have been advertised – regional staffing will be geared to service the needs of Court Services whose regional structure has, as yet, not been determined.

        • Much can be achieved by addressing the basics (training, duty sheets, effective supervision, policy etc) and fragmentation, through standardisation – this will be a process and not an event. This process is underway.

      • Systems
        • Out dated systems (deposit account, guardians fund etc) do not provide the control mechanisms to counter internal control weaknesses.
          • Solutions have been researched and are, in certain instances, targeted for implementation.

      • Funding
        • Seed funding will be needed to reengineer financial services in the Department which will unlock savings in the future.

      • Culture
        • Non-compliance and incompetence are being addressed – this need not be a process.

  • Way forward
    • Effecting change enjoys the crisp focus of the governance structures at all levels.
    • Capacity will have to be built over the next couple of years to effect meaningful change.
    • Discipline and creativity will be needed.
    • Short-term financial risks are high.
    • The outlook is one of hope as the will exists to effect action to address the large but manageable problems highlighted above.

Progress, however, has been made in the fact that the additional posts required have been confirmed by Work Study, funding has been allocated and the advertising of the posts has been completed. The posts of Deputy Director, Assistant Director, State Accountant, Chief Accounting Clerk and Accounting Clerk will be short-listed by the 6 – 8th November 2001. Prospective candidates for the more senior positions of CFO, Chief Director and Director will be short listed and interviewed before the end of November 2001.

Until these positions have been filled the process of micro-managing the everyday process of the Department cannot begin.

 

    1. The CFO makes two observations on training and the skills required to ensure a sustainable turnaround: "Finding solutions to staffing concerns cannot, and indeed has not been underestimated. The short term appointment of sufficient competent staff at approved rates of remuneration to fill numerous advertised vacancies at Head Office, is undoubtedly a pre-requisite to delivery" and "…initial seed funding will be required to enable wide spread forensic auditing, training, testing of competency levels, communication and time if the problem is to be addressed both effectively and holistically".

(a) Please provide statistics with regard to head office posts advertised during the last ten months and how many of these posts have been filled to date?

  1. At head office 27 posts were advertised in June 2001 after being cleared by work study. Some five cubic metres of application forms were received at some 4,500 applications for each of the lower grade posts. These have been given due consideration and all short listing will have been completed by the end of November with all interviews for the more senior posts having been completed by that date. With the award of the "Body Shop" tender last month the CFO has been enabled to source key contractors to assist him with the implementation of PEP. These appointments are new and some are still to be made. This interim project management team consists of:

  • Colin Wright – who apart from other assignments is overseeing the process of putting the donor funding and Deposit account backlog teams into action at National Office.
  • Colin Leeb – who is in charge of forming and motivating the task teams currently being formed to deal with all backlogs at all offices nationally.
  • Stephen Meyer – who will commence next week with implementing the PEP procurement plan.
  • Rob Witte – who is working with Llewellyn Loxton in conducting a business system’s analysis of the work performed by the Masters Office.
  • A.N Other ( To be appointed) – the implementation of the PEP Payroll Shared Service Centre.
  • A.N Other (To be appointed) – project manager for the Financial Operations. This function will cover the processes of Accounts Receivable, Accounts Payable, Asset Managements, General Ledger, Cash Office and Financial Reporting. These points were more fully dealt with in the PEP progress report for September 2001

 

On the backlog reduction initiative the donor funding backlogs (at head office) have been cleared to 1999. The years 2000 and 2001 will be cleared by the end of November 2001, thanks to a great effort on the part of the staff and Mr. Danie Fourie on loan from National Treasury. The clearing of the Deposit account is progressing well and current estimates are that the task will be complete by the end of December 2001. This unfortunately is only in relation to reconciliation backlogs that have reached the national office. The bulk of the work lies at a sub-office level where it has not been written up for dispatching to the head office. As the sub-office process gathers speed so too will the head office teams need to be reconstituted.

 

(b) Briefly indicate what steps have been taken to ensure needs based skills training is forthcoming?

The draft cash hall training manual was included in the CFO’s September information pack. Budget training as outlined above has been provided together with project management training in Denmark. The cash hall traing has been assessed as regards the requirements of IPFA. This detail is available on request. Please request same from the CFO at [email protected]

 

 

 

 

Regularity Audit Questions: MONIES IN TRUST (FORMER DEPOSIT ACCOUNT) PART B

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.

Paragraph 2.2 (a): Financial accounting system and accounting records

With reference to the special review performed by the office of the Auditor-General (RP100/2001), what steps have been taken to address–

    • Systems, prescripts and methods of work that are unable to produce financial information that are reliable and auditable
    • Correctness of opening balances which cannot be determined before the cashbook balances at 31 March 2000 have been verified and all related reconciliations have been completed and verified
    • Commercialisation of the Monies in Trust which had a significant negative effect on accounting and reporting process
    • Risk of fraud and irregularities which have not been addressed properly.

 

 

 

This is a highly complex problem given the circumstances that the Department finds itself in. The CFO is building alternative solutions in consultation with organisations such as the Post Office as well as with EDS UK who manage the administration of the magistrates courts in the UK. The laid down procedures relating to the establishment of a PPP are being adhered to in this regard. This process will not be in place in all the courts in the short term. The "separation" decision relating to the Magistracy and administrative duties is a major issue that will impact on this matter.

In short the CFO is looking to the upgrade of systems through a PPP arrangement as he does not expect to receive budget funding that will enable the purchase of a systems solution within a PPP which may be able to be dealt with as a transaction based service fee that it affordable to the Department (as one option). This whole area must be redesigned within a new business concept. It cannot be dealt with by way of an incremental improvement plan.

In the short term the problem is being dealt with by way of a training programme the details of which are attached.

2.

Why had one of the offices not submitted monthly returns for capturing on the financial system and what disciplinary and corrective actions have you taken as a consequence?

This is not a problem restricted to one office. The Northern Cape is the only province that is up to date in terms of record keeping. The Western Cape is close to being up to date in that they are expected to be up to date by the end of February 2002. The balance of the province’s books are in various stages of completion with the worst case being that the books have are not completely written up since 1982. Getting this matter cleared is an enormous task that has begun. As it is difficult to estimate the unknown it is difficult to estimate a completion date.

3.

(a) Please explain why the cash book balance did not agree with the financial management system (R27 million difference).

We are far from being in a position where we are able to quantify differences with any degree of reliability. Funds are held in some six hundred bank accounts in different magisterial districts by individual courts who have generally not written up their books (see above). Our monthly accounts reflect but the bank balances as advised by the respective courts. This may be regarded as the cumulative "cash book balance". The FMS is the computerised accounting package which reflects the "books" as processed. Many sub-offices maintain manual cashbooks which are captured by regional offices with varying lag periods to capture. Given the fact that the "books" are not written up and that the bank accounts will reflect deposited net balances these two should not "agree" given the current circumstances. Once the "books" are written up and known losses etc have been determined then the two should be reconcilable. Currently cheque frauds under investigation in cases where the amounts have been paid out amount to some R10 million. RD cheques that have been accepted as payment against which payments have been made and which an attempt is being made to recover is some R16 million. These amounts are estimates of what is known. The CFO is of the opinion that this matter must be dealt with by writing up the backlogs and then by reconciling differences. Simultaneously the need exists to explore alternative mechanisms for the management of these funds. This is being done.

 

(b) Has a reconciliation of the difference being done to address the problem?

No – at this stage Project "rolling stone" has started the process of getting the "books" written up.

 

(c) Has corrective measures been implemented to prevent this situation from recurring? (Please provide brief details.)

See comments on cash hall training.

4.

The Auditor-General reported that a misallocation of funds between the accounts took place. Please provide details as to why this happened as well as what has been done to correct this.

At the date of commercialisation on 1April 2000 the total national amounts relative to the bail, maintenance etc accounts was guessed as these had not before been maintained as separate balances. The process of guessing the totals means that a misallocation was effected. This was because the underlying records were not completely maintained. Thus the amount for bail which is reflected as an "overdrawn" balance simply means that since commercialisation that more has been paid out than has been received. This is also the case for the "contribution account" which is some R1.5 million overdrawn as at the send of September 2001. In the October accounts entries have been effected to adjust what seems to be a misallocation re the "overdrawn" balance of the bail account. This adjusting journal entry is too but another estimate that seems appropriate at this stage. Accounting for monies in trust is, at present, not an exact science. Only when the books are written up will we be able to reliably comment on what is known.

 

5.

Paragraph 2.2 (b): Bank reconciliations

The Auditor-General’s report contains various shortcomings relating to bank reconciliations.

(a) Have all staff been properly trained to perform bank reconciliations ?

 

Not yet, but as outlined above the training process is rolling out to some 1800 people at 270 venues in the next 20 weeks.

 

(b) Why are departmental prescripts and procedures not being complied with? What is being done to ensure compliance?

Prescripts and procedures not being complied with is a case of either non-compliance or incompetence and the corrective action taken is covered above.

 

(c) As from when will proper, accurate and timely bank reconciliations to be prepared, submitted and captured?

As stated, after training, officials will be required to sign a statement covering their competence. Thereafter disciplinary action will be taken for transgressions. In many offices that are understaffed the question of a recurrence of backlogs is a reality.

 

6.

Paragraph 2.2 (c): Cash count and banking procedures

Please provide details regarding the steps taken to address the following shortcomings included in the audit report –

    • Daily cash reconciliations not performed / could not be presented
    • Inaccuracies on daily transaction list resulting in incorrect deposits
    • Significant differences in bank transactions and cash book transactions
    • Not all payments recorded in cash book
    • Receipts and payments not recorded daily and completely
    • Cash not banked daily / on regular intervals
    • Cash counts differ from daily reconciliation
    • Non-compliance with prescripts, policies and procedures
    • Shortcomings relating to cash counts
    • Cash shortages not reported nor followed up.

 

  • Please refer to the draft training manual included in the September PEP report for detail on cash hall procedures.
  • Internal audit
  • External audit
  • Forensic audit
  • Compliance visits by the DG, A-G, Internal audit and the CFO
  • Visits and management by regional finance heads and their staff
  • Backlog "Rolling Stone" teams

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7.

Paragraph 2.2 (d): Internal checking and control (Charge sheets, Maintenance, Deferred fines, Estates, Bail, Inadequate staffing and segregation of duties)

Please provide the Committee with details on the steps taken to place internal control on a sound footing.

Achieving a sound system of internal control is a complex process that does not have a universal cheap implementation plan. Internal controls depend on the segregation of functions, such that any one person, should not be able to complete a transaction from start to finish. Correcting this either with more people or with more modern systems is not an affordable option at this stage.

8.

What specific measures were instituted to address the shortcomings relating to charge sheets, maintenance receipts and payments, deferred fines, estates and bail?

We have neither the people nor the systems to address the short comings but we are working on both of these aspects as outlined above.

9.

Weak controls increase the risk of fraud and irregularities. Was any investigations done to identify fraud and irregularities? Please provide details which should include the outcome, steps taken etc.

The plan is to get the books written up so that they can be audited, inspected etc. Any fraudulent activity that is suspected by anyone will be referred to the forensic audit team

10.

Please provide reasons for the documentation not submitted to the office of the Auditor-General. Was this documentation subsequently traced and submitted. Which measures were implemented to prevent this from recurring?

The problem is such that a sub-office was not able to provide the charge sheet written up by the Magistrate thus the auditor could not verify the fine paid in at the cash hall. This audit remark is based on a test sample to substantiate a general comment on this matter as relates to the Department. This "voucher" is needed to write up the books and as such this matter will be addressed as part of project "Rolling Stone". The specific detail of the specific test cases undertaken by the A-G were not conveyed to the Department.

11.

Has the problem of inadequate staffing and segregation of duties been addressed? Please provide brief details of steps taken.

No

 

12.

Paragraph 3.1: Face value forms

Please inform the Committee why adequate control over the use of face value forms were not excercised. What corrective measures have been put into place?

 

Incompetence or non-compliance. Steps include the training mentioned above.

 

13.

Paragraph 3.2: Payments to SARS

Why was amounts not paid over to SARS and local councils? Was this subsequently corrected? What amounts are involved?

 

 

 

The banks holding the funds have not been instructed to clear interest to a central account for transfer to SARS as current procedures call for the checking of these transfers by the regional offices which takes time. At 30 June when the last "sweep" of the accounts was done the amount of interest that has thus far been reported is some R35 million. This amount will shortly be paid to SARS once the exercise is complete.

14.

With reference to the statement by the CFO that the management of the Deposit Account has collapsed what reassurance can you give the Committee that this situation has been changed with reference to moneys in trust?

The "Monies in Trust" and the "Deposit Account" are one and the same for it is just an alternative name for the same financial process. The view of the CFO is based on his findings which are outlined above. Given the audit reports on this aspect it is possible for one to see why he came to hold this opinion. What is important is the fact that a huge effort is being mounted to address this matter. What is worrying is the fact that the CFO suspects that he will not have sufficient available funding to complete this process.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANNEXURE A

DRAFT EXIT STRATEGY FOR THE REGIONAL OFFICES

 

1. INTRODUCTION

Regional offices occupy a unique position in the justice value chain. In the recent past many questions than answers have been raised relating to their future.

In the normal course of events, the following questions need to be answered before an exit strategy is drawn. Did the decentralisation strategy that led to regional offices fail? If so, what are the reasons for the failure? Were the regional offices sufficiently empowered? Was the transition properly managed? Was there an attempt to consolidate or institutionalise? ? Is the reversal of the decentralisation strategy not a result of pressure from forces that benefited from the old status quo? Were regional offices by design a transient phenomenon? What measurements were put to determine failure or success of the strategy?

Which stakeholders are calling for the closure of regional offices? Is this nostalgia for centralisation?

Ideally a rationally study to provide answers to these questions would have made sense before an exit strategy is drawn.

 

2. BACKGROUND

The Regional Offices are a product of the decentralisation strategy of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. The approach was necessitated by the real or perceived bottlenecks in the justice service delivery process.

Stakeholders and partners have expressed dissatisfaction with the quality or value added by the Regional Offices. These concerns were echoed at the Colloquium of the Justice Department held last year.

This report intends to present three main strategic options in determining the fate of the regional offices and the implications of each option. This is intended to assist the decision makers to choose a path most suitable.

3. ASSUMPTIONS

There are a few assumptions that inform the need for an exit strategy.

4. STRATEGIC OPTIONS

This report proposes three possible exit strategies for regional offices. Each of these strategies has particular costs and benefits associated with them. A set of activities is proposed in the event any of the proposed strategy is adopted.

The three proposed strategies are: close regional offices, establish administrative clusters and rationalise and establish shared service centres.

The strategic options are dictated upon by factors such as cost-efficiency, service delivery, cycle time in responding to requests, volume of work and geography.

 

4.1 CLOSE REGIONAL OFFICES

The regional offices were intended to support the courts speedily and effectively. The rationale was that, if functions and powers were decentralised, the support to the courts would be quicker and efficient.

It is claimed that if regional offices were closed, an amount of R81 million will be saved. It can be assumed that the personnel employed in these offices will be retrenched. If this assumption is correct it can be concluded that this option is strong in relation to cost-efficiency.

On the other side, closure of offices will impact on service delivery and have social consequences. This is so because cost-efficiency will have to be accompanied by retrenchments. If retrenchments are not effected there is a need to re-deploy employees.

The closure would also mean a shift to centralisation. Centralisation is the ‘degree to which formal authority to make discretionary choices is concentrated in an individual unit, or level (usually high in the organisation), thus permitting employees (usually low in the organisation) minimum input into their work’ (Robbins, 1989). This may lead to a long complicated bureaucracy and the separation of responsibility with authority.

If this option is to be taken, some of the steps need to be taken:

 

4.2 PHASE OUT REGIONAL OFFICES INTO ADMINISTRATIVE CLUSTERS

Administration clusters are intended to serve as a support to both the judiciary and the prosecuting authority at the lowest point. The administrative boundaries follow the judicial demarcation. Fourteen (14) judicial clusters are proposed.

This option is stronger because it devolves decision making to the point of action. It can strengthen the service delivery because decisions will be made quicker. This would mean that the concentration of resources would be at the delivery point. This arrangement can work if there is matching of responsibility with authority. This option is best in that it will lead to a process of painless restructuring, there will not be people retrenched. It does not have severe social costs. This move strengthens the administrative capacity and coordination at the court.

On the downside, this process is likely going to escalate the costs as opposed to reducing them. The establishment of fourteen clusters would cost as much as the regional offices or even more.

The following process is suggested for the implementation of the administrative clusters.

4.3 ESTABLISH ‘SHARED SERVICE CENTRES’.

The third option is to reduce the number of offices through a process of consolidating functions into a shared service centre. A shared will be" pulling activities that support core business processes out of each business unit and consolidates them into a separate operating unit that runs these supporting processes as its core business process (Schulman al, 1999). A shared service is "the concentration of company resources performing like activities, typically spread across the organisation, in order to service multiple internal partners at lower cost and with higher service levels, with the common goal of delighting external customers and enhancing corporate value (Schulman et al, 1999).

The establishment of shared service centres will be accompanied by rationalisation of offices. The merging of offices will reduce the costs, release staff to the courts, lead to economies of scale and expertise and present an opportunity to speedily transform regional offices into shared service centres. Shared services centres inevitably lead to decentralisation, which in turn leads to rapid response to requests. It facilitates speedy action because it avoids the vertical hierarchy. Decentralisation helps in securing detailed input into the decision.

As the downside, those at the corporate level usually meet creation of a shared service centre with resistance.

A shared service centre reaps the benefit of both centralisation and decentralisation.

If this option is adopted the following process is recommended:

5. CONCLUSION

The second and third options present obvious benefits that can only benefit the provision of justice. These options are strong on cost-efficiency, process standardisation and service delivery.

6. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that:

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANNEXURE B

 

Numerous reports highlight the existence of backlogs in the processing of financial information in the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJ&CD). The natural culmination of these backlogs has been the inability of the Auditor General to perform an adequate Audit of the Department as a result of the decrease in the scope of the audit and thus this project was initiated to clear backlogs at all DoJ&CD offices, i.e. justice offices, regional offices and head office.

Since the initiation of the project a number of successes in the move towards reducing backlogs and reconciling the Vote and Trust Accounts have been achieved.

Gauteng

Achievements to date

The project was initiated and kicked off on 16/10/01

5 task teams have been formed to cleanup Gauteng "A" and Gauteng "B" offices

Cleared backlogs, cleaned up and reconciled Trust Account in Bronkhorstpruit and Pretoria North offices

Cleared backlogs, cleaned up and reconciled Vote Account in Pretoria North office.

(Appendix A) - Details of suspense accounts cleared.

Activities scheduled for next period

Complete cleanup of backlogs in Vote Account – Bronkhorstpruit (2/11/01)

Clear backlogs, clean up and reconcile Trust and Vote Accounts in:

Cullinan (9/11/01)

Randfontein (7/11/01)

Westonaria (14/11/01)

Engage 15 additional resources to complete the existing task teams (19/11/01)

Provide the necessary training

Form 10 task teams (50 internal and external resources) (18/12/01)

To clear the remaining 30 0ffices

Northern Province

Achievements to date

Project has been initiated

Activities scheduled for next period

Formal project kick-off and discussions with Regional project coordinator.

Form 5 task teams with internal and external resources (14/11/2001)

Provide necessary training (22/11/01)

Begin clearing backlogs in selected offices

North West Province

Achievements to date

The project was kicked off on 15/10/01

Formulated plan of action and order of cleanup

Resourcing of task teams (internal and external)

Dedicated regional resources already in sub-offices sorting out problems

Activities scheduled for next period

Form 5 task teams (internal and external) (9/11/01)

Provide necessary training (9/11/01)

Clear Zeerust Office (12/11/01)

Clear Ditsobotla and Lichtenberg offices (23/11/01)

Form 10 task teams (50 resources) to clear remaining offices (7/01/02)

Free State

Achievements to date

Project has been initiated

Activities scheduled for next period

Formal project kick-off and discussions with Regional project coordinator (9/11/01).

Form 5 task teams with internal and external resources (14/11/2001)

Provide necessary training (20/11/01)

Begin clearing backlogs in selected offices (phase 1)

Mpumalanga

Achievements to date

Project has been initiated

 

Activities scheduled for next period

Formal project kick-off and discussions with Regional project coordinator (7/11/01).

Form 5 task teams with internal and external resources (14/11/2001)

Provide necessary training (20/11/01)

Begin clearing backlogs in selected offices (phase 1)

Kwazulu Natal

Achievements to date

The project was kicked off on 30/10/01

Resourcing of task teams (internal and external)

Activities scheduled for next period

Finalise plan of action and order of cleanup

Form 5 task teams (internal and external) (14/11/01)

Provide necessary training (16/11/01)

Start cleanup of offices (phase 1)

Form 10 task teams (50 resources) to clear remaining offices (7/01/02)

Western Cape

Achievements to date

The project was initiated and kicked off on 22/10/01

5 task teams have been formed

Cleared backlogs, cleaned up, reconciled and finalised Vote Account (100%) in 12 offices.

Started clearing backlogs in remaining offices (5 % - 50 % complete)

Guardian Fund backlogs:

Task Team of 15 deployed in Umtata and Bisho (King Williams Town):

Procedures for receipts and payments correctly formulated and implemented

Cashbooks run on a daily basis

Card opened for every minor

All necessary cards brought up to date, before payments are made

Control lists for receipts and payments introduced

R 14.5 mill (King Williams Town) R 21 mill (Umtata) been paid to Public Investment Commissioner.

Problems prior to 1/10/01 have been ring-fenced.

Activities scheduled for next period

Task team administration workshop (2/11/01)

Draw and process journal entries (2/11/01)

Training (Monies in Trust) of sub office staff (13/11/01)

Complete clearing of backlogs, clean up and reconciliation of Vote Accounts in :

Cape Town Regional office (9/11/01)

Kuilsriver (9/11/01)

Cape Town High Court (16/11/01)

Ceres (16/11/01)

Worcester (16/11/01)

Stellenbosch (16/11/01)

Tulbagh (16/11/01)

Wellington (16/11/01)

Complete the remainder of the offices during January/February 2002.

Guardian Fund backlogs:

Thohoyando (5/11/01 – 9/11/01)

Eastern Cape

Achievements to date

Project has been initiated

Activities scheduled for next period

Formal project kick-off and discussions with Regional project coordinator (1/11/01).

Form 5 task teams with internal and external resources (14/11/2001)

Provide necessary training (29/11/01)

Begin clearing backlogs in selected offices (phase 1)

 

Northern Cape

Achievements to date

All backlogs have been cleared

All reconciliation's are up to date for Vote and Trust Accounts, at sub office and regional level

 

Activities scheduled for next period

Clearing of accounts and reconciliation's at head office

Sorting out of minor problems at head office.

Provide resources to other regional task teams

 

Appendix "A"

Office

Account

Pretoria North:

Receipt Suspense

General Suspense

Warrant Voucher control

PAYE

Agency Services

Bronkhorstpruit:

Orders Payable

S&T

Report 14’s for all months in 2000 were compiled and finalised.

 

 

Monies in trust

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Annexure C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT: JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

 

 

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

 

 

TO: CFO

FILE NO: 3/6/2/1 (SDG)

CC: HC

TEL NO: X1067

FROM: SDG

DATE: 30 October 2001

 

SUBJECT: NETWORK SECURITY AUDIT

  1. With reference to the Network security audit which was done, the necessary corrective action has been taken as advised by the Office of the Auditor General and as indicated on the attached annexure which was also submitted to the Auditor Generals Office. Further corrective actions will be implemented with the Windows 2000 deployment which will allow for more control and monitoring over the Departments networks.
  2. A tender has been published to upgrade and deploy Windows 2000, Network Management Tools, Training etc.. This tender has been awarded and is in the process of being finalised. When fully in place this tender will take care of the Departments network infrastructure based on standards set by the Department, International best practises and also the guidelines from the Auditor Generals office as indicated on the last audit.

 

 

Craig Fisher

Principal Data Technologist

 

Overview

The audit was conducted on both Windows NT domain authentication servers and application servers, and the Unix-based State Attorney and Justice Deposit Account System. This document focuses only on the Windows NT section of the audit report.

This document mentions the findings, the changes that were implemented since the audit (if any) and the actions that will be taken with the migration to a Windows 2000 environment. A separate document will be completed as part of the Windows 2000 architecture design that will include all the settings that will be applied to computers and servers by using Windows 2000 Group Policies.

Windows NT Domain Servers

Since the audit, the server JUSTICE1 was promoted to the PDC of the MAIL domain. The server DOJWEB is now a BDC for the MAIL domain. The PDC for the other domains are still the same.

The following table lists the comments regarding the Windows NT Domain Servers:

Component/Service/Control

Findings and Exposure

Service Packs

In the MAIL domain, service packs 4 and 5 were generally deployed on the NT servers and workstations, with one system (PTAEXCHANGE) running service pack 6. Domain controllers for MAIL, BUDGET and PTAHQ (DOJWEB, BUDGET1 and PRES respectively) were running service pack 4.

Service packs contained both documented and undocumented security fixes. Systems at service pack level 4 and 5 contained known vulnerabilities, and could be remotely crashed, affecting system availability.

Changes since audit

DOJWEB, BUDGET1, and PRES were upgraded to SP6a. There are still a few servers that are running SP4 and SP5, but most have been upgraded to SP6a.

Action plan

The process of upgrading service packs started after the audit. Machines are being upgraded to service pack 6a, but this process is hindered by a shortage of staff.

Windows 2000 project

All servers will be upgraded to Windows 2000 with SP1. SP2 will be released later this year and will be installed on all Windows 2000 servers once it has been tested in a lab environment.

Audit policies

File and Object Access failure and Use of User Rights failure were logged on PTAHQ domain controllers. The successes and failures of Security Policy Changes were logged on MAIL domain controllers. No other categories were audited. This included Log on and Log Off events, as well as User and Group Management events. Without logging, critical security events could not be traced and system issues that affected availability would also go unnoticed.

Changes since audit

The following audit policies were enabled:

Logon/Logoff – Success and Failure

File and Object Access – Success and Failure

Use of user rights – Success and Failure

User and Group Management – Success and Failure

Security Policy Changes – Success and Failure

Action plan

Implemented

Windows 2000 project

The recommendations from the audit report will be implemented during the deployment of Windows 2000 by using Group Policies.

Domain password policies

Weak and inconsistent password policies were found on domain controllers. The following weaknesses were identified:

  • The BUDGET and MAIL domains permitted blank passwords.
  • BUDGET and PTAHQ forced password changes after the default six weeks.
  • The MAIL domain did not enforce password changes at all.
  • No password history was retained on any of the three domains, which meant that even if password changes were enforced, users could reuse old passwords.

Changes since audit

Recommendations implemented

Action plan

Done

Windows 2000 project

The recommendations from the audit report will be implemented during the deployment of Windows 2000 by using Group Policies.

Domain account lockout

Account lockout was completely disabled on the BUDGET and MAIL domains, while PTAHQ’s account lockout policy was totally ineffective. PTAHQ users were locked out after five bad log-ons, but were automatically re-enabled after 30 minutes. The lockout monitoring duration was also 30 minutes, after which the bad log-on count was reset to zero. This meant that an attacker could brute force a password for a particular account by attempting four candidate passwords at thirty-minute intervals, without fear of locking out the account or being detected.

Changes since audit

Account lockout enabled with indefinite duration and until a administrator unlocks.

Action plan

Done

Windows 2000 project

The recommendations from the audit report will be implemented during the deployment of Windows 2000 by using Group Policies.

Blank passwords, or passwords equal to username

In the MAIL domain, one user’s password was blank, and two other users had passwords that correspond with their user names. This was an obvious entry point into the domain. Even unprivileged accounts needed to have strong passwords to prevent these accounts from being used in privilege elevation attacks, with the ultimate objective of gaining local administrative access.

Changes since audit

Blank passwords are not allowed on the system any more, but because of the user skill level in the department it is difficult to control password strong passwords

Action plan

All users in the Department will be trained as part of the DNS project implementation. A tender was published to address the problem. (RT1231KA)

Windows 2000 project

When the recommended account password policies are in place in the Windows 2000 environment, users won’t be able to use blank passwords. Users will be educated to use passwords different from their user names.

Null sessions

All four domains controllers examined permitted "null sessions". This essentially allowed an attacker to connect to the server as the null user "with a blank password". The attacker could then extract valuable information, such as user names, group membership, last log-on, etc., which could be used in focused attacks on dormant accounts, to mention one example.

Changes since audit

Null sessions not allowed any more

Action plan

Implemented

Windows 2000 project

In Windows 2000, null sessions are still allowed by default. The same registry key can be used to disallow the use of null sessions as was recommended in the audit report. This setting will be tested in a Windows 2000 lab environment to determine the affect on the use of Active Directory.

Guest accounts

DOJWEB, BUDGET1, and PRES all had enabled guest accounts, while PROGRAMMING’s guest account was disabled. The guest account on BUDGET1 was blank.

The guest account could be accessed by users who did not have valid log-on accounts, which provided attackers with system information for further targeted attacks.

Changes since audit

The status of the guest accounts of the domains are the same except for the BUDGET domain, which’s guest account is disabled.

Action plan

 

Windows 2000 project

The guest account of all the Windows 2000 domains will be disabled. Regular audits be conducted to confirm the status of these guest accounts.

FTP

DOJWEB, PRES and PROGRAMMING were all running FTP servers. Anonymous access was permitted to the FTP servers ran by DOJWEB and PROGRAMMING. PRES and PROGRAMMING were running Microsoft FTP Server 3, while DOJWEB was running version 4.

FTP provided another access path into a system, and running an additional network service provided another potential point of compromise. Anonymous access could permit unintentional access to sensitive files, and older versions of FTP could contain security holes.

Changes since audit

FTP service disabled

Action plan

Implemented

Windows 2000 project

With the installation of Windows 2000 with IIS, the default option is not to install the FTP service. This was not the case with IIS on Windows NT 4.0. This is probably why most of the servers that are running IIS on Windows NT 4.0 have FTP enabled.

FTP will only be enabled on the Windows 2000 servers that requires this service, but anonymous access will be disabled.

SQL Server

Microsoft SQL server was active on DOJWEB, BUDGET1, and PROGRAMMING. The SQL server security administrator (sa) account built into all three of these systems had a blank password. The privileged "sa" account could be used via SQL statements to execute command line commands, such as adding another user to the local administrator group.

Changes since audit

The password for the "sa" account was changed.

Action plan

 

Windows 2000 project

The architecture design for Windows 2000 for the DOJ does not include any changes to the current SQL implementation. The recommended changes should however be evaluated by the DOJ’s IT staff and implemented as necessary.

Web Servers

PROGRAMMING was running Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) 3.0 Web server. It could not be confirmed that this Web server served any useful pages, since the IIS default installation pages were returned.

IIS contained numerous security holes, and was insecure by default. This could potentially result in system compromise.

Changes since audit

No changes were applied to the IIS services since the audit. The IIS services are used for internal intranet publishing and sharing of information.

Action plan

 

Windows 2000 project

Windows 2000 servers that will be running IIS will be configured to comply with the recommended security checklists from Microsoft.

Table 1: Comments on Windows NT Domain Servers

Windows NT Domain Account Management

The following table lists the comments regarding the Windows NT Domain Account Management:

Service/Control/System

Findings and Exposure

"User cannot change password" option

The option that disallowed users to changes their passwords was set. Users were therefore not allowed to change their passwords. For example, 95% of PTASTAT users were not allowed to change their passwords. The risk existed that if users were not allowed to change their passwords on a regular basis, passwords would become known to other employees or attackers, leading to system compromise.

Changes since audit

The option that disallows users to change their passwords are still set on certain domains. When running a single domain it is difficult to keep all machines synchronised at all times. This results in users not able to change their passwords if domain controllers are not fully synchronised.

Action plan

The domains that were examined during the audit will become redundant in the Windows 2000 implementation. A tender has been published to address the Windows 2000 implementation. (RT1231KA)

Windows 2000 project

All accounts in all Windows 2000 domains will be configured to be able to change their passwords and users will be forced to change the password every 28 days (as per the audit report’s recommendation). These settings will be enforced by Group Policy.

Accounts with passwords last changed before 2000

Various user accounts were identified that had not changed their passwords recently. For example, 64% of the BUDGET accounts and 38% of the MAIL accounts had not changed their passwords since January 2000. For MAIL, 250 and 1068 accounts had their passwords changed in 1998 and 1999 respectively, and the password for the administrator account for JHBSTAT was last changed at the end of 1998. The risk existed that the active user accounts that had not had a password change could represent dormant user accounts through which unauthorised access could be gained, which could compromise the network.

Take note that the examples did not include user accounts that were not allowed to change their passwords. These accounts were a minority except for PTASTAT.

Changes since audit

A process has been started to look at users accounts that has not been used for while and password changes. This is a labour intensive exercise and again the shortage of staff is also a problem.

Action plan

The domains that were examined during the audit will become redundant in the Windows 2000 implementation. A tender has been published to address the Windows 2000 implementation. (RT1231KA)

Windows 2000 project

Users will be forced to change their passwords every 28 days (as per the audit report’s recommendation). User accounts that are no longer used will be disabled for a period of a month after which the inactive accounts will be deleted. The task of disabling and deleting user accounts can be delegated to the human resource (personnel) department, which wasn’t easy to do in a Windows NT 4.0 environment.

No password required

In the BUDGET and MAIL domains, blank passwords were permitted and certain accounts with blank passwords were identified. The risk existed that, if users were not required to use a password to log into the domain, they might be tempted to supply a blank password, which could easily be cracked by an intruder and used to gain unauthorised access to the domain.

Changes since audit

Blank password policy have been changed

Action plan

 

Windows 2000 project

All user accounts (including administrators and service accounts) will be forced to be a minimum of 6 characters long. No blank passwords will be allowed in any domain. These policies will be enforced by Group Policy.

Password expiry date not enabled

In all the above-mentioned domains, except for PTAHQ, more than 90% of user accounts were not required the change of their passwords, as passwords were not set to expire. In the PTASTAT domain with 118 users, only one user account had the password expiry option, "eputter", enabled. If passwords were not set to expire, users would continue to use their passwords indefinitely, which increased the possibility of other employees and intruders becoming familiar with such passwords. Any compromised password could be used by intruders for an extended period of time, since the user was not required to change the password.

Changes since audit

Password expiry has been enabled accept on the mail domain. The mail domain is a single domain for all offices. Initially the password expiry was enabled but caused user frustration and support calls to increase. The reason for this was that one cannot change your password if the domain controller that must authenticate you is not synchronised with PDC. This is a design flaw which we are currently addressing

Action plan

Windows 2000 single user logon implementation

Windows 2000 project

As already mentioned, all user accounts will be forced to change their passwords after 28 days. The only exception will be service accounts. Even administrators should be forced to change their passwords at the time that the passwords expire.

Disabled accounts

The guest user account was disabled in the PROGRAMMERS domain, but was active in all the other domains. In the MAIL domain, the following accounts were disabled: akruger2, AMKruger, Jbrink, Mhorn, SvanTonder and VVandyk. Disabled accounts are usually an indicative of poor housekeeping, and should generally be deleted after investigation.

Changes since audit

From the above mentioned accounts, the account AMKruger is still disabled, the account Mhorn was deleted and all the other accounts were enabled.

Action plan

In enforcing e-mail policies, accounts are disable by administrators when users are not in line with policies. The accounts will stay disable until a written undertaking is obtained from the users supervisor that the problem will not occur again. Accounts will then be enabled again.

Windows 2000 project

The guest accounts will be disabled on all the Windows 2000 domains. A task could be assigned to a person (or team) to occasionally audit these accounts. This can also be accomplished using scripts in Windows 2000. These scripts could be configured to run automatically at a scheduled time and could automatically disable guest accounts that were enabled since the last audit.

Locked-out accounts

The department’s account lockout policy was either not implemented or automatically re-enabled accounts after lockout. Locked-out accounts could be indicative of suspicious activity and should therefore be investigated and followed up.

Changes since audit

Account lockout has been fully enables

Action plan

Implemented

Windows 2000 project

The recommended account lockout settings will be configured in all the Windows 2000 domain by Group Policy.

Accounts never used to log on

At the time of the audit, only a single domain controller could be found for the BUDGET, JHBSTAT, PROGRAMMERS, PTAHQ and PTASTAT domains. The MAIL domain had 1 primary domain controller and 29 backup domain controllers. Several user accounts were identified that had never been used to log onto the PTASTAT and JHBSTAT domains. If intruders compromised such accounts it would go unnoticed and since they generally had a first or initial password these accounts were easy to crack once the password became known.

Changes since audit

A process has been started to look at users accounts that has not been used for while and password changes. This is a labour intensive exercise and again the shortage of staff is also a problem..

Action plan

 

Windows 2000 project

During the migration to Windows 2000, a list of users per department will be compiled which could be used to migrate the active users to the Windows 2000 environment. This should ensure that only active user accounts are migrated to Windows 2000. When the migration is completed, a final audit could be performed on the Windows NT 4.0 domain controllers to make sure all active accounts are migrated to the new environment.

Regarding domain that only have one domain controller: All domains in the Windows 2000 environment will have at least 2 domain controllers.

Table 2: Comments on Windows NT Domain Account Management

Windows Password Analysis

The following table lists the comments regarding the Windows Password Analysis:

Service/Control/System

Findings and Exposure

MAIL domain

Password quality was extremely poor. Of the 3717 passwords, 3630 (97.6%) were easily cracked, 333 (9%) of which could be derived from the corresponding user name. The most common passwords were password (1836), hallo (749), greet (112) and 123456 (26).

Weak passwords such as these allowed attackers easy access to domain resources. Once an attacker had non-privileged access to the domain, he or she would attempt to gain privileged access.

Changes since audit

No changes were implemented since the audit.

Action plan

This issue will be addressed with training and user orientation. A tender was published to address these issues. (RT1231KA)

Windows 2000 project

It is difficult to force users to use more difficult passwords, but by enforcing frequent password changes and not allowing previously used passwords, there should be less chances of intrusion by attackers by using known passwords.

By using Windows 2000, users will have less user accounts for different systems, which will help users because they wouldn’t have to remember many passwords for various systems.

Table 3: Comments on Windows Password Analysis