Question NW4321 to the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy
02 December 2022 - NW4321
Msimang, Prof CT to ask the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy
Considering that his department spent R500 000 on a report that recommended that the national nuclear regulator be removed from his department and placed within the former department of environmental affairs, and noting the significant amount spent on the specified report and its findings, (a) what are the reasons that the nuclear regulator remains within his department and (b) by what date will it be (i) moved to the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment and/or (ii) constituted as an independent agency within the Government?
Reply:
The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) was established as an independent Regulator through the National Nuclear Regulator Act 47 of 1999 (the NNR Act). This had evolved from Council for Nuclear Safety (CNS) that was housed within the then Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), currently the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa). The NNR plays a central role in ensuring safety in the use and handling of most “radioactive materials”, as defined in the NNR Act. In terms of section 8(1) of the NNR Act, the NNR is “governed and controlled” by its Board. The powers of the Board are extensive and it is placed at the centre of the most important decision-making functions of the NNR; and must direct and control the functions and operations of the NNR.
a) Following the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Mission in South Africa, the then Department of Energy undertook a process of reviewing its legislative framework to strengthen the effective independence of the Regulatory body. In October 2013, the Department commissioned a Feasibility Study at an estimated cost of about R500000 to be in a position to identify and establish where appropriate the following aspects:
- Legislation to ensure the effective independence of the National Nuclear Regulator (“NNR”) by ascertaining the best practice (through benchmarking) in enhancing the effective independence.
- The appropriate body in Government to which the NNR should be reporting; and
- The impact of moving the NNR to such a body.
The Feasibility Study indicated that thirty-one (31) countries operating nuclear power stations and international trends reveal that these countries’ nuclear safety regulators can be an integral part of the State’s governmental bureaucracy or in contrast, can be totally independent. These countries address the “effective independence” of their nuclear safety regulators taking into account the nuclear safety regulator’s Administrative Reporting Mechanisms, Funding Model and Regulatory Enforcement Measure. Taking these factors into account, proposed amendments to the NNR Act were considered prudent, noting the uniqueness of the nuclear industry, and required capacity within the appropriate Department.
(b)
(i) There is no date for any movement. The issue of effective independence of the regulator is being addressed through the strengthening of the statutory framework to ensure that the decisions of the NNR remain independent, given the existing reporting lines of the regulator. The NNR thus remains effectively independent and the perception that is not is unfounded.
(ii) Further amendments to the NNR Act have been proposed, amongst others, to strengthen the independence of the NNR, in particular removing any internal appeal to the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy on decisions of the NNR. These amendments will be facilitated through the legislative process.