Somalia: briefing by Department of Foreign Affairs

Meeting report

The Chairperson opened by addressing the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms Susan van der Merwe, who was present at the request of the Committee. He said that on numerous occasions, the Committee had indicated that a political office bearer or the department’s director-general should be present at their meetings. Furthermore, documents had to be given to the Committee at least 24 hours before the meeting. The Committee had only received the documents at the meeting. The Chairperson stated that if this were to happen again, the Committee would have no choice but to postpone the meeting until the Committee was better prepared with documents handed in on time.

Ms Susan van der Merwe (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) responded that the document had been sent through to their parliamentary liaison officer the day before who had engaged with the Committee’s secretary and it was understood that the documents had been forwarded to the Chairperson. Unfortunately the director-general could not be at the meeting as there was a meeting with the select committee happening simultaneously.

The Chairperson said that he had only received the document this morning and he would follow up on the issue. He had been assured that the document problem would be dealt with.

Situation in Somalia presentation
Mr Graham Maitland (Chief Director: East Africa: DFA) began his briefing by giving a short historical background. The origins of the conflict of Somalia were given. In the late 1980’s a plethora of opposition groups based on clan allegiances had increased in opposition to Mohamed Siad Barre’s Regime. It eventually led to the fall Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. Fighting amongst the clans intensified and the country gradually disintegrated. Since 1991 Somalia experienced thirteen failed peace processes. This was primarily due to the tendency of the Somalis to rely on military solutions. The last peace process was held in Mbagathi, Kenya in 2004 and it resulted in the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which failed to achieve peace.

The current political situation was that the paralysis of the TFG resulted in the emergence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). It was short lived as it was expelled by Ethiopian forces in January 2007. The UIC re-emerged as part of the Alliance for the liberation of Somalia. In 2007 the TFG launched a national reconciliation congress. At the conclusion of the congress, they had a number of resolutions and a time table for implementation. International reaction was divided with many labelling it a disappointment. President Yusuf seemed determined to remain in power despite poor health and isolation by the Western powers. Prime Minister Nur Adde supported reconciliation but lacked a power base of his own. The United Nations led the political process in Somalia, meditating peace talks between the opposition, Alliance for the Re-liberalisation of Somalia (ARS) and the TFG. The talks began in May 2008. A three track approach was proposed: a political dialogue between the TFG and the ARS; a credible security presence and a programmatic track.

The security situation was at its worse in seventeen years. Insurgents continued to make gains in Southern Somalia with counter-insurgency by the TFG and Ethiopian troops. In January 2008 the AUS extended the mandate of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for a further six months. Only Uganda and Burundi deployed 2 200 troops. The humanitarian situation saw humanitarian organisations declaring certain parts of Somalia as being in a state of humanitarian emergency. Up to 1 million Somali civilians have been displaced internally and forced to flee the country. High levels of insecurity created an obstacle to the work of humanitarian organisations. Socio-economically, Somalia was one of the poorest countries in the world with no proper economic structure. The oil sector drew international attention with a Chinese company signing a deal to explore northern Puntland. The regional relations of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Djibouti were briefly explained. Relations with countries such as South Africa, the United States of America (US), China and Italy were also explained.

Discussion
Ms F Hajaig (ANC) noted that the position on Somalia by certain countries had been outlined, however, what was the position of the African Union.

Mr M Sibande (ANC) asked if the AU played a role and if it had any impact.

Mr Maitland replied that there was some difficulty for the AU because of the regional dynamics between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It was especially difficult to make any impact in the later stages of the conflict in Somalia. The perceptions of the AU among the Somali stakeholders, particularly those in the opposition, was that the AU was partial to Ethiopia. If they were to push for a stronger AU role in the mediation process, it would become problematic because of that perception.

Mr M Ramgobin (ANC) noted that South Africa did not have any diplomatic relations with Somalia. However, it was mentioned that China was the focal point of the Security Council. He wanted to know what was meant by the term ‘focal point’.

Mr Maitland replied that in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) there were various point countries on the agenda of the UNSC. China as a focal point for Somalia meant that it was the lead country through which discussion, policy drafts and so forth would go to the broader Security Council.

Mr Ramgobin was concerned with the issue of China. There was a new phenomenon in international relations regarding China as a powerful country and the role that it could play in multi-lateral relations. He was concerned that China was entrusted with strengthening Somalia when he thought that China was part of the problem.

Ms van der Merwe replied that placing China as a focal point for Somalia in the UNSC was almost like an administrative task. It was a way of arranging the work and had nothing to do with being a champion for a country.

Mr T Leon (DA) noted that there seemed to be an omission in the report about current events. He had visited the refugee centre in Cape Town and knew that there were many Somalis in the country. It was also known that Somalis were the victims of the recent xenophobic attacks in the country. That was one of the co-lateral consequences of the failed state in Somalia and it was extraordinary that people would come all the way from Somalia to South Africa. He understood that because of resource constraints, they had not contributed a single soldier to aid the peace force that was in their estimation, two-thirds under-equipped. Apart from South Africa’s contribution in the United Nations, he wanted to know if anything else was being done.

Ms van der Merwe replied that South Africa could not send peacekeeping forces to a place where peace did not exist and there was no framework for them to operate. However, they have sent a military attaché to Addis Ababa to assist in the planning processes in order to get to a better and more peaceful situation and to promote the peace process.

Mr Leon asked how relevant or real was the threat that the areas that were controlled by the Islamic courts would provide a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and international terrorists. If so, what would be the consequences?

Mr P Nefolovhodwe (APO) was concerned by the involvement of the US. The US conceptualisation was skewed and when they intervened it was because of their narrow perspective of perceived danger to the US, this could be detrimental. Even in the US that vision was no longer acceptable. He wanted to know what was the US view on Somalia as he was not sure of their intentions.

Mr Maitland replied that the DFA had tried to make sense of the allegation that there was Al-Qaeda in Somalia. They had engaged with a number of actors close to the US government and analysts who were involved in that analysis. If a survey was done across a broad spectrum of opinion, there was an overwhelming consensus that there was no real threat of Al-Qaeda in Somalia. The problem should be located in the context of the emergence of the Islamic courts of the country. The courts, in their opinion, were a response to a situation that secular government was not able to deal with. The political parties had failed, government had failed and this was the response of the locals. It should be viewed in that context. Generalisations should not be made. They thought that Somalia was a specific and unique society that they thought would make it difficult for the emergence of Al-Qaeda. There was not a denial of the fact that there were no security institutions and no monitoring capacity. However, it had not been used as a sustainable safe haven for Al-Qaeda. Many have criticised the policy on this, including US academics. It did not help to bomb an area in Somalia at a time when peace was trying to be attained. It galvanised and humiliated the population and the international community’s perception of the population was skewed. That policy of the US, from the DFA’s perspective, was problematic.

Mr M Sibande (ANC) commented that there was confusion about the situation in Somalia. This was aided by the Cold War and the militarisation of Somalia by the US that saw the rise of warlords. Furthermore he wanted to clearly state that he was against the violence of the xenophobic attacks. However, he was concerned by how vocal the Somalis living in South Africa were in refusing assistance from this country and preferring the help from the United Nations.

Mr Ramgobin felt that South Africa had pioneered resolving racism, xenophobia and related matters. It bordered on insulting that a group of people termed refugees or asylum seekers, bit the hand that fed them. They were humiliated and insulted by the vulgar behaviour of South Africans brutalising other members of the African continent. South Africa was at the forefront in leading the movements for free trade, free movement, and common customs for the Southern African Development Community (SADC). With that said he thought it was grossly improper, especially for Somalis in the Western Cape, to take the position of separating themselves from the South African government. In relation to the population of the so-called refugees in the area, the Somalis were a handful. According to the media, there were references to 50 000 to a 100 000 refugees being displaced. If the media were to be believed, there would be in excess of 3 million refugees in the country. He asked where was the rest of them. He suggested to the Department that perhaps a more aggressive stance should be taken at border controls even though there was no sign of a government in Somalia. He suggested that the Department take the initiative. He also suggested that the Committee not only distance themselves from the violence, but condemn it. They had arrested approximately 1 400 people for xenophobic attacks who would be prosecuted very soon. Their inability and unwillingness to take a sterner stance at border controls was a fact and they would have to live with the reality that South Africa was a destination for people in Africa seeking a better life.

Ms van der Merwe replied that it should be reiterated that government and the vast majority of the South African population were experiencing feelings of repugnance towards the acts of violence against those of foreign nationality. The challenges that were raised were matters for further discussion. These were not matters for the DFA to pass judgement on. In addition the refugees would have to engage with them, since there was no other option but to deal with the South African government, considering all the services that were being provided. A specialised court system was being used. The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) was dealing with interim measures to ensure that people were properly documented. The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) was dealing with the establishment of safe places for people to stay. The entire government was dealing with the issue of reintegration. The state could not be ignored.

The Chairperson responded that the Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs had been quoted on the news saying that DHA did not have the capacity to deal with the current challenges.

Ms van der Merwe said that she thought that it would be better to have a proper engagement with the Minister of Home Affairs to properly ascertain the programmes that were being put in place.

Mr Ramgobin noted that the management, control and the taking forward of the needs of the refugees was the responsibility of the Disaster Management Committee and not the DHA. A common voice was required from all the government departments.

Ms Camerer thought that it did not seem useful to expect the DFA to make any decisions since it was a DHA matter. She suggested that the DHA should come before the Committee.        

Mr F Beukman (ANC) presumed that the approach after 9/11 was multi-lateralism. However, if the conventional definition of a failed state was to be followed and multi-lateralism was to occur there should be a number of stakeholders involved. A Chapter 7 resolution however sparked a unilateral reaction and would not speak to multi-lateralism. He wanted to know if all the stakeholders were involved.

Ms van der Merwe replied that they would continue to work through a multi-lateral approach. They believed that was the way forward. Many stakeholders had been excluded in the past and that had not yielded good results.

Mr Nefolovhodwe wanted to know who were the stakeholders and their capacity to influence the decisions.

Ms van der Merwe replied that the stakeholders were everybody that was involved. If there was exclusion there was potential for future conflict. It was those people that had an influence, constituency or a power base and who were able to negotiate a solution.

Mr Maitland added that the stakeholders were everybody. It cut across Islamic movements and charities and clan grouping and all of this added to the complexity of the situation.

The Chairperson read from the research report on Somalia by the Parliament Research Unit about stakeholders. It said that the stakeholders in Somalia participated with the intention of holding a political office and achieving access to resources but ending the conflict was not their ultimate goal. He questioned whether stakeholders with those motives were really stakeholders and perhaps they should find stakeholders with the proper motives.

Ms van der Merwe replied that the purpose of an engagement with stakeholders such as the ones that the Chairperson had mentioned, was to persuade them of a different view. That had been their philosophy as a government and as a movement and it was something that occurred at a multi-lateral level. The purpose of including everyone was to avoid having people outside jettisoning the peace process, but rather to include them and engage them on the kind of principles that they believed were the way forward. It was not an easy task.

Dr A Lutuli (ANC) asked if this situation in Somalia would be resolved.

Mr Maitland replied that that was an issue that had baffled everyone for the last fifteen years. Perhaps they needed modest objectives and to build on them incrementally. They had seen in the last fifteen years serious de-centralisation in Somalia. There was a collapsed state and government, however that did not mean that in large parts of Somalia there had not been governance. There was governance at a very localised level. The study of the Somali economy illustrated that it was a vibrant economy that included the privatisation of the telecommunications. Starting modestly and building upwards would be better as opposed to beginning with a grand idea and ignoring the foundations. People were looking at the functionalist approach, however it would take time, resources as well as engagement from the international community, including South Africa. The DFA had said to their counterparts that they were willing to help and utilise the expertise they had gained in Southern Sudan and the Congo.

Mr M Kalako (ANC) asked who were the counterparts that were alluded to and whether they were recognised by the South African government or the AU or the UN.

Ms van der Merwe replied that South Africa did recognise the Transitional Government. In the presentation, the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) arose out of the Transitional Government. There was a government even though the state behind the government did not exist. A number of countries recognised the Transitional Government. They had a paralysis in the interim that had not allowed government to move forward and create institutions of state.

Mr Maitland added that they did engage with the TFG. They were invited to conferences and forums that provided many opportunities to engage.

Dr Lutuli noted that South Africa had many Somali immigrants and they had no government in their own country. She asked how South Africa would deal with major issues if there was no Somali government.

Ms van der Merwe replied that there were a number of Somali people who had established themselves here and they appeared to be a well-organised community. There were also people from the rest of Africa in South Africa because many people saw the country as an opportunity to better themselves. There was nothing sinister with people looking for a way to better themselves.

Ms S Camerer (DA) asked if the DFA knew how many Somalis were in the country and if the DFA communicated with the DHA.

Ms van der Merwe replied that they did not have a figure. It was found that there were those that were of Somali descent but were South African citizens. They did keep close contact with the DHA regarding the issue.

Ms Camerer asked how large the population of Somalia was.

Ms van der Merwe responded that the population of Somalia was not known, as there was no proper data. They could only guess the number was perhaps 12 million people.

Mr Ramgobin said that they could not discount the reality that there was a struggle for space and turf wars within the Islamic movement. Shari’ah law also needed to be taken into consideration.

Mr D Motubatse-Hounkpatin (ANC) was concerned by the socio-economic situation in Somalia and asked how the wars were sustained.

Mr Maitland replied that one of the biggest sources of income were taxes at roadblocks from primarily humanitarian convoys. There was also the diaspora and the family linkages that could sustain the war.

Mr Nefolovhodwe said that the media including the public broadcaster should refrain from using derogatory terms such as “illegal aliens”. This was the term used to describe people that were supposed to be re-integrated into South African society. These people were African and should not be treated as outsiders.

Ms van der Merwe agreed that terminology should not reaffirm the prejudices of some people. They should ask the SABC to take up this matter. She also hoped that Members of Parliament could start a campaign.

The Chairperson mentioned that the impact of xenophobia on foreign policy had been raised since 2005. He believed that xenophobia went to the heart of foreign policy and wanted to know how the recent events had impacted on South Africa’s foreign policy.

Ms van der Merwe replied that while xenophobia was not a foreign policy itself, there was obviously an impact on the implementation of South African foreign policy. She felt that there should be a debate on this matter to ensure that it did not affect their foreign policy.

Mr Ramgobin question the oil deal made between President Yusuf and a Chinese oil company. He asked how permanent the president was, which areas he represented and whether it was a valid business deal.

Ms van der Merwe replied that they did recognise the TFG and it was assumed that they were enabled in terms of international law to enter into international agreements. There was nothing that the international community could do about the agreements that the President of Somalia entered into.

The Chairperson adjourned the meeting noting to the DFA that on 19 October 2006 the DFA had been presented with a resolution of Parliament about the extension of contracts. It was raised with the DG. He had not received a response. The DFA was required to develop a coherent succession strategy or plan and present it to the Committee within a period of six months calculated from the date of approval from the application of Parliament. The DFA would include the implementation of the succession strategy plan annually. The Committee had not received an annual report nor an update.

Meeting adjourned.