African Command (AFRICOM): Defence Department update

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International Relations

20 February 2008
Chairperson: Mr J Sithole (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Institute of Security Studies and the Independent Global Dialogue all gave presentations on the United States (US) African Command (AFRICOM). It was explained that the US government had decided to set up AFRICOM ostensibly to promote security and stability in the region, but it would be unique because there would be no troop deployment, but instead it would be an integration of military and civilian architecture. It would become operational on the 1st October 2008, regardless of countries’ ambivalence to or support of it. Most African countries were cautious in their response. The only country that offered to host AFRICOM was Liberia. The Southern African Development Community declined to host AFRICOM in the region. The African Union had not yet formally taken a position on the matter. South Africa was unwilling to host a foreign military on its sovereign territory. Due to its multi-lateral stance, South Africa would not interact with the US unilaterally on AFRICOM. Because of this, some of the joint programmes with the US could not be executed in full. The Department of Defence was adamant that US was in fact only interested in establishing an AFRICOM base in sub-Saharan Africa, and that without agreement the base would be established in Stuttgart.

The Institute for Security Studies noted that it was also important to consider the emergence of China and India as strategic competitors to the US for oil and other natural resources from Africa. It was felt that AFRICOM could mean the militarisation of the US foreign policy. There were contradictions as to what led to its creation, together with lack of consultation, and a fear that US troops might invite, rather than deter, terrorist attacks. Priorities in US and Africa were different and AFRICOM might undermine common policies in the Common Africa Defence Policy and post conflict reconstruction policy. AFRICOM would be set up, but there was a need to decide how African regional structures would engage with it. The Independent Global Dialogue noted that US might be attempting to divide Africa. It was vital for the African Union to ensure stability in the Horn of Africa. Some analysts had suggested that although a mission might begin as peacekeeping it could permeate into interference with domestic policy of other countries. The presence of the US had often destabilised a region. There was a need to ensure that the African Union and strong states shored up the weaker ones.

Members raised questions around the Pan African Parliament resolution, the findings of the African Union, the challenges around development, the comments of the US Ambassador at a meeting the previous year, the need for the African Union structures to act in concert, and the interaction by South Africa with other states. The position of Egypt was discussed. Members
resolved that the African Union’s position must be announced, and that the Committee must develop a report, including the Pan African Parliament resolution and the position of the Southern African Development Community, to refer to parliament.

Meeting report

The Chairperson wanted to know why there were no political office bearers present as he had indicated at the previous meeting that the Committee wanted political office bearers present at all meetings.

Mr M Sibande (ANC) added his concerns on the absence of the political office bearers. 

Mr Mxolisi Nkosi, Deputy Director-General: Africa Bilateral: Department of Foreign Affairs, apologised that the political office bearers were unable to attend because of prior engagements. 

United States African Command (AFRICOM): Update Briefing by Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
Mr Mxolisi Nkosi explained the background to AFRICOM.  President George Bush announced the formation of AFRICOM in February 2007, resulting from several discussions between different departments within the United States (US) government. Presently the Africa Command was shared between Central Command (CENTCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM) and European Command (EUCOM). It was the only area perceived to be without its own command. AFRICOM was initially conceived to be fully operational by 1 October 2008.  There was a possibility that AFRICOM might be based in Stuttgart, Germany

The AFRICOM Mission Statement was to promote US National Security objectives by working with African stakeholders. It would lead the inner-theatre Department of Defence response to support other US agencies in the implementing of US security policies and strategies. AFRICOM would conduct security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. It would conduct military operation to deter aggression and respond to crisis. The AFRICOM objectives would be based on three pillars -building local security capacity in Africa, civilian control of the military and defence reform, and military professionalisation.

The structure of AFRICOM was that the US State Department would continue to be the lead agency. Its mandate would support US foreign policy agencies and other humanitarian organisations. It would be composed of approximately 600 mainly administrative personnel, both civilian and military, from EUCOM, PACOM and CENTCOM. No military personnel would be based in Africa. An evaluation of AFRICOM concluded that it was widely recognised as emanating from US Strategic interest in Africa. General William Ward would be the Commander at AFRICOM.

Most African countries were cautious in their response. The only country that offered to host AFRICOM was Liberia. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) declined to host AFRICOM in the region. The African Union (AU) had not yet formally taken a position on the matter. South Africa had expressed reservations on AFRICOM. It was unwilling to host a foreign military on its sovereign territory. Due to its multi-lateral stance, South Africa would not interact with the US unilaterally on AFRICOM.
 
The US was working to allay fears surrounding AFRICOM. They had engaged countries bilaterally to garner support for AFRICOM. The US had characterised African ambivalence as misconception and felt that the role of the State Department was emphasised over that of the Department of Defence.

The Department of Foreign Affairs would continue to monitor developments around AFRICOM and would discuss the matter within Africa’s multilateral institutions.

AFRICOM : Department of Defence (DOD) response
Mr Tsepe Motumi, Chief:  Defence Policy: Department of Defence, told the Committee that the South African Department of Defence would engage with the US Department of Defence. He informed the Committee that last week the DOD locally had extensive engagement with the DOD in the USA. He stated that as result of the South African position, some of the programmes that South Africa was engaged in with the US may not be executed or may only be executed partially. The South African DOD was also multilaterally involved to seek a solution.

Lt General Moreti Matau, Chief Director: Intelligence, SA National Defence Force, explained that the change in US foreign policy happened in 2001 when, for the first time in US foreign policy, it was stated that Africa had emerged as a strategic area for US engagement. Since then there had been movement towards the development of AFRICOM. The history of the US command was usually referred to as combatant command because it was intended to be involved in combat. The South African approach was informed by the understanding that in international relations States interacted with each other, and not through any other structure. South Africa was clear that it would not host foreign military forces within South Africa. This position was taken to all multilateral structures.

SADC had two constraints in acting unilaterally on the issue of AFRICOM. SADC had signed a defence pact that bound all member states of SADC and its rules informed the position of each of the members of SADC. The South African position did not negate the sovereignty of a state to enter into bilateral relations with any other country as long as those relations did not militate against the country. SADC had taken a decision in its security structure, that it would like to create a stronger instrument to deal with security issues, particularly military issues. Central to that was the creation of the SADC Stand-by Brigade that would be an instrument to rally around the military forces with the region.

The Defence Intelligence Standing Committee of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDC) had made an assessment. Their assessment confirmed the earlier positions and their recommendations would remain. The five regions of the continent agreed that Africa would not host any foreign military presence on African soil.

The DOD had engaged with its US counterparts and was clear that the problem with the African command was a US problem. Throughout the years the US had designed forces the way they chose and that was their prerogative. It was indicated to the US that South Africa would not be subjected to conduct their foreign relations through AFRICOM but would continue to use normal structures of state.

Africa Command: Benevolent or Malevolent US Interests in Africa?: Institute for Security Studies (ISS) briefing
Mr Saki Mpanyane, Senior Researcher: Regional Programme: Institute for Security Studies, said that he would not reiterate those points made in the earlier presentations. US foreign policy had articulated AFRICOM as part of the US efforts to bring about peace and security on the continent and said this would promote common goals. The US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, expressed that AFRICOM was a realignment of the US military operations. Previously Africa had always been on the margin of the US foreign policy. However, the US did engage with Africa on security concerns. During the Cold War, the US response to Africa was as a result of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) engagement and expansion through Africa. After the Cold War Africa returned to the margins of the US foreign policy. The events of September 11, 2001 changed the policy and its security interests. The global war on terror catapulted Africa to the forefront of US foreign policy especially with its concerns on counter terrorism. Africa was also emerging as one of the largest suppliers of oil to the US. The emergence of China and India, as strategic competitors to the US on the emerging energy and natural resources in Africa, was also considered important. Africa’s economy was growing at 5.5% to 6% on average and that made Africa an important economic player. The US was beginning to play an active role in the security sector of Africa.

AFRICOM was seen as a unique command and would involve inter-agency cooperation. Its objectives were to oversee the security cooperation, to build partnership capabilities and to provide defence support to non-military missions. The US had said that there would be no troop deployment but rather an integrated civilian-military architecture. Recently the emphasis had been placed on non-kinetic (non-lethal) action, which meant that it would use diplomacy and not force. The AFRICOM structure was projected as a re-structuring of the US global force. It was felt that it could mean the militarisation of the US foreign policy.

There seemed to be a contradiction as to what led to the creation of AFRICOM and this was one of the reasons why the African views were ambivalent. On the one hand it seemed to be a clear policy response to global threat to US security. On the other hand, it also seemed to indicate that it was an overdue process of military realignment and organisation. The militarisation of US foreign policy towards Africa was presented as one of the reasons why Africa was sceptical to AFRICOM. There was also the lack of consultation, as AFRICOM was presented as a fait accompli. The rise of China and India was presented as an area of concern. Some commentators felt that three nations were competing for energy resources in Africa. Establishment of bases was not part of the sovereignty of the nation. It was noted that US troops might invite rather than deter terrorist attacks. There was an empathy with the post 9/11 situation and the issue of pre-emptive position. There were some assumptions that instability in Africa posed a direct threat to US security and that weak states would provide a safe haven to terrorists. Security concerns and priorities on how to deal with those concerns differed in Africa and the US. AFRICOM, from an African perspective, would undermine the common policies as indicated in the Common Africa Defence Policy as well as the Post Conflict Reconstruction policy.

In terms of AFRICOM and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) one of the challenges was that it was not clear how AFRICOM would merge with current policies already in place on the continent. The AU had set up mechanisms to dealt with issues of conflict resolution, which were important drivers of APSA. Regionally, the SADC views, as already indicated in the other presentations, were also important. The main issue was to what extent AFRICOM would undermine the policies already set in place in Africa.  The US was not forthcoming with this information. The US had indicated that there would be a directorate within AFRICOM that would deal with issues around capacity building as well as engagement both bilateral and multilateral. This might mean that US foreign policy would be subsumed and that the driver of this would be AFRICOM. The inter-agency linkages meant that the US State Department would be part of AFRICOM and the direction and leadership would be provided by AFRICOM. This was one of the areas of concern. Although AFRICOM could not be stopped, as the US were already working towards operationalisation in October 2008, it was important to decide how African regional structures engaged and to ensure that the US did not attempt to engage countries that were willing to work with them bilaterally or otherwise.

He concluded that it was important to acknowledge that there were issues with security and stability on the continent, and that these included terrorism. However, issues that were primary to African countries included combating poverty, fighting diseases, dealing with oppressive regimes and issues of welfare. It was important that South Africa continuously remained vigilant that Africa did not lose the view of African solutions to African problems. They should not discount US programmes and should ensure that AFRICOM worked through multilateral structures.  

AFRICOM: New Developments : Briefing by Independent Global Dialogue (IGD)
Dr Michele Ruiters, Senior Researcher: Multilateral Programme, Independent Global Dialogue, wanted to introduce a different perspective. AFRICOM had been established and was something that had to be dealt with in the foreign policy on the African continent. She thought that the visit of the US President, George Bush, was an indication of how desperate the US was about AFRICOM. President Bush had visited five nations, supposedly to reward good governance. Tanzania alone was the recipient of $700 million aid package. The total aid package from the US to Africa totalled approximately $9 billion.

Dr Ruiters felt that there was a need to assess how the US had attempted to divide Africa over the course of the next few months before AFRICOM became operational. She felt that Africa had an opportunity to address the US proposal for AFRICOM on the continent.

There was a perception that AFRICOM was a Department of Defence structure despite the fact that one of the deputies was from the State Department. General Ward was heading AFRICOM, and that made it a military initiative. She argued that the African society was already militarised because of the liberation process that the continent had gone through. The African military department were focussed on accruing military instruments, while poverty was detrimental to the continent.

The presence of China and India on the continent was interesting because the US was vying with them for oil. By 2015 Africa would be producing 25% of US oil. The US was going to rely almost completely on Africa’s oil because the Middle East was no longer an option. Africa should try to negotiate from a position of strength, because of its natural resources, and not from a position of weakness. The strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, being in close proximity to the Middle East, was vital. Through the AU there was a need to ensure stability in the Horn of Africa. Africa needed to escape the label of identity politics.

The fact that the military sector of AFRICOM was the most powerful meant that military solutions to problems would be considered first. The US had, historically, supported one side of conflict and then supported another, and that would destabilise the continent. Because African countries were willing to accept that kind of support from the US this could destabilise regional structures and cross-border relationships. Some of the analysts who were opposed to AFRICOM had spoken about ‘Mission Creep’. This meant that a mission could possibly start off as peace keeping or military training from the US, and could permeate into society so that the US could become involved in domestic policy. She warned that this could happen if the US were able to operate AFRICOM from Africa. The US had argued that there would not be a base but rather a ‘lily-pad’ into conflict areas. The US had also indicated that there would be no immediate response to conflict in Africa from AFRICOM. She questioned what that meant, if the objective of AFRICOM was to secure peace and stability in Africa. This was an indication that AFRICOM was an US driven interest and Africa was only a receptacle for US foreign policy within the global context.

The hyper-masculinity of the military was also a consequence of US militarisation of Africa. The gender implications were clear. In other parts of world the US presence in an area had resulted in a sex industry and rape by US soldiers on the host communities.

The African countries’ responses had been covered. She did touch on the subject of Liberia and its acceptance of AFRICOM. Liberia had had a long colonial relationship with the US. The post-colonial rubber industry in Liberia was US-driven. The US had complete investment in Liberia and the two countries’ economies were so interlinked that it would be difficult for Liberia to deny the US. It was about the power of the relationship. She argued that Africa could say no to the AFRICOM position, but it would depend on how it was addressed.

Dr Ruiters noted that the change in US policy happened last year when the US met with the AU and discovered the ‘misperceptions’ of the African continent. In response, the US had moved the debate toward development. US had moved the discussion toward peace that was only used in a military context, and development. However, the presence of the US had often destabilised a region. Therefore the African solutions for African problems would be directed by AFRICOM because they would indicate where the focus should be. This was problematic because Africa was aware of its own problems. The US had changed this by their presence and instead had created an American-focussed African policy.

The new concept of AFRICOM was termed as a stabilising partner. The US had changed its approach by using bilateral discussions. Africa had just come from the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) where Europe had divided the continent into individual countries, which meant that the regional economic communities had been broken down. Africa needed to guard against the bilateral approach under AFRICOM.

Dr Ruiters argued that the US would attempt to use weak and fragile states as possible locations for AFRICOM. The options of the AU and other strong states were to ensure that weak states were shored up.

She had heard that there was an AU position documented, and suggested that it be made public because the perception was that there was no unified approach. The African Peace and Security Council needed to be strengthened. Other institutions that had been developed by Africans needed to be strengthened. She reminded the Committee that the US economy was in decline and that the US empire was possibly over. The US did not come from a position of power as projected. The population needed development at all levels. Communities had to be facilitated in order to be involved in their development.
 
Discussion
The Chairperson disagreed with the assertion that the US were not operating at their previous strength, as they had been able to move into Iraq quickly. He did agree that they were in a weaker position. The current political leadership had made the foreign policy aggressive. With the current candidates up for election the foreign policy would be similar but there might be a change in the way it was directed. He would rather say that the current political leaders had created problems for themselves with an aggressive foreign policy.

Mr P Nefolovhodwe (APO) commented that the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) passed a resolution last year against AFRICOM. It was just an advisory platform but the PAP representative should give the resolution when the AU met.

Dr A Lutuli (ANC) wanted to know about the role of the AU and their lack of openness on their position. It was clear that the question of AFRICOM needed to be approached in a unified way by the whole continent, or else there would be division. She did not think that the Committee could be satisfied without knowing exactly what was AU’s position on AFRICOM. The AU had to take a strong position and remain united and consistent. 

Mr Nkosi replied that the resolution passed by PAP should be the basis of the AU position. There was no formal position by the AU; but there were discussions and documents in circulation r. Their official position would strengthen the weak countries and these countries’ inability to withstand the pressure to host AFRICOM.  

Mr Nefolovhodwe wanted a response from DOD on what was offered to them from US DOD.

Maj Gen Dan Mofokeng, Chief Director: Foreign Relations, SANDF, replied that there was nothing freely given by the US. Interactions with states were held for different reasons and therefore the South African DOD had reasons for interacting with the US DOD.

Mr Nefolovhodwe commented that one of the issues that made African nations weak was that it appeared that ordinary people were not included in issues of governance and development, and that resulted in disillusionment. When countries such as the US offered huge amounts of aid, African leaders felt compelled to accept in order to remain in power.

Mr Nkosi replied that the key challenge was development. This was the reason that the issue of security hinged on questions of development. For as long as development was lacking there would be security issues, and that was why they had forged ahead with the implementation of New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). Conflict, however, would have to end in order for development to take place. AFRICOM should not distract the role players from the core issue of development. It was important that the continent improved its capacity in the global economy.  

Dr S Pheko (PAC) remarked that this was a difficult subject that required maximum vigilance from the continent. Countries in the continent had fought for their independence and it seemed as if they were acquiring new dependence. He thought that the African leaders should be made aware that repudiation should not just originate from regional structures but from the AU in particular. The bilateral agreements in regard to AFRICOM would endanger Africa. He felt that Africa should be intelligent and strong on their position on AFRICOM. The US had a history of being ‘policemen’ of the world to the point of ignoring international charters. When the US Ambassador attended a Committee meeting he clearly noted that it was a question of interests. He added that the US should not look after its own interests at the expense of the continent.

The Chairperson asked if the African position would hold if they were to use, as an example, the way the European Union dealt with Africa on the issue of EPAs. He asked if African states were motivated by principle. He raised this issue because the US handed over an aid package after the prime minister of Tanzania had stated that they would not host AFRICOM.

Mr Nkosi noted Dr Pheko’s comment and his proposal that the AU should repudiate AFRICOM, and added that it was a matter that needed to be formalised within the structures of the AU. Furthermore he noted the comment regarding Tanzania. He added that the AU should pronounce itself on the issue before AFRICOM became operational in October 2008. 

Mr Mpanyane added that whether the AU’s position would hold was critical. If there was a move towards institutionalising the AU’s structure it would be unfortunate if all the structures did not work in concert. It was important that they move beyond announcing official positions. It should be that the AU position was binding and was able to be implemented.

Mr Sibande commented that Botswana should also be considered. The strategy by the US was to focus on the far and ravaged countries. The US had also remained quiet about the situations in Israel and the Middle East, yet their focus was on Africa. Their reasons should be analysed.

Mr Nkosi noted his comment that they should assess other countries and their position on AFRICOM, and said that the DFA would attempt to do that. He added that SADC had taken an official position.

Mr Sibande added that Africa had to proceed carefully. He suggested that there could be several motives for the US actions, such possible annexation or punishment for producing and selling yellow cake.

Ms S Camerer (DA) noted that there was a concern that AFRICOM would undermine African sovereignty, but the EUCOM, who did not seem to feel threatened by the presence of the US, should also be considered. She could not understand why there was the feeling that AFRICOM would undermine African sovereignty, and asked for reasons for this.

Mr Nkosi replied that the political office bearers would have been better equipped to answer the question. The concern of African countries arose from various issues. The issue of sovereignty was paramount. There was a relationship between the US and Europe. AFRICOM was viewed as a unilateral initiative since it was not discussed with Africa, and US alone had decided to create AFRICOM. The major focus in terms of the APSA was the establishment of the African Stand-By Force. This was seen as critical. If the US and other countries wanted to provide assistance in the implementation of those processes, Africa would prefer to choose what type of assistance should be provided. AFRICOM and the African Stand-By Force and Brigade would have to be completely African, as was indicated by protocol.

Dr Ruiters added that the Europeans were in a weakened state when the US entered Europe. It was the post-war period, the Marshall plan was in operation,  and Europe then was in a similar position to Africa now, having to reconstruct after the World War. Europe was also economically viable. African states, when they negotiated with China for instance, only considered the small elite that would benefit from negotiations. The African position in the global market was negligible because Africa supplied natural resources and did not add value to their goods.

Maj Gen Mofokeng replied that there was only one US combatant command that was based outside the US, and that was the EUCOM.  The historical reason was that it was created to be the frontline of the fight against communism. Therefore it was actually beneficial to Europe.  The structuring of the US forces was the responsibility of the President of the US and was done by an executive order.

The Chairperson reiterated that the economically viable countries were comfortable with the presence of the US command, and wanted to know what made Africa so different.

Mr Nkosi replied that Africa agreed with the US as long as it was in alignment with the pursuit of the African agenda. It would be difficult to agree with US if its interests were purely US driven and if they undermined African interests. AFRICOM would advance the interest of the US and could seriously undermine the interests of Africa.

Dr A Lutuli (ANC) felt that the presentations were a confirmation of the Committee’s suspicions. She emphasised that the US Ambassador had arrogantly confirmed that AFRICOM was ‘here to stay’.

Dr Lutuli wanted the DOD to clarify its comment that the creation of AFRICOM would not affect the way South Africa interacted with states.

Maj Gen Mofokeng replied that AFRICOM was going to happen, and that the consultation was only to allow Africa to buy in to the concept. The structure of the US commands was the same. There would be no difference to that of the EUCOM; the US had just changed the terminology.

The Chairperson noted that after 9/11, US reserved the rights to pre-emptively deal with whatever problems they perceived. That process sparked their perception that there was a need for AFRICOM. He wanted to know to what extent that would constitute the pursuit of a doctrine of regime change in Africa.

Mr Nkosi replied that it needed to be located within the framework of the emergence of unilateralism. This ran counter to the basic pillar of African foreign policy to pursue multilateralism in global issues. Africa did not agree with unilateralism and its notion that nations had reserved the right to pre-emptive action.

Mr Mpanyane added that he thought the possibility of a doctrine of regime change was high. It was important to note that the establishment of AFRICOM might provide the US with the opportunity to act outside the international legal framework.

The Chairperson noted that, historically, US had moved from one side to another and he asked whether this provided them with soft ground to make those types of activities easier and shift closer to Africa, because previously African states had been collaborators.

The Chairperson wanted to know why Egypt would not be part of AFRICOM. 

Mr Nkosi replied that Egypt was viewed as important in a geo-political context. Following the 1967 War Egypt became the second biggest receiver of US aid, because of its proximity to the Middle East.

Maj Gen Mofokeng added that on a technical basis Egypt would not be part of Africa because it had the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal was vital for the transportation of oil from the Middle East. Part of the CENTCOM’s responsibility was to protect the oil interests in the Middle East. 

The Chairperson found that Liberia was an interesting phenomenon because the US would be able to provide them with development.

Maj Gen Mofokeng replied that they were confident that the US would not base AFRICOM in Liberia.

The Chairperson asked, if Africa were to host AFRICOM, whether it would not be a direct interference into governance of the individual countries and regional institutions. Furthermore he asked why the US found it difficult to use the instruments that were already put in place and provide capacity building for those institutions. His view was that AFRICOM’s biggest task was to perform intelligence gathering on countries and individuals.  

Maj Gen Mofokeng replied that the US wanted to base their forces in SADC because SADC had emerged as the most powerful region on the continent. They were not concerned with other possible locations as they were sure that the US wanted to base their forces in Sub-Saharan Africa. If SADC did not agree then the US would have to base their forces in Stuttgart. He was optimistic that SADC countries were aware of the US motives.

The Chairperson concluded that this presented a challenge. He suggested that a report should be developed, including the PAP resolution and the SADC position, and that it then be taken to parliament. The draft of that report and the report on Kenya should be provided by next week. He added that he was concerned that the region was not able to hold its position and used the EPAs and the way the EU was able to manipulate the region.

The meeting was adjourned.

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