Conflict in Darfur: briefing

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE
12 September 2007
CONFLICT IN DARFUR: BRIEFING

Acting Chairperson: Dr A Luthuli (ANC)

Documents handed out:
Conflict in Darfur – Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 September 2007

Audio recording of meeting

SUMMARY
The Department of Foreign Affairs briefed the Committee on current developments in the Darfur Conflict. Areas of importance included the implementation of a joint UN/AU hybrid force as well as the need to consolidate various parallel peace endeavours under the auspices of the UN and AU. The impact of refuges and cross border attacks were causing a major humanitarian crisis, and a disruption of security, with rising malnutrition and hijacking of aid workers and looting of aid convoys. There was a call for troop deployment along the borders with Sudan. The peace processes and initiatives by various countries including Libya, France, Saudi Arabia and the African Union (AU) were outlined. A broad three phase plan had been agreed upon. The biggest obstacle was the absence of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) rebel leader, but the French were trying to get his participation. There would be peace talks on 27 October in Libya. The Sudanese now welcomed the hybrid peace keeping force, despite initial reservations around Western participation. South Africa had received requests to deploy troops; and currently approximately 800 personnel were active in Darfur. Challenges of logistics and equipment remained. The UN Security Council (UNSC) was divided on the question of sanctions, with the United Kingdom and France in favour of them and China against. United States had enforced sanctions, classing the crisis as one of genocide. South Africa was guided by multilateral considerations. The International Criminal Court had issued warrants against various human rights violators. Questions by Members addressed the relationship between the Janjaweed and the Fur was, the Chinese opposition to sanctions, the bearing of the International Criminal Court warrants on the peace process, and the interests of France. It was noted that Chad, Central African Republic and Sudan would not meet the Millennium Goals of Africa. Further questions addressed the causal dimensions, including resources, the process of the Comprehensive Peach Agreement, and South Africa' s role in peace keeping and post conflict redevelopment. The overlap of the African Union and United Nations Missions in Sudan was clarified, and it was stressed that South Africa’s interests in the region were peace and development for the greater good of Africa. The Department said it had not received formal allegations of involvement of deployment of staff by South African security companies.

MINUTES
Conflict in Darfur :Briefing by Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
Mr Mxolisi Nkosi, Deputy Director General, Department of Foreign Affairs, briefed the Committee on the current geo-political situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. Mr Nkosi stated that it would not be necessary to go through the background to the conflict. The nature of the humanitarian crisis was outlined as well as the impact on the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and the peace process.

Important dimensions of the conflict included the spill-over effect into Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), both in terms of the refugees and cross-border attacks, resulting in a negative effect on regional security. Malnutrition was rising and there had been hijacking of aid workers and looting of aid convoys. As a result of this there was a call for troop deployment along the respective countries borders’ with Sudan. The French efforts to spearhead an European Union (EU) deployment along these zones was outlined. Chad and the CAR’s approval of these countermeasures was noted, as well as Sudanese and Libyan concern with regards to the deployment of European forces in the region. Mr Nkosi stressed the need for an amicable agreement amongst all parties in this matter.

The peace processes and initiatives by various countries including, Libya, France, Saudi Arabia and the African Union (AU) were outlined in the presentation. The need to converge these various parallel programmes in order to eliminate superfluous endeavours under joint United Nations (UN) – AU auspices was stated. However a broad three phase plan had been agreed upon. Phase I concerned convergence of all peace initiatives and consultations, Phase II was the pre-negotiation phase, which included extensive consultation with the government and Darfur armed groups, and Phase III was the negotiation phase. The biggest obstacle to the process was the absence of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) rebel leader, AbdelWahid Al-Nur, who enjoyed popularity with the Fur ethnic group. Al Nur’s current non-participation was due to his insistence on an AU/UN led force being deployed prior to negotiations. However the French were currently engaging Al Nur in order to get his participation and endorsement of the current peace process.

Libya was due to host Phase III of the peace process on the 27 October 2007. This development occurred after talks between Colonel Muammar Al-Qaddafi and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

There was agreement in 2004 as to establishment of a peacekeeping mission. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in 2004 but had faced challenges because of lack of financial and logistical support, insufficient numbers and heavy casualties. The UNMIS would now reinforce the AMIS, resulting in a hybrid AU-UN force. UN Resolution 1706 expanded the mandate of the UN mission to include supporting the implementation of the peace accord. This would be the largest UN peacekeeping deployment in history. In November 2006 the Addis Ababa High Level Consultative Meeting detailed the basic elements of the UN Support Package. The Sudanese now welcomed the hybrid force, despite initial reservations around Western participation. The AU component comprised troops from Egypt, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Rwanda and Senegal. South Africa had received requests to deploy troops; and currently approximately 800 personnel were active in Darfur. Challenges of logistics and equipment remained.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) was divided on the question of sanctions, with the United Kingdom and France in favour of them and China against. Currently the threat of sanctions had been removed from UN resolutions concerning Sudan. However the United States had enforced sanctions, classing the crisis as one of genocide. South Africa was guided by multilateral considerations.

Mr Nkosi added that the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued warrants against various human rights violators. A Committee was established to monitor the security situation, chaired by Ahmed Haroura.

Discussion
Mr M Ramgobin (ANC) asked what the relationship between the Janjaweed and the Fur was. He noted the Chinese opposition to sanctions and asked for Mr Nkosi’s view on the motivations of those proposing sanctions.

Mr Nkosi replied that there was not a diametrical link. However there was a suspicion that there was a link between the Janjaweed militia and the Fur ethnic group, as militia cohesiveness had always had an ethnic link, but this did not mean that all militias were necessarily homogenous. It was difficult to analyse the situation from an ethnic position as there were Fur, Zagawi and other Arab ethnic identities that were not necessarily homogenous. Resources also played a confounding role.

In regard to sanctions, Mr Nkosi responded that the permanent members of the UNSC had their own views based on their interests. South Africa’s position was that it wanted all role-players to commit to a common strategy on how to progress.

Mr D Maluleke (ANC) asked what bearing the ICC warrants had on the peace process.

Mr Nkosi agreed that the ICC warrants introduced another element, but stated that he could not predetermine their impact. He acknowledged the need to evaluate the implications. In some cases ICC warrants had reinforced the peace process; however in others they had played a divisive role.

Ms C Nkuna (ANC) questioned the interests of France in the matter, and was very sceptical of their motives, citing a possible hidden agenda. She stated that in terms of Africa meeting its Millennium Goals, these three countries had already failed.

The Chairperson stated that South Africa had deployed 820 troops into the AMIS component and asked whether South Africa wielded any influence besides providing peacekeepers. She also stated that the process had become more complicated with the involvement of France and Libya, and asked Mr Nkosi what he thought of their motivations for engaging in the issue.

Mr Nkosi replied that he was not sure about France’s new policy in Africa as they were still assessing the Sarkozy administration. He did stress South Africa’s excellent relations with France, and the need to utilise them, as there were many areas of confluence of views between France and South Africa. He stated that if agreed upon, the EU force should be deployed along border zones, as Chad and the CAR were in favour of this. Mr Nkosi agreed that these three countries would not meet the Millennium Goals considering the current challenges faced by them, especially the CAR, as its current debt did not allow it to maintain structures of government. Chad’s own stability was threatened by rebels in Eastern Chad as well as the Darfur region, which led to stunted growth despite its ample resources. Sudan could not meet these goals as it had just emerged from one of Africa’s longest running civil wars.

Adv Z Madasa (ANC) stated that Darfur was caught between two conflicts: one between North Arab Africa and the rest of Africa over resources in the region; and another between Western Europe and North Arab Africa. He expressed his scepticism about Libya’s participation. Since 2004 Libya had historically initiated parallel consultation alternatives instead of AU participation. Furthermore rebel leaders were vehemently against Libyan, Saudi and Egyptian involvement.

Mr Nkosi agreed and stated that there were various causal dimensions, including resources, which needed to be evaluated. He stated that most African conflicts centred on resource possession and that Darfur was not an exception. Libya’s role had not been officially welcomed by the AU, but the UN Secretary General had extended his welcome to these endeavours.

Dr M Sefularo (ANC) stated that he was under the impression that there were some setbacks with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and asked whether positive developments had made it easier for Darfur to progress.

Mr Nkosi replied that the CPA was one of the most fundamental processes that should take Sudan forward, but that there had been a number of obstacles, notably the implementation of the wealth-sharing formula agreed upon. He stressed the need for this issue to be resolved in order to prevent it from hampering progress.

Mr M Sibande (ANC) required clarity over the spill over effects, as he felt that they could not only be affecting Chad and the CAR. The issue of whether sanctions would be conducive was raised.

Mr Nkosi acknowledged that the spill over effects were not limited to the CAR and Chad, but stressed that these two countries were directly affected.

Mr I Shah (DA) asked about post conflict redevelopment and the issue of the funds meant for the Government of National Unity (GNU). He questioned South Africa’s role in this sphere. He asked about South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping, and specifically how many more troops were requested. He was furthermore concerned about the AMISs mandate expiring in December, whilst UN/AMIS mandate was beginning in October.

Mr Nkosi replied that South Africa would adopt a very active and supporting reconstructive role that could not as yet be more clearly defined. A formal decision on troop deployment had not yet been taken. The total AU requirement was 26 000 and this needed to be considered in relation to South African deployment. The issue of an AMIS/UNAMIS mandate overlap period was a transitional issue, in order to ensure continued peacekeeping and was not a matter for concern.

Mr Graham Maitland, Assistant Deputy Director General, DFA added that the Darfur Fund for Development required further negotiations and that, as far as the Department knew, no progress had been made. He said that between October and December the Heavy Support Package would be in action, and this was another reason for the overlap mentioned earlier.

Mr Nkosi stated that South Africa’s interest in the region were peace and development for the greater good of Africa as a whole.

The Chairperson stated that there was a component in South Africa’s population that stressed the issue of benefits derived from intervention, and that the DFA needed to address these issues.

Mr Sibande asked for clarity around the possible truth of allegations that imperialist security companies of South African origin were deploying staff in Darfur.

Mr Nkosi replied that the Department had not received any formal allegations, and that the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act covered this type of situation, should it arise.

The meeting was adjourned.