Performance Evaluation of Heads of Department: Public Service Commission briefing
Public Service and Administration
07 March 2007
Meeting Summary
A summary of this committee meeting is not yet available.
Meeting report
PUBLIC SERVICE AND
ADMINISTRATION PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE
07 March 2007
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF HEADS OF DEPARTMENT: PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
BRIEFING
Chairperson: Mr P J Gomomo (ANC)
Documents handed out:
Public Service Commission
presentation: An update on the evaluation of the performance of heads of
department in the public service.
Public Service
Commission: An update on the evaluation of the performance of heads of
department in the public service. [Notes to accompany the presentation].
SUMMARY
The Public Service Commission updated the Committee on the annual
evaluation of the performance of the heads of department in the public service
in terms of guidelines issued by the Minister for Public Service and
Administration. A major challenge and concern was the declining numbers of
heads of department being evaluated at the end of each financial year, as was a
disturbing trend of departments whose heads had never been evaluated since the
2000/01 evaluation cycle; for example, Health, Home Affairs, Public Works,
Justice and Constitutional Development, and Arts and Culture. Furthermore there
were heads of department who had violated a November 2002 Cabinet decision that
required them to file their performance agreements with the Public Service
Commission. A further challenge was incomplete verification statements and
statements not aligned to performance agreements. Performance management and evaluations were
seemingly not accorded high priority, while department heads who were conscious
of their under-performance possibly delayed filing their performance agreements
to protect themselves. Trends in
performance ratings suggested a high level of satisfaction with departmental
heads' performance, but the question arose as to the extent to which
departmental heads' performance would compare to that of their departments. The
Commission would this year pilot a framework for taking account of departments'
performance. The Public Service
Commission recommended that executing authorities should demonstrate strong
commitment to the process and ensure that performance agreements were entered
into and filed with the Commission on time.
Members expressed especial concern with the disparity between the high
evaluations of some heads of departments and perceived performance of their
departments. Members generally appreciated the efforts of the Public Service
Commission itself, but felt that it should be more specific in its
recommendations. Urgent action was needed with regard to non-submission of
performance agreements and non-evaluation of heads of department.
MINUTES
The Chairperson welcomed the Members, the Public Service Commission (PSC)
delegation, and observers; and invited all present to introduce themselves. He
tendered apologies and expressed his desire that in future the agenda of the
meeting together with the minutes of the previous meeting would be ready and
circulated to Members beforehand, so that the minutes could be formally adopted
while their contents were fresh in the minds of Members.
PSC Presentation
The venue's audio-visual facilities were not functioning so Mr Mqshwahle
Diphofa, Deputy Director-General, referred to the paper version of the
presentation to update the Committee on the evaluation of the performance of
heads of department in the public service, whereby heads of department are
evaluated in terms of guidelines issued annually by the PSC. These guidelines
contain a legal framework issued by the Minister for Public Service and
Administration.
The presentation focused on the implementation of this framework during the
2003/2004 financial year but also reflected on progress made since their first
implementation in 2000/01. A major challenge remained the declining numbers of
heads of department being evaluated at the end of each financial year, largely
through executing authorities' failure to initiate the assessment of their
heads of department as required by the framework.
There was also a disturbing trend of departments whose heads of department had
never been evaluated since the 2000/01 evaluation cycle even though they
qualified, for example, Health, Home Affairs, Public Works, Justice and
Constitutional Development, and Arts and Culture.
A further key challenge was failure by heads of department to file their
performance agreements with the PSC in violation of a Cabinet decision in
November 2002 that all performance agreements of heads of departments must be
filed with the Commission. Performance agreements were the basis for evaluating
the performance of departmental heads and created a common point of reference
for the departmental head and the executing authority in the entire performance
management cycle.
A further challenge was the content of the documents submitted for the
evaluation process, for example, incomplete verification statements, even
without ratings or signatures of either the head of department, executing
authority, or both, and verification statements that were not even aligned to
the head of department's performance agreement, reflecting a possible failure
of communication between executing authorities and heads of departments. Feedback was not always provided by the
executing authority, as supervisor, to the head of department concerned.
Panel members have largely provided insightful input during evaluation meetings,
but the PSC has noted with concern some incidents where panel members have not
played their role in critically reflecting on the head of department's
performance in order to inform their advice to the executing authorities, and
is concerned that such incidents might compromise the integrity of the
evaluation process should such incidents develop into a trend.
Trends in performance ratings suggested a high level of satisfaction with heads
of department performance, but an important consideration was the extent to
which the performance of heads of department would compare to the performance
of the departments for which they are responsible.
It was the Commission's view that the main reason for non-compliance with the
framework for the evaluation of heads of department was that performance
management and evaluation was not accorded high priority, together possibly
with poor administrative support in the offices of executing authorities and
heads of departments from their human resource departments. Such support was
very necessary for new executing authorities and heads of departments who might
not be familiar with the framework and its requirements, and together possibly
with fundamental differences between executing authorities and heads of departments
which were not mediated and might have resulted in late or non-signing of
performance agreements. There was also the possibility that some heads of
department who were not performing well simply delayed the process for fear
that compliance would not be in their interest.
The Commission recommended that in order to improve the implementation of the
framework it was important that executing authorities should play their role
and initiate the process to evaluate their heads of departments. Without the strong
commitment of executing authorities, there would continue to be a high number
of heads of department who were not evaluated despite their qualifying for
evaluation. Executing authorities could also ensure that performance agreements
were entered into and filed with the Commission on time.
There was a need to standardize the management of career incidents of heads of
department. Premiers who had not delegated that function to their Members of
Executive Council should put in place a mechanism to avoid delays in
evaluations. It would be even better if such a mechanism were to be prescribed
as a regulatory instrument by the Minister for Public Service and
Administration.
Moreover, it was important that the performance of departments themselves were
taken into account when assessing the performance of their heads of department.
The Commission has created a framework for this and will pilot it during 2007.
Furthermore, there needs to be a round table with executing authorities to
further discuss the above challenge. This round table could also explore
practical measures that could improve the process.
Professor Stan Sangweni, Chairperson, explained that monitoring and evaluation
was a core function of the Commission. The Commission facilitated the process
of evaluation within the framework that it had developed. Decisions on the
basis of such monitoring and evaluation were the responsibility of the
Minister. He added that the Commission was informed by good international
practice, for example, New Zealand.
Discussion
Mr M R Sikakane (ANC) asked that, if the Commission had observed with concern
the declining momentum in the implementation of performance management for
heads of department, then who was responsible and why; and what should be done
to correct the decline.
Mr B Mthembu (ANC) was concerned about the lack of congruity between the
evaluation of a head of department and the performance of the department of
which the head of department concerned was head, and sought clarification as to
why the instrument used did not necessarily indicate the performance of the
department.
Mr M R Baloyi (ANC) asked whom the executing authority would normally appoint
to serve on the panel that would assess the head of department and advise on
her or his performance during a specific year. He asked whether members would
be chosen from outside the public service as well as from within and whether
there was an instrument with criteria to determine what categories of persons
should be included in the pool of candidates from which panel members should be
chosen.
Ms M F Tlake (ANC) said that there appeared to be much subjectivity in the
process and asked what measures could be taken to ensure that the process was
objective. Secondly, Ms Tlake asked what was happening at the level of local
government.
Dr U Roopnarain (IFP) said that from a reading of the documents it appeared
that the various roles overlapped to an extent that was confusing. It was not
always clear who was responsible for a particular function or stage of the
process.
Mr Baloyi said that the Committee was not asking about the Public Service
Commission's role of facilitator for the first time. Perhaps the Committee
should continue to ask that question until Members were satisfied that the role
of facilitator was a core function that did not prejudice the Commission's
independence and impartiality. Furthermore, he asked for a definition of
evaluation. If the Commission was involved at the level of the panels, perhaps
that might compromise its objectivity, impartiality and independence.
Mr K K Khumalo (ANC) asked when the performance reports were processed and
assessed.
Mr K J Julies (DA) asked how the nation could achieve service delivery, as had
been referred to in the President's 9 February 2007 State of the Nation
Address, if the percentage of heads of department who had undergone the
evaluation process had declined from 80% in 2001/02 to only 50% in 2003/04,
with only 59% of all qualifying heads of department evaluated in the 2004/05
cycle by October 2006.
Ms Tlake observed “a chronic decline” in the number of heads of department
evaluated and asked what the Commission proposed to do to arrest that
decline. An intervention greater than
monitoring was required.
Mr Baloyi asked if, in the detailed report that was to follow, the departments
mentioned with regard to the decline in the percentage of qualifying heads of
department evaluated would be named, so that, if the Committee were to take
action, the Members would know exactly which departments should be called to
account.
Mr Baloyi added that it would be beneficial to add some columns to “Table 1: Number of heads of departments
evaluated since the implementation”, in order to distinguish the total number
of heads of departments from qualified heads of departments, and to give a
breakdown of provinces in order to give the Committee a clearer picture of the
situation.
The Chairperson asked if those heads of department who did not meet the
requirements for evaluation could be nonetheless evaluated.
Mr Julies was greatly concerned that so many heads of department who had not
undergone evaluation were still in office.
Dr Roopnarain asked that defaulting departments should be called before the
Committee to ascertain why they had not signed performance agreements.
Ms Tlake asked for an honest answer as to whether the Commission's presentation
gave a fair and true picture of its activities, as she saw nothing
tangible.
Mr K J Minnie (DA) asked if the executing authority was the political authority.
It was necessary to give due importance to the political authority. The
Minister or the MEC concerned must take responsibility.
The Chairperson said that Committee Members also should be aware of their
responsibilities as a committee.
Mr Julies asked what the oversight role of the Portfolio Committee and its
Members was. He was deeply concerned
about the matter of defaulting departments.
The Chairperson said that the Commission was providing all the committees with
information as to what was happening, but, while they could provide information
and advice, they could not act in an executive mode. It was for the politicians
to act. Committee Members had to ask themselves what had they done with the
information provided by the Commission.
Mr Baloyi asked that attention be paid to the Commission's concerns that the
content of documents submitted for the evaluation process was not always of the
desired quality and that the performance agreements submitted did not always
meet the requirements, which raised concerns that there was a lack of
understanding of the regulatory requirements.
Mr Sikakane asked that the problem of insufficient communication between
executing authorities and heads of departments be given very serious attention.
Mr Khumalo said that the reasons advanced in the analysis of non-compliance,
for example that performance evaluation was not always given high priority,
were based on speculation. Clarity was needed.
Mr Baloyi asked if the Committee could assume that there were indeed extreme
cases of non-compliance. If there were, what was the rate of prevalence? As a
portfolio committee it was necessary to be provided with information about such
cases.
With regard to the Commission's recommendations, such as that the executing
authorities should play their role as provided in the evaluation framework, and
performance agreements should be entered into and filed with the Commission on
time, Mr Baloyi said that the Commission needed to be more specific.
The Chairperson asked that, in the absence of the Commission's right to
challenge the executive authority, the Commission provide the Committee with
the relevant information so that the Committee itself could act.
Ms Tlake supported the Chairperson's request. Failure of executing authorities
to fulfil their role as provided in the evaluation framework and failure to
enter into performance agreements and file them on time were very serious
matters. The Committee needed clarity on these so that it could assess how it
could assist.
Mr Baloyi supported the Commission's conclusion that it would continue to
monitor the process of evaluating heads of department, and report on progress.
The Chairperson urged the Commission to provide the Committee promptly with
information on all instances of failure or non-compliance and to use the
Committee’s services to assist in expediting the Commission's work.
Mr Diphofa said that the evaluation had to be initiated
by the executing authority as their supervisor concerned. The next step was the
evaluation panel appointed by the executing authority. Reasons for
non-evaluation were explained in the presentation and included lack of
agreement between the executing authority and the head of department as to what
should be included in the performance agreement. Regarding the panels
themselves, the Commission issued in August every year guidelines on the whole
evaluation process so that in September the final annual appraisals could take
place. At a national level a panel should include a Minister from the same
Cabinet cluster. At provincial level a panel should include a MEC from the same
cabinet cluster. A panel should also include a peer of the head of department
concerned from the same cluster. A panel could include key clients or stakeholders.
In some cases this could include the chairperson of the relevant portfolio
committee or the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the relevant public entity.
The guidelines issued by the Commission, which are sent physically to executing
authorities and published on the Commission's web site, indicate quite clearly
who is responsible for each stage of the evaluation process. The parties
concerned were not making effective use of the information that the Commission
had made available to them. A panel's role was to advise the executing
authority, which took decisions based on that advice. While subjectivity could
not be eliminated altogether, the evaluation procedures were designed to ensure
objectivity.
The Chairperson said that it was important to answer the question as to why the
evaluation procedures were not applied to local government.
Mr Diphofa replied that the Commission's mandate was confined to national and
provincial government.
The Chairperson asked for a more detailed explanation.
Professor Sangweni explained that new legislation to extend the same process to
local government was under consideration.
The Chairperson appreciated this.
Ms Odette Ramsingh, Director-General, responded that the Commission did not
have the authority to enforce its recommendations. It was up to the Portfolio Committee to call
defaulting departments to account for their failure to comply. The Commission
regarded performance management as of the utmost importance for quality in the
public service and envisaged the proposed round tables as a means to encourage
compliance and reverse the decline in the number of heads of departments being
evaluated; otherwise instances of non-compliance, such as that of the
Department of Home Affairs, would continue.
The Commission's organisational assessment tool that was to be piloted this
year was also aimed at improving the process. To qualify for evaluation, a head
of department had to be in post from the beginning of April to the end of March
in the evaluation year. In that case the process was straightforward. An
informal appraisal at the end of six months was followed by a formal appraisal
at the end of twelve months after which the Minister of Public Service and
Administration would decide if a cash bonus should be paid to the head of
department concerned. If, however, the head of department concerned had
completed only eleven months in office, the informal and formal appraisals
should be done, but the head of department would not be entitled to a bonus
until after 23 months. Consideration of a bonus should not stop the appraisal
process. In view of the understandable sensitivity of executing authorities and
heads of departments, the Committee could be assured that the Commission sought
to achieve the highest levels of objectivity.
The Chairperson addressed the researchers who were attending the meeting as
observers. Their role was to help the Committee by taking careful note of all
the issues raised and the responses to those issues. There was a need for the
Commission to be more specific about the steps it was taking to improve
performance management.
Ms Ramsingh said that the executing authorities' role was critical to good
performance management. At the final stage, it was the responsibility of the
Minister to take the necessary decisions.
The Portfolio Committee's responsibility in terms of oversight was to
call the parties concerned to account for deficiencies. From the verification
statements it was possible often to detect that the parties concerned had not
had a discussion about performance. Performance evaluation was not about
pushing papers; it was about discussion on what had been done and had not been
done, and commitment of the parties concerned to correct omissions and
deficiencies. While there were no instances of an absolute lack of
communication there was often evidence of a lack of honest discussion between
the concerned parties. The Commission could be clearer on general
administrative aspects but that it tried to be diplomatic when informing executing
authorities that they had failed to comply with requirements.
The Chairperson questioned the idea of diplomacy and urged the Commission to be
more specific when informing executing authorities about failing heads of
departments. He said that diplomacy must not hide instances of failing the
citizens of South Africa. It was indeed necessary to mention names.
Ms Ramsingh replied that the Commission did engage with executing authorities,
but some lacked the political will to act on the Commission's advice. The
Commission could do more regarding performance agreements by informing the
Committee regarding the progress of submissions at three-monthly intervals
rather than waiting to the end of the financial year.
Professor Sangweni emphasised that the Commission was engaging executing
authorities. However, performance management was not “a punitive process” but
rather a process of assisting senior management to improve performance and
achieve value for money expended.
Mr Diphofa said with regard to Mr Mthembu’s question concerning correlation of
the performance of the head of department with that of the department concerned
that some members of panels had also raised that question. The Commission saw
itself in a critical role in advising on how to improve performance in the
public service. Existing performance management was about individuals; the
Commission was studying how to extend the concept of performance management to
departments as entities themselves. This was at the pilot and exploratory stage:
meanwhile performance of departments as such was not taken into account in
performance appraisals of heads of departments.
Mr Sikakane said that in South Africa if one wanted fairness, honesty,
integrity and credibility, it was necessary to involve the Public Service
Commission, as, for example, with regard to the intervention committee in the
case of the Department of Home Affairs where Ms Ramsingh had been called in to
give direction to that committee. The Commission had made Mr Sikakane “very
proud” of their service not just to public administration and to Parliament but
to South Africa. He said that they were “too good for words”.
Mr Baloyi said that Professor Sangweni had indicated that the Commission was
playing a facilitative role. Similarly, the Chairperson of the Committee was
playing a facilitative role in conducting this meeting. But when a decision was taken as a committee,
the Chairperson was surely a party to the decision. It was in that context that
Mr Baloyi raised those points. He noted that the Chairperson of the Public
Service Commission had said that in the international context the Commission
was among the best of its kind. The
basis of such a comparison had to be questioned. The one similarity between
public service commissions in the world was that they were independent. But of
course there were unique circumstances and the Committee should research this
matter. The Constitution spoke of the evaluation of institutions. At that stage
it was necessary further to debate the issue. The Committee agreed that the
evaluations were not punitive but at the same time it was necessary to consider
corrective steps. As Mr Sikakane had said to achieve confidence in anything
concerning the public service, it was essential to involve the Public Service
Commission; but the Committee needed to do research to take the matter further.
The Chairperson said that he had enjoyed interacting with the Public Service
Commission and “provoking” them to discuss matters of concern for the benefit
of our society. He thanked the Commission for its presentation.
The meeting was adjourned.
Audio
No related
Documents
No related documents
Present
- We don't have attendance info for this committee meeting
Download as PDF
You can download this page as a PDF using your browser's print functionality. Click on the "Print" button below and select the "PDF" option under destinations/printers.
See detailed instructions for your browser here.