Public Service Commission
Review of State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy
26 January 2007
Meeting Summary
A summary of this committee meeting is not yet available.
Meeting report
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE REVIEW OF
STATE INSTITUTIONS SUPPORTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
26 January 2007
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Chairperson: Prof K Asmal (ANC)
Documents handed out:
Public
Service Commission’s Responses to the Committee’s Questionnaire
Relevant documents:
Terms of Reference
State of the Public
Service Report 2006
Public Service Commission Annual Report 2005/06 available on www.psc.gov.za
Presidential Review
Commission
SUMMARY
The Committee’s more than three hour long engagement with the Public Service
Commission saw Members asking questions about the Commission’s alleged neglect
of the provinces, its poor public visibility, the apparent lack of
collaboration on gender related issues and its budget-related challenges. The
Commission drew the Committee’s attention to their lack of power as far as
enforcing their recommendations. Some Members questioned why these powers had
been removed, while others suggested that the Commission might have greater
power around enforceability if regulations to this effect were put in place.
The parliamentary committees’ oversight capabilities were also drawn into sharp
focus.
Having read a South African Press Association report that had appeared the day
before and which had ascribed a statement to him which he did not make, the
Chairperson reminded the media of the necessity to be absolutely accurate in
their reporting.
MINUTE
Prof Asmal’s opening remarks
Prof Asmal welcomed all to the Committee’s engagement with the Public Service
Commission (PSC), the second of the bodies to be reviewed. He explained that
the Committee approached its work in good faith and in accordance with the
terms of reference that governed the proceedings.
He emphasised that there was no intimation of any conclusions arrived at during
the meetings and thus “any headlines that stated at this point that X,Y or Z
was not carrying out its mandate, ws erroneous.”. The Committee was merely
“teasing out” the way in which the Chapter Nine bodies responded to the
Committee’s 25 point questionnaire. The responses to the questions were general
in nature and the Committee would request the bodies to expand on them. There
were no prima facie conclusions. Conclusions would only be drawn after
six weeks of deliberations. In the light of the above, any statements
prescribed to a Member or to the Committee should have the highest degree of
accuracy. The sessions were privileged and protected and thus this accuracy was
of great importance.
Prof Asmal said that through the South African Press Association (SAPA) a
notice had gone out on 25 January reporting that he had warned that “alignment
to the ANC would not protect state funded bodies from scrutiny by the Committee
charged with reviewing their relevance”. He said that the proceedings were
recorded and there was no question that that statement could have been made by
him. Tapes were available to journalists.
What he had said was, because they were performing a constitutional function,
the Committee was not made up of a majority of ANC members. Judging from the
way the Committee had done its work so far, it was clear that they were
performing a function higher than a partisan political organisation. He had
wanted it to be quite clear that although their parties had nominated them,
they were performing a function for the National Assembly. He had specifically
said at the 24 January meeting that the Committee would be objective and “non
party and non partisan”. He knew that it was often politicians that had to
apologise, and that it was very rare that a report was withdrawn with an
apology. All he could say was that the statement that was ascribed to him had
cause “tremors and anxieties, particularly since SAPA saw fit to refer to two
bodies only. He said that, ”if he were the chairperson of one of those bodies
he would have been very offended" at what was he was ascribed to have
said. He expected SAPA to set the record straight, especially considering that
SAPA reports were picked up by every newspaper that was not there. He knew that
journalists did not have shorthand but reminded them that they could tape the
proceedings.
Prof Asmal then welcomed the Public Service Commission (PSC) which was a body
that many had had close relations with as ministers as well as members of
Parliament. They were very much aware of the PSC’s work and he had had ten
years of experience working with them.
He explained that the Committee was not a court of law, nor would Members put
anyone “through the mincing machine”, which is what portfolio committees should
be doing when they looked at departments or departmental bodies. The Committee
was looking at what were unique structures under the Constitution. The same
procedure would be followed with every body appearing before the Committee. By
the very nature of the questionnaire, responses had to be general. Members
would now have the opportunity to ask for additional information for clarity.
They realised that some information would not be readily available and the
Committee would then note that the PSC would supply said information within a
reasonable time period.
He remarked that the PSC now had women commissioners which he thought was a
great advance.
Opening remarks by the Chairperson of Public Service Commission
Prof Stan Sangweni led the delegation which included the Director General, Ms
Odette Ramsingh, Deputy Chairperson, Mr John Erntzen, Chief Director Ms M
Mampuru, and Commissioners Mr Neville Maharaj, Mr Admill Simpson and Ms M
Mokgalong.
Prof Sangweni said that the PSC welcomed the opportunity to share its views on
its role in supporting the democracy. They also welcomed the opportunity to
place close scrutiny on their institution without which they might stumble into
complacency which would not benefit the democracy.
The PSC was a Chapter 10 and not a Chapter 9 institution. Its mandate required
it to not only loosely oversee the national and provincial administration, but
also to inculcate the values and the principles that were enshrined in the
Constitution. Members would recall that although the Constitution was adopted
in 1996, because of “legal wrangling” it was not until 1999 that the PSC was
reconstituted. Once the legal entanglements to the functioning of the
Commission were removed, and given the very limited resources that were availed
to them, the Commission buckled down to interpret simultaneously their
multidimensional constitutional mandate and also to deliver the best they could
not only to the country but also to the continent.
As reflected in the submission, in the seven years since they were
reconstituted they had built a vast legacy of work in the areas of ethics and
corruption, human resource management, performance management, service delivery
and quality assurance, monitoring and evaluation, critical interventions in
national as well as provincial departments (which were encountering serious
problems) and of course the annual State of the Public Service Report. It was
not merely by their oversight reports that the PSC could be measured, but also
by the instruments and norms they had developed, together with the physical
hands-on work they had performed whilst in the departments.
A few of these instruments were taken for granted in the public service for
instance. These included the Code of Conduct Manual for the Public Service,
which was recommended in 1998 and was applicable to all 1.8 million public
civil servants; the Framework for the Evaluation of Heads of Departments at the
level of directors general; the Recruitment and Selection Toolkit; Guidelines
for the Implementation of Grievance Rules; Guidelines for Management of
Suspensions; Toolkit on the National Anti Corruption Hotline and the Guidelines
for the Implementation of the Protected Disclosures Act (2000). They were
currently working on a much broader integrity framework for the public service.
The impact of all this work on the entire public service could not be
quantified. The PSC’s work through the transformation of the public service
also impacted on the continent. Their work in Africa went to the heart of the
struggle for the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals central of
which was poverty reduction. The monitoring and evaluation system they had
developed played a central role for this. The PSC had hosted a conference
bringing together 67 donor and African countries on this issue but also
contributed in a sustained manner to capacity building in this area. They had
partnered with a number of institutions including the Development Bank of
Southern Africa (DBSA), the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
host a training workshop on the monitoring and evaluation of African Directors
General and senior managers, that was held in Tunis. The PSC had also been
instrumental in getting the DBSA to give dedicated capacity-building resources
to SADC partners.
The radical change in the mandate, function and powers of the PSC, which
started from 1999, and its consolidation in a single public service commission
were accompanied by radical curtailment of its resources. Rather than focusing
their energies on this area of challenge, the PSC had single-mindedly sought to
marshal its own to give its best to country and continent.
Discussion
Prof Asmal said that the PSC was a constitutionally prescribed body and whether
this ought to be so was an entirely different matter, which the Committee would
discuss at a later stage.
He noted that in their report the PSC said that it had to “balance the need for
independence” with “continued expectation by government departments for the
Commission to provide support and calling for involvement in executive
functions of Government”. Section 196(2) of the Constitution read that the PSC
had a constitutional duty to be independent and impartial, and could not
override the expectations of Government. He said that the judiciary, the
legislature and the executive were part of Government. He wondered if promoting
the needs of the executive did not lead to a conflict as far as the PSC’s
independence was concerned. He said that the public would be very interested to
know how they maintained their independence.
Prof Sangweni replied that the PSC made this comment against the backdrop of
their “extreme sensitivity” that the Commission was located within a
developmental state that had, as its major preoccupation, the transformation of
the society, and therefore the transformation of the public service itself.
They recognised the “sacred nature” of the Commission’s independence but also
wanted to make sure that the PSC was used. The PSC could not afford to be
“aloof” when exercising its independence. The practical instances of
maintaining that independence could be found when one considered the national and
provincial interventions the PSC made. Such interventions were made when
departments were facing collapse.
He explained that Section 100 of the Constitution provided for the President to
intervene when an administration was faced with collapse due to mismanagement.
There had been instances, such as in the Eastern Cape, where the President
should have intervened but instead opted for the PSC to join in the effort to
address the matter. The PSC would then be involved in what could be described
as an executive function. In such a situation the PSC would have to maintain
its independence so as to come up with a finding that could contribute to the
solution of the problem.
Ms Ramsingh added that the PSC considered its independence to be of utmost
importance and was sensitive that interference from role players could erode
it. They thus needed to ensure that such interference did not occur. The PSC
did not believe that maintaining their independence was difficult. The PSC was
sensitive to the fact that they were operating in a developmental state with a
very young public service.
The Constitution required the PSC to be an external monitor and evaluator. The
PSC could not afford the luxury of monitoring and evaluating without to some
degree influencing, steering and directing the public service into the
direction it ought to be going. They sometimes inevitably got their hands
dirty. Ms Ramsingh emphasised that the PSC entered that arena only by setting
its own agenda. On some occasions they did not get involved because of the fear
that it may influence their independence.
She added that the PSC needed to consider the state of the performance
management system. The PSC, realising the need for an improved system, had
entered into the arena and advised that unless the performance of heads of
departments were evaluated, one would be unable to measure whether Government
objectives were being met. The PSC saw that gap and since they had the
expertise and the ability to put a performance management framework into place,
they had offered that to Cabinet.
Prof Asmal thought that the Presidential Review Commission’s Report had made an
important comment, which may govern some of the Committee’s proceedings. It
found that the need for transformation and reform that characterised the public
service in recent years had highlighted a number of important tensions and
contradictions in the role and operation of the service commissions. At a
general level the constitutional position of the commissions orientated them
towards stability rather than change. As public service reform is usually
driven to a lesser or greater extent by political concerns, the service
commissions had always found it difficult to act as a focal point for change
especially in terms of the policy framework for personal management which
underpinned most areas of reform. This indicated that there was a tension.
There was no reason for the PSC to be defensive of their independence, because
the tension spoke to a problem that was related to the nature of the public service.
Ms Matsomela (ANC) thanked the PSC for the professional and comprehensive
manner in which they had made their response. She said that the PSC saw itself
as the custodian of the nine values and principles that governed the public
administration. They had structured their work into six key performance areas
and she asked how they ensured that all nine values and principles were
accommodated in the performance areas.
Ms Ramsingh replied that to answer this question frankly and honestly members
could refer to the section challenges and constraints within their submission.
Ideally one would have wanted to structure the PSC in a manner that spoke to
each one of the nine values and principles. However, the PSC had realised that
they did not have the finances or human resources to allow for such individual
attention.
There was overlap between the nine values and principles. In putting forward
the six key performance areas they ensured that none of the values and
principles were ignored. She thought that this was best demonstrated in the
PSC’s State of the Public Service Report. The basis of this was an evaluation
of the performance of the public service in a given financial year but actually
looked at the nine constitutional principles. She admitted that they had not
done as much work as they had wanted to and that the PSC accepted that the
broadness of their mandate and the limitation around resources did not
necessarily allow them to do the work they wanted to. Despite this they
definitely covered the priorities embodied in each of the principles.
Ms Matsomela said that the Committee had looked at some of the above-mentioned
reports. Members had observed that in reporting, the PSC always confined
themselves to the nine values. She asked whether this was not a constraint and
wondered whether there were no additional areas that could be reported on.
Prof Sangweni responded that the values were a constitutional imperative. The
PSC had no choice but to adhere to them. Whatever else the PSC may want to do
they had to make sure that the public administration was fully committed and
engaged as far as the nine values were concerned. The onslaught was on the
implementation of the values and this was the message the PSC presented in
their advocacy work.
He would have thought that the question to ask was whether the PSC was
succeeding in their advocacy work and in driving home the notion that the nine
values had to be embodied within the public service and needed to be
implemented. The assimilation of these values was the challenge they were faced
with.
Prof Asmal agreed that that was what was contained in Section 195 of the
Constitution, but Ms Matsomela was asking if there was another way, other than
referring to these very broad principles, of expressing what their activities
were to the Parliament and the public.
Ms Ramsingh explained that the PSC had made a conscious decision to develop the
transversal monitoring and evaluation system. The key indicators of that system
were drawn from the values, which were a constitutional imperative. The PSC was
also conscious that there were procedures and practices, which may fall under
the broad umbrella of the values but needed to be looked at a much deeper
level.
Prof Sangweni drew members’ attention to Batho Pele, which was an
elaboration on the constitutional values. It emphasised participation also on
the part of policy making, which was contained in the values. The PSC did have
very specific programmes to reinforce the ideals that Batho Pele
promoted.
Prof Asmal said that after Masakane, Batho Pele was his favourite
slogan.
Ms Matsomela noted that leadership and performance improvement were key
performance areas. The PSC had developed a framework for the evaluation of
heads of departments. Did the evaluations include directors general? How
successful were the evaluations?
Mr Erntzen confirmed that directors general were included. The PSC was
constantly reviewing the methodology for evaluating heads of departments. Their
evaluation was always done in relation to departmental performance because the
one was inextricably bound to the other.
They have had various degrees of success because heads of department and
particularly directors general did not remain constant. Some leave the public
service or were being moved from one department to another at the President’s
behest. The PSC was compiling a report on what they regarded as the weaknesses
of the current process and how it could be improved. They aimed to have a
Cabinet discussion on the matter.
Ms Ramsingh said that the PSC had realised that while the HOD framework was
geared towards looking at the individual performance of directors general and
the heads of department, there had to be a mechanism for measuring the
relationship between their individual performance and the organisational
performance. The evaluation of the HOD framework was aimed at recognising the
link between individual and organisational performance.
Prof Asmal said that the Committee might have to recall the PSC for another
session at which the matter could be discussed further.
Ms Matsomela noted that the PSC had raised a concern around the proposed
assignment of investigative powers to the Minister of Public Service and
Administration through Section 78 of the Public Service Amendment Bill (2006). She
wondered what effect the PSC thought this would have on their work.
Mr Maharaj responded that the PSC was arguing that Chapter 10 of the
Constitution assigned very specific functions to the PSC. Investigative powers
were assigned to the PSC.
Prof Asmal asked why the provision was being included then.
Mr Maharaj responded that the Minster was part of the Executive as well as the
political head of of the departments the PSC was intended to monitor and
evaluate independently. There might well be a conflict should one member of the
executive be expected to investigate another.
Prof Asmal asked the PSC why it thought the Minister was introducing this
particular proposal.
Mr Maharaj said that he could not speak for the Minister. If he read her
correctly she made the proposal based on the difficulties in implementing the
PSC’s recommendations (which followed the findings of their investigations).
Prof Asmal wondered if the proposal was not the result of impatience with the
PSC.
Dr J Delport (DA) noted that the PSC, on no less than ten occasions in the
report, complained about non response to their recommendations.
Prof Asmal wondered how the Minister investigating matters would improve the
level of response. The Minister was not a judge and would not be able to
execute decisions.
Dr Delport said that the report indicated that recommendations were not
enforced, that Parliament was not taking recommendations seriously, portfolio
committees were not interested in what they had to say and that the Executive did
not implement them. Departments reportedly adopted a negative attitude towards
the PSC. He said that the PSC could make rules and issue directives and
wondered to what extent they could use these processes to enforce their
recommendations.
Mr Maharaj replied that the PSC had the power to summons and call departments
to account but that was only at the administrative level, that is, at the
director general and head of department level. The PSC had no power over the
executive.
Prof Asmal wondered whether they had ever used the power to summons over
directors general and whether they had made a public statement about that.
Mr Maharaj confirmed that they had. Very often there were delays as far as
obtaining responses to enquiries made by the PSC. In these cases they used
their power of summons. They did however not publicise this information.
Prof Asmal asked what the point of doing good in private was. He asked the PSC
to supply the Committee with occasions, over the last three years, on which
summons had been issued.
Mr Maharaj explained that the PSC also had the power of enquiry. There had been
significant interaction between themselves and one of the oversight bodies
within Parliament on the same question i.e. the implementability of the PSC’s
recommendations, as well as their enforceability. He had then reminded the
select committee and the portfolio committee that in fact the power of
enforceability and power of accountability of the executive were vested in the
committees of Parliament and not the PSC.
They were publishing reports and making recommendations but, in the absence of
any authority over the executive, the PSC could not ensure that these were
implemented. The PSC’s frustrations were related to the interaction with the
committees of Parliament and in the way they exercised their oversight roles
and functions. In the interim Constitution the function of enforceability was
vested with the PSC.
Mr Ernzten said that the cause of the problems was "sitting on the
opposite side of the PSC today". He asked why the 1993 interim
Constitution, that imposed the will of the PSC’s findings on its recipients,
was changed. The PSC had to comply with the 1996 Constitution, which took away
the compulsion to comply. Recommendations would be disregarded unless public
watchdogs, the portfolio committees of Parliament inter alia, played their
role. He suggested that perhaps the Committee could reconsider the
Constitution.
Prof Asmal said that Mr Ernzten was raising a hornet’s nest. Some
recommendations such as the ones related to staff matters had to be binding. A
watchdog could not have judicial functions. The Committee’s work was concerned
with whether Parliament was performing its oversight function. So far at least
two answers indicated that the PSC felt that portfolio committees were not
performing their task. Parliament could not give binding directives to the
executive. He said that the PSC was the second body being reviewed that
compiled reports which did not appear in the public domain. This was either because
the reports were not published or because the PSC did not call departments to
task. The Committee’s task was to look at whether Parliament was performing its
oversight function. Whether the law should be changed or not was a political
matter that had its own complexities.
Dr Delport wondered to what extent the PSC could step in, in the case of
inefficient departments. Some departments were highly inefficient. How was it
possible that inefficient accounting officers could get a bonus despite a
damning report from the Auditor General? How could an accounting officer be
judged excellent when the department was performing poorly?
Prof Asmal said that it was very difficult for a minister to evaluate a
director general. The Minister and the Director General would have had to have
a relationship of at least five years. The PSC had already confirmed that they
were carrying out an evaluation of the process.
Ms Ramsingh said that there was a disjuncture which should not be there. There
should be a linear connection between individual performance and organisational
performance. This presented a serious gap that needed to be addressed as soon
as possible.
The PSC’s constitutional mandate allowed them to enter a department through
investigation, on own accord, or at the request of the executing authority.
They could also enter a department through monitoring and evaluation. The PSC
believed that their monitoring and evaluation activity in certain departments
offered an early warning sign to government or to the executive to do something
or to face disastrous consequences. This relayed also to the initial question
around how to balance their independence with the need to be responsive to the
challenges facing the public service. She asked how an evaluator and monitor
could get involved in the implementation process. This was one of the
challenges the PSC faced. They saw the problem but were not clear as to how
they could become implementers. If they implemented something today they would
have to monitor and evaluate that a year later and therein there could lie a
conflict.
Mr Simpson added that the disjuncture was the reason they wanted to implement
the organisational assessment instrument. There were instances where there
could be justifiable disjuncture in the level of performance of the HOD and the
level of performance of the organisation. HODs were only appointed for a very
short period of time. Sometimes they came into a department that was performing
extremely poorly. Then within a very short period of time he or she might have
improved the department’s work considerably.
Prof Sangweni said that the question under discussion related to an earlier
question. The PSC assessed a department and wrote the report which would point
out the weaknesses. This was done in association with the evaluation of the
HOD. The PSC then advised the executing authority on their findings. In terms
of the constitutional provision the PSC’s involvement ended there. They were in
no position to come up with remedial action. This presented a fundamental
weakness in the Constitution which needed to be corrected. He added that he was
not calling for a constitutional amendment as he believed that it had been
appropriately amended in 1998. This matter could be dealt with through
legislation. There was capacity for a dispensation where the recommendations
and advice given by the PSC would be implemented.
Ms Matsomela noted that the PSC appeared to rely mostly on feedback received
from departments. She wondered whether they received feedback timeously and
asked how reliable the information they received was.
Ms Ramsingh explained that the PSC had internal mechanisms for measuring
outcomes. One such mechanism was the tracking mechanism, which required the PSC
to do follow-ups to see whether implementation of recommendations had taken
place. The grievance rules required that the executing authority within a
department reply within five days of a recommendation.
Bigger investigations were very complex, and so were the recommendations in
these cases. In these cases the PSC would return three months after making a
report to assess whether there had been progress on the recommendations. This
was the only way that they measured response to their recommendations. The most
quantifiable way of measuring was to assess how many of the recommendations
made in a particular year had been implemented.
Ms Matsomela wondered what effect the move to a single public service would
have on the custodial oversight responsibilities and the monitoring, evaluation
and investigation of public administration practices.
Mr Ernzten responded that the question was a bit delicate to answer at that
stage since much discussion was still taking place around the single public
service concept. The PSC had been briefed by the relevant ministers around what
stage had been reached and what the thinking behind the concept was. The
legalities of who had jurisdiction over what and whether there was any
intention to make changes to this, had not been discussed.
On of the questions to be considered was whether the PSC would in terms of the
current provisions of the Constitution be able to do the monitoring and
evaluation and all the other attendant work which it currently did for the
public service. Public administration broadly included, amongst others, local
government and parastatals. The PSC was currently confined to the public
service only. Therefore the implications of the move could lead to an extension
of the PSC or alternatively the bringing into life of another body that would
work cheek by jowl with it. These were things that had not yet been dealt with
but to which they were applying their minds and would make inputs on at the
appropriate time. At the moment, it rested in the realm of the policy makers of
which the PSC was not a part.
Prof Asmal asked whether the PSC’s advice was not sought in policy discussions.
Mr Ernzten replied that while advice was sought the appropriateness of the
timing for the seeking of that information had to be addressed. No advice had
thus far been sought.
In reply to Prof Asmal noting that an announcement of a single unified public
service had already been made, Mr Ernzten said that there had been
announcements and briefings and that the PSC was abreast of this and was
applying their minds so that they could give the appropriate advice when it was
sought. Ms Mokgalong added that when the "single Public Service" Bill
was being debated the PSC would make an input.
Mr J van der Merwe (IFP) realised that the PSC was the watchdog in respect of
national and provincial departments but not local governments or parastatals.
The question thus was whether, when a single uniformed public service was
formed, they would be the umbrella body.
Prof Asmal said that the unified public service would be a unified service with
all the remarkable ramifications of the central, provincial and local
governments. It would have implications as far as salary scales, which, he
quipped, were the heart of the public service. These were issues around which
he had thought the PSC would have had some reasonably central advisory role.
Ms Ramsingh pointed out that there was a difference between advice seeking and
consultation. The PSC would not necessarily know when a proposed bill was being
placed on the table, but when the bill was initiated and the consultation
processes started they would be invited to give commentary on that bill. She
thought that what the Committee was actually asking was if the PSC did not have
the responsibility to proactively advise.
Ms Matsomela said that the PSC’s number of interactions with Parliament and
provincial legislatures had increased from 14 in 2004/5 to 33 in 2006/7. She
wondered to what extent the increased interaction added value to the work of
Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
Ms Mokgalong explained that the manner in which they interacted with both
Parliament and the provincial legislatures varied. Besides reporting on
investigations, they had on occasion accompanied the Portfolio Committee on
Public Service and Administration on their provincial oversight visits. This
gave effect to their technical and their political oversight role. They have
also conducted citizen forums with the Portfolio Committee and they had
participated in that committee’s strategic planning sessions. The interaction
in the provincial legislatures was not as rigorous as they wanted it to be
because not all provinces had established the same portfolio committees. This
matter had been addressed with the speakers of the provincial legislatures.
Ms Ramsingh added that the PSC saw Parliament as their primary and critical
stakeholder. To a large degree their interaction with portfolio committees had
helped to inform the work plan they developed for a particular year and helped
inform the kind of issues they investigated. She believed that the greatest
contribution they had made so far was the very relevant and informative reports
on the state of the public service presented to Parliament. They had armed them
with enough information to take things forward and to engage with departments
at different levels.
Prof Asmal said that the answer was very honest – the PSC had given departments
the basis for engagement. A central part of the Committee’s work was to
establish whether Parliament’s oversight was satisfactory. He asked the PSC to
give Members an honest and frank evaluation of whether portfolio committees
responded effectively.
Prof Sangweni said that the PSC’s sense was that the kind of material they
published was heavy and required a certain level of concentration. They sensed
that portfolio committees were overworked and thus often overwhelmed by the
information. Sometimes delegations were informed that all members could not be
present at a meeting because they had to attend other meetings.
Mr van der Merwe interjected that they were also underpaid.
Prof Asmal thought that Prof Sangweni’s response indicated that Parliament had
to review the organisation of portfolio committee meetings.
Prof Sangweni agreed and added that portfolio committees were also supposed to
be supported by a host of research capacities that attended to them and this
was not necessarily always the case. The PSC did at times feel that the
committees could engage a bit more. He agreed with Prof Asmal’s comment that
perhaps they needed to be more searching in their interactions with the PSC’s
work.
Mr Maharaj said that if one looked at the rigour with which the Standing
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) performed the function of assessing
financial management and then looked at how portfolio committees looked at the
performance and utilisation of those funds in terms of public service delivery,
there was a vast difference. Notwithstanding parliamentarians being underpaid
and overworked, the PSC believed that the emphasis was “a bit odd” because the financial
audits of a department was a small part of that department’s performance. The
PSC felt that the focus ought to be on the performance audit.
Prof Asmal said that SCOPA, by necessity had an excellent research staff. Since
members too were public servants, he did not think that the comments that they
were underpaid were relevant. How one made use of research staff depended
almost entirely on the committee.
Ms Matsomela noted that the PSC recommended the formation of strategic
partnerships between the portfolio, select committees and themselves as a way
of improving the effectiveness of Parliament’s oversight role. She wondered how
this could be done without impacting on the PSC’s independence and
impartiality.
Ms Ramsingh did not think that it would impact in the PSC’s independence and
impartiality. Supporting and assisting the portfolio committees could not
impede on their independence. If anything, the PSC saw itself as a research
unit for committees because it provided evidence-based research which could be
used to strengthen their work. The PSC maintained that if one had the strategic
partnership, they could also be more focussed in terms of what kind of public
service research the committees were interested in seeing done. It would be
useless for the PSC to do research on some remote issue when there was a
particular practice within the public administration on which no research was
being done. They saw themselves as a knowledge and research institution that
could contribute to providing evidence-based research to the committees which
they in turn could use to call departments to account. If anything such a
relationship would strengthen their role and the way in which they should be
positioning themselves in the technical oversight role of Parliament. Broadly
speaking the PSC saw themselves as having technical oversight – they gathered
and collated data which gave an opinion on one or other practice. Parliament
had political oversight which could only be enhanced and strengthened by the
technical assistance.
Ms Matsomela noted that the PSC had neither a formal nor an informal
relationship with the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE). She felt that such
a relationship would be appropriate considering that the PSC’s focus was on
gender equity as a public service imperative and the CGE’s role was to advance
gender equity in all spheres of the public service.
Mr Simpson explained that where there was a need for collaboration such as
research or discussion, the PSC involved all bodies such as the CGE. If it was
about gender mainstreaming in the public service, on which they were about to
bring out a report, they would include these organizations, in the discussion
following the publishing of the report. At the moment there was no formal
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two bodies. The PSC did involve
any organization which they believed was appropriate for the area of the public
administration they were investigating.
Prof Asmal felt that the MOU was very interesting. The response document mentioned
the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) quite extensively. The PSC
had MOUs with the Public Protector and the Auditor General. Yet there was not
much emphasis on the CGE. Their report of their relationship with other bodies
was superb but still made little mention of gender issues. He wondered why
there had been a slightly recessive approach to this area.
Prof Sangweni admitted that the PSC had not been proactive in its relationship
with the CGE. The PSC had however done a number of studies, one of which was a
comprehensive study on gender mainstreaming, which was currently in the process
of being finalised.
Prof Asmal interrupted and said that he felt that something was being left
unsaid. The PSC had taken major initiatives as far as gender issues and yet had
not forged a relationship with the CGE.
Prof Sangweni reiterated that the PSC had not involved itself with the CGE as
it should have. He admitted that that was an oversight of sorts.
Prof Asmal said that as with marriage, and corruption, collaboration too took
two.
Ms Ramsingh said that it was a practicality related issue. The practical
interface the PSC had with the Public Protector and the Auditor General were on
matters within their mandate that happened on a daily basis. The PSC would like
to give individual attention to each of the values and principles. Since far
more people were involved in the gender environment, the PSC did not think it
so pressing to get involved.
Prof Asmal asked whether the PSC was not duplicating a function that was
already being performed by a genuine Chapter 9 body. The Committee was not only
looking at collaboration and coordination, but also at whether the country was
getting value for money.
Ms Ramsingh categorically stated that there was no duplication of functions.
The PSC had to follow the constitutional imperative which put them in a
situation where they needed to assess transformation from a gender point as
well.
Prof Asmal said that the Constitution and the legislation on the SAHRC and the
CGE was quite clear: they had to collaborate with bodies of a similar function
and nature. The PSC spent R250 000 on doing the evaluation for the gender
mainstreaming report. They could have formed a joint committee with these
bodies. If one wanted a joined-up government, as the PSC tried to do all the
time, there was a statutory obligation on bodies to cooperate. He would have
thought that in areas such as violence against women, AIDS in the public
service, which affected women far more dramatically than men, that the bodies
would collaborate for greater impact. Instead it seemed as if the watchdogs did
not have many teeth in this regard.
Mr Ernzten said the PSC had not found the need to raise the bar to the level
the Committee seemed to want them to. They could only reconsider the matter.
The PSC spoke to the CGE when the need arose but could not emphasise a
relationship that did not exist.
Prof Asmal said that the PSC complained that they made recommendations but did
not know what became of them as they did not see the results. He wondered
whether they did not think that a joint report between the CGE, SAHRC and the
PSC would break new ground and would be widely publicised. He said that what
happened to women in public service was very much part of their daily work. One
of the questions the Committee would be looking at was where their mutual or
common cooperation lay.
Ms Matsomela said that the response document did not clearly indicate whether
CEOs, chairpersons and commissioners were prohibited from engaging in
activities that may result in a conflict of interest.
Prof Asmal said that the PSC failed to answer question 16 of the questionnaire.
He was curious to know where the public could access the disclosures register.
Prof Sangweni said the instrument covering the disclosure framework for
commissioners did not arise from any legislative instrument other than the
conditions of employment which required the commissioners to get permission
from the President if they wanted to take employment. That disclosure
instrument was arrived at through a process of discussion at the level of
Parliament through the conduit of the Portfolio Committee of Public Service and
Administration. The PSC drafted it but it still had to go through the portfolio
committee. One of the provisions was that the register would be lodged in the
Office of the President. Disclosures were done through his office and went to
the Office of the President (via the director general in the Office of the
President). The disclosure process followed by the PSC was the same as the one
that governed other civil servants’ disclosures.
Moving to the next question, Prof Asmal said that the question of the
accessibility of the register would have to be addressed later. The PSC had
asked the Auditor General to carry out an audit of the disclosures by senior
civil servants (from the level of director and up). He asked what findings had
been made.
Ms Ramsingh replied that ideally the PSC would have liked to do it themselves
but due to lack of resources, they had had to request the Auditor General to
perform the audit which had now been completed. The Auditor General had filed
an exception report – he had picked up that there had been some failure to
disclose. The PSC was currently engaging executing authorities to find why
there had been no disclosures and where it did not happen according to
regulations, disciplinary procedures had to be taken.
Ms Ramsingh felt that such disclosure was a very effective integrity mechanism.
The PSC had always maintained that 100% compliance would be the only acceptable
standard. She did however feel that it was noteworthy that in a public service
where a disclosure instrument had never existed before, there was currently 70%
compliance. Considering the rate of uptake and the consistency with which this
was being reported, it was an important building block within the integrity
framework, and should be strengthened.
Prof Asmal said that the Committee would discuss the matter further once
members had had a chance to look at the Auditor General’s report on
disclosures. He had drafted the parliamentary and the executive disclosure
framework and felt that the real problem, as far as the disclosure register was
concerned, was where it was vested and how accessible it was. It was often up
to the Director General to circulate it, was often badly printed and
photocopied and “often very incomplete”. If presented very late, the relevant
minister would suddenly be faced with 300 of these registers. This proved to be
a challenge to both a minister’s tenacity and time.
Prof Asmal added that he had attended a conference along with Prof Sangweni a
few days earlier at which values and ethics had been discussed. Central to the
discussion was the question of values and ethics within the public service. He
wondered what the PSC had done to inject the notion that this was a new kind of
civil service in a democratic dispensation that had not existed before and that
a renewal of the civil service was underway. He wondered what role the PSC
played in inculcating values such as ethics, morality, service and
professionalism.
Prof Sangweni replied that the discourse on the values and ethics of public
service dated back to 1995 when the first public service summit was held. This
was followed in 1998 by the broader summit on ethics in the entire country. All
of these were initiated by the PSC in collaboration with the Portfolio
Committee on Public Service and Administration. The PSC thus was at the helm of
advocating the ethics ethos. The Code of Conduct manual that was being promoted
was based on the Code of Conduct for the Public Service adopted in 1998 and was
recommended by the PSC after it had done extensive research on this.
Prof Asmal said that the Committee was aware of all the things the PSC had done
in this regard. What members were interested in knowing was how effective the
policy position was. He asked whether the true meaning of Batho Pele had been
injected into the daily lives of public servants. South Africa’s civil servants
were paid better than those in comparable economies. He asked whose job it was
to inject the remarkable value systems the PSC had developed into the
consciousness of public servants.
Prof Sangweni replied that when he raised the question for himself he always
thought that if on the day of judgement the Bible were to be assessed on the
basis of the number of sinners then all the clergy would be condemned to hell.
Departments, ministers and even NGOs had the arsenal in their hands with which
to attack the challenges facing the public service. The PSC and the entire
civil society structure were currently involved in a joint effort of promoting
ethics and non-corruption. He felt that it was everyone’s responsibility to
guard and promote these values.
Prof Asmal quipped that those who come from a secular tradition had a problem
with the last judgement. He said that it was of enormous importance that more
than a decade into South Africa’s democracy, the public service reflected
values that were in accordance with a democratic order and the values that the
PSC was charged with promoting. He knew that departments had to carry out the
values but felt that the initiative had to come from somewhere else.
Ms Mokgalong acknowledged the PSC’s role in the promotion and maintaining of professional
values in the public service. Prof Sangweni had indicated the PSC’s initiatives
Because the PSC realised that the values had not taken root sufficiently, they
had looked at ways and means of inculcating them. She assured the Committee
that the PSC was looking into the matter.
Mr Maharaj said that as a commissioner he would like to be “out in the field”
on a daily basis. He agreed that all nine values were not yet embedded in the
public service and acknowledged that “the public out there was getting a raw
deal”. The PSC was seriously considering going on regular inspections to look
at how services were being delivered and even doing back office inspections. He
added that of course there was protocol to observe and the PSC had to tread
carefully so as no to upset too many apple carts in the process.
Prof Asmal said that the Committee would also take into account how interlinked
the functions of the Chapter 9 and the Chapter 10 institutions were, when
making their recommendations. He added that the transmission of values could
“not be left to ministers and priests”.
Ms Matsomela wondered whether Citizen’s Forums, Citizens’ Satisfaction Surveys
and the National Anti-Corruption Forum were effective in all provinces. She
wondered what steps had been taken to ensure their effectiveness.
Mr Simpson said that the PSC was experiencing quite a few problems as far as
the National Anti Corruption Hotline was concerned. One such problem related to
the rate at which departments provided feedback for the cases the PSC referred
to them. This may be due to lack of investigative capacity, but it could also
be due to other problems. The PSC had gone through a round of workshops with
all anti corruption units within the provinces. They had also developed a
toolkit on the National Anti Corruption Hotline that had been distributed to
the units in the public service and that gave an indication of the kind of
processes they needed to put in place. He agreed that there was unevenness
across the public service even at national department level in the rate they
provided feedback to the hotline.
Ms Ramsingh added one should not lose sight of how important an instrument the
Hotline had become as far as participatory mechanisms were concerned. The
challenge for the public service and the PSC was how one could maintain the
integrity of the Hotline. Their concerns were on two levels: to what extent
were the departments in partnership with them to bring about credibility and
how will they get the capacity to address some of the more complicated issue.
Currently they were having difficulty doing so. She feared that, as innovative
as the project may be, it might come to bite them if they did not have the
capacity to deal with the cases reported.
Prof Asmal wondered what happened when corruption issues were referred to
departments or to the Public Protector. The letters he had received indicated
that nothing happened. Large numbers of people were frustrated because of the
lack of follow-up. He asked what the PSC did to protect whistle blowers and
what follow-up mechanisms were in place?
Prof Sangweni explained that the whistle-blowing continuum happened at
different levels. Whistle blowing under the Protected Disclosures Act (2000)
was quite a different matter from whistle blowing through the hotline
mechanism. The first was not in the PSC’s hands and was dealt with by the
Minister of Justice. While the PSC was interested in that, at their level they
were concerned that the legislation controlling this level of whistle blowing
had not been properly regulated. There were still no regulations or guidelines
as to how this should be implemented. There was not much they could do other
than exert some pressure.
He said that the Hotline was a fairly new project and was only introduced in
2004. Towards the end of 2006 a decision was taken to review the direction it
would take. They had encountered a tremendous amount of frustration as to what
happened to the referents. They knew that there were instances that concrete
evidence was referred to the relevant authorities and nothing came of it. The
PSC had proof that in some instances the relevant authority had even covered up
the matter. They would be doing a follow up and would take the appropriate
actions to deal with serious cases.
Ms Ramsingh added that departments were given 40 days in which to respond. Much
of the information gathered during an investigation was very complex. One had
to take into account the nature of the allegation and also that it may relate
to a regional or circuit office, which the director general needed to deal
with.
Ms D Smuts (DA) wondered whether the PSC was not “too soft” sometimes. She made
reference to the human resource investigations where they say that their
approach was developmental and supportive rather than punitive and judgmental.
She was encouraged by Mr Maharaj’s determination as far as addressing
malpractice, as well as by Mr Ernzten’s call to have the interim Constitution’s
powers of enforcement back. She thought this “refreshingly independent”. She
wondered why they did not make clearer that any malpractice and
maladministration was unacceptable. She referred to Prof Asmal’s statement that
one had to shame people who were guilty of transgressions and wondered whether
they had not lost the shame culture altogether.
Prof Sangweni said that the background to not being punitive went back to the
earlier dispensation. The pre-1996 dispensation was based on the Apartheid
commission, and was engaged in policy making and employed punitive methods. The
new PSC was sensitive to this background. The current PSC was equally strong in
implementing the ethos of professionalism and ethics. However, the PSC was
saying that due to weaknesses in the Constitution as far as its powers of
enforcement, challenges arose in ensuring implementation. If recommendations
were enforced, the public service would be very different. The PSC would not be
advocating a punitive approach. They did not believe that they needed to be
backed by punitive instruments, but rather that they should be backed with
constructive developmental instruments.
Ms Ramsingh added that investigations needed to be seen in broad terms. Some
investigations looked at systems and in these the PSC took a developmental role
because they wanted to uplift the public service so that it could be geared to
accelerate service delivery.
There were also investigations that dealt with malpractice and their
recommendations were very clear. The PSC had gone on record to say which
directors general should be charged for misconduct. Some investigations were
research orientated to improve the public service systems and were guided by a
developmental role.
In answer to Ms Matsomela’s earlier question, Ms Ramsingh said that the
citizens’ forum was an initiative the PSC was very proud of. It acknowledged
that public participation was lacking. The kind of robust social debate that
characterised the liberation struggle had largely disappeared. The PSC believed
that for public administration, public participation was an imperative. The PSC
realised that departments were not necessarily facilitating participation in a
structured way. The PSC had then introduced the citizens’ forums and had
encouraged departments, parliamentarians and communities to discuss issues. The
PSC acted as facilitator at these events. Due to budgetary constraints they had
had to fall back on rolling these out. They thus put in place a toolkit for
citizens’ forums and encouraged departments to use them. The PSC would like to
be at the forefront of driving these forums but this was not necessarily
happening.
Citizens’ Satisfaction Surveys were done on an annual basis. The PSC was not
only interested in how a department was performing but also interested in what
the public rated that performance. As far as the survey was concerned,
prioritisation was also necessary. Different sectors were surveyed at a time.
The Justice sector had been surveyed and very recently Water Affairs and
related services. These surveys were very effective and they encouraged
departments to use them to see what citizens thought and to establish what they
would like to see happening.
Ms Matsomela said that the complaints rules enabled members of the public to
complain to the PSC. She wondered what mechanisms had been put in place to
address complaints about the Commission itself.
Mr Simpson explained that the complaints rules that applied to the public
service also applied to the PSC. The same complaint form was used. Boxes in
which complaints could be placed were displayed at all PSC offices. Such
complaints were investigated in the same manner that the PSC investigated other
public service related complaints.
Mr Dithebe noted that on pages 33, 68 and 71 of the response document reference
was made to budgetary constraints. According to the 2006 estimates of national
expenditure (ENE), PSC expenditure increased rapidly from R62 million in 2002/3
to R92, 4 million in 2005/6. It was due to increase to R106, 6 million by
2008\9. The budget increases reported in the ENE appeared to contradict what
was stated in the response document.
Ms Ramsingh responded that while there was a marked increase in its budget, it
was not commensurate with the unfolding of its mandate. The PSC at times found
itself involved in “unfunded mandates”. It was for instance, asked to manage
the Hotline. This was not a problem because it fell sharply within the PSC’s
principle of ethics. The hotline was set up to manage cases of corruption. Of
the 3 500 odd cases about 1000 related to service delivery investigations
however. Prior to the hotline being set up there was a chief directorate of
investigations which dealt with about 65 investigations per year. Suddenly
there was an increase to 1000 per year yet neither the budget nor the chief
directorate had increased to accommodate this.
When the PSC did ask for funding, National Treasury gave funding for
investigations. That funding normally went to the category ‘consultancy’ or
‘professional fees'. Given the nature of the investigations the PSC could not
outsource the investigations to private consultants. If the PSC was allowed to
use the funds to grow their staff complement, they might even under spend.
Prof Asmal said that nonetheless there was still a remarkable increase from R56
million to more than R100 million in the space of five years. Government’s
commitment to dealing with ethics and dealing with corruption was central. He
wondered why the PSC then took on unfunded mandates. This was a political
matter and was very important to the Committee. If one took on unfunded mandates,
other issues might suffer since resources would have to be transferred. The
political issue therefore was that one should not undertake unfunded mandates.
Ms Ramsingh explained that in the PSC’s case it was slightly different. The
unfunded mandates in essence fell within the PSC’s mandate but had not
necessarily been rolled out yet. When the call came for the mandate to be
rolled out, it was not necessarily matched with increased funding. So it was
not an unfunded mandate but rather a call that mandates be rolled out faster.
Prof Asmal said that the Committee would take into account that their budget
was fixed by National Treasury without the intervention of the Department of
Public Service and Administration (DPSA). He noted that there was enormous variation
in the budgetary process with the consequent effect that some Chapter 9 bodies
may suffer and others may have an advantage.
Prof Sangweni said that the bulk of the unfunded work that the PSC found itself
obliged to undertake came from the provinces. The PSC was under a great deal of
pressure from the provincial administrations and stood accused of being
“national department-centric”. He said that this apparent absence from the
provinces could be linked to staff shortages.
Mr Dithebe recalled that in the 2001/2 evaluation of heads of departments there
was a very useful instrument called the ‘360 degree evaluation’. He wondered
why the PSC had chosen to make this evaluation optional.
Mr Simpson reminded members that the PSC did not have the authority to develop
policy. A recommendation on a framework had been made to Cabinet and the
decision was taken to use this instrument as an optional instrument. The 360
degree evaluation instrument was an add-on instrument to look at the
performance of heads of department in terms of core management criteria.
Subsequently, use of that instrument was withdrawn, through a policy directive.
Ms Smuts asserted that she believed in affirmative action but that she got very
concerned when it took “problematic forms”. One of the constitutional
imperatives relating to personnel practices required ability, objectivity,
fairness and representative. She wondered whether enough emphasis had been
placed on ability. It was only in the public service that representivity was
mandatory.
She added that everyone knew that there was lack of capacity and what the scale
of provincial under spend was and the disastrous consequence that resulted from
that. 60% of the money Parliament voted for went to the provinces and she was
pleased that the PSC would work with the provinces.
Mr Maharaj agreed that the question around ability was crucial. The PSC had
developed a toolkit on recruitment and selection processes in the public
service. If one read it, one would discover that the emphasis was not only on
one aspect of recruitment but looked at the whole picture. The Commission would
take umbrage if someone without ability was appointed to a position and would
make recommendations in that regard.
They had also done two studies on whether people were appropriately qualified
for the work they were doing. One was done at the level of deputy director, and
quite surprisingly, it was found that most of these managers had the necessary
qualifications. A subsequent investigation rendered similar results for
managers below the level of deputy director. It found that in terms of the
total package of ability, suitability, qualifications and necessary experience,
they all met the requirements.
He added that the PSC would take exception if people were employed only on the
basis of one particular criterion. This was often the issue for people who felt
aggrieved in appointment processes and the PSC would then make recommendations
in that regard. He said these complaints did not form the bulk of their
investigations.
Prof Asmal asked that the Committee be supplied with the information for the
hearings to be held in two weeks time.
Ms C Johnson (ANC) asked whether the investigations into the public servants
with fraudulent qualifications had been concluded.
Mr Maharaj said that the one report had come out but that he was not sure
whether the second one had been released. They had concluded the investigation
at a more senior level and that had been published.
Ms Ramsingh added that the report on senior managers had been published and
that there had only been one case of misrepresentation. The second report on
the deputy directors had revealed no misrepresentation. The investigation
around misrepresentation of qualifications at the level below deputy directors
had been rolled out to the provinces - due to resource constraints. The PSC
would do oversight of these investigations to see what they revealed.
Ms Matsomela noted that the response document indicated that the PSC funds were
not approved by the departments or organs of state that it was meant to
monitor. She wondered what the PSC would like to see happening in this regard.
Ms Ramsingh replied that the PSC had a direct vote as far the budget was
concerned. The Minister submitted the budget to the National Treasury. The
PSC’s challenge was that once that had been forward to Treasury, the PSC was
not in a position to debate for a better allocation when the executing
authorities sat and debated and lobbied for extra funding. They did not have
room to lobby and participate at such forums. Given their mandate and given the
safeguarding of their independence, they would find it difficult to approach
the Minister with a request to lobby on their behalf. They thus found
themselves in a very invidious position. Engaging with National Treasury at the
time of allocation was still “that one last step” that needed to be taken, and
still they did not find that they had the voice with which to do it.
Prof Asmal said that that the Director General was appointed by the Executive
and he assumed that the Minister played a big part in the appointment of the
Chief Executive. It seemed a bit anomalous then that these officials carried no
influence. Although formally they did not have any power, informally there
surely had to be accepted ways in which they could exercise some influence. He
did not expect an answer to this comment.
Prof Sangweni said that these were issues that they would like the Committee to
ponder. There was a perception that the PSC was under the Minister, that she
controlled the PSC’s budget because she presented it to Parliament. The PSC had
discussed the matter and some commissioners felt very strongly that the
responsibility should be shifted.
He said that the appointment of the Director Genera had to be seen in a
particular historical context. Pre-1996 the PSC was part of the administration
because it determined policy. There had been issues that tended to impact on
the Commission's independence.
Prof Asmal said the PSC was tasked to look after the quality of the public
service yet their report made no reference to the South African Management and
Development Institute (SAMDI), which was vested in the Ministry. The public had
a particular interest in it because the quality of public service was
enormously important.
Ms Ramsingh replied that the PSC was currently undertaking a study on the
extent of training at senior management service level. The Commission had been
involved in an evaluation of SAMDI. She agreed that they could do more as far
as training was concerned.
Prof Asmal wondered whether there was any other country in the world with a
similar level of political expedience and expectations that did not have a
civil service staff training college. India was a classical example. He
wondered whether it was not anomalous that South Africa did not have one.
Ms Ramsingh said that she would not like to pre-empt the Minister’s work around
the evaluation of SAMDI but could inform the Committee that some interesting
developments would unfold.
Prof Sangweni said that post 1994 there had been a trend within administration
to close teaching training colleges and nursing colleges. Training from
1994-1996 was under the South African Training Institute, which was under the
then PSC. This was removed and replaced by SAMDI. He did not know of any
country that did not have such a training college and agreed that this was a
pertinent question.
Prof Asmal responded that it was not the intention to embarrass the PSC at all.
He was merely curious as to why the report did not mention training.
Moving to the next issue Prof Asmal, said that the report noted that
interaction with the provinces was very limited despite nine provincial
commissioners having been appointed at relatively high salary levels. He
wondered with what credibility the Committee could report to Parliament, that
despite the presence of the 9 provincial commissioners’ offices, the national
PSC reported limited interaction with the provinces.
Mr Maharaj agreed that interaction with the provincial legislatures was
extremely limited. The PSC submitted the same reports and documents at
provincial and national speaker level. Provincial legislatures did not
necessarily engage with the reports in the way that the national level did. On
at least two occasions they had addressed appeals and correspondence to
provincial speakers and chairpersons of portfolio committees to address the
matter urgently. The PSC believed that they could impact much more
significantly at provincial level especially when it came to issues of public
service delivery.
He continued that the PSC frequently and regularly interacted with heads of
departments at the administrative level. He himself engaged with every single
department in terms of promoting the values and principles. In his first year
with the PSC they had gone to every department executive committee to inform
them of the role and function of the PSC and the value it could add to the
functioning of those departments. Within provincial departments they also
ensured compliance with some of the obligatory requirements such as submission
of financial disclosures.
The PSC could boast that within some of the provinces there was 100%
compliance, particularly because of the very direct interventions made by
provincial commissioners. The PSC believed that at a political level a lot more
could be done.
Prof Asmal brought their attention to the fact that on p31 of the response
document, they said that regional offices (provincial offices) were not
adequately capacitated to fulfil the PSC’s mandate in the respective provinces.
Reading this “from a cold, analytical point of view”, this statement indicated
that the system was not working in the provinces at administrative level. He
added that the Committee would like to see the budgets for each of the
provincial offices.
Mr Maharaj explained that for some reason or another, the provincial offices
had been confined to five persons only. Considering that there were 12 to 14
provincial departments, such a small unit could not do monitoring and evaluation
on each of these departments every year and still do other work as well. He
mentioned that in one of the provinces, the Office of the Auditor General was
the size of the entire PSC staff complement.
Prof Asmal pointed out that the function of the Auditor General was entirely
different. Moving on he said he dreamt of there being a one stop advice centre
in major towns so that people could get information as to where to lodge
complaints. The real issue was that people did not know where they could turn to.
He felt that if this could become a realisation, the PSC would be doing one of
the best services it had done since 1994.
Mr Dithebe noted that the PSC and Public Protector had signed an MOU in which
they agreed that the Public Protector would deal with complaints from the
public, while the PSC would deal with complaints from public servants. He
wondered whether the public had been made aware of this arrangement.
Ms Ramsingh said that the PSC had constrained itself as far as marketing was
concerned. This was because they wanted to contain the flood gate that would
inevitably open. The PSC had compiled a brochure which was distributed to the
public as well as to public servants. She agreed that the PSC could market the
hotline much more extensively. She admitted that marketing had been a
shortcoming in the PSC’s activities.
Prof Asmal noted that some very good work was being done but that the Committee
had not been aware of them. He said that for some odd reason the British Navy
was known as the ‘silent service’. He joked that the PSC was taking the idea of
a silent service too far. There were newspapers that took articles from third
rate academics all the time and he wondered why Commissioners did not write
articles on the PSC’s activities to be published in the papers. He added that
while only 3% of the population read newspapers vast numbers listened to the
radio. He did not think that the PSC needed a separate publicity unit for this.
Ms Johnson said that the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (2000) and the
Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000) required public awareness raising
activities. She said that the PSC had alluded to the fact that the public was
not aware of these provisions and that the public service was not compliant
with it. Such legislation meant nothing if not applied. She wondered what the
PSC was doing about this and what they thought the Committee could do to
assist.
Ms Ramsingh responded that the PSC had gone into collaboration with the
Department of Justice. They had done an evaluation on the implementation of
these two pieces of legislation. The findings were a matter of concern. They
were trying to partner with the Department of Justice and Constitutional
Affairs to promote these two pieces of legislation in a much more aggressive way.
Implementation of the legislation remained the responsibility of the relevant
department.
Prof Asmal said that according to the Presidential Review Commission, the PSC
was too large, unwieldy and costly. There was a need for much growth and change
and that it should be a much smaller body vested somewhere else. It also
pointed out that the body should be without the power to address employment
grievances, because such instruments were already in place. The report said
that the question remained whether these bodies were relevant in a
developmental state. Prof Asmal wondered whether the PSC could comment on this
statement either then or in writing.
Prof Sangweni said that the PSC could respond then as well as in writing at a
later stage. He recalled that the study Prof Asmal had referred to was made
against a particular backdrop. With hindsight, given the evolution and the
levels of transformation that had taken place, and given the magnitude of the
work they had done and the possibility of a single public service, there was no
need to tamper with the size of the PSC. The amount of work that needed to be
done was such that there would have to be greater resource allocation, if the
PSC were to continue in its current configuration. He did not think that the
recommendation was applicable in the present situation.
Prof Asmal said that the responses the Committee had received from the PSC were
sharp and helpful. He felt that the Committee had had a genuine interaction
with the PSC. He urged the PSC not to feel that they had been cornered and
reiterated that the Committee had not arrived at any conclusions.
He said that it would help the Committee if the PSC could consider the matters
raised in the questionnaire as well as at the meeting as citizens of South Africa and not merely as officials within the PSC. This would enable them to
objectively state what was happening within the public service rather than
always raising the "money matter". The Committee would like to have
self analytical responses.
The PSC was not like other commissions. They had been charged with special
work. Many of the commissioners had strong political backgrounds and had been
actively involved. They had insight into how things should happen, which they
could share with the younger commissioners. He invited them to make further
submissions that would assist the Committee and doing its work, before thanking
them for the engagement. He looked forward to possible further interaction.
Mr Ernzten said that the significance of what the Chairperson had said would
only be felt very much further down the line. It was significant to note that
he and Prof Sangweni were the last two remaining members from the original PSC.
In terms of the Constitution, 60% of the current commission had to leave in two
years' time. That institutional memory should not be lost. He added that the
PSC was working in the interest of the country and not just in the interest of
those who served on it.
Prof Asmal said that the Committee had made a similar observation. There were
one or two commissions, where effectively all the commissioners were new. Their
successes were not many at all and the new commissioners were held accountable.
He assured the PSC that the Committee would recognise the importance of
continuity.
Prof Sangweni thanked the Committee for the robust engagement. The delegation
had not felt that they were being interrogated at all. It had been a positive
engagement that helped them a great deal. In fact he could not recall any
engagement in the past seven years where the PSC required to reflect on things
they were doing. He recommended that the Committee should try to engage with
one or two of the provinces. It would help enormously.
The meeting was adjourned.
Audio
No related
Documents
No related documents
Present
- We don't have attendance info for this committee meeting
Download as PDF
You can download this page as a PDF using your browser's print functionality. Click on the "Print" button below and select the "PDF" option under destinations/printers.
See detailed instructions for your browser here.