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AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE OPEN DEMOCRACY BILL
2 NOVEMBER 1999
REVIEWING SUBMISSIONS AND HORIZONALITY
Open Democracy Bill [B67-98]
Expanded Summary of Submissions
Open Democracy Campaign Group Submissions:
South African Council of Churches: 13 & 18 October 1999 (ODB 15D & D1)
South African Council of Churches: February 1999 (ODB 15)
COSATU (ODB 64C)
The Committee discussed today the rest of the remaining submissions from Clause 74 through the end, and they ended the morning session with a summary of the issues that had to be discussed surrounding the issue of horizontality.
The Committee continued discussing horizontality. The drafters were encouraged to use the Open Democracy Campaign Group Submissions on the issue as a framework.
Chapter 2: Enforcement Mechanisms
Clause 74: Applications regarding decisions of information officers or heads of governmental bodies
The Chair asked how this section worked in terms of appeals, because appeals are normally from one court to another court and not from a department to the court. He felt that the use of the term "appeal" in 74(1)(b) was being used incorrectly.
Ms van Schoor agreed that the term was used wrongly.
The Chair said that the term should be "review" instead of "appeal."
Mr Lever (DP) felt that the term "appeal" could be used because it was being used in a different context.
The Chair asked how it was possible for the court to be bound by an appeal procedure within a department.
Mr Lever (DP) felt that the term "appeal" could be used in two different contexts. The court has discretion as to what evidence they let in during a proceeding. If the term is changed to "review", then that discretion will become much more narrow and restricting.
The Chair felt that they fundamentally disagreed on that point. The Chair was trying to explain that a requester should be able to present whatever evidence s/he wants when they go to court, because they were not afforded that opportunity at the time that the request was reviewed within the department.
Mr Smith (IFP) thought that appeal was being used in the general rather than the legal sense here, which would mean that fresh evidence could come in if the case went to court.
The Chair said that is why it cannot be an appeal. If you want the ability to bring in fresh evidence, which of course you do at this stage, then it cannot be considered an appeal. Appeals bind the court to the previous record, and the previous record in these types of cases would be missing any input from the requester.
Mr Jeffery (ANC) wanted some clarity to this section as well. He suggested that what would make the clause better would be to change the term "appeal" and replace it with "apply." Clause 74(1) would then read " . . .may apply to the court by way of an application."
The Chair tried to explain again the issue that was being discussed. He said that the person who has original jurisdiction over the case is the information officer. If the information is refused, then the requester can go to the designated officer (Director General). The Director General only looks at the information given to him by the information officer. If the designated officer still refuses to give the information (presumably because it fell under one of the exemptions), then the requester can take the case to court. If you keep the term "appeal" there, then the court would be bound to make a decision based only on what the information officer and the Director General looked at, which would exclude any evidence from the requester and which would violate the heart of judicial process. We still cannott exclude the right of "review" either.
Ms Smuts (DP) asked what does review give you?
Mr Lever (DP) supported Mr Jeffery's approach to change the wording. By adopting that approach you could still keep the right to review as well.
Ms Jana (ANC) just wanted to be sure that this would still mean that the court could hear fresh evidence.
The Chair said that new evidence could be heard if the wording was changed, which is what would make it different from the internal appeal process.
Mr Smith (IFP) wanted to know what the merit was behind 74(3) regarding the right of the Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) to appeal.
The Chair said that was a good question, because the SAHRC's role already is to litigate for people. He said that they would flag this point.
Dr Delport (DP) said that they needed to flag the terminology that was used in this entire section. What do we really want the section to mean; what do we want the term "appeal" to mean in this context? He understood that this would not be decided on now, especially since the committee had not even decided on a structure yet.
The Chair said they did not need to decide technical issues now as requested in the submission of the Judge President of the Northern Cape but that they would come back to that point. He then moved onto the Chief Justice's submission.
Mr Smith (IFP) questioned the structure of section 74, and wanted to know if you could appeal when the general override was used.
The Chair said that you can always appeal, but that there may be an issue of timeliness. Your request could fall into the urgent category, but the appeal process may not suit that urgency. Mr Smith's concern is covered by 74(1)(a). Third party appeals are covered under 74(1)(a) as well.
Clause 77: Assistance of Human Rights Commission
The Chair looked at the Chief Justice submission which asked whether or not the Bill intended that people should have the right to legal representation under this clause. The Chair said that the problem with changing the term to "legal representative" is that the state would have to pay for the representation, and he was not sure if this was a viable situation. He said that the Committee would have to look at that issue much more carefully
Clause 78: Production of Records of Governmental bodies to the High Court
The Chair looked at the Transnet submission and said that it had merit. Transnet had pointed out that even where the court refuses to allow access to information, the possibility exists that the information may be obtained through court transcript. The Chair said that if the court orders to see the document then they can, but that does not make the document freely available. He wanted to check that statement though to make sure he was correct.
Mr Lever (DP) said that there is a procedure already relating to the release of security documents
The Chair said that the problem was that if you take the case to court, then the court must decide whether or not you are allowed to see the contents of the document. This purpose would be ruined if the court requested the document and showed it to the party making the request to see it. Transnet is correct also in raising the concern about the requester asking questions that relate to the contents of the document. If the requester had the freedom of asking any questions regarding the contents of the document that they were seeking to have, then that would also defeat the purpose of the court case. The Chair said that the Committee needed to check what other jurisdictions were doing. It would be completely wrong to get access to documents through the judicial process, because the court is there to decide whether or not you can even have the access in the first place. You cannott ask all of the questions that you want.
Ms Camerer (NNP) understood that you cannot ask all of the questions that you want as a way of learning the contents of the document without actually getting permission to have access to the document. However, she said it would be a problem to create a special procedure in the courts for this type of case, because it could result in that process being abused or used for other unrelated proceedings.
The Chair pointed out that 78(1) gives the judge access to the document, but does not give access to the requester. The Chair agreed with Transnet's concern, but he is not sure how to resolve the problem right now.
Ms Jana (ANC) said that there is already a process by which evidence can be viewed in chambers. She also wanted to remind them that the Bill already has a provision by which the disputed information may be removed from the document. (She then directed a comment at the Chair saying that he should know about that process of removing information from documents, because the old Apartheid government was very good at maintaining the secrecy of documents.)
Mr Smith (IFP) pointed out that all of the discussions were missing 78(3)
The Chair said that even 78(3), which gives the court the discretion to either disclose or not disclose the record during the proceeding, does not solve the problem. The judge cannot make the document available to both sides and then say to them that they cannot use it for anything. To do that would again defeat the purpose of the court case
Ms Camerer (NNP) said that the judge should still be able to have discretion over whether or not to allow access to a document and to decide whether or not the information officer was wrong in refusing the information
The Chair said that was not the issue, because the judge already has that discretion. The issue is whether or not the disclosure of the information is protected by an exemption and not whether or not that information is confidential or sensitive
Mr Jeffery (ANC) was worried that the discussion was going in circles. The clause is a necessary one, but it does not yet adequately deal with the concerns raised by groups like Transnet.
Mr Smith (IFP) wanted to know how a person, wanting to get access to a document, could argue in court why they should get that document if they could not see what was in it.
The Chair understood his point, but told him that the judge will always have access, which is were the requester's protection lies. But the solution to this problem may be in what type of enforcement mechanism they choose.
Ms Smuts (DP) reminded the committee to look at section 58(e) of the Australian document when they are drafting the new version.
The Chair then told them that they were going to move on, especially since they did not know which mechanism they were going to use yet. They all agree that more research needed to be done.
Clause 79:Burden of Proof
The Chair looked at the Transnet submission but said they he did not want the Committee discussing this yet, because they have to decide on a enforcement mechanism first.
Clause 80: Decision on Application
There were no submissions on this section
Clause 81: Costs
The Chair said that they did not need to worry about the concern raised in the Telkom submission because there are already specific rules on security for costs so they do not have to include them here. He said that they would flag it just to be sure though.
Part 7: Miscellaneous Provisions
Clause 82: Additional Functions of the Human Rights Commission
Ms Smuts (DP) agreed with The Banking Council submission that the wording of this section was very clumsy.
The Chair says the problem is that they have defined private bodies as being everything that does not constitute a governmental body. Asking the SAHRC to review every private body on an annual basis is just too much and very unrealistic. The terms "substantial influence" gives the SAHRC discretion as to which private bodies they choose to review so long as they are the bigger companies.
Ms Camerer (NNP) questioned the SAHRC's ability to complete a task of such magnitude. How will they be able to do this with out getting more funding. It is one thing to ask them to review governmental bodies, but it is a whole other matter to ask them to also review private bodies.
The Chair understood her point about funding, but did not understand the second part of her argument.
Ms Camerer (NNP) said that if the SAHRC did not have the funding, then that would directly impact their ability to review this Act as section 82 requires
Mr Masutha (ANC) pointed out that it is quite a lot f information that you are asking the SAHRC to collect and sort through on an annual basis. The SAHRC is going to spend the entire year trying to get the information, and by the time they get it all, they will have to start all over again.
The Chair agreed with this point. He said that they will need to look at how often the SAHRC much obtain the information and how much information the SAHRC will need from the bodies in order to make a determination of the success of the Act.
Dr Jordan (ANC) asked if they could merely recast the clause so that it was the responsibility of the bodies to complete a report annually that they had to submit to the SAHRC.
The Chair said that was a possible solution, and as a matter of fact Clause 27 does just that. The question is if they can make Clause 27 apply to private bodies.
With regard to 82(2)(e), Mr Smith (IFP) asked if there was not already a regulation saying something about the government collecting money?
The Chair admitted that there was such a regulation, and that they would flag that point and raise it with the Department of Justice. He then moved onto the Mpumulanga Provincial Government submission. He believed that the SAHRC already had those powers that the Mpumulanga Provincial Government wanted to give them. They would confirm this point
Clause 84: Expenditure of Human Rights Commission in terms of Act
The Chair did not understand why this clause was in the Bill. What does this clause actually mean?
Ms van Schoor said that she would confirm, but that she thought that there was new legislation that superceded this clause.
The Chair said that it was unusual for the SAHRC to be able to spend whatever money they wanted without having a budget and then just ask to be reimbursed at a later time
Clause 85: Offences
The Chair said that most of the discussion on this section had occurred during their consideration of criminal sanctions for whistle-blowers. Specifically in relation to the Northern Province submission, the chair said that there was already a law, the Adjustment of Fines Act, which deals with monetary matters. It is not necessary to put this in this Bill unless the Committee wanted to change the set amounts already laid out in the other Act.
There was a long discussion about the term "classified" in 85(c) and what it meant in terms of the 86 (c ) "classification of records." The issues discussed are laid out in submissions by Wits University (OPD11A) and the South African Society of Archivists. Does the term "classified" mean that the document is secret and confidential or does it mean that records need to be sorted in specific categories of disclosure (pro-active disclosure, mandatory refusal, discretionary refusal, and disclosure after notification).
The other problem is that the only time the Bill mentions the classification of records is in clauses 85(c ) and 86(c ). The other provisions of the Bill imply that the classification of records should not be taken into account when making a decision as to whether or not that record should be disclosed. It is unclear what is meant by the classification of records in these sections, and whether or not the term "classified" even has the same meaning in both sections. Clauses 85(c) and 86(c) establish doubt and raise concern that the classification of records could be used to undermine other provisions of the Bill.
Dr Jordan (ANC) agreed that these sections were necessary, but if you read then with 63(3)(b)(i) and (ii) then there is a conflict. The sections were stated so broadly that you could end up criminalising acts that are in the public interest.
The Chair said that they need to look at 85(c) in terms of whistle-blowing as well.
Ms Smuts (DP) asked how 63(3)(b) will link to Freedom of Information cases. She told everyone that the classification references in s86 was a late edition. She wanted to know if the committee was planning on adopting the American classification of records, and if so then s86 would add support for the classification of records over the exemptions.
The Chair admitted that the records have to be classified, but that the problem would be linking the classification to the exemptions. Ms van Schoor needs to look at what laws currently deal with the classification of records. What does the Archives Act do? The Freedom of Information Act? There was broad consensus that the committee needed to look at the meaning of classification in order to decide what impact it had on the Bill and other legislation.
Clause 86: Regulations
The Chair summarized the same discussion as before on this issue. The Committee has the power to have the regulations on the Bill "tabled" so that they can review them.
There was general discussion relating to the points outlined in the submission as written above.
Mr Smith (IFP) said that the "must" in clause 86 should be changed to a "may".
The Chair said that he did not want to change it to "must" because that would put too much burden on them.
Issue of horizontality
The Chair summarized the issues that they would need to discuss regarding horizontality. First, they would have to discuss the Constitutional provisions in section 32(1)(b). However, he felt that he was fairly clear now on the intentions of the Constitution, but that they needed to be sure that the Bill was going to comply with them.
Second, it is clear that they have to pass legislation that covers both aspects of section 32. If the Committee ignores section 32(1)(b) of the Constitution, then they will do so at great price. It would mean that the courts would have to make decisions absent of any kind of guidance from Parliament on this issue. There could be severe inconsistencies among the jurisdictions regarding the exemptions and effects of the Bill.
Third, they need to decide on the amount of regulations that they will need. There is no other country like South Africa who has tried to cover private bodies under access to information laws, therefore there are no other laws that SA can model themselves after. The Open Democracy Campaign Group had helped in that they had provided a framework, but there is still a lot to do.
Fourth, the Committee needs to decide on a framework. The framework needs to state the right (not just in the exemptions), give deadlines to pass further legislation, provide procedures to use access to information, spell out the exemptions, and provide enforcement mechanisms. There are several models that the Committee could adopt to achieve these ends. One model is to look at section 50, which is the section that covers 32(b) of the Constitution. The problem with adopting this one is that it only deals with access to private information. Another suggestion is to adopt something completely new (at least the Open Democracy Campaign Group has given us something to work from). Finally, the Committee could take Mr Durr's suggestion, which is to separate the Bill so that one bill deals exclusively with the private sector independent of the public one. No matter if they decide to split the Bill or not, the Committee has to go through the process of deciding on a framework before 4 February 2000.
Fifth, the Committee has to look at the right to know in the private sphere. The Open Democracy Campaign Group has given some suggestions, but the problem is going to be making this work in practice. How are we going to regulate this considering the volume of private bodies in South Africa?
Sixth, the Committee needs to decide if any private bodies can be excluded, as Johannesburg Stock exchange has suggested.
Finally, they will need to discuss how fees apply. No one had raised this point in the submissions, but it must be dealt with.
Mr Durr (DP) agreed with the summary, but he said that they were not just dealing with section 32 but rather also section 14 (privacy) of the Constitution. One right does not outweigh any other. We warned that because they were dealing with a new area of law that no other country has dealt with, that they should be careful and not make any huge leaps forward because it could find South Africa in hot water. It is important to put the breaks on so as to not damage the right of access. The right to privacy should really be dealt with in a privacy bill and not in this one. The whistle-blower section should be taken out of this Bill and made a separate one. In order to meet the requirements laid out in section 32 of the Constitution for the legislation they need to look at what has already been passed to meet those set requirements. There is no need for the legislation to be perfect. If the government intends on passing privacy legislation next year, then they should add that to the Bill.
In conclusion, he said that the Committee should take out Chapter 4 of the Bill and make it its own Bill, which would contain how to access information in the private sphere
The Chair said that it is important not to mix up private information with information that is in the private sphere. Private information can be in either the public sphere or the private. Additionally, you will have to draft a Bill that deals with how to access information in the private sphere that does not constitute private information.
Mr Durr (DP) felt that Chapter 4 of the Bill was sufficient to deal with information in the private sphere for the moment. Further, he said that notification that other legislation to come would also be sufficient
Mr Smith (IFP) felt that they had to have full compliance with 32(1)(a) AND (b) before Feb. 4. He asked which models could realistically be addressed by December 15? How do we cross-reference something like the environmental legislation? Finally, he stated that he wanted one bill, because they are dealing with one right to access information
The Chair said that the framework which the Open Democracy Campaign Group had provided would go some way to meet the requirements of section 32(1)(b). The issue is really what certainty we can bring to this new area of law.
Ms Camerer (NNP) was worried about cutting Chapter 4 out, because the government holds personal information as well so the two parts need to be married. She agreed with Mr Durr that they need to be looking at section 14 of the Constitution as well, and liked the idea of giving a deadline for when privacy legislation had to be passed by.
The Chair said that nothing stops you from saying that we are going to pass future legislation, but this issue is giving a deadline to do so. He wanted to add that it is not just sections 14 and 32 of the Constitution that they had to look at but all that play a role here. It is all rights that are important, and no one right had priority over any other. He also wanted to remind everyone that all rights are subject to limitation. It is not enough to say that the clauses in Chapter 4 of the Bill belong in a privacy act. Ms van Schoor says that you can delete those parts of Chapter 4 that deal with access, because access is taken care of in the rest of the Bill through the use of the terms "all information." He is not sure if those terms go far enough in giving effect to the right.
Ms Smuts (DP) felt that the Committee would not get very far if they split the Bills. She felt that they should stay where they were and work with the framework provided by the Open Democracy Campaign Group.
The discussion on horizontality was carried over from the morning session.
Adv de Lange directed the committee on what it needs to do with regards to horizontality. The committee must be clear on what was private information and what was information held by the private sphere. The committee must also come to a decision on what it would and would not put in the Bill. Adv de Lange referred to Mr Durr's earlier proposal that the Bill provide a set of principles as a minimum to deal with the private sphere. The only submissions on this came from those involved with the Open Democracy Campaign Group:
· OPD 15, 15d and 15d(i), prepared by the South African Council of Churches (There was some confusion regarding these submissions. OPD 15 was submitted in February and provides a new and detailed part Part 4 on privately held information. OPD 15d is a later submission of 13 October that summarises OPD 15 in to a framework. OPD 15d(i) is a submission of 18 October giving further elaboration on OPD15d. As it was also labeled 15d it was relabeled 15d(i).)
· OPD 64c, prepared by COSATU.
The committee looked at the submissions with a view to considering them as a possible draft or as the basis for a draft.
This offers a definition of a private body that is the same as that proposed by the Law Society of South Africa. Adv de Lange said that the committee must decide who is a private body and who within a private body would act as an information officer, this issue was flagged.
OPD 15 then proposes a new part four which is a reflection of part three - access to records of governmental bodies. It creates the right to gain access to information of a private body if it contains personal information about the requestor or if it needed for the exercise of protection of any right. It then goes on to cover:
· Use of Act for criminal or civil discovery of private bodies' records excluded
· Right of disclosure of record to which access is given
· Access to records in terms of other law
· Form of requests
· Preservation of records until final decision on request Decision on request and notice thereof
· Extension of period to deal with request
· Deemed refusal of request
· Access fees
· Access and forms of access
· Language of access
This are essentially procedural clauses and Adv de Lange directed the drafters to look in to the detail of the proposals.
OPD15 also provides a Chapter two on grounds for refusal of access to records. This would be a crucial section as it set out the balance for access versus the protection of personal privacy.
On the advice of Mr Doug Tilton, South African Council of Churches representative, the committee decided it would look no further at OPD15 but instead would consider OPD15d as it was more recent and less detailed.
OPD 15d merely provides a greatly streamlined procedure for dealing with the private sphere.
It also provides categories for exemptions:
· protection of personal privacy
· protection of trade secrets and commercial information
· third parties not giving consent
· endangering of life or physical safety
· endangering of security of property
· information already publicly available
· unreasonable, frivolous or vexatious requests.
Adv de Lange stated that exemptions must be looked at in detail.
An override is proposed by OPD15d, but Adv de Lange said the committee needs to first decide whether they want an override. Further a timeframe for the granting of requests is also stipulated (30 days) but the committee must develop a viewpoint on this.
Adv de Lange felt that the OPD15d may be too streamlined, to the extent it may not fulfill section 32(1)(b) of the Constitution. He felt that the drafters needed to look at this proposals and the others made and see what they could come up with.
Mr Smith (IFP) agreed that the framework of OPD15d was too narrow and that proposals needed the detail laid out in Part three on access to records held by governmental bodies.
Adv de Lange felt that more detail was needed to ensure that access to privately held information did not become dependent on the interpretation of courts. Clear principles are needed so that a court can easily way up the balance of granting or refusing the request. However the detail of Part three is probably not required.
Ms Smuts (DP) said that it was impossible to legislate for exemptions for privately held information. You must include every conceivable way to protect your rights, it cannot be assumed that these are just the same as the public sphere.
Adv de Lange stated that exemptions must be legislated for as they are the only way to limit the rights to access information. The exemptions laid out for the public sphere reflect those of other nations. The private sphere is more problematic because areas are less crystallized but clear exemptions will develop over time and through the decisions of courts.
Ms Smuts continued to argue that any fleshing out of the proposals made in OPD15d would lead to the need for exact detail and therefore exact legislation on exemptions. The specific consequences of exemptions and the specific rights the legislation wished to protect must be what is legislated for and this is not possible.
Adv de Lange reiterated that exemptions could develop over time but accepted that the exemptions proposed in OPD15d failed to cover areas beyond commerce and environmental risk.
Ms Taljaard (DP) suggested that the drafters could look at proposals made on privatised utilities in Britain. Although she was unsure what had become law she felt the proposed legislation would provide examples on how to deal with the private sphere.
Mr Jeffery (ANC) raised the issue of the private sphere covering a huge corporation yet also a single person and the problems this caused. Information officers are to be appointed by the head of a body yet this could be impossible. Would the eldest member of a family structure appoint information officers? Further a juristic person could be a one person CC and if you were entitled to information from them how would this be dealt with.
Mr Lever (DP) felt that information officers within the private sphere could not be legislated for as very different structures exist there. Rather certain people should be deemed responsible for certain things, including information, as outlined in the Companies Act.
Adv de Lange felt that exact details should not be legislated for as they are for the public sphere. Instead a duty should be created, in larger companies at least to ensure requests are dealt with by someone and not merely passed around.
Ms Chohan-Kota (ANC) agreed that a duty alone, placed on the head of a company, should be legislated for and how they imposed that duty was up to them. However if they failed to meet the duty they could be held to account in court.
Ms Camerer (NNP) felt that a duty to provide a structure allowing access should only apply if you were a company over a certain size.
Mr Smith felt that size would not be a key issue, rather the number of requests a company would face should dictate the provision of structures.
At this point Mr Durr interceded that he felt the committee was discussing issues that go beyond the scope of what had been published for public comment. If it was intended to legislate for section32(1)(b) of the Constitution in this way, public hearings must be heard again as the potential impact would be huge.
Adv de Lange was adamant that this was an irrelevant point. Ultimately Parliament is the legislator and Parliament must comply with the obligations stated in the Constitution. Section 32(1)(b) must be given effect to and it has not been in this Bill. Public conferences and workshops have been held on this and it is accepted that the Bill will go further than what is drafted. It must be remembered that this Bill was drafted on the basis of the interim constitution and that this draft was only brought out because of the public pressure to produce legislation on 32(1)(b). Further it must be noted that we are still accepting submissions.
Ms Jana requested further clarity on the definitions of natural and juristic persons. She was concerned that this must be clear so that liability and responsible could be laid out clearly in the legislation.
Mr Smith felt that in law there was a third category lying between natural and juristic person.
Adv de Lange stated that the definition on private bodies is clear. Section 32(1) is also clear on what is being dealt with, it refers to 'everyone' and simply to 'person' and therefore this covers all possible categories. We do not want to have to deal with the structural detail to be set up within companies: just identify where the public need to go and place a responsibility that some internal mechanism must exist. We will therefore draft a chapter with this in mind using the ideas included in OPD15, 15d and 64c and will discuss this draft in detail and vote on whether we want this in or not at a later date. Such a draft would also have to cover issues not recognised in the submissions such as fees.
Adv de Lange then steered the committee towards whether there should be a 'right to know' clause for private bodies. This would allow them to exclude information from the Act if they made it readily available.
Mr Jeffrey supported the inclusion of such a clause because many companies already make information available and access to it should bypass this legislation.
Ms Smuts however wondered if a 'right to know' clause was compatible with the private sphere considering they are not accountable in the way government is.
Adv de Lange stressed that a 'right to know' clause should be seen as a means to access information in an easy way and not merely as a means to ensure accountability.
The final issue was a concern raised by Mr Mashanglu (ANC) regarding whether people outside South Africa can use the rights set out in the Bill to obtain information.
Adv de Lange felt that it would be difficult to limit the access set out in the Bill but felt that the aim of the Bill was really to increase the accountability of government to citizens of this country. It seems the answer is therefore not obvious.
Mr Smith made reference to section 7(1) of the Bill of Rights, which applies to 'all people in our country'. This seems to suggests the rights regulated in this Bill are rights to be used by anyone within South Africa. However this would leave open the question of whether South African citizens abroad could have the access provided by the Bill.
Mr Jeffery raised the concern that people whose applications for residency had been refused and were outside South Africa would not be able to access the documents that explained why their applications had been refused.
Adv de Lange referred the matter to the drafters. They must consider whether it is viable to legislate for access by six billion people and whether the access is allowed for 'any right' enshrined anywhere in the world.
The meeting adjourned.
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