A summary of this committee meeting is not yet available.
JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
19 May 1998
DEFENCE REVIEW; BMATT REPORT: BRIEFING
Documents handed out :
Chapter Nine : Force Structure - Defence Review (amended) [Appendix 1]
BMATT report [Appendix 2]
Follow-up action to BMATT report) [Appendix 3]
Chief of Army's response to BMATT report [Appendix 4]
This meeting of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence had two items of importance on the agenda.
The committee was briefed on the amendments made to the Defence Review by two representatives / departmental officials that work on Defence Research Policy. Committee members asked numerous questions and also raised several areas of concern during the briefing. The two representatives gave their responses.
The committee was then briefed by the Chief of the Army - Lt General Otto and his delegation of representatives - Major General Van Zyl (Officer of the Western Cape Command), Major General Nkwebe (Officer of Eastern Command), Colonel Scheepers (PSO Chief of Army) and Colonel Slabbert (SSO Military Law). The briefing was on the BMATT report that was released in October 1997. This briefing considered the issues surrounding it and the SANDF response. Discussion and questions followed the second briefing.
Chapter Nine: Final Defence Review
The chairperson - Mr. Tony Yengeni opened the meeting by welcoming the two representatives from the Department of Defence's Research Policy. He also welcomed Mr. Roy Ainslie from the KwaZulu Natal Legislature.
The briefing then began with the two representatives going over the amendments that had been made to the Defence Review, vis-à-vis the comments that the JSCD had made the last time they had met.
The first amendment was to the last sentence in paragraph one of Chapter 9 - Force Structure. This was a direct result of the Committee's last meeting and comments on the Defence Review.
Paragraph 2 has also changed. Paragraph 3 is a new added insertion, regarding the Civil Control Over the Military. There is also an amendment - 2.3.2. - with regards Structural and Normative Control. This distinguishes the roles and the responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Chief of the Defence Force. It has been amended in terms of the transformation process. Now a part time adviser and the Chief of the Service Corps fall under the Chief of the Defence Force. This is specifically to indicate the responsibilities in the Department.
The next amendment is to the diagram on page 46, which had caused reservation amongst the Committee members. This was regarding the relationship between Armscor and the Minister and the Legislature.
The bottom of page 49, paragraph 41 there is another amendment. This being in the last two sentences. It is regarding base closure. This is now also referred to in the land and environment chapter too.
On page 51, paragraph 55, the last sentence has been added. This is regarding resources.
The end of the chapter, just before the appendix, on page 53, paragraph 59, there is a separate addition. This is regarding the relationship between the department, the legislature and the executive. Also included in this is the relationship of the Department and its oversight mechanisms in transformation.
The last amendment is to the appendix of the chapter.
Questions by committee members:
Mr Koornhof posed two questions to the Department. Firstly, as to the role that the Service Corps played in the Department; and secondly regarding that part of the chapter that deals with 'force design' as opposed to the term 'force structure'.
The Department responded to the first question by stating that the Service Corps will remain in the Department as a background for downsizing and an agency for reintegration. In response to the second question, the Department reiterated that the Force Design as approved of on the 20 August 1997 remains as the benchmark for activities in the future. With the financial allocations to Defence they attempt to meet the policy vision. The Force Design is valid and is tempered for the short term, remaining with the ration of 30% for capital, 40% for operating expenses and 40% for personnel.
Ms ZA Kota (ANC) asked whether the Service Corps would be a continuation of the status quo. The response by the Department was that the rationalisation process would take 3 years, initially a decision taken by the executive. It is an integrating structure and the increase in the Service Corps will occur in accordance with downsizing.
Mr Yengeni (ANC), then approached the topic of base closure. Particularly mentioning the examples of Nyanga and Kroonstad. He stated that he was worried that taking the military out of the townships was not addressed properly in the document. Regarding page 44, on structure, he raised concern over "Acquisition and Logistics".
The Department replied, by stating regarding base closure, that a capacity did exist to absorb units. That Service Corps units do exist. As of yet bases have not been closed. And there was the capacity to deal with rationalisation at present.
Mr. Yengeni, from the ANC, stated that the issue must come before parliament, although an issue should not be made surrounding this problem. Base closure must be accepted by the Department of Defence.
Mr. Loots suggested that bases be situated in areas where there are no major police stations.
The response by the D.O.D., regarding page 44 on "Acquisitions and Logistics", in response to Mr Yengeni was that it was a three stage process. Implementing the supply of forces, equipping the Defence Force and employment of the force. The Chief of Acquisitions Secretary was not extraneous to the Defence Force but worked with the Sec. Of Defence. In terms of logistics, the Chief of Logistics was not responsible to the Chief of the Defence Force. Interaction was however a level below.
Mr. Yengeni, of the ANC, once again brought up base closure. He stated that there should not be any discrimination to any community. There should also be 'sensitivity' reflected in the document in this area.
An NP committee member asked what was the relationship of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defence in relation to the Minister and the President;how Defence Intelligence was related to the Minister and the President and was there a safeguard in co-ordination between the two.
Mr J Mashimbye (ANC) asked as to whether the Office of the Chairperson of Armscor was located properly and whether the Department was experiencing problems as to adequate political authority for intervening in Armscor.
The Department replied that the reporting line between Armscor and the Minister was dealt with last time. It was also to be reported on in the White Paper on Defence Industry, which was coming up shortly for discussion. The Department stated the location and appropriateness of Armscor in the new force structure. Armscor was a member of the National Council of Defence. Major decisions of acquisition are taken there as well as through the National Arms Co-ordinating Committee.
Lt. General Otto briefed the committee on his response to the BMATT report. He stressed from the outset that he had not discussed this with the Minister or Deputy Minister of Defence. He also stated that the re-organisation of the army was a 60 000 - 64 000 strong integration process of a total of seven forces into one. This would inevitably create problems. Colonel Davis who wrote the BMATT Report (8-9 months ago) dealt with things in the past. However he did not respect the respective communication channels and had antagonised him. Lt. General Otto revealed that Colonel Davis had a personal vendetta against the Chief of the S.A. Army. Personnel had been taken from the personnel department to deal with this. In particular from GS 1.
When the report became known, the matters discussed within it were already being addressed. The Chief of the Army did not receive a copy of the report until after the Minister had read it himself. If the report had come before, issues could have been raised and problems dealt with. He also stated that at present the report was too long to discuss with the committee but that he had constructed a formal response to the Minister which is also enclosed in the copy of the BMATT report that has been handed out.
A new BMATT team and Commander has since been installed and they have adopted a new and better approach than the previous task team.
Lt. General Otto raised a number of issues. The first was 'integration' which had been happening since 1994. Transformation in the SANDF and the Army (which makes up 84% of that) was extremely difficult and intricate process which tended to cause doubt and fear.
The second issue he raised was 'rationalisation'. There was to be a loss of 26 000 over the next four years, especially in the short term services. The budget cuts since 1996, especially regarding manning and equipment, were also discussed,. This had a great impact on the Army in particular. They lost a great deal of expertise through the number of severance packages taken.
The third point that Lt. General Otto discussed was the management of the BMATT report. The last issue was just how the army has dealt with the BMATT report since October 1997.
Lt. General Otto stressed that what occurred once the report had been received was that the commanders were sensitised to what had been reported. GS1 was the first place that instructions and feedback were given out and where things began to happen.
Lt General stated that he had discussed the BMATT Report with the Commander of BMATT. He also stated that he had discussed the contents with his General Staff. He did however feel that the report was based on the perceptions of one person alone. Lt. Gen. Otto also discussed the BMATT report with the Chief of the Defence Force and with the Commander Cadre. This was as early as 23 / 25 October 1997. Two letters to the Minister through the Chief of the Defence Force were sent on what was being done. The Chief of the Army had also dealt with five further reports in the last nine months.
The chairperson, Mr T Yengeni (ANC) thanked the Lt General for his briefing, He stated that the Joint Standing Committee on Defence seeks to assist and contribute to the findings of the BMATT Report and in no way seeks to compound them.
Questions by committee members:
An ANC committee member requested clarification on the meaning of a 'one man report'. This is what the BMATT report had been named by the Chief of the Army. Lt General Otto stated that it was his feeling that Colonel Davis concentrated on specific points while others had not and these points seemed to emerge distinctively in the report.
Mr Yengeni asked the Lt General what exactly this 'feeling' and 'vendetta' was.
Lt General Otto then stated that Colonel Davis had claimed that the SA Army was the 'lowest grade' army that he had ever seen in the world.
Mr J Selfe (DP) wanted to know what happened when the Minister required answers and was then not satisfied. Lt General Otto stated that the right channel to go through was the Chief of the SANDF who could supply the answer and only answer according to the investigation.
Mr Yengeni then enquired as to the BMATT Report and the adequate time response for discussion between the Minister and the Army, which as of this time had not occurred. This now being 9 months since the report was issued. Lt Gen. Otto stated he could then make an appointment with the Minister and clear his mind of uncertainties. He claimed that letter writing did not work.
Mr H Loots (ANC) raised the issue of court martialling. Lt Gen Otto called on Colonel Slabbert from the Legal side of the army to address this area. Col. Slabbert stated that the SANDF was awaiting a new Military Disciplinary Code (MDC) He then gave an example of two cases and claimed that his intent was not to compare. The first case was regarding the assault of a senior officer, and the second was the case of mutiny or AWOL. The former was given a lighter sentence than the latter.
At this stage Mr Yengeni asked the delegation not to 'cloud issues with comparisons' Col. Slabbert did state that the sentence in the mutiny case was inappropriate. Lt General Otto stated that he had to abide by the law and the outcome of cases, he could not change the Review Boards decision. This was made at Defence Headquarters and not in the Army.
Mr Loots then claimed that these cases left the process of rewriting the Military Disciplinary Code open and susceptible. Mr Yengeni said that this must be sorted out within the Military Disciplinary Code. They must ensure that loopholes are closed. Justice must be dispensed in a fair way.
Mr Mashimbye (ANC) commented that they were discussing a report when the original author was not present and no longer in the country. He stated that the 'rumours and vendettas' could be true because they were substantiated by people of importance. Here the Minister and the Deputy Minister of Defence as well as the Deputy President himself.
Mr Mashimbye also raised the issue of General Matanzima and asked whether or not there was an enquiry.
Lt General Otto responded by commenting on the Staff Course in Ghana (which was the issue of contention regarding Gen Matanzima). He stated that the Staff Course in Ghana, which although did not work on the same cycles as that of the SANDF, did similar things. It was thus not unnecessary to have sent him.
Lt General Otto was again questioned regarding the supposed meeting between himself and the Minister concerning the BMATT Report. Lt General Otto reiterated that they had had a tentative date but that the meeting had been cancelled but he would make a concerted effort. Relations now with BMATT were excellent and the present team accepts the chains of command.
Mr Yengeni wanted to know why the report had been available for nine months and there still had been no consultation with the Minister. Lt General Otto stressed that it had been in the hands of the Chief of the SANDF. Also that there was absolutely no 'uneasy' feeling between the two.
Mr Roy Ainslie, from the KwaZulu Natal legislature, wanted to know whether the court martials (which totalled to 4000) had been exaggerated. Lt General Otto stated that the legal status was analysed frequently. Lt General Otto claimed that the information was available and could be given to the committee members. Project 'Juggernaut' had also been implemented to address areas such as military culture and military discipline.
Mr Yengeni asked the Lt General for his personal opinion on the sentence passed in a specific case. Lt Gen Otto replied that he was completely against the outcome and the punishment was too light.
Ms Z Kota (ANC) questioned the delegation on the bridging course, Lt General Otto responded by saying that some of the integrating courses were not worth the money that was being spent. Directly concerned with this is the Council For Defence. He had informed the Minister who suggested exposing them to certain workshops before they went on staff courses. BMATT was also asked for their advice in this area.
Mr Yengeni also brought up the issue of court martialling, stating that the committee would show a vested interest in this area. Regarding the BMATT report and its consequences Mr Yengeni said he knew there were problems and the committee was there to seek positive solutions to these. He then thanked General Otto and his delegation for attending the meeting.
Mr Yengeni then notified the committee of the meeting on the Military Disciplinary Code happening at the South African Cultural Museum on Wednesday 20th May.
Appendix 1: Chapter Nine : Force Structure - Defence Review (amended)
Force Structure: Chapter 9 of Defence Review (as amended 5/5/98)
PROPOSED CHANGES TO CHAPTER NINE (FORCE STRUCTURE) OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW AS RECOMMENDED BY THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE ON 5 MAY 1998.
1. On the 5 May 1998 a team from the Department of Defence (DOD) briefed the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) on the proposed changes to the organization of the DoD in the forthcoming years. The JSCD recommend certain changes to the Force Structure Chapter (Chapter Nine) of the Defence Review. These changes are of a stylistic and not substantive nature and are outlined below.
2. The changes proposed are illustrated in italics below within the context of the original paragraphs as numbered
a. Paragraph 1: The transformation of the Department of Defence (DoD) takes place against the broader backdrop of the transformation process in South Africa generally. The post-1994 period has ushered in a series of challenges for South Africans which require a fundamental transformation of economic relations, political structures, and culture and values of South African society. This is reflected in key government policy documents including the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy, the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and the Defence White Paper. It is also reflected in the fact that the posture of the country has changed from that of an aggressive stance - as reflected in the doctrine of "Offensive Defence -to wards the region to a posture of co-operative and confidence-building defence.
b. Paragraph 2: Although the transformation of the organization and structures of the DoD is an important process with which the DoD is currently underway, structural transformation constitutes part of a much broader process of transformation within the DoD generally. The transformation of the DoD covers four major areas.
2.1 Civil-Military Relations: This entails transforming the relationships between the armed forces the defence function and its constitutional and legal status. The two critical areas of civil-military relations transformation cover the following.
a. Constitutional and Legal Transformation. This refers to the reorientation of the defence function in light of new constitutional and legal realities. The Constitution outlines the political channels of accountability governing the DoD, the functions of defence, its organizational outline and its composition. The institution of a new Constitution has required a corresponding revision of the Defence Act, the creation of appropriate Codes of Conduct and the internalization of these values in the education and training culture of the DoD. The key constitutional principles upon which the defence function is based are outlined in the Constitution. The key legal principles and laws governing the defence function are in the process of being revised - the process of which is outlined in the Legal Environment chapter of this Review.
b. Oversight Mechanisms. A key feature of democratic civil-military relations is the inviolability of the principle of civil control over the armed forces. This is reflected in the primacy afforded to parliament in approving the finances for the armed forces. the legislation governing the activities of the armed forces, and the approval of the policy framework within which the armed forces will function. To ensure that effective civil control is maintained over the armed forces, and that the activities of the armed forces are harmonized with broader government policy, a range of additional mechanisms are instituted to ensure robust and effective civil-military relations. These include the following:
i. Legislation passed by parliament which determines the defence mandate of the Department of Defence.
ii. The creation of Parliamentary Committees responsible for the oversight of the defence function. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the defence committees in the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces fulfill this function.
iii. The Parliamentary Committees of Finance and Public Accounts which has the authority to summon any public account holder with concerning their expenditure of funds.
iv. The Auditor General and his staff who report directly to parliament on the handling of finances by the Department of Defence.
v. The creation of a Ministry of Defence responsible for ensuring political control over the DoD and ensuring that the activities of the DoD are consistent with government policy.
vi. The creation of a largely civilian Defence Secretariat responsible for formulating policies, programmes and budgets and controlling the execution of the mandate of the National Defence Force.
vii. The creation of additional mechanisms to ensure that the activities of the DoD are consistent with the letter and the spirit of the new democracy - the role of the Public Protector and the Military Ombuds for example.
2.2 Normative and Cultural Transformation. This refers to the transformation of the culture of the DoD in relation to its values, traditions, human resource practices and managerial practices. Cultural transformation, therefore, refers to a wide range of activities reflected in a diversity of policy and programmes within the DoD including the following:
2.3.1 The institution of equal opportunity and affirmative action programmes within the DoD. This will ensure that the DoD will be broadly representative of South Africa's demographic composition. These programmes are reflected in the Human Resources and Part Time Forces chapters in this Defence Review.
2.3.2 The transformation of the traditions of both the full-time and part-time components of the DoD. This will ensure that the emerging South African military culture will be reflective of the diverse military traditions within South African society. It is significant to note that a DoD Committee has been established to oversee the transformation of the traditions of the new Department of Defence.
2.3.3 The creation of a military professional ethic which is consistent with the moral imperatives of the new political dispensation and accords with the ethical obligations of a soldier functioning in a democracy. This is reflected in the current Civic Education Programme within the DoD.
2.3.4 The transformation of the management practices of the DoD to ensure that such practices are normatively and practically consistent with the ethos of a new democracy. This is reflected in the design and institution of a Civic Education Programme within the DoD and the design of new Leadership, Command, Administrative and Management practices for use within the DoD.
2.4 Organizational Restructuring. Organizational restructuring refers to the rationalisation and right-sizing of the DoD so as to ensure the more efficient and effective utilisation of state resources This entails a range of measures including the disbanding of units, demobilisation and rationalisation of defence personnel, elimination of wasteful practices, eliminating the duplication of services, and the more efficient co-location of military bases and units. This component of transformation is addressed in greater detail in this chapter.
c. Paragraph 3: CIVIL CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY.
The following new paragraph is inserted:
Armed forces play an important role as an instrument of state policy in contributing towards the realization of the goals of our new democracy. The armed forces, however, like all government departments, and particularly in light of their coercive powers, must remain subordinate to elected government and respectful of the principle of civil supremacy. This is done through the institution of appropriate oversight and control mechanisms as both a parliamentary and executive level and via programmes within the armed forces such as highlighting the need for military professionalism and the inculcation amongst members of the armed forces respect for civil control through training programmes
d. Paragraph 17: Diagram 2 for this paragraph has been altered slightly so as to represent the latest changes in the proposed organizational features of the DoD.
e. Paragraph 31: (Diagram 3: DoD organisational levels.) This diagram has been altered to reflect the relationship of both the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Defence to the oversight and control mechanisms of both the executive and the legislature.
f. Paragraph 41: Units attached to a base are concentrated at that base as far as possible although some satellites may exist. Studies indicate that optimal economies of scale will be achieved with approximately 26 bases covering South Africa. A list of these proposed bases is shown in Table 2 while Map 1 indicates their location. Final decisions on these and the closure of the other bases are still to be taken after more detailed evaluation and consultation. It is important to note that base closure is a process that affects that careers and livelihoods of not only military personnel but also communities within which bases are located. Detailed guidelines governing the process of base closure and the consultations requires to ensure that this is conducted in a free and fair manner are contained in the Land and Environment chapter of the Defence Review.
g. Paragraph 55: A policy of focusing on core business and out sourcing of non-core functions will be followed in line with international practices in improving efficiency in armed forces and the significant achievements in public and private enterprises. Areas within which out sourcing can be done include the logistics arena (vehicle main ten ance1 catering etc) and aspects of administrative and financial services for example
h. Paragraph 60: Ongoing monitoring of Transformation, both in its broader sense and in relationship to organizational restructuring1 will be a key factor in ensuring its success. This will be effected outside the DoD via such structures as the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, Parliament and Cabinet.
3. The chapter now completed will be presented to Cabinet on the 13 May 1998
Appendix 2: BMATT Report
BMATT (SA) REPORT ON SANDF INTEGRATION AS AT 1 OCT 97 FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY INTEGRATION OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
Since BMATT's last report to The Parliamentary Integration Oversight Committee on the 8 Apr it would seem that integration has moved down in the SANDF's order of priorities as possibly more pressing issues have come to the fore. The SANDF's Defence Review held centre stage as it moved towards public acceptance and Parliamentary approval. Running concurrently with the Defence Review has been the SANDF's transformation process. Over 10 "re-engineering" teams have been formed and are now working full time on determining the detailed size and shape of the SANDF post - 2000. In addition the Council on Defence and Chiefs of the Arms of Service have been concentrating on ways and means of finding the unexpected R 700 M cut from this year's budget. Furthermore we have learned that the SAN DF has formed a team of senior officers. most of whom are recent Iv retired. who have redrafted the SANDF's TRC submission.
2. Regrettably the delegation of interest seems to have coincided with a marked change in attitude towards integration.1 On reflection BMATT believes that this hardening of attitudes towards ex Non Statutory Force (NSF) integratees mostly seen in the South African Army (SAA) and South Africa Medical Service (SAMS) can be traced back to the first quarter of the year. There have been many niggly incidents which have involved BMATT and are highlighted elsewhere in this report. I have elaborated on the repercussions of these attitudes and perceptions at paragraph 18.
3. Despite these developments the processes of integration. demobilisation and voluntary rationalisation have continued despite some disputes which have increased in number during this period. Now that the final mass intakes have been assembled and processed the focus has switched to Bridging Training (BT) and appointments. Phase 3 Demobilisation is well underway though it has been plagued by dishonest applicants.
ASSEMBLY AREA ACTIVITY
4. Assembly and induction of ex MK and APLA members continued at Wallmannstal Assembly Area (WAA) until Mon 30 Jun 97 when the final mass intake (\VAA 17) completed the process and moved to BT units. Subsequently WAA has been dismantled and a small residual Assembly Area (AA) staff has been redeployed to the Personnel Services School (P55 AA) at Voortekkerhooghte in Pretoria. The P55 AA is likely to remain open until 31 Mar 98 and will process any late integratees in small intakes of up to 100 personnel. NIK and APLA intake forecasts have been inaccurate but the current expectation is that 2 - 3 small intakes may be required to finalise induction. For example we understand that approximately 200 ex NSF members are awaiting entry into the South African Medical Service (SANAS).
5. WAA 16 intake produced 880 ex NSF members of which 863 were processed and 745 reported for WAA 17 of which 710 were inducted. Thus over 1600 new integratees (30% of whom are females) have entered the SANDF in the first half of 1997: they are likely to complete their BT by Dec 98. In overall terms MK have assembled 19.618 out of a Certified Personnel Register (CPR) total of 33.023 (le 59%) leaving 13.405 of their CPR members (41%) still unaccounted. The amendment to the Constitution. which now makes provision for APLA members to demobilise. has resulted in the assembly and processing of 6.884 ex APLA members from a CPR total of 9.809 (ie 70%) leaving 2.925 registered members outstanding (30%). To date over 26.503 ex NSF have been assembled from a combined CPR of 42.832 (62%) but only 16.635 ex NSF (39%) are actually in SANDF service due to demobilisation and wastage. The assembly of the KZSPF has continued and 1984 ex KZSPF members are now under training leaving a shortfall of 16 from their 2000 allocated "incorporation" vacancies. The assembly of KZSPF has now ceased thus this shortfall will remain.
6. The AAs have operated very smoothly, fairly and efficiently and there have been no disputes of any consequence during recent Placement Boards, with one exception which is presently being staffed. However a major dispute has arisen on the implementation of APLA Placement Board Appeals which although eventually resolved, but not before much nastiness was dispensed. BMATT's manpower coverage of induction has been adequate for the task although we have been stretched on occasion by the larger numbers electing to join the South African Air Force (SAAF) and South African Navy (SAN).
7. Overall BT has progressed satisfactorily with one exception which I deal with at paragraph 10. BMATT's contention that the control over the management of BT could be better was accepted in Apr 97 since when action has been taken to improve the situation. The Integration Committee (IC) and Integration Work Group (IWG) have taken steps to monitor BT progress much more closely though there is still some way to go. The initiative should help the SANDF's top level Management, Ministers and the Parliamentary Integration Oversight Committee (PIOC) with factual and timely BT progress reports.
8. The broad areas of dispute on training standards. curricula and language have for the most part receded. BT of ex NSF and KZSPP Other Ranks and Junior Leaders has progressed without significant disruption. However, disputes on pay. allowances and service conditions have continued. These disputes mostly in the SAA have been created by misunderstanding, poor communication and a continuing distrust of the Chain of Command which is perceived by ex NSF integratees to be predominantly ex SADF. Consequently BMATT members have been called upon to help resolve personnel matters at the work place. Meanwhile Senior Leader/Officers BT has progressed steadily. Although BMATT has validated all BT courses. there is a growing body of opinion that the SANDF's, and particularly the SAA's, officer training regime needs to be overhauled as it is outdated and out of step with modem international training syllabi. BMAWF sympathises with this view but has advised that the SANDF's training regime should be reviewed and updated on completion of BT and not during integration which would cause further disruption to the integration process.
9. Members of TBVC Homeland Forces. who had undergone career course training under SADF supervision. have now had this training accredited which is welcomed. However it was agreed by all parties that in some cases ex TBVC members would have to complete specific training modules apposite to South Africa, in order to receive full SANDF accreditation. These developments have relieved the SANDF of an unnecessary training burden. BMATT has continued to press for ex NSF personnel to be accredited with internationally accepted course training and this was achieved in May 97. Since then a series of representative Accreditation Boards have sat to determine the acceptability of individual applications for course accreditation. This policy which was part of the original Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC) agreements. has created a series of minor disputes on the precise application of the rules governing accreditation. These disputes are being properly and sensibility managed by the IC and I\VG and a consensus on the process should be obtained shortly. The aim of reducing the BT load on the SANDF is being met and the SANDF's policy of accrediting overseas training where applicable with contribute to clearing the backlog of Officer BT.
10. Rather worryingly the SAA has produced a list of 1066 integratees who have yet to start Phase 1 BT. the reason they have given as lack of funds, a figure of R 9.5 M has been quoted. We are concerned about how these integratees are presently being employed: there is not much they can usefully do before completing their initial training.
11. Through careful deployment of our dwindling manpower resources BMATT has managed to fulfil our charter' tasks in respect of BT. Despite the additional 1600 ex NSF integratees from WAA 16 and 17 intakes who are awaiting BT courses, we anticipate that our projected manning levels will cover this task adequately until Dec 1998 by which time the bulk of BT should have been completed.
12. BMATT was co-opted on to the Cabinet appointed Demobilisation Committee in Apr97. This has allowed us to continue our monitoring of demobilisation and in particular Phase 3 Demobilisation which was becoming a contentious issue. On joining the Committee it became clear that there were problems. The new regulations governing demobilisation prompted a rush of demobilisation applications by a wide range of personnel. It is also clear that senior MK officers now serving in the SANDF have been placed under considerable pressure to produce documentation to verify applicants membership of MK. These officers have resisted blatantly dishonest applications of which there have been many. However. overall the Demobilisation Committee has fulfilled its mandate to date in a transparent and equitable manner and has rejected many false applications plus attempts to manipulate ex NSF reckonable service thereby obtaining higher payment categories. The overall exercise has been an education for us all.
13. To date (1 Oct) 5,923 ex NSF members have demobilised which represents 14% of the total CPR. Demobilisation has accounted for 4.688 ex MK members and 1.235 ex APLA members representing 13% of both their respective CPR membership. Another 1.000 or so applicants are being processed under Phase 3 Demobilisation: the closing date for further applications is 18 Feb 98. R132M has been paid out on demobilisation benefits so far. We anticipate that demobilisation applications will decline sharply in the next few months although negotiations are still in hand to determine eligibility rights for specific ex NSF groups such as prisoners under sentence and widows of ex MK members who have died since 1994.
14. Our task of monitoring SANDF rationalisation has been limited during this period as the Personnel Rationalisation Work Group (PRWG). of which BMATT is a member, has suspended its meetings temporarily. This was anticipated as the PRWG is waiting Parliament's acceptance of the Defence Review and guidance from the Transformation Coordination Team before recommencing its work on SANDF rationalisation. Definition of the SANDF's manpower requirements and targets is taking longer than expected. However, work on the SANDF's detailed transformation has become slowed down by "re-engineering processes ". Taking all actions into account we can expect our rationalisation monitoring work to accelerate from early 1998.
15. Ex Statutory Force (SF) manning strengths have continued to decline through the Public Service's Voluntary Severance Package (VSP) which remains open to volunteers until further notice. So far over 13.000 ex NSF members have applied for the VSP of which 10.000 have been accepted and 3.000 rejected on the grounds of exigencies of the Service tie the applicants are in critical posts or operational manning requirements). It is noteworthy that over 1.400 TBVC members have opted for the VSP which represents 13% of the original strength. Despite the Government's intention to create headroom for affirmative action appointments. BMATT has cautioned Ministers on the dangers of allowing the SANDF to lose unacceptably high levels of experienced, skilled and highly qualified ex SADF personnel which could endanger operational effectiveness and a balanced, representative Force.
16. Integration of Former Statutory Force (IFSF). The process of formally integrating the Former Statutory Forces, which encompasses ex SADF and ex TBVC Forces. has finally been agreed and has started. albeit somewhat hesitantly. in essence the process has nominated representative teams led by ex NSF senior officers to scrutinise and verify the personnel records of all Former Statutory Forces. Should the Verification Teams discover any inconsistencies they will report these along with recommendations on remedial action to the Council on Defence (COD). In addition an appeal mechanism has been put in place. The DHQ Headquarters Team headed by Lt Gen Mobi, has delegated responsibility to his Arms of Service Team Leaders who are now embarking upon this process which is unlikely to be completed until well into the New Year. This undertaking was initiated by the Minister of Defence in Parliament in Jun 96. BMATT has helped to "kick" start the process and helped in obtaining consensus on the methodology to be adopted. However, progress to date has been very slow.
17. Equal Opportunities Directorate.
We are very encouraged by the establishment and subsequent development of the new Equal Opportunities Directorate (EO Dir) at DHQ.
Clearly we have a direct interest in the EO Dir as we will pass the torch of fair play to this Directorate and the Inspector General's department which will monitor Equal Opportunities (EO) issues on the ground. Although the EO Dir has only been in existence since Jan 97
much progress has been achieved in drafting the SANDF's new policy on EO which is due to be published soon Amendments to the complaints procedure (a problem area) are in hand. One of our female BMATT officers, who is the BMATT EO and Gender issues representative, has given some advice to SAN DF EO/Gender symposiums and the like and we think created much good wiII within BT units.
I8. Changing Attitudes Towards lntegration. We have formed a clear impression that the attitudes of some top level management in the SAA and SAMS has hardened noticeably towards ex NSF inte2ration since our last report. Since then we have had to raise 'yellow cards' and a 'red card' on a number of integration issues where we have identified foul play. Yellow cards' have been raised on APLA Placement Board Appeals (now resolved). The Special Course for former NSF Senior Officers (in the process of being resolved), The Army's postponement of Phase 1 BT (not yet resolved) and others. A 'red card' has been raised after SANIS refused to accept BMATT adjudication on 2 officers at Placement Boards on 16 and 17 Jul. This was unprecedented and has caused much acrimony. On 1 Oct the Chairman of the IC has stated that if SAMS still wanted to overturn the adjudications that they should refer the matter back to the original Placement Board. Since the beginning of the year we have noted that there are an increasing number of ex NSF personnel who are now joined by a number of ex SADF officers who feel that the former NSF members are not being fairly treated. After nearly 3 1/2 years of integration no one. including ourselves. can help but notice little in the physical structure of Army training institutions to show any ex NSF ownership. Very few room names, street names, flags, symbols, pictures or traditions come from the NSF. Thus. many of the ex NSF firmly feel they are being absorbed rather than integrated. The implication of this are far reaching.
19. BMATT SA Manning. We have provided an adjusted manning forecast to MOD London to determine our requirements to meet the Integration and Rationalisation tasks up to 1999. The forecast takes account of the need td provide 4 additional Roulement personnel for Roulements 7 and 8 (Jan 98 - Jan 99) to support the final intakes of former Non Statutory' Forces recently processed through Wallmannstal Assembly Area. The Change of Command arrangements for BMATT have been approved which will achieve adequate continuity and levels of experience for BMATT to fulfil its role.
20. Despite the increase in tensions and the volume of niggly disputes we believe that with good will integration can be kept on course. We are hopeful that induction at the PSS AA will be completed by the end of Mar 98. The IC's efforts to encourage the SANDF to put in place an accurate BT tracking system should bear fruit shortly which could reveal BT delays in some Corns taking BT into 1999. Given the long delays to ex SF verification we believe that this process will continue well into the New Year.
21. Since Demobilisation is governed by an act of Parliament applications for Phase 3 Demobilisation will not be accepted after 18 Feb 98 and that the process will be completed by 31 Mar98. Meanwhile, we are hopeful that the SANDF's 're-engineering' teams will produce a new and well defined structure for the SANDF's manpower planning targets for 2000 and beyond. This is likely to trigger an acceleration in BMAWF1s rationalisation monitoring task in 1998.
22. As the international monitors of SA&IDF it is tempting for BMATT to become totally immersed on integration matters and oblivious to enormous chance occurring elsewhere within the SANDF. As much momentum has moved to other areas it would seem that integration has become a lower SANDF priority. Firm leadership is required to stem the present trend and to put the whole process firmly back on course.
Appendix 3: Follow up to BMATT Report
British Military Advisory and Training Team
Private Bag X 159
Republic of South Africa
Tel: (012) 355 5030 Fax: (012) 355 5037
Lieutenant General R Otto, SD, SM, MMM
Chief of the South African Army
Private Bag X 172
Republic of South Africa 18 November 1997
FOLLOW UP ACTION TO BMATT REPORT ON INTEGRATION AS AT 1OCTOBER 1997 FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY INTEGRATION OVERSIGHT
1. Background. It is against my better judgement, and I believe not wholly in the interest of integration, that I submit to your request (made on the telephone at 1015 hrs on Wed 12 Nov 97) for further information concerning the recent BMATT PIOC report. I had hoped to brief you in the way traditionally adopted for Ministers and Chief SANDF which consisted of a verbal briefing. You have rejected this. Furthermore you have asked me to be precise and give you all the facts, stating occurrences, names and dates. I attach this information at Annex A but feel that I must make two directly relevant further points in the covering letter.
2. BMATT's MOU. I wish to reiterate what is clearly stated in our MOU less there be any mis-understanding. Some particularly relevant paragraphs read as follows:
a. Para 6d - Assist when requested in the evaluation of competencies and qualifications of individuals;
b. Para 6e - Advise when requested on the type of bridging and orientation training and any other training assistance required;
c. Pare 6f - Observe and monitor bridging training, providing advice and reports if unfairness in the application of training is detected; reports should include proposed course of action to correct the problem(s) detected;
If adhering to the requirements of the MOU involves us questioning the competence of certain officers involved in the integration process, so be it.
3. PIOC Report - Inquiry. You also told me on the telephone that you intend to carry out a full inquiry, once I have furnished you with the details that you requested. Earlier this year a similar exercise was done by the Army Inspector General (IG). While carrying out his investigation he did not, at any time approach the source of the information: the Comd or DComd of BMATT. The IG produced a report which contained a number of factual errors and some mis-perceptions which Brigadier C H Elliott brought to your attention in writing. While carrying out the inquiry the IG met a BMATT officer in the OFS Command. The outcome of this meeting was a letter of complaint from the BMATT officer. Brigadier C H Elliott did not act upon this complaint then in the interests of integration but, as you want all the facts, I now enclose the letter at Flag 0. I sincerely hope that if there is to be another investigation, that the investigating officer follows normal internationally recognised norms, and during his inquiry questions the source of the criticism, which in this case is Comd BMATT.
A. Follow Up Action to BMATT Report on Integration As At 1 October 1997 for the Parliamentary Integration Oversight Committee (PIOC).
Minister of Defence
Secretary for Defence
FOLLOW UP ACTION TO BMATT REPORT ON INTEGRATION AS AT 1 OCTOBER 1997 FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY INTEGRATION OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE (PIOC)
1 "Since BMATT's last report... it would seem that integration has moved down in the SANDF's order of priorities as possibly more pressing issues have come to the fore."
1. Communication between C Army and BMATT Army. Earlier this year C Army changed his policy and dis-allowed Comd BMATT Army direct access to him and also turned down BMATT's offer of regular (quarterly) BMATT briefings at his weekly General Staff (GS) Meetings. I think that we all agree that communication worked well in 1994, 1995 and 1996 (see for example, a letter of appreciation to BMATT from Major General C J Serfontein, writing on behalf C Army's, which is attached at Flag A). All other BMATT Service Comds have direct access to their respective Service Chiefs, which has worked both efficiently and effectively.
2. Non Attendance. Members of Committee not attending
Integration/Verification Meetings or having to provide their 21C's since Jun 97.
a. IC -1 Oct, 27Aug & 25 Jun.
b. IWG -l2Nov, l5 Oct, 3Sep, 2OAug, 13 Aug, l8Jun & 11 Jun.
c. Verification - 17 Nov, 10 Nov, 28 Oct, 14 Oct & 6 Oct.
3. Dir Trg Dept. No ex SADF one star. Brig Shoke has had to do BT courses this year and therefore has been unavailable some of the time. Despite his sincere efforts and outstanding performance his understandable lack of experience does not help. This exact point was raised by Brig CH Elliott with C Army on 14 Mar 97. This most important position surely needs someone who has had at least 25 years of experience of rules and procedures presently used. Brig Rheeder personally sorted out 50% of Army Integration problems, mostly with colleagues on the telephone. It would be a travesty of justice if Brig Shoke was blamed for present problems. Our recommended course of action is for one of the best Ex SADF Brigs to be immediately placed along side Brig Shoke.
Reasons: para 2 of Flag B
para 2 of Flag C
2 "Regrettably the delegation of interest seems to have coincided with a marked change in attitude towards integration. .....this hardening of attitudes towards ex Non Statutory Forces (NSF) integratees..."
1. May 97 - 4 SAl. 187 integratees court martialled and dismissed (all dealt with the same despite differing ranks, military records and roles in the incident). There have been many similar incidents since 1994 but none of them were dealt with in this unprecedented manner. The discussions has led to the questioning of the representivity at Courts Martial.
a. BMATT Report - 3 Jun - 7 Jul para 13
b. IWG- 15 Oct para 3130
c. IWG-8Oct para 3O78
d. IWG - 10 Sep para 3021
e. IWG-3Sep para2955
f. IWG - 20 Aug para 2911
g. IWG - 13 Aug para 2883
h. IWG - 23 Jul para 2782
i. IWG - 16 Jul para 2730
j. IWG - 7 Jul para 2674 - 2678
k. IWG - 18 Jun para 2671
m.IWG - 11 Jun para 2635
n. IC - 25 Jun para 54 - 58
2. Tear Gas Incident OFS Comd - Compare example 1 with the outcome this nasty incident. Why were those responsible not dismissed? See:
a. IWG - 18 Jun para 2672
b. IWG - 11 Jun para 2636
3. Postponement of Phase l BT. This was unprecedented and has not happened since integration started. What can soldiers usefully do if they are untrained? I am glad to see good sense has prevailed and training started again in Nov 97, after an unacceptable stoppage for 6 months.
a. BMATT Report - 31 Jul - 30 Aug para 2 - 4.
4. APLA Appeal Boards - The unnecessary nastiness caused by this is well documentated below:
a. IWG - 8 Oct para 309l
b. IWG - 20 Aug para 2925
c. IWG - 6 Aug para 2836-2846
5. Ex NSF Service Certificates - This concerned the loss of Ex NSF Service Certificates. When new ones were asked for and produced the old ones were suddenly found. Then both were compared and if the reckonable service dates were different criticism was directed at Ex NSF. Much unnecessary acrimony was caused by this. See:
a. IWG - 20 Aug 97 para 2923
b. IWG - 13 Aug 97 para 2880
c. IWG - 6 Aug para 2825 - 2832
6. Senior Officer Workshop. An integration matter that was not dealt with through Integration Channels for 5 months. BMATT not asked to verify course syllabi as laid down by JMCC and not initially asked to help resolve the depute, despite monitoring the course weekly, until V Adm K Loedolff convened a meeting in Oct 97. Dep Mm had asked for BMATT'~ view in writing which was forwarded to him by Brig Elliott on 1 Aug 97. Letter is attached at Flag D. You will see from this letter that Brig C H Elliott did not think that the Army's initial solution was fair. The matter remains unresolved. See:
a. BMATT Report - 17 Mar - 23 Apr para 5
b. IWG - 23 Jul para 2774
c. IWG- l6 Jun para 27l7
7. Deliberate Alteration of Minutes. The Minutes of the first Army Accreditation Board on 21 Jun 97 were deliberately changed thus misrepresenting Board Members. By any standards this is unacceptable and inevitably resulted in unwarranted disputes and a reduction of mutual trust and respect by integration parties. See Flag E. We are still awaiting a reply to Brig C H Elliott's letter of 29 Apr 97.
8. Communication Between C Army and BMATT Army. See Serial 1(c) above.
3a "We have formed a clear impression that the attitudes of some top-level management in the SAA..., has hardened noticeably. ... notice that little in the physical structure of Army training institutions to show any ex NSF ownership. ... The implications are far reaching.
See para 2 (c) of this Annex, examples 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7.
The SA Navy has changed the names of some of its ships. However, in the SAA very few room names, street names within barracks, flags, symbols, pictures or traditions that come from NSF are evident. Thus many Ex NSF feel they are being absorbed rather than integrated.
3b "the process of integration, demobilization and voluntary rationalisation have continued despite some disputes which have increased in number during this period."
The disputes are those outlined in para 2(c) of this Annex.
4 "The PSS AA is likely to remain open... intake forecasts have been inaccurate but current expectation is that 2 - 3 small intakes mat be required..."
Members of IC, 1\VG and Army Integration Committee have recognised and discussed this issue at length. SAMS inducted some 200 new integratees on 3 Nov 97. All involved are awaiting new intakes at P55 A? originally scheduled for end of this year. Intake forecasts, compiled by Ex NSF officers on a regional basis have invariably, since Jun 94 been inaccurate.
a. IWG - 6 Aug para 2818
b. IWG - 23 Jul para 2738
C. IC - 27 Aug para 35
5 "However, disputes over pay, allowances and service conditions have continued.... mostly in the SAA have been created by misunderstanding, poor communication and a continuing distrust of the Chain of Command which is perceived by Ex NSF integratees to be predominately Ex SADE."
Hardly an Army BMATT Report has been written that does not highlight pay problems since we arrived in Jun 94. In all First World Armies pay problems are a Chain of Command responsibility. Why are there so many problems being highlighted by BMATT and not the Chain of Command?
See all BMATT Reports this year as follows:
a. 10 Sep - 24 Oct para 4 (271 students at 3 SAl whose salaries are in
b. 22 Aug - 6 Sep - para 1.
c. 31 Jul - 30 Aug - para 9, 12, 16 & 20.
d. 3 Jun - 7 Jul para 10 & 13 (some with no pay for 8 months).
e. 17 Mar - 23 Apr para 13 & 20.
f. 25 Feb - 16 Mar para 14 & 15.
g. 27Jan-24 Feb para9& 10.
6 "... growing body of opinion...particularly the SAA's, officer training regime needs to be overhauled as it is outdated and out of step with modern international training syllabi. BMATT sympathises with this view...
We are not saying that your courses are worse or better than other First World Armies. We are not saying that the standards are different. What we are saying is that, for example, there is no Senior Army Staff Course in First World Armies that resembles yours in syllabus or rank attendance. I enclose Lt Col Falkner's Officer Training report, at Flag F, which he has discussed at length with your Army College personnel.
7 "The process of formally integrating the Former Statutory Forces ... has started, albeit somewhat hesitantly. However, progress to date has been very slow."
As I state at para 16 of Flag C, progress in all 4 services has been very slow. The service Verification Board Meeting chaired by Lt Gen Molbi was cancelled again on 10 Nov because of a lack of attendees. Anyone involved in the process knows how difficult and slow it has been.
8 "... it would seem that integration has become a lower SANDF priority."
Because of all that is written in serials 1 - 7 and in the covering letter.
When asked who we think are responsible for the above problems we are under remit to evaluate competencies and qualifications of individuals (MOU para 6d) and thus state our opinion. If pressed further we are under remit to propose courses of action to correct the problems detected (MOU para 6f).
Appendix 4: Chief of Army's response to the BMATT report
Enquiries: Lt. General R Otto
Chief of the Army
4 December 1997
Mr J Modise
Minister of Defence
COMMENT ON BMATT REPORT ON SANDF INTEGRATION AS AT 6 OCTOBER 1997 FOR THE PIOC
Reference A: BMATT SA/450 dd 7 Oct 97
A: Summary: SA Army Command Cadre Feedback
B: Bridging Training 1997
C: Total Bridging Training: SA Army 15 Nov 97
D: Total Corns Training: SA Army 15 Nov 97
1. This headquarters received a copy of the BMATT report, Reference A, on integration as at 6 October 1997 from the Chief of Personnel which is a follow up of the previous report dated 8 April 1997.
2. Your instructions, emanating from the above report and our discussions on 26 November 1997, refer.
3. The report was forwarded directly to the office of the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence as well as the PIOC without affording the SA Army any input or prior discussion of aspects raised. The SA Army however discussed the report during the command cadre conference held on 15 October 1997. The report was also circulated in the command cadre as well as to the Director Integration at this HQ.
4. At my request the BMATT commander clarified specific aspects by supplying me with examples. These examples are cited with the specific aspects in the following paragraphs.
COMMENT ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS RAISED IN THE REPORT
5. Par 1. ".... it would seem that integration has moved down in the SANDF's order of priorities as possibly more pressing issues have come to the fore ".
Examples: "Communication between C Army and BMATT Army. Earlier this year C Army changed his policy and dis-allowed Comd BMATT Army direct access to him and also turned down BMATT's offer of regular (quarterly) BMATT briefings at his weekly General Staff (GS) Meetings. I think that we all agree that communication worked well in 1994, 1995 and 1996 (see for example, a letter of appreciation to BMATT from Major General C J Serfontein, writing on behalf C Army's, which is attached at Flag A). All other BMATT Service Comds have direct access to their respective Service Chiefs, which has worked both efficiently and effectively."
Background. Col Paul Davis, BMATT, made certain allegations in a briefing to Dep C Army Maj Gen J. Coetzer on 21 Feb 97, C Army instructed IG (Army) Maj Gen. A. van Graan to conduct an investigation. The aim of the investigation was "to investigate the allegations made by Col P. Davis, BMATT, in a briefing made to Dep C Army on 21 Feb 97.
ii IG (Army) Report. During the GS meeting of 17 Mar97, 10 (Army) gave feedback on 10 Investigation 18/97 conducted by Ma5 Gen A. van Graan, Maj Gen M.J. Tshali, Col B.B. Mabandla and Col H.D. du Plessis. The findings and recommendations of the investigation team were:
(1) Findings with Regard to Communication with BMATT:
(a) BMATT did not brief the CS directly. The OS was briefed by Director Integration, Brig S.Z. Shoke, on a two weekly basis and presently on a monthly basis on all integration matters.
(b) Since integration problems are mostly personnel related, C Army S Pers was appointed by C Army as nodal point for BMAWF and an open door policy exists in this regard.
(c) The investigation team found that all the aspects reported by the BMATT Army Representative to Dep C Army were known to the Army chain of command and had been attended to before BMATT "discovered" these issues. k is also the opinion of the investigation team that the matter was a storm in a tea cup and revolves around Col Davis's desire to liaise directly with C Army and not with C Army S Pers.
(2) Recommendations. The following recommendations were made by the investigation team:
(a) Present communication lines between BMATT and Army HQ suits the purpose. C Army S Pers should be the nodal Point.
(b) Unit OCs and Comd GOCs should be informed of issues before BMATT submits its report to higher HQs.
iii. GS Decisions. Following the visit of Brig Elliot and Col. Davis to C Army on 14 Mar 97 at 10:00, the complaints raised by Cool Davis and the above-mentioned IG report were discussed at the OS meeting of 17 Mar 97. The following is an extract of the decisions as reflected in the OS minutes of 17 Mar 97:
(1) Liaison Channels
(a) The BMATT commander (Brig Elliot) will liaise directly with C Army.
(b) The BMATT Army representative (Col. Davis) will liaise with Dep C Army and C Army S Pers, but will have a direct liaison channel to C Army for serious matters.
(c) C Army S Pers remains the nodal point for routine liaison with BMATT.
(2) Routine BMATT Reports. The complaint from BMATT that OCs on ground level do not give attention to the problems must be rectified by C Army S Pers.
(3) Fair Treatment. The perception of BMATT that SA Army Comds do not treat ex-Non-Statutory Force NSF) members in the same manner as ex-SANDF members regarding course nominations, pay problems etc, must be investigated by C Army S Pers.
iv. Action by C Army S Pers. The routine BMATT reports and fair treatment is monitored on a monthly basis by C Army S Pers as instructed.
v. Visit by Col. Davis to Deputy Chief Army. Col. Davis, the BMATT Army representative visited Dep C Army, Maj Gen J. Coetzer, on 8 Apr 97 to discuss the GS decisions taken on 17 Mar 97. During the visit the above-mentioned GS decisions were conveyed to Col Davis who expressed his appreciation and satisfaction with the formalised communication channels. BMATT have since not utilised these channels.
vi. Subsequent to the latest report a meeting between me and the BMATT commander was arranged for 18 Nov 97. At this meeting all the aspects, emanating from the report, were discussed to the satisfaction of both parties. The outcome of the discussion may be summarised as follows:
(1) My open door policy was confirmed. BMATT Commander may approach me at any time.
(2) The GS is to be briefed by BMATT (Army) quarterly or monthly as required.
Example: "Non Attendance. Members of Committee not attending IntegrationlVerification Meetings or having to provide their 2ICs since Jun 97.
* IC - 1 Oct, 27 Aug and 25 Jun
* IWG 12Nov. 15 Oct, 3 Sep, 2O Aug, 13 Aug, 18 Jun, 11 Jun.
* Verification - 17 Nov, 10 Nov, 28 Oct, 14 Oct and 6 Oct."
b. Comment. Concerning the non-attendance of members at Integration/Verification meetings, it is not clear what is implied. Director Integration has reported that nothing brought to his attention except the Appeal Board meeting held at PSC School. If the question relates to the earlier meetings meant to discuss the ex-Statutory Forces verification neither this HQ nor the Directorate was involved since the matter was initiated at higher HQ.
Example:" Dir Trg Dept. No ex SADF one star. Brig Shoke has had to do BT courses this year and therefore has been unavailable some of the time. Despite his sincere efforts and outstanding performance his understandable lack of experience does not help. This exact point was raised by Brig CH Elliott with C Army on 14 Mar 97. This most important position surely needs someone who has had at least 25 years of experience of rules and procedures presently used. Brig Rheeder personally sorted out 50% of Army Integration problems, mostly with colleagues on the telephone. It would be a travesty of justice if Brig Shoke was blamed for present problems. Our recommended course of action is for one of the best Ex SADF Brigs to be immediately placed along side Brig Shoke."
i. The references to Brig Shoke and the recommendation to place an ex-SADF Brig alongside him are unfounded as Brig Shoke is currently executing his task within the required norms and standards. Brig Shoke was initially appointed in his present post as an understudy to Brig Rheeder and he, Brig Shoke, attended the SA Army Senior Command and Staff Course in 1996. This training empowered him to occupy a full-time post after taking over from Brig Rheeder.
ii. During 1997 he attended further development training to empower him for his post. His section is manned by staff from the spectrum of the constituent forces of the SANDF (including an ex-SADF Colonel) who are qualified to support him in his task.
iii. Furthermore he and his staff have direct access to all functional staff with in SA Army Headquarters to assist, advise and rectify any contingency that may be required.
iv. I am of the opinion that he should continue in his post and the recommendation of BMATT with respect to Ex-SADF support be discarded as counter-productive to integration.
6. Par 2 "Regrettably the delegation of interest seems to have coincided with a marked change in attitude towards integration. ..... this hardening of attitudes towards ex Non Statutory Forces (NSF) integratees..."
Examples: May 97 - 4 SAl. 187 integratees court martialled and dismissed (all dealt with the same despite differing ranks, military records and roles in the incident). There have been many similar incidents since 1994 but none of them were dealt with in this unprecedented manner. The discussions has led to the questioning of the representivity at Courts Martial. See:
a. BMATT Report - 3 Jun - 7 Jul para 13
b. IWG- 15 Oct para 3130
c. IWG- 8 Oct para 3O78
d. IWG - 10 Sep para 3021
e. IWG- 3 Sep para 2955
f. IWG - 20 Aug para 2911
g. IWG - 13 Aug para 2883
h. IWG - 23 Jul para 2782
i. IWG - 16 Jul para 2730
j. IWG - 7 Jul para 2674 - 2678
k. IWG - 18 Jun para 2671
m. IWG - 11 Jun para 2635
n. IWC - 25 Jun para 54 - 58."
i. On 23 Sep 96 some members of A, B and C Companies of 4 SAl Bn who were deployed at Army Battle School, gathered at 06:00 at the base wash bay instead of moving out to deploy in the field.
ii. On three occasions that morning, the troops were ordered to comply with their duties. They refused to obey on all three occasions.
iii. The troops communicated their wish to submit a grievance which was their dissatisfaction with a R34 per day deployment allowance which they believed, on the basis of an unconfirmed rumour, should have been a R64 per day deployment allowance.
iv A name list of the 229 members was drafted by the group. From 10.00 the entire process was videotaped.
v. Five representatives were selected by said group and met with their Officer Commanding to report aforesaid grievance.
vi. The Officer Commanding stated that their grievance would be addressed at a later stage. He repeated an earlier warning that they were committing the offence of mutiny and would be charged accordingly.
vii. On the same day an appropriate Account of Offence (DDI) was completed. None of the members were arrested.
viii. During the course of the preliminary investigation, 34 members went A\VOL. The case appeared before an Ordinary Court Martial on 4 Jun 97. After the closing of the State's case, an additional 8 members also went AWOL.
ix. The remaining 187 members 22 L Cpls and 165 Rfn, were found guilty on the main count of contravening Sec I 0 MDC (Mutiny) and acquitted on all the alternatives.
x. The convicted members were given sentences which varied from discharge from the SANDF, fines of RI 000-00 and discharge as well as reduction to the ranks and discharge from the SANDF.
xi. The accused made written representations to the Confirming Authority regarding the sentences and requested that all accused receive the same sentence, namely, discharge from the SANDF.
xii. Upon examination of the representations, the Confirming Authority amended the sentences as a result of which all the members bearing the rank of L Cpl received a sentence of reduction to the ranks and discharge from the SANDF and the SANDF received discharge from the SANDF.
xiii. It became clear during the course of the trial that all participants had been briefed before the planned deployment as to the amount of deployment allowance they would be entitled to.
xiv. The case was received by C Army (DLS) on 17 Jun 97 and the review completed on 24 Jun 97.
xv The Reviewing Authority thereafter endorsed both the findings and sentences of the 187 accused. The ease was then referred to CSP (AG) for review.
xvi On 2 Jul 97 an instruction was issued whereby all pertinent information must be communicated in writing to troops participating in a deployment before said deployment.
xvii. Examination of the minutes of the IWG meeting held on 18 Jun 97, indicates a number of factual inaccuracies and suppositions as to the nature of the allowance and cause of the actual grievance. The convictions were based upon evidence led and tested during the course of the trial, including videotape material which was formally admitted as true and accurate by the accused. This evidence confirmed that the grievance was based upon a rumour and did not originate from disinformation provided by the accused's superiors.
xviii. A remark was made by the BMATT representative concerning his or her impression that the sentences were inconsistent with other sentences of similar cases conducted at other Comds. In addition, the uniform sentence of each accused in the present case did not seem to take into account the accused's differing personal records, ages, ranks and experience.
xx. On this point, it must be noted that each case is decided upon its own unique set of facts. Accepted legal principles dictate the weighing of the interest of the state, the nature of the offence and the individual interests of the accused when deciding upon sentence. This is reflected in the original sentences passed by' the Ordinary' Court Martial, which is a nationally recognised court of law. The uniform amendment of sentences was at the accused's request.
xxi. The right to submit representations to challenge either or both the findings and sentences of a Court Martial before a Council of Review was not exercised by the accused in spite of legal representation at their disposal and the extensive time period allowed for said action.
xxii. C SANDF endorsed the findings and sentences on 17 Jul 97.
Example: "Tear Gas Incident OFS Comd. Compare example 1 with the outcome of this nasty incident. Why were those responsible not dismissed? See:
* IWG - 18 Jun par 2672.
* IWG - 11 Jun par 2636."
i. On 8 Mar 96 at approximately 15:35, WOI Lategan of Gp 35 HQ, OFS Comd, sprayed teargas in the Group Ops Room, which was occupied by three ex-NSF officers. The reason submitted by WOI Lategan was the decision to perform an emergency drill for Ops room personnel.
ii. The main entrance was a barred gate which was locked for the purpose of
the supposed drill. The three officers shouted for help as a result of which the barred gate was opened and the three officers released.
iii. A Board of Inquiry was convened by the Group on 18 Mar 96 and reached finalisation at C Army on 28 Oct 96. It was found on the basis of a medical examination that one of the officers was seriously affected by the gas.
iv. As a result of the findings and recommendations of the Board, disciplinary action in the form of a Court Martial was undertaken against WOl Lategan on 1 Jul 96 when he appeared before an Ordinary Court Martial on the main charge of contravening Sec 15 MDC (Assault of a superior officer).
v. The accused was convicted on the charge and sentenced to a reprimand.
vi. As stated above, a Court Martial, as in the case of any court law, must take due consideration of the unique set of facts and circumstances of each case when deciding upon sentence. Not only must the court take cognisance of the interests of the community and the nature of the offence but also and equally, the individual circumstances and interests of the accused. None of the three main considerations enjoy precedence. In this particular case, there were strong mitigatory factors such as extensive length of service and a clean disciplinary record on the part of the accused.
vii it should also be noted that Court Martial findings and sentences are subjected to an elaborate military review process. Should the accused so wish findings and sentences may be referred to the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Africa.
viii. In addition, another point related to legal aspects was raised in recent IWO meetings, namely, representative in Courts Martial. The present situation in the SANDF was recorded as during meetings held in Aug 97 and Sep 97.
vxi. Specific guidelines regarding the above have been included in the C Army Short Term Guidelines for 1998/99. It has, however, been for some time standing policy that Courts Martial in the SA Army shall be fully representative.
x. Specific measures to ensure representativity in the C Army (DLS) training section have been implemented in the form of the allocation of a black female instructor from Far North Comd to said section. She is responsible for the presentation of the Military Law Course.
Example: "Postponement of Phase 1 BT. This was unprecedented and has not happened since integration started. What can soldiers usefully do if they are untrained? I am glad to see good sense has prevailed and training started again in Nov 97, after an unacceptable stoppage for 6 months.
* BMATT Report - 31 Jul - 30 Aug par 2 - 4."
i. In order for D Trg to schedule the necessary courses for 1998 DPU4 had to determine the total of students, in the different rank groups, still to do phase 1 Bridging Training. This was requested by D Trg during Jul 97 and was to form pan of the yearly C Army S Ops (D Trg) Short Term guidelines.
ii On instruction of C Army S Pers, training was to commence during this year. D Trg, in conjunction with IDPU4. was pressured to determine the total of members who still had to do phase 1 Bridging Training. The following then took place before any course could commence:
(1) A work session was held with all the Corps Directors on 4 Sep 97 to identify units able to conduct the training, as most units were already busy with either phase I or phase 2 Bridging Training.
(2) A Presentation was made to C Army S Ops on 5 Sep 97 (H LEER/D OPL/B/103/2/I dd 5 Sep 97 refers) on the different options.
(3) By order of C Army S Ops the identified units were then to submit the total cost of the training as this was not budgeted for during the 1996/97 financial year.
(4) Several presentations were made requesting the additional funds and the SA Army Financial Committee approved the funds. Only then could the identified units start with the training.
(5) The scheduling of the courses and nomination of identified members took place.
iii. When D Trg initiated planning for additional Bridging Training in 1997, members of BMATT and the SA Army Integration Committee were kept well informed on this matter. A misinterpretation of additional training versus the normal flow of training might have been the case.
iv Appendix B indicates that Bridging Training was not discontinued for 6 months.
v. For the record the progress for both bridging and corps training is included as Appendix C and D respectively.
Example "APLA Appeal Board The unnecessary' nastiness caused by this is well documented below:
* IWG-8 Oct par 3091.
* IWG - 20 Aug par 2925
* IWG- 6 Aug par 2836- 2846."
The first APLA Appeal Boards commenced on 21 Jul 97, but were not correctly constituted. This caused the appeal process for APLA to come to a halt After revision of the initial corporate instructions which included the correct constitution of Appeal Boards, the SA Army recommenced on 27 Aug 97' and dealt with 835 APLA appeals of which 162 appeals are not yet finalised (132 appeals of the 162 were received after the cut-off date of 3l Jul 97.)
Example: Ex-NSF Service Certificates. This concerned the loss of Ex-NSF Service
Certificates. When new ones were asked for and produced the old ones were suddenly found. Then both were compared and if the reckonable service dates were different criticism was directed at Ex-NSF. Much unnecessary acrimony was caused by this. See:
* lWG - 20 Aug 97 par 2923.
* IWG - 13 Aug 97 par 2880.
* IWG - 6 Aug par 2825-2832."
Service certificates is a concern for the SA Army. It is difficult to apportion blame or determine intent. The recommendations of the Board of Inquiry, convened to investigate duplicated service certificate, suggested that members with no service certificates on file should he permitted to submit an affidavit. These affidavits will nullify the need for duplicated service certificates. A draft proposal has been sent to both MK, APLA, and BMATT for inputs but feedback is outstanding. D Integ is also investigating the establishments of a system on the main frame whereby ex-NSF service certificates can be stored and accessed when needed.
Example: "Senior Officer Workshop. An integration matter that was not dealt with through Integration Channels for 5 months. BMATT not asked to verify course syllabi as laid down by JMCC and not initially asked to help resolve the dispute, despite monitoring the course weekly until V Adm K Loedolff convened a meeting in Oct 97. Dep Min had asked for BMATTs view in writing which was forwarded to him by Brig Elliott on 1 Aug 97. You will see from this letter that Brig C.H. Elliott did not think that the Army s initial solution was fair. The matter remains unresolved. See:
* BMATT Report 17 Mar - 23 Apr par 5.
* IWG - 23 Jul par 2774.
i. On 3 Jul 96 C Army S Ops, Maj Gen C.J. Serfontein, received a memorandum from C Army S Pers, Maj Gen J.M. Dippenaar, requesting the former to constitute a special SA Army development opportunity (H LEER/DPB/B/lO3/2/1 dd 3 Jul 96 refers). This request referred to ten ex-NSF and TBVC officers in the rank group Col. to Maj. Gen. who were to be afforded an opportunity for further individual development to prepare them for a special Joint Staff Course and retirement. The original figure increased to sixteen members including three from SAMS.
ii. On 19 Jul 96 D Trg submitted a memorandum to C Army S Ops, for information C Army S Pers, containing the suggested training schedule for the identified members (H LEER/D OPL/B/103/2/1 dd 19 Jul 97 refers).
iii. On 26 Sep 96 D Trg promulgated Trg Instr 36/96: Development Workshop for Ex-NSF and TBVC Senior Officers (C ARMYID TRG/R/103/ 2/1 dd 26 Sep 96 refers). The mission as determined being the following, C Army S Ops (D Trg) is to prepare these officers to attend a special Joint Staff Course in Sep 97 by means of a special development program starting from 2 Oct 96 and finishing by Nov 97."
vi. This workshop was presented in 4 modules as originally planned and approved by C Army (Trg Instr 36/96 refers). The approach followed by D Trg from the outset was to afford each member the optimum measure of exposure and participation in a mature and professional style. Results and feedback from the Defence College indicates that the mission contained in Trg Instr 36/96, has indeed been accomplished.
v. Regarding BMATT involvement in this issue it may be safely stated that Brig P. Davis was kept well informed throughout. He appeared to be very satisfied with this development and verbally approved thereof. Col. S. Falkner (then resident at the SA Army College) offered to assist with instruction on Module 3 of the Development Workshop (Senior Command and Staff Duties Orientation Course) and was duly coopted. This was greatly appreciated and his inputs to the workshop were highly valued.
vi. As this exercise was regarded as a special development workshop and not a formal promotion course, no specific curriculum was developed. Certain elements of existing curricula were used to facilitate broad guidance. No formal evaluation was conducted and this aspect is also reflected in Trg Instr 36/96.
vii. As far as I am concerned no apparent dispute arose pertaining to either the workshop content or level of exposure.
Example: Deliberate Alteration of Minutes. The Minutes of the first Army Accreditation Board on 21 Jun 97 were deliberately changed thus misrepresenting Board Members. By any standards this is unacceptable and inevitably resulted in unwarranted disputes and a reduction of mutual trust and respect by integration parties. We are still awaiting a reply to Brig C.H. Elliott's letter of 29 Apr 97.
i. The minutes of the Accreditation Board held on 22 Jan 97 were ratified by he GS on 30 Jan 97. The GS decided that Maj Gen T.T. Matanzima must first attend the Joint Planning phase of the SA Army Senior Command and Staff Duties Course before admittance to the SA Staff Corps (Army).
ii. It is confirmed that Maj. Gen. Matanzima attended the Joint Planning phase of the Staff Course from 29 Sep 97 to 24 Oct97. A positive report was submitted by the SA Army College.
7. Par 3 "... the process of integration, demobilization and voluntary rationalisatian have continued despite some disputes which have increased in number during this period".
Comment. Yes there will be dispute/disagreements etc and they will always be there until we are a totally integrated force. As far as l'm concerned it is the responsibility of BMATT to play a role in accordance with their mandate.
8. Par 4. "The PSS AA is likely to remain open.... intake forecasts have been inaccurate but current expectation is that 2 - 3 small intakes might be required....".
Comment. The Matter has been discussed at a number of forums where both MK and APLA were requested to conduct an audit of integrated personnel before determining the final termination of intakes. A request has been made by MK and APLA that their members who have been involved with intakes be placed at comds to conduct the final audit. This has been done and feedback was due on I Dec 97. On 28 Nov 97 at a meeting between APLA, MK, BMATT and SA Army a tentative agreement has been reached that Jun 98 be the final cut off date for intakes subject to the outcome of the audit.
9. Par 8. "... disputes over pay, allowances and service conditions have continued mostly in the SAA have been created by misunderstanding, poor communication and a continuing distrust of the Chain of Command which is perceived by Ex-NSF integrates to be predominantly Ex-SANDF".
i. Pay, Allowances and Service Conditions and Benefits. It is untrue for BMATT to state that BMATT are highlighting pay problems and not the chain of command. The facts are that the SA Army Headquarters has handled the following problems and enquiries during the year:
Jan = 575
Feb = 456
Mar = 463
Apr = 647
May = 790
Jun = 662
Jul = 601
Aug = 701
Sep = 576
b. The abovementioned statistics are kept corporatively for the SA Army and therefore no distinction is made as per ex force.
c. It must be made abundantly clear that many of the members of the SA Army,. including the ex-NSF, contribute directly to this problem through their own actions such as changing banking details without sufficient notice to their units, AWOL, and late/incomplete/incorrect submission of documentation for a variety of aspects such as home owners allowance. It is, however, true that the concept of bridging training at units other than mother units has led to administrative, and pay problems, but this has been resolved and is managed on a day-to-day basis.
d. With respect to the last BMATT report the facts are as follows:
i SAl, initially five cases were reported. The problem related to their mother unit, nI 10 SAl Bn, not taking persons on strength for pay purposes. Resolved before the submission of the BMATT report.
ii. SA Army Signals Formation (5 Sig Regt). The problem was reported to this HQ after which an investigation was launched. The majority of problems in this respect were changes to, or incorrect, banking details submitted by the troops under training. As correct banking details were provided the necessary action was taken and the salaries released. At present there is one outstanding case relating to the cash payment for first month pay. The member involved. Pte Mbenege. is indicated as having received Jul 97 pay in cash, but she refutes this. Until documentary evidence can be shown that in fact did not receive cash payment no salary for July can be released.
e. Northern Cape Command (3 SAl Bn). The BMATT report states a number of
271. Reported for solution were 42 cases which were handled as follows:
i. Three members AWOL. Pay can not be finalised until such time as the persons return and are dealt with in terms of the MDC. Pay will then be reconciled and the difference paid out to members.
ii. Thirty-two outstanding mother unit transactions. All transactions have been finalised and members have received their pay.
iii. Two incorrect banking details. As soon as correct banking details were provided the necessary actions were taken and the outstanding salaries released.
iv. Four cases had been finalised by the time of the BMATT report.
v. One individual's salary was withheld pending a contract change due to incorrect appointment details. Finalised in the meantime.
f. General. The perception created by BMATT regarding pay problems has been studied in further detail. The problem is not as widespread as may be perceived. The problems referred to by BMATT, apart from the above, include aspects such as:
i APLA Final Settlement of Pay. Many queries were handled by BMATT in this regard. This was not so much a pay problem as a policy problem in that such payments could not be made until authorised and should therefore not be included as pay problems.
ii. KZSPF Incorporation. Members of the KZSPF who are being incorporated in the SANDF are not treated as ex-NSF integratees, but as new recruits into the SANDF. This leads to a differentiation in the total concept of pay as KZSPF members are not entitled to ah integration benefits accorded to ex-NSF members. This is not a pay problem as such but relates to the agreement between the DoD and the JFP on a political level. It is therefore incorrect to ascribe these problems to that of pay.
10. Para 8. "... growing body of opinion...particularly the SAA's, officer training regime needs to be overhauled as it is outdated and out of step with modern international training syllabi. BMATT sympathises with this view..."
a. Training Staff Competency. The SA Army College has staff members who have attended both local and foreign courses.
b. Svllabi Comparisons. A study to compare the British, American and Netherlands syllabi for Senior Command and Staff Duties training has been conducted. Findings indicate that the content of the SA Army Senior Command and Staff Duties course syllabus is in line with mentioned syllabi.
c. International Exposure. Various foreign military courses, students and instructors have visited the SA Army college and have left the impression that the SA Army College training is in line with international trends and developments.
d. Updating and Improvements to Training Syllabi and Standards
i. The SA Army College has enjoyed wide and varied international exposure. This means that there has been ample opportunity to compare the content and standards of course with a number of foreign courses and to make adjustments and changes where necessary.
ii The changing and dynamic and environmental demands, teaching methodology and course content are continually evaluated at the SA Army College. All courses are therefore revised to meet the transformation requirements of the SA Army in particular and the SANDF in general.
11. Para 16 "The process of formally integrating the Former Statutory Forces ... has started, albeit somewhat hesitantly. ... However, progress to date has been very slow."
a. Due to the numerous problems, for instance to identify replacements for Verification Team members being on course, work procedures, guidelines from higher HQ which were not clear, etc the SA Army Verification Team started their verification task on 25 Aug 97. It is felt that the progress made is satisfactory.
b. The Team consist of all parties, and to date there have been no problems with regard to former forces not turning up to do their job. Due to the unavailability of personnel, because of training to be completed, there is currently only one team in operation. A second team has not been placed yet, but is in the process of being activated in 1998.
c. It can be reported that there is a positive attitude within the team to perform the task to the best of their ability. Problems which arise are resolved within the group. If problems should occur which cannot be resolved the procedure as laid down by higher HQ shall be followed.
d. BMATT had only two visits to the Verification Team which were when the team started and when the new BMATT commander was introduced to the team. The decision by the HQ Team, that BMATT should sign all the files verified, has not been executed. The none availability of BMATT personnel to do this job, is at present a problem.
e. To date no problems can be identified. The accommodation, files, procedures etc were sorted out with all the parties being present. An aspect which could be mentioned, is that the installation of a telephone did take long due to Telkom, but the problem has been solved.
f. The procedure as prescribed by the HQ Team is followed. Monthly reports are forwarded to higher HQ as instructed. There is a positive response from Command/ Formations wrt information requested for the verification process.
g. The SA Army Verification Team has been attending the Verification Board meetings chaired by Lt. Gen. MoIoi, but on several occasions these meetings were cancelled.
h. As mentioned in par 11. a. the progress of the SA Army Team is satisfactory. Files verified to date are as follows:
i. Aug 97:159
ii. Sep 97:841
iii. Oct 97:170
iv. Nov 97:544
v. Total: 17l4
12. Para 18 "... We have formed a clear impression that the attitudes of some top-level management in the SAA..., has hardened noticeably. ... notice that little in the physical structure of Army training institutions to show any ex NSF ownership. ... The implications are far reaching.
Comment. It is true that most units have not yet changed names, etc. However it must be pointed out that changes will take place as we build and develop a common culture at unit level. I would also like to highlight the fact that units are responsible for their own cultures and traditions.
13. Para 22. "... it would seem that integration has become a lower SANDF priority."
Comment. Feedback received from all concerned has indicated that the culture of the SA Army is changing, but it must be accepted that this is not an overnight "quick fix". As more and more senior ex-NSF officers complete their training and become qualified to tally contribute to this process I am convinced that the tempo of change and acceptance of ownership will increase dramatically.
COMMENT FROM THE SA ARMY COMMAND CADRE
14. The report in question was circulated 10 the Command Cadre on 27 Oct 97 for comment.
15. Their feedback is summarised for your convenience in Appendix A. [ed note: Appendix not included]
16. I am of the opinion that BMATT have dented their credibility and reputation as an unbiased referee by providing information which is at odds with feedback from Commands and Formations. It is trusted that the recommendations, suggested in Appendix A, par 4, will prevent a repetition of this unfortunate state of affairs.
17. The SA Army is managing the integration process in its totality and remains convinced that the process is working and is being made to work. Therefore find the nature, innuendoes and generalist approach of the report in question very disappointing. The SA Army has, however, taken the report seriously and will give attention to those aspects which require action, especially in the field of communication.
I8. Finally, l am of the opinion that the BMATT report conveys perceptions only and does not grant due recognition to the successes of integration, for example, the issuing of a SA Army Order on "high flyers", the down-management of integration posts, the many training successes and specific measures introduced to guide and mentor ex-NSF officers with individual attention. Overall reports and feedback indicate that integration is proceeding well and in a transparent fashion.
CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY: LT GENL
SUMMARY: SA ARMY COMMAND CADRE FEEDBACK
1. Feedback Reports submitted by Commands and Formations indicate, without exception, that no negative feedback concerning integration has been received from BMATT.
2. Challenges Facing Integration. It has been acknowledged by Commands and Formations that the integration process has not been without its challenges. However. in cases where problems arose, they were solved at the origin by those concerned. According to feedback, most problems arose as a result of poor communication and language difficulties. Common aspects which caused complications are as follows:
a. Attendance of formal courses.
d. Pay discrepancies.
e. Lack of sensitivity.
f. Service conditions.
g. Renewal of STS and MTS contracts.
3. Comment on Command Cadre Feedback
a. The BMATT report does not portray the true state of affairs as it is incongruent with feedback received from Commands and Formations. The report appears to focus on fostering doubt and suspicion between former statutory and non-statutory force members by pitting the former against the latter. This has unfortunate implications for transformation and must be prevented at all costs.
b. Very little, if any, attention has been paid to positive input from BMATT representatives at Command level.
It therefore appears that the content of the report is the result of one or a combination of the following:
i. Both BMATT HQ and BMATT representatives at Command and Formation level are out of touch with the true situation.
ii. BMATT representatives are providing feedback to Commands and Formations which is inconsistent with feedback to their own HQ.
iii. BMATT HQ have a negative perception of the integration process while BMATT representatives have a positive perception of the situation.
4. Recommendations. Irrespective of possible causes, as mentioned in par 3.0., the root of the problem lies in poor communication. The following recommendations pertaining to the handling of Commands and Formations arc suggested:
a. That BMATT representatives visit Units, Commands and Formations according to a pre-arranged roster.
b. That the aim and purpose of each visit is clarified with the Unit Officer Commanding and Command or Formation Commander.
c. That a written report is submitted within 48 hours by the UMAYT representative to the Unit Officer Commanding and/or Formation Commanders which addresses the following:
i. Positive aspects concerning integration.
ii. Negative aspects concerning integration.
iii. Recommendations or corrective actions.
d. That a monthly report is compiled by BMATT for submission to C Army S Pers. The report should summarise Command and Formations visits and findings.
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