Force Structure (Chapter 9 Of Defence Review): briefing

The problems are:

1) Force Transformation and

2) Support Formations

Gen Vorster refered the committee to Chapter 9 (Force Structure) Point 36 of the Defence Review.

The different types of formations spoken about are:

1) type formation which seeks to make forces combat ready

2) anti-aircraft formation which has different units under it (full time and part time)

3) intelligence formation which has to do with strategies to be employed and all the planning involved

4) parachute formation

5) special forces formation etc

The General mentioned that the Navy has decided to have only one type of formation because of its small number of vessels. He also mentioned that there is a new formation put in place known as the military policy formation whose task is to combine police functions and to supply policy requirements.

The members where referred to the map labelled Location of Bases IN Chapter 9 which shows the locations of the 26 military bases which will be maintained to support the army. The other bases will be closed down. The 26 bases are:

Bloemfontein Messina

Bloemspruit Middelburg

De Aar Mmabathu

Debrug Mtubatuba

Durban Phalaborwa

Ellisras Potchefstroom

Grahamstown Port Elizabeth

Ladysmith Simonstown

Kimberley Tek Base (Pretoria)

Langebaanweg Upington

Lohatla Voortrekkerhoogte

Louis Trichardt Waterkloof

Wonderboom

After the address by General Vorster, the chairperson opened the floor to the house.

The General was asked if the military base in Kroonstad would be closed down and, if so, what would happen to ordinary staff there. Mr Yengeni also posed a similar question. Gen Vorster replied that a final decision about closure of bases is still to be taken after proper consultation with members of the community and of parliament.

Mr Marais (NP) asked if closure of bases does take place, would capabilities be kept, ie places for training, equipment etc? Gen Vorster said that no equipment still required would be phased out. The whole exercise is for cutting down on duplication of services by 50% and of fighting equipment by 10%. The reality of the budget had to be faced.

Ms Kota (ANC) wanted to know if part-time forces were being transformed and what were the budget implications when talking of transformation? Gen Vorster said that he was not in a position to discuss part-time forces since it was a different matter altogether. Transformation existed in order to come within the budget.

Mr Zondo (ANC) asked how far was the country in terms of transformation in the defence department at this stage considering past history. Gen Vorster referred him to Chapter 10 of the Defence Review for that answer. Mr Netsianda commented that the fact that Lt-Gen Siphiwe Nyanda had been elected as Chief Of Defence showed that there were changes taking place, though at a slow pace.

Mr Molekane (ANC) raised his concern about bases and regiments that still have old names and suggested the changing of these names. Mr Netsianda replied that the department had decided to change names of certain regiments and bases. One name had already been changed though he could not remember the name. Mr Yengeni added that the changing of names as such is not the issue but the changing of the lives of men and women and all people of the defence force and the question was how does the department transform to reflect the diversity and culture of people in an organised and systematic manner. Mr Netsianda said that there was a group of people looking into affirmative action and language etc. General Vorster added that there was an organisational behaviour sub-project to address issues such as culture as part of transformation program.

The Chairperson wanted to know the criteria used and the motivation behind the planned closure of military bases. To answer his question General Vorster mentioned the example of Swartkops Air base which will be closed down because there are not enough aircraft at the base. He said that by year 2000 there will be about 250 aircraft at the base instead of 700. Mr Yengeni expressed his dissatisfaction about the planned closure of bases especially in those areas with high crime rates.

Mr Loots (ANC) asked why there were still old order celebrations, such as Kasinga Day, taking place at some of the military bases. Mr Netsianda said that it was no longer celebrated. Mr Yengeni added that they would wait for the Minister to brief them on this.

Mr Makwetla (ANC) stated that to restructure the department in order to save state resources was not transformation at all. Mr Yengeni said that transformation was linked to restructuring: you cannot transform without restructuring first. But it was true that transformation and restructuring were different.

Mr Makwetla expressed his dissatisfaction about the phrasing in the document itself. He suggested the restructuring of certain paragraphs since, he said, some words in the paragraphs have a negative connotation.

Mr Mokwetla highlighted a problem with Point 14.6 and 14.7 of Chapter 9 which has to do with the role of the Secretary Of Defence. It gives the impression that the Chief of Defence needs to be kept under constant check. He said he had a problem with the way it was presented in the document and suggested that this should be seriously looked into. The chairperson agreed with him.

Mr Netsianda also agreed that the diagram (Reporting Responsibilities in the Integrated MoD Head Office) in the document was old and would be changed so that it was consistent with Point 33.

Mr Mashimbye (ANC) said that he saw the establishment of the defence secretariat as an important aspect of transformation. He suggested that implementation of decisions taken should be monitored to ensure that transformation does take place.

In rounding up, Mr Yengeni said that the forthcoming meeting with the minister will help address concerns of some of the committee members and issues such as civic education will be talked about in detail. Mr Yengeni also mentioned that the minister will table the Defence Review before the committee. The proposed meeting is still to be structured and planned with the defence department.

Appendix: Force Structure: Chapter 9 of Defence Review

CHAPTER 9: FORCE STRUCTURE

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

1.The transformation of the Department of Defence (DoD) takes place against the broader backdrop of the transformation process in South Africa generally. The post-1994 period has ushered in a series of challenges for South Africans which require a fundamental transformation of economic relations, political structures. and culture and values of South African society. This is reflected in key government policy documents including the Reconstruction and Development Programme. the Growth. Employment and Redistribution Strategy. the white Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and the Defence White Paper.

2.The transformation of the DoD covers four major areas:

2.1 Constitutional and Legal Transformation. This refers to the reorientation of the defence function in light of new constitutional and legal realities. The Constitution outlines the political channels of accountability governing the DoD, the functions of defence, its organizational outline and its composition. The institution of a new Constitution has required a corresponding revision of the Defence Act. the creation of appropriate Codes of Conduct and the internalization of these values in the education and training culture of the DoD. The key constitutional principles upon which the defence function is based are outlined in the Constitution. The key legal principles and laws governing the defence function are in the process of being revised - the process of which is outlined in the Legal Environment chapter of this Review.

2.2 Transformation of Civil-Military Relations. A key feature of democratic civil-military relations is the inviolability of the principle of civil control over the armed forces. This is reflected in the primacy afforded to parliament in approving the finances for the armed forces, the legislation governing the activities of the armed forces, and the approval of the policy framework within which the armed forces will function. To ensure that effective civil control is maintained over the armed forces,

and that the activities of the armed forces are harmonized with broader government policy. a range of additional mechanisms are instituted to ensure robust and effective civil-military relations. These include the following:

2.2.1 Legislation passed by parliament which determines the defence mandate of the Department of Defence.

2.2.2 The creation of Parliamentary Committees responsible for the oversight of the defence function. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the defence committees in the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces fulfil this function.

2.2.3 The Parliamentary Committees of Finance and Public Accounts which has the authority to summon any public account holder with concerning their expenditure of funds.

2.2.4 The Auditor General and his staff who report directly to parliament on the handling of finances by the Department of Defence.

2.2.5 The creation of a Ministry of Defence responsible for ensuring political control over the DoD and ensuring that the activities of the DoD are consistent with government policy.

2.2.6 The creation of a largely civilian Defence Secretariat responsible for formulating policies, programmes and budgets and controlling the execution of the mandate of the National Defence Force.

2.2.7 The creation of additional mechanisms to ensure that the activities of the DoD are consistent with the letter and the spirit of the new democracy - the role of the Public Protector and the Military Ombuds for example.

2.3 Normative and Cultural Transformation. This refers to the transformation of the culture of the DoD in relation to its values, traditions, human resource practices and managerial practices. Cultural transformation, therefore. refers to a wide range of activities reflected in a diversity of policy and programmes within the DoD including the following:

2.3.1 The institution of equal opportunity and affirmative action programmes within the DoD. This will ensure that the DoD will be broadly representative of South Africa's demographic composition. These programmes are reflected in the Human Resources and Part Time Forces chapters in this Defence Review.

2.3.2 The transformation of the traditions of both the full-time and part-time components of the DoD. This will ensure that the emerging South African military culture will be reflective of the diverse military traditions within South African society.

2.3.3 The creation of a military professional ethic which is consistent with the moral imperatives of the new political dispensation and accords with the ethical obligations of a soldier functioning in a democracy. This is reflected in the current Civic Education Programme within the DoD.

2.3.4 The transformation of the management practices of the DoD to ensure that such practices are normatively and practically consistent with the ethos of a new democracy This is reflected in the design and institution of a Civic Education Programme within the DoD and the design of new Leadership, Command. Administrative and Management practices for use within the DoD.

2.4 Organizational Restructuring. Organizational restructuring refers to the rationalisation and right-sizing of the DoD so as to ensure the more efficient and effective utilisation of state resources. This entails a range of measures including the disbanding of units. demobilisation and rationalisation of defence personnel, elimination of wasteful practices, eliminating the duplication of services. and the more efficient co-location of military bases and units. This component of transformation is addressed in greater detail in this chapter.

CIVIL CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

3. In part because armed forces have the means to intervene in political processes. governments establish civil control over them. A further aspect of this is to highlight the need for military professionalism and to inculcate in members of the armed forces respect for civil control through training.

4. With the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, government undertook to establish civil control over the armed forces in line with democratic practice throughout the world.

5. Civil control is established by the elected democratic authority appointing a political head over the respective forces and department. In South Africa the Constitution mandates the Minister of Defence to exercise control over and be accountable for the entire defence function.

6. To support the Minister. civilians are appointed in the department to assist policy functions. This includes setting the ends of defence. establishing the ways and means of defence through programming and budgeting and assisting the Minister in control of the Defence Force to ensure that it fulfils its mandate in line with the Government's directions.

Management of the Defence Function

7. The SANDF's mandate is firstly that of the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. It should be able to meet this obligation with force should it be called upon to do so.

8. Management of the defence force is established constitutionally and through the Defence Act in the following way:

8. 1 The SANDF must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force (Constitution. 200(1)).

The President as head of the national executive is Commander-in-Chief of the defence force. and must appoint the Military Command of the force (Constitution. 200 (1)).

8.3 Command of the defence force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Minister of Defence under the authority of the President (Constitution. 202 (2)).

8.4 C SANDF shall have the powers and be charged with the duties functions and be responsible to the Minister for the efficient management and administration of the SANDF. including the effective utilisation and training of all members of that force (Defence Act 7C(e)). 8(3)(b)].

8.5 The Secretary by virtue of the Defence Act and Public Service Act. shall exercise his functions and powers as Head of Department and Accounting Officer with reference to the SANDF by providing C SANDF with comprehensive instructions for the issuing of orders and directives and the giving of commands (Defence Act 7C(e)).

8.6 The Chief of the Defence Force:

8.6.1 Is responsible for the issuing of such orders and directives and the giving of commands and for ensuring that such orders, directives and commands are complied with (Defence Act 8(3)(e)).

8.6.2 Must also see to the execution of all budgetary programmes relating to the SANDF (Defence Act 8(3)(d))

8.6.3 Has to supply all information and inputs with regard to the SANDF to the Secretary to enable him or her to perform his or her functions properly (Defence Act 8(3)(f)).

The Defence Secretariat

9. The role of a Department of State is to formulate policies. programmes and budgets and to control the execution of the mandate of the defence force.

10. The Constitution establishes a Defence Secretariat to assist the Minister with the above mentioned functions. Section 204 of the Constitution states: -A civilian Secretariat for Defence must be established by national legislation to function under the direction of the Cabinet member responsible for defence'.

11. The national legislation referred to in the Constitution is provided in Section 7A and 7B of the Defence Act by virtue of item 2. Schedule 6 of the Constitution. The Defence Secretariat is established by Section 7A(1)(a): 'There is hereby established in the Department of Defence a Defence Secretariat'.

12. Section 7A(1)(b) of the Defence Act states: the officers and employees within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1994 (Proclamation No 103. 1994) which are necessary for the performance of the work connected to the functions of the Secretary shall be appointed to posts in the Defence Secretariat in consultation with the Minister.

13. This section clearly indicates that the members named here are civilian members as envisaged in the Constitution. Section 7A(2) also allows for members of the SANDF with their consent to be placed at the disposal of the Secretary to serve in posts in the Defence Secretariat. These personnel do not lose their identity as members of the SANDF.

Role of the Secretary for Defence

14 Section 7C of the Defence Act defines the role of the Secretary for Defence. The Secretary shall be a citizen of the Republic and may not be a member of the SANDF. The Secretary shall:

14. 1 Be the head of the department and accounting officer of the DoD.

14.2 Be the head of the Defence Secretariat and as such be responsible for the management of and administrative control over the staff of the Defence Secretariat.

14.3 Be the principal departmental adviser to the Minister with regard to defence policy matters as well as any matter which may be investigated by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence of the Parliament under section 228(3)(d) of the Constitution and in respect of which that committee may make recommendations.

14.4 Advise the Minister on any particular matter referred by Minister to the Secretary.

14.5 Perform such duties and functions as may from time to time be assigned or referred to him or her by the Minister in particular any function or duty necessary or expedient to enhance Parliamentary oversight and Ministerial control over the SANDF.

14.6 Provide C SANDF with comprehensive instructions for the issuing of orders and directives and the giving of commands with regards to the functioning of the Secretary as head and accounting officer of the DoD.

14.7 Monitor compliance with directions issued by the Minister under the Constitution. to C SANDF and report thereon to the Minister.

14.8 Perform all functions of head of department regarding the effective management and administration of the DoD.

Establishment of the integrated head office

15. The integrated head office was established in order to achieve synergy between the work of the Defence Secretariat and that of the SANDF. The Secretariat has to fulfil its functions in conjunction with the SANDF. International practice has evolved from a position where the functions were performed in parallel to one where they are fulfilled in interaction with each other. It is pointless for policy formulators to suggest ends which the military do not agree with or are unable to fulfil. and to allow for a practice of going back and forth between the Secretariat and the SANDF to come to acceptable solutions.

16. Accordingly. it was decided that military and civilian personnel should work closely together with regard to the Secretariat function in determining departmentally with the approval of the Minister the ends, ways and means of defence, and to effect savings and avoid duplication of effort. Similarly, civilians work closely with military personnel in establishing accountability and checking on proper utilisation of state resources.

17. Civilian personnel, however. do not intervene in the military operational chain of command. i.e. when military personnel are implementing military operations.

Diagram 1: Reporting Responsibilities in the Integrated MoD Head Office.

[Ed. Note: Diagram 1 not included]

18. Diagram 1 sets out the newly established organisation of the integrated head office and serves to identify the reporting functions and lines of control between the Secretary and C SANDF. The blocks indicated in white in the diagram are those functions which the Secretary needs to control to fulfil his function as Head of Department - to formulate policies, programmes and budgets and to control the execution of the mandate of the defence force. The black blocks are indicative of force functions and the incumbents report to C SANDF.

19. Blocks indicated in both black and white refer to those functions that are shared by both the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the National Defence Force. Further studies on the clarification of these primary lines of responsibility and accountability for these functions (whether they report to the Secretary for Defence or the Chief of the National Defence Force) will have to be investigated in further work of the Transformation process and duly approved by the Minister of Defence.

20. The Transformation Project will need to determine which of the posts in the integrated head office are civilian. and which are military. Ideally. those functions which are the responsibility of the Secretary should have chiefs of division which are civilian while those which are the responsibility of C SANDF should be military posts. Those which are their joint responsibility could either be civilian or military.

ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION

21. The DoD is being organisationally transformed to ensure that it carries out its roles and functions efficiently and effectively and within the framework of national values and policies. A key aspect to this is to enhance performance management and to improve cost effectiveness. This section sets out a vision for an organisationally transformed DoD. This vision will need to be elaborated on modified and improved through planning and consultation in line functions and costed in terms of implementation.

Key Concepts

22. The following key concepts underpin the transformation of administrative. command and control and supporting structures of the DoD:

22.1 A systems approach to the management of defence.

22.2 Maximum synchronisation between arms of service (known as .jointness') while preserving essential service uniqueness.

22.3 A focus on the core business of defence and the out-sourcing of noncore functions.

22.4 Civilianisation where uniformed posts are not required.

22.5 Maximal reliance on the Part-Time Component.

22.6 Exploiting information technology.

SYSTEMS APPROACH

23. The DoD adopts a systems approach to organisational restructuring. In terms of this approach. the DoD consists of elements or sub-systems which work together to produce a specific output - in the DoD's case this is output is defined as being those combat-ready forces that can be employed on operational missions. The combat forces can. in turn. be viewed as systems.

24. The systems approach is based on four main processes: Strategic Direction. Support Forces. Provide Forces. and Employ Forces. The latter three are executive processes. Diagram 2 presents the relationship between these processes and are explained below.

25. The Strategic Direction process is vested in the integrated MoD. and directs the three executive processes through ministerial direction. the policy framework of the DoD. and the departmental strategy and plan.

26. The Support Forces process aims at providing forces. material and personnel to the combat forces so that these can be used operationally.

27. The Provide Forces process integrates and converts force components into combat-ready forces. This has three distinct sub-processes:

27.1 Force components are integrated and converted into combat-ready units, such as battalions. squadrons and ships.

27.2 Combat-ready units are integrated and converted into combat-ready single service forces such as brigades(i.e. forces drawn from one arm of service).

27.3 Combat-ready single service forces are integrated and converted into combat-ready joint forces (task forces).

28. The Employ Forces process involves the deployment of forces in an operational capacity. Combat-ready forces are used to accomplish specific missions as ordered by the appropriate presidential directions.

Diagram 2: Core departmental processes with inputs and outputs

[Ed. Note: Diagram 2 not included]

29. The .systems approach aims to achieve effectiveness. efficiency and economy and to facilitate the following policy objectives. although these objectives will only be Achieved through careful planning and costing:

29. 1 Performance management is facilitated and accountability enhanced.

29.2 Total costs of outputs are made visible.

29.3 Empowerment of lower hierarchical levels can take place and bureaucracy can be reduced.

29.4 Control over military power is enhanced through separation of the Provide Forces and Employ Forces processes.

JOINTNESS

30. Jointness seeks to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of all military operations by synchronising the actions of the four arms of service (army, navy, air force and military health service) and the civilian component of the DoD at every level. In developing force components and preparing forces. joint integrators such as technologies. command and control sub-systems and administrative and training procedures. will be nurtured. However. jointness will not be achieved by destroying the unique features of the arms of service: service cultures are necessary for the different operating environments and will be maintained. although some adaptations may be necessary.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

31. It is envisaged that the DoD, as indicated in diagram 3, will be a three-tier organisation with five levels. The three tiers are:

31.1 The Ministry of Defence (MoD) tier with three levels (levels 0. 1 and 2)

31.2 The intermediate tier (level 3)

31.3 The unit level (level 4).

Structural building blocks

32. The three-tier organisational structure will comprise the following building blocks:

32.1 The MoD as an integrated head office and the highest military headquarters.

32.2 Task forces as the intermediate level force employment structures.

32.3 Type Formations as the intermediate level force support structures.

32.4 Support formations as intermediate level force support structures.

32.5 Bases as unit level supporting structures for units and satellite MoD offices in a specific geographical location.

32.6 Combat and supporting units.

32.7 Regionally decentralised MoD satellite offices.

32.8 Service centres that perform high volume repetitive transactions on a centralised basis as an agency service.

32.9 A state corporation as an acquisition agency.

Ministry of Defence

33. The MoD is an integrated organisation comprising all the elements that together form the departmental head office and highest military headquarters. The MoD is small and focuses predominantly on policy. plans and control (directing and not operating activities). All the elements of the MoD are co-located in a single building complex. The elements of the MoD are:

33.1. The Office of the Minister of Defence responsible for the following:

a. Ensuring political control and direction over the activities of the DoD.

b. Ensuring that government policy is communicated to the DoD via the Ministry and the activities of the DoD are consistent with government policy.

c. Determination of defence policy.

d. Ensuring that the needs of the DoD are communicated to government via the Ministry.

33.2 The Office of the Secretary for Defence and CSANDF (including their respective deputies)

33.3 Corporate divisions reporting primarily to the Secretary for Defence

- The Policy and Planning division

- The Finance division

- The Defence Inspectorate

- The Personnel division (including Joint Training Division)

- The Legal Services division

- The Command and Management Information (CMI) division

- The Logistics division

- The Departmental Acquisition and Procurement division

- The Corporate Communication division.

33.4 Corporate divisions reporting primarily to the C SANDF

- The Joint Operations Staff division

- The Defence Intelligence division including Foreign Relations division

- The Chaplain General

- The Army division (comprising Chief of the Army and Staff)

- The Air Force division (comprising Chief of the Air Force and Staff)

- The Navy division (comprising Chief of the Navy and Staff)

- The Military Health Service (MHS) division (comprising Surgeon Genera] and Staff)

- The Military Policing agency

- The Part Time Component advisor.

Task forces

34. Task forces are employment structures under task force commanders. which are created for executing specific operations or exercises. They disband on completion of the operation or exercise although some forces may be relatively permanent if the operations for which they have been created are enduring.

35. Combat-ready units and formations constituting task forces are usually prepared and provided by arms of service. although there may be minor exceptions. Task forces are generally joint structures. Task force commanders are intermediate level (operational) commanders appointed for the duration of the operation and will exercise unified command over assigned forces. under the overall command of C SANDF.

Type formations

36. A type formation is a structure responsible for the preparation and development of a specific type of combat-ready unit. As far as possible type formations have the following features:

36.1 Integration within a type formation of all units and support elements required to make the formation work.

36.2 The ability to provide fully supported units to a commander in either a land. air. maritime or military health capacity.

36.3 The ability to provide fully supported units to a task force commander appointed by C SANDF.

36.4 A type formation improves on the cost effectiveness of providing combat-ready systems. It does this via a consolidation and rationalisation of functions and structures. eliminating duplication and providing more integrated management practices.

36.5 A type formation has a specific geographic location where as many as possible of its combat and support units are concentrated. and is usually supported by a base which in some cases may form part of the type formation itself. Type formations can also have satellite units and may he co-located with other type formations. sometimes sharing a base.

37. The functions of type formations include the following:

37.1 Providing combat-ready user systems of its specific type, including the training and exercising of the systems and their personnel.

37.2 Acting as a centre of excellence for its specific types of user system. developing expertise on the systems and providing advice on their use. This includes administrative. operating and technical expertise and policies.

37.3 Managing a business plan for the type formation. The commander compiles a plan as a subset of higher order plans within the DoD. is a budget holder for the user systems and manages the finances of the formation.

37.4 Career management for personnel responsible for specific user Systems takes place within the type formation below the level of Colonel (or Captain in the navy). The formation also provides personnel for other DoD clients.

37.5 Managing user system logistics if the product is unique to the type formation (e.g. torpedoes).

37.6 Managing quality assurance to ensure that the required outputs are met and that documentation is provided.

37.7 Managing command. control, communications. computers. information and intelligence within the type formation.

38. A table of envisaged type formation per Arm of Service and their proposed associated units is described in detail in Appendix A to this chapter. [Ed. Note: Appendix not included]

Support formations

39. Support formations are intermediate-level support structures. They are similar to type formations except that they do not provide combat-ready forces. but give support to type formations and other system structures. Examples would be a formation providing logistical and administrative services for a wide range of units.

Proposed Support Formations and Units

[Ed. Note: Diagram not included]

Bases

40. Formations and units are clustered on or around bases and share their common facilities and services. Bases are provided by the army. air force or navy. but may have attached support units from other arms of service. MoD satellite offices or service centres.

41. Units attached to a base are concentrated at that base as far as possible although some satellites may exist. Studies indicate that optimal economies of scale will be achieved with approximately 26 bases covering South Africa. A list of these proposed bases is shown in Table 2 while Map 1 indicates their location. Final decisions on these and the closure of the other bases are still to be taken after more detailed evaluation and consultation.

[Ed. Note: map not included]

+Table 2: Possible option for 26 bases after transformation

[Ed. Note: map not included]

42. Bases may be tasked to support specific operations or exercises, but do not have command over attached units although they exercise administrative control for specific purposes. Base commanders may be type formation commanders or may be appointed as task force commanders. Bases have self-accounting status and support attached units for accounting purposes.

Combat and supporting units

43. Units, which are clustered on or around bases may be combat units (e.g. artillery regiments, air force squadrons, ships or medical battalion groups) or support units (e.g. depots or schools).

MoD satellite offices

44. MoD satellite offices are extensions of MoD divisions located outside headquarters to provide services on a geographically dispersed basis. They are located on bases and share common facilities and services with units. The legal services regional offices and defence inspectorate regional audit offices are examples of these.

Service centres

45. Service centres are unit-level structures that perform high-volume repetitive transactions on a centralised basis as an agency service. They are located on bases and share common facilities.

Acquisition agency

46. It is foreseen that Armscor will remain the state corporation responsible for the acquisition of complex defence equipment as long as it remains unfeasible to attract the required engineering specialists within the constraints of public service salary scales.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

47. One of the cornerstones of DoD transformation is the use of appropriate communication and information technology. This promises significant efficiency improvements and will also give operational and combat advantage to the SANDF.

48. The Command and Management Information system takes into account the erosion of the distinctions between strategic, operational and tactical systems and between information and communication systems. Such systems are therefore being integrated into one coherent system which serve the needs of DoD business as a whole.

PART-TIME COMPONENT

49. The core force approach of the DoD relies extensively on the expansion capability inherent in the part-time component. All structures that may require expansion at a more rapid rate than normal recruiting and career development timescales will allow will have a part-time component. The part-time component will be organised around two concepts: the multi-regiment battalion, and the expandable single permanent structure.

50. The multi-regiment battalion concept is used mainly in the army (both conventional and territorial) and military health service. It calls for the maintenance of virtual units at low levels of readiness across different type formations which maintain the necessary equipment. Permanent training staff in the type formations manage force preparation cycles while personnel are maintained in part-time units.

51. There should be no limit to the number of part-time units provided funds are available in terms of the order of battle of the type formation. To encourage volunteers. the unique cultures. traditions and individual identities of part-time units should be encouraged.

52. Parts of full-time units may also be designated as virtual parts to be staffed by part-time units. for example by maintaining full-time personnel for two squadrons of an armour regiment and filling the third from part-time units.

CIVILIANISATION

53. In general civilians are considerably less expensive than uniformed personnel in the same post due to the higher cost of military service conditions. Civilians should therefore be used where uniformed posts are not justified. Considerable improvements in departmental education and training opportunities for civilians will need to be made.

54. An holistic systems view will however be maintained: availability of rotation posts for operational personnel, feasibility of career patters and availability of a ready internal reserve are essential factors to consider in the civilianisation process.

CORE BUSINESS FOCUS AND OUTSOURCING

55. A policy of focusing on core business and outsourcing of non-core functions will be followed in line with international practices in improving efficiency in armed forces and the significant achievements in public and private enterprises.

56. It is foreseen that the volume and scope of services brought in from outside the DoD will expand considerably, with commensurate savings. A section will be set up in the Acquisition Division to manage the administrative complexities and to support and promote outsourcing.

IMPLEMENTATION

57. Implementation of structural transformation has already begun and it is envisaged that the process will be completed within three years. with some exceptions. As the implementation phase is already under way (although detailed design will need to continue until the end of 1998) the process is no longer being managed as a separate project. but is integrated into the mainstream strategic management process of the DoD. Divisional chiefs have been appointed project officers for implementation and this task has been incorporated into their work plans.

ANNUAL BUDGET REQUIRED

58. Two graphs illustrate the annual budget required.

[Ed. Note: graphs not included]

58.1 The first "transformation sustainable cash flow",. illustrates what should ideally be invested annually to ensure sustainability. It is clear that the budget is not available to fund this.

58.2 The second graph illustrates what is available for capital. should operating and transition cost be funded first. Capital planning will have to take this limit into account. Depending on the speed of transition, a sustainable situation could be reached between 2004 and 2012.

Language Policy: Department Of Defence Draft Number 4: Executive Summary

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (DoD) LANGUAGE POLICY DRAFT NUMBER 4:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

1. The DoD Consultative Forum on Language, which is chaired by the Chief of Policy and Planning, comprises language specialists representing the arms of the service, as well as the part-time component, members of Parliament, members representing various NGOs, members of the Pan-South African Language Board, the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, the Department of Education and academics (a full list of the persons involved is given at Appendix A).

2. The DoD Consultative forum on Language were, in their deliberations, strongly guided by

a. the Constitution;

b. the White Paper on Defence.

c. the Department's requirements;

d. the Pan-South African Language Board Act of 1996; and

e. the LANGTAG recommendations to Cabinet.

SUMMARY

3. The salient points of the present proposals are as follows:

a. The use of English as the thread language for the Department (a lingua franca for general communication, command, control and coordination as well as for training).

b. The use of the other official languages as link languages where the situation warrants or demands it.

c. The translation, when required, of important documents and training material into various official languages. This would be done by the State Language Service in conjunction with the DoD Language Service Directorate.

d. A policy of non-discrimination iro language and the recognition of the status of the official languages of our country, particularly of the importance of the knowledge of such languages within the Department.

e. The principle of obligation on the part of communicators, both recipients and originators, to ensure that mutual understanding, i.e. effective communication, has been achieved.

f. The management of linguistic diversity with the same effectiveness as other aspects of diversity within the organisation. In this context, the application of the concept of functional (situational) multilingualism (as proposed by the LANGTAG Report) is suggested as being suited to our corporate environment.

g. The training and utilisation of language facilitators (interpreters, translators), as well as the application of facilitation and enablement measures in support of the proposed policy.

h. The specification of the language rights applicable to all members of the Department.

i. Constant monitoring, reviewing and revision of the policy in the light of national policy and of changing circumstances. To this end, we propose the appointment of a Language Policy Monitoring Advisory Body broadly representative of the internal and external stake-holders.

j. Liaison with other state departments, NGOs and the Pan-South African Language Board in the context of language planning.

k. Sensitizing members of the department to the concept of language equity and to the fact that language diversity is to be considered a resource rather than a disadvantage.

THE PROCESS AHEAD

5. This draft policy, in its subsequent amended forms, will be the subject of consultations with the broad spectrum of members of the Department the JSCPD, the Pan-South African Language Board, and external interest groups (by means of a public hearing). The product of these consultations will be considered by the Consultative Forum who will produce firm policy proposals for approval by the appropriate bodies.

CONCLUSION

6. There is no turnkey solution to the problems arising from linguistic diversity, whether it be at national, government or corporate level. Key factors in the successful management of linguistic diversity will be the willingness of all (across the whole language spectrum and across hierarchical lines) to solve problems as they arise and to act fairly, constitutionally and in the interests of the organisation and towards the achievement of its mission, putting aside politico- and socio-linguistic misconceptions and prejudices. The Consultative Forum is of the opinion that the proposed draft policy lays a firm foundation to this end.

Operation Boleas in Lesotho: 22 September 1998

MEDIA RELEASE

OPERATION BOLEAS/ONE

22 September 1998