Iranian Nuclear Development and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Stance: briefing

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International Relations

22 March 2006
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Meeting report

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE
22 March 2006
DEPARTMENT BRIEFING: IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY’S STANCE

Acting Chairperson:
Ms F Hajaig (ANC)

Documents handed out:
Implementation of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards in Iran (PowerPoint): Part
1 & 2
Implementation of the Treaty Safeguards: Agreement on Iran – Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005
Information Services -Research: International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran’s Nuclear Energy Development

SUMMARY
The Department briefed the Committee on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Iran and the disputes surrounding this implementation. The nature of the dispute was presented as well as the action taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency and other significant stakeholders. The recent developments regarding this situation were also highlighted. Lastly, the Committee was informed of South Africa’s stance regarding this issue.

The Committee was concerned over the role played by the dominant Western powers in the dispute as well as the introduction of this issue into the United Nations Security Council. Members wished to know how an invasion of Iran could be prevented as well as the level of threat this dispute was to world peace. The Committee adopted the minutes of the Committee meeting that took place on 15 March 2006, as well as a Report on the Sudan briefing it had received, unanimously and without any amendments or objections.

MINUTES
Mr A Minty (Deputy Director General: Department of Foreign Affairs, and Member of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors) briefed the Committee on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran had been party to the NPT since 2 February 1970. Its safeguard agreement with the IAEA entered into force on 15 October 1974. Since 1992 it had allowed the IAEA to undertake inspections of its nuclear facilities. Iran had denied the existence of a nuclear weapons programme and to date the IAEA had not found any evidence of the diversion of material for non-peaceful purposes.

The IAEA depended on the legal framework provided by the NPT and the Statute of the IAEA. The Committee was further briefed on the nature of the dispute and the action the IAEA had taken. In March 2003 the IAEA reported that Iran had over the last 18 years failed to report on its nuclear activities. A number of failures by Iran regarding this issue were listed by the IAEA. A number of corrective actions were taken by Iran. However, not all those failures were addressed and a number of additional failures were further identified. Since 2003, the Board of Directors of the IAEA had called on Iran to adopt voluntary confidence-building. Confidence building was not a legal obligation and in October 2003 Iran had voluntarily signed the Additional Protocol.

Further information was provided on the major role the EU3 (United Kingdom, France and Germany) played, included the 2004 Paris Agreement brokered by the EU3, with its offer of an economic package proposal that required Iran to suspend its nuclear energy activities. The package proposal had been rejected by Iran.

In September 2005 the IAEA Board adopted a resolution founding Iran to have been non-compliant in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute. This resolution was not adopted by consensus and South Africa had abstained from the resolution. Under the IAEA Statute a finding of non-compliance required the Board to report the matter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly (GA). A Russian proposal was also highlighted whereby Iran and Russia would jointly enrich uranium in Russia to be utilised by Iran for peaceful purposes. This proposal has not been successful.

The most important recent development was the emergency session of the IAEA Board from 2-4 February 2006. The session had taken place due to the resumption of research and development activities by Iran. The Board adopted a resolution that outlined the steps Iran needed to take for it to re-establish confidence and requested that the Director General of the IAEA report these steps to the UNSC as well as in all the IAEA reports and resolutions on Iran. The Director General’s report to the March 2006 Board also had to be sent to the UNSC. On 5 February 2006 Iran notified the IAEA of its decision to suspend all its voluntary confidence building measures but still continued to implement its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Iran still provided co-operation beyond legal obligation.

The latest report by the IAEA Director General reconfirmed that all declared nuclear material in Iran had been accounted for and the Agency had not yet found any evidence of diversion to nuclear weapons. The Report was discussed at the March 2006 session of the Board of Governors of the IAEA without a resolution on Iran being considered. It requested that the Director General submit this report to the UNSC. In the week following the March meeting, the five permanent members of the UNSC had held informal consultations on the possible text for the UNSC Presidential statement. Differences between Russia, China and the rest of the permanent members prevented an agreement being reached.

South Africa’s position of was highlighted in the briefing. Mostly importantly, South Africa wished the issue to be resolved through dialogue and within the framework of the Agency. There needed to be a focus on the clarification of all outstanding safeguards and South Africa recognised the importance of the confidence-building measures as well as the importance of distinguishing between legal obligations and voluntary confidence building. South Africa had abstained from the 24 September resolution, as it felt more time was needed for dialogue and negotiation, as well as the 4 February 2006 due to a number of important reasons which were mentioned.

Discussion
The Chairperson stated that the briefing highlighted the problem of the current lack of uniformity with regard to the monitoring processes of countries that had nuclear technology. There seemed to be an uneven process of accountability to the NPT

Mr M Skosana (IFP) said that he had ascertained from the briefing that the majority of IAEFA Board members were apprehensive of the unrefined Report reaching the UNSC. This was why a number of negotiations had taken place so that the Report reached the UNSC in an acceptable language. The introduction of this Report to the Security Council was inevitable. Some officials were apprehensive of this occurrence due to the doctrine of the Security Council. This was a doctrine of international power and security and many of the more powerful nations projected their interests in the UNSC. This was one of the main reasons for the reluctance towards the transformation of the UNSC and the General Assembly.

With these issues in mind he wished to know how long it would take for China and Russia to ‘climb down’ from the position they had taken in the UNSC with regard to Iran and its nuclear energy development. All countries had national interests and their representatives on the UNSC were expected to assist in maintaining the status quo. For example, the Committee had been briefed on the Sudan recently and had noted the extensive interests of China in this country’s conflict.

Mr Minty replied that Russia and China were currently in discussion with all 15 members of the UNSC. There were also not many cases where these two countries had used their veto rights. It was clear that the five permanent members had to reach a common understanding even if there was no agreement on an issue. The rest of the UNSC had been complaining for a while that there were very few issues that were discussed by the entire Council. Usually the five permanent members made a decision and the other members were merely required to rubber stamp it. It was important to realise that bilaterally the pressure of the big powers were extremely formidable and this made it difficult to discuss matters in a straightforward way. Unfortunately, the issue of Iran and nuclear energy had reached the Security Council. The Board of the IAEA had not been required to refer its Report to the UNSC as this body was free to discuss any matter it wished to. This had already been made clear by the United States of America (USA) in 2003.

The non-aligned members did have a procedure known as the non-aligned caucus where non-aligned members of the UNSC met with the troika of the non-aligned. Despite this contact, reports from New York had indicated that there was the problem of a lack of technical information. Mr Minty was prepared to visit New York so that he could assist governments in obtaining this information. An important issue that also needed to be addressed was that under the IAEA Statute a finding of non-compliance required the Board to report the matter to the UNSC and GA. However, the GA had not been mentioned at the emergency meeting in February. Mr Minty had issued a statement at the March meeting that South Africa requested any reports that were sent to the UNSC to be sent to the GA. It was important that, if a report was presented to the UN body, all its members were included. However, it was also clear that the Board of the Governors of the IAEA was not a very democratic body as it overrepresented Europe while the African continent had only one permanent seat and there was therefore a clear western nation majority. To overcome this problem the Board had tried not to politicise issues and worked on a spirit of consensus.

Mr W Seremane (DA) commented that there seemed to be a great deal of hair-splitting over this issue. He had two questions. Firstly, he questioned what could be done to regulate deliberations on the Iran issue and secondly, how greatly was world peace threatened by the current modus operandi.

Mr Minty agreed that there was a great deal of hair-splitting over the issue. However, it was important that South Africa identified as far as possible the nuances that existed around the hair-splitting as this was where the real concerns lay. South Africa was frustrated as the confrontation process had lead to tension and to a point where both sides were merely seeking ways to try to defeat the other side. The tense atmosphere left no room for common sense. The Director General of the IAEA was concerned over the problem. South Africa believed that nothing should be done which would result in the inspectors being prevented from entering Iran.

The developments that had occurred in the Middle East were not conducive to the creation of peace. Action in Iran therefore posed enormous dangers. The Shia leader of Iraq had stated that if there was any attack on Iran, Iraq would stand by it. This would mean that the peace process in Iraq would unravel. Iran had, until then, supported many of the USA’s programmes in the Middle East and more specifically Iraq and had been an important contributor in creating stability. However, Iran had made it clear that, if action was taken against it, this support would be removed and it would therefore not work with other countries to try and promote peace and stability in the region. A number of other affects would also be felt. Firstly the price of oil would increase as Iran was the second biggest producer of oil. The Russians had also been contracted to build a nuclear plant in Iran and therefore sanctions imposed by the UNSC would affect this contract negatively. India had also concluded a large gas pipeline deal which would run through Pakistan and a number of tankers also passed Iran regularly. The American ambassador to the UN had stated that the Iran issue was the biggest threat since 11 September, and this was reiterated in President Bush’s strategy document which had been released during the previous week.

Mr M Ramgobin (ANC) stated that the briefing had been very detailed. However, he felt that one issue had been omitted regarding the understanding of the conflicting oppositions on the question of nuclear energy in Iran. This was that there was no consideration of the role the major powers played in respect of ‘surrogate’ countries that had nuclear energy. He would have liked to believe that Iran refused to be a surrogate of any country as it had its own national and regional interests to protect.

The briefing had highlighted the role of the EU in great detail but had ignored the overt presence of the USA. To be frank, it was the USA that sought the involvement of the UNSC as it could defy that structure as it had done in the past. The USA could not defy the IAEFA with the same vehemence and freedom as it could with the UNSC. There was a time when North Korea had been chastised by the international community on the same issue and rumours had spread that this was actually an attempt to chastise China. The USA had recently completed an agreement with India regarding nuclear energy for non-military purposes. This agreement involved inspection at certain levels and non-inspection at other levels and it was accused by many as being a double standard approach. With these points having been made, it was important to highlight that the balance of forces would be affected if Iran was given the free scope to develop nuclear capacity in its region.

Mr Minty replied that many countries had begun asking a number of questions. The agreement with India, which had been concluded with the USA, France and Great Britain, had lead to Pakistan requesting a similar deal. However, the USA had refused this request arguing that Pakistan’s non-proliferation record was not good and that it did not have large enough nuclear energy programmes. A meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group was currently taking place in Vienna where the issue of countries that had broken the NPT was being dealt with. Control measures would be drawn up at this meeting whereby countries would not sell products to India, Pakistan and Israel as all three were guilty of breaking the NPT. However, the USA had now concluded an agreement with India and this issue would therefore have to be discussed in greater detail at a later stage. Russia had in the past supplied uranium to India, going against the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and had then been condemned by the western nations. However, Russia has since then announced further deals.

He wished to highlight an important issue which had not been covered by the briefing. In February 2004 President Bush had made a statement that countries could not be trusted with nuclear enrichment programmes as, once these countries had the technology, they could use it for weapons. He therefore proposed that from February 2004, countries that did not have enrichment programmes in place would not be allowed to enrich in the future and those that did could carry on with their enrichment processes. South Africa had clearly rejected this proposal as it was felt that many countries in the developing world would be prohibited from enriching while countries like Israel, India and Pakistan could continue with their enrichment programmes.

However, there are still strong pressures to adopt this proposal and Russia had recently announced that it had created the first international centre for uranium supplies. Countries could therefore acquire uranium from this centre without having to produce it. This programme had been endorsed by the USA and, if Iran accepted this proposal, many other countries would feel the pressure to do the same. South Africa was currently planning the development of a pebble bed reactor and if it was successful the country might be interested in enriching uranium in the future as it would then have the technology to do so. South Africa was therefore against this proposal even though it felt increasing pressure to accept it.

Mr M Sibande (ANC) had a number of concerns. Most importantly the briefing had highlighted the fact that the IAEA had not yet found any evidence of diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. However, in September 2005, the IAEFA Board adopted the resolution that it had found Iran to have been non-compliant with the NPT Safeguard Agreement. This was obviously a contradiction. He was also concerned that there seemed to be countries pushing for the invasion of Iran without there being a proper reason to do so. He asked what could be done to prevent this unnecessary invasion from occurring. He agreed with Mr Ramgobin that some countries needed other countries to become instruments of imperialism and, if these countries refused, they became a target.

Mr Minty responded that the IAEFA Board had stated in 2003 that Iran had not provided any information on its nuclear activities for eighteen years. This classified as "non-compliance". Even though Iran had in the interim corrected the situation it was still being held on the issue. South Africa had argued in one of the Board meetings that a paradox existed as Iran tried to address its failures while at the same time the new resolutions that were being adopted were becoming stricter. It was important to note that new issues had also come up and the Board still had to clarify many of them. South Africa strongly supported this clarification process.

He was unsure of how an invasion could be prevented. Many authors had come to the conclusion that an invasion would not be practical as it would be much more difficult than the invasion of Iraq. However, possible aerial attacks had not been ruled out. What could happen in the future was that the EU could impose sanctions similar to those imposed on Zimbabwe, such as sanctions that affected the country’s funding, sport sanctions and people sanctions where individuals were prohibited from travelling. The world would then have to wait to see what Iran’s reaction would be to these sanctions. This was the cycle that would lead to a confrontation developing. The USA had already strengthened its existing sanctions against Iran.

Ms S Motubatse-Hounkpatin (ANC) recognised that South Africa’s position on the situation was clear. She wished to know if Iran enjoyed any support from other countries such as the other Arab nations. She asked if these nations were working collectively with Iran or whether it (Iran) was on its own.

Mr Minty replied that Iran was a member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. This was obviously not an Arab country but it did have relations with the Arab league. There had also recently been efforts to declare the Gulf region a nuclear weapon free zone. Iran had questioned why this declaration could not apply to the whole of the Middle East. A number of the Gulf countries had been concerned over the Iran issue and had met with South Africa from time to time to discuss possible solutions. However, there was no regional group such as the African Union (AU) that could deal with the issue as a region. A reason for this were the processes that were followed at IAEA meetings in Vienna as countries never worked through political groups. When countries voted at these meetings, they mostly voted according to their own national interests; and therefore in different directions.

He was unsure of what would happen at the UN in New York as it was theoretically possible that the non-aligned members or the G77 could take on the matter once it was discussed in the UNSC. However, a gap still existed as the GA had not received the information which had been presented to the UN. South Africa often stood alone as it acted on principle throughout the deliberations and had no personal interests. Many countries respected South Africa because of this stance and, even though they did not always agree with its arguments, they were always willing to listen to it. South Africa had also been on the IAEA Board continuously and Mr Minty was the longest serving member of the Board. Secondly, South Africa had the vital technical experience and experts that were needed to understand many of the technical issues and problems that existed. However, South Africa’s power was diminished when the bigger powers became involved.

The Chairperson thanked Mr Minty and commented that, when looking at the entire situation, it was clear that it did not just entail monitoring the use of nuclear technology for peaceful means but rather that an obvious western political agenda existed which was to prevent developing countries from moving forward in this field. This situation also had a number of possible consequences including the possibility of the USA attacking Iran in the same way it had attacked Iraq. Many hidden forces were playing a role in the work done by the permanent members of the UNSC with regards to the NPT. This was frightening as, if the situation were not handled properly, there would be serious repercussions.

The Chairperson proposed that the Committee adopt the minutes of the Committee meeting that took place on 15 March 2006 as well as a Report on the Sudan briefing which the Committee had requested to receive.

The Minutes and the Report were adopted unanimously and without any amendments or objections.

The meeting was adjourned.

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