Centre for Conflict Resolution, Centre for Policy Studies & African Institute Reports on United Nations Reform: briefings

Meeting report

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE
26 August 2005
CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES AND AFRICAN INSTITUTE REPORTS ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM: BRIEFINGS

Chairperson: Mr D Sithole (ANC)

Documents handed out:
Centre for Conflict Resolution’s Report on United Nations Reform
African Institute briefing

SUMMARY
The Centre for Conflict Resolution, the Center for Policy Studies and the African Institute briefed the Committee on latest developments in the United Nations (UN) reform process. The presenters referred to the various relevant reports, including the UN High-level Panel Report and the Freedom Report. They felt Africa had to ensure that ‘soft security’ issues, such as development and poverty, were not ignored in favour of ‘hard security’ issues, such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Reforms also needed to occur within the United Nations General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. The collective African voice should be strengthened. The majority of conflicts tended to occur in Africa. Presenters stated that extensive Security Council reform was unlikely. A fragile consensus currently prevailed within Africa that demanded a veto for new permanent members. The insistence on the veto would undermine overall reform possibilities. They provided detail on the chances of the three country candidates, South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, and the criteria for permanent membership.

Members asked questions about the implications and motivation of the ‘veto or nothing’ stance; the role of nation ‘spoilers’ in the process; the national interests of other African states; the need for enhanced state capacity; the benefits of Security Council membership for African states; the value of the veto as a reform mechanism, and the need for a ‘middle path’ to reform the UN.

MINUTES
The Chairperson stated that the meeting provided an opportunity for Members to gain civil society perspectives on the UN reform debate. The Committee would hold a similar meeting next week with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Members would also acquire insight into current developments and political positions adopted by particular African countries.

Centre for Conflict Resolution briefing
Dr A Adebajo (CCR Head) referred to their recent report based on a series of debates on the UN reform process and an optimum African response position. The UN High-level Panel report and the Freedom report had been analysed, together with various African country positions. The report summarised the discussions and the findings drawn from top African scholars. Africa had to avoid the establishment of a ‘hierarchy of threats’ that defined security threats in the present age. For example, the predominance of ‘hard security’ threats, such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism, should not take precedence over ‘soft threats’ such as poverty and under-development. A balance had to be attained. A meeting held in Addis Addiba in March 2004 that involved African civil society groups, had acknowledged the vast advances made within Africa to improve governance and democracit functioning. However, NGOs had stressed the need for greater involvement from African leaders and media groups in promoting and communicating successes.

The Security Council reform process should not dominate proceedings to the detriment of other important concerns, such as the strengthening of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Many still criticised remained that the proposed reforms contained a Western bias. The emphasis on humanitarian issues could be perceived as an opportunity for ‘gunboat diplomacy’ by the most powerful states. A prevailing perception was that African influence in the UN had declined to the detriment of ‘an African consensus’. The recent appointment of Mr Gumbari as the head of UN political affairs had mitigated this perception to some extent. African intellectuals had recommended that the link between the various capital cities and the UN should be improved to improve communication of priorities. The High-level Panel report had triggered extensive debate within Africa and promoted co-operation between the African Union and other sub-regional groups. The advent of global terrorism posed new challenges for Africa and placed pressure on African governments to pass ‘draconian’ anti-terror legislation in exchange for further financial assistance. The role of poverty in fostering terrorism should not be ignored in devising appropriate responses to the threat.

Both reports emphasised the dangers of HIV/AIDS and the need for a collective African response. The continuing debt crisis had to be addressed through debt cancellation initiatives, rather than improved repayment mechanisms. Trade barriers and agricultural subsidies had to be removed to facilitate economic development. The role of peacekeepers in Africa should be clarified as 70% of Security Council deliberations focused on African conflicts.

The current African position regarding Security Council reform was for two permanent seats with a veto and two extra rotating seats. The three leading African candidates were Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa. Nigeria had the largest number of peacekeepers currently deployed, but had recently experienced 15 years of military rule and instability. South Africa possessed a sound peacekeeping record but the military, civil society organisations and academia were perceived as ‘too white’ within the African context. Egypt had produced a Secretary-General but was perceived as lacking adequate ‘African credentials’ and it was too ‘Middle East focused’. Extensive Security Council reform was unlikely to happen as many potential ‘spoilers’ existed. Africa should have accepted the G4 countries' compromise position on the veto. Reform required a two-thirds majority within the General Assembly.

The UN had committed to financing African regional organisations and Secretary-General Kofi Annan had displayed clear support for the AU. A Peace-Building Commission within the UN would likely be created that would concentrate on post-conflict peace initiatives, incorporating financial assistance from regional development banks. Africa had produced two Secretary-Generals in Boutros-Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan. They had notable differences in personality, but both had displayed fervent support for the UN's role in the developing world. Annan had been criticised for his failure to warn of the impending Rwandan genocide when UN Head of Peacekeeping. Recent corruption allegations directed at his son could undermine his role in the reform process and damage his reputation.

Centre for Policy Studies briefing
Mr C Landsberg stated that recent Financial Times reports on the UN reform process had hinted that minor reforms within the Security Council could occur. An extensive divide separated the ‘North’ from the ‘South’, and in particular between the United States and the developing world. The Panel Report and the Freedom Report were desperate attempts to include development issues within the debate on reform. Security should not be seen as strictly about hard issues such as terrorism and nuclear weapons. Africa's insistence on a veto could act as a deal breaker and stall meaningful UN reform. The UN Secretariat saw reform as a two-pronged strategy involving North support for development, coupled with South retraction on the veto demand. The developing world could use the opportunity to facilitate increased resource allocation and trade reform. The Ezulweni Consensus had also reiterated Africa's opposition to nuclear proliferation and placed additional responsibility on the nuclear powers to act responsibly. UN Charter principles and the international legal framework should be strengthened together with sub-regional bodies.

A fragile consensus had been reached within Africa on Security Council reform. The various reports entrenched the current tilt towards the West. The human security agenda of the South remained weak. The reports did not place additional stress on the South's development agenda. The High-level Panel's emphasis on intervention on humanitarian grounds could be interpreted as an opportunity to engage in pre-emptive strikes against targeted countries by the powerful states. No widespread reform was predicted at next month's UN meeting. The debate centered on non-veto expansion of the Security Council, as opposed to continued insistence on the veto for new permanent members. The non-veto expansion was likely to succeed, but significant doubts remained. Africa should foster intra-African co-operation and establish a common voice on development and other agendas. A continued fragmentation of Africa would prevent the advancement of the continent.

African Institute briefing
Dr E Maloka (AI CEO) stated that the notion of reform fell into three categories, namely institutional reforms; a paradigm shift; and more energy placed into related issues such as the environment. The Institute had recently engaged in three exercises to promote the reform process and assisted in the generation of analyses. The High-level Panel Report had been interrogated in New York; the UN Special Envoy to Africa had been assisted with regard to meetings; and the Diaspora Conference in Jamaica had debated the Panel Report. The Institute recommended that Africa maintain a strong and united position within the UN. Security Council reform should not be focused on to the detriment of other pressing issues. The African common position should allow for certain countries to act independently if necessary. A more flexible approach could be of benefit to Africa in general.

The Institute listed certain criteria for African representation on the Security Council: adherence to democratic principles; capacity for adequate representation; adequate respect for the African continent; and reasonable levels of political stability and technical knowledge to participate effectively on the Council. The intransigence on the veto issue did not help the African cause and the G4 compromise should be supported. The Institute regarded Egypt as the advantaged candidate due primarily to its strategic geographical location between Africa and the Middle East. Another perspective might portray South Africa as the primary candidate. Nigeria appeared to be the weakest candidate. Africa had to consider the strategic significance of the UN for its development agenda. They provided a list of advantages of the UN for Africa, including the ability to restrain ‘United States imperialism’, support for development, debt and trade reforms.

Discussion
The Chairperson asked how South Africa should respond to the collective decision adopted at Addis Addiba and about the implications of ‘veto or nothing’. He wanted to know what had informed Africa's position. Intransigence was not in Africa's best interest. To what extent could Africa’s insistence on a veto benefit other countries outside Africa with a ‘spoiler's agenda’. The presence of only three known candidates might have an adverse impact on the voting procedure.

Mr M Ramgobin (ANC) stated that Africa had to remain realistic in its ambition to reform the UN. The awarding of veto status within the Security Council was a very remote possibility. Enhanced capacity to represent Africa's interests had to be generated. The relevance of the security veto in respect of development needs, should also be questioned. One veto could scuttle any initiative and Africa would face constant opposition from powerful states. The colonial legacy had contributed to the maintenance of division within Africa and the presence of different positions on reform.

Ms F Hajaig (ANC) asked for clarity on the expected benefits of Security Council representation for Africa and why a veto was so vital. The context of US anti-terror priorities verses the development and humanitarian agenda of Africa, should be borne in mind. Decisive action at this juncture was imperative as Africa was engaged in a progressive upliftment process. She referred to a recent conference in Nigeria where Nigerian officials had attempted to impose their position onto the delegates as a resolution. She thus questioned the relevance of the claims for African unity. Delegates had to oppose the proposal and prevent attempts at overriding their positions. The lobbying of poor countries within Africa should be checked, so a genuine consensus could be achieved.

Mr L Greyling (ID) referred to the hypocrisy of powerful states in calling for democratic principles within the developing world, while maintaining an undemocratic system in the Security Council. He questioned why Africa wanted to gain access to such an ‘elitist club’, and suggested that African countries should rather seek to remove the veto mechanism as a part of meaningful reforms. The imposition of ‘half-hearted’ reforms could now lock the international community into a flawed framework for decades. The challenge for African states was to generate real solidarity within the developing world.

Mr O Bapela (ANC) would attend a Speakers Forum at the UN on behalf of Parliament in September 2005, prior to the final decision of the General Assembly. The interaction with the presenters should enhance his knowledge and facilitate meaningful input at the Forum. He questioned the logic of Africa's current position and noted that earlier compromises on the veto demand had collapsed after the decision reached at the Heads of State meeting in Addis Addaba. He asked whether unity prevailed in Africa and which approach was the most logical in the given context. A ‘middle path’ was needed to avoid African isolation and rejection.

Dr Adebajo replied that Security Council reform could lapse for a time if significant changes did not occur now. Reform of the Council should be separated from other necessary reforms to avoid the neglect of development and poverty eradication efforts. The last reform of the Security Council had occurred in 1965 and no further initiative was likely in the short term. South Africa ‘breaking ranks’ now would be a danger and have negative consequences. South Africa should instead adhere to the consensus but continue to lobby behind the scenes. The ‘veto or nothing’ approach was ‘suicidal’ for Africa and the G4 compromise should be supported. Japan and Germany were two of the largest contributors to the UN, and these countries had agreed on a compromise.

The reason for the intransigence was unclear and various theories could be proffered. Certain countries could have decided to wreck the process out of self-interest or as ‘by proxy’. The Security Council could be viewed as an undemocratic entity created by the victors of World War Two. Africa urgently needed seats on the Security Council as the most powerful decision -making body in the UN. Weak consultation with Africa had to be strengthened and Africa's collective voice had to be heard. Pressure should be placed on the powerful states to deploy peacekeepers in Africa more readily, and to avoid future Rwandan genocide scenarios. A coalition of states, including Libya and Zimbabwe, had opposed the compromise position at the Head of States meeting. Continued Egyptian and Algerian intransigence had persisted at a Foreign Ministers' meeting where Nigeria had proposed a compromise.

Dr Maloka responded that it was not an option for South Africa to break ranks with Africa's consensus. He advocated a more flexible position that allowed for individual lobbying on the part of certain states. The common position might entail hidden agendas by certain countries to scuttle the overall process. A common position on Security Council reform would be difficult to attain, but the current consensus should be maintained in the interests of Africa as a whole. Candidates for permanent membership had to possess a certain level of capacity to competently fulfil the function and ensure adequate resources. A pragmatic approach to reform should be adopted to achieve realistic objectives. Insistence on the veto by certain countries could be driven by jealousy and specific national interests. The problem could only be adequately addressed through informal processes.

Mr Landsberg stated that South Africa had adopted the most sensible approach out of the three frontrunners to public disagreements over the appropriate African position. South Africa should not initiate any breaking of the consensus. The country should not assume a position of respect within Africa in terms of the criteria for membership. Libya and Zimbabwe could claim that other countries were the spoilers as the original African consensus was to insist on a veto. Subsequent arguments away from this position could be perceived as stemming from expediency. Divisions within Africa were common knowledge and the attainment and retention of a consensus position was problematic.

Current reforms needed to alter the UN in favour of Africa and the developing world. Africa should be present in the Security Council and more UN involvement was needed in Africa. A rotation of African members within the Security Council would be the optimum arrangement. Two four-year memberships on a renewable basis would be more beneficial than two permanent memberships. The future stability of the leading candidates could not be assumed. For example, inequalities within South Africa would have to be addressed in the long term. Rotation should be arranged on a regional basis to incorporate different needs of the continent. African countries should remain critical of imperialism from whatever quarter, including allegedly growing Chinese imperialism. Powerful African countries should move beyond narrow national interests for the sake of overall consensus. Divisions had to be ameliorated to foster development.

Dr Maloka asserted that South Africa had an important role to play in African development, and its international influence was acknowledged by African states. The recognised strength outweighed any antagonisms.

The Chairperson stated that any potential permanent members of the Security Council should have sufficient capacity to fulfil the functions in an effective manner. An important question was the reasons for the escalating doubt in the African position over the veto demand, and what could have contributed towards the change.

The meeting was adjourned.