State of SANDF Reserves & Military Ombudsman


01 November 2000
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Meeting Summary

A summary of this committee meeting is not yet available.

Meeting report


1 November 2000

Chairperson: Mr J N Mashimbye

Department of Defence delegation: Minister Lekota; General Nyanda: Chief of the SANDF; Admiral Trainer: Chief of Corporate Staff; General Matanzima: Chief of Joint Support Division; Major-General Deetlefs: Chief of Reserve Forces; Major-General Papane: Chief of Corporate Commandos; Brigadier-General Tatana: Head of Commandos/Territorial Reserves; Col Schoeman: Operations (responsible for deployment of reserves) ; Col Zietsmann: Reserves.

Documents Handed Out:
Status of Reserve Forces: Department of Defence Presentation

The Department of Defence gave a presentation regarding the nature and functions of the reserve forces.

Issues raised by members related to transformation and representivity, as well as civic education and training. Budgetary constraints were discussed as they impacted on the Defence Force’s ability to continue training with reserve force members and their ability to recruit adequate numbers of new members. It was shown how this has a negative impact on efforts at changing the complexion of the Defence Force. It was decided that a further meeting was required in order to focus more extensively on this issue, with the suggestion being welcomed by both the committee and the Department. Interaction will also continue on a more specialised basis with study groups taking responsibility for various aspects of the transformation issue.

An undertaking was given by the Department that instances of criminality and misconduct as have been highlighted in the recent media do not constitute everyday occurrences, and where these are reported they are investigated and prosecuted according to due process.

The Minister of Defence stated that in spite of the fact that he was unable to stay for the presentation, he took full responsibility for the information contained therein. He requested that the Committee ensure that in future all requests for audiences with the Department be channelled through himself in order to ensure that he is fully able to take responsibility and be accountable for the department.

The Chair stated that it was standard practice for the committee to request meetings with the Department of Defence through the Ministry, and that it was always done in writing.

The Minister stated that he would address this with the chairpersons of both the Joint Committee and the Portfolio Committees and the Ministry staff.

General Nyanda and his staff made the presentation to the committee (see document).

Ms Modise (ANC) picked up on the General’s characterisation of the reserve forces as ‘vibrant and representative’, questioning why, if this is the case, their image remains so negative. She asked what was being done to clean up the image of the reserve forces.

Ms Modise also asked for the gender breakdown of the reserve forces, and a further breakdown of the number of women members by race and geographic location. She stated that in spite of the fact that the contention is made that the reserves are representative, this is not the case.

General Nyanda replied that the Department of Defence is the first to admit that there is a problem with regard to the image of the reserves. However when reports are made of misconduct, these are immediately investigated and action is taken. He has instructed the Commanders to work for immediate suspension of these members once due process has been followed.

He said that they were not able to produce statistics at this meeting. He gave an undertaking to submit the statisitics since 1994 in order to show the progress made.

Ms Modise asked for an update in the case of a man who was sprayed with silver paint as well as the recent shooting at Simonstown Naval base. She enquired if the state is bearing the cost of these parties’ legal costs?

Gen. Nyanda replied that as both parties were off duty and acting in their private capacities, the Department was not responsible for paying for any legal costs.

Brigadier-General Schalkwyk (DP) stated that he felt that more community recognition and support should be given to our soldiers, as these are the people on whom we will rely for our safety in a time of war. He noted that the operational requirement for border commandos is 54 but the Department is restricted to only 19 as a result of budgetary constraints. He asked whether it was not short-sighted to skimp in such an important area as the presence of these commandos could have the dual impact of aiding with the stemming of illegal immigrants into the country. The cost burden in terms of social services to illegal immigrants outweighed the cost of appointing the full complement of border commandos.

He also asked for clarity regarding active personnel strength. In the case of a call-up of reserves, do the correct people arrive for duty - from all levels of the rank structure?

Ms Kota (ANC) stated that she has noticed that there were now no ‘part-time’ soldiers, and only reserve commandos. Had the part-time soldiers been done away with? She commented that while there needs to be recognition of the budgetary constraints that the Department faces, this is surely inconsistent with the ‘one force’ concept as outlined in the presentation. She asked the following questions:
- in the light of the budgetary constraints, what was being done about civil education and equal opportunities
- a realistic timeframe be presented as to when improvements in representivity in the Defence Department would be seen.
- what steps were being taken to get the right people involved in the armed forces.
- what the targeted number of new recruits is per intake and what number is actually attained each year
- what role does natural attrition play in changing the demographics of the Department.

General Nyanda replied that the Department is well aware of the problems that are associated with having only 19 border commandos when 54 are required, as this also impacts on their ability to support the South African Police Service. Budgetary constraints are being felt by all sectors of the Department, but the current situation remains that the Army and Airforce are not able to fulfil their obligations (in terms of patrols and air assistance), the Navy is still currently able to do so. This is not due to unwillingness, but rather the reality that there simply is no money for fuel and salaries.

Regarding call-ups, he stated that as there is no obligation on the part of employers to release reserve members for training or call-up, the full complement of soldiers do not report for each call-up. Often this means that there are not enough soldiers, and that the key people are not present. A new strategy is being devised to address this, and this will be presented to the Portfolio Committee as soon as this is completed. He added, however, that the number of people reporting for duty also is dependent on the type of exercise called up for - for example turnout for election duty, help with foot-and-mouth disease and cholera in KwaZulu Natal have been very good.

He clarified that the change in terminology from ‘part-time soldiers’ to reserves was done to more accurately reflect their status.

Regarding transformation, General Nyanda replied that transformation is indeed a process, which includes a change of mindset. Equal opportunities and civil education are part of this. Whereas there may be less attention paid to other areas as a result of the tight budget, this issue is very important , especially among middle-level management. The goal is to inculcate the process of transformation in each and every individual, but this requires money which is not available at present.

As to a timeframe, he pointed out that marked changes have occurred since 1994, when the Department of Defence was almost exclusively white. The challenge is that the leadership remains mostly white as it takes time to train new officers. Attention is being paid to aiding this process, and the General suggested that members come to the bases and meet with the soldiers so that they can see what is being done in this regard and make further suggestions.

Recruitment is a related issue, and it has been shown that it is not difficult to recruit people for the Department of Defence - probably in part due to the high unemployment rate. This does not mean that the Department of Defence has halted recruiting people who are not there for opportunistic reasons. Members with training and education are being recruited to help train younger members. Since 1994 intakes per year have dropped from 2000 soldiers to roughly 600 as a result of budgetary constraints once again. About 20 000 reserves are needed to ensure that the needs of the Department of Defence are optimally filled, but even 10 000 new reserves would be adequate. The reality of the situation is that as a result of the decreased intakes, the average age of the force is very old, with privates sometimes ageing between 35 - 40 years old. He said that natural attrition was taking place, although he did not have figures with him.

The Chair asked whether provision was still being made for civic education.

General Nyanda replied that this was taking place and was the responsibility of the Joint Training Division.

Mr Ngculu (ANC) stated that he was not convinced that there is progress with regard to recruitment specifically with regard to previously excluded people being brought in. The argument is given that black people do not want to join or are opportunistic, especially in the Western Cape. Reassurance is needed that people are being enlisted from outside the Department and it is essential to develop a programme to ensure that this happens. He added that part of this process is ensuring that the issue of ranking is addressed, as the reserve forces should also carry rank. Finally he asked for clarity as to how initial military service is operationalised, how other people are sensitised that this is still happening, and who is responding to calls for volunteer soldiers.

Prof Mabeta (UDM) stated that it is a serious oversight that the central issues to transformation are not the points of departure in the Department of Defence’s presentation. He requested a new presentation to deal specifically with transformation and the different aspects of civil education, as well as the system of mentorship which should be benefiting those from disadvantaged backgrounds. He stated that there is a tendency to stop at those aspects which are working to the detriment of those aspects that are not. The issue for discussion is not the effective execution of operations, but rather the morale and environment of those who have to do the execution. If this is neglected, the progress made thus far will be lost.

Major-General Deetlefs stated that the Reserve Forces Council is an independent body , and is a voluntary organisation started in 1992. Representatives to this council are elected democratically and are not under the ‘umbrella’ of the Department of Defence. He undertook to contact the council and raise the committee’s concerns.

Regarding the ranking issues, this has resulted primarily from the integration of the former non-statutory forces. A framework has been published and a process for handling the ranking of these people has been set up. A list of 150 names have been submitted by APLA and MK of their officers. For posts of Colonel and above, General Nyanda has indicated that he wants to take a personal hand in appointing to these posts. This process will commence within the next two months.

General Nyanda continued that when ranking people, there is a specific post profile and the appointee must have the capacity in terms of available time and completed training to be successful. Some suggested candidates are too highly qualified for the positions, as often candidates of the rank of general are submitted, but the post is more hands on.

On the issue of initial military service, Major-General Deetlefs stated that one year’s initial service is advertised in the press, with an annual response of about 20 000 - 30 000 people for 500 posts. Personnel acquisition in Pretoria handle the process of selection. The Department of Defence plans to have enough funds by 2002 to take in 2000 soldiers, which will have a significant positive impact.

General Nyanda continued that budgetary constraints result in the fact that the Department of Defence cannot afford what it needs. The challenge therefore is to innovate the process so that the net result is that there is racial integration at all levels. The Department welcomes the committee’s oversight role, and would be very happy to prepare a further presentation to concentrate on the issues surrounding transformation. He re-iterated that this was not the mandate of the Department for this presentation. He stated that the issue of civic education is an important one, and underlined that this is only one aspect of transformation. The responsibility of Defence is operations, and care must be taken to train people adequately in all areas to be able to ensure that this is carried out effectively.

Brigadier-General Tatana stated that care must be taken to strike a balance between the need for taking new people in, and the Department’s ability to utilise them. There is the real danger that the Department is losing people to the private security industry for example as a result of the Department’s inability to use them actively.

Mr Makwetla (ANC) asked for the Department’s opinion regarding the performance of the reserves, as they have a very negative image with good reports being few and far between. He also identified a contradiction between the plan to have a lean core unit with reserve forces and the need to expand in order to transform. But the Department cannot expand something that has a second function, and is it really therefore committed to expanding the reserve forces?

A member stated that in his opinion training is not happening. By way of example he used himself, as he is a member of the reserve forces. His training camps involve activities for which he is not trained, followed by a braai. He asked when the budget and policy document would be co-ordinated. He stated that training cannot be done in the classroom, and unless there is money to start the tanks, the exercise is futile.

Ms Modise stated that she supported the suggestion that the Department brief the committee again, and asked that this briefing also address the issue of the need for these forces. She also stated that she was concerned by the statement that the Reserve Force Council is independent of the Chief of the Defence Force as this can lead to a situation where the chief is excluded from decisions taken by the council. She asked if a portion of the Defence Force budget is allocated to the Reserve Force Council, saying that if there was any allocation of funds it is impossible to say that it is wholly independent. She underlined that the issue of civic education is of paramount importance. Further the issue of Defence Force members’ power to arrest should also be tabled for further discussion.

General Nyanda stated that the Defence Force is of the opinion that the reserve forces are doing sterling work and are extremely necessary in spite of the small contingent that besmirch their good name. He agreed that a further meeting was required, and undertook to brief the committee as to how the reserves fit into the Defence Force as a whole. He stated that it is important to remember that reserve members are trained soldiers and form the absolutely essential second line when they are deployed.

General Matanzima stated that the Department is not proud of the instances of criminal complicity and that they are committed to prosecuting these cases. It is essential that there is the appeal to all people to help the process of transformation of the complexion of the defence force as this can only be done from within - it is up to the individual.

Colonel Zietsman stated that extensive training is planned for 2001 and this will include:
Junior leadership training; Bridging training; Instruction in civic education; Decentralised and modular training courses to ensure accessibility; Achieving of efficiency goals, with an emphasis on being needs-driven.

General Nyanda stated that he is currently engaging with the Minister to attempt to address the issue of budgetary constraints. He clarified that the Reserve Force Council falls under the auspices of the Ministry, and is therefore not entirely independent. They are responsible for advising the Minister on matters relating to the reserves, and have their own structure for doing this.

The Chair thanked the Department of Defence for their presentation, and their willingness to engage with the committee on such important and difficult issues. He expressed the hope that the passion of the committee members and their commitment to see these issues addressed could lead to a meaningful interaction with the Department of Defence - with tangible results ensuing. He urged members to take up the offer of visits to the bases to see the reality of day-to-day operations.

The meeting closed at 13h35.

Appendix 1:

1. Let me start by saying that the Reserve Force is an integral part of the SANDF. They are a key element in all our strategies and plans for the defence of South Africa.

2. The White Paper on Defence 1996 and the Defence Review 1998 continue to provide the policy direction and guidelines for the Reserve Force except that the term "Part time Component" has been replaced by "Reserve Force".

3. At the present moment, and for the past number of years, the Reserves Force is undergoing transformation, like the rest of the SANDF. They are also experiencing the stresses and uncertainty brought about by change and the pressure on resources.

4. A major change has been the move to an all volunteer force. This has had a particularly severe impact on the Reserve Force. Never-the-less, we still support the volunteer principle.

5. The question arises, why have a Reserve Force? Reserves are of critical importance because "wars are won by reserves", meaning that the regulars alone will not prevail in war unless they are substantially strengthened by reserves.

6. The mere existence of a large, competent and motivated reserve is a major deterrent to any potential aggressor.

7. Reserves exist primarily for war. They come into their own in terms of motivation and availability when there is a sense of national emergency, when there is a "political mobilization" of the nation. This applies both when there is a threat of war or a major national disaster. This is because reserve members are citizens of South Africa. They respond very enthusiastically when the national interest, (and therefore their own interests), is threatened.

8. The Army Territorial Reserve is a good example of this. On an ongoing basis they respond readily to appeals to provide support to the South Africa Police Service. Their active participation stems from a natural motivation to protect and maintain stability in their own communities.

9. All the members of the Reserve Force are potentially available to provide such support to the South African Police Service or render other service to the people of South Africa in the event of crises such as natural disasters, accidents, rescues and health disasters.

10. South Africa has a proud history of military support by its citizens. The first recorded military action of its "citizen force" was in 1510, when a group of Khoi defeated Francisco D’Almeida and 57 of his men at the mouth of the Salt River not far from Parliament. This has repeated itself throughout the history of this country until contemporary times. Examples of this can be found during the Boer War, World War I, World War II, the conflict in Namibia/Angola and the Liberation Struggle.

11. The Reserve Force of the SANDF comprises the following:
a. The Reserve Force Council. (It is proposed to make it a statutory body)
b. A Reserve Force staff structure at DOD level
c. Reserve Force staff structures in the Services
d. Army Conventional Reserve
e. Army Territorial Reserve
f. Air Force Reserve
g. Naval Reserve
h. Military Health Service Reserve
i. A civilian support body: the National Defence Liaison Committee.

12. The South African Police Service also have a reserve, but, unlike the SANDF’s Reserve Force, the police reservists are not paid. This might partially explain why they are relatively few in number.

13. From a numbers point of view the composition of the Reserve Force is as follows, (see transparencies):
a. Reserve Force and Regular Force
b. Reserve Force by Service
c. Reserve Force by race
d. Reserve Force by gender.

14. The details of the Reserves of each of the Services will be given later.

15. The raison d’être of the Reserve Force is confirmed by the national consensus on defence as manifested in The Defence Act, The White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review as follows :
a. The White Paper on Defence; Chapter 5. "For political, strategic and economic reasons, the SANDF will be an all-volunteer force. It will comprise a relatively small Regular Force, including a civilian component, which is backed up by a sufficiently large Part Time Force."
b. The White Paper on Defence; Chapter 5. "The PTF will consist of personnel who serve on a part-time basis when required. They will be organized, trained and equipped in such a way that they are available for deployment alongside Regular Force members according to the demands placed on the SANDF."
c. Defence Review ; Chapter 3 (par 9.6). "The SANDF must comprise a relatively small regular component, backed up by a sufficiently large part-time component. This structure is cost-effective and will promote regional confidence."

16. The requirement for a Reserve Force in the SANDF is therefor not questioned, contrary to the opinion of some commentators. The previous Minister of Defence confirmed this when he said on 5 June 1996 that "It is universally acknowledged that in a democracy the Citizen in Uniform, the part-time soldier, is an indispensable element of a country’s defence".

17. A number of candid assessments have revealed the following in respect of the Reserve Force.

a. General Issues
i. The SANDF is over its designed strength so it is difficult to utilize the Reserve Force at greater force levels, because Regulars are available. The latter cannot however be fully utilized, because although paid, operating funds for their deployment are limited.

ii The members of the Reserve Force, and also their civilian employers, have no binding legal obligation towards the SANDF.

iii Generally speaking, the Army Territorial Reserve is more active and therefore more visible than the Army Conventional Reserve and tends to draw more resources. Operating funds still remain a constraint, which hinders the growth, transformation, preparation and further employment of the whole Reserve Force.

b. The Army Conventional Reserve
i. The capability of the Army Conventional Reserve has deteriorated seriously. Although headquarters are still in place, and most of the command structure posts on unit level are still filled, units are experiencing serious problems in terms of filling their structures and fulfilling their force preparation (training and exercises) obligations.

ii The Reserve Force presently has no effective feeding source as the Initial Military Service System primarily feeds the Regular Force. This is because the majority of members who enter the Initial Military Service with the intention to join the Reserves are attracted to the Regular Force by the prospect of permanent employment. Little can be done to discourage this. The Army Conventional Reserve does not presently have the mandate or the capacity for recruitment and training of recruits without any prior basic military training.

iii. As is to be expected in time of peace, there is presently a perception of an absence of purpose and employment of the Army Conventional Reserve. They can, and are increasingly supplying troops to bolster the Territorials in the community safeguarding role and operations other then war.

iv The shortage of funds required for equipment, training and exercises further restricts the effectiveness and the capacity of the Army Conventional Reserve.

c The Territorial Reserve (Army and elements of the Air Force Reserve, Naval Reserve and Military Health Service Reserve.)
i the Territorial Reserves are in place and are functioning (relatively) well in the role of "Area Protection". The primary reason for this is the fact that the members of this force has the incentive of being able to contribute to their own safety and security in the process.
ii Although this force is structured for "Rear Area Protection" and community protection during a war situation, they are presently utilised effectively in a community safeguarding role. In the process they are contributing to the SAPS efforts towards the maintenance of law and order. Their active participation is motivated primarily by the opportunity to protect their communities and maintain stability in their own areas.
iii The Air Force Reserve squadrons, who are also classified as Territorials, operate civilian registered aircraft. They are providing a cost-effective light air transport service, and visual air reconnaissance primarily within their specific regions. The only limitation preventing optimum use of this capability is the shortage of funds for this purpose.
iv The Naval Reserve units, also participate in territorial type functions in the ports and coastal areas where they operate.
v The Military Health Service Reserve has a territorial component which supports, primarily, the Army Territorial Reserve.
vi There is a ready supply of people (all races) WANTING to join in the Territorial role. Limitations of funding and other resources is a restraining factor.
18. Strategic Issue. The situation has led the SANDF to register the Reserve Force as a strategic issue. This strategic Issue is expressed in the DOD Level 1 Plan as "the availability of the Reserve Force as a contingent ready force cannot be guaranteed".

19. Commitment. The SANDF is committed to addressing the challenges in the Army Conventional Reserve and indeed the Reserve Force. To this end the SANDF has developed a strategic framework for the Reserve Force which will be discussed below, aimed at rehabilitating the Army’s Conventional Reserve to be an effective and well trained force, so that they can make an important contribution towards the execution of any of the following tasks:

a.Defence of the RSA.
b.Stability Projection.
c.Supporting the SAPS (and other State Departments) in the Maintenance of Law and Order and Border Control.

20. Strategic Framework for the Reserve Force. In order to guide the future development and transformation of the Reserve Force, the SANDF has produced a strategic framework which describes the desired end state for the Reserve Force and which is being used to direct planning. The Defence Staff Council approved this framework in March 2000.

21. Reserve Force Vision and Mission. In terms of the strategic framework the vision of the Reserve Force is defined as follows; "The Reserve Force is contingent ready, fully integrated and functional within the SANDF, while at the same time providing for the expansion capability of the SANDF and contributing significantly to the reduction of the personnel and running cost of the SANDF in the medium term." The mission of the Reserve Force is defined as "To provide contingent ready forces that contribute to the execution of the mission of the SANDF".

22. Critical Issues and Drivers. Nine critical issues have been identified as drivers aimed at directing the further development of the Reserve Force. Plans being developed now and in the short-term include ways and means of addressing these critical issues, which are as follows:

a. The Legitimacy of the Reserve Force. The Reserve Force is being promoted and marketed as a legitimate force to the public, communities, labour, employers and internally within the DOD.

b. Resource Support. Ways and means are being investigated to adequately and cost effectively resource the Reserve Force in order to ensure that they are uniformly equipped and trained vis-à-vis the Regular Force.

c. Command and Control/Management. The role and success of the Reserve Force is dependent on shared command and control/management and the involvement of the Reserve Force in decision making at all levels including Divisional and Corporate HQ level. Presently approved structures at Levels 2 and below contain posts for Reserve Force members and the staffing of such posts is about to commence.

d. Staffing and Personnel Management. Essential to sustainability is that the Reserve Force be continuously fed to ensure a throughflow of competent, fit and appropriately aged personnel. It may be necessary, in future to include a limited commitment to serve in the Reserve Force after honorable termination of regular service. A new approach to feeding the Reserve Force is to develop a system based on the current system of voluntary initial military training to direct more trained and young members to the Reserve Force. It is envisaged that a pilot scheme will be followed in 2001 to test and establish such a service system. It is also essential to the maintenance of efficiency and good morale, that the personnel of the Reserve Force are served by professional and efficient personnel management and support.

e. Training. Education, training and development (ETD) needed to ensure the required competency levels in the Reserve Force is being made available in the most user-friendly way for the Reserve Force.

f. Incentives. An investigation to develop incentives to encourage active participation in the Reserve Force and to encourage the employers to support the Reserve Force and their employees, is in progress. (There is little room for maneuver.

g. Availability. Essential to the success of the Reserve Force is the fact that its members must be available and accessible. Systems in the SANDF are being investigated to enhance the availability and the accessibility/mobility of Reserve Force members.

h. Force Structure. In terms of the White Paper on Defence, the size and structure of the Reserve Force will be determined by the force design and structure of the SANDF as a whole. Currently this is being addressed during current strategic planning to establish the final Force Design and Structure of the SANDF.

i. Legal Basis. The Reserve Force has special legal requirements because of its difference vis-à-vis the Regular Force. The legal basis for the employment of the Reserve Force is being set. Issues such as job protection, liability to serve, the individual’s protection during operations inside and outside the borders of the RSA, the effect of unionization on the Reserve Force, the alignment of the Defence Act iro the Reserve Force and other issues are the subjects of ongoing investigation.

23. Defence of South Africa. Defence is the primary function of the SANDF. It consists of those military operations which are intended to protect South Africa, its territorial integrity and its people. In the wartime role of the SANDF the landward defence is characterised by the following:

a. The conduct of Mobile Conventional Operations, with conventional forces, including the Army Conventional Reserve, providing the first and main line of defence against external military threats.

b. The conduct of Area Defence Operations, comprising Area Protection and Border Safeguarding. Area Protection provides defence in depth against military incursions by external military forces, as well as a firm base from where mobile operations can be conducted. Border Protection provides defence of the integrity of the border against a military threat and against crossings by unauthorised individuals and groups. These operations would be mostly conducted by the Army Territorial Reserve.

24. Peace Time Roles. In peace time the Reserves also come into play in the secondary functions of the SANDF. This includes the preservation of life, health and property; the provision or maintenance of essential services; and the upholding of law and order in support of the SAPS.

25. Command and Control. The operations in peace time are co-ordinated by the National Operational Co-ordination mechanism (NOCOC), which cascades down to the ground level Grassroots Operational Co-ordinating Committees (GOCOCs). Operational planning is done on a weekly basis with SAPS at the Grassroots Operational Coordination Committee level. During all patrols and/or Vehicle Control Points, all Territorial Reserve Forces must have a SAPS member with them or be authorized by the local SAPS Station Commander to deploy without a SAPS member.

26. Deployments. Currently the Territorial Reserves deploy with Regular Forces in community safe-guarding operations called Operations POTHER (combating of crime) and STIPPER (rural protection) in support of the SAPS. During 1999 and 2000 the Territorial Reserves were deployed in community safeguarding as follows:
a. 1999 – 7 302 operational activities in support to the SAPS.
b. 2000 – 8 589 operational activities in support to the SAPS.

27. Numbers. During these military actions, an average of 900 Territorial Reserve Members were deployed daily nation wide, in community safeguarding, in support of the SAPS. For the forthcoming local government elections it is planned that about 7 000 members of the Army Territorial Reserve will be deployed daily. This will start 14 days prior to the election and continue to 7 days after.

28. Eyes and Ears. The Territorial Reserve units are the communities’ eyes and ears on the ground. This has been proven on many occasions such as the recent floods in the Northern Province, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape and the support provided in the current outbreak of disease in KwaZulu-Natal.

29. Stability Operations. The Territorial Reserves also play a major role in stability operations in South Africa and form the backbone of the Rural Protection Plan, as promulgated by President Mandela and endorsed by President Mbeki during April 2000.

30. Results. The Territorial Reserves have achieved the following operational results (roughly 35% of the SANDF operational results with roughly 23% of the SANDF force employment budget):

31. Complaints. Since January 1999, 73 complaints have been received from various individuals and groups regarding Army Territorial Reserve actions. Of these 73 complaints, 18 cases were referred to courts for prosecution. Of these:

a cases have been withdrawn;
b cases have been scrapped from the roll;
c in 1 case the verdict was not guilty;
d in 2 cases, the Attorney General has not yet made a decision to prosecute;
e 2 cases are dormant and it is expected that the cases will be withdrawn;
f 2 cases have not yet been placed on the roll;
g in 3 cases, the members are awaiting trial; and
h in 4 cases, the trials are in progress.
Of the remainder, all were investigated and in only in one case was disciplinary action required.

32. Opinion. When the Army Territorial Reserve is looked at as a whole it is evident that a relatively small number of incidents (in relation to the numbers deployed and the circumstances of the deployments) have had a negative effect on their image. There are no outright bad units. On the contrary they are mainly vibrant units which are well-supported by the communities they serve. They are from the community. The are doing a good and invaluable job. They are staffed by good people who represent the spectrum of their communities. In many cases they are shining lights of reconciliation and community spirit.


[Ed. Note: document ends here / attempts to locate rest of presentation ongoing ]


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