Contraband in correctional centres & prevention measures; with Deputy Minister

Meeting report

Confiscated contraband in correctional facilities

The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) briefed the Portfolio Committee on the status of contraband confiscated within correctional facilities, and the measures put in place to prevent further smuggling. The presentation highlighted the scale of the problem, security gaps, and enforcement efforts undertaken in the past year.

Contraband confiscation (Jan 2024 – Jan 2025)

The Committee was informed that 41 853 cell phones were confiscated nationwide, with the Eastern Cape recording the highest number. The Western Cape led in sharpened objects (11 894) seized and drugs (1 458 kg). Significant amounts of alcohol (267.6 litres) and cash (R201 765.13) were also recovered, raising concerns about ongoing smuggling networks operating within correctional centres.

Challenges in preventing contraband

The Department acknowledged that despite ongoing security operations and unannounced searches, contraband continued to enter facilities due to:

• Corrupt officials working with external networks.
• Inadequate perimeter security, with reports of fences being cut to allow contraband entry.
• Failure to criminally charge some officials, as certain smuggling cases were not considered strong enough for court proceedings.

Disciplinary and legal action taken

A total of 64 officials were implicated in contraband smuggling:

• 16 were dismissed;
• 37 remain under investigation;
• 11 were criminally charged and cases were handed to the South African Police Service (SAPS).

Additionally, 145 offenders were internally charged and had privileges revoked, while 44 members of the public and 11 contractors were suspended from visiting correctional facilities for attempting to smuggle contraband.

Security measures implemented

To curb the influx of contraband, the Department outlined the following measures:

• Stricter visitor screening and enhanced perimeter security.
• Deployment of body scanners, closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, and narcotic dogs at high-risk facilities.
• Closer cooperation with SAPS and intelligence structures to track smuggling networks.
• Stronger oversight of officials, including potential lifestyle audits to identify corrupt activities.
• National Joint Operations and Intelligence Structures (NATJOINTS/PROVJOINTS) were engaged to improve security strategies.

Conclusion

The DCS emphasised its commitment to tackling contraband smuggling, but challenges remain, particularly in addressing corruption within its ranks and weak perimeter security. Committee Members stressed the need for harsher penalties for smuggling, stricter enforcement, and increased intelligence-driven security measures to ensure safer correctional facilities.

See attached for full presentation

Discussion

Mr M Daniels (PA) acknowledged the challenges faced by correctional services, and said that while he did not have all the answers, he wanted to share his perspective.

He reflected on the risks associated with working in correctional services, recalling a past incident that highlighted these dangers. Officials’ lives were at risk, and their service to the country needed to be recognised. He noted that upon reviewing the presentation, the number of officials charged and under investigation was concerning. While it was an uncomfortable issue, it needed to be addressed.

He pointed out that many decisions and instructions in prison originated from inside, emphasising the influence of internal leadership. Drawing from personal experience, he said that in his own neighbourhood, individuals often faced pressure to act against their will due to threats to their families. While he did not condone the smuggling of contraband, he recognised the difficult choices faced by correctional officials, and stressed the importance of finding practical solutions.

Mr Daniels highlighted that coercion was a reality within prisons, with threats to officials' families forcing them into compliance. This was an issue that required urgent attention, even though it was often avoided in discussions.

He then addressed the issue of contraband, stating that certain substances, while illegal outside, were decriminalised in prison settings. He observed that when these substances were available, there was often a sense of order, but when they were absent, violence, including stabbings, tended to increase. He acknowledged that this perspective might be unpopular, but maintained that it was an uncomfortable truth that needed to be confronted.

Ms B Diale (EFF) questioned whether enough was being done to regulate activities inside correctional facilities. She commented that if certain substances were being decriminalised, there should be a broader discussion about managing and regulating them effectively. In her view, failing to do so contributed to violence within prison walls. Whether people liked it or not, the reality needed to be addressed, and practical solutions had to be explored. She emphasised the need to consider the safety and well-being of both inmates and officials.

She raised concern about the large number of confiscated cell phones within correctional facilities. In just 12 months, over 41 000 phones had been seized. This, she argued, was a clear indication that further investigation was needed. She questioned whether officials were properly engaging with law enforcement to track the origins of these contraband items and identify those responsible for smuggling them into prisons.

She asked whether the Department collaborated with the SAPS to investigate confiscated contraband, particularly cell phones. If thorough investigations were conducted, it should be possible to trace the sources of these items and hold those involved accountable.

Ms Diale also inquired about security measures within facilities, particularly the use of body scanners and other technologies to prevent contraband smuggling. She wanted to know whether additional security infrastructure had been installed and, if so, to what extent.

She expressed deep concern about the role of officials in smuggling contraband into prisons. While some action had been taken against corrupt officials, she believed it was not enough. Inmates could not access these items without assistance, and she called for stricter measures to investigate and hold officials accountable.

In conclusion, she urged the Department to take a firmer stance on internal corruption and improve investigative processes to prevent the smuggling of contraband into prisons.

Ms K Kgobisa-Ngcaba (DA) requested a breakdown of how contraband entered correctional facilities, specifically the proportion coming from officials versus external sources, such as items being thrown over the fence. She asked whether there was an assessment identifying the biggest source of contraband.

While her colleague had addressed the issue of investigations, she sought further clarification on handling cases. It had been stated that all cases involving the public and offenders were handed over to the SAPS, but there was no confirmation regarding cases involving officials. She pointed out that 37 cases were under investigation, and questioned why internal investigations could not run parallel to SAPS investigations.

Referring to slide 17 of the presentation, she raised concerns about the establishment of a "well-resourced information-gathering team." Given the Department’s existing resource and staffing constraints, she questioned where the resources for this team had been sourced, and asked for further details.

She expressed serious concerns on the issue of perimeter security, stating that she had visited a correctional facility where a fence had been cut, allowing people to climb into buildings and deliver contraband inside. She also observed the location where an inmate had escaped, highlighting the ongoing security risks.

She recalled that the Department had previously responded to a parliamentary question, stating that 120 correctional centres required perimeter fencing. While acknowledging resource limitations, she asked for a concrete plan to address this issue, questioning whether the Department aimed to reinforce at least ten centres this year, or fewer. She stressed that the security risks remained high as long as the public could jump over a prison fence.

She warned that the issue extended beyond contraband, as there was a real risk of a fatal incident occurring if weapons were smuggled in. She called for urgent action and a clear strategy to strengthen perimeter security.

Mr J Engelbrecht (DA) remarked that it was the first time he had encountered a situation where people were trying to break into prison rather than out, specifically to smuggle drugs.

He noted that body scanners and other detection devices had been mentioned as a solution, but acknowledged that such equipment was expensive. Given the Department’s current budget constraints, he questioned how the acquisition of these devices would be funded.

He raised concerns regarding criminal charges under Sections 119 and 120 of the Correctional Services Act. He asked whether there was an issue with opening cases or if there was reluctance to conduct investigations. He sought clarity on whether the challenge lay in the process of laying charges, or in a lack of willingness to investigate.

He emphasised that if an offender was found in possession of contraband, their sentence could be extended, and if an official was involved, they should be charged accordingly. He suggested that plea bargains should be used to extract information from offenders regarding the sources of drugs and weapons entering facilities.

Referring to the ongoing confiscation of contraband, he stressed that the problem was persistent and would not end unless decisive action was taken. He expressed concern that if officials were responsible for bringing contraband into facilities, it would put the lives of their colleagues at risk.

He concluded by questioning why there were delays in bringing criminal charges against those involved. He called for clarity on the enforcement of the Correctional Services Act, asking why more prosecutions were not being pursued.

Mr S Mwali (MK) raised concerns about the mention of certain security measures on page 7 of the report, particularly the reference to narcotic dogs, which he had never seen in any facilities. He questioned which facilities had such dogs, and highlighted the broader issue of security within a constrained budget. While acknowledging financial limitations, he stressed the need to implement key measures to address the problem effectively.

He noted that the report mentioned an intent to improve security, but found it lacking in concrete solutions. He was particularly concerned that intelligence efforts were only reactive -- focused on identifying contraband after it had already entered facilities -- rather than proactive in preventing its entry. He emphasised the need for preventive measures to stop contraband from getting in, rather than merely detecting, and confiscating it afterwards.

Mr Mwali called for stronger internal intelligence, suggesting that employees should play a more active role in reporting security breaches. He agreed with his colleague’s call for stricter criminal action against corrupt officials involved in smuggling contraband. He stressed that the law allows for criminal prosecution, and urged the Department to take decisive action against implicated officials.

He expressed concern that criminals were effectively running correctional facilities, and noted that some officials were complicit in smuggling contraband, including cell phones, into prisons. While he acknowledged the efforts of the National Commissioner’s office in conducting spot checks, he described these efforts as insufficient -- a mere "drop in the ocean." The confiscation of 41 000 cell phones, as stated in the report, was not an achievement but rather an indication of the larger problem, as countless more devices remained inside the facilities. He pointed out that inmates were openly using social media platforms such as TikTok from within their cells, which suggested a fundamental failure in security measures.

He criticised the report for focusing on confiscation statistics rather than addressing the root cause of how contraband entered the facilities. He urged the Committee and the Department to shift their focus toward identifying and eliminating the supply channels that allowed cell phones and other contraband into prisons.

Mr Mwali was particularly alarmed by the Department’s apparent lack of a concrete plan to address the issue, stating that the report painted a picture of a system overwhelmed by the problem. He pointed out that the existing legal framework required contraband prevention rather than just detection and removal. He also highlighted the scale of the issue, referring to 145 inmates yet dealing with a staggering influx of illicit items.

He concluded by emphasising that allowing inmates to access cell phones facilitated continued criminal activity from within prisons. Inmates were able to coordinate and execute crimes while incarcerated, which undermined the purpose of the correctional system. He called for immediate and decisive action to address the crisis.

Mr M Sokopo (ANC) raised concern regarding the use of cell phones by incarcerated individuals to continue criminal activities outside of correctional facilities. He emphasised the need for stronger collaboration between the Department and the SAPS to trace and eliminate unauthorised cell phone usage within prisons. He questioned the effectiveness of current measures, noting that thousands of devices remain unaccounted for. He also highlighted issues related to drug possession among officials, arguing that any official found in possession of drugs, regardless of the quantity or claimed medicinal use, should face strict consequences. He urged further discussions on these matters in future committee meetings.

Mr E Cloete (ANC) questioned the status of certain investigations and suspensions within correctional facilities, noting that 44 members of the public had been suspended from visiting correctional centres. He asked how long the 37 officials currently under investigation had been under scrutiny. and what progress had been made.

Mr Cloete also inquired about the effectiveness of body scanners in correctional facilities, asking how they assist in ensuring security and preventing contraband from entering the system. He emphasised the importance of proper oversight and the need for concrete measures to address ongoing challenges.

Mr W Plaatjies (ANC) welcomed the presentation and raised several critical issues regarding investigations, prison security, and the location of correctional facilities.

He inquired about the 37 officials under investigation, specifically questioning the expected turnaround time for such investigations. He asked whether there were fixed timeframes, or if they were open-ended, seeking clarity on how cases progressed through the different stages.

Regarding the 16 dismissed officials and the 11 cases handed over to the SAPS, he questioned the fate of the remaining five individuals, asking whether they were linked to the initial group or their cases were separate.

Mr Plaatjies expressed concern about the impact of prison locations on security and community dynamics. He pointed out that some correctional facilities were situated in busy town areas, which led to increased movement and interaction at night. He questioned the correlation between prison location and contraband movement, asking about the Department’s collaboration with communities to address security risks.

He also raised concerns about contraband smuggling, particularly the high prevalence of cell phones in prisons. He asked whether the Department had conducted any analysis on where and how contraband entered correctional facilities, highlighting the need to understand patterns and potential external influences.

On security measures, he questioned the Department’s stance on signal jamming and network restrictions. He suggested that prisons should have strict signal controls to prevent unauthorised communication, particularly if inmates were using cell phones to coordinate illegal activities. He also emphasised the importance of increasing surveillance, recommending more cameras in prisons to enhance security.

Finally, he questioned what consequences followed when contraband, particularly cell phones, was found in prisons. He sought clarity on what actions were taken against those caught with prohibited items, asking whether there were any legal repercussions, or if such cases were simply documented without further enforcement.

Mr M Gasa (ANC) raised concern about accountability and the lack of consequence management in correctional facilities. He pointed out that despite various measures being in place, there was little enforcement, allowing misconduct to persist unchecked.

He highlighted the issue of smuggling within correctional facilities, noting that 41 853 cell phones and other contraband items had been confiscated. However, despite these efforts, the failure to secure facilities remained a significant problem, particularly in prisons, where there were high levels of smuggling.

Referring to the report, Mr Gasa noted that only 64 officials had been implicated in smuggling activities, with just 16 dismissals and 11 criminal charges. He argued that such leniency fostered a culture of impunity. He recommended a lifestyle audit for all Department of Correctional Services (DCS) officials, stricter policy reforms, harsher punishments, and improved surveillance measures to address this. He also called for independent oversight to ensure compliance with regulations.

He requested that the DCS provide a detailed report on the steps taken to investigate and dismiss officials involved in smuggling networks, both internally and externally. Additionally, he asked for evidence on how the Department enforces consequence management and conducts lifestyle audits to root out corruption among staff.

The Chairperson raised concern about the management of contraband within correctional facilities, particularly the large quantities of confiscated cell phones, drugs, and money. She noted that while reports indicated that 41 853 cell phones had been found, the issue persisted, raising questions about accountability and consequence management.

She acknowledged the presence of the Deputy Minister, and noted her apology. Referring to the inmate population, she pointed out that certain provinces were hotspots for smuggling activities, with the Western Cape ranked highest, followed by KwaZulu-Natal. Despite this, the financial recoveries from these activities did not align with the scale of contraband being smuggled. She found it concerning that only R27 000 had been recovered from KZN, while the amounts found in other provinces were significantly higher. Given the prevalence of drugs in facilities and the fact that they were sold at higher prices inside than outside, she questioned how such a low amount had been confiscated.

She sought clarity on why officials caught smuggling contraband were not facing criminal charges, despite legislation permitting such action. She was concerned that the issue was repeatedly discussed without decisive action. She also referred to the 44 members of the public who had been suspended from visiting correctional facilities due to smuggling activities. She asked how long these suspensions lasted, and why criminal cases were not being opened against them. She stressed that prosecuting offenders would send a strong message to communities that smuggling into correctional facilities carried serious consequences.

She also raised concerns about contractors found assisting in smuggling contraband. She questioned what actions were taken against them, and whether they were allowed to continue providing services to correctional facilities. If so, she asked whether the Department had instructed contractors to take disciplinary action against those involved.

Finally, she highlighted the total of R201 765.13 recovered across all correctional centres from 2024 to 2025, and demanded clarity on how these funds were managed. She asked whether the money was reused, kept in reserve, or handed over to the SAPS as evidence. She emphasised the need for transparency in the management of these recovered funds.

DCS response

Mr Makgothi Thobakgale, National Commissioner, DCS, noted that the Committee had been discussing the proceeds of crime, which were collected from cases opened and deposited into a fund managed by the Department of Justice to support crime-related operations. He emphasised that action was taken against individuals involved in corruption, including terminating contracts, suspending implicated officials, and opening cases with the SAPS.

The issue of illicit funds circulating within correctional facilities remained a serious concern. Financial transactions have evolved, making it harder to trace illicit money. The recovered amounts -- whether R50 000 or R200 000 -- did not fully reflect the scale of the problem, as illicit transactions extended beyond cash exchanges to money markets and digital platforms. He referred to a 2020 case in the Western Cape, where a major drug cartel operation had been uncovered, leading to an arrest and the exposure of wider criminal networks.

He acknowledged that corruption within the Department itself contributed to the inflow of contraband into facilities. Officials were the primary facilitators of these activities, which was why the Department had strict policies prohibiting members from bringing personal belongings or cell phones into facilities. However, compliance varied across different centres.

Ensuring discipline and accountability was a priority. Heads of centres were responsible for enforcing security measures, as outlined in the Correctional Services Act. Independent oversight was conducted by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS), which monitored conditions and investigated complaints from offenders. He had received a message from the CEO of JICS during the meeting regarding ongoing investigations into these complaints.

With 38 000 employees in the Department, accountability was critical. Investigations into misconduct should ideally be concluded within 30 to 60 days, but delays often occur due to employees exploiting legal loopholes. The Department was working on proactive monitoring and enforcement, but catching individuals in the act required careful planning and strong evidence.

Facility design and location posed additional challenges in preventing security breaches. To address this, the Department was investing in enhanced security infrastructure, including CCTV cameras and surveillance technology. These efforts were part of a broader strategy to strengthen security, enforce discipline, and ensure accountability within correctional facilities.

Dr Riaan Botha, Deputy Commissioner, DCS, highlighted concerns regarding the location of correctional facilities. He noted that many facilities were initially built far from communities, but residential areas had expanded closer to them over time. As a result, some facilities faced security challenges, including break-ins and threats against officials.

He pointed out that once considered isolated, certain facilities were now more exposed, making it easier for criminals to access them. Additionally, many correctional officials lived in the same communities as offenders, which created risks of intimidation and coercion. Officials could be pressured into facilitating illegal activities due to their proximity to known criminals.

He emphasised the need to consider these realities when discussing security in correctional facilities.

Further discussion

The Chairperson emphasised the importance of providing accommodation for prison officials. She argued that it was essential for their safety and well-being, as they faced risks, particularly from inmates who may not comply with instructions. Officials sometimes faced threats, and ensuring they had proper accommodation would help address these risks. She highlighted that this was one of the key priorities to ensure the safety of officials while they performed their duties in correctional facilities.

Ms Diale mentioned that she still needed to receive information concerning the investigations. She raised the issue of cell phones being confiscated by the Department, noting that 41 853 phones had been taken. She said her question regarding this matter had not been answered, as she did not understand why it was an ongoing issue for the Department.

Commissioner Thobakgale responded by explaining that the Department handed over confiscated cell phones to SAPS for analysis. He mentioned that many of the phones were locked, but sometimes, they could get offenders to unlock them using specific methods. Once unlocked, the Department analysed the phones before being handed over to the SAPS for further investigation. He clarified that the goal was to gather more information, particularly regarding cases involving drugs. He emphasised that allowing the phones to be used helps link them to specific cases. He concluded by mentioning that the Department works to dismantle sources of illicit activities and prevent the distribution of contraband, such as drugs.

The Chairperson thanked the National Commissioner for the DCS's input, and asked Members if they had any follow-up questions or comments. She noted that the meeting had been shorter than expected, but expressed gratitude to all attendees for their participation, assuring them that there would be more opportunities for engagement in future sessions.

She also suggested that Members dress comfortably for the next session, as oversight visits could be physically demanding. She emphasised the importance of being prepared for such visits, particularly when touring correctional facilities.

She expressed strong support for the revival of the K-9 unit, recognising its vital role in controlling the smuggling of contraband, including weapons and drugs. She pointed out that only 14 of the 143 correctional facilities were properly equipped to address this issue. She called for a reassessment of the Department’s budget to prioritise the safety of both officials and inmates.

She stressed the importance of ensuring safety measures, particularly following incidents in which weapons such as knives and guns were smuggled into correctional facilities. She proposed that the budget be reallocated to address these concerns, and reiterated the need for lifestyle audits for correctional officials to identify potential corruption. She shared an example of an official driving an expensive car inconsistent with their salary, and called for greater accountability in such cases.

She also raised concerns about the ease with which contraband was smuggled into facilities. She proposed the termination of contractors involved in such activities, and insisted that they be held accountable for adhering strictly to their contracts.

The Chairperson recommended that unannounced inspections become a regular practice to maintain security and expose any systemic issues. She suggested that these inspections should focus on areas where contraband was most smuggled.

On the topic of preventing contraband from entering correctional facilities, she proposed stricter security measures, such as enhanced inmate classification and reinforced security protocols. She emphasised the need for immediate action to stop contraband from entering facilities, rather than simply reacting to it after the fact.

In conclusion, she called for stronger disciplinary action against both officials and inmates involved in the smuggling of contraband. She underscored the importance of holding individuals accountable and implementing consequences to safeguard the integrity and safety of correctional facilities.

Deputy Minister Closing Remarks

Ms Lindiwe Ntshalintshali, Deputy Minister of Correctional Services, thanked the Chairperson for the acknowledgment and expressed her appreciation for the team from the Department, commending its efforts and the contributions made by the team in facilitating the discussion.

Deputy Minister Ntshalintshali emphasised the importance of the guidance provided through the recommendations, and how they would be instrumental as the Department plans and reprioritises its activities to run an effective service. She expressed gratitude for the support and assistance given, highlighting the value of collaboration in achieving better outcomes.

The Deputy Minister also acknowledged the work done by the research team in providing valuable insights and assisting with amendments. She recognised the importance of working together and expressed her commitment to improving the Department's operations.

She stressed the need for continued collaboration with portfolio committees and other stakeholders to assist with effective governance.

In her closing remarks, she reaffirmed the Department's dedication to preventing contraband from entering facilities, emphasising that it should be dealt with immediately once contraband was brought into a facility. She thanked everyone involved in the process, and reiterated the Department’s commitment to keeping facilities secure and ensuring that rehabilitation efforts were not hindered by external threats.

Finally, she expressed her gratitude for the work being done. She assured the Committee that the DCS would continue to work towards improving the conditions within correctional facilities and ensuring public safety.

The meeting was adjourned.