BMA festive season readiness and operational challenges at the Lebombo Port of Entry; with Minister

Meeting report

The Chairperson commended the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) on its recent achievements, including a successful conference on border management and interventions addressing challenges at the borders. He noted ongoing issues, such as insufficient funding, particularly as the country prepares for next year's G20 sitting.

BMA on readiness for Festive Season

Minister's opening comments

Dr Leon Schreiber, Minister of Home Affairs, highlighted the critical role the Border Management Authority (BMA) and the Department would play in preparing for South Africa’s first hosting of the G20. This event represented a valuable opportunity to showcase the country’s advancements in border management. However, limited funding and incomplete digital transformation could impact these preparations.

He expressed appreciation for the collaborative efforts demonstrated at the recent BMA Expo. The expo showcased the benefits of integrating public-private partnerships (PPPs) and a whole-of-society approach to border management, focusing on technology, technical capacity, and infrastructure improvements. He called for continued collaboration to further enhance operational effectiveness.

A recent incident at the Lebombo border post posed significant challenges to the economy and the movement of people. He commended the BMA for its swift and effective response, highlighting the agency's improved ability to make nimble operational decisions. This approach marked a significant departure from past delays caused by poor coordination, allowing the BMA to maintain stability and minimise disruption.

The Festive Season would mark a pivotal moment for the BMA. He expressed excitement about the initial deployment of drones and other technologies to enhance border surveillance and management. While resource limitations remained, he stressed the importance of demonstrating progress and building public confidence in the BMA’s technological capabilities. These advancements would pave the way for a safer and more effective border management system.

He concluded by outlining a vision where drones and body cameras work in tandem to enable high-quality, real-time decision-making. Drones could identify unauthorised crossings, relay live footage to a targeting centre, and facilitate timely responses. This would elevate the standard of border management and serve as a model for future developments. The upcoming Festive Season would showcase these advancements and solidify the case for further investment.

BMA's operational plan

Mr Mkhabela, Assistant Commissioner: BMA, presented the Operational Plan for the 2024/25 Festive Season. The plan was a collaborative effort involving all the relevant stakeholders in the border environment, including the inter-ministerial consultative committee, the border technical committee, and others. The planning process started in September.

The plan was intelligence-driven, using two main sources of information: historical data from previous years, dating back to 2018, and a threat and risk assessment report from intelligence agencies. The initial draft of the plan was presented to the BMA’s management committee, which had recommended it to the executive management committee. After approval, it was submitted to the Border Technical Committee. Following further recommendations, it was presented to the inter-ministerial consultative committee and subsequently approved. The plan was then integrated into the broader national festive season plan, which was approved the previous Thursday. As part of the final steps, regional commanders presented the plan in various provinces, ensuring that it would be adopted and coordinated across all provinces.

Increased travellers during this peak period would bring various security challenges and risks. The plan was responsive to these risks and designed to manage the higher volume of people passing through the ports of entry. Historical data showed a significant increase in travellers since the COVID-19 pandemic. The highest volumes were expected at the six priority ports of entry: OR Tambo International Airport, Beitbridge, Lebombo, Ficksburg, Maseru Bridge, and Cape Town International Airport.

Operations were set to begin on 10 December, with demobilisation scheduled for 15 January. The operations would focus on deploying security personnel -- border guards, the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) -- at the most vulnerable points and ports of entry. The mission of the operation was grounded in the founding legislation of the BMA, which aimed to facilitate and manage legitimate cross-border movement while limiting illegal activities. This would involve deterring illegal crossings, ensuring consistent security operations, apprehending undocumented individuals, and confiscating contraband.

Assistant Commissioner Mkhabela then outlined the five key pillars of the Festive Season operational plan.

• Intelligence

The first pillar was intelligence, which formed the foundation of the entire plan. This pillar includes the analysis of historical data and threat assessments from the intelligence community, which together inform the strategic planning for the operation.

• Proactive approach

The second pillar focuses on a proactive approach, emphasising high visibility to deter criminal activity. This visibility would be heightened at three key areas: the ports of entry, the borderlines, and the corridors leading to the ports of entry. He stressed that this increased presence was designed to discourage individuals from attempting illegal activities near the border.

• Combat approach

The third pillar was a combat approach, which aims to disrupt illegal activities based on intelligence. Starting in the week of 9 December, the national targeting centre and operational command centre would be activated, with various intelligence and security agencies working together to provide real-time intelligence on the ground.

• Reactive approach

The fourth pillar involves a reactive approach, where officials would detect, arrest, and address offences that had already been committed.

• Communication and liaison

The fifth pillar was communication and liaison, which was critical for coordinating the various stakeholders involved. He emphasised that communication would be centralised through the BMA’s communication unit to prevent conflicting messages.

Assistant Commissioner Mkhabela highlighted the five biggest risks identified in the report, starting with congestion at the ports of entry. This was expected to be a major issue, particularly at the 12 prioritised ports, and the operation would focus on intensifying efforts to manage congestion effectively during the festive season.

The second risk was related to self-repatriation, where undocumented or illegal travellers would attempt to leave the country, often claiming to return home for the holidays. This process contributed to congestion, and when these individuals attempt to re-enter the country in the new year without the necessary legal documents, it would create additional border challenges. To address this, the operation would focus on managing departures, while also increasing security measures at the border when these travellers return. There was also the risk of corruption and unethical behaviour, as some individuals assisted illegal travellers in crossing the border. Another challenge identified was the potential strain on information communication technology (ICT) systems due to increased activity during the peak season. The operation would deploy permanent IT staff at the busiest ports, starting on 9 December, to address any ICT issues promptly.

Operations at the 12 prioritised ports of entry would be intensified based on historical data and the threat and risk assessment, and would also be focused on vulnerable segments of the border, where most border transgressions occur.

Further outlining the implementation of Pillar Three of the operational plan, he said strategies included conducting vehicle control points, roadblocks, and waylays to intercept illegal activities before they reach the border. Intelligence-driven actions would be guided by the National Targeting Centre, which would provide real-time information for operations. The K-9 unit would play a crucial role in detecting illegal chemicals and other illicit materials crossing the borders, with specialised training to handle new chemicals linked to food-borne illnesses. Public order police (POP) would assist in crowd management if necessary.

Pillar Four, which focuses on an active approach to address offences, includes arresting offenders and working with the Department of Social Development (DSD) for cases involving minors. Media communication would be managed by the BMA unit to ensure transparency, manage media briefings, and counter misinformation.

For the first time, the plan prioritises inland operations at critical embarkation points, where public transport is used to reach the ports. This strategy aims to streamline the flow of traffic to prevent congestion at the border. Roadblocks would be minimised, but increased if intelligence warrants it. Anti-smuggling operations, particularly human trafficking, would be intensified, with collaboration from Interpol.

For surveillance, drones would be deployed at five key ports of entry, with additional support from 33 pilots provided by the Department of Agriculture. The plan also includes extending operational hours at ports of entry and increasing collaboration with other stakeholders, such as the SAPS, the cross-border transport agency, and the SANDF, to ensure a coordinated approach.

ICT support would be available at the prioritised ports from 9 December, and infrastructure improvements would be made in collaboration with the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure (DPWI).

Operational challenges at Lebombo Port of Entry

Dr Mike Masiapato, Commissioner, BMA, described the operational challenges at the Lebombo port of entry due to political instability in Mozambique.

He began by providing context to the events that led to the disruptions. By 5 November, protests had moved to the Maputo Corridor, including the area around the Lebombo port, and had become violent. This included attacks on immigration officers, their homes and vehicles. Several Mozambican immigration officers had fled to South Africa for safety. As a result of the violence and the closure of the port on the Mozambican side, the South African authorities, including the Port Management Committee, convened to assess the situation. The closure of the port on 5 November was a direct consequence of the unrest, with the Mozambican side unable to operate. The BMA, in coordination with other key authorities, had decided to close the South African side temporarily as well.

Intensive discussions were then held with the Mozambican authorities and local stakeholders to resolve the situation. Various alternatives were considered, such as diverting trucks to Durban or Richards Bay, but these options were not feasible due to logistical complexities and a lack of available shipping options. Furthermore, diverting trucks through Eswatini was complicated by administrative issues and the refusal of the Mozambican authorities to allow it. A solution was reached by deploying Mozambican military and police forces to secure the corridor and escort the trucks to Maputo port, allowing for the resumption of operations. This arrangement avoided further complications and ensured that freight could continue moving. The operational challenges were ultimately resolved by 8 November, and operations at the Lebombo port were reactivated.

Commissioner Masiapato explained that after operations had resumed, the situation became tense once again. The protesters were not engaging in violent actions, but had instead blocked the road. Operations were suspended again on 18 November due to the disruptions. The protests were suspended when the opposition declared a period of mourning for those killed during the unrest, and operations at the port resumed on 14 November.

The Commissioner emphasised that the situation remained fluid, with ongoing monitoring of the political and security developments in Mozambique. He commented that while operations had resumed and were running smoothly, the possibility of another closure could not be ruled out.

He also highlighted the collaborative efforts with the SAPS, who were called upon to activate public order policing, which had helped to manage the situation. He clarified a miscommunication in the media, where it was reported that SAPS had used rubber bullets on Mozambicans trying to enter South Africa. In fact, the situation involved Mozambicans attempting to return to their country after the closure of the port, and they had been dispersed to prevent them from forcing entry. Once the port reopened, the situation was managed, and the necessary processing of people and goods was carried out.

Broader challenges and risks faced during this period included traffic congestion, infrastructure damage, and operational delays. Traffic congestion was primarily caused by ordinary citizens, who took alternative routes into Mozambique, bypassing the port but creating significant delays for cargo transport. Cargo, particularly damaged or looted vehicles, was a key concern, with some trucks carrying hazardous cargo being at risk of tampering. The authorities took swift action to retrieve and secure these vehicles, preventing potential disasters.

He also highlighted the reduced processing capacity on the Mozambican side due to officials fleeing for safety, which had further slowed down the clearance of goods. This had had an impact on South Africa's operations and logistics. Key concerns were the increased costs for private sector actors, particularly due to insurance and logistical complications. The loss of business, especially in Mozambique's local economy, was also a reality, with many shops facing shortages due to disrupted trade.

In terms of security, the primary goal was protecting infrastructure and personnel. However, the violence, including looting and vandalism, had escalated in some areas, with looters initially taking food items and later even steel from trucks. The complexity of the legal issues surrounding logistics contracts, particularly when ships were delayed in the harbour, was another factor requiring coordination with customs and regulatory authorities to resolve.

The Commissioner also raised concerns regarding damage to the public image of the port due to delays, which had global repercussions, especially given that many mineral resources from South Africa were exported worldwide. The potential loss of investor confidence was a serious concern, as this corridor was vital for both South Africa and Mozambique’s economies. The impact of the protests was seen not only in logistical disruptions, but also in environmental concerns, such as trucks being stuck for long periods, contributing to a higher carbon footprint.

The situation was also challenging for workers, especially on the Mozambican side, where some had to live in their vehicles due to safety concerns. The impact on South African workers was minimal, but the strain on local communities, particularly around the port in Mozambique, was significant. The township surrounding the Ressano Garcia port had led to tension between the workers and the community, adding to the complexity of the situation.

In terms of risk management, the Commissioner highlighted that they had applied a tri-categorisation approach to assess and prioritise high risk areas, which had enabled them to respond effectively to changing circumstances. The flexibility and agility of decision-making had been key in managing the crisis.

See attached for full presentation

Discussion

Ms N Bollman (DA) inquired whether there was a system similar to the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) and the Provincial Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (PROVJOINTS) meetings for the various border stations and role players, asking whether decision-making processes were in place to mitigate risks during the season. She highlighted the need for continuous intelligence sharing, pointing out that intelligence was an ever-moving target, and questioning whether there was a continuous flow of information between the BMA and the State Security Agency (SSA).

She also raised the issue of border drones, seeking clarification on the number of drones available, whether they had been procured and were ready for use, and whether additional drones would be procured before the season ends.

Lastly, she asked about the size of the SANDF companies in terms of numbers that would be deployed at the borders, and whether there were any expectations for the SANDF to provide more resources on the ground.

Mr A Roos (DA) sought clarification on how vehicle flow segregation would work at border posts to prevent road blockages, especially for commercial vehicles. He also inquired about coordination between different authorities when queues extended beyond the 10-kilometre border enforcement zone. He asked about provisions, such as toilets and water for those stuck in traffic, as well as backup systems in case of network failures affecting connectivity.

He also sought more information on the biometric movement control system, including what happens if it went offline. He questioned why no additional resources were allocated to Lebombo in the provided diagram, and whether SANDF support was coordinated at the border posts. Lastly, he asked for details on the financial implications of the KM7 route upgrade, and the reasoning behind recommending that Treasury fund the project.

Ms M Mtolo (ANC) asked about gaps in South African laws, and whether a proper strategy or model exists for managing the country's ports of entry. She then inquired about the lessons learned from the Cuban training on border issues, and how Cuba was succeeding in managing its borders. She also sought clarification on the numbers and statistics presented in the BMA risk model (slide 13). Lastly, she asked if there had been any consideration of the need for international aid or intervention to enhance Mozambique's border processing capacity.

Mr M Mbatha (MK) inquired whether intelligence had detected an increase in the movement of 4x4 vehicles from the Mozambican side during the protests, and whether there were suspicions that criminal networks had funded the opposition protest and were involved in the illegal movement of cargo. He specifically asked if any vehicles had been moved from Mozambique to South Africa, or vice versa. He also raised the issue of illegal border crossings from Swaziland into South Africa. He expressed concern about the security risks posed by such crossings, especially during peak times like the Festive Season, and whether the authorities had plans to manage this.

Ms M Modise-Mpya (ANC) asked whether intelligence gathered included information on illegal activities at Lesotho's border posts, particularly regarding undocumented travellers using bridges to cross illegally. She emphasised that such activities were well-known and required a plan for detection and prevention. She also pointed out the absence of a breakdown of plans for specific ports of entry, mentioning that each port had unique challenges. She was concerned that no additional resources were allocated to key areas, such as Lebombo, despite heavy traffic during peak seasons. She also requested a detailed financial breakdown of the budget needed to manage border control during the Festive Season, as there was a recognition of limited funding.

Ms Modise-Mpya also questioned the communication plan to inform travellers about alternative routes and ports of entry to avoid congestion and long waiting times at peak points. Regarding self-repatriation, she inquired whether travellers without legal documentation were allowed to leave South Africa and whether their movements were tracked to prevent re-entry. She asked whether data on such individuals was kept to monitor future border crossings.

Ms F Muthambi (ANC) agreed with Mr Roos’s concerns about the availability of personnel during peak periods. She also sought clarification on the commitment to infrastructure improvements, particularly in ICT, commenting that deficiencies in infrastructure would impact the Department's work. She also pointed out that while risks had been identified, there was no mention of mitigating factors or remedial actions to address those risks. She stressed the importance of addressing these challenges to prevent them from undermining the BMA's work. She commended the Department's efforts and the Commissioner’s hands-on approach, encouraging continued support for their work. She then raised concerns about corruption, emphasising the importance of vetting officials, particularly immigration officers.

On a policy matter, she questioned whether the Canadian border management model, on which the BMA was based, was suitable for South Africa, given the differences between Canada and South Africa's contexts. She compared South Africa's approach to the strict measures in neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe and Mozambique, noting that while these countries regularly had roadblocks and searches, South Africa lacked such measures.

The Chairperson highlighted the need for further discussion on self-repatriation, suggesting that the Minister should invite immigration officers from the DHA to address the issue, particularly in relation to border crossings like those at Mananga and Mbuzini, and raised concerns that these areas were not adequately reflected in the BMA's plan. He also questioned the resource allocation for border management during the Festive Season. He said that some areas, like Mananga, had very few officials, and emphasised that the BMA should consider deploying more resources to these critical areas, particularly in light of the Festive Season's increased traffic. He then pointed to the collaboration between the BMA and provincial governments, such as the Western Cape, Limpopo and Mpumalanga, but urged that the financial implications of these partnerships should be clarified.

Further, he raised concerns about the BMA's approach to workforce deployment, noting that the BMA had a practice of deploying additional resources during peak periods, only to withdraw them afterwards. He questioned whether this created an opportunity for transgressors to exploit the absence of resources.

Finally, he commended the Commissioner and the team for their swift and effective response to issues, but expressed concern that the BMA had not been as communicative about its work as the DHA had been in the past. He called for improved media engagement and more demonstrable communication efforts in the future.

BMA's response

Commissioner Masiapato confirmed that the BMA had procured drones, but they had not yet been delivered due to complications in the supply chain. The plan was to use the delay to train border guards as drone pilots, with practical experience supported by drone pilots from the Department of Agriculture.

The management of traffic congestion along the border corridor had been a persistent problem, especially in areas like Lebombo and Beitbridge. To mitigate this, they had put in place a strong plan involving local traffic police, SAPS, the Cross Border Road Transport Agency (CBRTA) and the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC). The plan would cover the entire corridor, even beyond the 10-kilometre zone, with the goal of staggering traffic towards the port and preventing congestion.

Infrastructure at the ports was supposed to be transferred to the BMA, as per the BMA Act. He confirmed that the BMA was in the final stages of this process and he hoped that by the next financial year, the infrastructure budget would be fully under their control. He added that in the interim, the BMA had written to the DPWI requesting additional resources such as barricades, ablution facilities, and water provisions to assist with managing the traffic and the flow of people during the exit process.

Regarding the deployment of the SANDF personnel, he explained that while the SANDF had a permanent deployment on a six-month cycle, they were not adding additional resources specifically for the festive period due to a lack of special funds for such deployments. As a result, they would rely on the existing personnel to manage the situation, particularly focusing on vulnerable segments along the border.

Regarding the KM7 project, he explained that the BMA was not requesting Treasury to fund the project. Instead, the Transport Research Activity Centre (TRAC), which was already managing the N4 corridor, had offered to donate R13 million to improve KM7 by paving the road to provide a staging area for trucks. However, due to the complexities of South Africa's financial systems, particularly the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), the BMA could not simply accept the donation. Treasury needed to approve the donation before it could be accepted, and they had raised concerns about what TRAC would gain from the contribution. In response, the BMA clarified that TRAC would benefit indirectly by facilitating the movement of trucks along the corridor. They were not building infrastructure, but merely paving an off-road section of land owned by the government, which would prevent trucks from sinking into the ground. Despite the reservations from Treasury, the BMA was continuing efforts to move forward with the project.

Commissioner Masiapato assured the Committee that there were no gaps in South African law regarding border management. He emphasised that the BMA model, which integrated multiple stakeholders into a single command and control system, was a highly effective framework, praised both domestically and internationally. He said that the BMA Act was the result of extensive work over six administrations, and the model was recognised globally, with strong interest from other countries in adopting it.

He clarified the parallel between South Africa's model and the Canadian approach, which was the first to successfully integrate border management systems. He mentioned that while the U.K. faced challenges due to internal conflicts between customs and immigration, Canada had perfected the integration.

Regarding the Cuban training, the Commissioner clarified that the BMA was unaware of any specific Cuban training, especially related to their border management practices. It was possible that the training had been conducted for the military, but the BMA had no direct knowledge of it. Instead, the BMA had been engaging with countries like Australia, Canada and the U.K. to refine its own model, which had become a source of admiration, even within Africa.

Regarding a potential spike in Mozambican refugees fleeing the protests into South Africa, he clarified that there had been no increase in such movements -- instead, the opposite had occurred. Mozambicans already in South Africa were seeking to return home to participate in the protests. The Commissioner further explained that if people had fled the protests, it would have involved asylum seekers, and would have required a different legal process.

Regarding the movement of 4x4 vehicles, he acknowledged that while the BMA records the movement of vehicles, it did not capture such specific details. However, many South Africans with business interests in Mozambique commonly used such vehicles for travel to lodges or other destinations. The Commissioner suggested that they could look into whether there had been an unusual increase due to the protests.

On the issue of open platforms that allowed people to cross borders, Commissioner Masiapato admitted that such informal crossing points existed, noting that some individuals from neighbouring countries, particularly older people, used South African identification to access pensions. He stressed that the BMA’s current focus was on areas with high levels of criminal activity, which limited their capacity to address all such issues immediately. He pointed out that the BMA had only 600 border guards, with the rest of their workforce specialised in areas like immigration, agricultural and environmental biosecurity, and port health. With the vast border to patrol, the BMA prioritised high-risk areas, such as stopping the smuggling of illicit goods like cigarettes. Despite acknowledging that illegal movements across borders occurred, the Commissioner emphasised the importance of focusing resources on the most critical threats.

Commissioner Masiapato recounted his personal experience at Maseru Bridge and Ficksburg, where he had encountered facilitators, some armed with AK-47s, helping people cross the Caledon River. These situations were extremely difficult to control, especially given the terrain and the tactics used by border-crossers, which often involved moving back and forth across different areas.

The Commissioner highlighted the importance of using drones to monitor the border effectively, as they would allow for targeted deployments and better response times. Without such technology, it would be nearly impossible to manage the situation, given the constant movement of people and the vastness of the area. He also acknowledged the financial investments required to deploy drones and other resources, emphasising the need for continued support and funding for border management.

Regarding the deployment of additional resources at Lebombo and Beitbridge, he explained that when 400 border guards graduated in June, 100 had been assigned to each of these areas. This decision was made with the understanding that these areas would need stabilisation. As a result, complaints from these regions decreased, and additional resources were not deemed necessary at this stage.

Regarding financial challenges, last year, the BMA requested 390 personnel from the Department of Home Affairs, which cost them R43 million. Due to budget constraints this year, the BMA relied on its own staff and would incur only minimal costs related to allowances for those coming from headquarters.

On the issue of communication, more needed to be done to educate the public on alternative border crossing points to alleviate congestion. Communication efforts would be increased, particularly with the implementation of extended port operating hours, to inform people of the changes and improve the flow of traffic at the borders.

Regarding the challenge of self-repatriation, particularly for nationals from Lesotho, he explained that when individuals arrived at the Maseru Bridge without documentation and expressed their intent to return home, the BMA could not stop them from doing so. However, it did take their fingerprints and added them to the system, declaring them "undesirable." This meant that even if they later obtained a passport, they would be flagged upon attempting to return to South Africa and would be prevented from re-entering for five years. Despite this, the BMA facilitated their return without stopping the repatriation process, as it was their right to go home.

Regarding the commitment of the DPWI, the Commissioner confirmed that while they had not yet received a formal response, they were confident that cooperation would continue as it had in the past. He assured the Committee that if any issues arose, the BMA would escalate them, but he did not foresee any challenges.

On the issue of risk identification and mitigation, the plan presented by the BMA was intelligence-based and aimed to address various risks, including congestion. The plan included measures such as high visibility and the strategic deployment of personnel to manage congestion. He acknowledged the need for further intensification of these efforts, and indicated that the BMA was committed to ensuring that risks were mitigated effectively.

On the issue of vetting, he explained that under Section 13 of the BMA Act, all personnel must be vetted before joining the BMA. However, due to capacity constraints, particularly within the SSA, the vetting process could not be conducted on a mass scale for large groups. Instead, the BMA was vetting staff progressively as they joined the organisation. The Commissioner acknowledged that this process was challenging, but emphasised that the BMA was working to address it as efficiently as possible.

Regarding the coordination between the BMA, SAPS, and the military, he clarified the distinct roles of these entities. As outlined in the Defence Act and the Constitution, the military's primary responsibility was border protection against external threats, such as potential military invasions or paramilitary groups. The police, on the other hand, handled conventional crime. The BMA's mandate was specific to border management and immigration law enforcement. Without sufficient capacity, it became difficult to close the gaps between the military, the police and the BMA to manage border issues. He added that when the BMA was not adequately equipped, civilian border-crossing issues could blur the roles of defence and policing.

Regarding the expansion of BMA operations to other regions, such as Cape Town, the current focus was on perfecting the initial blueprint. The BMA and the Minister were working to finalise this plan before expanding it to other areas, including OR Tambo and the Ekurhuleni Metro. The goal was to refine the approach to ensure its effectiveness before implementing it elsewhere.

Lastly, the Commissioner acknowledged the funding challenges, and indicated that they would work on providing a detailed budget for operations to be submitted in the next financial year. He stressed that the current approach had been to operate with the available resources, while continuing to seek more funding to meet the BMA's needs.

Assistant Commissioner Mkhabela clarified that the plan presented was a high-level strategic plan. Each port had a customised, detailed plan that was aligned with national strategies. Regional commanders were finalising these plans at the local level, where more specific plans were adopted. Intelligence was updated daily, and port management committees adjusted their plans based on the latest information from the national targeting centre.

Regarding drone operations, the BMA initially targeted five ports with 33 drone pilots, with a minimum of five drones operating daily. While the funding process had been slow, the BMA had procured smaller drones internally, along with training for eight new pilots, to expedite the operation.

The BMA was making the most of its current resources. The pre-deployment committee would finalise the deployment for the next six months on 4 and 5 December, which would determine the number of SANDF personnel involved.

He also clarified that the BMA's approach to traffic management involved the use of escorts for vehicles being processed at key points along the border, ensuring the safe passage of goods and people within legal boundaries. This interactive handover would extend beyond the 10-kilometer radius, if necessary, in accordance with the law.

Financially, the operation was estimated to cost R4 million, which would cover accommodation, travel, and subsistence for BMA personnel. A meeting with the DPWI was scheduled for later that week to finalise a ‘state of readiness checklist’ before the operation’s launch.

On the issue of deportations, he confirmed that individuals detected as illegal travellers at the border were directly deported without being sent inland, differentiating this process from inland enforcement handled by Home Affairs.

Finally, collaborative efforts were underway with various stakeholders, including the City of Cape Town, provincial governments, and other border management agencies, to ensure coordinated operations across multiple regions.

Minister's comments

Minister Schreiber acknowledged the proactive approach taken by the BMA in addressing resource constraints, especially in relation to the use of drones. He commended the collaboration with the Department of Agriculture, which had made vehicles available. He also praised the BMA for training their own drone pilots, commenting that this would put them ahead of schedule when the full set of drones and pilots arrive.

Regarding the issue of corruption and vetting, he urged the need for swift action. Drawing on the example of the DHA, where 18 people were recently dismissed for offences including fraud, he urged the BMA to adopt a similar approach to corruption within their ranks. He emphasised the importance of conducting investigations promptly and ensuring that offenders were dealt with quickly, without delay.

He highlighted the value of collaboration as a solution to the BMA’s resource challenges. He pointed to the successful model used by the DHA, where volunteers were seconded to assist with their services. He encouraged the BMA to continue seeking innovative ways to collaborate, particularly with local governments, as exemplified by the City of Cape Town’s offer to provide trained, vetted officials to assist with immigration processes during peak times.

Finally, on the issue of public-private partnerships, he expressed frustration that these offers had not been fully utilised due to regulatory constraints. He mentioned the recent announcement by the Finance Minister about updated regulations on PPPs, which could facilitate such collaborations. He expressed hope that the new regulations would make it easier to act on these offers, improving infrastructure and alleviating congestion. He encouraged the Committee to carefully review these developments and ensure that opportunities for collaboration were seized.

The Chairperson thanked the Minister and the commissioners for their presentations, and dismissed them from the meeting.

Committee matters

Mr Eddie Mathonsi, Committee Secretary, provided an update on the Immigration Amendment Bill and the Immigration Tax Funding Act, commenting that the advertisement for the Immigration Amendment Bill had closed on 22 November. He said that a total of 234 submissions had been received, though some were incomplete or irrelevant, such as blank submissions or CVs. He clarified that after reviewing the submissions, he had checked 250 so far, but expected this number to decrease as he filtered out the invalid ones. He aimed to finish reviewing the submissions by the next day.

On the matter of political party funding, he reported receiving eight submissions from various organisations, including the ANC, IFP, EFF, My Vote Counts, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the Progressive Business Forum, and the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference. In addition, a letter from Mr Michael Atkins, previously sent to the Speaker of the National Assembly, had also been forwarded to the Committee. He said the submissions had been emailed to Committee Members for review, and that the research section of the Committee would be preparing summaries of the submissions.

The Chairperson suggested that the Committee should proceed with the submissions on the political party funding report, and proposed that the Committee handle the submissions at their next meeting, scheduled for the coming Tuesday.

Ms Muthambi moved in support of the proposal.

Mr Roos seconded.

The Chairperson proposed that the Committee approve the minutes at the next meeting, and the Committee agreed.

The meeting was adjourned.