Classification IPID Report on murder of Lt. Col Kinnear; POCDATARA Bill deliberations; with Deputy Minister

Meeting report

Chairperson’s Opening Remarks

The Chairperson welcomed the Committee, the Deputy Minister, and the team from the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). She asked Ms Babalwa Mbengo, Committee Secretary, to flight the minutes of the meeting and the consideration and adoption of the public participation report.

Ms Nicolette van Zyl-Gous, Committee Content Advisor, said they had to roll the report over to the next week because they had received another submission.

The Chairperson said that they would continue with the adoption of the minutes of the previous meeting that was held on 26 October and with the deliberations on the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities (POCDATRA) Amendment Bill [B15-2022]. The agenda and the minutes were considered and adopted by the Committee.

The Chairperson said the Committee had asked in the previous meeting for more clarity on how the IPID report was classified. Several Members had perused the report, and some could still peruse it if they wanted to. She asked the Executive Director of IPID and their team to present explanations to respond to the Committee’s concerns.

She said that the National Commissioner was ill, and therefore an Acting National Commissioner was present.

Mr H Shembeni (EFF) asked for the name of the Acting National Commissioner so that they could address him or her accordingly.

The Chairperson allowed Deputy Minister Cassel Mathale to introduce the team.

Deputy Minister Mathale said that Lt Gen Tebello Mosikili was the Acting National Commissioner. He introduced the delegation who were present in the meeting to respond to the Committee’s questions and concerns.

IPID on classification of Kinnear murder report

Mr Mario September, Deputy Provincial Head: Western Cape, IPID, guided the Committee through the classification of the IPID report on the murder of Lt. Col Kinnear.

(See attached document for details).

He said that Section 28 (1) of the IPID Act obligated the Directorate to investigate the following:

• any deaths in police custody;
• deaths as a result of police actions;
• any complaint relating to the discharge of an official firearm by any police officer;
• rape by a police officer, whether the police officer was on or off duty;
• rape of any person while that person was in police custody;
• any complaint of torture or assault against a police officer in the execution of his or her duties;
• corruption matters within the police initiated by the Executive Director on his or her own, or  after the receipt of a complaint from a member of the public, or referred to the Directorate by the Minister, a Member of the Executive Council (MEC) or the Secretary, as the case may be; and
• any other matter referred to it as a result of a decision by the Executive Director, or if so requested by the Minister, a MEC or the Secretary as the case may be, in the prescribed manner.

A letter of complaint was received on 3 December 2020 from the former National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS): General Khehla Sithole. The letter of complaint was accompanied by a report of an internal investigation which was classified as secret.

The Deputy Minister indicated that the correspondence had been sent to the Secretary of Parliament on the classification of the report, and she had stated that the report was classified. He thanked the Chairperson for allowing them to clarify this matter. In addition to the letter, further documentation classified as secret was subsequently received from the Minister of Police on 26 April 2021 for investigation in line with section 28 (1) (h) of the IPID Act 1 of 2011. It was standard practice that information related to any investigation conducted by the Directorate could not be disclosed to any parties other than those mentioned in Sections 7 and 33 (2) of the IPID Act.

He said a task team was appointed on 21 January 2021 to investigate the matter. After the investigation, a completed investigation report was submitted to the office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), the National Commissioner of Police and the Minister of Police for consideration and implementation.

The report was classified as ‘top secret’ due to the amount of sensitive information, incriminating statements made under oath, and related documentary evidence. In addition to that, the report contained personal identifiable information (PII) that was private and confidential. If disclosed, it would inadvertently offend against the very protection offered by the Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act, and expose the state to civil litigation and subject the users’ private data information to further abuse.

The Directorate maintained that procedural fairness protected the rights of individuals and enhanced public confidence in the process. She said that the SAPS internal investigation report was attached to the letter of complaint which advised that the final IPID investigative report had been classified as secret and had since not been declassified by the author or the head of the institution. The Directorate continued to reassess the level of classification, and when circumstances changed, she might consider changing the level. The Directorate was reviewing the security and vetting to strengthen information security 

(See attached document for details).

Discussion        

Mr A Whitfield (DA) said the presentation had conflated the IPID report with the SAPS internal investigation. The presentation was unclear, and did not separate the two reports to explain which was classified. The presentation either lumped the two reports together or deliberately created confusion between the two, and this was a serious concern. Members never received any evidence as to whether the report was classified, and none of the letters that were referred to by the Deputy Minister had been provided to the Committee, that he was aware of. Having seen the report, he had several other concerns and about its contents. He did not want to repeat them during the meeting, but would rather address certain procedural concerns that he had.

He stressed how important it was for the Committee to receive answers from the IPID, as they had received only the convenient answers from them, without any specific details. They needed specific details about the classification of the report. The presentation stated that the SAPS internal investigation report had been classified at inception. The Committee needed clarity on whether former National Commissioner, General Sitole, had classified the report. The presentation did not state when the IPID report was classified or by whom, as only certain senior officials were allowed to classify such a document.

He had read the IPID report, and it was not classified. They did not have to obtain security clearance to read the report -- it was watermarked ‘top secret’ on only the cover page, and no other page or annexure in the report was watermarked. He did not have to sign a document to allow him access to the ‘top secret’ document, and he had to sign only an attendance register upon arrival and departure. He asked why Members of Parliament were not required to have top secret clearance to view the report.

The Chairperson said they needed answers to some of the questions before continuing. The questions were important and no questions were going to be answered in writing. It was important to clarify all the outstanding matters on the recommendations that IPID had made in its report. There was a SAPS internal investigation report and the preliminary IPID report, which was the classified document that the Committee had been allowed to review, along with the final report. The preliminary report was a 2021 report, and the final report was a May 2022 report.

Mr O Terblanche (DA) confirmed that he had viewed the report and had had a similar experience to Mr Whitfield. As far as he was concerned, the report was not classified and was supposed to be classified. Although the report was said to be classified, it had been leaked in The Argus newspaper on 2 November.

He pointed out slide two stated that “the completed investigation report was submitted to the office of the National Director of Public Prosecution (NDPP), the National Commissioner of Police (SAPS), and Minister of Police for consideration and implementation,” and he asked when this had been done.

The IPID report was a good investigation report and was quite comprehensive, but it seemed as though they got a bit lost on the legislative mandate. He asked if all investigations were going to be treated as Mr September had mentioned in slide 3 of the presentation. He asked whether Mr September and the Director had forgotten that they were acting within the guidelines of the Criminal Procedure Act, and questioned how they got the other information and guidelines mentioned in the presentation. They had mentioned that the people had not had a day in Court yet, and he asked why that was the case. What happened to the referral of the case to the National Prosecuting Authority? In terms of Section 7(4) of their legislation, it was stated clearly that the Minister had to be informed accordingly. As far as he knew, the Minister had been informed more than a year ago, yet nothing had happened.

In slide 4, he said that the Directorate reviewed the security and vetting to strengthen information security, and just before that, he mentioned adherence to the Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS). It seemed as though they had no idea what they were dealing with.

A document with a top secret classification surely had to put a country’s state security at risk, and he had not read anything indicating or suggesting that.

Rev K Meshoe (ACDP) said it had raised a major concern when the Deputy Minister mentioned that the report had been classified at inception. If that were the case, it would easily allow for cover-ups. Over the years, they had seen and heard of corruption within the police. Even this morning, there was an article about a policeman who was arrested for hijacking an off-duty Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD) officer, unaware of the fact that it was an off-duty police officer. When investigations were being done -- even before they ended -- the investigation would be classified as ‘top secret’. This created a major loophole that had to be addressed, otherwise police corruption was going to happen continuously and members of the communities would continue to distrust the police. He emphasised that it was unacceptable to classify an investigation as ‘top-secret’ at inception.

On this matter, he asked who had the authority to classify a report and at what stage. If an investigation was classified at inception, what needed to happen for that to occur? On what basis was a report classified as being ‘top secret’? He asked whether a group of people decided on the classification or whether it was an individual, who they were, who appointed them, and on what basis. They constantly received complaints from the public that the police were involved in criminal activities.

Former policemen in the Committee knew what a top-secret report looked like, so they were speaking from experience. Cover-ups occurred when police officers were being investigated and the Western Cape High court had revealed that they had evidence that gangsters had infiltrated the top management of the police. He questioned whether all the investigations into the top management were therefore going to be classified as top-secret. He urged the Committee to recognise the importance of restoring trust in police officers, because currently, it was not looking good.

Dr P Groenewald (FF+) said that the report was classified as top-secret due to some sensitive information, incriminating statements made under oath, and related documentary evidence. He asked what the sensitive information was.

The presentation stated that the report contained personal identifiable information (PII) that was private and confidential, and that if they disclosed it, it would inadvertently offend against the very protection offered by the POPI Act. He pointed out that the wilful disclosure of the identity of implicated persons in the report may be found to be against the enunciated principles of the rules of natural justice and, in particular, the audi alteram partem principle. If one took the two general aspects he had mentioned, it meant that no person charged with a criminal offence was allowed to be known. He rejected that, and said that it did not make sense, because that meant they would never be able to know who had been accused of a criminal offence.

He asked what the process was when they adhered to the MISS.

If a document was top secret, how could the Speaker have the authority to declassify a document to allow people who did not have top-secret clearance to review it? If one did not have top-secret clearance and one viewed the report, then one was contravening the law and actually committing a crime oneself.

Mr Shembeni said that an investigation had been carried out, a report had been written and suspects had been identified, but his biggest concern was how long this matter was still going to take. There was a tendency for people to resign when they were found to have been in contravention of certain acts, or where they had been involved in certain crimes. Serious steps needed to be taken when officials were found to be involved in criminal activities, no matter the rank. It was unacceptable that lower-ranked officials were being handcuffed in public but nothing was being done about the senior-ranked officials, and their names were being kept secret. Action needed to be taken against the perpetrators and all the people involved. He questioned what the purpose of the whole process was if some of the people implicated in this investigation were still working. The Department had to be seen as a strong department, otherwise nothing was going to be done in the country.

Mr A Seabi (ANC) referred to the last slide, on the way forward, and asked what the process would be to classify a document in adherence to MISS. There was a possibility that the classification could be changed under certain circumstances -- what circumstances could lead to the declassification of the report?

The Chairperson said that the 2021 preliminary report had been leaked, and articles were published in the Daily Maverick. If the report had already been covered in the media, could it still be classified as "top-secret"? An article was published today, which meant that the preliminary report was not much different from the final report, and that any media house could have replicated what was published in the Daily Maverick last year. She emphasised that it had been a year since the preliminary report was leaked, and asked what had happened subsequently.

How was the document classified from the very beginning? Had they followed the correct steps?

She urged the Department to respond to all the questions.

Responses

Deputy Minister Mathale said there was no intention for any of the leadership of the SAPS, DPCI, IPID or the Ministry to do a cover-up of the killing of Col Kinnear. The people who were responsible had to face the consequences of the law, and they should not lose sight of that.

On the issue of the report that was leaked to the media, he said they were not going to let that influence their investigation -- just because something had been leaked, it did not mean that they could not continue to follow the correct processes. The case remained classified, but it did not mean that the Members were not allowed to discuss the issue.

On the process of allowing permission to view the report, he said it was a different process. The Speaker was in a better position to answer the question because a different authority granted permission. The intention of any investigation was never to conceal information, even if it was classified as top-secret. Investigations were conducted, concluded, and then communicated to the relevant authorities, where final decisions were then taken. Once a decision was taken to prosecute, the individuals were arrested and taken to court, where media reports were then written on them. Even in the case of Col Kinnear, when someone was arrested, the media was going to write something about it. As a Ministry, they did not know anything about the arrests until they read about them in the media. Any investigation that was done, was done within the correct framework by following the correct investigation processes.

The Chairperson emphasised the fact that the preliminary report had been leaked a year ago and that there had been five articles in the Daily Maverick. What had been done since the preliminary report was leaked and what was different from the report that was leaked and the report that was being classified today? Did it make a difference to the classification of the report? She urged the Department to give the Committee clarity on this matter.

The Deputy Minister said that the leaked information was leaked information. The classification of the report would be explained.

The Chairperson asked the Executive Director and her team to respond to the outstanding questions before she took the second round of questions from the Committee.

Ms Dikeledi Jennifer Ntlatseng, Executive Director, IPID, said that they did not want to back off when information was leaked, as there was still sensitive information in the report, where people’s names had been mentioned, especially victims. This was brought to the attention of the National Commissioner then and to the Minister. It was difficult to investigate the matter when information was leaked. The reason why the report remained classified was because of the sensitive information that she had just mentioned. There were pieces of information they were still trying to keep top secret. When the report was given to the IPID, it was already classified because an investigation had already occurred within the SAPS. IPID had to come up with an independent investigation just to see if the two reports were not different from each other. IPID had managed to gather more information, as they had been able to get statements from people, and they were trying their best to protect the statements from the public and the media to protect the victims.

She emphasised that they were not going to protect any police officers, no matter the rank. They had submitted their report to the previous National Commissioner and the new National Commissioner to act on the officers implicated in the process.

Some members had resigned, but this did not exclude them from still being charged. IPID had opened a criminal case to deal with these cases. It would never cover up for any police officers.

On the process of classifying a document as top-secret, she acknowledged that they had not followed the MISS process, but together with the investigating officers, they had agreed to keep the information secret from the public. IPID had made recommendations, and they wanted action to be taken. They had received reports from the HAWKS and the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), and had realised that there were still some challenges. They were still contesting with the DPCI and the HAWKS national head on the response they had received. The SAPS still had not responded, even after numerous attempts to contact them. In response, they opened a criminal case against the person who did not want to act and cooperate with IPID’s processes. Even though the report was finalised it was not going to stop them from pursuing what they recommended. She urged the Chairperson to allow them to engage with people to whom they had written the recommendations, to see what actions they were proposing to deal with the matter. They were going to review the classification of the document based on various circumstances, after they had gone for a legal review.

Mr September said that the IPID investigation had taken just over a year. He assured the Committee that they were not there to protect any individuals, and that they were required to follow the correct processes. The team under his leadership had marked the report as top secret when they presented the preliminary report in September 2021. It was unfortunate that the report was leaked. The influence and access of the media was something that needed to be addressed in the future, as many peoples’ lives were at stake.

On access to the report and the question around why the Members were not asked whether or not they had security clearance to view the report, he said that Parliament had its own processes in place. IPID was unable to answer questions about that matter.

Regarding when the report was classified, he said it was classified upon presentation to the Executive Director. The report was classified by himself, as a director of investigations, in terms of the authority that was assigned to him. The Executive Director had also agreed with him on his decision. The date on which the document was classified was 4 May 2022, when the final report was issued.

As to whether the report was not classified because it had appeared in The Argus, he said that the report remained classified. He acknowledged that they may not have followed the exact processes according to MISS, but the document had to be classified from an investigative point of view.

On the question about the sensitive information, he said that they were the custodians of the information and that the report could not be read in isolation -- it had to be read in the context of the annexures. If the information in the annexures had been leaked, it would have been an issue for national security. The POPI Act was there to protect the victims, and some of the victims had already been murdered. Some of the victims may have already been violated and may have suffered from various injuries, therefore it was important to protect them and information about their identities.

He responded to the question of how long it was going to take to conclude the report, as certain members were resigning. For this specific reason, they issued the preliminary report, because they knew that some of them were going to resign or go on retirement. The report had been presented to the National Commissioner, with recommendations, to ensure that the members faced the consequences before they went on retirement. Unfortunately, this was in the domain of the National Commissioner to act on the recommendations made in the preliminary and final reports. Recommendations were made to Lieutenant-General Godfrey Lebeya, National Head, DPCI, and he had already responded to the recommendations last year, and they were engaging with those responses.

They were going to ask their legal services to discuss the missing document issue.

Ms Ntlatseng said that Mr September had been attacked during the investigation of this case. His family was nearly shot at, and his daughters were nearly killed because of this case. She assured the Committee that they were not going to protect anybody from prosecution, and that they were going to make sure that all the people responsible for the death of Col Kinnear, were exposed.

Discussion

Dr Groenewald raised a point of order. He said that he felt insulted by the SAPS, as they seemed to think that the Committee was a bunch of fools. They had just said that the MISS process was not followed and that they had followed another procedure, but it did not make sense. They were wasting the Committee's time. In the presentation, it was stated that they had followed the MISS procedure and now they have said they did not. It was an insult to the Portfolio Committee and Parliament. He urged the Chairperson to rule on the matter, because they were wasting time. They had not followed the correct procedure in the classification of the document, and it must be withdrawn immediately.

The Chairperson said that he was correct, and the correct processes had not been followed by the Executive Director and Mr September. No further discussions were going to be held on the matter.

Mr Whitfield said that the head of department, or the executive director in this case, may request an exemption from a provision of the MISS, and that should be submitted to the Minister. He asked whether such an exemption from the MISS was submitted to the Minister, and whether it was granted or not. That was the only way in which they could have been allowed to not strictly adhere to the MISS. Otherwise, there was no way in which the report could be classified as top secret. The Committee had a responsibility to provide clear oversight. The IPID was aware that they were an independent body and were not required to classify its reports, whereas the SAPS did.

Mr Terblanche agreed with what was said by his colleagues. The Committee had been misled, and the investigators did not adhere to the law. Something had to be done about this matter -- it could not be tolerated.

Mr Seabi urged the Chairperson to allow them to answer unanswered questions.

The Chairperson approved the request, and allowed the outstanding questions to be responded to.

Responses

Mr Stephens Ramafoko, Acting Chief Director: Legal Services, IPID, said that the whole issue around the non-compliance with MISS was not around the process of the classification of the document, but rather the fact that the document was not accurately marked as top-secret on all the pages.

On the issue of who had the authority to classify the document, he referred the Committee to Chapter 2 of the MISS document. Under Clause 2, on page 4, it stated that the head of the institution, or the person who acted on his or her behalf, who prepared, generated or initially classified a document, or had it classified, was the person who had the authority to classify a document.

He said that the concept of ‘top-secret’ may have been misunderstood. He referred to pages 6 and 7 of the MISS document, Clause 4.4, where he read the exact definition of ‘top secret’ as “the classification given to information that can be used by malicious/opposing/hostile elements to neutralise the objectives and functions of institutions and/or state.” Further, it stated that “intelligence/information must be classified as ‘top secret’ when the compromising thereof:

• can disrupt the effective execution of information or operational planning and/or plans;
• can seriously damage operational relations between institutions;
• can lead to the discontinuation of diplomatic relations between states; and
• can result in the declaration of war.

For something to be classified as ‘top secret,’ it had to pose a threat to national security. The first two elements that were mentioned above were generally disregarded, and that was unfortunate. However, such a classification was permissible in their context.

On the circumstances under which the report was classified, he said that they looked at the information and the sensitivity of the particular information. He reassured the Committee that they had no intention to protect any individual from the SAPS, as that would undermine the whole purpose of the IPID. The sensitive information in the document was there to protect the witnesses and their personal information which could lead to more risks for those people if the information was leaked. The Directorate continued to reassess the level of classification, and only when circumstances changed, she might consider regrading the report.

Mr September was asked to address the confusion around the Kinnear report that was leaked, and the final report.

He said that the former National Commissioner and his team had failed to cooperate with the investigative team, leading to a criminal case docket being opened. This delayed the process of responding to the relevant stakeholders. The other matter was about corruption allegations that had been made against Col Kinnear which they had to investigate. The last matter was that they had to make specific pronouncements on withdrawing the protection of Col Kinnear in 2019.

Lt Gen Mosikili said that they received recommendations from IPID and had to put the internal SAPS processes into action, which had been done to investigate the matter. She acknowledged that they should have responded to IPID to say that they were working on their recommendations, as that could have been one of their shortcomings. With every recommendation they received, they needed to initiate an internal investigation, according to the SAPS disciplinary code. The final report was received only in this year. They wanted to see if they had arrived at the same conclusions after investigating the two reports before finalising the report.

Mr September said that the issues in the recommendations presented to the SAPS had to be considered and discussed in detail, as they had not received any official response from the SAPS. They had made recommendations on the preliminary report in 2021, and they had to be implemented. He emphasised that they had received a response only from the DPIC, and not from the SAPS.

Lt Gen (Adv/Dr) Godfrey Lebeya, National Head, DPCI, said that the IPID had indicated that they had received their response. When they received their recommendations, they responded as quickly as possible.

He said the DPCI would never protect anybody. The people who were responsible for the death of Col Kinnear were being brought before the court. The DPCI was a specialised investigation unit and had various methods they used in the investigation.

Further discussion

Mr Seabi asked that if they did not adhere to the MISS processes on the classification of a document, the law allowed them to go back and classify the document correctly.

Mr Shembeni said that Lt Gen Mosikili had said that they had received the recommendations, but was a report compiled after the recommendations of the IPID were implemented?

Mr Whitfield said that leaking a document containing top-secret information was a criminal offence. It was therefore strange that no consequences or steps had been taken against the media houses that had leaked the information. He asked why nothing was done about this if they knew that a classified document had been leaked.

He asked whether the Executive Director of IPID had received any instructions from the Minister on the classification of the IPID report.

Was it possible for the report to be considered classified correctly if it was not classified in line with the MISS?

The state of policing in the Western Cape had come under a lot of scrutiny. He said that the IPID Amendment Bill was going to provide the necessary powers to the IPID to insulate it from political interference.

Mr Terblanche said there was no sense of urgency to conclude the report. What was going to be done about the issues that had been raised?

Responses

Ms Ntlatseng said that the MISS did allow them to go back and classify the document correctly, and that was a priority for them.

On the consequences for the media houses for leaking confidential information, she said that they had opened a forensic investigation to determine where the leakage had come from.

They realised when they started with the investigation, that gang members had infiltrated the SAPS, and they were busy investigating the matter.

Referring to the Amendment Bill, she said that the IPID needed more power.

The Chairperson thanked all the people who answered the Committee’s questions.

Further discussion

The Chairperson urged that permission be requested by the Minister to review and re-classify the document, because it had not been classified correctly. This had to be done by next week.

She said the IPID Executive Director had said that they had not yet received responses from the SAPS. According to the IPID Act, SAPS had to respond 30 days after receiving the document. She asked that the Minister, the Deputy Minister, and the Acting National Commissioner, report back to the Committee in the next meeting on why they had not responded.

The progress report on the recommendations had to be submitted to Parliament in the next week.

She said that Judge Daniel Thulare had indicated that gangsters had infiltrated the top management of the SAPS in the Western Cape. One of the recommendations made in the report was that the anti-gang unit had to be disestablished, since it had been found and confirmed that there was a rogue unit within it. Progress on this also had to be included in the progress report.

The IPID Amendment Bill had been published in the Government Gazette for public comments. She requested that the Committee Secretary and the Content Advisor circulate the draft Bill to all the Members.

Deputy Minister Mathale said a comment had been made about the appointment of an inexperienced person. Even if there were challenges that they experienced, one should never question a person’s experience.

On the issue around the matter of the incorrect classification of the document, he said that the Minister had no powers regarding that, and that it was in the hands of the Executive Director.

The Chairperson suggested that all the relevant parties meet to discuss the classification of the document, and that they return to the Committee with the correct explanations and information.

Committee deliberations on the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities (POCDATARA) Amendment Bill [B15-2022]

The Chairperson said that the IPID Amendment Bill had already been sent to the Members,and they were now going to discuss the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities (POCDATARA) Amendment Bill [B15-2022].

Ms Nicolette van Zyl-Gous, Committee Content Advisor, said that the new submission was sent to the Department only yesterday, and that they would respond to it before next week’s meeting.

The Chairperson then asked what they were expected to discuss today.

Ms Van Zyl-Gous said it would be good if the Members could reiterate which clauses in the Bill they would like to have amended. They had received responses from Mr Whitfield and Mr Terblanche.

The Chairperson allowed them to give the Committee a summary of their input.

Mr Whitfield said that the definition of property in Clause 1 was broad. Some vague and broad definitions could give rise to potential loopholes in the legislation.

References to cryptocurrencies were a duplication, as the current definition already provided for items that held value.

Around the definition of ‘terrorist activity’, the definition was contested by a range of inputs, and they shared the same concerns. They believed that the definition required more attention and revision from the Secretariat.

Clause 3 A provided for broad criminality, even when there was no intention on behalf of the person who published the content. They believe it was a subjective test that should not attract criminal sanctions.

He highlighted another broad definition in Clause 3 BB.

In Clause 3 A(2), he pointed out that it may be limiting freedom of expression, and that public submissions also echoed this.

He mentioned that in Clause 3 A (3-5), the criminalisation of publishing information, even when there was no intention on the part of the person, further criminalised a person who caused the content to be published, including social media and the internet. That would mean that social media entities, such as Twitter and Facebook, could be criminalised for allowing content to be published on their platform.

Under Clause 3 A(5), he said that they welcomed the defence for academic research and journalists, but that still posed problems and was still open to abuse from the state.

The rest of the inputs were largely concerned with violating the freedom of expression and access to information, along with a range of other concerns mentioned in the submission.

He said that he was not aware that they were going to present to the Committee, but he had sent his input to the Secretary.

There were elements of the Amendment Bill that were not fundamental to the urgency of the grey-listing threat to the Republic. He said that they had to reassess whether the amendments to the Bill were necessary, or whether the amendments were arising because the police were not doing their job.

The Chairperson thanked him for his input, and said it would be circulated among the Committee.

Mr Terblanche said that he was covered by Mr Whitfield. He had comments on the input by DearSA. There had been more or less 25 000 people who had commented on their page. The inputs were mainly concerned with the definitions and exactly what ‘terrorism’ entailed. The other major concern the people voiced was the potential overreach by government and/or the future government. He suggested that they come up with their own precise definition to illustrate exactly what they meant.

Many concerns have been raised about what impact this Bill would have on human rights.

Dr Groenewald asked if they could do a follow-up with DearSA, and whether they could submit a proposal on their definition.

The Chairperson said they would adopt the public participation report next week, and do a clause-by-clause appreciation of the Bill. DearSA had submitted their inputs only this morning and that was still going to be attended to.

She asked the Committee to clearly indicate what they wanted to have changed and include in the Bill before Friday next week. They would do their best to address the submissions, but it did not necessarily mean they would be included in the Bill.

The Committee agreed, and the Chairperson asked if there were any inputs from any of the other parties.

Deputy Minister Mathale said it was clear what the Chairperson proposed, and that the matter would be addressed in the next meeting.

Mr Takalani Ramaru, Acting Secretary for Police Service, said they were happy with the processes being followed and would respond once they received the document from Ms Van-Zyl Gous.

The Chairperson thanked all the Members and the Deputy Minister for their input. She said that no apologies were going to be allowed for the next meeting.

The meeting was adjourned.