Current border safeguarding operations; Cooperation with Border Management Agency; with Deputy Minister

Meeting report

Chairperson Xaba opened the meeting and welcomed the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) for its presentation to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence on current border safeguarding operations, including challenges and successes; technology usage and shortcomings in this regard; the cooperation with the Border Management Agency (BMA); and the impact of the Agency on its functions.

Status of SANDF border safeguarding operation

Maj-Gen Siphiwe Sangweni, Chief of Joint Operations, SANDF, provided a briefing on the current situation of the border safeguarding operation (OP CORONA).

OP CORONA was executed as part of the SANDF mandate “to defend the territorial integrity” of the Republic of South Africa. The area of operations (AOO) was the area that ran parallel to the international borderline and extended 10 km inland from the international borderline. Border areas -- towns, villages, in the close vicinity of the borderline, but stretching/located outside of the 10km zone -- were regarded as an extended land and air AOO, as these areas had influence, effect, and/or were affected by illegal cross-border movement and cross-border criminality.

Technology has been used in border safeguarding for a number of years, and continues to be used periodically in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) deployed as part of the battlefield surveillance force elements/ capability. New technology systems in the form of sensors and radars were being acquired for deployment on the borderline by 2023.

The Department of Defence (DOD) proposed the involvement and contribution of other government departments for a dedicated whole-of-the-government effort to address the lack of adequate capabilities in the protection of the borderline by means of:

Opening up/establishment of patrol roads along the entire stretch of the borderline.
Consideration to establish a servitude area/restricted zone along the entire stretch of the borderline.
Adoption of the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN )provincial government initiative of placing/installing barricades (Jersey barriers) to make it difficult for vehicles to drive through/across the borderline.

The SANDF force elements were permanently deployed for border safeguarding 365 days of the year. Border safeguarding involved the land, air, and maritime borderline domains and cyberspace domains. Border safeguarding was the responsibility of the SANDF to protect the borderline outside of the ports of entry, border posts and border gates, as well as the maritime territorial waters.

The set objectives of Op CORONA were to:

Prevent the illegal cross-border movements of persons, contraband, livestock, weapons, drugs, and vehicles across our international borderline.
Apprehend undocumented persons, criminals, illegal livestock, illegal weapons, drugs, contraband and stolen vehicles.
Create a deterrence to any possible illegal cross-border movement and/or threat of foreign aggression across our international border.

Developments and future plans include:

In the short term, an increase in force levels (sub-units) on land borderline deployment was highly unlikely.
The maritime borderline domain in 2023 would be highly improved, and domination of the territorial waters would be effected. This was due to the acquisition of three new inshore multi-mission patrol vessels (IMMPVs) in the medium term. The first IMMPV would be operationally deployed by early  2023.
Work was underway to bring in technology in the form of sensors and radars as a force multiplier in the medium term.

Areas of optimisation to mitigate the capability shortcomings, such as mobility, equipment, infrastructure and personnel, would see the SANDF:

Maintain and improve existing coordination, collaboration, and cooperation with other national and local government department role-players, as well as stakeholders such as the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Border Management Agency (BMA) and the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and Environment (DFFE).
Maintain and improve coordination, collaboration, and cooperation with local traditional leadership, community forums, business leaders, farming communities, and identified private security companies.
Maintain and improve cooperation, coordination, and collaboration with counterparts across the borderline, conducting borderline security/control by means of regular meetings, sharing of information, and conducting joint/combined operations.
Work was underway to increase the deployment and use of technology by acquiring new technology systems.
The application of innovations was intended to dominate the AOO.
Improve the conditions of the Ops Base facilities, including the forward operating bases (FOBs) and temporary bases (TBs).
Increased effort and contribution by government towards improving the condition of the borderline infrastructure, such as proper and suitable fences and patrol roads.

Maj-Gen Sangweni said the SANDF was faced with the following challenges:

Lack of adequate mobility (land, air and sea) and transport capabilities.
Facilities for soldiers on deployment were not up to the required standard and affected the morale of deployed soldiers.
A cumbersome and lengthy procurement process negatively affected the required sustainment and support to the deployed soldiers.
Continuous and adequate logistical supply support was a critical enabler in the conduct of operations.
Poor borderline infrastructure (border fence, patrol roads, access routes) seriously impedes exercising full control of the deployment area.
Legislative impediments.

He said cooperation with the BMA involved the implementation protocol between the DOD and the BMA in regulating/guiding the cooperation. Working together at the borders had been drafted, agreed upon, signed, and was operational. Cooperation between the DOD and the BMA was currently in place, with cordial relations and no challenges thus far.

SANDF force elements deployed on the borderline would continue working hard, with commitment, dedication and zeal to achieve the set objectives and to continue making a difference, despite the serious capacity challenges the DOD faced.

Discussion
 
The Chairperson said that he noticed that the budget for expropriation for 2021/22 was R4.1 billion. He asked if Maj-Gen Sangweni could explain his role as Chief of Joint Operations (CJOps). He had looked at the estimates from as far back as 2018 and the purpose of each programme. He referred to programmes four and five, and read out their purpose and capabilities. The objective of the programme was to defend and prepare defence capabilities. He asked whether what was provided in the presentation was what was available, or whether it was just a wish list. 

Mr S Marais (DA) referred to slide five on the cyberspace domain. He asked if the CJOps could provide more information on the need for cyberspace technology, its main capability, what was happening in that domain, and what to expect. He had the impression that although cyberspace had been mentioned, the thought process behind it was not big enough and the requirement was to work within what was achievable and affordable. However, the situation may be that what was required was more than what was affordable. In the past, the Committee had been informed that there were two UAVs along the border of the Kruger National Park (KNP). He asked where South Africa stood with the UAVs. Which areas was the SANDF responsible for and which areas were the BMA’s responsibility? On slide six, it was shown what needed to be prevented, and that there was a lot that was happening. He asked what the success of deterrence was, and what was required in border safeguarding for better deterrence.

Slide seven showed 15 companies, and where they were deployed. Mr Marais asked what distance the companies had to cover, either by foot or vehicle. How many soldiers were there per shift, and how many groups were there to perform these duties? The Committee was aware that 15 was not enough, and an increase was highly unlikely.

He referred to the inshore multi-mission patrol vessels coming in from next year, and over the next three years, and said that if it was correct that the frigates and submarines were still not serviceable, how would this affect the success of border control? How far were the UAV drones and radar in operation, since their enormous capabilities had been seen? The National Treasury had given R225 million for borderline technology, but some of the funds had been used for fighting Covid and other projects, and now only R85 million would be used for borderline technology.

Mr D Ryder (DA, Gauteng) said that there was a transitional phase in the Border Management Authority. He did not understand the role of the SANDF, and asked the CJ Ops to provide an indication of what its duties were. What kind of transition period was in place to achieve an understanding of the BMA?

Mr T Mmutle (ANC) asked what impact deploying personnel from the BMA had made and whether there had been a relief in terms of the work they had been doing. His next concern was how well things were going in controlling the air borders, and whether they were being secured. What were the challenges faced, and how could they be dealt with? He agreed with the procedure that the SANDF was following, but the proposal took too long.

Ms T Legwase (ANC) asked how reporting had worked between the departments since there was a Border Management Authority, especially with departments that did not fall under Home Affairs, such as the Defence Force. There have been challenges with border security and the involvement of the SANDF in safeguarding the borders. What change was the BMA implementing for safeguarding the borders? Had any plan been developed to strengthen the work at the borders, and had technological methods been applied in strategies?

Co-Chairperson Nchabeleng said the SANDF had solved problems in the Vaal Dam area in record time, and all leakages had been stopped. He suggested that the same should be done at the current bases and that approval from the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure (DPWI) to stop leakages and cut grass near bases should not be necessary -- some things could be done internally if they focused on solving the problems. A concern was what progress was being made with issues raised.

SANDF's response
 
Maj Gen Sangweni said that the questions raised by the Co-Chairperson were outside the environment of Operations. There was work being done at the moment with the conceptualisation and inception of the Defence Works Formation. There had been phases agreed upon to devolve the functions of defence work and the DPWI. There were instances where Defence managed buildings and conducted repairs, but this formed only a small element. Where limited success was seen in Defence work, it resulted from limited resources. The process was still being developed to a desirable standard that would make a difference.

Technology was shown to be beneficial in the air force when presented in Limpopo, but it was not enough to revamp the entire capabilities of the Defence Force. The DOD had developed a plan to increase the capabilities of its engineers, but the lack of budget and the impact on the numbers of Defence personnel had not made this possible. The dilapidation of facilities and the bases not being clean was also a result of this. However, the situation was better than in 1994, by comparison. Sometimes minor changes were required, but if the authority of the DPWI was required, this caused delays.

No reporting took place that the Committee should be concerned about, because the Department was not under the command of the BMA, therefore no reporting was required. According to the Act, the Defence Force was not responsible to any department, and remained independent. Defence worked with other departments when the SANDF was on the borderline. The planning for introducing technology was underway and would be implemented, but in small steps.

He said there was no impact of the BMA, either negative or positive, because the SANDF was independent on the borderline. The BMA interaction was very small, and they were usually stationed at different points. There was no duplication of responsibility -- when other bodies worked on the borderline, they complemented the SANDF. The BMA focused on vulnerable areas.

The challenge with securing the airspace domain was that there was not enough capability. Defence had radars, but this still required asset patrolling.

He thanked the Committee for its support of the servitude proposal, and said that duties had not been taken over by the BMA yet, but it was clear in the Act and clear in the protocol agreements. Cyberspace was something linked to government’s responsibility. Cyberspace was a sensitive space and countries did not speak openly about it.

Defence did work with UAVs in the Kruger National Park, which fell under part of their own management. He reminded the Committee that the area of responsibility of the SANDF was at the point of entry and outside the point of entry. Defence had definitely achieved the goal of creating deterrence, such as when the country decided that borderline control be handed over to the police. When it could not be managed, the SANDF took over.

Submarines, training vessels and the inshore patrol vessels (IPVs) were adequate to do border safeguarding within territorial waters, but not beyond, and there was a plan with the SA Navy too. He asked for the Department to be given space to do research and studies on technology, free from considering personal opinions on which strategy would be best. Government would assist with funding going forward too.

He responded that his role as Chief of Joint Operations was not generally part of the funding, as funding fell within the scope of the secretariat. What Operations did involved environmental care every year. The usual scope of work was to compare historical work, the current situation, and what was required for the future. After the comparison, strategies were developed and the secretariat allocated the different programmes.

Follow-up discussion
 
Mr Marais said that since Treasury allocated R225 million specifically for technology, and only R85 million would be used, he wanted to know how the R85 million would be spent, and what the remaining R140 million would be used for. Had cheaper options for Jersey Barriers, which had no funding allocated, been considered? He also enquired about options for land transport, and what the plans were to resuscitate the capabilities of 35 Squadron, because there was only one old Dakota aircraft.

He referred to slide19 detailing the logistics and the costs of infrastructure. He suggested that the Committee and Department of Defence should approach Treasury with the procurement challenges, and propose that different procurement systems should be used when there was an authorised deployment by the President.

Mr Ryder asked if the Committee could receive a copy of the service level agreement between the SANDF and the Border Management Authority.

Follow-up response

Maj-Gen Sangweni said the Jersey Barrier was not the responsibility of the Department of Defence, but other departments. The barrier was appropriate and much cheaper, and the Department had applied its mind to military techniques and obstacles. The proposal was that if the Jersey Barrier could be rolled out everywhere, it should be.

The feasibility of troop packs was not at the required level. It had started working only in 2018 and was at the end of its lifespan -- there was no funding to replace troop packs. There were plans for better speed and agility, but there was a constraint of funding that affected their capabilities. The air force would be in a better position to answer the concern about the air force squadron. He agreed that the suggestion about procurement was a good one. He said that the technology funding had not been used in its entirety over three years, and the reasons for this had been presented.

Ms Gladys Sonto Ku​djoe, Secretary of Defence, said that the Border Management Authority had changed from an agency to an authority. A number of role players were expected to play their part. There was a document available to be sent to the Committee, but a lot was still unfolding, and not all the issues had been addressed. The Department needed to go back and look at the mandates set for the borders and the solutions used, and revisit them to ensure that they close the gap and address the challenges. In an ideal situation, there would be sufficient funding for the 22 relevant companies for maximum efficiency and effectiveness. Planning, the ring-fencing of money, and revisiting solutions were required. 

She said that the focus of the presentation had been on the land borders, but the questions had been about maritime and airspace. The Department was still working on ways how to work together in these areas. Two weeks ago, the Department had presented the cyber command, detailing where resources had been utilised, where improvement was necessary, and where challenges were still being experienced. The issue of servitude was something that the Department needed to investigate further, as the people living next to the border needed to be determined as persons on privately owned land or publicly-owned land.

Next year, the Department would have three IPVs, placing the Department in a better position to man the maritime borders. The Department was awaiting the finalisation of the reports from a meeting in Durban, and careful steps needed to be taken in the areas of maritime and airspace

The Chairperson thanked the Secretary for her valuable input, because she was opening up a conversation about the issue of borderlines in land, airspace, and maritime. The Committee had requested an audit of the land under the SANDF's claim, just to get an update on how far the claim was, whether the land would be restored to the initial owners, or whether the money would be received in return.

Mr Thabang Makweta, Deputy Minister of Defence, said that the budget for border security management over the medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) period was projected on the basis of the serviceable aspects of the different arms of government that participated in the BMA. The aspects were unserviceable at the time, and although there was a capacity, that capacity had deteriorated, and this should be the context in which the budget should be understood. It was not necessarily a budget needed to meet all their needs. If the Committee agreed, it may be necessary for the Joint Committee to be provided with a presentation in a closed meeting regarding projects that the Department was working on, the contractors involved, the time period involved, to provide a clear picture of how the integration of technology into one system would be done to create one comprehensive programme.

The meeting was adjourned.