Current political dynamics in Libya: Briefing; with Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation

Meeting report

The Chairperson welcomed everyone in attendance, including the Committee Members and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), and in particular the presenter who would be taking them through the political situation in Libya. Before the presentation, he would give the Department an opportunity to introduce the issues.

 

He then took apologies. There were three: Dr Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation was attending a Cabinet meeting, Rev K Meshoe (ACDP) was attending a Portfolio Committee on Police meeting, and the Acting Director-General of DIRCO, was absent due to a bereavement. 

 

The Chairperson noted that the main task on the agenda was to understand the political situation in Libya. Recently, Libya had been through difficult times and now it had to prepare for elections. The Committee had invited a guest to help them understand the unfolding situation. That guest was DIRCO. They heard from the apologies that the Acting Director-General, Ambassador Nonceba Losi, was absent due to bereavement. So, after discussing with the Department that morning, they decided that Mr Clayson Monyela, Head of Public Diplomacy for DIRCO, would do the presentation on behalf of the Department in an acting capacity, which had been designated by the Minister in line with her delegating powers as granted by the President of the Republic. 

 

The Chairperson said he would first give the Department an opportunity to deliver the presentation, after which there would be an interaction with Committee Members. After this, they would discuss the workshop/retreat for the Portfolio Committee to plan for the financial year ahead.

 

Ms Candith Mashego-Dlamini, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, said that she was present and wanted to make some opening remarks. The Chairperson apologised and said he was not aware she was present. 

 

Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini said that South Africa’s foreign vision was to achieve an African continent that is peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist, united and prosperous, and which would contribute to a world that is just and equitable. South Africa pursued this policy vision guided by the African value of Ubuntu. The Department’s strategic forecast was guided by the National Development Plan Vision 2030, as was unpacked in the Medium-Term Strategy Framework (MTSF) 2019-2024, which inter alia was in line with the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 2030 Agenda. During the execution of South African foreign policy, DIRCO worked to contribute to all seven MTSF priorities, with the seventh priority first in mind – achieving a better Africa and world. In doing so, the Department had to contend with an environment interlinked with regional, continental, and global development, including fluctuations and disruptions. South Africa’s foreign policy is implemented within a highly dynamic and challenging global environment, which was currently unpredictable. 

 

The forthcoming presentation would outline South Africa’s foreign policy approach to the political and electoral developments in Libya. She said that the current global environment was characterised by threats of transnational organised crime; the displacement of populations due to civil conflict; global irregular and illegal immigration due to conflict, poverty and inequality; the rise in populism; tensions over the control of strategic resources; geopolitical influences and trade wars. There had also been an increasing trend towards unilateralism, protectionism, nationalism, populism and an inward-looking focus on countries’ domestic priorities. Strong tendencies were emerging [for countries] to pursue national interests in the context of global decision making. 

 

Multilateralism, which was under threat, remained a focal point of South Africa's foreign policy. Engagement with the multilateral process was premised on the need to advance the development priorities of developing countries. The Libyan case suggested that conflict resolution was still depending on United Nations’ (UN) peacekeepers to bring about stability, while an ownership-based process led and driven by Libyans themselves remained a distant reality. The Libyan case further showed that instability often involved foreign interests in influencing, conquering or even securing natural resources from the African continent. Similar military manoeuvres to those that played out in Syria appeared evident in Libya. 

 

To promote peace, security and stability on the continent, South Africa needed to use its previous presence in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and its position as chair of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, to strengthen cooperation between the UN and AU on this issue. South Africa needed to do more within the AU High Level Panel on Libya to contribute towards Libya’s progress on free, fair and credible presidential and parliamentary elections. This was necessary to realise an African continent that is peaceful, democratic, united, prosperous and would contribute to a world that is just and equitable.

 

On the bilateral relationship – Libya is widely known to have supported South Africa during its anti-apartheid struggle, offering military training within its borders. Formal diplomatic relations between the countries were established in 1996, and subsequently, diplomatic missions of both countries were opened in Tshwane and Tripoli. South Africa had structured bilateral mechanisms with Libya, called the Joint Bilateral Commission (JBC) of 2001, at a ministerial level. Since the 2011 uprising [in Libya], later backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) under the UN Resolution, the JBC had not had another session. Due to security concerns, South Africa – like several other countries – also closed its embassy in Tripoli. As Libyan authorities have tried to find stability, they called on countries to re-open their embassies for the resumption of bilateral relations. 

 

Following the ousting of former President Gaddafi in the post-2011 environment, Libya had been struggling to establish democratic institutions. There had been a lack of government capacity to control militias that refused to subject themselves to the rule of law under the government. Violence between rival militias, foreign troops, mercenaries, and tribal and religious groups competing for control of certain territories and resources, had deprived the government of the opportunity to move forward on establishing strong democratic institutions. 

 

Government institutions that were meant to unite during the political process towards democracy had continued to undermine each other, and political leaders appeared to put their comfort in privileged positions above the needs of ordinary citizens. Libya remained deeply divided and continued to suffer from a lack of unified political leadership. The East – the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) – and the West – led by General Haftar – recently portrayed a polarised geostrategic division in Libya, and remained divided with elements of tribal clashes and militia rivalries. 

 

Some members of the international community were similarly displaying unilateral involvement as external actors. This was becoming a glaring issue in hindering the Libyan political process. The ongoing political and security tensions were the reason why the elections scheduled for 24 December 2021 did not take place. The Libyan Peoples Dialogue Forum for 2021 outlined that the mandate of the UN-backed GNU would expire on 25 December 2021.

 

In February 2022, anti-GNU groups led by General Haftar imposed a new Prime Minister, Fathi Bashagha. This move was endorsed by the Parliament, effectively meaning that the country had two Prime Ministers, following a refusal of the current recognised GNU Prime Minister – Abdul Hamid Dbeibah – to hand over power. Parliament deemed the GNU mandate post 24 December 2021 as nullified and requested its Parliamentary Committee to hold an election within 14 months from its constitutional amendment. However, the GNU was pursuing elections as early as June 2022, and Prime Minister Dbeibah refused to step down on basis that elections have not yet taken place. He has continued to receive support from the UN and the West. There was an attempt on his life on 19 February 2022, leading to an increased military presence in Tripoli. 

 

South Africa was ready to assist Libya and share its experience in the Constitution-building process and the democratic transformation of the state. In the early days of post-Gaddafi Libya, South Africa helped Libya – through the exchange of a high-level delegation – by sharing with the National Transitional Council of Libya its experiences in transitional justice, transformation of the state, unification of forces and the development of the economy. As a member of the AU High Level Committee on Libya, chaired by the Republic of Congo, South Africa would continue to engage the various Libyan stakeholders to promote and undertake the dialogue.

 

Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini then requested Mr Monyela, to introduce the presenter. 

 

Mr Monyela appreciated the invitation from the Committee to allow the Department to share its views and analysis on what was happening in Libya. The prepared presentation would be delivered by Mr Fadil Nacerodien, Chief Director of North and Central Africa, DIRCO. 

 

Presentation

Mr Nacerodien said what was happening in Libya was of great concern. Libya has been having a very difficult time. The conclusion of his presentation would be that, unless something very different occurs, Libya may only continue to suffer these difficulties, or even regress. 

 

He started with the global environment and trends relevant to the issue. He explained the rival factions – the GNU backed by the UN in the West, and General Haftar’s opposition group in the East. 

 

The conflict was complicated by tribal, ethnic, linguistic and historical elements to the constantly shifting alliances. This was further complicated by so many outside forces playing a significant role in the trajectory of the conflict and its possible resolution. The conflict mostly played out at multilateral level, but there were also significant bilateral interests. General Haftar’s side received military and other support from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while the GNU had been supported by countries such as Turkey and Qatar. Mercenaries also played an active role in the conflict, most notably the Wagner Group of Russian origin, acting on the side of General Haftar through Egypt. Such mercenaries worsened the conflict and made the path towards establishing government through Parliament extremely difficult. 

 

There was an increasing trend of power projection and geostrategic interests overriding issues of sovereignty, development and coexistence, in the interests of border security and broader security for regional and global powers.  This went against the African principles of silencing the guns, a constitutional change of government and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.  

 

The United Nations had adopted a technical rollover – a three-month mandate for the UN support mission to continue for another 3 months. But divisions within the UN were evident in the UN’s statements supporting a rollover. Almost all (UN) members expressed dismay that the UNSC was unable to find consensus in taking a firmer stance in Libya by charting a more specific path to mandate. The intervention in Libya was a Chapter 7 UN intervention. Concerns have been expressed that the members of the UNSC could have taken firmer steps. Divisions among the bigger powers meant that whatever was currently happening in Libya under the UN could continue for another three months, rather than strengthening the mandate for the UN to take a firmer position in their stewardship of the conflict resolution process. 

 

The UN Secretary-General’s (UNSG) Special Representative, Ms Stephanie Williams of the United States, had shown good skill in being able to speak to different factions and extract compromises from various parties. This was why the ceasefire had managed to hold. However, as UNSC divisions came to light, her job became much more difficult. The GNU faction, generally recognised by UN, recently implied she was biased against them. This was because, in trying to find a way forward in her mediation with the two sides’ competing roadmaps and Prime Ministers, she had indicated that she may consider a longer period for them to hold elections. The GNU felt that she should have given full support to their position, which was supposed to be the UN’s position. It seemed contradictory that as a Special Representative to the UNSG, she was not giving full support to their position. The GNU’s allegation that she was siding with general Haftar’s faction has threatened her mediation efforts.

 

Mr Nacerodien then went on to discuss South Africa’s bilateral relations with Libya, some key historical developments in Libya leading up to the current conflict, as well as the electoral developments. 

 

DIRCO recommended that South Africa should stand ready to assist Libya in post conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), to share expertise through the JBC structures. South Africa should engage with the international community and use its position on the AU High Level Panel on Libya to reach a lasting solution. 

 

He concluded that they were at a critical juncture regarding the future of Libya and the region itself. This was not merely a domestic issue, but also a conflation of great external interests. Thus, the role of the AU and South Africa was important in championing constitutional changes in government, constitutionalism, and free, fair, open and inclusive elections. These are the ideals that South Africa cherishes through the AU. South Africa needed to continue to monitor the situation and engage, through the AU, on the way forward. The continent needed to play a firmer role in supporting Libya. The priorities were maintenance of the ceasefire and a continuation of dialogue. 

 

Mr Monyela thanked the Chairperson for allowing the presentation. 

 

The Chairperson asked Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini whether the ambassador for Libya was present. She responded that they did not currently have an ambassador posted in Libya, as his presence was temporarily suspended in Libya due to security concerns. The Chairperson commented that it would have been preferable for the most recent ambassador for Libya to have joined the meeting. He said this should be noted for future meetings. 

 

Before giving the opportunity for interaction, the Chairperson drew members’ attention to the involvement of other countries, like Egypt and Qatar, in Libya. He asked if South Africa had engaged with those countries separately from the formal processes agreed to through the AU. Since South Africa had diplomatic relations with them, it would help achieve the strategic goals of stabilisation and democratisation if the country engaged with these external actors about their support for different Libyan factions.

 

Further, he wanted to know which specific countries from the West had been interfering in Libya. For example, he wanted to know specifically if Italy was involved and why. This would also allow more effective engagement with those countries, or companies from those countries, involved in the extraction of value for selfish interests. South Africa would then be able to know what those interests were, or how the countries deal with their companies’ interests in the situation. 

 

Discussion 

Mr G Hendricks (Al Jama-ah) recalled that he was in Libya in 1974, and the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council members representing the people were very passionate about bringing down apartheid in South Africa. Through the Palestinian branch in Libya, they started to send weapons to South Africa via Angola, so that the liberation groups could speed up the overthrow of apartheid. He welcomed this policy position to assist the people of Libya because they had shown a lot of compassion and interest in South Africa in the past. 

 

He noted that obviously they would not send arms to Libya, but would offer reconciliation services and support to reduce the conflict. This was because it was more of a civil war situation. He was very happy with the approach given and hoped the Portfolio Committee would support it. 

 

Mr B Nkosi (ANC) wanted to raise three issues. Firstly, at the UN level, he asked to what extent South Africa was actively lobbying for resolution of the conflict. He also asked what the attitudes and opinions towards the conflict were from other important players, outside of the UNSC. Were they rather prioritising the resolution of conflict in Egypt? To what extent was the Libya conflict regarded as a priority?

 

Secondly, at the AU level, his observation was that to a very large extent, the solution to the problem in Libya was externally driven. There was active participation by non-Libyans such as Italy, and the UAE etc. He did not have a sense that the AU was actively involved in trying to resolve the problem. He asked what the issues were that prevented the AU from taking a firmer stance. Were there constraints within the AU itself, and what were they? He wanted more clarity on whether there were geopolitical constraints, or whether members of the AU were concentrating on their internal situations and thus neglecting the Libyan conflict. 

 

His third point concerned the geopolitics in the Maghreb region, and more broadly in the Arabic world. To what extent were such geopolitics playing a part in either stalling or propelling movement towards creating peace and democracy in Libya? 

 

Lastly, he interpreted from the presentation that South Africa was not actively involved in ensuring there was security in Libya. Rather, it seemed to be focusing on the post-democratic process for unity and reconciliation. What was South Africa’s active role? Prior to 2011, it seemed to be more of an active participant in that conflict.

 

Mr T Mpanza (ANC) said the briefing was a very useful exercise to engage on the Libyan issue. He followed on from what Mr Hendricks had said about Libya’s anti-apartheid struggle credentials, and the progressive nature of Libya as a country, considering their involvement in promoting liberty on the continent. It was very disturbing what was happening in Libya. He appealed to the Department that perhaps South Africa needed to play a more active role in assisting to resolve the conflict. He had the same concern as Mr Nkosi that South Africa appeared to be a passive participant.

 

Further, he proposed that, since the presentations were so important to understand what was happening in other parts of Africa and the globe, it was vital for presenters to provide Committee members with some history of the country, what political policies it was advancing, its agenda, whether it was once colonised, what their struggles were leading up to liberation etc, in order to broaden their knowledge of the particular country before a presentation. This background information would assist members in understanding the struggles of Libya before 2011. He suggested this for presentations going forward. 

 

Mr Mpanza agreed with the Chairperson that the external forces involved in the conflict should be mentioned by name. It was not only countries but also private security forces intervening, sometimes without the mandate of the country they were coming from, due to private economic interests in the destabilisation of order. Mercenaries and bandits have also taken advantage of the conflict situation. Having all the information of these external actors would enable South Africa to deal with all the conflict’s participants in a more comprehensive manner, rather than in a haphazard and isolated manner which may not be helpful in getting a lasting solution to the conflict. 

 

Mr W Faber (DA) wanted to know about the money lent to South Africa during the Arab Spring and the fall of Gaddafi in 2011. Former President Zuma and the Minister of Finance were believed to have organised the reception of 12 billion US Dollars into South Africa from General Gaddafi. More recently, the Libyan government asked for the return of this money. According to his understanding, former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan had already paid back an amount to the Libyan government. He wanted to be enlightened on this situation to better understand South Africa’s relationship with the current government in Libya. Did the Libyan government still want this money back? Was this still a burning issue? Was it secret? 

 

The Chairperson asked whether South Africa, with friends in the AU and elsewhere, was finding other ways of working with different groupings involved in the conflict – such as religious, political and other groups – in such a way that they could understand long term stability benefits for the people of Libya, the African continent and the world. Speaking to such organisations could help in bringing an important political variable into the equation. 

 

If it had already been done, he offered congratulations to them, but if not, he suggested the Department invest its energy and resources into identifying these groups and pursuing this endeavour. The Department needed to determine how to engage with such groups, even if outside formal processes, so it could gain a deeper knowledge of their underlying reasons to cooperate in bringing about peace in Libya. If they did not engage with society on the ground, Libya could have elections but they would not bring peace. There would simply be a revolving door of new problems. If the Department invested in talking to people's organisations on the ground and also engaged with the imperialist forces pursuing their agendas of economic anarchy at the expense of the people, it could make better progress in conflict resolution. For example, they should engage with the Italians and ask why they continued to participate in Libya, so South Africa could find a way of having an external positive influence, rather than a negative and disruptive one. 

 

The Chairperson then gave the floor to the Deputy Minister and her team for responses. 

 

Response

Mr Nacerodien thanked the Committee members for the questions and suggestions, which he noted were very valid and displayed the benefit of this kind of dialogue. 

 

On the issue of naming the countries involved as external players, he mentioned the Wagner Group as the most notable mercenary influence. While many other players also acted as mercenaries, this group was particularly concerning and worthy of discussion. This was because they had not only been involved in Libya, but also in many other theatres of conflict including Mozambique, Madagascar, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Mali. He agreed that they may need closer engagement to discuss concern around this activity. Other external players in terms of active military participation included Chad, Mali, and Sudan. Whether they were there as paid participants from other bigger powers was uncertain. 

 

The UAE provided financing and weapons General Haftar’s faction. When they received this support they launched a large offensive to take over the capital of Tripoli. Then, through the intervention of Turkey, which put boots on the ground as well as more sophisticated defence systems, the GNU managed to push back General Haftar as well as bring about conditions conducive to a ceasefire. If Turkey had been allowed to continue with these tactics, there would have been a more large scale proxy conflict between those supporting Haftar (Egypt and the UAE) and those supporting the GNU (Turkey and Morocco). The avoidance of a proxy war brought about a stalemate between the two sides and was a contributing factor to a ceasefire and bringing the rival Libyan parties to the table. 

 

He agreed that Members were correct in pointing out that the dialogue had been largely externally driven thus far. However, South Africa had been very vocal in stating that the international community could offer its support, but the dialogue had to be between Libyans themselves. Negotiations of final outcomes would require some difficult compromises on all sides (as, he recalled, was the case in South Africa). Libyans would have to do this internally with the support of the international community, rather than its interference. Bringing Libyans to talk to each other required the creation of an environment conducive to negotiation. One of the important factors of the external role, for example from the UN, was also to ensure the ceasefire holds and that there would not be another outbreak of full-scale armed conflict. He noted that the AU did recognise its need to play a greater role. 

 

Mr Nacerodien said that South Africa was not a passive observer in the conflict, but it respected the channels through which it engaged. It engaged at multilateral levels through the UN and the UNSC, by actively looking at the UN resolutions adopted, and engaging with delegations representing Africa as elected members of the UNSC. South Africa was also a member of the High-Level Panel on Libya in the AU and actively kept the issue on the agenda, pushing for the AU to have greater involvement in the processes unfolding. This was especially regarding the fact that some external actors mentioned, such as Egypt, were also members of the High-Level Panel. 

 

Further, South Africa was engaging at a bilateral level. It lobbied for members [of the UN/AU] to support a process that would lead to elections, negotiations, and the adoption of a constitution, rather than fuel conflict through military engagement. The priority was to set up a viable functioning state. A Member correctly pointed out that there were external interests involved, making it a very difficult dialogue. Southern European countries were especially concerned about migration issues resulting from conflict, hence their interest in stability, peace and security. Other countries, specifically the bigger powers, had an interest in the mineral sector, considering that Libya had large reserves of petroleum. Protecting these reserves was a vital goal of these powers to allow their companies with facilities in Libya to have the necessary security to keep functioning. 

 

Currently, the situation in Ukraine was starkly reminding them of the fact that at a point many years ago, South Africa was in the midst of a bipolar world with two superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States of America (USA). This was followed by a diffusion into a multipolar world, as power became more regionally decentralised. Then, the world was faced with a sole global superpower in the form of the USA. This superpower battle was playing out internationally again, since the world was seeing tensions and projections of power globally in various geostrategic areas, such as the South China Sea, the Pacific, and the Baltic Area. Ukraine was the current flashpoint for this power play. When NATO extended its mandate, which was a key issue for Russia in the Ukraine situation, Libya was in some sense the precursor to this whole idea that NATO could intervene under an international mandate in a country, in stark contrast to the prior understanding that it was purely a defensive mechanism for European countries. Increasingly, it had been extending its role globally. NATO intervened in Libya in bringing down the rule of Gaddafi, but this left the rest of the world with a messy threat to peace and security. Russia’s role as one of the parties to the Libyan conflict, supporting General Haftar’s faction as opposed to the UN-backed GNU, has resulted in another global power conflict. This sent a very wrong signal to internal players – since the international community was in disarray, it gave space to create problematic conditions on the ground in Libya. 

 

Saudi Arabia also supported general Haftar’s faction, as well as France, Sudan, Chad, Niger, and the UAE. The EU also played a role by having a broader position of its own, especially concerning the issue of migration.

 

On the question of providing more of a history, he fully agreed with its importance in offering a deeper understanding of the conflict. He noted that the interpretation of history was also vital. Unfortunately, timing was the enemy in these briefings, so he tried to give a background context without too much detail. However, in future, he would be guided by the needs of the Committee members.  

 

The Department did not have information on the money mentioned by Mr Faber. He was not in a position to deal with that question, because he did not have any more information than what Mr Faber already had. 

 

DIRCO did not have an ambassador in Libya due to the peace and security situation. Rather, their ambassador in Tunisia, Ambassador MSA Masango, covered Libya from Tunisia. However, he was currently not available [for the PC meeting]. A colleague acting in the embassy in Tunisia, Mr N Mathe, was invited to join so that he could also give some feedback. 

 

On working with other parties, the Department had worked with governments to the extent that they could. They had not engaged with Non-Governmental Organisations or other parties. On the one hand, this was because it was difficult – there are not many parties engaged other than those doing humanitarian work. At a political level, this had not happened, as their priority was to support the parties engaged in the conflict themselves – various factions and political parties on the ground in Libya. But he agreed that it was a good point that perhaps there were other groups that could be helpful to engage with, such as religious and civic leaders. He would explore this option further and if they made inroads, would report to the Committee on this in the future. 

 

Mr Mathe joined the conversation and the Chairperson filled him in on the discussions thus far. As the most recent person dealing with the Libya situation, he mentioned that Mr Mathe’s feedback would be helpful.

 

Mr Mathe noted that in Tunisia they had been following the Libyan events on a daily basis. They had prepared the presentation given that day. The current issue was that there were two Prime Ministers, making the situation on the ground very difficult, as mercenaries and militias were taking sides. He continued updating the Department with weekly reports since they were closely following the Libyan conflict as it unfolded. 

 

The Chairperson asked if Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini wanted to say anything in wrapping up. She thanked the Chairperson and Members for their questions. She said it was safe to say that what South Africa was doing respected individual country sovereignty. Lobbying to stakeholders in Libya was the primary focus since at the end of the day it is the Libyans themselves that needed to take a decision. South Africa had no right to push its ideas on Libyans since their relations were mutual.

 

On the issue of private security companies hired to stabilise the conflict, she said she did not have information on this but would follow up. This issue involved country-to-country relations. They had previously discovered that a security company was hired from South Africa to go to Mozambique. They were hired privately and not through the government. However, while they have a right to trade anywhere, they do not have a right to interfere with South Africa’s foreign policy. This was an important issue to consider.  

 

Concerning the issue of money owed – this also needed to be followed up. She agreed with Mr Mpanza’s proposal to give a more elaborate history of the conflict. She suggested sending this background information beforehand so that when the Department presented the members had already received a preview.

 

The Chairperson then thanked the Department and Members in attendance. The Department’s briefing was useful and insightful in understanding the Libyan situation better. He hoped that DIRCO would continue to intensify all means possible through diplomacy to achieve the strategic goal of a peaceful, stable, and democratic Libya. He thanked Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini for providing leadership in that regard. 

 

He then discussed the workshop dates with Members and closed the meeting.